Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

NOVEMBER 2024
LEBANON

ASSESSMENT REPORT
Interim Damage and
Loss Assessment (DaLA)
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Cover photo: Mohamad Azakir/World Bank

LEBANON
Interim Damage and
Loss Assessment (DaLA)
ASSESSMENT REPORT
NOVEMBER 2024

1
 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACLED. . . . . Armed Conflict Location and Event Data

CAS.. . . . . . Central Administration of Statistics
CCA.. . . . . . Climate Change Adaptation
CM. . . . . . . Centimeters
DaLA.. . . . . Damage and Loss Assessment
DRR. . . . . . Disaster Risk Reduction
DTM. . . . . . Displacement Tracking Matrix
EU. . . . . . . European Union
FAO.. . . . . . Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP. . . . . . Gross Domestic Product
GDPR. . . . . General Data Protection Regulation
GFDRR. . . . Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
IDPs. . . . . . Internally Displaced Persons
ILO. . . . . . . International Labor Organization
IOM. . . . . . International Organization for Migration
KII. . . . . . . Key Informer Interview
KM. . . . . . . Kilometer
Landsat. . . Land Satellite
LBP.. . . . . . Lebanese Pound
LFPRs. . . . . Labor force participation rates
M. . . . . . . . Meter
MEHE. . . . . Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoE. . . . . . Ministry of Environment
MoPH. . . . . Ministry of Public Health
NGO. . . . . . Non-Governmental Organization
OEA. . . . . . Order of Engineers and Architects
PAI. . . . . . . Publicly available information
PDNA. . . . . Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PISA. . . . . . Program for International Student Assessment
QITABI. . . . Quality Instruction Towards Access and Basic Education Improvement
RDNA. . . . . Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
SAR.. . . . . . Synthetic Aperture Radar
SMEB. . . . . Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket
SWM. . . . . . Solid Waste Management
TVET. . . . . . Technical and Vocational Education and Training
TIMSS. . . . . Trends in Mathematics and Science Study
UN. . . . . . . United Nations
UNHCR. . . . United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP. . . . . United Nations Development Program
UNICEF. . . . United Nations Children’s Fund
UNFPA. . . . United Nations Population Fund
UN OCHA.. . United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODA. . . . United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNRWA. . . . United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UR. . . . . . . Unemployment Rates
USD. . . . . . United States Dollar
WAP. . . . . . Working Age Population
WB. . . . . . . World Bank
WFP. . . . . . World Food Program
WHO. . . . . . World Health Organization

2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The team would like to express its deep appreciation to all individuals and organizations who contributed to this
assessment.

The assessment was prepared by a multidisciplinary team led by Salim Rouhana (Program Leader), Rob Pilkington
(Senior Urban Finance Specialist), Philipp Petermann (Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist), and Lamia
Mansour (Senior Environmental Specialist), under the strategic guidance of Jean-Christophe Carret (Country
Director for the Middle East Department (Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria)) and Catherine Signe Tovey
(Practice Manager, Urban, Resilience and Land, Middle East and North Africa). The core team included Lara Loussert
(Consultant), Sara Boughedir (Consultant), Fares Salem (Consultant), Ghizlane Aqariden (Consultant), Zeina Azar
(Operations Officer), Elie Mahfouz (Consultant), Melody Tamer (Consultant), Rabeeya Suhail Arif (Consultant),
and Randy Rizk (Program Assistant). The team received valuable comments and inputs from Reynaldo Pastor
(Chief Counsel), Colleen Gorove-Dreyhaupt (Manager, External Affairs Unit), Norbert Matthias Fiess (Lead Country
Economist), Zoe Trohanis (Lead Disaster Risk Management Specialist), Daria Goldstein (Lead Counsel), Karima Ben
Bih (Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist), John Anderson (Senior Operations Officer), and Zeina El Khalil
(Senior External Affairs Officer).

The sector specialists and experts who have contributed to the DaLA are:

„ Agriculture: Hadi Fathallah (E T Consultant) and Melody Tamer (Consultant)

„ Commerce: Zeina El Khoury (Senior Private Sector Development Specialist) and Patricia Haydamous
(Consultant)

„ Displacement: Angela Elzir Assy (Senior Labor and Social Protection Specialist), Zeina Azar (Operations
Officer), Jeremy Tomlinson (Social Development Specialist), and Mohamad Hussein Mansour (E T Consultant)

„ Education: Adelle Pushparatnam (Senior Education Specialist), Nadine Joseph El Franji (Consultant) and
Cynthia Yammine (Program Assistant)

„ Environment: Lamia Mansour (Senior Environmental Specialist), Linda Khalil (Environmental Specialist) and
Farouk Merhebi (Consultant)

„ Health: Ronald Eduardo Gomez Suarez (Senior Economist, Health) and Farah Asfahani (Health Specialist)

„ Housing: Philipp Petermann (Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist), Narayanan Edadan (Consultant),
Sara Boughedir (Consultant) and Elie Mahfouz (Consultant)

„ Tourism and Hospitality: Zeina El Khoury (Senior Private Sector Development Specialist) and Patricia
Haydamous (Consultant)

„ Macroeconomic impact: Dima Krayem (Senior Economist), Naji Abou Hamde (Analyst) and Ibrahim Jamali
(Consultant)

Finally, the team is thankful for the financial and technical support from the World Bank’s Global Facility for
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR).

3
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
KEY ASSESSMENT FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Damage estimate.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Loss estimate.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Macroeconomic analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Displacement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Social and environmental impact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

SECTORAL ASSESSMENT FINDINGS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Commerce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Education.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Health. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Housing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Tourism and Hospitality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

METHODOLOGY, DATA AND LIMITATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Damage and Loss assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Methodology for the macro-economic impact analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

NEXT STEPS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
ANNEXES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Annex A: Detailed methodological note.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Annex B: Maps and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Evolution of conflict.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Figure 2: Displacement patterns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 3: Agriculture damaged areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Figure 4: Functionality of schools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 5: Environment damage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 6: Damage to hospitals and healthcare facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 7: Functionality of hospitals and healthcare facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 8: Housing damage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

4
 OVERVIEW
This report presents the findings of an interim Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) conducted by
the World Bank to assess the impact of the conflict affecting Lebanon. As of November 7, 2024, the
conflict has reportedly claimed the lives of 3,102 individuals in Lebanon, injured 13,8191 and resulted
in the displacement of over 1.3 million people.2 The DaLA estimates sectoral damage that has
occurred between October 8, 2023, and October 27, 2024 (inclusive), for commerce, health, housing,
and tourism and hospitality, and between October 8, 2023, and September 27, 2024 (inclusive), for
agriculture and environment.3,4 For these sectors, along with education,5 it also estimates sectoral
losses for a period of 12 months based on damage incurred, displacement, and other sector-
specific transmission channels as of these same cut-off dates.6 In addition to the damage and loss
assessment, the report presents a complementary analysis of the impact of the conflict on Lebanon’s
economic growth as measured through its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It also covers an analysis
of key displacement patterns.

The report finds that damage to physical structures alone amounts to at least US$3.4 billion and
estimates that the conflict has caused US$5.1 billion in economic losses as of the assessment cut-off
dates. The final damage and losses due to the conflict are expected to be significantly higher, as the
conflict has continued and additional sectors are increasingly impacted, explained further below. The
conflict is estimated to have cut Lebanon’s real GDP growth for 2024 by at least 6.6 percent, whereas
modest growth had been forecast prior to the conflict. This compounds five years of sustained sharp
economic contraction in Lebanon that has exceeded 34 percent of real GDP, losing the equivalent of
15 years of economic growth.

The DaLA is spatially targeted and covers a minimum of 80 percent of Lebanon’s conflict-affected
areas as of October 27, 2024, spread through six of Lebanon’s nine governorates (Baalbek-Hermel,
Beirut, Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, and South). Where data allow, losses are also assessed
nationwide because the economic impact of the conflict extends beyond the damaged areas.
Annexes detail the geographic scope and methodology for each sector, as well as present maps that
support the assessment.

Damage in agriculture is estimated at US$124 million, with losses over US$1.1 billion, driven by lost
harvest caused by destruction of crops and livestock and displacement of farmers. Commerce
accounts for US$178 million in damage with losses estimated at US$1.7 billion, primarily driven by the
displacement of employees and business owners, supply chain disruptions, and shifts in consumption
towards essential goods. In the education sector, losses are estimated at US$215 million based on
Environment, through
lost private school tuition payments and the costs of temporary schooling.7 Environment
natural resource degradation and the impact on solid waste management, has incurred US$221
million in damage with losses estimated at US$214 million. The health sector has suffered damage
valued at US$74 million, with losses estimated at US$338 million. Housing is the sector with the most
damage, estimated at US$2.8 billion, with over 99,000 housing units partially or fully damaged, and
with sector losses estimated at US$389 million. Tourism and hospitality account for US$18 million
of damage, but have losses estimated at US$1.1 billion, driven by reductions in tourist arrivals and
inbound travel, affecting revenues of hotels, restaurants and other businesses reliant on tourist
spending.

The final cost of damage and losses for Lebanon associated with the conflict is expected to
significantly exceed those presented in this assessment. This assessment only focuses on select
sectors that were initially identified as being the most impacted, while noting that additional
sectors such as electricity, transportation, cultural heritage, municipal services, and water are also
increasingly affected by the continued conflict. In addition, the conflict has continued since the cut-
off dates of this assessment, increasing in intensity and expanding to more districts in the south,
around Beirut, and in northeast Lebanon (see Figure 1 in Annex B). Finally, the assessment relies on
remote data collection sources and analytics, and, as such, can only provide a preliminary estimate
of damage and losses. A comprehensive Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) that assesses
damage and losses in more detail and for a wider range of sectors, as well as prioritizes financing
needs for recovery and reconstruction, will be completed once the situation allows.

5
 KEY ASSESSMENT FINDINGS

DAMAGE ESTIMATE
This assessment estimates that the total damage caused by the conflict as of the assessment’s cut-off dates
is equivalent to US$3.4 billion, largely concentrated in the housing sector which makes up nearly 82 percent of
total damage observed. In terms of geographic distribution, damage is concentrated in the Nabatiyeh and South
governorates, which respectively represent 45 and 38 percent of the total damage in the assessed areas, followed
by Bekaa (12 percent).

Table 1: Summary of damage estimates per sector

Sector Damage (US$ million) 1% 4%

Agriculture $ 124 5%
6% 2% Agriculture
Commerce $ 178
Commerce
Environment $ 221 Environment
Health
Health $ 74
Housing
Housing $ 2,799 Tourism and
Hospitality
Tourism and Hospitality $ 18 82%

Total 8 $ 3,413

Note: Damage to commerce, health, housing, and tourism and hospitality are assessed based on data as of October 27, 2024,
while damage to agriculture and environment are assessed based on data as of September 27, 2024.

Table 2: Geographic distribution of damage estimates9

Governorate Damage (US$ million)

Bekaa - Hermel 10
Baalbek $ 18
193

Beirut & Mount Lebanon

(including the southern $ 144
suburbs of Beirut)
Bekaa $ 415
El Nabatiyeh $ 1,546
South Governorate $ 1,289
11
Total $ 3,413

Source: IPSOS, for the World Bank

6
LOSS ESTIMATE
Losses are estimated at US$5.1 billion for a 12-month period for the assessed sectors, based on damage
incurred, displacement, and other sector-specific transmission channels as of the assessment’s cut-off dates.
These losses are largely concentrated in the commerce and tourism and hospitality sectors, which have been
increasingly impacted as the conflict has expanded, affecting the wider national economy and inbound tourism; as
well as in the agriculture sector, which has been particularly affected in the southern regions of Lebanon. Together,
these three sectors represent an estimated 77 percent of total losses. For most sectors, it is anticipated that losses
will further accumulate beyond this period.

Table 3: Summary of 12-month loss estimates per sector

Sector 12-month losses (US$ million)

Agriculture $ 1,134
10% Agriculture
Commerce $ 1,674 22% 22%
9% 29% Commerce
Education $ 215 Education
5%
Environment $ 214 8% Environment
5%
Health
Health $ 338 7%
Housing
Housing $ 389 4% 33%
4% Tourism and
42%
Tourism and Hospitality $ 1,097 Hospitality

Total 12 $ 5,062

MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
As of mid-September 2024, and taking into account the conflict’s significant escalation, the conflict is estimated
to have cut real GDP growth for 2024 by at least 6.6 percent. The analysis evaluates the conflict’s impact on
the Lebanese economy by examining shocks to consumption and net exports as these serve as the primary
transmission channels for the conflict’s effects to date. With these impacts, real GDP is projected to contract by at
least 5.7 percent in 2024, compared to a counterfactual scenario without conflict in which real GDP growth would
have been 0.9 percent. Widespread displacement and destruction have triggered a substantial decline in private
consumption, which accounted for 134 percent of GDP in 2023, significantly slowing economic activity. Tourism,
a key economic pillar, has been hard hit, with the 2024 escalation likely halting this sector for the year, leading to
major losses in service exports.

These impacts of the conflict represent yet another shock to Lebanon’s already struggling economy, which has
undergone an unprecedented economic crisis that began in 2019 and has seen a contraction of over 34 percent
in real GDP since then, equivalent to 15 years of GDP growth. The conflict compounds the effects of the ongoing
prolonged economic downturn and further undermines Lebanon’s prospects for recovery, which are already
hampered by sovereign default, a systemic banking crisis, limited capital investment, and significantly curtailed
public services.

While the macroeconomic analysis examines the impact of the conflict on the whole economy for 2024, the DaLA
examines sector-level damage and corresponding losses, with impacts that will likely extend over a multi-year
period. For example, in addition to immediate impacts on economic activity, the damage identified in the DaLA
will ultimately affect the physical and human capital across all sectors of the economy, impacting Lebanon’s GDP
growth potential in the medium and long-term. As such, the findings of the macroeconomic assessment are not
directly comparable to the DaLA estimates.

7
DISPLACEMENT
The scale of internal displacement in Lebanon has triggered a humanitarian crisis, which is also exacerbating
fragility and vulnerability. There are over 875,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Lebanon as of November 6,
2024.13 Women, children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, refugees, and certain migrant workers are particularly
at risk.14 Based on the number of IDPs, along with data about labor force participation at origin, employment rates,
and average monthly earnings of employees of US$84.22 (see Annex A for more details), approximately 166,000
individuals are estimated to have lost their employment, which would correspond to a reduction in earnings of up
to US$168 million per year. Displacement increases pressure in host communities on delivery of basic services and
infrastructure, including health, education, water, electricity, and municipal services. Local authorities, which are
still struggling from the ongoing economic crisis that began in 2019, are largely unable to cover these costs and
face significant environmental and public health challenges.

Most IDPs have been displaced from southern Lebanon, as well as from other areas including the districts of
Baabda (which includes the southern suburbs of Beirut), Baalbek, and the Bekaa, to Beirut and its southern
coastal districts, as well as to certain districts in the north and northeast (see Figure 2 in Annex B).15 This
massive displacement, if not effectively managed, may exacerbate pre-existing social tensions between different
communities that could further increase fragility in Lebanon. Additionally, more than 440,000 people are estimated
to have left the Lebanese territory to Syria as of October 25, 2024, of which 312,000 are estimated to be Syrians.16

SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT17

In addition to the sectoral damage and losses, the conflict has broader social and environmental implications
in Lebanon. Prior to recent escalations, Lebanon had already been facing record-high currency depreciation,
with food inflation soaring compared to pre-COVID levels. Monetary poverty had more than tripled over the
past decade, and the ongoing nature of the conflict is expected to push many more people into poverty.18 From
October 8, 2023, to October 25, 2024, 64 percent of the Lebanese population had been directly exposed to conflict.19
In the southern regions of the country, the alleged use of white phosphorus munitions, which has not been
independently verified by the World Bank as part of this assessment,20 could lead to the contamination of crops,
surface and ground water, potentially posing a long-term threat to health, agriculture, and the environment, which
would necessitate extensive remediation efforts.21,22 Additionally, the conflict has exacerbated food insecurity with
only 40,000 tons of wheat available as of November 2024 (1.3 months’ worth of consumption) and increased
shipping costs due to rising insurance premiums. Short-term food security needs for IDPs are increasing and are
estimated at US$131 million per month.23

8
 SECTORAL ASSESSMENT FINDINGS
The following assessment findings consider damage from October 8, 2023, up to the cut-off date for each
sector. Sectoral losses, unless stated otherwise, are estimated for a 12-month period, based on damage incurred,
displacement, and other sector-specific transmission channels as of the same cut-off dates.

AGRICULTURE
Damage to the agriculture sector to its cut-off date of September 27, 2024,
is estimated at US$124 million. 12-month losses are estimated at US$1.1 billion.
„ Pre-conflict situation: The Bekaa, Nabatiyeh and South governorates were prominent agricultural areas
supplying most of the agricultural outputs for local and international markets. The agri-food sector contributed
up to 80 percent of these regions’ GDP.24,25 The South governorate alone was responsible for 64 percent of
the country’s citrus trees,26 94 percent of banana plantations, 15 percent of olive trees and 44 percent of the
country’s tropical fruit trees, including 63 percent of avocado trees.27 Bekaa produced 70 percent of Lebanon’s
grapes, 30 percent of which were used for winemaking.28 Livestock farming, particularly dairy production,
supported around 60 percent of the poorest agricultural households in the South.29 However, the sector had
already been weakened by the 2019 economic crisis, which limited access to finance, exacerbated by poor value
chain integration and inefficient public institutions. With 30 percent of Lebanon’s cooperatives based in the
Nabatiyeh and South governorates, agribusiness was heavily reliant on international aid and NGO support,
which has been diminished by the conflict.30

„ Damage and losses: Damage to the agriculture sector is evaluated at US$124 million. It is estimated that
12-month losses in the agriculture sector amount to US$1.1 billion,31 due to the burning and abandonment of
large areas of agricultural land and livestock, particularly in the southern and Bekaa regions (see Figure 3 in
Annex B), along with lost harvests due to the displacement of farmers from the south. The impact of the conflict
varies across districts, with regions near the southern border suffering the most significant damage and losses.
Crops have suffered US$25 million in damage, which, combined with displacement, results in 12-month losses
of US$601 million. Losses for banana plantations alone are estimated at US$353 million due to both sustained
damage and the inaccessibility of plantations, all of which are located in Tyre and Saida. The disruption of
the olive harvest caused by bombing and displacement is expected to lead to US$58 million in losses with
12 percent of olive groves in the assessed area destroyed. This impact is expected to have further market
implications as the region’s olive oil typically commands a 16 percent premium. Citrus production has also been
hit, with losses amounting to US$16 million. Other crops, such as potatoes and vegetables, are also sustaining
significant losses with 23 percent of the fields in the assessed areas impacted leading to an estimated US$111
million in losses. Further, 19 percent of mixed orchards and fields and 16 percent of tobacco fields have been
impacted by the conflict while 16 percent of vineyards have been destroyed. Livestock has also been severely
affected, with US$99 million in damage and US$533 million in losses, affecting cattle, poultry, sheep, goats,
and other animals. Poultry has experienced the highest losses at US$297 million, followed by cattle at US$154
million. The situation is further exacerbated by disruptions in feed supplies and the abandonment of herds and
flocks due to evacuation, complicating future recovery efforts.

COMMERCE
Damage to the commerce sector to its cut-off date of October 27, 2024,
is estimated at US$178 million. 12-month losses are estimated at US$1.7 billion.
„ Pre-conflict situation: Lebanon’s commerce sector accounted for 33 percent of GDP including around 140,000
formal and informal establishments across trade, professional services, and manufacturing.32 Since 2019, the
sector had been gradually recovering from multiple challenges, including the economic and financial crisis, the
COVID-19 pandemic, and the Beirut port explosion. Lebanon remained a net importing country despite small-
scale growth in agribusiness, chemicals and medicinal production. Access to banking services for businesses
remained a significant challenge and insurance policies typically covered conflict-related damage only when
costly additional premiums are paid.

„ Damage and losses: The commerce sector in Lebanon has been severely impacted by the conflict, with
damage estimated at US$178 million and losses of US$1.7 billion. Approximately 11 percent of establishments

9
 in areas affected by the conflict has been damaged, with the highest costs incurred in the southern districts,
particularly Tyre, Saida, Nabatiyeh, Marjayoun, and Bint Jbeil. An estimated 83 percent of losses are expected
to accrue in conflict-affected areas, with 17 percent occurring in the rest of Lebanon. Losses are mainly driven
by the displacement of both employees and business owners from conflict-affected areas, causing a close-
to-complete cessation of business activity; the disruptions to supply chains to and from conflict districts;
and changes in consumption behavior in non-conflict zones with a concentration on necessary rather than
discretionary spending. The severity of damage in the heavily impacted areas will likely delay the return of the
displaced (employers, employees and consumers). These barriers to return may complicate the reconstruction
of impacted establishments and their contribution to the medium to long-term recovery.

EDUCATION
12-month losses in the education sector are estimated at US$215 million.
„ Pre-conflict situation: The Lebanese education system faced severe challenges even before the current conflict,
including a decline in the qualified teaching force, outdated curriculum, and inefficient processes. The 2018
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) results ranked Lebanon among the lowest, with over two-
thirds of students not achieving basic literacy,33 and Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) results
showed a decline in science scores from 2007 to 2019.34 Public school students experienced significant learning
losses due to disrupted academic years from 2019-2023, receiving only 270 days of in-person teaching instead
of the expected 600 days, leading to long-term economic impacts.35

„ Losses: The conflict has severely impacted the education sector, displacing around 150,000 public and 300,000
private school students in the 2024-25 academic year.36 The start of the 2024-25 academic year for public
schools has been postponed to November 4, 2024, with many schools not functional as of September 27, 2024
especially in the south and east, and many public schools around the country being used as shelters (see Figure
4 in Annex B).37 While the DaLA did not estimate damage due to few reports of damage to school buildings,
total losses were estimated and amount to US$215 million. These losses consider the full 2023-24 academic year
and the first term of the 2024-25 academic year (September-December 2024) and are based on displacement
up until September 27, 2024. Losses due to the additional costs associated with setting up temporary learning
spaces are estimated at US$75 per affected student, totaling US$17 million. Losses associated with reduced
private school revenues driven by the displacement of students are estimated at US$198 million, including
US$18 million for 2023-24 and US$180 million for the first term of 2024-25.38 The estimation of losses based
on lost school revenues due to lack of tuition payments follows standard DaLA methodology to estimate the
immediate loss of economic activity resulting from the conflict. At the same time, the disruptions to education
will also have longer-term impact on human development and the economy due to lost future earnings, the
analysis of which goes beyond the scope of this DaLA.39

ENVIRONMENT
Damage to the environment sector to its cut-off date of September 27, 2024,
is estimated at US$221 million. 12-month losses are estimated at US$214 million.
„ Pre-conflict situation: The impact of the conflict on the environment sector in the assessed areas encompasses
two main aspects: natural resources and municipal solid waste management (SWM). The assessed areas
include extensive forests (around 35 percent of the country’s total forest area), grasslands, rivers, and coastal
ecosystems. All these provide essential ecosystem services, such as preventing soil erosion and protecting
water quality, but are already threatened by urbanization, pollution, and climate change.40 The solid waste
sector already suffered from inefficiencies and financial instability, which were worsened by the 2019 economic
and financial crisis. Only 8 percent of waste is treated with the remainder managed through basic collection
systems and limited sanitary disposal options.41

„ Damage and losses: The estimated damage to the environment sector is US$221 million, with losses of US$214
million, affecting natural resource-based ecosystem services (US$198 million) and SWM provision (US$16
million). The conflict has severely damaged Lebanon’s environment, affecting 13 percent of forests, 16 percent
of grasslands, and 17 percent of riverine ecosystems in the assessed areas. In the South Governorate alone, 14
percent of the coastline has been impacted (see Figure 5 in Annex B for the geographic distribution of damage
to the environment as of September 27, 2024). Solid waste management infrastructure also suffered damage
estimated at US$3.1 million for waste bins and trucks and over US$0.4 million for SWM facilities. Reduced

10
 functionality of ecosystems is expected to lead to disrupted water purification, air quality, and soil fertility.
Such disruptions in natural resource ecosystem services lead to losses that are valued at US$198 million
annually, including US$163 million from riverine ecosystem services, US$28 million from coastland ecosystem
services, US$4 million from forest ecosystem services, and US$4 million from grassland ecosystem services.
Losses in SWM are due to loss of revenues from recycling activities (US$3 million per year) and additional waste
management costs due to displacement (US$13 million per year), which can lead to severe environmental and
public health challenges.

HEALTH
Damage to the health sector to its cut-off date of October 27, 2024,
is estimated at US$74 million. 12-month losses are estimated at US$338 million.
„ Pre-conflict situation: Lebanon’s healthcare system is predominantly private, with 83 percent of hospital beds
in privately-owned facilities and significant out-of-pocket costs leading to disparities in access. Historically,
the sector has faced fragmentation in financing and governance, insufficient coverage, inefficiency. In the
last decade, it has been strained by the influx of Syrian refugees. Compounded challenges, including the 2019
economic and financial crisis, the Port of Beirut explosion, and the COVID-19 pandemic, have severely impacted
service delivery, with a significant increase in households deprived of healthcare and a shortage of healthcare
workers.

„ Damage and losses: Damage to health facilities amounts to US$74 million. The conflict has impacted 66
percent of hospitals and 36 percent of primary healthcare centers in the assessed areas, leaving 31 hospitals and
26 primary healthcare centers damaged, primarily across South and Nabatiyeh governorates in the south and in
the southern suburbs of Beirut (see Figure 6 in Annex B). It is likely that other health clinics, pharmacies, blood
banks, and other types of health facilities have also incurred damage, exacerbating the challenge of providing
medical services. Losses, totaling US$338 million, result from increased costs for additional health treatment
of injuries and sicknesses due to the conflict (US$13 million) and displacement (US$34 million), decreased
revenue from inoperative facilities (US$201 million); and reduced availability of health personnel to provide
proper medical attention, leading to increased mortality and morbidity (US$91 million). Moreover, 36 percent
of hospitals and primary healthcare centers have been rendered partially or fully non-operational reducing
service availability, again primarily across South and Nabatiyeh governorates in the south and in the southern
suburbs of Beirut (see Figure 7 in Annex B). During the reporting period, the World Health Organization’s (WHO)
Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care recorded 55 attacks on healthcare facilities, including 28 attacks
on medical transport vehicles. According to the Ministry of Public Health, 163 fatalities and 272 injuries have
been recorded among health personnel. The disruption in service delivery has increased waiting times, reduced
access to healthcare, and exacerbated health inequities, while overcrowding in shelters is IDPs are heightening
public health risks.

HOUSING
Damage to the housing sector to its cut-off date of October 27, 2024,
is estimated at US$2.8 billion. 12-month losses are estimated at US$389 million.
„ Pre-conflict situation: Lebanon’s housing sector was already in crisis due to the economic downturn that began
in 2019. High inflation, currency devaluation, and soaring building material costs left many private housing
projects incomplete, while government subsidies became unviable due to budget constraints.

„ Damage and losses: The conflict has damaged an estimated 99,209 housing units, impacting over 8 percent
of the housing stock in the assessed areas. Of these damaged units, 18 percent are assessed as completely
destroyed and 82 percent as partly damaged. The total damage is estimated at US$2.8 billion, with apartments
and houses accounting for 91 and 8 percent of this cost, respectively. Economic losses, including rental revenue,
operating revenue, wage income of domestic workers, and property tax revenue, are estimated at US$389
million. Out of the twelve districts covered by the housing sector assessment, those of Tyre, Nabatiyeh, Saida,
Bint Jbeil, and Marjayoun are the most impacted, concentrating 81 percent of the assessed damage and losses
(see the geographic distribution of housing stock damage in Figure 8 in Annex B).

11
 TOURISM AND HOSPITALITY
Damage to the tourism and hospitality sector to its cut-off date of October 27, 2024,
is estimated at US$18 million. 12-month losses are estimated at US$ 1.1 billion.
„ Pre-conflict situation: Tourism and hospitality covers establishments operating as restaurants, cafes, bars,
hotels (and other short-term accommodation), hospitality services, and other tourism-related facilities.42
Tourism has historically been a source of employment and key driver of the Lebanese economy, especially
when accounting for foreign expatriate and Lebanese diaspora spending as tourism revenues. Tourist arrivals
(excluding expatriates) reached 1.46 million in 2022, reflecting a rise of 56.6 percent from 2021. Despite the 24
percent drop in incoming visitors in Q4 2023 in comparison with Q4 2022, the sector still accounted for around
8.6 percent of GDP in 2023; when including expatriate spending, the sector’s contribution to GDP is expected
to be even higher. Employment in the tourism and hospitality sector is estimated to be around 4.4 percent of
total employment43 and accounts for up to 20 percent of the sector’s total input costs.

„ Damage and losses: Damage to the tourism and hospitality sector is estimated at US$18 million, with losses
estimated at US$1.1 billion reflecting the national impact of the conflict on the sector. An estimated 43 percent
of losses are expected to accrue in conflict-affected areas, with 57 percent occurring in the rest of Lebanon.
Losses include US$183 million in lost wages along with other lost economic activity including payments for
rent, consumable inputs, and profits. Losses are mainly due to a drastic drop in tourist arrivals and hotel
occupancy. Multiple evacuation calls and travel advisories led to a 75 percent reduction in airport arrivals
and less than 10 percent hotel occupancy rates in the summer of 2024, as the impact of the conflict spread
from directly affected areas to tourism and hospitality across the whole country. This decline has adversely
impacted activities such as restaurants, retail, and transportation, and job losses are expected to increase. The
small segment of local consumers with spending power has also shrunk as many have fled the country. In the
long term, the resumption of tourism activity may be delayed, possibly complicating post-conflict economic
recovery.

12
 METHODOLOGY, DATA AND LIMITATIONS

DAMAGE AND LOSS ASSESSMENT

The assessment employs the established DaLA methodology developed by the World Bank in collaboration with
the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), and other partners.44 This approach integrates both quantitative
and qualitative data, bringing a sectoral lens to the analysis of impacts to ensure a comprehensive understanding
of the situation. Damage refers to the current costs of replacing damaged and destroyed assets, while losses refer
to the changes in economic flows resulting from the interruption or reduction of production and services due to
the conflict, estimated for a period of twelve months.

The methodology leverages high-resolution and hyperspectral imagery provided by Ipsos, a multinational research
firm with a global network of over 22,000 surveyors in 95 countries and an extensive network of data suppliers. It
also relies on publicly available information from trusted sources, including the UN, to triangulate and improve the
veracity of the data. The use of AI-based machine learning enables rapid processing of this data. Where possible,
findings are corroborated by ground information, enhancing the reliability of the assessment.

Given that the conflict is ongoing with damage already observed beyond the sector cut-off dates for this
assessment, and that losses will likely accumulate over a longer period than the assessment considers, estimates
presented are likely to be conservative. Additional details on methodology, data and limitations are available in
Annex A.

METHODOLOGY FOR THE MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS

The macroeconomic impact analysis presented focuses on 2023 and 2024 and assumes the conflict will persist for
the remainder of 2024. This analysis adopts an expenditures-based approach to assess the losses in the economy’s
two main components: consumption45 and net exports. These channels of impact are examined in detail, in view
of their contribution as key drivers of real GDP growth. The macroeconomic analysis complements the DaLA,
which examines sector-level damage and extends over a longer period. The damage identified in the DaLA will
ultimately affect the capital stock across all sectors of the economy; however, they will not immediately influence
GDP projections for 2024. Instead, they are expected to significantly impact Lebanon’s future GDP potential, with
the effects of fixed capital destruction likely to persist for years to come.

NEXT STEPS

The DaLA findings will contribute to a more comprehensive RDNA to be conducted by the World Bank in
collaboration with the Government of Lebanon, the EU, UN agencies, and other development partners once the
situation allows and the government indicates its readiness to proceed. This RDNA will encompass the entire
country, provide a full assessment for all impacted sectors (including needs), and develop recovery options for all
sectors, culminating in a sequenced and prioritized reconstruction and recovery strategy.

13
Endnotes
1 Numbers reported by the Lebanon Ministry of Public Health on November 7, 2024.
2 Based on the latest IOM/DTM mobility snapshots available, as of November 6, 2024, a total of 875,180 people have been displaced internally
within Lebanon: International Organization for Migration (IOM), Nov 07 2024. DTM Lebanon - Mobility Snapshot - Round 60 - 07-11-2024.
IOM, Lebanon.. External displacement data, reported by UNHCR, only includes the number of people who have crossed the border to Syria
and does not account for external displacement to other destinations. This data reports that 440,000 people have arrived to Syria from
Lebanon as of October 22, 2024: UNHCR Syria Flash Update #18: Response to Displacement from Lebanon to Syria (Reporting period: 24
September - 25 October 2024).
3 Agriculture includes crops and livestock; commerce includes trade, industries and services, but excludes financial services; education
covers losses related to school operating costs and tuition fees; environment includes natural resources, ecosystem services and solid
waste management; health includes hospitals and primary healthcare centers; housing covers the residential housing stock; tourism and
hospitality covers restaurants, hotels, hospitality services, and other tourism-related facilities.
4 The DaLA estimates sectoral damage that has occurred between October 8, 2023, and September 27, 2024 (inclusive) for agriculture and
environment, and October 27, 2024 (inclusive) for commerce, health, housing, and tourism and hospitality. The rationale for the different
cut-off dates is as follows:
„ Agriculture and environment: These sectors were assessed up to September 27, 2024, as the primary damage was largely stabilized by
this date, capturing a full cycle of agricultural activities and environmental impacts over a year.
„ Commerce, health, housing, and tourism and hospitality: the cut-off date for these sectors was extended to October 27, 2024, due
to significant conflict escalation in urban areas after September 27, 2024. This escalation led to increased damage in these sectors,
necessitating an updated assessment to capture the full extent of the impact.
5 Damage to the education sector was not estimated for this interim DaLA since it was considered limited at the time of the data cut-off
date. However, this may change as the conflict is still ongoing. Damage for the education sector will be evaluated as part of the upcoming
RDNA.
6 Sector-specific transmission channels refer to factors such as reduced or absent travel (specific to tourism), use of facilities as shelters (e.g.,
schools), economic disruptions, and supply chain interruptions.
7 Tuition payments represent a direct and quantifiable economic impact on private educational institutions, which rely on these funds for
operational sustainability. The loss of tuition payments reflects a disruption in the education sector’s economic ecosystem, affecting not
only schools but also associated services and employment. While parents might redirect their spending, the specific economic contribution
of the education sector, including its multiplier effects, cannot be fully replaced by other expenditures. This approach to calculating losses
aligns with the DaLA methodology’s objective to capture sector-specific economic disruptions comprehensively.
8 The total damage amount is US$3.413 billion. The table presented does not sum due to rounding at the row level.
9 For the governorate of Baalbek-Hermel, only the environmental and health damage was assessed as damage to other sectors remained
relatively minor until October 27, 2024. The damage number thus does not account for housing, which is expected to be significant due to
conflict escalation in the governorate after the cut-off date of October 27, 2024. This will be evaluated as part of the upcoming RDNA.
10 Damage for the governorate of Beirut amounts to US$1.3 million. Damage for the governorate of Mount Lebanon, which includes the
southern suburbs of Beirut, amounts to US$143 million.
11 The total damage amount is US$3.413 billion. The table presented does not sum due to rounding at the row level.
12 The total losses amount is US$5.062 billion. The table presented does not sum due to rounding at the row level.
13 IOM, Nov 07 2024. DTM Lebanon - Mobility Snapshot - Round 60 - 07-11-2024. IOM, Lebanon.
14 Children are particularly affected by the conflict with 35 percent of IDPs being under 18, and many at risk of disease due to low vaccination
coverage. Women and girls face significant challenges, including lack of privacy in shelters and limited access to reproductive healthcare for
11,600 pregnant women (based on numbers from UNFPA as of October 15, 2024, which may have evolved since then. Source: UNFPA, 2024.
Situation Report #2: UNFPA response to the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, October 23, 2024).
15 As of 30 October 2024, a total of 3,669 IDPs are registered in UNRWA shelters. Source: UNRWA Situation Report #11 on the Lebanon
Emergency Response dated Sunday November 3, 2024. Link: https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-11-
lebanon-emergency-response.
16 UNHCR Syria Flash Update #18, October 25, 2024. Available at https://www.unhcr.org/sy/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2024/10/UNHCR-
FLASH-UPDATE-18_Displacement-from-Lebanon_25-October-2024.pdf.
17 Some information on the social and environmental impact of the conflict included in this report extends beyond the cut-off date for the
assessment, to give a more comprehensive understanding of the ongoing situation.
18 World Bank. (2024). Lebanon Poverty and Equity Assessment: Weathering a Protracted Crisis. Washington DC. © World Bank.
19 Data retrieved from ACLED: https://acleddata.com/conflict-exposure/#calculator.
20 The alleged use of white phosphorus in Lebanon was not independently and scientifically verified by the World Bank as part of this
interim assessment, nor by any other international independent investigator. Media and non-governmental agencies have reported on the
alleged use of white phosphorus in Southern Lebanon, including: (i) Human Rights Watch (see: https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/05/
lebanon-israels-white-phosphorous-use-risks-civilian-harm); (ii) The Washington Post (see: https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/2023/12/11/israel-us-white-phosphorus-lebanon/ ); (iii) and Amnesty International (see: https://www.washingtonpost.
com/investigations/2023/12/11/israel-us-white-phosphorus-lebanon/).
21 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Incendiary weapons. https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/incendiary-
weapons/.
22 Duerksen-Hughes, P., & Richter, P. 1997. Toxicological profile for white phosphorus. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (US),
chapter 5. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK598122/
23 According to the World Food Program (WFP), the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) for a family of five in Lebanon is
approximately US$435 per month. This basket includes essential food items necessary for basic survival. The SMEB is designed to meet the
basic survival food needs of households, particularly in crisis situations. This basket is valued at approximately US$2.90 per person per day.

14
24 FAO, 2024. Lebanon at a Glance. https://www.fao.org/lebanon/our-office/lebanon-at-a-glance/en#:~:text=Agriculture%20plays%20
an%20important%20role,to%2013%20percent%20in%202020.
25 UNDP, 2023. Gaza war: preliminary findings on the socio-economic and environmental impact on Lebanon. December 2024. https://www.
undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-12/gaza_war_preliminary_findings_on_the_socio-economic_and_environmental_impact_on_
lebanon.pdf.
26 US$16.25 million out of US$22.5 million in total. Jalkh, Jeanine, 2024. Lebanon’s Economy, Another Victim of Hezbollah-Israel War. L’Orient
Today, 26 Mar. 2024. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1408350/lebanons-economy-another-victim-of-hezbollah-israel-war.html.
27 Ministry of Agriculture, 2010. ‫ اإلحصاء الزراعي الشامل لعام‬- ‫وزارة الزراعة‬. http://www.agriculture.gov.lb/Statistics-and-Studies/Comprehensive-
Agricultural-Statistics/statistics-2010.
28 Ibid.
29 Abdallah, C., Der Sarkissian, R., Termos, S., Darwich, T. & Faour, G., 2018. Agricultural risk assessment for Lebanon to facilitate contingency
& DRR/CCA planning by the Ministry of Agriculture. Beirut, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
30 International Labour Organization (ILO), 2018. The Cooperative Sector in Lebanon: What Role? What Future? / International Labour
Organization, Regional Office for Arab States. ILO: Beirut. https://researchrepository.ilo.org/esploro/outputs/report/The-cooperative-
sector-in-Lebanon-what/995219323902676.
31 Full recovery in the agriculture sector will take up to three years. As such, losses are likely to accumulate beyond the 12-month period used
for this assessment.
32 At current price, Lebanon National Accounts 2004–2021, CAS. Sub-sectors included: food and beverage, light manufacturing, heavy
manufacturing, repair (vehicles), wholesale and retail trade, services.
33 World Bank Group. 2018. Lebanon PISA 2018. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/435071580399593024-0280022020/original/
LEBANONPISABrief2018.pdf.
34 Gajderowicz,Tomasz Janusz; Jakubowski,Maciej Jan. Lessons from TIMSS 2019 to Improve Education in Lebanon (English). Washington, D.C. : World
Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099052423032013756/P1758141dbe28a4d16482140a218488143ec88da5ec3
35 Pushparatnam, A., Kheyfets, I., El-Ghali, H., & El Franji, N. (2023). Another Lost Year: Estimating the Educational and Economic Costs
of Lebanon’s Public-School Closures in 2022-23. World Bank. https://documents.worldbank.org/pt/publication/documents-reports/
documentdetail/099092623073542135/p1758140ac57150b0aeb70e40d19f082b5.
36 As reported by the Ministry of Education & Higher Education (MEHE).
37 According to latest available data from the MEHE and UNICEF, as of October 31, 2024, a total of 506 public schools have been repurposed
as collective shelters for IDPs. This assessment only accounts for 421 public schools as shelters, as of September 27, 2024 (cut-off date for
data collection for the education sector).
38 It is assumed that 40 percent of all displaced private school students withdraw from private schools, and 60 percent of them will continue
to stay enrolled and pay tuition despite being displaced. For the 2023-24 academic year, it is assumed that affected schools lost a full year
of tuition fees for the 40 percent displaced students, and for the 2024-25 academic year, losses include tuition fees for the first term (3
months). If the conflict continues, affected private schools stand to lose a similar amount for each of the next two terms of the 2024-25
academic year (January-June 2025).
39 Initial analysis based on approaches developed over recent years in Lebanon indicates a further potential long-term impact on the
economy as a result of lost earnings accruing at an estimated net present value of at least US$3.3 million per day. Based on this analysis,
if the conflict continues throughout the 2024-25 academic year, total reductions of future earnings could exceed US$496 million. See for
example: Pushparatnam, A., Kheyfets, I., El-Ghali, H., & El Franji, N. (2023). Another Lost Year: Estimating the Educational and Economic Costs
of Lebanon’s Public-School Closures in 2022-23. World Bank.
40 Ministry of Environment (MoE)/UNDP. 2022. Calculating the Quarrying Sector’s Dues to the National Treasury in Lebanon. Beirut. https://
www.undp.org/lebanon/publications/calculating-quarrying-sectors-dues-national-treasury-lebanon.
41 MoE/World Bank, 2023. Lebanon Solid Waste Roadmap 2023–2026: Towards an Integrated Solid Waste Management System. Lebanon.
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099112023054014380/pdf/P179435059e4c00080bd5a091bc0270002d.pdf.
42 At current price, Lebanon National Accounts 2004–2021, Central Administration of Statistics (CAS).
43 Labor Force Survey 2018–2019, CAS.
44 For further information on the methodology, please refer to the guidance notes available at: https://www.gfdrr.org/en/damage-loss-and-
needs-assessment-tools-and-methodology.
45 Consumption alone accounts for more than 100 percent of GDP.

15
 ANNEXES

ANNEX A: DETAILED METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

1. Assessment Summary

Macroeconomic Impact Damage Losses

Purpose Estimate overall impact of Quantify the physical damage induced Estimate economic losses,
the conflict on 2024 GDP by the conflict based on pre conflict including reductions in
dollar value revenues

Geographic National Conflict-affected areas in Lebanon Conflict-affected areas plus

Scope indirect impact nationwide

Sector Scope Whole Economy Agriculture, commerce, environment, Agriculture, commerce,

health, housing, tourism and education, environment,
hospitality health, housing, tourism
and hospitality

Time Period 2024 (projected) Agriculture and environment: October 12-month losses
8, 2023 – September 27, 2024;
Commerce, health, housing, and
tourism and hospitality: October 8,
2023 – October 27, 2024

Approach Expenditure based Identification (remote sensing, field Assumption-based

econometric modelling of reports) and quantification of partially sectoral losses based on
shocks to consumption and and fully damaged assets damage and displacement
net exports (specifically data as well as sector-
tourism revenues) specific transmission
channels

Unit of Percent GDP Monetary value (USD, pre-conflict prices)

Results

Key Data Central Administration of Satellite imagery; Synthetic Aperture Damage data, sectoral
Sources Statistics, Nighttime Lights Radar (SAR); Key informers’ interviews data, displacement data
Data, World Bank Datalab, (KII); Hyperspectral imagery; Artificial
World Bank macro modelling. intelligence and algorithms.

2. Sector-specific Geographic Scope for Damage Assessment

„ Agriculture: all districts in the Governorates of Bekaa, Nabatiyeh and South.

„ Commerce: Greater Beirut (Beirut Governorate and Baabda District in Mount Lebanon Governorate), South,
Nabatiyeh and Bekaa Governorates.

„ Health: all districts in the Governorates of Beirut, Bekaa, Nabatiyeh, South and Baalbek-Hermel; districts of Aley
and Baabda in Mount Lebanon Governorate.

„ Environment: for the Green and the Brown Environment, the Governorates of Beqaa, Nabatiyeh, and South. For
the Brown Environment, the districts of Baalbek and Hermel in Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, and the districts
of Aley and Baabda in Mount Lebanon Governorate.

„ Housing: Greater Beirut (Beirut Governorate and Baabda District in Mount Lebanon Governorate), South,
Nabatiyeh and Bekaa Governorates.

„ Tourism and hospitality: Greater Beirut (Beirut Governorate and Baabda District in Mount Lebanon
Governorate), South, Nabatiyeh and Bekaa Governorates.

16
3. General DaLA Methodological Approach
The assessment is based on the Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) methodology, jointly developed by the EU,
the UN and the World Bank (WB), which has been successfully applied in numerous countries.i It differs from a
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), as the DaLA doesn’t include the needs and costs associated with the
restoration of service delivery and recovery and reconstruction across a broader array of sectors.

This rapidly and primarily remotely conducted Interim DaLA for Lebanon provides preliminary estimates of: i)
damage to physical assets, estimated as the replacement value of completely destroyed or partially damaged
physical assets; and ii) economic losses, estimated as changes in economic flows that result from the interruption
or reduction of production and services due to the conflict. More specifically:

Baseline. The baseline consists of the pre-conflict situation in terms of number and geographical distribution of
assets, as well as their economic values (pre-conflict replacement cost of the asset).

Damage. The damage estimates are calculated based on: (i) the pre-conflict replacement cost per asset category;
(ii) the number of assets damaged in each category assessed within the sector; and (iii) the physical status of
the assets (partially damaged or completely destroyed). As a general assumption in line with standard DaLA
methodology, completely destroyed assets were costed at 100 percent of the replacement cost; partially damaged
assets, at 40 percent.

Losses. Estimating losses entails capturing the effects of the conflict beyond the immediate damage and
destruction of physical assets. This can include lost income, increased operational costs, and reduced productivity.
Given that the conflict is still ongoing, losses were estimated for a period of 12 months based on damage incurred,
displacement patterns and other sector-specific transmission channels, as of the cut-off date for each sector.
Sector-specific transmission channels refer to factors such as reduced or absent travel (specific to tourism), use
of facilities as shelters (such as schools), economic disruptions, and supply chain interruptions, all contributing to
sectoral losses. However, it is likely that losses will continue to accumulate beyond this period, depending on the
continuation of the conflict, the speed of sectoral recovery, and sector-specific criteria.

4. Data Sources and Analysis

The assessment predominantly relied on remotely collected data, using triangulation of sources to strengthen
the veracity and accuracy of the estimates. Data was provided to a large extend by Ipsos, a multinational research
firm.ii The following type of data sources were used:

„ High-resolution optical imagery: at 30-50cm, from Airbus and Planet Labs, with pre-conflict imagery taken as
closely as possible prior to the onset of conflict and recent imagery acquired by October 27, 2024 (commerce,
health, housing, and trade and hospitality) and by September 27, 2024 (agriculture and environment). Both
pre-conflict and recent snapshots were used to provide accurate estimate of sectoral baselines and damage.

„ Hyperspectral imagery: that captures images across a wide range of wavelengths in the electromagnetic
spectrum, allowing to distinguish between different materials or objects based on their unique spectral
signatures. It informed the assessments of the environmental and agriculture damage. This imagery was
obtained from Wyvern Space, which provides imagery at 5m resolution and 26 bands from a satellite considered
the world’s highest resolution hyperspectral satellite.

„ Synthetic aperture radar to capture areas not covered by high resolution optical imagery.

„ Artificial intelligence and algorithms, refined via manual review: This was used for object detection and for
activity detection to integrate data from multiple sources to achieve highest level of accuracy possible. Object
detection algorithms include YOLO V8 and Segment Anything Mode and its models for activity detection focus
on proprietary models built on top of spatial-temporal graph neural, spectral analysis techniques, including
common techniques such as Normalized Difference Vegetation Index, Normalized Difference Snow Index,
spectral unmixing and isolation forest for anomaly detection, among others. Automated results were further
refined via manual review of trained imagery analysts.

„ Key Informer Interviews (KIIs) were conducted with about 50 people who collected their own damage
assessment information, and sectoral experts.

„ Anonymized cell phone data: Anonymized mobile phone data compliant with the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) has been used across Lebanon for the assessment on displacement

17
„ Publicly available information (PAI), including social media analytics, available datasets (e.g.: census data,
national accounts, etc.) and news reporting.

„ (Limited) Partner data collection, including from government (when data was already available) and
development partners (in particular from United Nations agencies).

„ Proxy indicators: from other similar countries and/or similar assessments (e.g.: Beirut RDNA, 2020).

Each sector proceeded with the following assumptions and data sources for the sectoral analysis of baseline,
damage, and losses:

Assessment
item Approach and assumptions Data sources

Agriculture (includes crops and livestock)

Baseline Identification of main cropland and geographical distribution, per PAI (Census), Partner’s
type of crops; Identification of the type of livestock; Determination data (FAO, ILO, Ministry of
of average unit size of assets (harvest quantities per ha, average Agriculture), KIIs, literature
livestock production per head), and replacement costs. review.

Damage Damage consists of the value of replacement costs of crops, trees, Normalized Burn Ratio
and livestock. Damage to cropland was established through the derived from LandSat 8
percentage of agriculture areas burned; Damage to livestock was satellite imagery and Wyvern
established through extrapolation and data triangulation. Hyperspectral Imagery, KIIs

Losses Losses encompass the market price in Lebanon of crop harvest KIIs, literature review.
and livestock revenues. For fruit orchards, average yield per hectare
and farmgate price per kilo for apricot and avocado orchards were
used. Mixed orchards average yield and farmgate price include
those of tomatoes, zucchini, avocado, and apricot. Potato and
vegetable yields and prices were averaged, while yields for bananas,
citrus, tobacco, vineyards, wheat, and barley were obtained
through KIIs. Olive yields and prices were averaged between
those for consumption and oil production. Livestock revenues
consist of the value of meat as the single unit price, and animal-
specific byproducts like milk, eggs, tallow, and wool. Production
assumptions were made for chicken, cattle, goats, and sheep based
on KIIs.

Commerce (commercial trade, professional services, and manufacturing/ industry; excludes financial services)
Tourism & Hospitality (restaurants, hotels, hospitality services, and other tourism-related facilities)

Baseline Population growth projection on the commerce/tourism Establishment Census of

establishment census of 2004, as it is the only and most recent 2004 (Lebanese Central
source providing a distribution of commerce establishments Administration of Statistics)
nation-wide over the concerned economic activities.

Damage The team used the geographic distribution of housing damage Proxy Data
at subdistrict level as a proxy to estimate damage to commerce/
tourism establishments in conflict-affected areas.

18
Assessment
item Approach and assumptions Data sources

Losses The loss estimates for the commerce as well as tourism Establishment Census of
and hospitality sectors utilize two key data sources: (i) the 2004 (Lebanese Central
2004 establishment census that contains the distribution of Administration of Statistics)
establishments by economic activity and by district – a growth 2020 National Accounts
factor relative to population growth was applied to obtain an Proxy Data
approximation of the 2023 distribution, and (ii) the national KIIs
accounts, which provides the value added of economic activity
– the data was based on past trends and team estimates
of the market progression. Due to lack of data on size and
production capacity of establishments, the team assumed that all
establishments in all districts produce equal outputs.
Districts were divided into direct high impact areas; direct
moderate impact (districts adjacent to high impact areas that
have seen moderate levels of conflict incidents); and indirect
impact zones (without direct conflict incidents) with assumptions
developed relevant to each zone and asset type. A time variable
was also integrated across districts to account for the geographic
escalations of the conflict.iii These percentages were then applied
to the GDP estimates (of each establishment) to obtain proxies on
output losses and estimated wage losses.

Displacement

Displacement ƒ Displacement tracking data is indicative in light of the ƒ IOM, Oct 10 2024. DTM
tracking and emergency situation and the informal nature of displacement. Lebanon - Mobility Snapshot
analysis IDP is defined as per the definition of the IOM DTM. - Round 52 - 10-10-2024. IOM,
ƒ Emergency needs for this assessment include basic needs as Lebanon.
defined in the Poverty and Equity Assessment (excluding shelter ƒ International Organization
and education) based on the updated poverty line. for Migration (IOM), Nov 07
ƒ Assumption that all IDPs in collective shelters need assistance 2024. DTM Lebanon - Mobility
and at least 50 percent of IDPs outside collective shelters need Snapshot - Round 60 - 07-11-
assistance. 2024. IOM, Lebanon..
ƒ Assumption that women, children, the elderly, persons with ƒ UNHCR Syria Flash
disabilities, refugees and some migrant workers are particularly Update #18: Response to
vulnerable. Displacement from Lebanon
to Syria (Reporting period:
24 September - 25 October
2024).
ƒ World Bank. 2024. “Lebanon
Poverty and Equity
Assessment 2024: Weathering
a Protracted Crisis.
ƒ IPSOS displacement data
extrapolated based on
anonymized GDPR-compliant
cellphone data across
Lebanon.

19
 Assessment
item Approach and assumptions Data sources

Employment Based on IOM’s estimated number of IDPs and their demographics, IDPs numbers from IOM’s
Losses the size of the working age population (WAP) amongst them (aged Mobility Snapshot Round 60;
19+) was estimated. Based on their place of origin, corresponding LFPR, UR and average earnings
labor force participation rates (LFPRs) and Unemployment Rates from CAS 2022 follow up to the
(URs) were applied to reach to an estimated size of the employed LFS
amongst IDPs pre-conflict. It is important to note the following
assumptions (A) made and notes (N) to keep in mind: (i) A1: IDPs
have the same LFPR and UR than the WAP in the places of origin;
(ii) A2: all those in the labor force have lost their employment;
(iii) A3: applying the same demographic share by age category
for all places of origin (which might not be the case, for e.g.,
more women/children might be IDPs than other regions); (iv) N1:
estimated LFPR cover 15+ age group while the WAP is calculated
for 19+ based on data available from IOM; (vi) N2: it does not
take into account the impact of employment from the reduced
economic activities in ‘safer’ areas; (vii) N3: as per CAS’ 2022 follow
up to the labor force survey, the average monthly earnings of
employees was 2,300,000 LBP, applying the World Bank estimate
of the exchange rate average in 2022 of 27,309 LBP/US$ leads to an
average monthly earnings equivalent to US$84.22.

Education

Baseline Lebanon ranking in 2018 PISA results, Lebanon results in TIMSS, World Bank: Lebanon PISA 2018
QITABI 2 literacy and numeracy (evolution of Student Performance QITABI 2 literacy and numeracy
in Primary Public schools in Lebanon), World Bank 2022-2023 baseline report (USAID)
simulated learning outcomes. Another lost year: Estimating
the educational and economic
costs of Lebanon’s public-
school closures in 2022-23
(World Bank)

Damage Damage to schools was not calculated in the DaLA as it was N/A
minimal as of September 27, 2024.

Losses Time Frame: Losses are calculated for the full 2023-24 academic Calculated based on Beirut
year and the first term of the 2024-25 academic year (September- RDNA methodology, with
December 2024), based on displacement up until September 27, triangulation from IPSOS data.
2024.
Another lost year: estimating
Temporary Learning Spaces: Additional costs associated with setting the Educational and Economic
up temporary learning spaces are estimated at US$ 75 per affected Costs of Lebanon’s Public
student. School Closures in 2022 – 23
(World Bank)
Private School Revenues: Losses in private school revenues are
estimated based on the assumption that 40 percent of displaced
students will withdraw from private schools (primary and
secondary), assuming 40 percent of all displaced private school
students withdraw from private schools, while 60 percent continue
to stay enrolled and pay tuition despite being displaced. However,
this estimate likely underestimates the total revenue loss, as it does
not account for lost fees from private TVET centers and private
universities.

Tuition Fees: For the 2023-24 academic year, it is assumed that

affected schools lost a full year of tuition fees for the 40 percent
of displaced students. For the 2024-25 academic year, losses are
calculated for the first term (3 months, September-December 2024)
of schooling, as private school tuition fees are paid termly. If the
conflict continues, affected private schools are expected to lose
a similar amount for each of the next two terms of the 2024-25
academic year (January-June 2025).

20
Assessment
item Approach and assumptions Data sources

Environment (includes natural resources or the “Green environment”, and solid waste or the “Brown environment”)

Baseline The areas for riverine ecosystem are estimated based on a width of Hyper-Spectral Satellite
100m (50m from each side of the stream). Imagery
The areas for coastline ecosystem are estimated based on a width Partner ‘s data
of 1 km. Proxy Data
The assessment of the number of waste collection bins and trucks Government and World Bank
in each district was made using assumptions based on the number dataiv
of inhabitants and the quantity of waste generated. The estimates
were based on an assumed collection frequency of 3-4 days per
week and a filling rate of bins up to 80 percent of their volumes.
For simplification in the absence of relevant data, all trucks were
assumed to have a 6 tons capacity while bin volumes are 240
liters, which is in line with the recent assessment and roadmap
conducted jointly by the Ministry of Environment and the World
Bank.
Trucks vary in size from open tipper pick-up truck (5-6 m3) to
compactor vehicles (6 tons or 10 tons). Sorting and composting
facilities vary in capacity from 1 ton per day to 25 ton per day (in
Khiam) and depending on technology used.

Damage Damage to Green Environment assets was established through Normalized Burn Ratio derived
the percentage of Environment Areas burned. It is assumed from LandSat 8 satellite
that 40 percent of waste collection bins and trucks across the imagery, Wyvern Multi-spectral
affected districts have suffered some level of damage, which was Satellite Imagery, KIIs
corroborated through ground verification conducted with local
authorities from the affected area. In Baabda district, damage to
bins was assumed to be 60 percent while on trucks it was assumed
to be 10 percent. Damage to sorting and composting facilities
were estimated based on the capacity of the facilities (from 1 ton
per day to 25 ton per day) and the technology used.

Losses Losses from the Green Environment encompass losses from Literature review
ecosystem services provided by the different Green Environment Proxy Data
assets (forest, grassland, riverine ecosystems, wetland and WB and Ministry of
coastline). Environment, 2023. Solid
Losses from the Brown Environment include the loss of Waste Management
revenues from waste recycling and the additional cost for Roadmap. https://documents1.
waste management generated by displaced populations in host worldbank.org/curated/
communities. en/099112023054014380/pdf/
P179435059e4c00080
bd5a091bc0270002d.pdf
IOM DTM Displacement
tracking Matrix Round 52 dated
October 10, 2024.

21
 Assessment
item Approach and assumptions Data sources

Health (includes hospitals and primary healthcare centers)

Baseline 47 Hospitals (public and private) and 72 Primary Healthcare Centers MoPH data
were providing health services in the affected areas prior to the
conflict

Damage Asset-based damage assessment of facilities included in baseline. A Field Based Data, MoPH data,
field study for a sample of them took place through direct contact satellite imagery
with administrators at each of the facilities.

Losses Losses were assessed through a field survey led on the ground Literature review, MoPH data,
and by phone for a sample of facilities, complemented by data proxy data, 2020 Beirut RDNA
provided by the Ministry of Health. They include:
(i) Additional costs due to increased utilization of health
resources for treatment of injuries and sicknesses resulting
from conflict and displacement;
(ii) loss due to decreased revenue in health facilities rendered
inoperable, calculated based on functionality data and average
health facility revenue;
(iii) loss due to reduced availability of Human Resources for
Health in affected areas calculated based on number of health
personnel killed and injured.

Housing (includes residential properties for rent or ownership)

Baseline Central Administration of

Inventory ratios were applied to the housing stock for each district. Statistics, Global Urban
Unit costs were estimated based on KIIs and PAI; these are likely Heights Footprint, KII, PAI,
to be conservative estimates. The following housing typology building footprint baseline was
was used: House, Villa, Apartment Building, Informal. Apartment collected from the Microsoft
buildings were assumed to have 16 housing units in Mount Machine Learning building and
Lebanon (Baabda district – Southern Beirut), 8 for Beirut and 3.01 from Open Street Map building
for all other administrative areas covered, to reflect variable urban databases and intersected with
density. the areas of interest admin
areas.

Damage Damage was assessed by initially running SAR analysis across the SAR, Very High-Resolution
entire area of concern. This was followed by a manual review of Satellite Imagery (30cm) and
high-resolution satellite imagery for approximately 10.5% of the KIIs
grid cells, including sensitive areas such as Beirut, Mount Lebanon,
and Tyre. The assessment was further refined by cross-referencing
incidents from the ACLED and WNEP databases, excluding outlier
districts with no recorded incidents.
Damage costs were estimated based on physical status (partial
damage or complete destruction) and the replacement value of
the asset class (unit cost). The replacement values only include
construction costs; they don’t cover any land value and profit
margins and can therefore not be compared with advertised real
estate values.

Losses Losses included the rental revenue generated by the residential Field Based Data, Literature
properties (applying an 18.4 percentage of housing under rent), Review
operating and maintenance revenue generated by the housing
wraparound services providers, the wage income receivable to
the domestic workers and housekeeping staff employed by the
families, and the property tax.

22
5. Average unit sizes and unit costs
The following average unit sizes and unit costs were used in this assessment. These were obtained through data
triangulation from different sources, including PAI, information shared by government and development partners,
a private construction company in Lebanon, the Lebanese Order of Engineers and Architects (OEA), and proxy data
from other assessments conducted in countries with similar geographic and socio-economic contexts.

Unit of Unit Cost

Asset Unit Size Measurement (US$) Sources

Agriculture

Banana Plantations (Plants) N/A ha $1,941 KIIs, Team Estimate

Banana Plantations (Harvest) 10,000 Kg/ha Kg $0.7 KIIs

Citrus Orchard (Plants) N/A ha $1,000 KIIs, Team Estimate

Citrus Orchard (Harvest) 27,400 Kg/ha Kg $0.7 KIIs

Fruit Orchard (Plants) N/A ha $2,250 KIIs

Fruit Orchard (Harvest) 35,000 Kg/ha Kg $1.4 KIIs

Mixed Orchards and Fields (Plants) N/A ha $2,475 KIIs

Mixed Orchards and Fields (Harvest) 50,000 Kg/ha Kg $0.9 KIIS

Olive Groves (Plants) N/A ha $3,400 KIIs, Team Estimates

Olive Groves (Harvest) 650 Kg/ha Kg $4 KIIs

Potatoes and Vegetables

N/A ha $2,700 KIIs, Team Estimates
(Seeds)

Potatoes and Vegetables

55,000 Kg/ha Kg $0.5 KIIs, Team Estimates
(Harvest)

Tobacco (Plants) N/A ha $4,300 KIIs

Tobacco (Harvest) 1,000 Kg/ha Kg $10 KIIs

Vineyard (Plants) N/A ha $3,823 KIIs

Vineyard (Harvest) 5,000 Kg/ha Kg $1.2 KIIs

Wheat and Barley (Seeds) N/A ha $1,606 KIIs, Team Estimate

Wheat and Barley (Harvest) 3,500 Kg/ha Kg $0.26 KIIs, Team Estimate

Chicken (Animal) N/A Head $10 KIIs

300 eggs/
Chicken (Eggs) Egg $0.2 KIIs
year

Cattle (Animal) N/A Head $1,000 KIIs

Cattle (Milk) 10,000 L/year L $1 KIIs

Ducks (Animal) N/A Head $20 KIIs

23
 Unit of Unit Cost
Asset Unit Size Measurement (US$) Sources

Ducks (For consumption) N/A Head $30 KIIs

Goats (Animal) N/A Head $100 KIIs

Goats (Milk) 575 L/year L $1 KIIs

Horses (Animal) N/A Head $3,000 Team Estimate

Pigs (Animal) N/A Head $300 Team Estimate

Sheep (Animal) N/A Head $300 KIIs

Sheep (Milk) 300 L/year L $1 KIIs

Commerce

Industry

Food and Beverage 293.6 m2 $1,200 KIIs

Light Manufacturing 532.9 m2 $1,100 KIIs

Heavy Manufacturer 462.2 m2 $1,450 KIIs

Repair (Vehicles and Motorbikes) 333.6 m2 $900 KIIs

Commercial Trade

Retail 387.5 m2 $750 KIIs, team estimates

Wholesale 454 m2 m2 $1,150 KIIs, team estimates

Trade Logistics 500 m2 m2 $700 KIIs, team estimates

Services 250 m2 $750 KIIS, team estimates

Education

Team estimates based

on Minister’s decision
(prior to the conflict)
to ask parents to
Additional cost for temporary learning contribute $50 per
N/A student $75
spaces first shift (Lebanese)
and $100 per second
shift (non-Lebanese)
student towards school
operating costs.

Lost Private School Fees N/A Academic year $4,500 Team estimates

24
 Unit of Unit Cost
Asset Unit Size Measurement (US$) Sources

Environment

Proxy (Gaza RDNA/

Damage to Riverine zone N/A ha $33,000
wetland

WB, Cost of
Loss of Riverine Ecosystem services (per Environmental
N/A ha $2,513
month) Degradation in Lebanon
for 2023

Proxy (Previous Gaza &

Damage to Forest including shrubland N/A ha $2,390
Libya RDNAs)

WB, Cost of
Loss of Forest ecosystem services (per Environmental
N/A ha $123
month) Degradation in Lebanon
for 2023

Damage to Wetland N/A ha $33,000 Proxy (Gaza RDNA)

Proxy (Previous Gaza &

Loss of Wetland ecosystem (per month) N/A ha $1,183
Libya RDNAs)

Damage to Coastline N/A ha $80,000 Proxy (Gaza RDNA)

Loss of Coastline ecosystem services (per Proxy (Previous Gaza &

N/A ha $6,158
month) Libya RDNAs)

WB, Cost of
Loss of Grassland ecosystem services (per Environmental
N/A ha $18.42
month) Degradation in Lebanon
for 2023

Collection Trucks 6 tons Unit $35,000 Team estimates

Collection Trucks 10 tons Unit $60,000 Team estimates

Waste Bins 240 L Unit $50 Team estimates

Waste Bins 1100 L Unit $300 Team estimates

12 tons per
Treatment Facility Unit $350,000 Team estimates
day

25
 Unit of Unit Cost
Asset Unit Size Measurement (US$) Sources

Health

Proxy (Port of Beirut

Hospital 1,224 m2 $1,800
explosion RDNA)

Proxy (Port of Beirut

Primary Health Care Center 253 m2 $900
explosion RDNA)

Breakdown of severity of injuries 45% minor,

30% moderate,
17% critical
requiring
surgery,
4% severe
requiring
Team estimates based
intensive care
N/A N/A on MoPH severity
without surgery,
categories
2% severe
requiring one
surgery and
2% severe
requiring
multiple
surgeries

Average cost of treatment for injuries $50 minor,

$250 moderate,
$1,200 critical
requiring
surgery,
$1,200 severe
requiring
intensive care
N/A N/A MoPH tariffs
without surgery,
$2,400 severe
requiring one
surgery and
$3,600 severe
requiring
multiple
surgeries

Average revenue per hospital bed per day $1,875 Team estimates based
N/A N/A on proxy (Port of Beirut
RDNA)

Average revenue per Primary Health Care $1,250 Team estimates based
Center per day N/A N/A on proxy (Port of Beirut
RDNA)

Average duration required before Team estimates based

damaged health facility is rendered N/A N/A 90 days on proxy (Port of Beirut
operable RDNA)

26
 Unit of Unit Cost
Asset Unit Size Measurement (US$) Sources

Housing

House (replacement cost, just

170 m2 m2 $400 OEAv
construction)

Villa (replacement cost, just

280 m2 m2 $600 OEA, team estimates
construction)

Apartment (unit) (replacement cost, just

120 m2 m2 $450 OEA, team estimates
construction) - other districts

Informal (replacement cost, just

60 m2 m2 $300 Team Estimates
construction)

House (Monthly Rent) N/A Unit $300 KII, Team estimates

Luxury Villa (Monthly Rent) N/A Unit $800 KII, Team estimates

Apartment (unit) (Monthly Rent) N/A Unit $200 KII, Team estimates

Informal (Monthly Rent) N/A Unit N/A KII, Team estimates

House (Monthly Maintenance) N/A Unit $100 KII, Team estimates

Villa (Monthly Maintenance) N/A Unit $200 KII, Team estimates

Apartment (unit) (Monthly Maintenance) N/A Unit $50 KII, Team estimates

Informal (Monthly Maintenance) N/A Unit 0 KII, Team estimates

Property Tax (per property value) N/A $ 0.65% OEA

House (Employed persons monthly wage) 1 Unit $200 Team estimates

Villa (Employed persons monthly wage) 3 Unit $400 Team estimates

Apartment (unit) (Employed persons

1 Unit $200 Team estimates
monthly wage)

Tourism & Hospitality

Restaurants and cafes 250 m2 $1,100 KIIs, team estimates

Hotels 550 m2 $1350 KIIs, team estimates

Other tourism-related facilities and KIIs, team estimates

400 m2 $950
hospitality services

27
6. Limitations
Limited sectoral scope. The assessment focuses on seven key sectors. This limitation inherently means that the
analysis does not encompass the full spectrum of the country’s economic, social, and infrastructural landscape.

Limited spatial scope. The damage assessment covers a minimum of 80 percent of conflict-affected areas in six
out of Lebanon’s nine governorates (Baalbek-Hermel, Beirut, Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, and South), which
are the most-affected governorates as of the cut-off dates for this assessment. This limitation means that not all
conflict incidents and related impacts have been captured.

Remote nature of the assessment. Given the security challenges and logistical constraints linked to the conflict,
the assessment has been conducted primarily through remote means. This reliance on remote data collection
methods increases the risk of inaccuracy in the assessment. For these reasons, the findings should be interpreted
as preliminary estimates.

Snapshot character. The assessment covers the estimated impact of the ongoing conflict taking place in Lebanon
between October 8, 2023, and October 27, 2024, for commerce, health, housing, tourism and hospitality and
September 27, 2024, for agriculture and environment, and estimates losses for a period of 12 months only. With
the conflict still ongoing at the time of publication of this assessment, it is likely that both damage and losses will
further accumulate. In addition, the type of losses that have been assessed usually last longer than one year (e.g.
they can go up to 10 years for some sectors such as the environment).

No coverage of recovery and reconstruction needs. The current assessment is inherently backward-looking,
focusing on estimating the damage that has already occurred and losses for a one-year time inferred from the
damage and conflict-related displacement. Contrary to a full-fledged RDNA or PDNA, it does not identify forward-
looking recovery and reconstruction needs, which are critical for recovery planning.

28
Annex A endnotes
i For example: Gaza (2021 and March 2024), Libya Floods (February 2024), Syria Earthquake (2023), Ukraine (2022), Pakistan Floods (2022),
Beirut (2020).
ii Ipsos is a multinational research firm with a global network of over 22,000 surveyors in 95 countries and an extensive network of data
suppliers. Ipsos has extensive experience in damage data collection, having undertaken multiple projects on this topic for the WB.
iii
Direct high impact area Direct moderate impact area Indirect impact area
High conflict Manufacturing - light 95% 70% 10%
intensity and heavy
(October - Wholesale and retail 95% 60% 20%
December 2023 Tourism and hospitality 100% 85% 75%
& July - October Services 90% 50% 5%
2024)
Food and beverage 90% 50% 0%

Direct high impact area Direct moderate impact area Indirect impact area
Moderate Manufacturing - light 20% 10% 3%
conflict intensity and heavy
(January 2024 - Wholesale and retail 20% 10% 10%
June 2024) Tourism and hospitality 70% 60% 50%
Services 20% 10% 3%
Food and beverage 15% 5% 0%

iv MoE/World Bank, 2023. Lebanon Solid Waste Roadmap 2023–2026: Towards an Integrated Solid Waste Management System. Lebanon.
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099112023054014380/pdf/P179435059e4c00080bd5a091bc0270002d.pdf.
v Order of Engineers and Architects, Lebanon.
https://www.oea.org.lb/Library/Files/Arabic/Downloads/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA/
Construction_Applications/namazij%20moamalat%20feb%202018/%D9%85%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA
%D9%83%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%81.pdf.

29
ANNEX B: MAPS AND FIGURES

Figure 1: Evolution of conflict before and after assessment cut-off dates

Source: Maps generated for the World Bank, IPSOS

30
Figure 2: Displacement patterns as of October 28, 2024

Source: Maps generated for the purpose of this assessment, IPSOS

31
 Figure 3: Agriculture damaged areas in Southern Lebanon as of September 27, 2024

Source: Map generated for the purpose of this assessment, IPSOS

32
Figure 4: Functionality of schools in Lebanon as of September 27, 2024

Source: Map generated for the purpose of this assessment, IPSOS

33
 Figure 5: Environment damage as of September 27, 2024

Source: Maps generated for the purpose of this assessment, IPSOS

34
Figure 6: Damage to hospitals and healthcare facilities as of October 27, 2024

Source: Maps generated for the purpose of this assessment, IPSOS

35
 Figure 7: Functionality of hospitals and healthcare facilities as of October 27, 2024

Source: Maps generated for the purpose of this assessment, IPSOS

36
Figure 8: Housing damage map as of October 27, 2024

Source: Map generated for the purpose of this assessment, IPSOS

37