ABSTRACT

This paper presents a comparative analysis of civil-military relations in Pakistan, focusing on

historical patterns, institutional dynamics, and socio-political implications. By examining key
periods, such as the military regimes of Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf,
alongside democratic transitions, the study highlights the interplay between civilian governance
and military influence. The analysis employs a multi-dimensional framework, considering
factors such as political culture, economic conditions, and external pressures. The findings reveal
a cyclical nature of civil-military relations, where military dominance often undermines
democratic institutions, leading to governance challenges. Moreover, the study explores
contemporary issues, including the rise of hybrid governance and the role of non-state actors,
suggesting that sustainable civil-military relations require a reevaluation of institutional roles and
greater public accountability. This comparative perspective not only contributes to the
understanding of Pakistan's political landscape but also offers insights applicable to similar
contexts in South Asia. To assess the extent to which Pakistan military relations democratized,
the dissertation will compare and contrast the position of the military in Pakistan by utilizing a
common framework, based on Alfred Stephan’s military prerogatives, through institutional,
behavioral and attitudinal dimensions of democratic control.
Keywords: Civil, Military, Relations, Regime, Democracy
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Jinnah said: Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous,
we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the
masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet,
you are bound to succeed (Jinnah, Speeches and Statements 1947-1948). Civil-military relations
in Pakistan have long been characterized by a complex interplay between democratic institutions
and military authority. Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has experienced several military
coups, prolonged periods of martial law, and fluctuating democratic governance, creating a
unique political landscape. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for assessing the
implications of military involvement in civilian affairs and the prospects for democratic stability.

Civil-military relations in Pakistan have been a subject of extensive academic and policy-
oriented analysis due to their profound impact on the country’s political trajectory, governance
structures, and socio-economic development. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has
experienced an enduring struggle to establish a stable balance of power between civilian and
military institutions. The recurrent military interventions, weak democratic institutions, and a
politically active military have shaped the contours of Pakistan’s civil-military relations, making
it an intriguing case for comparative analysis in the broader context of civil-military dynamics in
developing countries. Historically, the military’s institutional dominance has been attributed to
Pakistan’s geostrategic imperatives, internal political instability, and the lack of robust civilian
leadership. The formative years of Pakistan were marked by a fragile political system and the
military’s emergence as a cohesive and resource-rich institution, which positioned it as a key
actor in state affairs (Siddiqa, 2007). Coupled with Cold War alliances, the military’s
entrenchment in politics became further reinforced, setting a precedent for future interventions
(Jalal, 1995).

Comparative analyses of civil-military relations in Pakistan and other nations reveal key
factors influencing the civil-military power dynamics. For instance, the role of economic control,
judicial complicity, and international support for authoritarian regimes highlights patterns
common to several countries with similar experiences of military dominance (Huntington, 1957).
However, Pakistan’s unique interplay of ideological, ethnic, and security dimensions adds
complexity to its civil-military relationship. Moreover, the oscillation between civilian and
military dominance has left Pakistan in a state of what scholars describe as “hybrid governance,”
where both civilian and military institutions coexist but with overlapping and often conflicting
domains of authority (Rizvi, 2000).

This dynamic not only undermines democratic consolidation but also impacts governance
and public policy outcomes, particularly in areas such as economic planning, foreign policy, and
counterterrorism. Throughout the political history of Pakistan, the process of smooth and stable
democracy has remained a distant dream. The country experienced intermittent phases of martial
law within different phases of defective democracy. It is not that retrospective military regimes
in the country were a choice; rather, it was more than a compulsion. Intermittent destabilization
stages of economy coupled with wrangling among political parties and inability to serve general
interests are few reasons that warrant the role of military in the political process of Pakistan
(Hassan, 2018).

In any sovereign state, the maintenance of internal law and order and the necessary
provision for protection against external threats are the prime responsibility of the state which
delegates the authority to its defence forces to discharge this responsibility and hence their
significance. The paradox to this imperative is Edmund Burke’s warning, “Armed discipline
body is in essence, dangerous to the liberty, the potential threat to an incumbent administration
and to the society at large”.

Harnessing this armed body to deliver and to remain subservient to civil rule is in essence
what the objective of ideal civil-military relations (CMR) ought to be. Civil-military relations
can be broadly termed as the relationship and distribution of power between the armed forces
and the civilian authority, which ironically, in Pakistan has remained in the state of
disequilibrium mutating into an abiding civil-military conflict and an object of scathing diatribe
in the public. One place in the world where there had been military rule aplenty is the African
continent, where about a quarter of the countries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa are
governed in one form or another by their armies, either through direct military rule or through
naturalization into the power structure and in other cases through indirect influence. Except for
Tanzania and Zambia where there is some semblance of civil-military relations, in other
countries, these have been lopsided with a military bias. The rate of coups within the region on
average had been three successful coups per annum during the past three-quarter century
Gordon, S. (2014).

“The overall number of coups attempts in Africa remained remarkably consistent at an

average of around four a year in the four decades between 1960 and 2000″. For instance, Egypt
faced a coup in 1952 and 2013, Sudan in 1958, 1969, 1971, 1985, 1989, 2019, and 2021 (for
every successful coup there had been two unsuccessful ones); Uganda in 1971, Nigeria had eight
coups between 1966 and 1993. However, comparatively speaking, coups have been less
prevalent in Southern Africa than in Central and East Africa, perhaps because of the way they
were decolonised. “Overall, Africa has experienced more coups than any other continent. Of the
16 coups recorded globally since 2017, all but one – Myanmar in 2021 – have been in Africa”.
Pakistan has not been an exception to this trend and is almost a mirror image of the African
fable, as the military has been virtually in the business of running the country in its various forms
of direct, indirect, or hybrid dispensation. Bonapartism has remained a favorite vocation of
military generals resulting in decades of military rule (1958-71, 1977-1988, and 1999-2008),
often solemnized and greeted by the public Jalal, (2021).

Intriguing though it may appear, the neutrality notion contextualization by Amir Zia says
it all, “Many view the fall of the Imran Khan’s government amid this buzz of ‘neutrality’ as
a switching of sides by the army, or worse, abject surrender to the much-tried, tested and failed
corrupt political dynasties in this country”. According to Brettscheneider (2006), conceptually
‘democracy’ as a political system depends upon at least three core values: Sovereignty of the
electorate, equal opportunity to participate in the electoral/political process, and the basic sense
of liberty.

According to the views of Dahl (1971), and Diamond (2008), although, the aforesaid
three core values of democracy are considered as the essential functional features of any
democratic system of government but the scholars disagree regarding both the mode and means
of the implementation of the aforesaid principles of democracy. To overcome the aforesaid
difficulty about the conceptual understanding of the democracy, it would be wise enough to
imagine a spectrum representing the various levels of democracy adjusting the whole range of
the possibilities i.e. from the minimalist to idealist versions of democracy.

Croissant et al. (2010) claimed the basic beliefs of the minimalist version of democracy
essentially included the constitutional guarantees about the fundamental rights, a definite
electoral mechanism ensuring the universal adult franchise, a governance system based on the
rule of law, the supremacy of the elected civilian leadership in decision making, and the civilian
control on the military forces. According to him, the civilian control over the armed forces works
as a sine qua non for any democratic system of government. Some scholars are of the view that
without achieving complete civilian control over all of the state affairs democracy is simply
impossible.

As per the views of Croissant et al. (2011), the nature of civil-military relations becomes
the cutting-edge defining criteria for treating any system of government/state as democracy i.e.
where the elected civilian government can exercise full control over its armed forces without any
covert or overt resistance from the leadership of the armed forces. They have further defined the
term ‘civilian control’ as the constant political formula according to which the elected civilian
leadership possesses the exclusive authority to take both the policy making and policy
implementation-oriented decisions. They further provided that, on the other side some level of
dysfunctional democracy is equally possible i.e. in which the military leadership tends to control
the basic decisions about the nature of political policy structures, and the civilian leadership
hardly possesses any potent role in the state level policy decisions, additionally, it is also quite
possible to categorize the nature of civilian control in various degrees e.g. weak, mild, moderate,
strong etc.

Dahl (1989), Kohn (1997), and Bland, (2001) were of the view that the basic nature of
the challenges to the power structures controlled by the democratically elected civilian leadership
may be represented in two different formats which can be named as: formally institutionalized
prerogatives and the informal contestation. They maintained that the formally institutionalized
prerogatives include the formal legal privileges/entitlements through which the military
leadership becomes able not only to exclusively control its internal affairs but it becomes in a
position to encroach upon an essential role in the general state affairs i.e. related to the foreign,
economic and political affairs.
 Civil-military relations in Pakistan have remained a central theme in the country’s
political discourse since its inception in 1947. These relations are characterized by a complex
interplay of power dynamics between civilian leadership and the military establishment, which
has significantly shaped the trajectory of Pakistan's governance and development. While the
country’s founding leaders envisioned a democratic polity, the military’s entrenched role in
national politics has often disrupted democratic consolidation. This introduction delves into the
historical evolution, patterns, and comparative aspects of civil-military relations in Pakistan,
offering a foundation for understanding the delicate balance between civilian supremacy and
military autonomy.

The seeds of civil-military imbalance in Pakistan were sown during its formative years.
At independence, Pakistan inherited weak civilian institutions juxtaposed with a relatively robust
military inherited from the British colonial administration (Ganguly, 1997). The fragile state
apparatus, coupled with an existential threat perception from India, provided fertile ground for
the military to step into governance. The absence of strong political leadership after the death of
Muhammad Ali Jinnah further exacerbated the situation, creating a vacuum that the military
willingly filled (Talbot, 2015).

Over the decades, Pakistan’s military has staged multiple coups, justifying its
interventions as necessary measures to stabilize the state during times of political crisis. From
Ayub Khan’s martial law in 1958 to Pervez Musharraf’s takeover in 1999, military rulers have
repeatedly suspended constitutions and marginalized civilian governments. This recurring cycle
underscores the military’s perception of itself as the ultimate guardian of national stability and
sovereignty (Siddiqa, 2007). Understanding these episodes within a comparative framework
allows us to evaluate Pakistan’s experience against global patterns of civil-military relations.

One significant factor contributing to the militarization of Pakistan’s politics is the

regional security environment. The protracted conflict with India over Kashmir, the Afghan
wars, and Pakistan’s strategic alliance with the United States during the Cold War bolstered the
military’s political clout (Rizvi, 2000). These external dynamics not only increased the defense
budget but also legitimized the military’s narrative as the defender of Pakistan’s ideological and
territorial boundaries. By comparing Pakistan’s case with other postcolonial states, we can
discern how external threats amplify internal military dominance.

Economics has also played a crucial role in shaping civil-military relations in Pakistan.
The military’s involvement in economic enterprises, often referred to as the “military-industrial
complex,” has deepened its entrenchment in the country’s power structures (Siddiqa, 2007).
Through foundations, trusts, and commercial ventures, the military has become an economic
actor, creating a vested interest in maintaining its dominance. Comparative studies reveal that
such economic entanglements are not unique to Pakistan but are prevalent in countries with
similar trajectories of military intervention.

In contrast to countries where democratization has curbed military power, Pakistan

presents a paradox where democratic transitions have often coexisted with military tutelage.
Even during periods of civilian rule, such as the governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif, the military retained significant influence over foreign policy and national security
matters (Zaidi, 2019). This phenomenon, often termed as “controlled democracy,” reflects the
enduring imbalance in civil-military relations. The judiciary’s role in legitimizing military
interventions has further undermined civilian supremacy in Pakistan. Through doctrines such as
the “Doctrine of Necessity,” courts have repeatedly validated unconstitutional takeovers,
weakening democratic institutions (Munir, 1958). Comparative analysis shows that similar
judicial complicity has occurred in other countries, but the frequency and consistency in
Pakistan’s case stand out.

Media and civil society have emerged as critical actors in reshaping civil-military
relations in Pakistan. The proliferation of independent media outlets since the early 2000s has
brought increased scrutiny of military actions, fostering a culture of accountability.
Simultaneously, civil society movements, such as the Lawyers’ Movement in 2007-09, have
challenged military overreach, indicating a slow but growing shift toward civilian empowerment
(Hussain, 2013). These developments parallel global trends where vibrant civil societies act as
checks on military dominance. The historical evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan is
marked by three distinct phases: the early post-independence years (1947-1958), the era of direct
military rule (1958-1988), and the phase of controlled democracy (1988 onwards). Each phase
offers unique insights into the mechanisms through which the military has influenced political
processes. A comparative analysis with countries like Turkey and Indonesia, which have
experienced similar cycles, provides valuable lessons for Pakistan.

The early years of Pakistan saw a lack of consensus among civilian leaders, which
allowed the military to emerge as an arbiter of national crises. The weak institutionalization of
political parties and the absence of a clear democratic vision contributed to the military’s
ascendancy (Jalal, 1995). Comparing this phase with Turkey’s experience under Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk highlights the importance of strong civilian leadership in curbing military ambitions.
Direct military rule in Pakistan, particularly under Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and
Pervez Musharraf, institutionalized the military’s dominance. These regimes used legal
frameworks, such as constitutional amendments and emergency laws, to legitimize their rule. By
comparing Pakistan’s military regimes with Indonesia under Suharto, we can identify common
strategies employed by militaries to maintain power, including the use of patronage networks and
suppression of dissent.

The post-1988 phase of controlled democracy in Pakistan reflects a hybrid political

system where the military wields influence behind the scenes. Civilian governments during this
period have often been undermined by military interference in governance, ranging from judicial
manipulation to covert political engineering (Shafqat, 1997). Comparing this phase with
countries like Egypt post-Arab Spring underscores the challenges of achieving genuine civilian
supremacy in transitional democracies. Pakistan’s civil-military relations are also shaped by
ideological factors. The military’s self-perception as the guardian of Pakistan’s Islamic identity
has reinforced its political role. This ideological dimension distinguishes Pakistan from other
countries with dominant militaries, such as Thailand or Brazil, where the justification for
military intervention is often secular nationalism.

The role of international actors in shaping civil-military relations in Pakistan cannot be

overlooked. During the Cold War, the United States’ support for Pakistan’s military regimes
bolstered the institution’s political power. Similarly, international financial institutions often
prioritized stability over democracy, indirectly empowering the military (Haqqani, 2005). A
comparative analysis with Latin American countries reveals similar patterns of external support
reinforcing military dominance. Efforts to reform civil-military relations in Pakistan have yielded
mixed results. Constitutional amendments, such as the 18th Amendment, and democratic
movements have attempted to assert civilian supremacy. However, these measures often face
resistance from entrenched military interests. A comparative perspective with South Korea,
which successfully transitioned to civilian control, offers valuable insights into the prerequisites
for sustainable reform. The future of civil-military relations in Pakistan hinges on several factors,
including the strengthening of democratic institutions, the role of the judiciary, and the
effectiveness of civilian leadership. Learning from the experiences of countries that have
successfully navigated similar challenges can provide a roadmap for Pakistan to achieve a
balanced and functional civil-military dynamic.

Civil-Military relations in Pakistan represent a complex interplay of historical, political,

economic, and ideological factors. By analyzing these relations through a comparative lens, we
can gain a deeper understanding of the systemic challenges and potential pathways for reform.
This comparative approach not only contextualizes Pakistan’s experience but also enriches the
broader discourse on civil-military relations in transitional democracies.

1.2 Research Objectives

The primary objectives of this study are to:

1. Analyze the historical patterns of civil-military relations in Pakistan.

2. Examine the impact of military influence on democratic governance.

3. Assess contemporary challenges and developments in civil-military dynamics.

1.3 Hypothesis

H 1:

Military dominance in Pakistan has historically led to the erosion of democratic institutions,
resulting in persistent political instability and public disillusionment with governance.

H 2:

The increasing complexity of civil-military relations in contemporary Pakistan, characterized by

hybrid governance models, has created new challenges for accountability and democratic
practices, further complicating the civilian government's ability to function effectively.
1.4 Research Questions

To guide this investigation, the following research questions will be addressed:

1. What historical factors have shaped civil-military relations in Pakistan?

2. How has military involvement affected the trajectory of democratic governance?

3. What are the contemporary challenges to civil-military relations in Pakistan, and how can
they be addressed?

1.4 Methodology

This research employs a qualitative methodology, utilizing historical analysis, case studies, and
comparative frameworks. Data will be collected from a variety of sources, including academic
literature, government reports, and interviews with political analysts and historians. The study
will focus on key periods in Pakistan’s political history to draw comparisons and identify
patterns.

1.5 Significance of the Study

Understanding civil-military relations is vital for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike, as it
sheds light on the factors influencing governance and stability in Pakistan. This study aims to
contribute to the academic discourse on civil-military relations, offering insights that may inform
future political strategies and reforms.

1.6 Need and Nature of the Project

This project addresses the pressing need to comprehend the evolving dynamics between civilian
and military institutions in Pakistan, especially in light of recent political upheavals and rising
hybrid governance models. By exploring both historical and contemporary contexts, the research
will provide a comprehensive overview of civil-military relations, contributing to better-
informed discussions about the future of democracy in Pakistan.

1.7 Research Gap

Civil-military relations in Pakistan have been a longstanding area of study due to the military's
prominent role in the country's politics, governance, and policy-making. However, despite the
significant contributions made by previous research, several gaps remain in the understanding of
this relationship. While much research focuses on military dominance during the earlier years of
Pakistan’s history, there is a need for a deeper exploration of the evolving civil-military
dynamics in the post-2000 period, particularly after the 2008 civilian resurgence and the
subsequent military engagement in counter-terrorism operations. How these developments have
altered the balance of power and civil-military interactions remains insufficiently studied. The
role of social media in shaping public perception of the military and its relationship with the
civilian government has become more pronounced in recent years. Research on how social media
platforms influence civil-military relations and public attitudes toward the military’s role in
politics is an emerging area that has yet to be fully explored. While many studies focus on
military coups or interventions, there is limited research on the long-term impact of civil-military
relations on the effectiveness and stability of governance. More attention is needed on how
military influence in civilian policymaking affects governance quality, economic development,
and democratic institutions. Addressing these gaps can contribute to a more comprehensive
understanding of the civil-military relationship in Pakistan, highlighting both the complexities of
military influence and the pathways toward a more balanced civil-military relationship in the
future.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Civil Military Relations is a sub-arena of political science intent on various studies of
armed services as well as their affiliation with civilian leaders. Several books, journals and
articles have been inscribed on ‘civil-military relations’ in addition ‘democratic consolidation in
new democracies. However, main articles and books which are most pertinent to the proposed
study discussed below.

The study of civil-military relations follows its beginnings to the great work by S.
Huntington’s Soldier and the State (1957). Huntington looks at the military as an organization in
the western democracies and contends that ‘Professionalism’ is the key to military sovereignty
and keeping up ‘objective civilian control’ over military. Consequently, in 1960s and 70s,
researchers were worried about political development and role that militaries had in
modernization of different Third World states. It required study of military as both a societal
phenomenon and an institution influencing politics. Political Order in Changing Societies (1968)
by Huntington, additionally addresses military involvement in the politics and contends that
involvement is an aftereffect of the general politicization of institutions and social forces. The
incapability of political establishments to adapt to expanding social preparation causes issue and
turmoil accordingly improving the probability of military intercession. Huntington contends that
the military as an institution is the advance guard of the middle class which advances social and
economic reform, and national integration. The shortcoming of civilian institutions and civilian
politicians to manage their state's issues makes the military move toward becoming politicized.
While Huntington’s theory has laid the foundation for all future civil-military relations
scholarship, his ideas do little to describe the relationship between the military and civilians on a
daily basis and to provide clear measures that can be used to increase civilian control over the
military institution. Huntington’s theory completely fails to explain what may happen if the
military disobeys the civilian institution despite their level of relative professionalization. His
proposition of objective control has been practiced in Pakistan since inception but it has not been
effective in preventing military’s repeated intervention in politics.

The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (1964) by Janowitz has more
or less followed the same professional path. The main inquiry this work addresses is to
clarify how attributes of military institutions and work affect their actions in the procedures of
modernization and democratization. He contends that in all new and updating countries military
and socio-political setting in which they work tend to have common qualities, bringing about a
high potential for the military inclusion in the politics and creating that involvement unstable.
Interestingly, to elucidate the patterns of civil military relations, he pays little attention to the
history of military organization, the period since independence, and the level of economic
development. The Military Institutions and the Coercion in the developing Nations (1964)
written by Janowitz. However, this volume's new arrangement did not include any novel bits of
knowledge regardless of its effort at re-bundling the professional with an excessive number of
cases, and that from various socio-cultural background. By and large they, from one viewpoint,
deemphasize the significance of institutional clarification of civil-military relation cross
nationally and instead, tremendously settlement the overbearing of context. In terms of
exercising the control over military, structural theory of Desch Civilian Control of the Military:
The Changing Security Environment (2001) on civilian control over military clarifies the
parameters and methods of its operation. In his findings he asserts that, civil military relations
are good when the external threat is high and internal threat is low, which could apply in
Pakistan and Turkey as all military interventions occurred in the similar settings.

In the foregoing years, other intellectuals have also deliberated on this subject. Some
explicated the phenomenon and propose remedies e.g. Samuel Edward Finer in The Man on
Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (2004) provides insight into military
interventions and their outcomes by connecting politico-cultural developments of a country to
military interventions. His categorization of countries with minimal, low, developed and mature
political culture provide the backdrop to understand the military interventions. The low political
culture in Pakistan, characterized by authoritarianism, non- adherence to democratic values,
corruption and absence of rule of law provides the backdrop to understand Gen. Musharraf’s
coup and regime.

Another group of interventionist scholars focuses on internal dynamics of military

hierarchy, corporate interests, personal ambitions, and idiosyncrasies of particular military elites.
Scholars such as Eric Nordlinger (1977) and Amos Perlmutter (1977) are concerned with how
the military as an institution influences military elites. InSoldiers in Politics: Military Coup and
Governments (1977) Nordlinger add that including political status and the idea of the
revolution's management the choice to arbitrate is simply a political choice. When militaries
have achieved control, they incline not to continue in control long.

In the writing, from politics this has been known as martial extraction or departure.
Military withdrawals from politic have been additionally investigated by scholars who have
expected military intervention. He further portrays how, when open connection to civilian
background is strong the danger of military mediation is less. In post-war Pakistan general
society's connection to the military might be greater than its connection to public- institutions,
and that may create a chance for mediate the army-force.

Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and
Turkey (2007) have written by S. Cook. The writer looks at the Egyptian Algerian and Turkish
militaries utilization of democracy as a front to drag out their control. Even though, whenever
there's any hint of achievement by the Islamists, the military administrations step in to invalidate
the outcomes. Cook contends this obsessive example of including and barring Islamists mirrors
the dependability of these administrations. To best comprehend why democratization has not
grabbed hold in the Middle East, cook features the connection between what he calls the military
enclave of military elites and civilian government officials in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey and
prescribes what outdoor players could do to affect this relationship.

Turkey had the distinction of being the first modern, secular state in a predominantly
Islamic Middle East. In this major new study, Feroz Ahmad traces the work of generations of
reformers, contrasting the institution builders of the nineteenth century with their successors, the
‘Young Turks’, engineers of a new social order. The book has been written at time when military
playing a bulging political role in Turkey, The Making of Modern Turkey challenges (2003) the
conventional wisdom of a monolithic and unchanging army. He examines the choices facing
Turkey’s leaders today. In contrast to most recent writing, throughout his analysis, the author
emphasises socio-economic changes rather than continuities as the motor of Turkish politics.
The article Turkish model of Civil- military relations (2013) by Ozan O. Varol shows that
the military played a crucial role in Turkish modernization and democratization during the coup
and in its immediate aftermath, a role that has been largely obscured by the current portrayal of
the Turkish military as a hegemonic and repressive institution. The article explains the recent
exodus of the Turkish military from politics with the ascension to power of stable civilian
governments and Turkey’s accession process to the European Union. It concludes by offering
observations and lessons for other nations seeking to normalize their civil-military relations.
Democracy under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia Co-
Edited (1957) have written by the Aurel Croissant and Paul Chambers. It researches reinstated
and diligent cases of reviving and latent autocracy with regards to civil-military relations in
South and Southeast Asia, relating to ‘Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the
Philippines, and Thailand. As civil-military relationship is a time-honored academic sort, this
accumulation of hypothetical reassessment and observational undertaking is not proposed to be
significant. It simply adds new proof to and refreshes significant writing on the part of the
military in the local legislative issues of six essential nations. In this manner, it features just one
of its center areas of focus as well as economic cooperation, internal conflict and regional
security.
Civil Military Relations in New Democracies (2011) written by D. Pion-Berlin is the
ideal research field for enganging in structure versus agency debate. Peers of researchers have
pondered the circumstances under which political leaders may or may not build up successful
power over their military. From the starting points of current civil- military scholarships in the
comparative politics to present, this inquiry has shaped the primary subject of the research field.
This research discusses pertinent questions in the study of civil-military relations in
democratizing East and Southeast Asia from the perspective of Latin American research about
civilian control. Thereby it aims to introduce the theme of this special issue and, at the same
time, attempts to build an intellectual bridge, connecting research on two regions of the world by
pointing to common theoretical and methodological questions.
However, many scholars have prevailing with regards to presenting democratic
consolidation in broader terms; they have occupied a lesser enthusiasm for portraying the
essential conditions that should be present for ‘democratic consolidation’ of a nation
characterizes consolidation of the democracy.Problems of Democratic Transitions and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (1996) written by
Linz and Alfred Stepan as a political condition in which democracy has come to be the only
game in town. In this perspective, Linz and Stepan have made generous commitment in their
most recent writing, and they portray five arenas of ‘democratic consolidation’ that would be
helpful in examining the present study. In that sense Pakistan and Turkey can proceed further
without any hesitation. According to Linz and Stepan the five situations illustrated should be
inter-connected and mutually strengthened to ensure the ‘democratic consolidation’.
Notwithstanding, high military impact of a nation will consequently stifle the above conditions.
In a comparative situation, the Pakistani and Turkish military has officially occupied with
performing exaggerated roles in the Post-War reconciliation activities and this may affect also
consolidation of the democracy.
Most scholars in the field focus on developing tools to effectively assess objective
civilian control. One prominent example is Alfred Stepan’s Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil
and the Southern Cone (1997), in which he outlines 11 military prerogatives in which the
military assumes they have acquired the right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise
effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the
state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between state and political or civil society.
Though Stepan's approach might be valuable for assessing CMR as a part of democratic
consolidation and for clarifying how and why objective civilian control of military has not so far
matured in an apparently democratic country.
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (1986) have written by G.
O'Donnell, P. C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead separating the transition to democracy into dual
stages. The primary stage is the procedure from the autocrat regime to establishment of a
democracy and the second stage is the procedure from that democratic regime to the
Consolidation of Democracy (CoD). In any case, although the previously mentioned illuminating
presences in the field of Democratic Transition and Consolidation have made valuable efforts to
introduce the well-founded delineations for transition and consolidation of democracy, they do
not integrate the military as a vital determinant element. Though, the model and idea displayed
by the scholars might be helpful in introducing the study on Pakistan and Turkey at present
undergoing an era of reconciliation that might have sound effects of military on consolidation of
democracy. Schmitter has an alternate discernment on democratic consolidation. He argues that
democracies are never supposed to be consolidated. Different regimes should have the potential
to adopt continuous changes that may require self-transformation to effect changes to their
structures and rules. He further maintains that consolidation is not simply a continuation of
transition from authoritarian regime it is a combination of processes such as new actors, new
processes, new values and resources and he deliberates the relevance of military in the
consolidation of democracy under Negotiation of a Military Pact, and Submission of Military to
Civilian Control. These are valued perceptions that can be employed for study of the situation in
present context.
It is Narcis Serra who clearly advocates in The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of
the Armed Forces that, in order to consolidate a democracy, it is needed to include the military
as an essential variable. He confident that military can weaken the process of transition and
consolidation of the democracy of a state, particularly in a circumstance where the military expect that
they are guarantors of the state. In the Pakistan and Turkey as well, military with popularity they have
earned, may imagine themselves as guarantors of the country and act correspondingly.

InCivil Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model (2011) Heper argues that
the military is autonomous or even free from societal forces within the dominant classes and
class divisions.As per this reading, in Turkey, development of national capital was blocked due
to robust state traditions and did not encourage the leaders to develop the strong relations with
civil society. In civil society, state persistent to perform without any supporters and no collective
goods were present among the bourgeoisie and bureaucracy.
However, the latest scholarly work of Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson asserts
in Bruneau and Tollefson, ed., Who Guards the Guardians that diverse states may have their
interesting methods of political transition however, as soon as such a stage is accomplished; the
continuous democratic consolidation is comparable of the most area. These contentions give a
perfect viewpoint from that to investigate the present setting, a state in process of the establishing
‘democratic consolidation’ after the transitioning phase.
T. C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei argues in Toward a New Conceptualization of
Democratization and Civil-Military Relations (2008) that emphasis of these scholars restricted to
created democracies, particularly to the US where the basic concerns are governing the military
and subservience of military to guarantee the civilian supremacy. Conversely, theories of the
Huntington and Janowitz habitually related to the apprehensions of the trade-offs concerning
security and freedom. Bruneau and Matei keep up that such methodologies are risky, as literature
focuses just around the domestic USA environment whose pertinence is faulty somewhere else
on the world.
Though, prior researchers had turned to characterizing relations among civilians and
military barely as collaboration between the higher political elites and the top brass of military.
Civil Military Relations in Europe: Learning Crisis and Institutional Change (2006) written by H.
Born, and J. Kuhulmann comprehend in that CMR must to be understood in broader context
away from the common civil component i.e. civilian political elites. They push that it ought to be
a comprehensive approach that advances military relationships with the entire society, centered
on terms of the democratic qualities including such customs as pluralism, openness,
accountability, transparency and legitimacy.
By comparing, the writings on civil military relationships in African and Asian states are
comparatively constrained. In such scarcity, as per Diamond and Plattner in Civil-Military
Relations in Southern Africa gives restricted data on the civil military relations in this raging
area. The region has experienced major equipped clashes and, since the decolonization,
extremely politicized military corps has existed, apart from a few states just some kind of
developed military that admits the authority of the civilian control. Majority of militaries have
either employed Soviet or European doctrines and by 1980, and by 1980 two thirds of the
countries south of Sahara were governed by democracies, though their prospects appear to be
unclear. With this context one cannot assume rich literature to be made from the said area on
CMR.
Democratization and civil military relationships of Asia (2006), a theoretical and
comparative research on democratization and civil-military relations of Asia written by Aurel
Croissant, David Kuehn and Philip Lorenz, expands many countries transitioned from the
authoritarian regimes toward democracies like Thailand, Bangladesh, Philippine, Indonesia,
Taiwan, South Korea and Pakistan. It offers a reasonable idea that permits a substitute
comparative evaluation on difficult examples of indirect and direct military impact that forms
civil-military relations. They see Asia as the best locale with great variety for drawing
deductions on civil military relationships and democratization. Nevertheless, they focus that the
alleged democratic transitions have paid reasonably in the nation building, and are assuming the
dual function (economic and socio) principle is an example.Assessing the explanations for
uncertainty in Pakistan, Paul Staniland assumes in his paper as Back to the Future, Again, and
Again: Military Cohesion, Mass Contestation, and Pakistan’s Peculiar Regime Instability that the
unanswered puzzle is why Pakistan has not become a military ruled bureaucratic-authoritarian
state despite three sustained attempts to build precisely such a regime. Scholars assume that the
army simply could not maintain its rule, but comparisons make it clear that military-backed
authoritarianism can be enduring.
The literature covering military withdrawal in Pakistan is quite small, paralleling the
small segment the study of ‘returns to the barracks’ occupies in the field as a whole, Mazhar
Aziz inMilitary control in Pakistan: The Parallel states (2007) utilizes path dependence and a
historical institutionalism framework to clarify that how untimely political game plans and forces
mediations motivated to profile civil-military results, diagnosing that the communal interests of
the military are serious. Hassan Askari Rizvi offers a complete study concerning the military's
part in legislative issues, overthrows, and the character and approaches of the military
administrations in The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997 (2000). Rizvi discusses the
reasons for military withdrawals in Pakistan, yet tragically his essential surrounding of the
wonders is to some degree inelegant. However, every upset and withdrawal in Pakistan has been
driven by the dynamic leader of the Army, upheld by the big bosses, and got participation down
the command structure. There has never been a genuine overthrow endeavor in Pakistan exuding
from junior officers, unconstrained unit uprisings, or a non-military gathering. Despite the fact
that the military is greatly politicized, it has remained a profoundly proficient association with a
significant degree of internal discipline and cohesion. Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Pakistan Military in
Politics: Origins, Evolution, Consequences (2013) examines the role of military in politics in
‘post-colonial garrison state’ and projects that the direction Pakistan takes in coming months and
years will depend on the role of military plays.
The military’s viewpoint in this discourse has not been adequately represented in
scholarly literature, save through a few interviews and public statements. However, a few former
military officers have deliberated on the issues related to politics and civil military relations.
Ayub Khan in his autobiography Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography explains the
military mind and military’s approach to resolving political problems. His argument is in line
with the military training of the officers i.e. appreciation of the situation and formulating policy
options to solve Pakistan’s problems. His basic premise is that politicians are unable to put their
act together, therefore military has to intervene.
Western efforts to support democratic control of military (2003) by Levitsky and Way
describe regularly by means of restriction, significantly expanded the cost of maintaining
directly dictator governments and made a solid motivation for fringe elites to receive formal
democratic foundations. The growths of the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe and their
separate democratic control-related confirmation prerequisites have been the critical drivers of
military change in hopeful nations. To be sure, the writing on the CEE underlines the prevalent
position of the Western security community as the single most prominent outer factor molding
examples of civil-armed relations in the region. The West's political, military power, economic
and the craving of possibility for mix with the West, gave Western association’s huge impact and
use in these nations. It was NATO anyway that assumed a conclusive part in promoting civilian
control of armed forces and in setting the agenda for structural reform across the military
organizations in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). NATO has acted as a major catalyst in
advancing democratic direction of the military in the region ‘since it’ serves as a model, it
creates incentives for reforms because democratic control of the military is an explicit condition
for admission;
and it also provides material assistance and advice to new or aspiring members through NATO’s
partnership for peace program and, more recently, its Membership Action Plan (MAP). These
projects have encouraged not exclusively advancing the civil-military change motivation in the
area but also to socialize participants into complying with NATO standards.
Country Building and the Pakistan Army: 1947-1969 (1979) by Raymond Moore has,
while towing the legitimist line, come up with more or less the same themes. Moore's perspective
was the military rule led by General Zia-ul-Haq, who put the 1973 constitution in suspension
through a military overthrow in July 1977. Moore also believes that socio- economic
improvement, if not democracy, can be guaranteed by a military rule. In addition, Moore has
likewise stayed unaware of the post-overthrow concealment of human rights, suspension of the
constitution, the transcription to the legal, monstrous destitution, poor condition of wellbeing and
training and so on in Pakistan.
Change from Military to Civilian Rule (1988) by G. W. Choudhury has additionally
played with clear cards as far as accepting military from an innovator. He follows the
establishment of forces intercession from the pre-sector days. Due to the innate frail and
insufficient political authority and in accumulation frail political groups, the military's
intercession under Ayub Khan is legitimized. One marvels what made Choudhury choose not to
see to the bleak cores that the common residents of Pakistan tackled i.e. concealment of essential
human rights, (constrained) Islamization, wilderness, Afghan Jihad, a massive occurrence of
poverty and etc. This book will be helpful for this research work.
 Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and historical perspective
by Ayesha Jalal is a comparative and historical study of the interplay between democratic
politics and authoritarian states in post-colonial South Asia, Ayesha Jalal explains how a
common British colonial legacy led to apparently contrasting patterns of political development -
democracy in India and military authoritarianism in Pakistan and Bangladesh. By comparing the
state structures and political developments, the author evaluates and redefines democracy,
citizenship, sovereignty and the nation-state, arguing for a more decentralized governmental
structure better able to arbitrate between ethnic and regional movements. This original and
provocative study will challenge students and scholars in the field to rethink traditional concepts
of democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia.
Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq (1991) written by Shahid Javed
Burki has tranquil largely on Pakistan's governmental matters. Whereas compiling from an
economic-development point of view, Burki trusts that the nation accomplished more economic
development under military rule. In this regard, the economic development accomplished by the
working class under Ayub is vehemently cited. Though, all at once the authenticity of the drop
downs of this progress towards poor is overlooked. Furthermore, a little place in the record
determined by the autocracy and severity of Ayub’s armed govern. Additionally, an orientation
to the armed sociology has been made by Burki that is, in Pakistan’s governmental matters a
long approach from contacting the central inquiries of military mediation. Moreover, supports in
1977 elections, the diffusion and arrangement of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), the record is
quiet on Baluchistan mission.
Evolving Perceptions, Altered Reality: Pakistan’s Economy under Musharraf 1999-2006
(2007) by S. J. Burki legitimized the 1977 coup. Zia was contradictory to Yahya and Ayub,
tentative to presume control. Truth is told, He was constrained by Bhutto and his (terrible)
polices to mediate. Should failure of arrangements by an elected Prime Minister welcome a
military overthrow? The record gives no answer. Also, if the Bhutto's unsafe strategies were a
threat for the security and improvement of the nation, what did Zia administration do on these
fronts? Burki took the torment to address these inquiries. Strangely, the author has overlooked
the military mediation and its causes and has rather featured the strategies utilized for
intercession. What's more, the record points of interest social foundation of the armed force
commanders so as to clarifying Pakistan's legislative issues and the part of military in it. Be that
as it may, the causality of this variable isn't built up in any way. By studying the role of political
elite and their failures he does not establish resultant causal relationship with military
interventions.
Journals of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan (1993) written by Lt. Gen. (rtd) Gul Hassan Khan,
who motivated in the direction of appropriate Pakistan army chief soon after the birth of
Bangladesh in December 1971 is the legitimist story. Gul additionally trusts that since the
formation of the nation lawmakers and civil administrators ran the affairs of the nation explicitly.
Strikingly however, Gul has not convincingly addressed why then Mirza was sent into a forced
exile after right around three weeks of coup. Also, the reasons for politicization of commanders
are not furnished with any solid proof. Reflectively, the ex-army chief envisions that Ayub Khan
was not solemn in his endeavors to democratize the nation in any case. He gave Pakistan a
constitution and a half-baked democracy. In any case, again the author has given validity to
Ayub in the Ayub Yahya incident. For instance, in March 1969 it were ministers who advised
Ayub to force martial law which considered by Gul. Be that as it may, to the greatest advantage
of the nation, did not do as such. Rather martial law was forced by Yahya Khan.
Seen as the theory of the part, in The Military and Politics in Modern Times Perlmutter’s
typology of states and soldiers led to the advancement of the idea of praetorian state, society and
military. Presented as anti-thesis to the civilian dominance, such states were to evolve out of the
democratic system and not imposed by the military through interventions. His projections were
not entirely true but still many thinkers take the concept and apply it selectively to Pakistan.
Essentially to criticize the military without realizing that the concept finds greater applicability
too many civilian regimes, where authoritarianism and oligarchy are defining characteristics.
In 2007, Ayesha Siddiqa heartened a raw nerve through publishing Military Inc.: Inside
Pakistan’s Military Economy. At that time Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf named her a
traitor and stopped the book from launching, blammed her for treason and persecuted her out of
the Pakistan. Her crime was reporting the Pakistani military's business association (Milbus) at the
cost of the general population economy. The 2017 release of Military Inc. includes subtle
elements from the post-Musharraf period and reasons that Milbus has turned into a lasting
component now. There is additionally far reaching open and media acknowledgment of Milbus
through the Pakistan military's fruitful endeavors in reviewing its picture as the most trustworthy
security guardian even under civilian rule.
 Christine C. Fair, weigh up to be an expert on Pakistan, in one of her book Fighting to the
End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War (2014) she has also portrayed one sided story about the
supremacy of military in Pakistan. Instead, both scholars have unheeded towards the geostrategic
safety compulsions faced by Pakistan. Therefore, an objectivity dearth shows in their analysis
because it ignores the link of Kashmir issue with Pakistani politics and existing Indian threat for
Pakistan. For this, in Pakistan different policy choices has exercised time to time as assessed by
these scholars.
The Armed Forces of Pakistan (2002) written by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema has also
legitimized the military intercession in legislative issues on the grounds of national security and
ineptitude of civilian politicians. In is substance, it is a strong contention that Pakistan confronted
(even) militarily an intense adversary India; that there was more danger to the plain presence of
the territory of Pakistan since the primary war over Kashmir in October 1947. One marvels why
the military at that point organized a coup in October 1958-from Cheema's rationale of national
security-when Pakistan, a partner of the US, confronted no security danger from India.
Curiously, this thinking likewise neglects to answer why the two nations did not engange in any
war between 1947/48-1958.
In the Line of Fire (2006) by General (retd) Pervez Musharraf, the last visible example of
legitimism following the rationale of his military and non-military forerunners, Musharraf, has
put the fault of demolishing the nation on the civilian initiative. He contends that the Pakistan's
political authority ‘played a total lack of statesmanship’. The essayist additionally contends that
Mirza and Ayub broke down a parliament which was deficient authenticity and unelected. In this
mode they retracted the foundation. Nevertheless, over power-sharing Mirza was sent home and
Ayub won. Musharraf, be that as it may, concedes that the Constitution (1962) Ayub introduced
was dictator and antidemocratic. On his October 1999 coup, Musharraf accuses the then Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif who pulled back from Kargil. Besides, Sharif supplanted the author with
a flexible armed force boss to win the following decisions.
Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (1970) Tariq Ali, self-announced has
composed broadly on the diverse periods of Pakistan's politics from a connivance viewpoint. His
main contention is that the Pakistan's military includes in politics for the sake of the USA. In the
harsh elements War setting, Pakistan aligned with the entrepreneur obstruct against the
communist USSR. The military was supported by Washington in 1958, 1969 and 1977 to
organize an overthrow in light of the fact that a solid general as leader of the military and the
state would better serve the Washington's geostrategic advantages. An internal aspect is present
in his conspiracy theory. Apparently, his arguments seem attractive though, their empirical
ground is weak. In addition, he is unsuccessful to comprehened the facts of the contextuality of
politics generally and civil military relations particularly with special reference to Pakistan. Put
simply, his accounts are essentalized, subjective and conspiratorial in nature.
Pakistan's Armored Democracy (2003) by Aqil Shah is another expansion to ‘conspiracy
theory’ follows the US impact in Pakistan's politics from a different approach. Shah has
endeavored to comprehend the working of International Financial Institutions (IFIs), i.e.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and so on, and their responsibility in
aiding authoritarianism to Pakistan. Henceforth, the civilian governments were rejected because
of failure of the economy in spite of the way that the previous had little assets available to them.
Shah, in this regard has not probed the presence of crooked practices among politicians as well
as civil servants. In other words, his reasoning takes conspiratorial tone: that the US influences
Pakistan through the IFIs, and that Pakistan has no independent sovereign status. Nonetheless, in
assuming so, Shah has ignored the open- ended fact that the IFIs are a global phenomenon. There
are many countries in the world that have signed mutual agreements for economic collaboration
with the World Bank or IMF. Moreover, having put all the burden of responsibility on
exogenous factors, the account has demoted the importance of domestic variables, actors, their
rationality and context.
The Army and Democracy by Aqil Shah (2014) is an interpretation in light of the
realities as comprehended, experienced, and communicated by military officers and civilian
elites, including legislators, civil servants, scholars, and authors. It doesn't address the lived
understanding of normal Pakistanis. Regardless of how much public support military dictators
claim to enjoy, the decisions and inclination of the indistinct individuals generally don't
straightforwardly decide the real choice, arranging, and execution of military mediations and of
military removals from control. The same is by and large valid for other significant strategies or
choices commonly made for the sake of the people, particularly in tyrant settings. It does not
mean that the people are not important, but have to acknowledge that decisions taken by military
have significant impacts on the public life. So they have to treat separately.
Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections (2006) by Mohammad
Waseem also has convincingly settled the transformative connections of the civil organization
with that of Pakistan. In dissecting the structure and stature of the civil administration in the
colonial state, Waseem, even so, has considered an essential part of the regional state that is non-
civil bureaucracy - the military. Moreover, in the postcolonial zone of Pakistan, the author has
not emphasized the evolutions and their causes in the trustworthy structure of the civil
bureaucracy. Furthermore, he structurally has faith in the continuum of rule of law from the pre-
Partition to present. Nonetheless, he has ignored the contextual difference between the colonial
and post-colonial states as well as the identifier of the rule of law incidentally.
Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (2005) written by Haqqani’s record from the
start is exceptionally fascinating. In factionalizing political parties by and huge and constraint
exclusively, he has demonstrated about the job of intelligence agencies that the value of his work
lies in the pragmatic data. However, his record is to a great degree essentialist. It recognizes the
position of religion truly the making of Pakistan vital and a given. So, since pre- panel days the
province of Pakistan is essentialized as Islamic. To protect the Islamic spirit of the state it is,
from Haqqani’s motivation, the accountability, be that spiritual or something else, of the mullah-
military joins civil administration and government officials. However, in response to this sense,
it is contended that Haqqani has failed to realize the instrumentality of religion as enacted by
Jinnah, the Muslim League, the mullah and the military etc.
Extensive review of available literature relevant to the subject confirms that there is
sufficient material pertaining to developed countries (with established democracies) and
transitioning democracies (located mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America,
and Asia). In contrast, insufficient literature available on new democracies and it is even difficult
as compared to Middle East to find literature on countries in the South Asian region that are in
transition or consolidating as democracies, especially after cold- war era. While utilizing the
existing literature as a base for study, this thesis attempts to remedy the scarcity of literature
available on South Asia with special reference to Pakistan and provide some utility for scholars
focusing on the South Asian region.
CHAPTER 3
MATERIAL AND METHODS

3.1 Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research design to analyze civil-military relations in Pakistan,
focusing on historical contexts, contemporary dynamics, and their implications for governance.
The methodology is structured to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the complexities
involved.

3.2 Research Design

The research design is primarily exploratory and descriptive, utilizing historical analysis and
case studies to examine significant periods in Pakistan’s political history. By analyzing both
military regimes and democratic transitions, the study aims to draw connections between
historical events and their impacts on civil-military relations.

3.3 Data Collection

Primary Sources:

Interviews:

Semi-structured interviews will be conducted with political analysts, historians, military

officials, and key stakeholders involved in governance. These interviews will provide firsthand
insights into the dynamics of civil-military relations.

Government Documents:

Official reports, policy papers, and legislative documents will be reviewed to understand the
formal structures and frameworks governing civil-military interactions.

Secondary Sources:

Academic Literature:
A comprehensive review of existing literature on civil-military relations, political history, and
governance in Pakistan will be conducted. This includes books, journal articles, and theses.

Media Analysis:

Articles from reputable newspapers and journals will be analyzed to gauge public sentiment and
media narratives surrounding civil-military relations.

Case Studies

The study will focus on specific case studies from key historical periods, such as:

 The Ayub Khan regime (1958–1969)

 The Zia-ul-Haq era (1977–1988)
 The Musharraf regime (1999–2008)
 Recent democratic transitions and the role of the military in contemporary governance.

These case studies will allow for an in-depth examination of how military interventions have
shaped political outcomes and public perception over time.

3.4 Data Analysis

The collected data will be analyzed using thematic analysis to identify patterns, themes, and
significant trends in civil-military relations. Key themes will include:

 The role of military influence in political decision-making

 The impact of military interventions on democratic institutions
 Public perceptions and attitudes towards military and civilian governance

3.5. Ethical Considerations

Ethical guidelines will be followed throughout the research process. Informed consent will be
obtained from interview participants, ensuring their confidentiality and the right to withdraw
from the study at any time. The research will also aim to present findings responsibly, avoiding
biases and acknowledging the limitations of the study.
3.6 Limitations

While this study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis, it acknowledges certain limitations,
including potential biases in available data and the challenges of capturing the full complexity of
civil-military relations within the constraints of qualitative research. Additionally, the subjective
nature of interviews may introduce variations in perspectives, which will be considered in the
analysis. By utilizing this methodology, the study aims to offer a nuanced understanding of civil-
military relations in Pakistan, contributing valuable insights to the broader discourse on
governance and democracy in the region.

Laying the ‘theoretical framework’ is inevitable prior to knock the exact comparative analysis of
particular countries fixed for this scholarship. The part one of the chapter three concisely
deliberates the significant and vital theoretical terms and clarifications that will be valuable to
understanding the study. The research structure formulated as ‘conceptual framework and
theoretical perspective’ to provide direction and set parameters for sightseeing the core and
following the research questions. The conceptual framework comprises the route of
democratization, reasons of military intervention, exercise of the civilian control over military in
democratic framework. Consistently, theoretical perspective expounds the conceptual framework
as well as focuses on relationship of democratization and the politics to ascertain the efficacy of
approaches for managing ‘Civil Military Relations’ and ‘Democratic Consolidation’ in new
democracies. The framework established in this portion institutes that Strong working
relationships under the constitution in addition strong political leadership and popular support for
civil government discourage the military’s political intervention (Ebo, 2005).

Civil-military relations is well-defined as a “web of relations between the military and society
within which it operates, and of which it is necessarily part. Such relations encompass all aspects
of the role of the military (as a professional, political, social and economic instituteon) in the
entire gambit of the national life. Civil military relations involve issues of the attitude of the
civilians towards the military, the civilian society’s perception of, and attitudes of the military
towards the civilian society. Moreover, it involves the civilian society’s perception of and the
attitudes to the military and the role of armed forces in relation to the state” (Ebo, 2005).
Civil- Military Relation is not a distinct academic area of the study but lures the diverse arenas of
the political science, history, international relations, psychology, economics, sociology and
anthropology etc. Scholars have endured to study the progressing dimensions of these
relationships to identify challenges at large. They investigate certain cases to comprehend the
dynamics or set the cases for the comparative studies in a stab to understand non-normative
attitude of certain militaries specifically, their intervention in the politics indirectly or directly.
These scholarships are contextualized in the domestic, regional and global settings.

3.7 Materials

Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Civil-military relations in Pakistan have been a key factor shaping the country’s political history.
The military's role in governance has ranged from overt control to behind-the-scenes influence,
significantly affecting democratic processes, governance, and foreign policy. From the first
military coup in 1958 to recent times, Pakistan has experienced periods of military rule, with the
army asserting its influence over civilian governments (Schaffer, 2009). Scholars argue that the
military in Pakistan has historically seen itself as the guardian of national stability, which often
justifies its involvement in politics. This involvement has undermined the development of a
consistent democratic system, as the military's role is considered essential in areas such as
defense and internal security, while also influencing decisions on economic and foreign policies
(Pervez, 2012).

The Military's Political Role in Pakistan's Early Years

In the early years of Pakistan’s independence, the military maintained a relatively non-political
role. However, the 1958 coup led by General Ayub Khan marked the beginning of military
dominance in Pakistani politics. Ayub Khan assumed control under the pretext of maintaining
national stability, and his regime laid the foundations for military involvement in political
matters (Ali, 2003). He introduced the 1962 Constitution, which centralized power in the
presidency, a move that further entrenched the military’s role. While Ayub Khan's era saw some
modernization efforts, including economic development, it also exposed the lack of political
consensus and institutional stability, ultimately leading to his resignation in 1969 after public
unrest and political challenges (Nasr, 2008).

The Zia Regime and Military’s Role in Islamization

The 1977 military coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq ushered in a new phase of military rule in
Pakistan, which not only intensified the army's control over the political landscape but also led to
the Islamization of the legal and social fabric of the country. Zia's regime introduced policies
aimed at integrating Islamic laws into Pakistan’s legal system, thereby intertwining military rule
with religious ideology (Cohen, 2004). This period witnessed the military’s strong ties with
religious groups, which Zia used to legitimize his rule. Zia’s authoritarian regime stifled political
dissent, and his Islamization policies left a lasting impact on Pakistan’s political culture,
intertwining the military with religious politics in a way that has endured in subsequent years
(Grare, 2006).

Return to Civilian Rule and Continued Military Influence

After General Zia’s death in 1988, Pakistan transitioned back to civilian rule with the election of
Benazir Bhutto. However, despite the return of civilian governments, the military's influence
remained robust. The military continued to exercise significant influence over foreign policy and
defense, while the civilian governments often struggled to assert full control over internal
governance (Jalal, 2008). The 1990s saw a constant struggle between the military and the
political leadership, particularly between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Both civilian leaders
faced pressure from the military, which frequently acted as a shadow player in national politics
(Pildat, 2013). This period also highlighted the civilian governments' inability to curb corruption
or effectively manage the country, leading to further military intervention behind the scenes.

The Kargil Conflict and Military's Assertiveness

The 1999 Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India highlighted the tension between civilian
leadership and military control. The military, under General Pervez Musharraf, initiated the
conflict without consulting then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, creating a rift between the two.
The Kargil War led to a significant loss of life and international diplomatic pressure, particularly
from the United States, which forced Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the Kargil region. This
episode demonstrated the military’s willingness to act independently of civilian leadership and
its readiness to engage in military conflicts to assert its authority (Abbas, 2002). Ultimately, the
aftermath of Kargil weakened Nawaz Sharif’s government, contributing to the military's
successful coup later that year.

The Musharraf Era and Authoritarian Rule

General Pervez Musharraf's tenure (1999-2008) marked a significant period in Pakistan's civil-
military relations. After the 1999 coup, Musharraf assumed power, portraying himself as a
reformer who would bring stability to Pakistan. However, his rule was characterized by a strong
military presence in all aspects of governance. Musharraf centralized authority, dissolving the
judiciary and consolidating military power. He implemented economic reforms but faced
criticism for undermining democratic institutions and suppressing political opposition (Rashid,
2008). Musharraf’s authoritarian tendencies and his failure to restore genuine democracy during
his rule led to a growing opposition movement, culminating in his resignation in 2008.

The Role of the Military in National Security and Foreign Policy

The military in Pakistan has always seen itself as the protector of the nation’s security, both
internally and externally. The role of the military in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy has been
paramount, particularly regarding relations with India, Afghanistan, and the United States (Raza,
2010). The military’s influence on Pakistan’s strategic decisions, including its stance on nuclear
weapons, is central to understanding its hold over national policy. Scholars argue that while
civilian leaders may change, the military remains a constant factor in determining the country’s
foreign policy, especially in matters related to defense and security (Mushahid, 2012). This
monopoly over defense policy allows the military to maintain its power even in periods of
civilian rule.

Political Stability and the Military’s Role in Governance

Political stability in Pakistan has often been linked to the military's involvement in governance.
Civilian governments have repeatedly faced challenges in maintaining stability, both
economically and politically. The military’s involvement is often justified as a stabilizing force,
but this also leads to the perpetuation of authoritarian practices. Civilian leaders have frequently
sought the military’s support to counter opposition or control internal unrest. For example, the
military’s assistance was sought during the 2007 judicial crisis, where Musharraf dismissed the
judiciary and sought the army's backing to ensure his rule (Khan, 2009). This cycle of instability
and military intervention has hindered Pakistan’s ability to develop a fully functioning
democratic system.

The Return of Civilian Government and Military's Continued Influence

Following Musharraf’s resignation in 2008, Pakistan returned to civilian governance with the
election of Asif Ali Zardari. Despite the return of democratic rule, the military continued to exert
considerable influence over the government’s decisions, especially in matters of defense and
national security. The military also played a crucial role in the war on terror, following the 9/11
attacks, maintaining a direct link to the U.S. military and intelligence services. In this context,
civilian governments were often constrained by the military’s dominant role in foreign relations
and security policies (Jaffrelot, 2014). Thus, even in periods of civilian rule, the military’s
influence has not waned.

Challenges to Civilian Control and Democratic Consolidation

Despite efforts to strengthen democracy, the civilian governments of Pakistan have faced
multiple challenges in asserting full control over governance. The military has maintained
substantial power, particularly in key areas like defense and intelligence, which has undermined
the consolidation of democracy. The relationship between civilian leaders and the military has
been characterized by mutual mistrust, with the military often seeking to safeguard its interests
against civilian authority (Shafqat, 2004). This tension is exacerbated by Pakistan’s strategic
vulnerabilities, including its conflicts with India and concerns over its nuclear program, which
the military sees as central to national security.

The Role of the Military in Economic Decision-Making

The military in Pakistan also plays a significant role in the country’s economic affairs. Beyond
its control over defense and security matters, the military has expanded its influence into
business ventures, with the establishment of military-run corporations and businesses. These
entities contribute to the military’s economic autonomy, providing it with resources independent
of civilian governments (Siddiqa, 2007). As a result, the military has significant economic
power, allowing it to maintain its political leverage and influence over national policies.

The Impact of U.S. Relations on Civil-Military Dynamics

The relationship between Pakistan and the United States has been another critical factor in
shaping civil-military relations. During the War on Terror, the military’s role in cooperating with
the U.S. significantly strengthened its position within Pakistan’s political structure. The
military’s cooperation in counterterrorism efforts has resulted in considerable military aid, which
has provided it with additional resources and political legitimacy (Rashid, 2008). However, the
civilian government often finds itself sidelined in decisions regarding foreign policy, particularly
those involving relations with the U.S. and Afghanistan.

Public Opinion and the Military’s Popularity

Public opinion in Pakistan often shows high levels of support for the military, especially in times
of national crises or when the civilian government faces political instability. The military’s
image as a stabilizing force in the country is reinforced by its portrayal in the media and its
success in providing security. Despite the military’s historical dominance in politics, it remains a
popular institution among large segments of the population, particularly when it can present itself
as an alternative to ineffective civilian governments (Jalal, 2008). This popularity gives the
military the ability to maintain significant influence even during periods of civilian rule.

The Role of the Military in Counterterrorism Efforts

The military’s engagement in counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the tribal areas and in
response to domestic insurgencies, has strengthened its role as the primary authority on national
security. Its involvement in combating extremism and maintaining internal security has solidified
its control over state institutions (Chaudhry, 2013). This not only enhances the military's
standing within Pakistan but also allows it to dominate discussions on domestic and international
security matters, marginalizing civilian authorities in key policy areas.

The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

The future of civil-military relations in Pakistan remains uncertain. While there have been
periods of democratic rule, the military’s entrenched position within Pakistan’s political,
economic, and security sectors suggests that its influence will persist for the foreseeable future.
The struggle between civilian governments and the military for control over national affairs
continues to define Pakistan's political landscape. The prospect of genuine democratic
consolidation remains dependent on the ability of civilian leaders to assert authority over military
institutions and create a more balanced civil-military dynamic (Cohen, 2004). Until then, the
military will likely continue to play a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of Pakistan’s
governance.
CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Pakistan got its independence in an extremely volatile situation where the colonial reminiscent of
Britain and external threats were a major inheritance. Besides, the complex environment within
the country and external threats convinced the then leaders to invest in the defence sector in a
heavy manner. With the gradual advancement of military in addition to foreign support vis-à-vis
the prism of capitalist bloc handed the country a strong armed force the general populace had a
confidence in as well as was capable of combating both internal and external dangers (Janjua,
2010). The legacy from the British Army is a major ramification of Pakistan Army which has its
roots in the pre-partition history, which became one of the reasons that the military was indulged
or remained strict to the tradition of civilian supremacy despite having five military leaders as
heads of the state. While military played a significance role during the independence as well as
in the prolonged political process of the country, many phases have glided past which challenged
the credibility of the military role in the administrative and bureaucratic systems (Haq, 2019).

Keeping in view this perspective, many questions arise such as why the role of military has been
so dominant in Pakistan, how the relations between civilian and military regimes shaped the
democratic process of the country, or how the relations between them will ensure the supremacy
of civilian regime in years ahead. These and many others questions make the compendium of this
research article.

Deciphering the Nature of Civil Military Relations

The civil military relations, according to the study of, form a significant strand when it comes to
national security strategy. During peace, they positively affect the internal situation of a nation
state; in war, they directly influence the repercussions. Samuel Huntington, one of the chief
American political scientist and the author of a renowned book ‘Clash of Civilizations’
endeavoured to break down various phases of civil-military relationships that collectively exist in
a country’s civil system. He is of the view that in order to eliminate any kind of possibility of the
military’s intrusion in government affairs, civilian supremacy must be fully pervaded in a state
(Huntington, 1981). The nexus between the two regimes describes such a relationship where
retention of civil authority is the determined objective. He further argued that the communication
between twin imperatives of accountability and security is in the essence of the trouble between
civil-military relations. “The military entity of any state is shaped particularly by two major
forces: a societal imperative emanating from distinct social ideologies and forces that are
prevalent within the society, and a functional imperative arising from the menaces of the security
of the society (Croissant, Kuhn & Wolf, 2011). The relations depend on these forces that
persistently demand the military to be responsive and accountable to the society that it serves.

Another leading thinker namely Janowitz have argued about civil-military relations that the civil
control and the essential need to attain an optimal balance between the two regimes must be the
sole objective of a democratic state. But the challenge that confronts their hierarchy is
indubitably is the acquisition of a pertinent balance when the matter relates to the protection of
the society and its values. This kind of balance is indeed the holy grail of an ideal equation of
civil- military relationship (Feaver, 1996). From a sociological perspective, the relations between
the two does not merely mean the association between the top military hierarchy and government
of the day; rather, their role and functions in accordance within their respective domains whose
end is the betterment of the society as a whole is the matter that is of more significance (Taylor,
2014). The key argument with regard to nexus between the two institutions is that there is a
direct link between civilian control of state affairs on one hand and military efficacy on the other.
Huntington stressfully argued that political leadership of a state must avoid any civilian
intervention in military affairs for the maximisation of its effectiveness (Janowitz, 1981).

Another important study looked to the adverse effect of political control mechanisms that were
opted by authoritarian governments in the Middle East region on the military effectiveness of
armed forces. It is contended that a rigid- cum-centralised command structure of few Arab states
coupled with mending command chains for political reasons has negatively impacts the
potentiality of Arab militaries (Bruneau & Croissant, 2019). However, it is also argued that sans

civilian involvement, military regimes could become static and reluctant to accept necessary
involvement from political parties in response of changes that are required to ameliorate the
political situation of states (Mares, 2018). That is why some political theorists emphasises upon
intervention of civilian leaders in order to force innovation in the military, because they hold the
view that civilian control can promote integration of political-military regimes which will
subsequently knit together both military means as well as political ends in a unanimous manner.

However, in the case of Pakistan, civil supremacy over the military is deemed a complicated
matter. The wrongness and ambiguities in decision-making and policy implementation have
perhaps been the two biggest stumbling blocks in carrying out a strong civil authority due to
which the presence of military in political affairs has become inevitable. Since there have been
intermittent military takeovers of civilian affairs, a smooth running of civilian affairs has hardly
been witnessed (Murtaza, 2015). If it is allowed to function in a smooth run, strong civil-military
relations can be evinced.

Irrespective of what version of history one denotes to, the turbulent political past of Pakistan
shows that it has not remained fully settled on any specific form of state government and kept on
oscillating between short-lived democratic tenures to repetitive military takeovers, either in the
form of coup d’état or maligned elections. Taking a popular perception into consideration, a
prolonged legacy of irritable relations is still existent, thus, developing a void between both the
cadres of the country (Rizvi, 2015). However, the problem at hand ought to be comprehended
keeping in view all intricacies of power struggle within the country’s societal setup.

Regrettably, the growing predilection among several from political leadership and intelligentsia
is to perceive the problematique in the form of how political scientists would see elite civil-
military relations, and not in the form of societal relations (Dandekar, 2017). Such a
Huntingtonian proposition to see reality is short-sighted, since it condones the significance of
dynamic within power relations that particularly shape the society and which draw out from the
societal fabric (Siddiqa, 2017). For instance, what bestows power to the Pakistani military is not
a mere barrel of the gun, but also a social legitimacy to make its role effective and pervasive and,
most importantly, the whole-and-sole guarantor of state security in accordance with the enforced
constitution (Khan, 2012)

A Retrospect of Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations

Since the birth of the country, it has experienced as many as thirty military rule years. Even at
certain stages, the regime has intermittently sought from the government regarding consolidation
of political power within which the Inter- Service Intelligence (ISI) played a prominent-cum-
covert role. The aim of such a control was to rein domestic and foreign affairs to some extent
especially given sceptic relations of Pakistan with its neighbouring countries particularly India
and Afghanistan. From the turn of 1958 until 1971, there was a reflection of militarised character
in the political contours of the country. From the Muslim League of Field Marshal Ayub Khan to
that of Pervez Musharraf, the political landscape of the country had congealed military footholds
as a result of which civilian governments always regarded the employment of military means
with a grain of salt (Bhattacharya, 2016). When it comes to Ayub’s acquisition of democratic

control, it was justified with the ineptness of politicians or public office holders. To him,
majority of them were incapable of comprehending the rationale of democracy and ensuring
provision of basic rights due to which the general populace had seemed to have reluctantly
accepted Ayub’s position in the political affairs of the country.

Concerning with the era of Yahya Khan, his period is reckoned as a ‘General’s Revolt’ owing to
his act of abrogating the 19962 Constitution coupled with putting the country at risk by
endeavouring to split political parties into two separate wings (East and West). Moreover, the
general elections of 1970 and subsequent fall of East Pakistan derailed the plan of the military
regime to retain the helm of affairs (Farooq, 2012). Regrettably, his own cadres and officers
forced him to relinquish his powers as he was deemed as a complete disaster both for the military
prestige as well as for the country itself.

The separate of the Eastern wing was perhaps the biggest tragedy in the history of the country.
This fearful tide did not last until the organisational restructuring of the civil and military
bureaucracy under the civilian rule of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He was the first President of the
country was adorned the hat of civilian martial law administrator and later on became the Prime
Ministry of the country. His dictatorial and rigid behaviour constantly put him on military
leadership’s whims. Owing to various political opponents against his regime, the military
leadership got the opportunity of thwarting this rule under the pretext of suppressing opposition
voices. The country was then abounding with political instability which General Zia ul Haq took
the opportunity of (Hussain, 2014). The biggest failure of Bhutto was perhaps his unintelligent
and ill-planned execution of civil and military bureaucracy along with his pursuit of having
military as an important stakeholder in his regime.

As far as Zia-ul-Haq’s period is concerned, it is regarded as the third transitory period of the
military rule After Ayub and Yahya. Though at the beginning, he appear to be giving favour for
free elections with a view to returning to democracy, his experimented Islamization and pasty-
less system earned him scant legitimacy to run the political affairs of the country. Probably his
biggest mistake was the forcible-cum-unjustified passage of eighth amendment which gave him
the authority to dissolve the Parliament at any point of time (Hussain, 2018). Also, his conducive
nature towards his loyal civilian affairs to further and an effort to consolidate his position in the
next elections went in perish as his leadership collided with unforeseeable airplane killing.
However, the civil-military equation was unceasingly dominated by military, even the country
witnessed a decade of democracy between 1988 and 1999 vis-à-vis presidential type of relations
between both the regimes (Rizvi, 2015).

It was not until the adoption of a parliamentary democracy and subsequent revocation of
presidential power to dissolve the parliament that General Musharraf usurped power for
suspending the Constitution and began ruling as a ‘Chief Executive’ by a decree. Reinstating
Article 58 (20 (b) was a blatant effort from the military regime to interfere in civilian affairs
under the guise of derailing economy and worse socio-political condition. The Constitution was
reinstated in the year 2002 with the incorporation of Legal Framework Order (LFO) for the
restoration

of presidential powers. Unfortunately, Musharraf’s witch hunting failed to weaken two

mainstream parties (PPP and PLMn) and its veteran leaders (ul Haq, 2012).

The era of Musharraf is perhaps the most interesting phase in the historical struggle for
maintaining civil-military balance. In here, the establishment felt little to impose martial law in
order to reign the affairs of the state; instead, it kept tabbing over many political aspects of the
country where public anxiety was ascertained as well as disgruntled political affairs by
manoeuvring their exploitation of military role in the government. It is pertinent to mention here
that at this point of history, the establishment left no stone unturned to maintain its relations with
political parties of the country especially those which had been conducive to the dictates of the
military, such as Muttahida Muslim League (MMA) and Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (Hassan,
2018). It was not before he stepped down as Army Chief at the turn of 2007 that the country
began adopting a slow but steady path to democratic evolution by attaining some sort of balance
between the establishment and political forces under the doctrine of General Kayani.
Musharraf’s effort to impose emergency earned by much defamation both from the general
populace as well as other countries as a result of which the process of smooth democratic
transition began (Gregory, 2015).

This comprehensive constitutional history clearly depicts teeming political anguish to decide
upon a pertinent form of government where generals have been regarded as power usurpers and
law-givers. But the fact is that the inability of civilian governments coupled with consistent
animosity among state animosity were the implicit reasons for which military takeovers became
the requisite need, both for upholding the supremacy of the constitution and preventing politico-
economic affairs from being completely nosedived. The path to military takeovers is often
aligned with a systemic form of manipulation and fragility by the incompetence of quarrelling
politicians and the consequent lack of ability to ensure deliverance which handed them a serious
mistrust from the establishment. The ‘doctrine of necessity can be made a useful reference point
here where the judicial body of state has many a time provided the military with full-fledged
constitutional cover, thus, to mend disruptive political affairs of the country. There has seemed to
be a rationale for military intervention to try to balance between dissemination of state powers
and subsequent achievement of harmony between the two regimes (Farooq, 2012). Nevertheless,
a larger segment of the Pakistani society still believes that the present polity of the country is
chiefly dominated by the military especially when it comes to its formulation of foreign policy,
in addition to deciding on how to prevent chaos and confusion purported by anti-state elements.

Ramifications of Divergence of Relations

In contrast to other democratic countries, the depiction of Pakistan’s political history manifests
how military intervention formed the basis for introduction of an underdevelopment cycle when
it comes to strengthening state institutions. It can be observed from the above articulation that
while civilian governments failed to transform state administration into a mature political
system, military rules prevented the country from adopting the smooth running of a democratic
system (Khan, 2010). Scholarly debates have identified umpteen reasons for deprivation of
civilian governments to improve political conditions of the country entailing incompetence of
political leaders, feeble discourse regarding territorial integrity

and state sovereignty, indulgence of prioritising personal interests over those of the state, to
name a few. When there is a glaring lack of political leadership in the country, it is obvious that
the saviours of state territory and its security would come to the limelight and prevent the
country from experiencing more political chaos (Matei, 2012). These can be justifiable reasons
for divergence in civil- military relations and subsequent development of a stable nexus between
the two. This can be evinced from the fact that the history has witnessed much economic debacle
which political leaders fail to overcome especially that the turn of the last century when the
country was grappling with severe economic constraints internally and impositions of sanctions
externally (Hussain, 2014).

This necessity though proved to be indispensable in order to prevent the country from
experiencing further domestic indebtedness and augmenting unemployment and poverty crisis,
the then incoming military leadership placed more perils for the country in the form of
radicalisation and continued dominance of militancy. In the post 9/11 period, the military
government seemed to be capable of dealing with domestic affairs of the country much
potentially, it failed to effectively handle external affairs and consequently put the state’s
sovereignty at stake, for instance, by sanctioning US forces to monitor border areas of the
country which was a blatant compromise of the state without being directly involved in the
animosity between the US and Taliban (Janjua, 2010). These regrettably stretched gaps in the
convergence of civil-military relations and a wave of mistrust between the two continue to
remain intact.

It is argued that Pakistan has always been in the need of developing a nurtured democratic
leadership due to consistence absence of ability from the civilian governments’ side to improve
basic structure of the country and bring stability in its political system. Such a fostered leadership
has been a wild goose chase since much of the state affairs were led by aristocratic political
leaders that failed to realise the importance of state interests itself. The pervaded feudalism and
assiduity in increasing power and maintaining authority compelled military leadership to ensure
protection of the country from such impotent leaderships (Hussain, 2010). But this leadership
was also not without caring for its position when two dictators (Zia ul Haq & Musharraf) made
an effort to strengthen their position by restoring Article 58 (2) (b), with a view to increasing
presidential power. Also, blatant attempt by Musharraf to impose state of emergency widened
more divergences in relations between the two regimes and sparked much violence particularly
between the military and judiciary pertaining to the attempt from the former to abrogate the
constitution (Kamran, 2008). Therefore, it can be inferred that holes of political blunders have
been found in both the leaderships proper convergence of relations has remained a distant dream.

Arguments regarding Civil-Military Imbalance

There is no denying the fact that the democratic order under which state institutions carried out
their endeavours and the indispensability of military to try to dominate its existence manifested
unease from the Media, intelligentsias and the general public. Therefore it is essential to analyse
some augments regarding such a balance between the two regimes. Balance generally ascribes
working from the state institutions in accordance with their vested functions (Armstrong, 2013).
Thus, the first argument that erupts is from defining military functions as

stipulated in the Constitution of Pakistan. For instance, the Article 244 and 245 which aligns
with some clauses of the Army Act 1952 restricts military’s role in political affairs. Broadly.
These stipulations put the Federal Government to direct Armed forces to come to its aid only
when called upon to do so. It denotes that though the significant responsibility of Armed Forces
is to protect the country against anti-state elements, the civilian government can call upon it for
the objective of collaborating with it when it comes to formulating strategies regarding national
security of the country (Bhattacharya, 2016). If their activities appear to be covered under the
law, the state institutions will then begin functioning as per their prescribed functions.

However, in the case of Pakistan, when considering domestic politics of the country and
emanated wrangling among political parties which becomes a source for political instability and
economic weakening of the country, they have put military at arm’s length while, at the same
time, been comprehensively unable to reform strengthen such weaknesses. That is why
intermittent interference of military in civilian affairs has not been regarded as a breach of the
constitution but the compulsion of trying of keep the institutions on track (Greenwood &
Balachandran, 2014). Another rationale argument regarding civil-military imbalance has recently
emerged with the establishment of military courts after a heinous attack at Army Public School
in Peshawar. If the constitution is deprived of having any provision with regard to the
establishment of military court akin to regular civil courts, the imbalance between military and
civil seems to favour the former (Haq, 2019). Providentially, the constitution has provided for
the establishment of such courts by constitutionalising twenty-first amendment by amending
Article 175. Obviously, the transition of trialling persons from civilian to military courts was to
speed up the process of convicting terrorists or militants in the aftermath of 2014 attack. It holds
that by allowing such a mechanism to proceed, establishing courts can be regarded as not
disturbing civil-military balance whatsoever especially after providing four basic rights to the
accused persons ranging from producing them before the court within twenty-four hours to
permitting them to engage in private defence counsel (Hassan, 2018). Thirdly, it is often argued
that the role of military in the foreign policy formulation is prevalent where input from its side is
considered as meddling in the affairs of foreign office rather than providing them with profound
insight of how to maintain country’s external relations.

Unfortunately, little has been heard from the intelligentsia that such an input is indispensable for
the interest and security of the country particularly when country’s neighbours like India and
Afghanistan are obsessed with active engagement of military forces against clandestine militants
in these countries (Rizvi, 2015). Thus, in technical terms, there is currently no imbalance
between the two entities but a mere struggle for power politics and some sort of mistrust between
the two. Even Pentagon remains actively engaged with the President about the matter of security
but it does not imply meddling in state affairs from the military side (Piplani & Talmadge, 2016).

Role of Civil Society vis-a-vis Civil-Military Relations

The role of civilians (people without arms) is pivotal when considering the relationship between
civil and military regimes. The society at large on one hand and a separate armed body on the
other indubitably bring an order to the society. The phrase ‘civil society’ is like an umbrella in
Pakistan, making the compendium of unions, networks non-state institutions, i.e. non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), which operate in extensive social, political and economic
areas (Greenwood & Balachandran, 2014). Unlike the civil society of western countries which
reflect liberal tendencies that often become a direct challenge to the state, the civil society of
Pakistan is considered as a set of different actors. Since the development of civil society in the
country, it has hitherto been somehow deprived of witnessing the smooth configuration and
consolidation of the state. The reason of the establishment and subsequent development of Civil
Society Organisations (CSO), especially in the last decade, is that the Pakistani society is still
reeling with umpteen problems ranging from illiteracy to poverty and expecting the state to
deliver appropriate and better services to the general populace. If one has a retrospect over the
initial years of Ayub’s regime, the civil society was abounding with enthusiasm and produced a
sense of unanimity (Gregory, 2015). But the rational concept of nation-building fell flat upon the
society’s face when civil governments marred with country with foiled policies and military
regimes kept on consolidating their position.

Few novel dominant factions that consisted of rural feudal conservatives and urban bourgeois
preserved a political supremacy in order to wield and hold political authority. Though Auyb’s
regime provided for a strong ground to the locals, it was a mere farce attempt to reinforce the
state control over political and economic decisions. The glaring controversy in the form of 1965
elections resulted in public processes in which emerging interest and pressure groups came to the
limelight (Siddiqa, 2017). Numerous agitations were also experienced when lawyers, doctors and
economists reprimanded the audacious military rule of 1970. The mobility of civil society kept
on increasing in 1970s and 1980s where the middle class stratum of the society began reckoning
their requisite role in civil military relations. They were able to render their views and opinions
about fluctuating politico-economic conditions of the country in almost twelve-year
comprehensive rule of civilian governments. Before, the repressive actions of Zia’s regime
brought more acquaintance to the intelligentsia and millennial of the country when they were
witnessing fanatic state actions against sectarian populace which regrettably brought chauvinism
among people for their own communities (ul Haq, 2012).

With the passage of time, when the country saw consistent upheavals of its disruptive political
and economic situations they became more capable of questioning efforts of the state towards
them. In here, the role of NGOs have appeared to be of significance importance which have
brought awareness especially among people of far-fetched areas regarding their rights and duties
when considering engagement of civilian and military regimes and handling of security,
administrative and judicial affairs (Taj, 2016).
These efforts prevailed the notion of bringing political, economic and social stability in the
country and became more explicit after the end of last military rule that resulted in the smooth
transition of democratic governments. Though the people of Pakistan who are politically
unelected but belong to numerous civil society organisations prioritise indispensability of
military role in government affairs to put a check on central state leadership, they always prefer
electing

politicians within their own communities who have a direct association with their social
circumstances.

Recent Trends in Civil-Military Relations

There is no denying the fact that the role of military in government affairs is requisite for myriad
reasons for which governments itself want armed forces to come to its protection whenever
required. Be it the conduct of elections, census and relief work, these types of duties form the
basis for coordination and compromise between both. Broadly speaking, the recent convergence
of civil- military relations especially after the success of two military operations (Zarb e Azb &
Radd ul Fassad) brought pervaded security consolidation in the state as well as strengthen of
diplomatic functions (Qazi, 2019). Given the present convergence between ruling party and the
military, there is consistent opportunity when democratic principles of civil-military relations are
nourishing in a positive manner and providentially under the rubric of civilian supremacy that
has always been a longing hope for the people. This is entailing progressively some manifest
assumptions, such as the military is or ought to be recognised as an independent stakeholder
when it comes to governing the country, must remain exempt from overhauling the civilian
authority elected by the people and should have a protection both from the media as well as the
civil society (Haq, 2019).

Looking these essentials from a relationship spectrum, both the entities currently seem to be on
one page in the matters of state interest and external relations of the country. This can further be
evinced when the Army is pleasantly surprised over Prime Minister Imran Khan’s ability to
obtain foreign funding for the country’s cash-starved economy and his cooperation with the
military over the issues related to Financial Assistance Task Force (FATF) sanctions and money
laundering (Hussain, 2018). The credibility of present political leadership will be intact as long
as it remains concerned about resolving the perennial problems lie within its relations with the
establishment. The condemnable anti-state actions from the country’s neighbourhood coupled
with eliminating radicalisation within the state has had so far positive repercussions with regard
to mutual cooperation between both. Such a cooperation has to be perpetual especially given a
plethora of economic and security constraints the country is still grappling with. Issues such as
the extension in the existence of military courts and Chief of Army Staff’s (COAS) tenure should
be seen a beacon light in resolving out the hurdles of security and militancy rather than a
compromise on the civilian government’s ineffectiveness.
CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY
With the above exhaustive articulation, it can be inferred that civil-military relations have at
times been problematic throughout the history of Pakistan. The power struggle between the two
and endeavours to control state authority has negatively impacted democratic principles of the
country upon the basis of which the forefathers established it. The repercussions of military
rules that have negatively affected that country are still existential along with mistrusts among
the populace in civilian governments due to their past experience of ineptness and wrangling.
The overarching authority of military does not bear bounty in any democratic state of the world,
nor does lack of trust and deprivation of confidence among people towards political leadership.
Both the bodies must realise that prefer larger interests of the people over their own will
strengthen the political condition of the country for which promotion of democratic values,
prevention of radical actions against suspicious fanatics, empowerment of the masses, and
positive diplomatic image of the country must be higher priorities from both sides. In this
manner, the affairs of the state will be handled effectively and eventually bring heydays to the
country.

In the historical context, the civil-military relations in Pakistan have experienced many ups and
downs and the state has constantly experienced an upsurge in the role of the military in politics.
Over the course of its history, the military as an institution has successfully managed to resist
all sorts of the institutional efforts to establish civilian supremacy i.e. in both the general state
affairs and in the affairs of military organization. Further, the military as an institution has not
only been successful in extending its institutionalized role in the decision making process at the
expense of vital organs of the government i.e. legislature, executive and judiciary, but has
managed to install a parallel governance structure (may be called a government within the
government) also.

Despite of the ever-existed overarching role of the military as an institution i.e. in the politics of
Pakistan, the history has provided the various civilian democratic governments multiple
opportunities to consolidate and regain their power but unfortunately each of such opportunities
has been wasted by the concerned civilian leadership perhaps due to the lack of capacity or
competence. The case of the PML-N regime (2013-18) was not very much different than of the
previous civilian governments as it simply failed to achieve the ever- missed civilian supremacy
i.e. in the general state affairs. The military successfully managed to sustain its traditional role
in the politics and general state affairs under the garb of their ‘new’ role i.e. in the Apex
committees and through the military courts for the trials of the civilians. Despite of the fact that
during the period under study the PML-N regime used to take all its critical decisions about the
major issues were taken through the ‘mutual consultation’ in the respective institutional
framework i.e. Apex committees, but it was quite crystal clear that the actual authority to take
most of the critical policy decisions routinely remained in the hands of the military leadership.
Further, in the light of the above noted facts about the nature of the civil-military relations i.e.
during the last PML-N regime, it may be fairly concluded that the traditional patterns of the
civil-military relations did not change and the control of the military on the state affairs has
become not only more strengthened but more institutionalized as well.
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