NGA_CPIN_Separatist_groups_in_the_South-East

Country Policy and Information Note
Nigeria: Separatist groups in the

South-East
Version 3.0
March 2022
Preface
Purpose
This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by
Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human
rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an
exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme.
It is split into 2 parts: (1) an assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI.
These are explained in more detail below.
Assessment
This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note - that is information in the
COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw - by
describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general,
whether one or more of the following applies:
• a person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm
• that the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial
grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions
amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and
339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules / Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR)
• that the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing
there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual
threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a
situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and
339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules
• a person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)
• a person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory
• a claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of
leave, and
• if a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’
under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis,
taking into account each case’s specific facts.
Country of origin information
The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with
the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European
Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008,
and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and
Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training
Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy,
balance, currency, transparency and traceability.
The structure and content of the country information section follows a terms of
reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to this note.
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All information included in the note was published or made publicly available on or
before the ‘cut-off’ date(s) in the country information section. Any event taking place
or report/article published after these date(s) is not included.
All information is publicly accessible or can be made publicly available. Sources and
the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors
relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:
• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
• the currency and detail of information
• whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources.
Multiple sourcing is used to ensure that the information is accurate and balanced,
which is compared and contrasted where appropriate so that a comprehensive and
up-to-date picture is provided of the issues relevant to this note at the time of
publication.
The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s)
expressed.
Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote. Full details of all sources cited
and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.
Feedback
Our goal is to provide accurate, reliable and up-to-date COI and clear guidance. We
welcome feedback on how to improve our products. If you would like to comment on
this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in
March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to
support him in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of
COI produced by the Home Office.
The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the
function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy.
The IAGCI may be contacted at:
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
5th Floor
Globe House
89 Eccleston Square
London, SW1V 1PN
Email: [email protected]
Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the documents which have been
reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s pages of
the gov.uk website.
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Contents
Assessment.................................................................................................................. 6
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Basis of claim .............................................................................................. 6
1.2 Points to note .............................................................................................. 6
2. Consideration of issues ...................................................................................... 6
2.1 Credibility ..................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Exclusion ..................................................................................................... 7
2.3 Convention reason(s).................................................................................. 8
2.4 Risk .............................................................................................................. 8
2.5 Protection .................................................................................................. 13
2.6 Internal relocation...................................................................................... 13
2.7 Certification ............................................................................................... 13
Country information .................................................................................................. 13
3. ‘Biafra’ background ........................................................................................... 14
3.1 Geography and demography .................................................................... 14
3.2 Civil war and secession ............................................................................ 15
4. Political landscape ............................................................................................ 16
4.1 Background ............................................................................................... 16
4.2 Unitary state and public order ................................................................... 19
5. Separatist groups.............................................................................................. 19
5.1 Overview of groups ................................................................................... 19
6. Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ .................. 21
6.1 Background ............................................................................................... 21
6.2 Legal status ............................................................................................... 22
7. Treatment of MASSOB ..................................................................................... 23
7.1 Killings, discrimination, violence and harassment.................................... 23
7.2 Arbitrary arrest and detention ................................................................... 23
8. Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB) ............................................................... 24
8.1 Background ............................................................................................... 24
8.2 Proscription/legal status of IPOB .............................................................. 27
8.3 Aims ........................................................................................................... 27
8.4 Activities .................................................................................................... 30
8.5 Clashes between state and IPOB............................................................. 33
9. Treatment of IPOB ............................................................................................ 43
9.1 State treatment: security presence in South East zone ........................... 43
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9.2 Break-up of/use of excessive force against demonstrations ................... 47
9.3 Killings, discrimination, violence and harassment.................................... 47
9.4 Arrest and detention .................................................................................. 52
9.5 Prosecutions and convictions ................................................................... 59
10. Separatist groups outside of Nigeria ................................................................ 59
10.1 Nigerian diaspora ...................................................................................... 59
10.2 Size and composition of separatist groups in the diaspora ..................... 62
10.3 Sur place activities of separatist groups ................................................... 62
10.4 Monitoring of ‘Biafra’ groups in Nigeria and the UK ................................. 63
Terms of Reference ................................................................................................... 67
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 68
Sources cited ........................................................................................................... 68
Sources consulted but not cited .............................................................................. 73
Version control .......................................................................................................... 75
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Assessment
Updated: 16 March 2022
1. Introduction
1.1 Basis of claim
1.1.1 Fear of persecution and/or serious harm by state actors because the person
is a member or supporter of, or perceived to belong to, a group that supports
a separate state of ‘Biafra’.
1.2 Points to note
1.2.1 ‘Biafra’ was the name used by former Eastern Region of Nigeria when it
unilaterally declared independence from Nigeria in 1967. This action led to
the Nigerian Civil War, which concluded in 1970. ‘Biafra’ is not a legally
recognised area but is often invoked by those members of the Igbo people
who support secession from Nigeria. The states in Nigeria with a majority
Igbo population are Abia, Imo, Ebonyi, Enugu and Anambra forming the
south-east geopolitical zone of Nigeria.
1.2.2 Open source material referenced in this note refers to ‘Biafra’ rather than the
south-east geopolitical zone. For consistency and clarity, this note will also
use the term ‘Biafra’. although it is important to note that the UK
government’s consistent policy to respect the territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, and use of the term ’Biafra’ in this note, does
not in any way imply any shift in that policy.
1.2.3 There are reported to be several groups aiming for the secession of ‘Biafra’.
This Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) focuses on the 2 main
groups, which are:
• the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’
(MASSOB)
• Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB)
1.2.4 Where a claim is refused, it must be considered for certification under
section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as Nigeria is
listed as a designated state in respect of men only.
1.2.5 For information on certification, see the instruction on Certification of
protection and human rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).
Back to Contents
2. Consideration of issues
2.1 Credibility
2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing
Credibility and Refugee Status.
2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for
a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas
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should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum
Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).
2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language
analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).
Official – sensitive: Start of section
The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home
Office use only.
Official – sensitive: End of section
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2.2 Exclusion
2.2.1 IPOB is proscribed as a terrorist group by the Nigerian government, and
members of the group and its paramilitary wing – the Eastern Security
Network (created in December 2020) – have reportedly committed human
rights violations in Nigeria (see Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB) and
various media articles in Activities and Clashes between state and IPOB)
2.2.2 MASSOB has been banned, but is not a proscribed terrorist group in Nigeria.
It too has reportedly been involved in violent clashes with the authorities (see
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’).
2.2.3 If a person has been involved with IPOB (and/or an affiliated group),
MASSOB or any other ‘Biafran’ group that incites or uses violence to achieve
its aims, decision makers must consider whether one (or more) of the
exclusion clauses under the Refugee Convention is applicable. Persons who
commit human rights violations must not be granted asylum.
2.2.4 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be
excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection.
2.2.5 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses and restricted leave, see the
Asylum Instructions on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention, Humanitarian Protection and Restricted Leave.
Office use only.
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2.3 Convention reason(s)
2.3.1 A person’s actual or imputed political opinion.
2.3.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a
refugee. The question is whether the particular person has a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of their actual or imputed convention reason.
2.3.3 For further guidance on Convention reasons see the instruction on
Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
Back to Contents
2.4 Risk
a. Political context
2.4.1 ‘Biafra’ is a loosely defined area in the south-east of Nigeria that roughly
corresponds to the states of Abia, Imo, Ebonyi, Enugu and Anambra. The
area is inhabited principally by Igbo (Ibo) people who are one of the
country’s 3 largest ethnic groups (see ‘Biafra’ background).
2.4.2 In the mid-1960s, newly independent Nigeria was affected by economic and
political instability and ethnic friction. A number of violent clashes occurred,
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including in September 1966, when some sources estimate that between
10,000 and 30,000 Igbo were killed in northern Nigeria. Attempts to resolve
tensions failed and in May 1967 Eastern Nigeria unilaterally declared its
independence from Nigeria as the Republic of ‘Biafra’, triggering a civil war
in which an estimated one to three million people died. ‘Biafran’ rebels were
eventually overwhelmed by and surrendered to the federal government
forces in January 1970 (see ‘Biafra’ background).
2.4.3 Since the 1990s new ‘Biafra’ separatist movements have been established,
reportedly driven by a perceived sense of unfair treatment and
marginalisation. While several groups have formed with the goal of achieving
‘Biafran’ secession, the 2 main groups are: (i) the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB); and (ii) the
Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB) (see Movement for the Actualization of
the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) leadership) and Indigenous
People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB).
2.4.4 While during the early 2000s MASSOB was the foremost ‘Biafran’ group, in
recent years reports suggest it has become divided splitting into several
smaller groups and has become less active. IPOB grew out of MASSOB
between 2012 and 2014 and has a presence outside of Nigeria, including the
UK, Germany and elsewhere. There is limited information in the sources
consulted on the organisational structure or membership procedures for
either IPOB or MASSOB. There are also reported to be a number of other
‘Biafran’ groups but these do not seem to have a significant presence in
Nigeria (see Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’
(MASSOB) leadership) and Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB).
2.4.5 Although both MASSOB and IPOB have advocated for peaceful change they
have also used rhetoric that may encourage violence and, in some
instances, used violence directly against the state and its agents. In recent
years, IPOB appears to have become the publicly dominant ‘Biafran’
separatist group (see Overview of groups, Movement for the Actualization of
the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) and Separatist groups outside of
Nigeria).
2.4.6 For further information on insecurity in Nigeria see country policy information
notes (CPINs) Actors of protection , Internal relocation and Islamist extremist
groups in North East Nigeria.
Back to Contents
b. MASSOB
2.4.7 In May 2013 former President Goodluck Jonathan identified MASSOB as
one of the 3 ‘extremist groups threatening the national security’. In 2015 pro-
‘Biafra’ marches were banned in some southern states. However, sources
are inconsistent about the legal status of MASSOB – whether it was simply
banned or was proscribed as a terrorist organisation. DFAT concluded in
December 2020 that MASSOB is not a banned organisation and continues
to conduct public activities (see Overview of groups and Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) leadership).
2.4.8 MASSOB, since its formation in the late 1990s, has clashed with the security
forces. Some sources report that numerous individuals have been killed,
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wounded and arrested during these clashes – usually during
demonstrations. Over a hundred arrests were made in September 2018, at
least 10 in 2019; and, in July 2020, members of MASSOB were reportedly
arrested following clashes with police (see Overview of groups and
Treatment of MASSOB).
2.4.9 A person is unlikely to be of interest to the authorities simply for expressing
support for the group. However, the risk of arrest and violence increases
during pro-‘Biafra’ demonstrations or gatherings, given that the organisation
is reported to be banned. Any risk of persecution may depend on the roles of
persons involved, their profile and activities for the group, and previous
arrests by the state.
Back to Contents
c. IPOB
2.4.10 In September 2017, IPOB was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in
Nigeria (see Overview of groups and Movement for the Actualization of the
Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) leadership).
2.4.11 Through its online platform, ‘Radio Biafra’, and other social media, IPOB
have increasingly used inflammatory rhetoric to encourage secessionist
aspirations and resistance to the authorities, including violence (see
Overview of groups, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State
of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) and Separatist groups outside of Nigeria).
2.4.12 Sources reported that the security forces have arrested hundreds of IPOB
supporters at different events, particularly between 2015 and 2017 and
including during raids on homes of IPOB leaders. Since 2015, IPOB has also
claimed that the security forces have used excessive force, including killing
and injuring hundreds of its supporters (see Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’:
Clashes between state and secessionist groups and Treatment of IPOB).
2.4.13 Several sources also reported clashes between IPOB and the authorities
during 2018 and 2019. Further clashes and violence occurred between
security forces and IPOB in August 2020 in the city of Enugu, and in October
2020 during confrontations in Rivers State. In November 2020, there were
reports that security forces carried out operations against IPOB in the
Oyigbo area of Rivers State. However, these reports were denied by state
Governor Nyesom Wike. These incidents resulted in the arrests and deaths
of IPOB supporters as well as security force personnel (see Indigenous
People of ‘Biafra’: Clashes between state and secessionist groups and
Treatment of IPOB).
2.4.14 In December 2020, IPOB is reported to have set up the Eastern Security
Network (ESN), a para-military force (see Overview of groups, Movement for
the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) and Separatist
groups outside of Nigeria).
2.4.15 In February 2021, the Nigerian military launched land and air operations
against ESN operatives (see Aims, Activities, Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’:
Clashes between state and secessionist groups and Treatment of IPOB).
2.4.16 Clashes between IPOB and the authorities continued into 2021. The group
were involved in attacks reported to have taken place in April 2021 in Imo
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State where a police headquarters was destroyed and over 1,800 prisoners
were reported to have escaped from a prison, although IPOB denied
involvement in the attacks. In May 2021, clashes between state security
forces and IPOB resulted in the deaths of both members of IPOB/ESN and
the security forces. Sources also reported in June 2021 that the Nigerian
Army had stated that IPOB/ESN had killed 128 military and police, 15 Civil
Defence officers and 31 community policing members as well as over 100
people for not supporting IPOB. Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of IPOB, denied
this claim. Clashes between state security forces and IPOB/ESN continued
throughout the second half of 2021 into 2022. Media sources reported the
deaths of 11 security forces in June 2021, with a further 22 deaths between
October and December 2021 inclusive (see Aims, Activities, Indigenous
People of ‘Biafra’: Clashes between state and secessionist groups and
Treatment of IPOB).
2.4.17 The government’s ‘Operation Restore Peace’, intended to restore stability in
the region, was launched in May 2021. On 15 May 2021, 9 suspected IPOB
members were arrested in Delta State along with the seizure of weapons,
followed by 5 suspected members arrested in Imo State on the same day in
connection with the killing of a police sergeant (see Aims, Activities,
Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’: Clashes between state and secessionist
groups and Treatment of IPOB).
2.4.18 Following an attack on police stations by IPOB members in Rivers State in
October 2020, the governor offered a reward for information that could lead
to the arrest and prosecution of the IPOB state leader, Stanley Mgbere.
Kanu publicly issued a N100m (c. £170-175,000) bounty on the governor in
response. CPIT could find no further information in the sources consulted
that Mr Mgbere had been located and arrested. In November 2020, 2
unnamed suspected senior IPOB leaders were reportedly arrested in Rivers
State (see Clashes between state and IPOB and Bibliography).
2.4.19 As well as arrests of IPOB supporters/armed activists, a number of IPOB
senior members have been arrested including the IPOB leader Nnamdi
Kanu, who was originally jailed in 2015 for 2 years and then subsequently
released on bail. Following a clash with soldiers at his home in Abia state in
2017, Kanu fled Nigeria whilst on bail facing charges of terrorism and
incitement. In June 2021 the Nigerian government announced he had been
arrested in a third country and returned. Kanu remains in custody in Nigeria
and is subject to ongoing legal proceedings (see Arrest and detention)
2.4.20 While there are reports that some IPOB supporters and leaders arrested
have been charged with treason, sources do not indicate whether these
cases have led to prosecutions and convictions for treason or other crimes.
Sources claim that some of those arrested have been held without charge
and incommunicado, but do not provide specific information about the length
or treatment of members or supporters of IPOB in detention (see Clashes
between state and secessionist groups, and Treatment of IPOB).
2.4.21 IPOB is a proscribed terrorist organisation in Nigeria and has been
implicated in inciting and acts of violence against the state and other actors.
The government has a legitimate interest in pursuing and arresting persons
who are, or are suspected of being, involved with or supporting the group. In
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general, IPOB supporters or members who are fleeing prosecution or
punishment for a criminal offence, including human rights violations, are not
likely to be refugees.
2.4.22 However, prosecution may amount to persecution if it involves victimisation
in its application by the authorities. For example, if it is the vehicle or excuse
for persecution or if only certain groups are prosecuted for a particular
offence and the consequences of that discrimination are sufficiently severe.
Punishment which is cruel, inhuman or degrading (including punishment
which is out of all proportion to the offence committed) may also amount to
persecution (see the section on prosecution in the Asylum Instruction on
Assessing credibility and refugee status).
2.4.23 Where a person is able to demonstrate that because of their links to IPOB
they are likely to face prosecution or punishment which is disproportionate to
the crime committed or discriminatory; or faces detention in degrading or
inhuman conditions or torture then such treatment is likely to amount to
persecution (see country policy and information note, Actors of protection
and Country Background Note for more information about the criminal justice
system, including detention conditions).
2.4.24 Each case will need to be carefully considered on its facts, taking into
account the individual’s behaviour and actions, previous state interest and
conduct of family members.
2.4.25 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the instruction on Assessing
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d. Sur place activity
2.4.26 Pro-‘Biafra’ organisations exhibit a varied online presence in the form of
websites, radio broadcasts and social media (see ‘Biafran’
separatists/supporters in the UK). However, the size of the support within a
large and established diaspora living in the UK is not clear (see Size and
composition of separatist groups in the diaspora).
2.4.27 From the sources consulted, pro’Biafra’ protests have been held in the UK.
However, there is no evidence in the sources consulted that there is
significant ongoing pro-‘Biafran’ activity in the UK (see Sur place activities of
separatist groups).
2.4.28 Open source material suggests that the Nigerian government may monitor
groups it considers a threat in Nigeria and that it may have blocked websites
advocating ‘Biafran’ independence. However, there is no specific information
in the sources consulted indicating that the Nigerian government monitors
the activities of members of the Nigerian diaspora in the UK, including
supporters of ‘Biafran’ separatist groups (see Separatist groups outside of
Nigeria and Bibliography).
2.4.29 Decision makers must consider each case on its facts, taking into account:
• the legal status, profile, size, and organisation of the group/organisation
to which the person belongs and its activities
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• whether a person in the UK would wish to continue their activism if
returned to Nigeria (if not, why not)
• whether the group/organisation has a presence in Nigeria as well as
outside of the country and any evidence that it is being monitored by the
government
• the person’s profile and political activities (including those online) and
relevant documentary or other evidence
• the profile and activities of family members
• past treatment of the person
• evidence that their activities in the UK may have come to the attention of
the Nigerian security agencies.
2.4.30 Decision makers will also need to take into account whether the person
supports and is active on behalf of IPOB, which is a proscribed group in
Nigeria, and whether they fear prosecution rather than persecution.
2.4.31 The onus is on the person to demonstrate that they are of interest to the
government because of their profile and activities and are at risk of serious
harm or persecution.
Back to Contents
2.5 Protection
2.5.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from the state, they
are unlikely to be able to avail themselves of the protection of the authorities.
Back to Contents
2.6 Internal relocation
2.6.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from the state, it is
unlikely a person will be able to relocate to escape that risk.
2.6.2 For further guidance on internal relocation see the instruction on Assessing
Back to Contents
2.7 Certification
2.7.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’
under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
2.7.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and
Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and
Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).
Back to Contents
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Country information
Section 3 updated: 16 March 2022
3. ‘Biafra’ background
3.1 Geography and demography
3.1.1 The map below produced by Africa Centre for Strategic Studies shows the
South East states of Enugu, Ebonyi, Anambra, Abia and Imo. The hot spots
labelled the Orlu crisis show the areas where security forces and Eastern
Security Network have clashed in 2021 (see Clashes between state and
IPOB).
3.1.2 An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRBC) response of June

2019, based on a range of sources, stated: ‘Biafra is a region in South East
Nigeria… populated predominately by people of the Igbo ethnicity…’ 2
3.1.3 The Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT) country information report of December 2020 stated:
1 ACforSC, ‘Nigeria’s diverse security threats’, 30 March 2021

2 IRBC, ‘Nigeria: The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)…’, 28 June 2019
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‘Nigeria is… grouped into six geopolitical zones: North West, North East,
North Central, South West, South East [which according to DFAT’s map of
Nigeria encompasses Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo states] and
South…
‘The Igbo people are the third largest ethnic group in Nigeria, constituting 15
per cent of the population. They originate from southeastern Nigeria and live
in large numbers in the states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo.
The Igbo speak a number of Igbo dialects. They are predominantly
Christian.’3
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3.2 Civil war and secession
3.2.1 The Encyclopaedia Britannica provided a short history of the secessionist
state of ‘Biafra’ which:
‘… unilaterally declared its independence from Nigeria in May 1967. It
constituted the former Eastern Region of Nigeria and was inhabited
principally by Igbo (Ibo) people. Biafra ceased to exist as an independent
state in January 1970.
‘In the mid-1960s economic and political instability and ethnic friction
characterized Nigerian public life. In the mostly Hausa north, resentment
against the more prosperous, educated Igbo minority erupted into violence.
In September 1966, some 10,000 to 30,000 Igbo people were massacred in
the Northern Region, and perhaps 1,000,000 fled as refugees to the Igbo-
dominated east. Non-Igbos were then expelled from the Eastern Region.
‘Attempts by representatives of all regions to come to an agreement were
unsuccessful. On May 30, 1967, the head of the Eastern Region, Lieutenant
Colonel (later General) Odumegwu Ojukwu, with the authorization of a
consultative assembly, declared the region a sovereign and independent
republic under the name of Biafra. General Yakubu Gowon, the leader of the
federal government, refused to recognize Biafra’s secession. In the hostilities
that broke out the following July, Biafran troops were at first successful, but
soon the numerically superior federal forces began to press Biafra’s
boundaries inward from the south, west, and north. Biafra shrank to one-
tenth its original area in the course of the war. By 1968 it had lost its
seaports and become landlocked; supplies could be brought in only by air.
Starvation and disease followed; estimates of mortality during the war
generally range from 500,000 to 3,000,000.
‘The Organization of African Unity, the papacy, and others tried to reconcile
the combatants. Most countries continued to recognize Gowon’s regime as
the government of all Nigeria, and the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union
supplied it with arms. On the other hand, international sympathy for the plight
of starving Biafran children brought airlifts of food and medicine from many
countries. Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania, and Zambia recognized Biafra as
an independent state, and France sent Biafra weapons.
‘Biafran forces were finally routed in a series of engagements in late
December 1969 and early January 1970. Ojukwu fled to Côte d’Ivoire, and
3 DFAT, ‘Country information report: Nigeria’ (section 2.38 & 3.7 - 3.8), updated 3 December 2020
Page 15 of 75
the remaining Biafran officers surrendered to the federal government on
January 15, 1970. Biafra, on the point of total collapse, thereupon ceased to
exist.’4
3.2.2 A 2017 publication on the ‘Biafran’ famine, The Handbook of Famine,
Starvation, and Nutrient Deprivation stated:
‘Following ethnic, economic, and religious tensions, the republic of Biafra
unilaterally declared independence from the rest of Nigeria in 1967. This
action triggered the Nigerian civil war in which the inflow of food and supplies
to Biafra was blocked. The result was extensive famine, regarded as one of
the great nutritional disasters of modern times. During the two-and-a-half
years of armed conflict, an estimated one to three million people died, most
of them from starvation.’5
Back to Contents
4. Political landscape
4.1 Background
For further information on the political situation and system in Nigeria see
Nigeria: Country Background Note.
4.1.1 An African Arguments article from May 2017 provided background
information:
‘Separatists contend that since the Biafra War, the Igbo, one of the country’s
three major ethnic groups, have been marginalised. They note that no Igbo
has been elected to lead the country since Nnamdi Azikiwe’s ceremonial
presidency in the 1960s or to be vice president since Alex Ekwueme (1979
to 1983).
‘This persisted even under military rule. The only Igbo head of state in this
period, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, was killed after only seven
months.
‘Administrative structures decreed by northern-led military governments have
also undermined the region. Of the country’s six geo-political zones, all but
the south east contain either six or seven states. The south east has just
five, while it accounts for only 96 of Nigeria’s 774 local governments.
Representation in government and the flow of federal resources are based
on those administrative units.
‘Today, the south east, like much of the country, suffers deficient and
dilapidated infrastructure and widespread youth unemployment. But many
believe this is structural. They point out that as federal revenue allocation is
based on number of states and local governments, the south east receives
the least of all zones.’ 6
4.1.2 A BBC news article from July 2017 reported that Igbo leaders at a specially
convened meeting in Enugu city had pledged their loyalty and ’full support’ to
4 Encyclopædia Britannica, inc, ‘Biafra – secessionist state, Nigeria’, 4 March 2015

5 Norman M, ‘Handbook of Famine, Starvation, and Nutrient Deprivation’, 20 February 2017
6 African Arguments, ‘Nigeria: How to solve a problem like Biafra’, 29 May 2017
Page 16 of 75
a ’united Nigeria’, rejecting calls for a Biafran state to be created in the
south-east, whilst appealing that the state be ’restructured’ to achieve “a just
and equitable society. The Igbo leaders involvement has been seen by some
as an attempt to de-escalate tensions between rival communities in Nigeria7.
4.1.3 An expert comment by Sola Tayo, a BBC journalist, and Fidelis Mbah,
journalist, published on the Chatham House website in November 2017:
‘The new campaign for Biafran independence is largely championed by
young people who were born after the civil war, with no memory of the
suffering it caused.
‘The first sign of reviving the call for Biafra emerged in 1999 – shortly after
the end of Nigeria’s period of military rule – in the form of an organisation
called MASSOB, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State
of Biafra. The group was led by Ralph Uwazuruike, who had several brushes
with security agencies, and was arrested and imprisoned on charges of
treason.
‘IPOB came to prominence at the centre of the latest wave of Igbo
nationalism following the arrival in office of Nigeria’s President Muhammadu
Buhari. The tone of the new president towards the people of the southeast
was perceived as at best dismissive, and at times hostile. He was accused
of favouring his northern constituents, notably in terms of senior government
appointments. The president has yet to visit the southeast. With anti-Abuja
sentiment growing in the southeast, IPOB seized the opportunity to
reactivate the demand for secession.
‘IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu was at the forefront of these demands. A British-
Nigerian political activist, Nnamdi Kanu is the director of London-based
Radio Biafra, a broadcast outfit set up to propagate the demands of
secessionists. He had been recruited by MASSOB leader Uwazuruike to run
Radio Biafra in London. The pair fell out and Kanu later re-emerged as IPOB
leader. The station broadcasts daily programmes in English and the Igbo
language, including anti-Nigeria and pro-Biafra propaganda.’8
2019, based on a range of sources, stated: ‘Sources state people in the
South East feel marginalized due to the Nigerian military presence… or to
the lack of government investment in the region….’ 9
4.1.5 A Deutsche Welle article of 14 January 2020, noting that people in the
‘Biafra’ region feel marginalised, considered the perception versus the
reality:
‘But the statistics paint a different picture: In the 2015 national development
index for example — the latest available edition — the geopolitical eastern
and southern parts of the country are further ahead in terms of education,
gender equality and poverty reduction compared to the north.
‘[Eghosa] Osaghae [professor of comparative politics at the University of
Ibadan] says this is often where perception and reality drift apart: "Many
7 BBC News, ‘Nigeria's Igbo leaders reject call for Biafra state’, 3 July 2017
8 CH, ‘Calls for Biafran Independence Return to South East Nigeria’, 9 November 2017
Page 17 of 75
people from the southeast do not know the north at all. In their opinion, the
north still gets the lion's share of the resources."
‘The main point of contention — as it was before the war — is the oil which
comes from the southeast.’10
4.1.6 The US State Department Human Rights Practices Report 2021(USSD
Human Rights report 2020) covering events in 2020 stated: ‘The law
prohibits ethnic discrimination by the government, but most ethnic groups
claimed marginalization in terms of government revenue allocation, political
representation, or both.’ 11
4.1.7 Bertelsmann Stiftung in an April 2020 country report, covering events
between 2017 and 2019, stated: ‘In the Igbo heartland, a wave of renewed
nationalism in the spirit of a sovereign Biafra has subsided somewhat thanks
to the fact that its main proponent, Nnamdi Kanu, allegedly fled to Israel, a
claim that the Israeli government denies.’12
4.1.8 The DFAT report of December 2020 stated:
‘Despite … moves to encourage greater national unity, there has never been
a national reckoning or dialogue in relation to the issues that led to the Biafra
conflict, which is not officially commemorated. According to observers, many
in the southeast report feeling ongoing resentment at the lack of action to
resolve issues emanating from the conflict and from their perceived ongoing
marginalisation in national life. Such feelings have reportedly grown stronger
in the years since President Buhari came to power, with many of his major
political and military appointments tending to favour individuals from the
north. As a result, in recent years there has been a noticeable resurgence of
calls from the southeast for greater self-determination in the form of an
independent Biafran state.’ 13
4.1.9 The DFAT report of December 2020 also stated:
‘There are no legal provisions targeting the Igbo population in Nigeria and
the Igbo, like all Nigerians, are able to move freely within Nigeria. Many Igbo
have migrated to other areas of Nigeria, including northern states. Like other
non-indigenous communities, Igbo residing in these areas have occasionally
faced discrimination from locals… DFAT is not aware of any other significant
cases in which Igbo have been specifically targeted for violence or exclusion
due to their ethnicity.
‘…Senior Igbo figures have claimed successive Nigerian governments,
including the Buhari administration, have subsequently excluded Igbo from
senior political, military and civil service positions. A number of political
organisations continue to advocate for an independent Biafran state and
have occasionally clashed with security authorities.’ 14
4.1.10 DFAT concluded: ‘… Igbo are not specifically targeted for discrimination on
the basis of their ethnicity throughout Nigeria. Like other non-indigenous
10 DW, ‘The Long Shadow of Biafra Lingers over Nigeria’, 14 January 2020
11 USSD, 2020 Human Rights Report, Nigeria (Section 6), 30 March 2021
12 Bertelsmann Stiftung: BTI 2020 Country Report Nigeria (p6), 29 April 2020
13 DFAT, ‘Country information report: Nigeria’ (section 3.47), updated 3 December 2020
14 DFAT, ‘Country information report: Nigeria’ (section 3.8-3.10), updated 3 December 2020
Page 18 of 75
communities, Igbo residing outside of their traditional homeland may face
localised discrimination.’15
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4.2 Unitary state and public order
4.2.1 The Constitution of Nigeria explains in Chapter 1, part I that ‘Nigeria is one
indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state to be known by the name of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria.’ It also provides various provisions for public
order and public safety (Chapter 1, part II) and establishment of political
parties (Chapter VI, part III) 16.
4.2.2 The country policy and information note on actors of protection provide
background information on the role and activities of the security forces, as
well the criminal justice system more generally including detention centres
and conditions.
Back to Contents
5. Separatist groups
5.1 Overview of groups
5.1.1 An expert comment by Sola Tayo, a BBC journalist, and Fidelis Mbah, a
journalist, published on the Chatham House website in November 2017
identified the 2 main groups aiming for secession as the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’ (MASSOB) and the
Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB). The same source stated, ‘There are
several other pro-Biafra groups in the southeast but internal disputes have
so far prevented them from presenting a unified front.’ 17
2019, based on a range of sources, stated that it was announced in June
2017 that 7 pro-‘Biafran’ groups had agreed to collaborate under the
leadership of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu as the ‘Biafran’ People National
Council, and that a Nigerian Newspaper in May 2019 reported that at least a
further 5 pro-‘Biafran’ groups had formed a coalition called ‘Biafra’ Liberation
Movement (BPLM) see table below. IRBC commented that no further
information on either umbrella group could be found18.
‘Biafran’ People National Council ‘Biafra’ Liberation Movement
IPOB MASSOB
MASSOB Eastern People Congress (EPC)
‘Biafran’ Revolutionary Igbo Youth Cultural and Restoration

Organization (BRO) Initiative (IYCRI)
16 Nigeria government, Constitution (accessed via refworld), 1999
Page 19 of 75
‘Biafran’ People National Council ‘Biafra’ Liberation Movement
Eastern People Congress (EPC) Movement of ‘Biafrans’ in Nigeria

(MOBIN)
Joint Revolutionary Council of Customary Government of

‘Biafra’ (JRCB) ‘Biafra’(CGB)
‘Biafra’ Liberation Crusaders (BLC)

Salvation People of ‘Biafra’
19
5.1.3 The Nigerian newspaper, the National Daily news, website gave a list of
groups reported to be involved with marking the 51st anniversary of the
secession of the Eastern Region on 30 May 2018:
• ‘Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign state of Biafra
(MASSOB),
• ‘Eastern Peoples Congress (EPC), Igbo Youth Cultural and Restoration
Initiative (IYCRI),
• ‘Bilie Human Rights Initiative (BHRI),
• ‘Movement of Biafrans in Nigeria (MOBIN), Biafran National Liberation
Council (BNLC),
• ‘Biafran Revolutionary Organisation (BRO),
• ‘Biafran Liberation Crusade (BLC),
• ‘Joint Revolutionary Council of Biafra (JRCB),
• ‘Biafra Revolutionary Force (BRF), Customary Government of Biafra
(CGB),
• ‘Biafran Central Council (BCC)
• ‘Biafran United Liberation Council (BULCO).’20
5.1.4 The DFAT report of December 2020 stated:
‘While there are a number of Biafran secessionist movements, the two most
prominent are the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of
Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Both
MASSOB and IPOB draw their support predominantly from the Igbo
speaking southeast states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo. The
differences between the two groups (and other Biafran secessionist
movements) is unclear, and DFAT does not have any information on the
membership procedures or organisational structure for either movement.’ 21

20 National Daily, ‘MASSOB dares military, insists to mark Biafra at 51’, 28 May 2018
Page 20 of 75
5.1.5 Country information included in the EASO Country Guidance for Nigeria of
October 2021, based on material in EASO’s COI reports, stated: ‘…Since
August 2020 violence between IPOB and the Nigerian security forces has
escalated. IPOB’s paramilitary wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN)
has engaged in armed clashes with Nigerian state forces… Both
organisations claim to be non-violent and aim to reach secession through
referendum. They mostly engage in awareness-raising activities, marches,
and other gatherings. However, the leader of IPOB has reportedly endorsed
violence as means for resuscitating Biafra.’ 22
5.1.6 There is no further information in the sources consulted regarding the
activities of smaller pro-‘Biafran’ groups in Nigeria or their interest to the
Nigerian authorities (see Bibliography).
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6. Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of ‘Biafra’
6.1 Background
Office use only.
22 EASO, ‘Country Guidance: Nigeria’ (page 14 and 54), October 2021
Page 21 of 75
Office use only.

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6.2 Legal status
6.2.1 The BBC reported that MASSOB was banned in or around 200223. Country
information included in the EASO Country Guidance stated: ‘MASSOB was
banned by the Nigeria authorities in 2001.’24
6.2.2 Human Rights Watch in a 2005 report stated: ‘Although there is no law
proscribing MASSOB, the federal government has declared membership of
the organization illegal on the grounds that they constitute a threat to the
security and sovereignty of the nation.’25
6.2.3 However, DFAT stated in its December 2020 report that ‘…, although
authorities have threatened to proscribe MASSOB on several occasions,
they have not actually done so and MASSOB has continued to conduct
public activities.’ 26
23 BBC, ‘Nigeria arrests Biafra separatist', 27 October 2005

24 EASO, ‘Country Guidance: Nigeria’ (page 54), October 2021
25
HRW, ‘”Rest in Pieces”, Police Torture and Deaths in Custody in NGA’ (section VI), July 2005
26 DFAT, ‘Country information report: Nigeria’ (section 3.51), 3 December 2020
Page 22 of 75
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7. Treatment of MASSOB
7.1 Killings, discrimination, violence and harassment
7.1.1 The EASO Targeting of individuals report of November 2018 citing several
media news sources stated: ‘Over the years, police and security agencies
have clashed hard with MASSOB members, arresting and killing many,
during manifestations and rallies. The use of a Biafra flag or currency is
considered unlawful and anyone caught in possession of such items will be
arrested and can even be accused of sedition or treason.’ 27
7.1.2 BBC monitoring reported via the Nigerian diaspora website Sahara
Reporters that ‘…during preparations for the MASSOB 19 th anniversary
celebrations on 22 May 2019 at Upper Iweka, police opened fire on
MASSOB members. Two were reported killed, 10 were arrested and 15
sustained bullet wounds. The regional administrator of the movement,
Mr Amadi Ifeanyi (aka Ochiagha), said that they were “a non-violent
organisation but that this incident would not stop them from struggling for a
Biafran state.”’28
7.1.3 The 2020 DFAT country information report Nigeria commented:
‘… There have also been recent reports of deaths, injuries and mass arrests
of MASSOB members in the context of clashes with security forces during
pro-Biafra demonstrations. In May 2019, two MASSOB members were
reportedly killed and 15 wounded following clashes with police at a MASSOB
anniversary event in Onitsha, Anambra state, while in the same period a
MASSOB member was reportedly arrested and tortured at a police station in
Mgbidi, Imo state. In September 2018, 125 MASSOB members were
reportedly arrested, with some sustaining injuries, during a rally in Anambra
state…’ 29
7.1.4 DFAT assessed ‘Ordinary members of …, MASSOB and other Biafran
secessionist organisations who participate in political demonstrations or
rallies face a moderate risk of being subjected to violence by state security
forces.’ 30
Back to Contents
7.2 Arbitrary arrest and detention
7.2.1 BBC monitoring reported, via the Nigerian newspaper website the Guardian,
in July 2020:
‘The Imo State Police Command has arrested some members of the
Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)
in Owerri for allegedly attempting to murder and dispossess some police
officers on duty of their service riffles.
27 EASO, ‘Nigeria: Targeting of individuals’ (page 82), November 2018

28 BBC Monitoring, ‘Nigerian separatists in violent confrontations…’, 23 May 2019, subscription only
Page 23 of 75
‘In a statement yesterday signed by the command's Public Relations Officer,
Orlando Godson Ikeokwu, the police also accused members of the
movement of inflicting machete wounds on some officers.
‘Ikeokwu added that while some of the agitators were arrested, others took
to their heels.
‘The statement read in part: "On July 23, 2020, at about 20:15hrs, a group of
persons claiming to be members of MASSOB in an attempt to snatch rifles,
attacked some policemen on duty around New Owerri area and inflicted
machete injuries on two of the policemen.
‘"Also today being July 24, 2020, a group of persons numbering about 100
claiming to be members of MASSOB, attacked a team of policemen attached
to Orji Division along Owerri/Okigwe Road by the Orji Flyover.
‘"The hoodlums while trying to dispossess the policemen of their service
rifles also inflicted machete wounds on them. However, the attack was
successfully repelled with arrests made, while some others ran away with
various degree of injuries."
…
‘All efforts made to reach the leader of the group, Uchenna Madu, as at
press time, yielded no fruit, as his phone was unreachable.
‘But The Guardian learnt that the members of the movement were agitating
for self-determination, among others.’31
Back to Contents
8. Indigenous People of ‘Biafra’ (IPOB)
8.1 Background
Office use only.
31BBC Monitoring, ‘Nigerian police arrest separatist group members in Imo State’, 25 July 2020,
subscription only
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Office use only.
Office use only.
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Office use only.
Office use only.
Office use only.
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Office use only.

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8.2 Proscription/legal status of IPOB
8.2.1 Country information included in the EASO Country Guidance stated: ‘In
2017, the Nigerian authorities declared IPOB a terrorist organisation.’32
8.2.2 AfricaNews in January 2018 stated that, ‘A court in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja,
has upheld an earlier ruling that pro-secessionist group, Indigenous People
of Biafra (IPOB), is a terrorist group. The court presided over by Justice
Abdul Kafarati ruled that the Attorney General of the Federation had used
proper legal processes to apply for IPOB’s proscription in September
2017.’33
media news sources stated:
‘After the crackdown [August 2015 and August 2016] in which the army killed
and arrested an unknown number of IPOB members, the military, endorsed
by the federal government, banned IPOB and declared it a terrorist
organisation. This declaration was not supported by many Nigerians and
international observers such as the EU and the US, as the Chatham House
article noted. It was stated that “IPOB supporters are not known to be violent
and that the protests have been largely peaceful”.’ 34
8.2.4 Human Rights Watch in their World Report 2019, Nigeria: Events of 2018
stated: ‘In a letter to President Buhari in March, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) declared the government’s
proscription of IPOB as a terrorist group and attacks against its members as
prima facie violation of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.
In April, Nigeria’s sixth periodic report on the implementation of the charter
was considered at the ACHPR’s 62nd Ordinary Session in Mauritania.’35
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8.3 Aims
8.3.1 Amnesty International in their November 2016 report stated:
‘Thousands of people frequently tune in to the clandestine radio station
Radio Biafra. The station broadcasts messages that may constitute
incitement to violent acts against the Nigerian state. For example, on 31
August 2015, the day after the military killed two and injured 30 IPOB
32 EASO, ‘Country Guidance: Nigeria’ (page 54), October 2021

33 African News, ‘Biafra agitation: Nigeria court upholds IPOB terrorist label’, 19 January 2018
35 HRW, ‘World Report 2019, Nigeria: Events of 2018’, 17 January 2019
Page 27 of 75
members in Onitsha, the station aired a message that threated violent
retaliation against the military.
‘In another example, an IPOB statement referred to President Buhari as “the
Hitler of Nigeria.” Radio Biafra has also accused the Nigerian security forces
of committing “genocide”.
‘Similarly, some of Nnamdi Kanu’s interviews and speeches may constitute
incitement to violence. For example, he said in March 2014: “Our promise is
very simple. If they fail to give us Biafra, Somalia will look like a paradise,
compared to what happened there. It is a promise, it is a threat and also a
pledge… we have had enough of this nonsense…” In an address to the
World Igbo Congress on 5 September 2015, Nnamdi Kanu told the audience
“we need guns and we need bullets”.
‘… As in other regions in Nigeria, there is a strong feeling of marginalization
in the southeast. Most of the IPOB members and supporters Amnesty
International interviewed said they felt excluded by the Federal government
of Nigeria. They claimed that without an independent Biafran state, the
people of southeast Nigeria would not be able to realize their socio-
economic and political aspirations. Many of them are young and
unemployed, and have vested their hopes and aspirations in an independent
Biafran state. They view the group’s leader as some kind of “redeemer” and
follow him unquestioningly.’36
2019, based on a range of sources, stated:
‘According to an interview with Agence France-Presse (AFP), Nnamdi Kanu,
the leader of IPOB, stated:
‘"The mission and the values of IPOB are very simple: to restore Biafra, to
make sure Biafra comes by whatever means possible… We have chosen
the track of peaceful agitation, non-violence, persuasion, logic, reason,
argument. We are going to deploy all of that to make sure we get Biafra … .
Our ultimate goal is freedom, referendum is the path we have chosen to take
to get Biafra... There is no alternative." (AFP 31 May 2017, last ellipsis in
original).’ 37
8.3.3 A BBC monitoring biography timeline updated in June 2021 of Mr Nnamdi
Kanu, leader of IPOB and director of the London-based Radio “Biafra”, using
a range of sources included the following points:
‘28 January 2019 -The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) says it is on 16
February 2019 going to hold a referendum to ascertain the number of
Nigerians who want a separate Biafra republic through a peaceful and
democratic process. IPOB in a statement says: "Our leader Mazi Nnamdi
Kanu is currently meeting with IPOB high command in Europe to perfect
plans for the referendum which will go side by side with the February 16
presidential poll"
‘10 November 2019 - The leader of the Indigenous Peoples of
Biafra, Nnamdi Kanu says he is ready to face trials and defend Biafrans at
36 AI, ‘Nigeria: Bullets were raining everywhere’(p8), 24 November 2016
Page 28 of 75
the International Criminal Court (ICC), against "genocidal" attacks by "killer
herdsmen and bandits". Speaking on a live broadcast on Radio Biafra, he
says: "Herdsmen will attack us, rape our women, destroy our farms and kill
our farmers nobody will arrest them but when we try to defend ourselves, the
government will come after us rolling out the tanks and using their helicopter
gunboats. If defending our ancestral land against conquest by Fulani
Janjaweed invaders will take me to The Hague, I am ready to go to The
Hague"
‘2 June 2021 [Kanu] Says none of the soldiers deployed to the south-east
region will return alive. In a tweet, [response to President Buhari’s tweet in
June 2021, (‘Many of those misbehaving today are too young to be aware of
the destruction and loss of lives that occurred during the Nigerian Civil War.
Those of us in the fields for 30 months, who went through the war, will treat
them in the language they understand’38) ] he [Kanu] also uses derogatory
words to describe some government officials. He says: "It's not for the living
to respond to the dead but given the lack of reasoning prevalent in the #Zoo
Nigeria, I wish to assure @GarShehu (Garba Shehu), the Jihadi midget
@elrufai (Nasir El-Rufai) & that Fulani lapdog Femi Adesina that any army
they send to #Biafraland will die there. None will return alive". Femi Adesina
and Garba Shehu are both presidential aides while El-Rufai is the governor
of Kaduna State.’
‘5 June 2021 Twitter deletes his [Kanu’s] "controversial and inciting" post
threatening that Nigerian soldiers deployed to the country's south-east will be
killed.
‘14 August 2021 The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) suspends a
weekly stay-at-home protest it launched on 9 August 2021 in the country's
south-east over the detention of Nnamdi Kanu. In a statement, the group's
spokesperson Emma Powerful says the sit-at-home will, in the meantime, be
observed on the date of their Kanu's court appearances. He further says in
case they have any reason or directive from the IPOB highest command that
require them to reactivate the suspended weekly sit-at-home, then the
leadership will not hesitate to lift the suspension and continue with the civil
action.
‘22 October 2021 Accused by the Nigerian government of using
Radio Biafra to instigate violence in Lagos and other parts of the country
during the October 2020 #EndSARS protest [slogan calling for the
disbanding of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a unit of the Nigerian
police with a record of "abuses"]. Addressing the media in Abuja, Attorney-
General of the Federation (AGF) and Minister of Justice, Abubakar Malami,
says: "The EndSARS protests of October 2020 played into the sinister plans
of Nnamdi Kanu, whereby he seized the protests through subversive and
inciting online broadcasts and actively commanded and directed attacks on
security personnel and facilities". Abubakar Malami further claims that as a
result of the broadcasts, members of the Indigenous People
of Biafra (IPOB) attacked and killed security personnel and burnt down
police stations, correctional centres, Independent National Electoral
38 BBC News, ‘Muhammadu Buhari: Twitter deletes Nigerian leader's 'civil war' post’, 2 June 2021
Page 29 of 75
Commission (INEC) offices, bus terminals, the Palace of Oba of Lagos,
banks, hospitals, shopping malls and vehicles, amongst others’39
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8.4 Activities
8.4.1 Amnesty report in its 2016 report:
‘Despite these inflammatory statements [in an address to the World Igbo
Congress on 5 September 2015, Nnamdi Kanu see 9.3.1], all the IPOB
protests in Nigeria that Amnesty International researched and documented
for this report were largely peaceful. IBOP members and coordinators in
Nigeria that Amnesty International interviewed claimed that the IPOB
leadership has instructed its members to make their demands without the
use of force. According to a leading IPOB member, the movement is only
opposing “orchestrated violence against the people of Biafra” with words,
and the inflammatory remarks were made in the context of self-defence. He
further stated that “despite the mass killings by the Nigerian army and police,
we have remained calm and focused in the face of the provocation.”’ 40
8.4.2 Lifos, the COI unit of the Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket),
noted in December 2017 on IPOB’s non-violence claim:
‘IPOB has occasionally resorted to violent rhetorics, not least through the
transmissions of Radio Biafra. The occurrence of clashes between security
forces and activists, some resulting in casualties on both sides, has also
been reported during IPOB arrangements. Nevertheless, the movement
appears to have aspired to a non-violent approach with the realisation of a
secession through referendum. Apart from the Nigerian authorities’ view that
IPOB has performed acts of violence that are to be considered as terrorism
(see below), Lifos has not been able to identify information signaling that
incidents of violence committed during IPOB manifestations have been
endorsed by leaders of the movement.’41
8.4.3 The EASO ‘Targeting of individuals’ report of November 2018 citing several
‘IPOB’s activities include “distribution of flyers, awareness-raising amongst
the population, meetings, marches, and other gatherings (such as prayer
meetings).” Like MASSOB, IPOB claims to be a nonviolent organisation –
which the government contests.
‘However, IPOB’s leader Nnamdi Kanu has repeatedly expressed
“inflammatory statements” about President Muhammadu Buhari (describing
him as “terrorist-in-chief”), and the need to arm the movement: at the World
Igbo Congress in 2015, he told the audience: “we need guns and we need
bullets”. International Crisis Group also notes: “repudiating MASSOB’s
pledge for non-violence, Kanu has strongly endorsed violence as an
instrument for resuscitating Biafra.”
39 BBC Monitoring, ‘Biography - Nnamdi Kanu’, updated 23 January 2022, subscription only.
40 AI, ‘Nigeria: Bullets were raining everywhere’(p8), 24 November 2016
41 Lifos: Nigeria – Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), 19 December 2017
Page 30 of 75
‘March 2016, MASSOB and IPOB issued a statement together that all Fulani
herdsmen should retreat to northern Nigeria, as “their safety [could] no
longer be guaranteed”, because MASSOB and IPOB “can no longer tolerate
the systematic killing of our people and invasion of our land in the name of
cattle grazing”.
‘In April 2016, the Nigerian secret police accused IPOB of abducting and
killing 5 Hausa-Fulani residents, whose bodies were found buried in a forest
in Abia State together with 50 other unidentified bodies.
‘The allegations were denied by MASSOB, stating that “IPOB and MASSOB
are non-violent organizations”.’42
8.4.4 The same report stated: ‘Several sources report support by IPOB for the
NDA (Niger Delta Avengers) and vice verse. The NDA criticised President
Buhari for the detention of Kanu in October 2015 and threatened to attack oil
plants unless he was released.’ 43
8.4.5 With regards to activities linked to IPOB the IRBC response stated:
‘Various sources state Radio Biafra broadcasts from London (Amnesty
International 24 Nov. 2016, 5; Tayo and Mbah 9 Nov. 2017; BBC 5 May
2017). However, a Los Angeles Times (LA Times) article published in April
2019 indicates the broadcasts are conducted live from an undisclosed
location in Nigeria (LA Times 30 Apr. 2019). Tayo and Mbah state the daily
broadcasts are in English and in Igbo (Tayo and Mbah 9 Nov. 2017).
Sources further indicate broadcasts on IPOB's Radio Biafra are used to
advocate for an independent Biafra (Turnbull Aug. 2017, 30; BBC 5 May
2017; LA Times 30 Apr. 2019). The LA Times article states that Radio Biafra
is used by its main host, Emma Powerful, to organize protests, including a
boycott of the 2019 election (LA Times 30 Apr. 2019). The same source
further indicates that the broadcasts are illegal, and that activists report that
people caught listening have been beaten or arrested (LA Times 30 Apr.
2019). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources
consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this
Response.’ 44
8.4.6 Pulse, a Nigerian news website, reported in May 2018 that:
‘The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has announced a sit-at-home order
across the entire south east region as a mark of honour for the Nigerians
who died in the Civil War decades ago, as well as victims of ongoing
violence in the country.
‘In a statement signed by the proscribed group, the south east, south and
selected cities and states in Nigeria will witness a total lock-down. The
statement named Lagos state, Southern Kaduna, Benue state, and other
Middle Belt areas experiencing savage attacks, as locations where the sit-at-
home will take place.
42 EASO, ‘Nigeria: Targeting of individuals’ (page 82-83), November 2018

Page 31 of 75
‘It noted that the day will serve as a remembrance of the declaration of
Biafran Republic in 1967 as well as the opportunity to mourn victims of the
resulting war against the federal government that lasted three years.
‘For the sit-at-home, the group declared a curfew, with no human or
vehicular movement, in affected states between 6pm on Tuesday, May 29
and 6pm on Wednesday, May 30, 2018. Only ambulances and those
responding to emergencies are allowed on the roads.’45
8.4.7 The Nigerian Voice news website reported on 2 May 2019 of a similar call for
a ‘sit-at-home’ made by IPOB in 2019:
‘The Indigenous People of Biafra, IPOB, on Thursday, asked its members
and people of the Benue, Adamawa, Nasarawa, Kogi and Kaduna States, to
sit at home on May 30 [2019].
‘IPOB explained that the order was in protest over killings by Fulani
herdsmen and Boko Haram activities in the affected states.
‘The annual sit-at-home order is a move by the proscribed IPOB aimed at
pushing for the actualisation of the sovereign state of Biafra across the
South-East. It is expecting that Igbo and those sympathetic to the struggle
for Biafra on May 30 stay indoors.
‘In a statement signed by its spokesperson, Emma Powerful, the
secessionist group stated that there would be no vehicular movement both in
South East and the Middle Belt region of the country on May 30.’46
8.4.8 The Guardian – Nigeria reported on 30 May 2019 that: ‘Enugu State
residents Thursday partially observed the sit at home order by the
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) to protest and mark its “holy day” in
deference to those that have lost their lives to the struggle.’47
8.4.9 BBC monitoring reported on 26 August 2020:
‘A pro-secession radio station [Radio Biafra] has called on “Biafra”
supporters to defend themselves against attacks by security forces.
‘Radio Biafra made the call and invited listeners to comment on an attack
against members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) by security
forces on 23 August [in reference to clash between Nigerian security forces
and members of IPOB in the city of Enugu on 23 August 2020 – see section
9.5].’ 48
8.4.10 The DFAT country information report of December 2020 stated: ‘While the
two groups [IPOB and MASSOB] (and other Biafran secessionist
movements) have called for independence to occur through peaceful means,
such as via referendum, central authorities have strongly rejected such calls,
stating the country’s unity is “not negotiable.”’ 49
Back to Contents
45 Pulse, ‘Pro-Biafra group announces May 30 sit-at-home order…’, 25 May 2018

46 TNV, ‘Ipob Gives A Sit-at-home Order On 30th May 2019’, 2 May 2020
47 The Guardian – Nigeria, ‘Enugu residents partially comply with IPOB’s…’, 30 May 2019
48 BBC Monitoring, ‘Nigerian radio urges ‘Biafra’ supporters…’, subscription only, 26 August 2020
Page 32 of 75
8.5 Clashes between state and IPOB
8.5.1 The information in this section focuses on events since 2019. For information
about clashes prior to this, see Nigeria Watch
8.5.2 Today.ng reported in December 2019 that: ‘The Police command in
Anambra have confirmed the death of two police officers, allegedly attacked
and shot by suspected members of the proscribed Indigenous People of
Biafra (IPOB) at Oraifite in Ekwusigo council area of the state.’ 50
8.5.3 Pulse, a Nigerian news website, in October 2020 stated: ‘A total of seven
members of the group [IPOB] have now been killed since the #Endsars
protest started in the state.
‘Some IPOB members were reported to have engaged in a shoot-out with a
joint security team comprising soldiers and police deployed to quell their
activities at some flashpoints in the state.’51
8.5.4 Premium Times news website in October 2020 reported:
‘The police in Rivers State have accused members of the pro-Biafra group,
Indigenous People of Biafra, (IPOB), of hiding under the #EndSARS protests
to kill three police officers in the state…
‘Mr Mukan said IPOB invaded Oyigbo local government area on October 21,
launched “senseless and mindless attacks on the area command, Oyigbo
and Afam police stations, and burnt down the three stations.”
‘He said, “They also went to the adjoining Eberi-Omuma local government
area, where they attacked the Umuebulu police station.
‘“In all the attacks, several vehicles were burnt and three policemen were
hacked to death and burnt to ashes.”
‘Mr Mukan said the IPOB members also attempted to burn down Mile One
police station the same day, but were repelled by the police.
‘Four of the IPOB members were killed, while eight of them were arrested
during the attack, Mr Mukan said.
‘The police chief, who paraded the suspects before journalists, said 21
people have been arrested so far in the state.
‘He began his address to reporters by saying that his heart was heavy
because of the attacks on public and private property in the state. He,
however, said there was “relative peace” in Oyigbo, which is still under
curfew imposed by the Rivers State government.
‘The Rivers State governor, Nyesom Wike, on Friday declared one Stanley
Mgbere, said to be a leader of IPOB in the state, wanted over the violence in
Oyigbo.
‘The governor announced a N50 million reward to anyone with information
that could lead to the arrest and prosecution of Mr Mgbere.
‘IPOB, which wants an independent Biafra country, has been proscribed by
the Nigerian government which labels it a terrorist organisation. The group,
50 Today.ng, ‘Police confirm attack, killing of two officers…’, 3 December 2019
51 Pulse, ‘9 feared dead as soldiers and IPOB members clash in Rivers’, 25 October 2020
Page 33 of 75
however, says it wants to achieve its goal in a peaceful manner and through
a referendum.’52
Janes noted that on‘20 October 2020 – ‘In Oyigbo, Rivers state, six soldiers
were killed by Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) militants in an unspecified
attack. The report added that 50 unspecified weapons were stolen by the
militants during the attack.’ 53 Janes added that on‘2 November 2020 - In
Rivers State … [IPOB] militants had allegedly been involved in an attack
during which 10 security force personnel were killed in the town of Oyigbo in
the same state in separate attacks on 20 October and on an unspecified
earlier date.54
8.5.5 BBC News in a November 2020 article reported:
‘Nigerian security forces are carrying out extrajudicial killings in Oyigbo, say
residents of the town in southern Rivers state.
‘They accuse the army of carrying out revenge killings after authorities said
three policemen and six soldiers were killed by members of a proscribed
separatist group.
‘Amnesty International also said it had received reports that "soldiers are
allegedly invading homes" and that "some residents reported seeing dead
bodies on the street, allegedly shot by soldiers" [see Amnesty International
Nigeria Facebook post of November 2020].
‘Monday Bakor, 36, told BBC Igbo that police officers shot dead his fiancée
Queen Nwazuo on 22 October [2020] while they were both locking up their
barbing salon…
‘Police spokesman Nnamdi Omoni told the BBC that no report had been
made of the incident.
‘Mr Bakor said he could not do this because of a 24-hour curfew in the area
and pointed out the closest police stations had been burnt down…
‘Authorities say members of the Indigenous People of Biafra - Ipob,
proscribed as a terrorist organisation in 2017 by Nigeria's federal
government - targeted security operatives in Oyigbo as tensions spilled over
following the #EndSars protests against police brutality in the country…
‘Two police stations and a hospital in the area were burned on 21 October
as widespread mayhem erupted after protesters against police brutality
were shot at the Lekki toll gate in Lagos.
‘Encouraged by their leader Nnamdi Kanu, Ipob members are accused of
attacking security operatives in eastern Nigeria.
‘Clashes with the army in Abia state spilled over into the neighbouring
Oyigbo town in Rivers state.
‘Ipob activists are accused of burning down three police stations in the area
and killing three policemen, after one of them was killed during a protest at a
police station in Oyigbo.
52 Premium Times, ‘Police accuse IPOB members of killing three officers in Rivers’, 26 October 2020
53 Janes, website, subscription only, undated
54 Janes, website, subscription only, undated
Page 34 of 75
‘Rivers state Governor Nyesom Wike imposed a 24-hour curfew on 23
October in Oyigbo as the violence threatened to spiral out of control but said
on Monday that soldiers had not been killing people in the area.
‘"It is not correct that soldiers are going from house to house to kill. When the
Ipob killed the Army officers, they took their guns. It is normal for them [army]
to recover those guns. In any case, there are consequences when soldiers
are killed," Mr Wike said on Monday.
‘The governor last month banned demonstrations in the state on the eve of a
peaceful #EndSars protest but protesters defied him, marching to
government house in the state capital, Port Harcourt, and forcing him out to
address them.
‘Demonstrations by Ipob were banned in the state. Mr Wike recently placed
a bounty of 50 million naira ($130,000; £100,000) on the head of the group's
leader.
‘"This is clearly a terrorist group which existence, creed, mission and
activities are strongly denounced even by the government and peoples of
South-Eastern States of the country," he said.
‘Army spokesman, Major Charles Ekeocha, also denied that soldiers were
going door-to-door and killing people, telling a local radio station that there
was an ongoing operation in Oyigbo but that soldiers were not targeting
people.
‘"People have been spreading information based on their interests but when
you investigate you find out it's not true," he told government-owned Radio
Nigeria.’55
8.5.6 AllNews reported in October 2020: ‘… the leader of the proscribed
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) placed the N100 million bounty following
Governor Wike's directives to security agencies to arrest anybody connected
to the group.’56
8.5.7 The Guardian Nigeria reporting on the same incident stated:
‘Rivers State Governor, Nyesom Wike, has declared that alleged killing of
Igbo was a ploy to shift attention from activities of outlawed Indigenous
People of Biafra (IPOB) in Oyigbo Council Area of the state.
‘He described the allegation that he ordered the Nigerian Army to kill Igbo in
Oyigbo, as a politically motivated falsehood. Governor Wike made the
clarification on a live television programme in Port Harcourt yesterday,
maintaining that he imposed curfew on Oyigbo to restore calm after IPOB
members killed six soldiers, four policemen and destroyed all police stations
and courts in the area.
‘His words: “I know that this is not the first time IPOB has used Oyigbo as
launching ground. Security agencies are aware of this, but IPOB added a
new dimension to their activities this time.
55 BBC News, ‘Oyigbo clashes: “Nigerian security agents shot dead my fiancée”’, 3 November 2020
56 Allnews, IPOB: ‘Nnamdi Kanu Places N100 Million Bounty On Gov. Wike’, 27 October 2020
Page 35 of 75
‘“They killed six Army Officers and burnt one, killed four police officers and
destroyed all the police stations and court buildings. I imposed curfew to
restore calm and I proscribed IPOB activities anywhere in the state.”
‘In the statement issued by his Special Assistant on Media, Kelvin Ebiri, the
governor condemned IPOB for its effrontery to rename a local government in
the state and hoist its flag in a public school in Komkom Town.
‘Wike stated that the state government did not regret its stance on IPOB,
which he said, had been designated as a terrorist organisation by the
Federal Government, adding that the South-East Governors have never
supported IPOB and wondered why any governor of a Niger Delta should
tolerate the group.
‘He said during a search of some residents in Oyigbo, security agencies
uncovered shrines with IPOB flags and Nnamdi Kanu’s picture, maintaining
that if IPOB members were allowed to operate in Oyigbo, they would soon
overrun the state.’57
8.5.8 In January 2021 and following clashes between security forces and
members of ESN a curfew was imposed in Orlu town, Imo state from 6pm to
6am daily5859.
8.5.9 The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies stated in a March 2021 article:
‘Nigerian security forces and ESN [Eastern Security Network - a paramilitary
force in the region] have clashed in a series of skirmishes in 2021 that have
resulted in the deaths of several civilians in what has become known as
the Orlu crisis.’60
8.5.10 Premium Times in a news article from 9 May 2021 and reporting on police
officers killed stated:
‘At least one police officer was killed as suspected members of ESN in the
early hours of Thursday invaded a police facility in Obiozara, Ohaozara
Local Government Area of Ebonyi State.
‘The attackers were said to have invaded the station at about 3 a.m., and set
ablaze the office of the Divisional Police Officer (DPO) and the administrative
building…
‘Suspected members of the ESN on Thursday attacked a police facility in
Imo State. However, the attackers were repelled and 11 of them were killed,
according to an official account.
‘Army spokesperson Mohammed Yerima said the gunmen attacked the
police area command in Orlu, Imo State, Thursday night.
‘They were repelled by the police officers present who were then joined by
soldiers and other security operatives.
57 The Guardian - Nigeria, ‘Alleged killing of Igbo a distraction from IPOBS…’, 3 November 2020
58 Pulse, ‘Imo Governor Uzodinma imposes curfew in Orlu zone following unrest’, 25 January 2021
59 Premium Times, ‘Hours after shootings, Uzodinma declares curfew in 10 LGAs…’ 26 January 2021
60 ACforSC, ‘Nigeria’s diverse security threats’, 30 March 2021
Page 36 of 75
‘Mr Yerima said no security operative was killed in the attack while 11 of the
gunmen were killed. He said seven vehicles and several arms and
ammunition were also recovered from the attackers.’ 61
8.5.11 Nigeria Watch, which documents security incidents in the country, stated in
its annual report for 2020: ‘Violent clashes between the Indigenous People of
Biafra (IPOB) and security operatives claimed 44 lives in 2020. The group
was proscribed by the government in 2017 following clashes with security
operatives and disruption of socio-economic activities in the Southeast and
the South-South.’62
8.5.12 The media organisation ‘This Day’ reported in June 2021 that the Nigerian
Army had claimed that IPOB/ESN had killed 128 military police, 15 Civil
Defence officers and 31 community policing members. The army also
claimed that over 100 civilians had been killed for not supporting IPOB63.
Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of IPOB, responded to the claim by the Nigerian
Army, denying that IPOB/ESN were the gunmen responsible for a series of
violence incidents across South-East Nigeria as reported by ‘This Day’ in
June 202164.
8.5.13 Nigeria Watch, according to its ‘About us’ page is a research project
which has monitored lethal violence, conflicts, and human security in Nigeria
since 2006 and is hosted by the French Institute for Research in Africa65. Its
website using a range of sources, mainly Nigerian media organisations,
contains a database of violent events based on local media reporting.
Search results using the word ‘IPOB’ and taking data from the description
section, showed 87 incidents in 2021 resulting in 302 deaths of suspected
IPOB/ESN members the police and civilians. The highest recorded months
are shown below:
• May 2021 - 81 of those deaths occurred over 20 incidents during May
2021, of those 81 deaths 34 were state forces and 41 were suspected
IPOB / ESN members, civilians accounted for 6 of the deaths.
• June 2021 - 39 deaths were recorded of which 27 were suspected
IPOB / ESN members, 11 were state forces and 1 was a civilian. The
10 most recent incidents are shown in more detail below.66.
• August 2021 – 48 deaths recorded, 24 suspected IPOB / ESN, 8 were
state forces and 12 were reported to be civilians.
• October 2021 – 24 suspected IPOB / ESN, 6 state forces and 3
civilian.
The most recent incidents are shown in more detail below. Note that the
number of deaths recorded do not always correspond to the deaths listed in
the incident description67.
61 Premium Times, ’16 Police officers killed in Nigeria last week’, 9 May 2021
62 Nigeria Watch, ‘Tenth Report on Violence in Nigeria (2020)’, no date
63 This Day, ‘Army: IPOB Killed 128 Military, Police Personnel’, 8 June 2021
64 Nigerian Eye, ‘IPOB, ESN not unknown gunmen – Nnamdi Kanu insists’, 9 June 2021
65 Nigeria Watch, About us, undated
66 Nigeria Watch, database – IPOB, results searched 24 January 2022
67 Nigeria Watch, database – IPOB, results searched 24 January 2022
Page 37 of 75
Date Incident description State Suspected Civilian
deaths IPOB / ESN deaths
deaths
1801/2022 Gunmen Kill 2, Enugu - : Gunmen 2
attacked a meeting being held by
members of Enugu South Local
Government's chapter of the All
Progressive Congress (APC) and
killed its State Youth Leader, Mr.
Kelvin Ezeoha and another member of
the party.
17/01/2022 Army vs IPOB, Anambra - Some 10

members of IPOB were gunned down
by the Army during a clearance
operation aimed at ridding the
hoodlums. Troops also recovered
several weapons and insignia. Due to
the nature of the story, it is assumed
that 10 people were killed.
14/01/2022 Gunmen Attack, Imo - Gunmen 1
attacked a police headquarters, killing
an inspector and leaving another
policeman who died from the injuries
he sustained.
10/01/2022 Gunmen Kill 2, Anambra - 2 people 2
were shot dead in Ekwulobia by
gunmen who were enforcing a sit-at-
home.
10/01/2022 Gunmen Kill 2, Anambra - 5 people 2
were shot dead in Uwani, by gunmen
who were enforcing a sit-at home
order.
03/01/2022 Police vs Gunmen, Imo - One person 1
was killed and many others wounded
as gunmen attacked the palace of Eze
Imo, Dr. E. C. Okeke.
29/12/2021 Gunmen vs Ex-Customs Officer, 1

Anambra - Some gunmen killed a
retired Customs Officer identified as
Mr. Nkemakonam Ume-Agudosi in his
hometown.
29/12/2021 Gunmen vs Police, Anambra - Some 1
gunmen killed a policeman and injured
another in attack at on a health centre.
25/12/2021 IPOB vs Policemen, Anambra - Three 3

policemen en route to the Anambra
International Airport killed by
suspected members IPOB.
18/12/2021 Gunmen vs Police, Anambra - 2

Gunmen attacked a police checkpoint,
killed two policemen, and burnt their
patrol vehicle.
17/12/2021 Gunmen vs Man, Anambra - Some 1
unknown gunmen shot dead a young
man in the early hours of the day.
Page 38 of 75
Date Incident description State Suspected Civilian
deaths IPOB / ESN deaths
deaths
25/11/2021 Gunmen vs Police, Anambra - 2
Gunmen killed two policemen and
burnt their bodies.
23/11/2021 Gunmen vs Police, Imo - A policeman 1
was killed by some gunmen when they
attacked and burnt a divisional police
headquarters.
04/11/2021 Gunmen vs Police, Anambra - 6 6
operatives of the Nigerian Police were
gunned down by unidentified gunmen.
29/10/2021 Gunmen vs Police, Anambra - 4 4
policemen were shot dead by unknown
gunmen who stormed the political rally
of the All Progressive Grand Alliance
(APGA).
28/10/2021 Army vs BNG, Abia - Biafran National 1
Guard gunman was killed by troops of
Exercise Golden Dawn.
24/10/2021 Gunmen vs Police, Ebonyi - A 1 2
policeman and a hoodlum were killed
when some gunmen tried to attack a
police station.
21/10/2021 Gunmen vs Police, Imo - A female 1
police officer was shot dead by some
unidentified gunmen.
21/10/2021 Army vs IPOB , Abia - 5 members of 5
IPOB were killed when IPOB members
clashed with some soldiers.
11/10/2021 Gunmen vs Man, Enugu - A security 1
guard of the University of Nigeria
Teaching Hospital, shot dead by
gunmen who were trying to enforce the
sit-at-home order of IPOB.
8.5.14 The BBC monitoring timeline for IPOB updated to 23 January 2022 included
the following incidents:
‘6 December 2019 - The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) claims
responsibility for the attack on Nigeria's transport minister, Rotimi Amaechi in
Madrid, Spain. In a statement, the group's spokesman Emma Powerful says:
"Yes, IPOB beat Amaechi the transport minister based on the standing order
given by our leader Mazi Nnamdi Kanu to reprimand those politicians who
think they have arrived"…
‘22 October 2020 - IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu dismisses an allegation that
he ordered the destruction of properties belonging to the people of the
South-West geopolitical zone. He says that his statement was twisted by his
enemies to suit their purposes, and urged his followers and the entire Igbo to
guard against any destruction in the ongoing #EndSARS protests across
Nigeria…
‘13 December 2020 - The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) launches
Eastern Security Network (ESN), a security outfit for the South-East and
Page 39 of 75
South-South regions. IPOB spokesperson Emma Powerful says the
establishment of ESN is due to the failure of governments of the two regions
to set up regional security outfits like their counterparts in other regions
despite the worsening insecurity in the country…
‘20 February 2021 - Several people are feared dead and property destroyed
as members of the Eastern Security Network set up by the Indigenous
Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) clash with a combined team of police and army in
Orlu in Imo state, south-east Nigeria.
‘20 February 2021 -The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) says the
military raid of Orlu and Orsu Local Government Areas of Imo State on 18
February 2021 marked the beginning of the second Nigeria/Biafra war. This
is after the military admitted launching of land and air operations against
operatives of Eastern Security Network (ESN), a vigilante group protecting
the eastern region's people against "terrorists and killer herdsmen". In a
statement, the IPOB spokesperson Emma Powerful says: "We wish to bring
to the attention of the whole world that the Nigeria military has, at last,
brought war to Biafra land. Supported by other security agencies, including
police and the Department of State Services, they came with military jets,
tanks and heavy war equipment against us. Yes, the second Nigeria/Biafra
war has begun! It began on Thursday, 18 February 2021 at Orlu in Imo
State, Biafra land"…
‘5 April 2021 - …gunmen attacked Owerri Correctional Prison in Imo State
and freed over 1,500 inmates. They also razed the Imo State Police
Command headquarters including the vehicles parked in the premises.
‘5 April 2021 - The Inspector-General of Police, Mohammed Adamu, says
preliminary investigation has revealed that the attack on the Imo State police
headquarters and a correctional facility was carried out by members of the
Eastern Security Network (ESN) which was established by the proscribed
Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB). In a statement, he directs the
commissioner of police in Imo to carry out holistic investigations into the
incident with a view to fishing out the perpetrators and bringing them to
justice. IPOB's leader, Nnamdi Kanu, had in December 2020 launched ESN
to protect the people of South-East and South-South regions from militants
allegedly trooping in from the North
‘5 April 2021 - The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) denies responsibility
over attacks on police and correctional service headquarters in Imo State. In
a statement, IPOB spokesperson Emma Powerful says the group was
formed on the principle of peace and would not compromise its principles.
He says: "The attention of IPOB has been drawn to the fallacious and
fabricated reports that it is involved in the attack of prison and police
headquarters in Imo. IPOB and Eastern Security Network (ESN) are known
groups, not unknown gunmen. ESN is in the bush chasing terrorists and has
no business with the said attacks"
‘24 April 2021 - The Nigeria police, army and intelligence services, in a joint
operation storm the operational headquarters of the Eastern Security
Network (ESN), the military wing of the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB)
in Awomama, Oru East Local Government Area of Imo State, killing seven
Page 40 of 75
members of the group. The group is said to be responsible for the attack on
the Imo State police headquarters and the headquarters of the Nigerian
Correctional Service on 5 April, 2021. Among those killed is Commander
Ikonso, identified as the Vice President-designate of IPOB
‘24 April 2021 - IPOB confirms the killing of one of its commanders, warning
that Imo State Governor, Hope Uzodinma will pay dearly. In a statement,
IPOB's spokesperson Emma Powerful, says: "The killing of the heroic
innocent Biafrans protecting our communities and towns from Fulani
terrorists herdsmen masquerading as cattle herders in cold blood is very
painful. The Supreme Court Administrator of Imo State Hope Uzodinma and
all those who had a hand in this wickedness will pay dearly"
‘6 May 2021 - Nigerian army claims killing 11 members of the Indigenous
People of Biafra (IPOB) following an attempted attack on the police
command in Imo state. In a statement, the army spokesman, Mohammed
Yerima, says: "A gang of IPOB/ESN terrorists mounted in vehicles on
Thursday, 6 May 2021, stormed Orlu town with intention to attack the
compound housing the Area Command and Police Station in Orlu LGA of
Imo State. The attackers were resisted by vigilant police personnel at the
Area Command and were completely obliterated when a reinforcement team
of the Nigerian Army and Nigerian Air Force arrived at the scene. Following
the encounter, 11 IPOB/ESN terrorists were neutralised while four AK47,
one G3 and one Pump Action Rifles as well as a Berretta Pistol, charms and
assorted ammunitions were recovered"
‘12 May 2021 - Police in Delta State arrest nine suspected members of the
Indigenous People of Biafra and recover 13 stolen police rifles. Parading the
suspects in Asaba, the state capital, Hafiz Inuwa, the state commissioner of
police, alleges that the men, who were arrested in April, were behind the
numerous attacks on policemen in Asaba and environs.
‘15 May 2021 - Police in Imo State arrest five people suspected to be
members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) over the alleged killing
of Joseph Nwaka, a police sergeant.
‘27 May 2021 - The Nigerian army in conjunction with other security
agencies raid an operational base of the Eastern Security Network, an
armed arm of the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), kill seven suspected
members of the group. The raid was carried on the base located at
Agbomchia Forest of Rivers State. In a statement, the army spokesman
Mohammed Yerima says: "In the firefight that ensued during the
clearance/raid operation, seven IPOB/ESN members were neutralized while
five suspects arrested. Various items belonging to the criminals including
arms and ammunition were also recovered by the security forces. The camp
was promptly destroyed while suspects and corpses were handed over to
the police for further actions"
‘27 May 2021 Police in south Nigeria's Imo State accuses the Indigenous
People of Biafra and its security arm, the Eastern Security Network (ESN) of
killing Ahmed Gulak, a chieftain of the All Progressives Congress (APC)
party and a former political adviser to former President Goodluck Jonathan.
Gulak was shot dead in Owerri, Imo State on 30 May 2021, while on his way
Page 41 of 75
to Sam Mbakwe airport. Police in a statement say the killers were traced to
their location within Imo where they were shot dead during a gun battle with
security operatives. "The six hoodlums who carried out the killings and four
other members of their gang were fatally injured. The assailants were
identified as members of the proscribed IPOB and ESN"
‘31 May 2021 IPOB denies any involvement in the killing of Ahmed Gulak, a
former adviser to ex-President Goodluck Jonathan. The group, in a
statement by its spokesperson, Emma Powerful says: "We state without
equivocation that IPOB knows nothing about the said assassination. In the
first place, what threat did the late Gulak constitute to our cause to warrant
his elimination? We had nothing in common with him and could not have in
any way killed him
‘6 June 2021 The Nigeria police say they have killed the Indigenous People
of Biafra (IPOB)/Eastern Security Network (ESN) commander Joseph Uka
Nnachi aka Dragon alongside five of his members. They allege the
commander was responsible for over 70 per cent of the killings carried out
by ESN in the south-east. According to police, the six were killed during an
attempted attack on Imo State police headquarters. The police allege that
the other five suspects killed alongside Dragon were his key men"
‘14 July 2021 Two Nigerian soldiers are killed as troops repel attack after
operatives of the Indigenous People of Biafra's militant arm, Eastern Security
Network (ESN), attacked its location at Iggah and Asaba checkpoint in
Enugu State. In a statement, the army states that the troops had been
deployed to checkmate the activities of gunmen at Adani community of Uzo-
Uwani Local Government Area of Enugu State, on 13 July 2021 when they
came under the attack of the ESN
’29 October 2021 - The Nigerian army kills four members of the Indigenous
People of Biafra/Eastern Security Network (IPOB/ESN) in a "fierce"
encounter at Idemili South local government area of Anambra State. A
soldier also died in the crossfire. In a statement, the army spokesperson,
Onyema Nwachukwu says arms and ammunition were recovered from the
group during an encounter…
’29 November 2021 - The federal government condemns the murder of two
police officers in Anambra State, stating that those who carried out the
killings, videotaped them, and circulated the footage will be apprehended
and brought to justice. In a statement, the minister of information, Lai
Mohammed, describes the killing as horrific and barbaric and accuses
members of the Eastern Security Network (ESN), the armed wing of
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) of executing the two officers in cold
blood. He stresses that the targeting and killing of security agents, under any
guise, is a direct attack on Nigeria and will not be tolerated. The officers
were abducted on 27 November…’68
8.5.15 See also the following links to incidents where IPOB have denied
involvement.
68 BBC Monitoring, IPOB Timeline, updated 23 January 2022, subscription only
Page 42 of 75
• Nigeria police chief sacked after jailbreak attack, African News, 6 April
2021
• Gunmen Free More Than 1,800 Inmates in Attack on Nigerian Prison |
World News US News, 6 April 2021
• Mayhem in Anambra, Abia: 9 dead, Zone 13 Police Hq attacked
(vanguardngr.com), 20 April 2021
Back to Contents
9. Treatment of IPOB
9.1 State treatment: security presence in South East zone
9.1.1 An expert comment by Sola Tayo, a BBC journalist, and Fidelis Mbah, a
journalist, published on the Chatham House website in November 2017
stated:
‘In September [2017] Nigeria’s military launched Operation Python Dance II,
its second military exercise in South East Nigeria this year. It was carried out
with the intention of quashing any calls for secession in a region with a long
history of antagonism with the central Nigerian state…
‘… Python Dance II escalated into a violent confrontation in which supporters
of secessionist group the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) claim some of
their members were killed, and the home of the group’s leader, Nnamdi
Kanu, was raided. Kanu has not been seen in public since the raid on his
house.’ 69
9.1.2 The report continued that:
‘Indeed, in the southeast, Operation Python Dance II seems to have
emboldened rather than silenced IPOB supporters, through adding to the
feeling of discrimination felt in the region and by making a martyr out of
Kanu. And in any case, IPOB may be the most prominent, but it is not the
only group advocating secession. MASSOB is also accused of violence by
Nigeria's government, and, like Kanu, Uwazuruike has previously been
imprisoned, accused of treason and released. There are several other pro-
Biafra groups in the southeast but internal disputes have so far prevented
them from presenting a unified front.
‘The umbrella body of Igbo people, Ohaneze Ndigbo, has openly voiced its
concerns and is calling for the government to address the grievances of the
region. They may not all support IPOB's rhetoric but are vehemently against
labelling the group a terrorist organization, and condemn attacks against its
members.
‘Kanu’s continued absence and violent confrontations risk igniting an
insurrection that could destabilize Nigeria’s southeast. The federal
government’s response and tactics employed by Nigeria’s military should be
called into question as forces are stretched on many fronts. In addition to the
Boko Haram crisis in the northeast, the military has also been deployed to
combat a rise in kidnapping of civilians and violence in the oil producing
Page 43 of 75
Niger Delta region. The proscribing of IPOB could in fact lead to a fully
armed insurrection, plunging the country into deeper insecurity and sewing
further division in this fragmented nation.’ 70
9.1.3 The EASO report also included sources which commented on Operation
Python Dance noting that ‘In March 2018, an article in the World Politics
Review reports that, “since the launch of Operation Python Dance II, the
southeast has effectively become a police state. Igbos who live elsewhere in
the country and who returned for Christmas celebrations last year reported
being detained and harassed for hours by Nigerian soldiers conducting stop-
and-search operations.”’ 71
9.1.4 The USSD Human Rights report 2020 stated: ‘The government continued to
turn to the armed forces to address internal security concerns, due to
insufficient capacity and staffing of domestic law enforcement agencies. The
constitution authorizes the use of the military to “[s]uppress insurrection and
act in aid of civil authorities to restore order.” Armed forces were part of
continuing joint security operations throughout the country.’ 72
9.1.5 A report by ECP - Escola de Cultura de Pau, Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona and published by ReliefWeb from July 2020 noted: ‘…with regard
to the situation in Biafra… Various local and international human rights
organisations noted that during 2019, violent persecution of social actors and
civilians suspected of being sympathizers of the independence movement
[IPOB] (considered a terrorist movement by the Nigerian state) continued.’73
9.1.6 Whilst not an area in the South East zone, Pulse, a Nigerian news website,
published in October 2020 an article concerning Rivers State, an area where
Igbo live:
‘Governor Nyesom Wike of Rivers has signed an executive order to reinforce
the ban on the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) and its activities in the
State.
‘He made this known in a statement by Mr Kelvin Ebiri, Special Assistant
(Media) to the Governor.….
‘According to the statement… “the State government is opposed to the
presence and activities of the legally-proscribed and anarchic IPOB and
whatever it stands for in Rivers State… we have everything against the
presence and activities of the legally-proscribed IPOB and whatever that
group stands for in Rivers State,” the governor warned.
‘“This is clearly a terrorist group which existence, creed, mission and
activities are strongly denounced even by the Government and peoples of
South-Eastern States of the country.
‘“I have, therefore, signed the executive order to reinforce the total ban on
IPOB and its activities in Rivers State or any part thereof and nothing will
stop us from enforcing this ban in its entirety,’’ he said.
72 USSD, 2020 Human Rights Report, Nigeria (Section 1), 30 March 2021
73 ECP, ‘Alert 2020! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding’, July 2020
Page 44 of 75
‘The statement also added that Wike also “directed security agencies and
the Chairmen of Local Government Areas to fish out and resolutely deal with
any member of IPOB found in any community following the executive order
and other legal instruments’’.’74
9.1.7 Africa Confidential, a current affairs journal, of April 2021 observed
‘Since January [2021], Nigeria's armed forces have been raiding cities in the
South East region, on a search for training camps of the Eastern Security
Network (ESN), the armed wing of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)
secessionist group. When hundreds of soldiers stormed Orlu, 40 kilometres
north of Imo state capital Owerri, on 21 January in Hilux trucks, their arrival
triggered pandemonium.
‘Local media reported four civilian casualties and that the soldiers were in
town to retaliate after a couple of military personnel had been harassed in
the area. In February, military helicopters were also seen patrolling the air
above parts of Orlu.
‘When the militia launched in December [2020], with the promise of
addressing security issues in the region, it was accompanied by a strong
caveat. A statement signed by IPOB spokesman Emma Powerful stressed
that the ESN was not a security outfit gunning for secession in disguise. Its
sole aim, the group said, is “to halt every criminal activity and terrorist attack
on Biafraland”, comparing itself to Amotekun, the regional vigilante group to
protect farmers in the south-west, and Miyetti Allah, the umbrella
organisation of herders…
‘The ESN is capitalising on herder-farmer clashes, presenting itself as the
defender of the farmers, and by extension, the “indigenes”, a fissile concept
in a federation which is meant to guarantee free movement to all citizens.
‘IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu says ESN was launched in response to soldiers
killing dozens of unarmed civilians in Oyigbo, Rivers State, last November
[2020]. The government said it was a reprisal after three policemen and six
soldiers had been killed by secessionist agitators. Governor Nyesom Wike
placed a 50 million naira (£95,000) bounty on the head of the state's IPOB
leader, Stanley Mgbere, in October [2020]. The ESN has been spreading
propaganda including videos of armed men in red masks and berets on
Facebook and other social media networks…
‘Many in the south-east are sympathetic to the Biafran cause but will not
back a group using violence to achieve it. However, they are unlikely to give
information to security agencies that will lead to the arrest of supporters of
the group.’75
9.1.8 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) featured on their website a blog
post by John Campbell, a former Ambassador who is described on CFR’s
expert biography page as ‘a senior fellow for Africa policy studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC’76. The post from 18 May
2021 stated
74 Pulse, ‘Gov. Wilke signs executive order proscribing IPOB in Rivers State’, 29 October 2020
75 Africa Confidential, ‘States rethink security’, 15 April 2021
76 CFR, Expert Bio – John Campbell, undated
Page 45 of 75
‘Following President Muhammadu Buhari's May 11 [2021] meeting with the
military service chiefs and the inspector general of police, Nigerian military
sources confirmed that some troops were being moved from Borno State,
where they have been engaged with Boko Haram and other jihadis, to the
South East, to counter "bandits" and the regional separatist organization, the
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), along with its security force, the Eastern
Security Network (ESN). The army and police have sustained increased
casualties in the South East, so aircraft—including combat helicopters—will
be "deployed to conduct massive raids" on the hideouts of "criminals" from
the IPOB and ESN. Another source suggested traditional rulers, community
heads, and chiefs could be arrested to warn them against "conniving with the
agitators." The police announced yesterday the launch of Operation Restore
Peace to confront the IPOB and ESN.’77
9.1.9 Punch, A Nigerian newspaper, in a May 2021 online article reported:
‘The acting Inspector General of Police [IGP], Usman Baba, on Tuesday
declared war on Biafra agitators and gunmen attacking and destroying police
infrastructure in the South-East and South-South regions and ordered their
extermination.
…
‘In an address earlier, before declaring open the operation codenamed,
Operation RT – Restore Peace, which was witnessed by governors of the
South-East states and heads of other security agencies, Usman stated that
the operation was for the stabilisation of the security order in the geopolitical
zone.’78
9.1.10 The CFR in a further post from May 2021 and commenting on Usman
Baba’s address stated:
‘The Nigerian government has launched Operation Restore Peace, designed
to destroy the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist group in
support of independence for the former breakaway Republic of Biafra, and
its security wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). According to Acting
Inspector General of Police (IGP) Usman Baba, the security services are not
to be constrained by human rights considerations…
‘So, the IGP is not only giving the green light to human rights violations, but
also promising his protection for those who commit them. In addition, he is
threatening those who might hang back with the loss of pension benefits!
Usman is implying that he has the full support of President Muhammadu
Buhari.
‘Other reporting79 alleges that security services are conducting house-to-
house searches in Ebonyi, Imo, and Rivers states, all with large Igbo
populations. Local people are saying that the security services are rounding
up young men and their family members and taking them away for
questioning. IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu has dubbed the police initiative
"Operation Massacre Biafrans."
77 CFR, ‘Nigerian Government Threatens to Use the Hammer in the South East’, 19 May 2021
78 Punch, ‘IGP declares war on Biafran agitators, criminal element’, 19 May 2021
79 Sahara Reporters, ‘Nigerian Army, Police Conduct House-To-House Raid For IPOB…’19 May 2021
Page 46 of 75
‘Usman Baba is a northern Muslim from Yobe State—long a Boko Haram
stronghold. He is a career police officer. There is nothing in his background
that would suggest an understanding of southern and eastern grievances
and fears of the "establishment of a Fulani Caliphate."
‘Operation Restore Peace and Baba's rhetoric would seem tailor-made to
feed the revived Biafra secessionist movement and general southern and
Christian fears of a Fulani-Muslim onslaught against Christians. It should be
anticipated that local people will fight back viciously and the security
services—as directed by Usman Baba—will respond in kind. It is to be
hoped that President Buhari will repudiate Baba's rhetoric and methods, not
least for the sake of the unity of Nigeria.’80
Back to Contents
9.2 Break-up of/use of excessive force against demonstrations
9.2.1 The EASO ‘Targeting of individuals’ report of November 2018 citing several
media news sources stated: ‘As MASSOB and IPOB have the same aim, are
often taken together in media reports, and the authorities tend to react in the
same way on rallies, demonstrations and members/supporters of both
groups…’ 81
9.2.2 The International Centre for not-for-profit Law stated in a report updated in
November 2020: ‘In 2015, in Rivers State in the south of the country, pro-
Biafra marches were banned by the state governor. In the run-up to
gubernatorial elections in Bayelsa State, also in the south, protests were
similarly banned by the Nigeria Police. In January 2017, the police also
broke up a protest in favor of US President Donald Trump by the
Independent Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), which led to the death of a
protestor.’82
Back to Contents
9.3 Killings, discrimination, violence and harassment
‘The military Special Board, set up to investigate the events of 30 May 2016
[Remembrance day when at least 60 people were killed], did not find any
wrongdoing by the army, reporting only on the arrest of 14 persons during
the demonstrations on those days. In August 2017, after numerous protests
and calls for investigation from both national and international organisations,
the Governor of Anambra State apologised to IPOB members for the events
of 30 May 2016.
‘Another major clash between the armed forces and the pro-Biafra activists
occurred in October 2015 when the IPOB-leader Kanu was arrested on
charges of treason and ethnic incitement. A wave of street protests and
arrests followed. Kanu was released on 25 April 2017. However, on 22
80 CFR, ‘Nigerian Initiative Against Separatists Looks Nasty’, 21 May 2021

82 ICNL, ‘Civic Freedom Monitor: Nigeria’ (section: Legal analysis - Enforcement), 5 October 2019
Page 47 of 75
September 2017, soldiers attacked the house where Kanu was staying and
killed 28 people in the surroundings. The government denied the claim.’ 83
9.3.2 The EASO ‘Targeting of individuals’ report of November 2018 stated:
‘The Nigerian federal authorities consider IPOB’s activism as a threat to the
national security, “even if the support for an independent Biafra does not
appear to be strong, even not among the Igbo”, as Lifos [the COI unit of the
Swedish Migration Agency - Migrationsverket] notes. The ban on IPOB in
September 2017 implies that all activities were declared illegal; even
possession of IPOB material can lead to arrest and prosecution. Several
members have been charged with treason which is punishable with the
death penalty in Nigeria.’84
9.3.3 Agnes Callamard, United Nations Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions [SR] stated in a statement of September
2019 following a visit to Nigeria that:
‘… nation-wide and broader regional pressures applied against Nigeria’s
diverse eco-political-economic systems are producing localised systems and
country-wide patterns of violence, many of which are seemingly spinning out
of control. They are claiming the lives of thousands and include, for instance,
arbitrary killings in the context of: The repression of the Indigenous People of
Biafra (IPOB)…
In yet other eco-political systems of violence, the security response is
dangerously quasi-prospective, with individuals, communities and
associations actively targeted for what they may have done decades ago, or
for what they may do or may become, rather than for what they are doing or
have done (e.g. members of the IMN, IPOB).’ 85
9.3.4 Agnes Callamard also reported in September 2019 on killings and arrests:
‘Since 2015, members of IPOB have faced arbitrary arrests, torture and
extrajudicial executions, predominantly in the context of demonstrations.
Between 2015 and 2016, it is alleged that law enforcement officials killed at
least 100 IPOB members in different events in Aba (Abia State), and Awka
and Onitsha (Anambra State). On 29 and 30 May 2016, during a
demonstration, the Nigerian military opened fire on IPOB members and
bystanders in Onitsha. At least 60 persons were killed and over 70 injured,
mainly shot in the back. The exact number of deaths remains unknown.
‘Between 12 and 14 September 2017, IPOB followers gathered at the family
home of their leader, Nnamdi Kanu, in Afara-Ukwu (Abia State) to take part
in a peaceful vigil. The military operation (as part of Python Dance II) carried
out in the afternoon of 14 September 2017 is alleged to have resulted in the
killing of 150 persons. The IPOB leader went in exile and some of its
followers remain disappeared since then. No Nigerian soldiers were killed in
the operation. Following this event, the Federal High Court in Abuja
proscribed IPOB and designated it as a terrorist group.
83 EASO, ‘Nigeria: Targeting of individuals’ (page 54-55), November 2018

85 OHCHR, ‘End of visit statement of the Special Rapporteur…’ (para 11 & 14), 2 September 2019
Page 48 of 75
‘During my [Agnes Callamard, United Nations Special Rapporteur] visit, I met
with several survivors of various security attacks and witness to killings. I
have received a large number of allegations of killings by the Military Forces
in 2017, 2018 and 2019…
‘On March 8, 2018, the African Commission [for Human Rights, ACHR]
issued Provisional Measures, asking the Federal Government of Nigeria to
rescind its decision branding IPOB and its members as terrorists as well as
the proscription and “Not to take any further action so as to avoid irreparable
damage to the Victim, IPOB and its members, pending the decision of the
Commission on this Communication.”
‘I am not aware of any steps taken to implement the ACHR interim decision
at the time of writing these preliminary observations.’86
9.3.5 The SR’s same report stated that:
‘The Government has acknowledged in 2016 that “in the course of security
operations against Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria and recently in the
context of countering militant and separatist groups like the Islamic
Movement of Nigeria (IMN), the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and the
Niger Delta Avengers, the Nigerian Military have been accused of
extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrarily arrest and detention”. The report
further states that all allegations of torture, extrajudicial killings and war
crimes made against the Nigerian Military will be investigated.’ 87
9.3.6 The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees – Germany reported, based
on various sources, that that on 2 December 2019:
‘…. police went to the home of lawyer Ifeanyi Ejiofor in Oraifite (federal state
of Anambra). Ejiofor is representing the wanted leader of the banned pro-
Biafra organisation IPOB, Nnamdi Kanu, in his trial. According to the police,
they were investigating a case of abduction and intended to arrest suspects
in Ejiofor’s house. According to IPOB, the police allegedly attacked the
house, shooting at people who were inside. At least two police officers and
two people in the house are believed to have been killed in the course of a
violent altercation between IPOB supporters and the police. The police
burned the house down. In connection with the outbreak of violence John
Abang, chief of police in the federal state of Anambra, declared IPOB
member Ejiofor and his supporters to be wanted persons. The whereabouts
of Ejiofor, who was not at home during the clash, is since unknown.’88
9.3.7 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) in a December 2019
regional overview noted: ‘Elsewhere in the country, the attempted arrest of
an Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) lawyer sparked clashes between
security forces and IPOB youth, causing the death of two officers and two
IPOB supporters.’89
9.3.8 The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) – Germany reported
in August 2020 that:
86 OHCHR, ‘End of visit statement of the Special Rapporteur…’ (para 47-52), 2 September 2019
87 OHCHR, ‘End of visit statement of the Special Rapporteur…’ (para 74), 2 September 2019
88 BAMF, ‘Nigeria: briefing notes’ (p6), 9 December 2019
89 ACLED, ‘Regional Overview – Africa (1 - 7 December 2019)’ (p2), 10 December 2019
Page 49 of 75
‘On 23 August 2020 the police stormed the Community Secondary School
(aka St Patrick Secondary School) in the city of Enugu (capital of the south-
eastern state of the same name) in the Emene district. Members of the
separatist organization Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) held a meeting
there. The separatists allegedly resisted the attempt to arrest them and
overpowered the police. More than a dozen patrol cars with officers of the
police, the military, and the Department of State Services (DSS), the
domestic intelligence service, had appeared to reinforce the security forces,
reports said. Violent clashes then occurred on the school grounds and along
the old Abakaliki Road between the school and the Catholic Church of St
Joseph. The reports on the number of victims vary. On 23 August 2020, the
IPOB spokesperson, Emma Powerful, announced that 21 IPOB members
had been killed and 47 arrested in the course of the violent clashes.
According to the police chief of the state of Enugu, the police arrested four
IPOB members; four people were killed in the incident, he said. A DSS
spokesperson informed that two DSS members had been killed.’90
9.3.9 PM News reporting on the same incident noted:
‘Ahmed Abdulrahman, the Police Commissioner in Enugu state has given an
official account of the bloody clash between security agents and members of
the Indigenous People of Biafra(IPOB). But it is not all the truth as IPOB
offered a different version.
‘The clash at Emene Community Secondary School in Enugu on Sunday led
to many deaths. The police gave an official death toll of four. But IPOB
claimed 20 of their members were killed. Abdurahman said his command
also arrested five IPOB members.
‘One of the arrested IPOB members, Ebube Agu told journalists that they
were having a martial art training for self defence when they were attacked
by the security agents. Agu said that they were not armed as claimed by the
police.
‘Abdulrahman, in his own account said trouble started when operatives of
the Department of State Services (DSS) went on a covert operation in
Emene early Sunday morning. But they were overwhelmed and two of their
officials allegedly abducted by IPOB members. Abdurahman said that the
DSS operatives called in the police and the army for reinforcement. He noted
that the police were able to rescue one of the DSS officials in a building
where he was held hostage. The DSS later claimed it lost two of its men.
‘”However, four persons lost their lives; two were hacked to death with
machetes and one passerby set ablaze.
‘“Many of the IPOB members also escaped with bullet wound and police
have started tracing them,” he said.
‘Abdurrahman urged health facilities to treat anyone with bullet wounds but
should report such cases to the police. In a statement, the DSS confirmed
that said two of its men died during the clash. The service said a
comprehensive investigation had commenced into the incident, according to
its Public Relations Officer, Dr Peter Afunanya.
90 BAMF, ‘Nigeria: briefing notes’ (p5), 24 August 2020
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‘“The DSS wishes to inform the public that its patrol team was, today
(Sunday), attacked in Emene, Enugu State by members of the outlawed
Indigenous People of Biafra.
‘“The service lost two personnel in what was clearly an unprovoked violent
attack launched by IPOB on the team.”’91
9.3.10 The Guardian Nigeria reported in August 2020:
‘Igbo socio-cultural organisation, Nzuko Umunna, has charged Enugu State
Governor Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi to set up a judicial commission of inquiry to
unravel the circumstances surrounding the killing of unarmed Igbo youths in
the state by suspected security agents or face them in court.
‘Persons suspected to be state security officials allegedly opened fire on
unarmed youths who were having physical exercise training in Emene and
massacred them in cold blood on August 23, 2020.
‘Represented by its counsel, Edwin Anikwem, the group said the unprovoked
attack and murder of innocent and unarmed indigenes of Enugu caused
unrest within Enugu and environs, as the citizens live in fear…
‘Meanwhile, Good Conscience Forum (GCF) says the call by the leader of
the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Nnamdi Kanu, on his members to
attack security operatives is a “significant threat to peace and tranquility in
Nigeria”. Kanu had reportedly told IPOB to retaliate further killing of its
members by security operatives.
‘The group, in a statement signed by its National President, Dr. Edwin Ogbu,
at the weekend, urged relevant authorities to take proactive action to avoid a
breakdown in law and order.
‘Department of State Services (DSS) had said that two of its operatives were
killed penultimate Sunday in a clash with IPOB members in Enugu State.
‘“The GCF is in receipt of the call by the leader of IPOB for its members to
attack security operatives in South East Nigeria.
‘“We consequently condemn the call by Kanu in very strong terms, as
Nigeria is a sovereign country governed by extant laws in the conduct of its
affairs. We also condemn the recent clash between security operatives and
IPOB members in Enugu that led to the death of two security operatives and
life threatening injuries to scores of other innocent people,” he stated.
‘The group called on South East governors, stakeholders and parents to
caution their children not to allow anyone to be recruited by IPOB.
‘“We urge members of the general public to assist security agencies in
Nigeria by providing credible information that would lead to the arrest and
subsequent prosecution of IPOB members for the threat to human lives and
the unity of the country,” he added, calling on the government to probe the
clash between IPOB and security operatives in Enugu that led to the loss of
lives.’92
9.3.11 The 2020 DFAT country information report on Nigeria stated:
91 PM News, ‘Genesis of the bloody IPOB – Police, DSS clash in Enugu’ 24 August 2020
92 The Guardian, ‘Nzuko Umunna may sue Ugwuanyi over killing of Igbo youths’, 31 August 2020
Page 51 of 75
‘While the clampdown [Operation Python Dance] by security forces
appeared to largely curtail IPOB’s public activities, November 2020 saw a
new outbreak of open conflict in the southeast of the country. Rivers state
Governor Nyesom Wike has reportedly ‘declared war’ on the group following
an attack on security forces which killed six soldiers and four police
officers.’93
9.3.12 The 2020 DFAT country information report Nigeria commented: ‘The Special
Rapporteur’s report … noted reports of extrajudicial killings by state forces in
relation to other groups, including … IPOB … the latter primarily in the
context of demonstrations.’ 94
Back to Contents
9.4 Arrest and detention
9.4.1 Amnesty International in their 2016 report stated:
‘The authorities initially allowed IPOB rallies to take place, but from
September 2015 onwards the authorities have claimed that IPOB is a threat
to the security of Nigeria, despite the fact that the IPOB protests and
gatherings documented by Amnesty International were largely non-violent.
Since the IPOB leader and Radio Biafra director Nnamdi Kanu was arrested
on 14 October 2015, the meetings and demonstrations calling for his release
have increased and so have the violations committed by the military.’
‘The security forces have arrested hundreds pro-Biafra activists. In addition,
DSS [Department of State Security,] has arrested eight IPOB coordinators;
some at IPOB events and others at their homes. While some have been
released, many others were charged with treason, which carries the death
penalty under Nigeria law. Amnesty International was not able to confirm the
exact number of people who have been arbitrarily arrested and detained in
connection with the Biafra independence campaign in various parts of
southeast Nigeria.
‘Many of the people arrested after IPOB events have told Amnesty
International that they were beaten or subjected to other forms of ill-
treatment. Some were tortured in detention. In addition, there is a consistent
pattern of the security forces denying injured victims medical treatment.’ 95
9.4.2 The EASO Targeting of individuals report of November 2018 citing media
news sources stated: ‘On 18-19 May 2017, a group of women supporters of
the IPOB reported being harassed, stripped and arrested by the Nigerian
Army, during a rally in Abiriba, Abia State.’ 96
9.4.3 Amnesty International reported that in May 2017 ‘a high court ordered the
SSS [State Security Service] to release Bright Chimezie, a member of the
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Instead, the SSS included his name in
another case. Bright Chimezie had not been brought to court by the end of
93 DFAT, ‘Country information report: Nigeria’ (section 3.49, 3.50, 3.52), updated 3 December 2020
95 AI, ‘Nigeria: Bullets were raining everywhere’, (p5), 24 November 2016
Page 52 of 75
the year [2017]; the SSS had held him in incommunicado detention for more
than one year’.97
9.4.4 The Nigerian newspaper Punch reported on its website in January 2018 that:
‘The Nigerian Army said on Thursday that its troops on Operation Mesa have
arrested 27 members of the Indigenous People of Biafra and recovered an
AK-47 rifle from one of them, Oliver Onyebunachi, in Imo State.
‘According to the military, the IPOB members, who were 23 men and four
women, were apprehended by troops of 144 Battalion, 82 Division, on
October 1 [2017].
‘The army noted that the IPOB members had a spiritual leader, Pa Michael
Madumere, a 56-year-old, who hailed from the Ideator South Local
Government Area of Imo State.’98
9.4.5 The News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reported in August 2018 that:
‘A high court sitting in Owerri on Friday granted the unconditional release of
114 women alleged to be members of the Indigenous People of Biafra
(IPOB) group.
‘The women who were remanded on the orders of a magistrate’s court in
Owerri were arrested on Friday August 17 [2018] by the police for
demanding to know the whereabouts of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu. They
were also held for unlawful assembly.
‘NAN reports that the bail application filed by the lead counsel to the women,
Ejiofor Uche was not opposed by the police.
‘Theaddus Oke, prosecuting for the police, told NAN correspondent that the
case had been referred to the state Ministry of Justice for advice.
‘He said that the police had no say in whatever decision that was taken by
the court.
‘NAN recalls that the arrests sparked off widespread condemnation by
residents of the state and sympathisers of IPOB.’99
9.4.6 NAN also reported in November 2018 that:
‘The Police said they would charge 33 members of the banned Indigenous
People (IPOB) of Biafra with terrorism after they allegedly killed an inspector
and set ablaze a police patrol vehicle.
‘The men, whose identities were unveiled Sunday, were arrested in Nnewi,
Anambra state, along with some insignias of IPOB and eight motorcycles.
‘The police said they may also be charged with murder, attempted murder,
rioting and malicious damage, upon the completion of their investigation.’100
9.4.7 The EASO report also noted that ‘Lifos [the COI unit of the Swedish
Migration Agency - Migrationsverket] analyses that “the vulnerability of
97 AI, Nigeria 2017/2018, February 2018

98 Punch, ‘Army arrests 27 IPOB members’, 4 October 2019
99 NAN, ‘Court frees 114 women demanding IPOB leaders Kanu whereabouts’, 24 August 2018
100 NAN, ‘Police to charge arrested IPOB members with terrorism’, 25 November 2018
Page 53 of 75
arrested persons suspected of IPOB affiliation may have been enhanced
following the government’s decision to brand IPOB a terror organisation”.’ 101
9.4.8 Human Rights Watch in their World Report 2019, Nigeria: Events of 2018
stated: ‘On August 17, 112 women were arrested and prosecuted in Owerri,
Imo State, for protesting the disappearance of IPOB leader, Nnamdi Kanu.
They were discharged and released by a court six days later.’102
2019, based on a range of sources, stated:
‘According to sources, 51 people suspected of being IPOB members, were
arrested in December 2018 as they "were reportedly setting for [a] Judaism
service within the premises of the country home of the leader of [IPOB] Mazi
Nnamdi Kanu" in Unuhia… or during a procession through the streets which
started in the Afaraukwu community from which Kanu hails… Sources
indicate they were demonstrating for an independent Jewish State … and
that they were arrested for "being in possession" of different emblems of the
IPOB… Sources state they were arraigned at magistrate court for terrorism
and treason but the court decided it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and
ordered the detainees into custody while the case is transferred… Counsel
for the defendants was quoted as saying the prosecution's decision to
arraign the respondents at a court lacking jurisdiction was illegal and
unconstitutional, citing similar Supreme Court decisions… According to
the Guardian, the detainees were granted bail on 8 January 2019….’ 103
9.4.10 Amnesty International’s Human Rights review of 2019 stated: ‘Security
forces have arbitrarily arrested at least 200 and killed at least 10 members
and supporters of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) at different times
during the year [2019].’104
9.4.11 PM News, a Lagos based news outlet, reported in May 2019 that 140
members of IPOB were arrested in Nsukka, Enugu state. The arrests were
confirmed by the Police public relations officer (PPRO). The group were
arrested for organising an unlawful procession, displaying proscribed items
and chanting inciting songs. The PPRO said that the suspects would be later
be charged to court105.
9.4.12 Reporting on the same incident, the IRBC response of June 2019, based on
a range of sources, stated:
‘A representative of the Enugu Police was quoted, by the News Agency of
Nigeria (NAN), a state-run news agency (NAN n.d.), as stating that 140
IPOB members were arrested for "'engaging in unlawful procession and
display of prohibited items'" in the Nsukka region of Enugu State on 22 May
2019 (NAN 23 May 2019). In contrast, the International Society for Civil
Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), a Nigerian civil society and human
rights group, as quoted in the Sun, stated that the 140 individuals were
arrested at a military and police checkpoint while going to a funeral,

102 HRW, ‘World Report 2019, Nigeria: Events of 2018’, 17 January 2019
104 Amnesty International, Human Rights in Africa: Review of 2019 - Nigeria, 8 April 2020
105 PM News, ‘Police arrest 140 members of Biafra group in Nsukka’, 23 May 2019
Page 54 of 75
"'tortured'," then arraigned in court on 23 May, where the court decided it
does not have jurisdiction to hear the case and ordered them to prison (The
Sun 6 June 2019). The same source further states that the detainees have
not received a trial date as of two weeks after their arraignment (The Sun 6
June 2019). Similarly, the South-East Based Coalition of Human Rights &
Democracy Organisations (SBCHROs), "a coalition of 22 rights and
democracy groups operating in the Southeast part of Eastern Nigeria,"
quoted in News Express, a Nigerian online newspaper (News Express n.d.),
indicates "'Biafra insignias'" including "'flags and bangles'" were found by the
"'Enugu State Joint Security Patrol teams'" on some of the 140 people going
to a funeral (News Express 26 May 2019). The same source indicates that
all 140 individuals were arrested and charged with terrorism, and were sent
to prison by the magistrate court until their case can be heard at the High
Court (News Express 26 May 2019).’ 106
9.4.13 A 24 December 2019 report on the Nigerian news website Today.ng stated:
‘Four persons, suspected to be members of the banned Indigenous People
of Biafra have been arrested in Aba Market by Nigerian soldiers for selling a
banned Biafran newspaper.
‘The men were picked up under the Nigerian Army “Exercise Atilogwu Udo
1’’, now ongoing in the South eastern states and Cross River.
‘Col. Aliyu Yusuf, Deputy Director, Public Relations of 82 Division of the
Nigerian Army said on Tuesday in Enugu, the four vendors were arrested by
troops of sector 2 in Abia on Nov. 19.
‘He gave the names of the vendors as Sunday Elom, Martins Ogwuchukwu,
Chineme Obiechifula and Innocent Mike.
‘Yusuf did not indicate the name of the newspaper.
‘But he said they have been handed over to the appropriate security agency
for further action.’107
9.4.14 The 2020 DFAT country information report Nigeria stated:
‘In her September 2019 post-visit report, the UN Special Rapporteur …
noted a number of arrested IPOB members had allegedly been held
incommunicado before being detained without charges; and there had not
been any convictions of IPOB members since 2015 due to the
discontinuance or dismissal of charges…108
9.4.15 DFAT assessed that ‘… as members of a proscribed organisation, IPOB
members face a risk of arrest that is likely to be higher for those in
leadership positions.’ 109
9.4.16 Africa Confidential also noted in the article of April 2021:
‘In 28 March [2021], police claimed they had arrested 16 people on suspicion
of being behind the killing of at least 34 security agents in the south-east.
According to the police, the suspects confessed to being members of IPOB
107 Today.ng, ‘IPOB members arrested for selling Biafra newspaper’, 24 December 2019
Page 55 of 75
and the ESN. But security experts say the routine use of torture to extract
confessions means such claims should be treated with scepticism.
‘Even if the claims are accurate, the arrest of a few ESN fighters will not stop
what is a growing guerrilla campaign and clandestine collaboration between
armed groups in the region and beyond. IPOB has been trying to expand its
area of operations towards the Niger Delta, where it clashed with security
forces last year.
‘IPOB created the ESN to oppose the practice of open grazing by herders in
the region. The historic clashes between settled farmers and nomadic
herders in the northern and middle belt states are spreading to the south-
east and south-west, partly because of the shortage of grazing land…
‘Much of IPOB's support reflects communal solidarity on security rather than
an upswing in favour of an independent state of Biafra. It tries to play on
religious and regional loyalties and what it considers to be politically-biased
security forces.’110
9.4.17 Premium Times reported on 29th June 2021:
‘The lead counsel to the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB),
Ifeanyi Ejiofor, has said the arrest and arraignment of Nnamdi Kanu earlier
Tuesday was without his knowledge.
‘“We have just confirmed through a correspondence from the Federal High
Court Abuja about the arrest and the extradition of my Client- Mazi Nnamdi
Kanu by the Nigerian State,” Mr Ejiofor said in a statement on Tuesday
evening.
‘“He was brought before the Federal High Court No 2 Abuja today on an
Eleven count charge, though without our knowledge,” the attorney added.
‘He said regardless of the offences or charge against his client, he is still
presumed innocent of the allegation under the law.
‘Mr Kanu, who is being prosecuted on charges of treasonable felony, was re-
arrested and returned to Nigeria on Sunday, the Attorney-General of the
Federation and Minister of Justice, Abubakar Malami, said earlier
‘According to the AGF, the IPOB leader was arrested through “collaborative
efforts of Nigerian intelligence and security services.”
‘Although, Mr Kanu is believed to have fled to the United Kingdom, the AGF
did not give the details of the exact place of his arrest and the diplomatic
collaborations the operation must have involved…’ 111
9.4.18 Sahara Reporters in a December 2021 article reported that IPOB had
disclosed a list of the names of some people is said were being illegally
detained by the state following arrests within the preceding seven months112.
9.4.19 In January 2022 Premium Times reported the following with regard the arrest
and trial of Mr Kanu:
110 Africa Confidential, ‘States rethink security’, 15 April 2021

111 Premium Times, ‘IPOB’s lawyer speaks on Nnamdi Kanu’s arrest’, 29 June 2021
112 Sahara Reporters, ‘IPOB Lists Names Of Young Innocent Men Allegedly…’, 30 December 2021
Page 56 of 75
‘The federal government filed an amended 15-count charge against him on
Monday.
‘Mr Kanu was accused of various offences, including treasonable felony and
terrorism, offences he allegedly committed in the course of his separatist
campaigns.
‘He was initially scheduled to be re-arraigned before the court on Tuesday,
but the judge, Binta Nyako, had to adjourn the case after the defence team
complained about the late service of the amended charges on them.
‘Mr Kanu pleaded not guilty to all 15 counts read to him on Wednesday.’113
9.4.20 The BBC monitoring timeline for IPOB updated to 23 January 2022 included
the following:
’26 July 2021 - Some members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)
are arrested by the police at the Federal High Court in Abuja where Nnamdi
Kanu is standing trial. They were chanting slogans in support of Nnamdi
Kanu, demanding his freedom…
‘2 August 2021 - Police in Imo State arrest Boniface Okeke, an alleged
financier of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and its militant wing
Eastern Security Network (ESN). At least 25 other people suspected to be
members of IPOB are also arrested, including seven women. The police say
the suspects are being held in connection with terrorism and attacks on
security agencies and private individuals where several police stations were
burnt down and a number of police officers killed.
‘8 August 2021 - Police in Imo State arrest 29 suspected members of the
Eastern Security Network (ESN), for allegedly planning to attack the state
ahead of the sit-at-home order by the Indigenous People of Biafra, IPOB, on
9 August 2021
’29 October 2021 - Police in Anambra State say they have arrested a
suspected top commander of the Indigenous People of Biafra
(IPOB)/Eastern Security Network (ESN), Udebuan Chubueze. According to
police, a search was conducted in his houses at Ekwulobia and Nnewi where
four AK-47, two automatic pump-action and ammunition were recovered.
The suspect allegedly confesses to having led several attacks on police
facilities, and that he was part of the group responsible for the killing of some
policemen and personnel of the Nigerian navy.
’25 December 2021 - The Nigerian army in conjunction with other security
agencies arrest Godwin Nnamdi, a suspected leader of the Indigenous
People of Biafra (IPOB) and Eastern Security Network (ESN) in Nkanu East
Local Government Area of Enugu State.
‘17 January 2022 - The Federal Government of Nigeria files fresh terrorism
charges against the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB),
Nnamdi Kanu. In the amended process it filed before the Federal High Court
sitting in Abuja, the government increased the counts in the initial charge it
preferred against him. Kanu, who has been in detention since his alleged
abduction from Kenya and repatriation to Nigeria, faced a seven-count
113 Premium Times, ‘Kanu pleads not guilty to fresh charges…’, 19 January 2022
Page 57 of 75
treasonable felony charge, will now enter his fresh plea to 15 amended
charges…
‘19 January 2022 - The leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB),
Nnamdi Kanu pleads not guilty to the fresh amended 15-count charge of
treasonable felony filed against him by the federal government. The court
adjourns till 16 February 2022 to hear the pending application.’114
‘16 February 2022 - The Federal High Court in Abuja fixes 8 April 2022 for
ruling on a preliminary objection filed by Nnamdi Kanu, challenging the
validity of the 15 amended charges filed against him by the federal
government.’115
9.4.21 With regard the arrest of Mr Kanu and comments made by his lawyers with
regard his treatment BBC monitoring reported:
’26 July 2021 - The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) reacts to the failure
of the Department of State Services (DSS) to produce its leader, Nnamdi
Kanu, in court for the resumption of his trial. In a statement, IPOB
spokesperson Emma Powerful says: "We are no longer comfortable with this
development. We have enough grounds to suspect foul play. With the failure
of DSS to produce our leader in court today without any cogent reason and
coupled with the torture meted out to him since his abduction in Kenya, we
are worried about the safety of our leader. The failure of DSS to produce our
leader in court today is confirming our fear over the uncertainty concerning
his health"
‘7 September 2021 - Files a lawsuit against the Federal Government of
Nigeria at the Abia State High Court, over what he describes as violations of
his human rights. The federal government, Nigeria army, the Department of
State Service (DSS), and the Nigerian police are respondents in the suit. He
is urging the Abia State High Court to compel the respondents to pay him
5bn naira in damages as monetary compensation for the "physical, mental,
emotional, psychological and other damages" suffered as a result of the
alleged infringements on his fundamental rights.
‘10 November 2021 - The Federal High Court in Abuja adjourns his trial to
19 January 2022. The adjournment comes after his team of lawyers, staged
a walk out over the refusal of operatives of the Department of State Services
(DSS) to allow some of them access into the courtroom. Kanu decried the
refusal of security agents to allow some members of his legal team,
especially his lawyer from the US, Bruce Fein, to enter the courtroom
‘6 December 2021 - Alleges that he is being denied food in the facility of the
Department of State Service (DSS). In a statement, his brother Prince Kanu
says: "Just visited the Alpha Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, at the Department of State
Security Services Abuja. During my interaction with him, he told me that he
has been denied food since yesterday. As if that wasn't enough, DSS had
also denied him his medical report after taking his blood for more than 21
times. They have continuously disobeyed all the court orders"
115 BBC Monitoring, ‘Biography - Nnamdi Kanu’, updated 21 February 2022, subscription only
Page 58 of 75
‘17 January 2022 - The Federal Government of Nigeria amends the charges
against him, raising the counts from seven to 15 ahead of the resumed
hearing on 18 January 2022. His lawyer, Ifeanyi Ejiofor describes the new
charges as a joke. In a statement, he says: "This is indeed a joke taken too
far as the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) is now scouting for an
opportunity to truncate tomorrow's proceeding, knowing fully well that the
smokescreen charge is dead on arrival. We wish to categorically point out
with dismay, that this further amended charge is the worst kind of abuse of
legal process that we have encountered in the history of legal practice -
either in Nigeria or anywhere in the world".
‘19 January 2022 - The High Court in Abia State orders the federal
government to pay the 1bn naira to the leader of the Indigenous People of
Biafra (IPOB), Nnamdi Kanu, as compensation over the invasion of his
father's house on 10 September 2017 by the military. Kanu's lawyer, Aloy
Ejimakor, says in a tweet: "Mazi Nnamdi Kanu wins as Abia High Court rules
that the federal government violated his fundamental rights. Orders the
federal government to pay 1bn naira to him and issue a letter of apology to
him.’116
Back to Contents
9.5 Prosecutions and convictions
9.5.1 Agnes Callamard, United Nations Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions stated in a September 2019 report in a
section titled ‘Arbitrary Killings of Members of the Indigenous People of
Biafra (IPOB)’ that:
‘ a number of those arrested are allegedly held incommunicado before being
detained without charges. When charges are finally made, they include
membership to a terrorist organisation, unlawful gathering and in some
cases kidnapping.
‘It is alleged that not a single conviction against IPOB members has been
secured since 2015, due to discontinuance or dismissal of charges. None of
the killings of IPOB members have been investigated.’ 117
9.5.2 There is no further information about the outcome of arrests in the sources
consulted (see Bibliography).
Back to Contents
10. Separatist groups outside of Nigeria
10.1 Nigerian diaspora
10.1.1 The UK Office for National Statistics published figures to June 2021
estimates that 312,000 people (with a confidence interval (CI) of 31,000) that
were born in Nigeria live in the UK. Additionally, the figures also show that
117 OHCHR, ‘End of visit statement of the Special Rapporteur…’ (para 49-50), 2 September 2019
Page 59 of 75
there are estimated to be 178,000 (CI 23,000) people with Nigerian
citizenship living in the UK118.
10.1.2 Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation UK (NIDO) have headquarters in London
and Manchester. Their website stated that their aim is: ‘to bring Nigerians
living in the United Kingdom together and to identify those willing to offer
their skills (Education, Information Technology, Health, Economic, science,
Administration, Law, Political and Corporate Governance, Management etc.)
to assist Nigeria’s national development.’119 There is no indication from the
sources consulted that this group have connections to IPOB.
10.1.3 The Nigerian in Diaspora monitoring group (NDMG) were reported to have
called for Nigerians living abroad to distance themselves from Nnamdi Kanu
and IPOB120. At a press conference held in London in August 2019 a
statement was made by the group’s president which was critical of Kanu and
IPOB members and their activities outside of Nigeria121. The president of the
group condemned in particular the attack of a member of the National
Assembly in Germany by reportedly members of IPOB 122 123.
Back to Contents
10.2
Office use only.
118 OfNS, ‘Population of the UK by country of birth and nationality’, 25 November 2021
119 NIDO, ‘About us’, undated
120 Vanguard, ‘Group to Nigerians in diaspora: Be wary of Kanu’, 29 August 2019
123 Premium Times, ‘Ekweremadu dragged, assaulted in Germany’, 17 August 2019
Page 60 of 75
Office use only.
Office use only.

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Page 61 of 75
10.3 Size and composition of separatist groups in the diaspora
10.3.1 CPIT was unable to find information about the number, size, aims and
activities of pro-‘Biafran’ groups in the UK in the sources consulted (see
Bibliography).
Back to Contents
10.4 Sur place activities of separatist groups
10.4.1 April 2018 footage available on YouTube shows a group protesting in
London where they are calling for a referendum on ‘Biafra’124.
10.4.2 Premium Times reported on 17 August 2019 that: ‘Nigeria’s former Deputy
Senate President, Ike Ekweremadu, was on Saturday physically attacked by
a mob while attending a cultural event in Germany. Mr Ekweremadu, who
confirmed the attack in a statement, said the attackers were members of the
Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB)…’125
10.4.3 Premium Times an Abuja based Nigerian media organisation reported on its
website on 6 December 2019 that IPOB had claimed responsibility for an
attack on Nigeria’s transport minister, Rotimi Amaechi in Madrid by the
Spanish branch of the group following an order by Nnamdi Kanu to ‘“attack
Nigerian leaders anywhere they are seen”.’126
10.4.4 Sahara Reporters in a June 2021 article reported ‘Nigerians of Igbo
extraction residing in the United Kingdom have barricaded the Parliament
House in London to protest against the alleged genocide in the South East
region.
‘In a video shared on Friday morning, the Biafra protesters demanded an
end to the killing of Igbo youths in Nigeria…
‘In the protest in London, protesters are seen with Biafra flags, polo shirts
and wrist bands shouting ‘stop killing our children, stop the genocide.’127
10.4.5 The Nigerian newspaper Punch reported on its website in September 2021:
‘Scores of female members of the proscribed Indigenous People of Biafra
based in London have begun a three-day “mega rally” in the United
Kingdom.
‘The women are calling for the release of the embattled IPOB leader,
Nnamdi Kanu, from the custody of the Department of State Service,
according to a video posted by a Twitter user, @Emekannaoma.’128
10.4.6 There is no further information in the sources consulted of recent recorded
activities in the UK by IPOB or other groups supporting the creation of a
‘Biafran’ state (see Bibliography).
Back to Contents
124 YouTube, ‘Biafra Protest: Group Protests In London, Call For Referendum’, 19 April 2018
125 Premium Times, ‘Ekweremadu dragged, assaulted in Germany’, 17 August 2019
126 Premium Times, ‘IPOB claims responsibility for attack on Amaechi in Spain’, 6 December 2019
127 Sahara Reporters, ‘Biafra Agitators Storm UK Parliament, London To Protest Against Alleged
Genocide In South-East’, 11 June 2021

128 Punch, ‘IPOB women protest in London, demand Kanu’s release’, 30 September 2021
Page 62 of 75
10.5 Monitoring of ‘Biafra’ groups in Nigeria and the UK
10.5.1 The Nigerian Nationality Security Agencies Act established the Nigerian
intelligence services responsible detecting and preventing crimes against the
state inside and outside of Nigeria (see Country Policy and Information Note:
Nigeria – Actors of Protection). There is, however, no information in the
sources consulted of the capability, presence and activities of the
intelligences services in the UK (see Bibliography).
10.5.2 A Vanguard article from September 2016 reported on the alleged listing of a
number of IPOB members in Nigeria and the diaspora as wanted by the
Department of State Services (DSS) in Nigeria129. The same allegations
appeared in an article in the Nigerian news website Sun News online130
however no further details regarding these allegations were found in the
sources consulted (see Bibliography)..
10.5.3 Premium Times, a Nigerian news outlet, stated in August 2017:
‘President Muhammadu Buhari has been urged to prevail on the military to
halt its ongoing monitoring of Nigerians on the Internet.
‘The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project, SERAP, was joined
by another civic group, Concerned Nigerians, in a recent demand for the
president to respect the freedom of Nigerians on all social media platforms…
‘The admonition followed an announcement by Defence Headquarters that
citizens are being monitored for “hate speech, anti-government and anti-
security information” on social media.
‘The defence spokesperson, John Enenche, who hinted at the operation in
an interview with Channels Television this week did not elaborate on the
type of speeches that military deemed as constituting “hate” or “anti-
government.”… But the administration’s stance on did not go down well with
many Nigerians, and rights groups have roundly criticised any attempts to
curb freedom of expression.’131
10.5.4 Freedom House annual report on political rights and civil liberties in 2020
(Freedom in the World 2021) stated:
‘Nigerians are generally free to engage in discussions on politics and other
topics, though expression of critical views on political leaders or sensitive
subjects like the military, religion, and ethnicity occasionally leads to arrests
or violent reprisals.
‘By 2018, the National Assembly passed a Digital Rights and Freedom Bill,
which would expand freedom of expression online by regulating government
surveillance and prohibiting the suspension of internet services [at the time
of writing the bill had not become law in the sources consulted – see
Bibliography]. The bill was sent to the president in 2019, but Buhari declined
to sign it, stating that it covered too many technical subjects and did not
address them extensively. A revised bill was under legislative consideration
at the end of 2020.
129 Vanguard, ‘DSS list declaring our members wanted, shameful…’, 8 September 2016
130 Sun News Online, ‘Biafra: Our members on DSS wanted list - IPOB’, 9 September 2016
131 Premium Times, ‘Stop military from tracking Nigerians groups tell Buhari’, 27 August 2017
Page 63 of 75
‘Legislators considered bills on hate speech and on the dissemination of
purportedly false statements in 2020. The false-statements bill would impose
fines, a one-year prison sentence, or both against offenders, while the hate-
speech bill would allow the death penalty for speech that is linked to the
death of another person. NGOs including Amnesty International and the
Nigerian Union of Journalists harshly criticized the false-statements bill in
front of the Senate judiciary committee in March. Both bills remained under
consideration at year’s end.’132
10.5.5 The 2020 DFAT country information report on Nigeria stated: ‘Internet
service providers sometimes block websites at the NCC’s [The Nigerian
Communications Commission] request, particularly websites advocating
Biafran independence.’ 133
10.5.6 The BBC reported on 5 June 2021:
‘Nigeria will prosecute anyone found to have breached the country's ban on
the social media firm Twitter, a government spokesperson has told the BBC.
‘The government announced on Friday it was suspending Twitter's
operations in the country.
‘Mobile phone networks blocked access after being ordered to do so, but
some users are getting around the ban.
‘The move comes after Twitter deleted a tweet by President Muhammadu
Buhari for breaching the site's rules.
‘Some users saw his post, which referred to Nigeria's civil war four decades
ago, as a veiled threat towards a secessionist movement in the south-east of
the country
‘His government said on Saturday the tweet's removal was "disappointing",
but not the only reason for the "temporary" suspension.’134
10.5.7 Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2021, covering events in Nigeria
between June 2020 and May 2021, based on a number of sources,
observed:
‘In December 2020, an investigation by the Citizen Lab identified the
Defence Intelligence Agency, Nigeria’s primary military intelligence agency,
as a likely customer of the surveillance company Circles. The company—
which is affiliated with the private Israeli firm NSO Group, known for its
Pegasus spyware—provides services that allows customers to monitor calls,
texts, and cell phone geolocation by exploiting weaknesses in mobile
telecommunications infrastructure… Previously, a June 2016 Premium
Times investigation found that politicians in Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers
States had purchased spyware from Circles…
‘The Nigerian government blocked online content during the coverage
period..
‘On June 5, 2021, after the coverage period, the Nigerian government
ordered Twitter blocked on most major networks. Days earlier, the platform
132 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2021: Nigeria, 3 March 2021
134 BBC News, ‘Nigeria's Twitter ban: Government orders prosecution of violators’, 5 June 2021
Page 64 of 75
had deleted a post from Buhari’s account and suspended the account for 12
hours, stating that Buhari’s post violated rules on abusive behavior; the post
seemed to threaten violence against Biafran secessionists… The
government subsequently threatened to prosecute Nigerians accessing
Twitter through circumvention tools and ordered media organizations to stop
using the platform…
‘Earlier, in November 2017, it was revealed that service providers blocked 21
websites, including the popular Naij.com online news outlet, at the request of
the NCC… Though the blocking order lacked transparency, many of the
blocked sites promoted the independence of Biafra, the region that
attempted to secede from Nigeria in 1967 and fought against the federal
government in the 1967–70 Biafran War. Although access to Naij.com was
eventually restored, at least nine websites remained inaccessible, but the
others were accessible as of 2021.’135
10.5.8 The FH report also noted, with regard to Nigeria and not on activities outside
of the country, that
‘The persistent arrests of users for their online activities under the 2015
Cybercrime Act has resulted in growing self-censorship, particularly among
professional journalists who publish content online… This self-censorship
worsened after recent reports that revealed the extent of the Nigerian
security services’ surveillance and interception powers. Security forces had
access to journalists’ private communications, and sometimes used that
information to facilitate arrests…’136
10.5.9 The FH report also noted, in the context of Nigeria not outside of the country:
‘In October 2019, a Nigerian law enforcement agency disclosed that Nigerian
security forces use software from Cellebrite and AccessDataGroup, two
companies that provide technology to extract and forensically search data
from electronic devices, including devices protected by strong encryption.
Forensic search technology was reportedly used to search over 20
computers and phones sized from the Daily Trust when the paper’s editors
were arrested in January 2019 for their reporting on military operations in the
northeast… Earlier news reports revealed government contracts with the
Italian surveillance firm Hacking Team,… as well as the presence of a
command-and-control server located within Nigeria…
‘The government’s intent to enhance its surveillance capabilities is reflected
in federal budget allocations. Tens of millions of dollars have been set aside
since 2018 for various surveillance projects… that apparently fall under the
purview of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) and
Department of State Security (DSS). These include tools for social media
monitoring, and drones and other mobile surveillance tools… apparently
capable of intercepting mobile phone traffic and collecting location data of
mobile phone users… The 2021 Executive Budget Proposal once again
included funding for surveillance equipment…
‘Many online journalists have long suspected that they are being surveilled
by the state. In February 2020, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
135 FH, ‘Freedom on the Net 2021’ (Nigeria), 21 September 2021
136 FH, ‘‘Freedom on the Net 2021’ (Nigeria), 21 September 2021
Page 65 of 75
reported on the use of cell phone data by Nigerian security forces to arrest
investigative journalists (see C6). Police used phone records to identify
journalists’ contacts, detained those contacts, and then pressured those
individuals to gain access to journalists and arrest them… ’137
10.5.10 The Guardian reported on the 13 January 2022:
‘Nigeria has lifted a ban on Twitter, restoring access to millions of users,
seven months after it clamped down on the social media site in a row over
Twitter’s decision to delete a post by the president.
‘The government said the company had agreed to its conditions on the
management of unlawful content, to registering its operations in Nigeria and
to a new tax arrangement.
‘“The FGN [federal government of Nigeria] lifts the suspension of
the Twitter operations in Nigeria from midnight of 13 January 2022,” said a
statement from Kashifu Inuwa Abdullahi, the director-general of Nigeria’s
National Information Technology Development Agency.’138
10.5.11 No further information was found in the sources consulted of the Nigerian
authorities monitoring the online or physical activities of the diaspora in the
UK (see Bibliography).
Back to Contents
137 FH, ‘‘Freedom on the Net 2021’ (Nigeria), 21 September 2021

138 The Guardian, ‘Nigeria lifts Twitter ban seven months after site deleted…’, 13 January 2022
Page 66 of 75
Terms of Reference
A ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) is a broad outline of what the CPIN seeks to cover.
They form the basis for the country information section. The Home Office’s Country
Policy and Information Team uses some standardised ToRs, depending on the
subject, and these are then adapted depending on the country concerned.
For this particular CPIN, the following topics were identified prior to drafting as
relevant and on which research was undertaken:
• ‘Biafra’: background
o ‘Biafra’ regions
o ‘Biafra’ war and famine
• The Political landscape
o Elections 2019 /Ruling party
o Southeast/Igbo participation in political process
• Security situation in South-east Nigeria
• Separatist Groups
o IPOB
o MASSOB
o Other separatist groups
o Separatist/supporters actions
• State treatment of separatist groups
o Legal context
o Discrimination and harassment
o Meetings and demonstrations
o Arrest and detention
Prosecutions and convictions
o Treatment in detention
• Separatist groups outside of Nigeria
o Size and composition of separatist groups in the Diaspora
o Sur place activities of separatist groups
o Monitoring by Nigerian Government in the UK
o Treatment of returns
• Freedom of movement (covered by IFA CPIN)
Page 67 of 75
Bibliography
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Africa Confidential, ‘States rethink security’, 15 April 2021. Last accessed: 9 June
2021
African News, ‘Biafra agitation: Nigeria court upholds IPOB terrorist label’, 19
January 2018. Last accessed: 13 February 2020
Allnews, IPOB: ‘Nnamdi Kanu Places N100 Million Bounty On Gov. Wike’, 27
October 2020. Last accessed: 22 June 2021
Amnesty International,
‘Nigeria: Bullets were raining everywhere’, 24 November 2016. Last
‘Nigeria 2017/2018’, 1 February 2018. Last accessed: 5 March 2020
Human Rights in Africa: Review of 2019 - Nigeria, 8 April 2020. Last
accessed: 30 December 2020
Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT,
‘Country information report: Nigeria’, 9 March 2018. Last accessed: 27
February 2020
‘Country information report: Nigeria’, updated 3 December 2020. Last
accessed: 21 January 2021
Bertelsmann Stiftung: BTI 2020 Country Report Nigeria, 29 April 2020. Last
The Council on Foreign Relations, CFR,
Blog Post: John Campbell, ‘Nigerian Initiative Against Separatists Looks
Nasty’, 21 May 2021
Blog Post: John Campbell, ‘Nigerian Government Threatens to Use the
Hammer in the South East’, 19 May 2021
BBC Monitoring,
‘Nigerian separatists in violent confrontations with police’, 23 May 2019,
subscription only. Last accessed: 14 January 2021
‘Biography - Nnamdi Kanu’, 21 February 2022, subscription only. Last
‘Organisation – Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)’, 16 May 2021. Last
‘Nigeria separatists deny affiliation with Avengers’, 17 June 2016, subscription
only. Last accessed: 14 January 2021
Page 68 of 75
‘Organisation - Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of
Biafra (MASSOB)’, 20 July 2017, Subscription only. Last accessed: 14
January 2021
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subscription only. Last accessed: 21 January 2021
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only, 26 August 2020. Last accessed: 14 January 2021
BBC News,
‘Nigeria's Igbo leaders reject call for Biafra state’, 3 July 2017. Last accessed:
13 February 2020
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2018. Last accessed: 5 March 2020
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speech’, 4 February 2021. Last accessed: 25 February 2021
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February 2021
‘Muhammadu Buhari: Twitter deletes Nigerian leader's 'civil war' post’, 2 June
2021. Last accessed: 22 June 2021
The Cable, ‘Nnamdi Kanu hints at not returning to Nigeria for parents’ funeral’, 10
February 2020. Last accessed: 5 March 2020
The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, ‘Nigeria: The Indigenous People of
Biafra (IPOB), including objectives, structure, activities, relations with other Biafran
independence groups and treatment by authorities (2017-May 2019)’, 28 June 2019.
Last accessed: 27 February 2020
Chatham House, ‘Calls for Biafran Independence Return to South East Nigeria’, 9
November 2017. Last accessed: 13 February 2020
Deutsche Welle, ‘The Long Shadow of Biafra Lingers over Nigeria’, 14 January
2020. Last accessed: 18 February 2020
EASO,
‘Country Guidance: Nigeria’ (page 49), February 2019. Last accessed: 13
February 2020
‘Nigeria: Targeting of individuals’, November 2018. Last accessed: 13
February 2020
ECP - Escola de Cultura de Pau (Author), Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona (Author), published by ReliefWeb: ‘Alert 2020! Report on conflicts, human
rights and peacebuilding’, July 2020. Last accessed: 30 December 2020
Encyclopædia Britannica, inc, ‘Biafra – secessionist state, Nigeria’, 4 March 2015.
Last accessed: 28 January 2020
The Federal Office for migration and Refugees – Germany (BAMF),
Page 69 of 75
‘Briefing Notes’, 9 December 2019. Last accessed: 8 January 2020
‘Briefing Notes 1 April’,1 April 2019. Last accessed: 5 March 2020
‘Nigeria: briefing notes’, 24 August 2020. Last accessed: 29 December 2020
Freedom House,
Freedom in the world 2021: Nigeria, 3 March 2021. Last accessed: 22 June
2021
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January 2022
The Guardian, ‘Nigeria lifts Twitter ban seven months after site deleted president’s
post’, 13 January 2022. Last accessed: 24 January 2022
The Guardian – Nigeria,
‘Enugu residents partially comply with IPOB’s sit at home order’, 30 May
2019. Last accessed: 15 January 2020
‘Alleged killing of Igbo a distraction from IPOBS activities says Wike’, 3
November 2020. Last accessed: 13 January 2021
Nzuko Umunna may sue Ugwuanyi over killing of Igbo youths’, 31 August
Human Rights Watch,
‘”Rest in Pieces”, Police Torture and Deaths in Custody in NGA’ (section VI),
July 2005. Last accessed: 6 February 2021
‘Biafra – The historical and cultural context’, 2 October 2019, (published by
EASO). Last accessed: 13 February 2021
‘World Report 2019, Nigeria: Events of 2018’, 17 January 2019. Last
Independent, ‘Soldiers came to kill me: I’d be shot in the head and dumped in a
shallow grave with my dead companions’, 6 November 2019. Last accessed: 16
January 2020
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), ‘Civic Freedom Monitor: Nigeria’, 5
October 2019. Last accessed 17 December 2019
Migrationsverket – Swedish Migration Agency: Nigeria – Indigenous People of Biafra
(IPOB), 19 December 2017. Last accessed: 22 February 2021
National Daily, ‘MASSOB dares military, insists to mark Biafra at 51’, 28 May 2018.
The News Agency of Nigeria,
‘Court frees 114 women demanding IPOB leaders Kanu whereabouts’, 24
August 2018. Last accessed: 13 January 2020
‘Police to charge arrested IPOB members with terrorism’, 25 November 2018.
Nigerian Eye, ‘IPOB, ESN not unknown gunmen – Nnamdi Kanu insists’, 9 June
Page 70 of 75
The Nigerians in Diaspora Organization, ‘About us’, undated. Last accessed: 13
January 2020
Nigerian government, ‘Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999’, circa
1999, accessed via refworld. Last accessed: 10 March 2020
The Nigerian Voice (TNV), ‘Ipob Gives A Sit-at-home Order On 30th May 2019’, 2
May 2020. Last accessed: 15 January 2020
Nigeria Watch, database – IPOB, results searched 24 January 2022. Last accessed:
24 January 2022
Office for National Statistics, ‘Population of the UK by country of birth and
nationality’, 28 November 2019. Last accessed: 13 February 2020
Norman M; Ueda P. (2017) Biafran Famine. In: Preedy V., Patel V. (eds), ‘Handbook
of Famine, Starvation, and Nutrient Deprivation’, Springer, Cham, 20 February 2017.
Last accessed 17 December 2019
PM News,
‘Police arrest 140 members of Biafra group in Nsukka’, 23 May 2019. Last
‘Genesis of the bloody IPOB – Police, DSS clash in Enugu’ 24 August 2020.
Premium Times,
‘Ekweremadu dragged, assaulted in Germany’, 17 August 2019. Last
‘Police accuse IPOB members of killing three officers in Rivers’, 26 October
‘Stop military from tracking Nigerians groups tell Buhari’, 27 August 2017. Last
’16 Police officers killed in Nigeria last week’, 9 May 2021. Last accessed: 24
May 2021
‘IPOB claims responsibility for attack on Amaechi in Spain’, 6 December
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Pulse,
‘Pro-Biafra group announces May 30 sit-at-home order for national day of
mourning’, 25 May 2018. Last accessed: 15 January 2020
9 feared dead as soldiers and IPOB members clash in Rivers’, 25 October
‘Gov. Wilke signs executive order proscribing IPOB in Rivers State’, 29
October 2020. Last accessed: 21 January 2021
Page 71 of 75
‘Imo Governor Uzodinma imposes curfew in Orlu zone following unrest’, 25
January 2021. Last accessed: 14 June 2021
Punch,
‘Court affirms IPOB’s proscription, designation as terrorist group’, 19 January
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2020
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accessed: 24 May 2021
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‘Nigerian Army, Police Conduct House-To-House Raid For IPOB, ESN
Members In South-East’, 19 May 2021. Last accessed: 24 May 2021
‘IPOB Lists Names Of Young Innocent Men Allegedly Abducted, Detained By
Nigerian Army, Others’, 30 December 202. Last accessed: 24 January 2022
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Genocide In South-East’, 11 June 2021. Last accessed: 16 March 2022
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2016. Last accessed: 18 February 2020
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accessed: 14 June 2021
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‘IPOB members arrested for selling Biafra newspaper’, 24 December 2019.
‘Police confirm attack, killing of two officers by ‘IPOB members’ in Anambra’, 3
December 2019. Last accessed: 20 January 2020
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‘Group to Nigerians in diaspora: Be wary of Kanu’, 29 August 2019. Last
Page 72 of 75
‘DSS list declaring our members wanted, shameful, playing to the gallery-
IPOB’, 8 September 2016. Last accessed: 13 January 2020
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Back to Contents
Sources consulted but not cited
Amnesty International, ‘Endangered voices – Attack on freedom of expression in
Nigeria’, 14 October 2019. Last accessed: 28 January 2020
BBC News, ‘Nigeria Presidential Elections Results’, Last updated 26 February 2019.
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January 2010. Last accessed: 29 March 2021
The Federal Office for migration and Refugees – Germany (BAMF), ‘Briefing Notes 4
June 2018’, 4 June 2018. Last accessed: 28 January 2020
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September 2017. Last accessed: 28 January 2020
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‘Freedom in the World 2019 – Nigeria’, 4 February 2019. Last accessed: 13
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accessed: 15 March 2021
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Page 73 of 75
The News Agency of Nigeria,
‘Ignore IPOB’s social media propaganda – Army urges public’, 14 February
‘Southeast Governors Forum decries alleged IPOB attack’, 14 February 2019.
The Sun (Nigeria), ‘Biafra: Our members on DSS wanted list –IPOB’, 9 September
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Countries of Particular Concern (CPC): Nigeria, April 2020. Last accessed: 30
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February 2020
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Back to Contents
Page 74 of 75
Version control
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• version 3.0
• valid from 17 March 2022
Office use only.
Changes from last version of this note

Updated country information and assessment.
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Country Policy and Information Note

Nigeria: Separatist groups in the

Official – sensitive: Start of section

Official – sensitive: End of section

Official – sensitive: Start of section

3.1.2 An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRBC) response of June

1 ACforSC, ‘Nigeria’s diverse security threats’, 30 March 2021

4 Encyclopædia Britannica, inc, ‘Biafra – secessionist state, Nigeria’, 4 March 2015

‘Biafran’ Revolutionary Igbo Youth Cultural and Restoration

Eastern People Congress (EPC) Movement of ‘Biafrans’ in Nigeria

Joint Revolutionary Council of Customary Government of

‘Biafra’ Liberation Crusaders (BLC)

19 IRBC, ‘Nigeria: The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)…’, 28 June 2019

Section 6 updated: 16 March 2022

Official – sensitive: Start of section

22 EASO, ‘Country Guidance: Nigeria’ (page 14 and 54), October 2021

Official – sensitive: End of section

23 BBC, ‘Nigeria arrests Biafra separatist', 27 October 2005

27 EASO, ‘Nigeria: Targeting of individuals’ (page 82), November 2018

Official – sensitive: Start of section

Official – sensitive: End of section

32 EASO, ‘Country Guidance: Nigeria’ (page 54), October 2021

42 EASO, ‘Nigeria: Targeting of individuals’ (page 82-83), November 2018

45 Pulse, ‘Pro-Biafra group announces May 30 sit-at-home order…’, 25 May 2018

17/01/2022 Army vs IPOB, Anambra - Some 10

29/12/2021 Gunmen vs Ex-Customs Officer, 1

25/12/2021 IPOB vs Policemen, Anambra - Three 3

18/12/2021 Gunmen vs Police, Anambra - 2

68 BBC Monitoring, IPOB Timeline, updated 23 January 2022, subscription only

80 CFR, ‘Nigerian Initiative Against Separatists Looks Nasty’, 21 May 2021

83 EASO, ‘Nigeria: Targeting of individuals’ (page 54-55), November 2018

90 BAMF, ‘Nigeria: briefing notes’ (p5), 24 August 2020

97 AI, Nigeria 2017/2018, February 2018

101 EASO, ‘Nigeria: Targeting of individuals’ (page 84), November 2018

110 Africa Confidential, ‘States rethink security’, 15 April 2021

Official – sensitive: Start of section

Official – sensitive: End of section

Genocide In South-East’, 11 June 2021

137 FH, ‘‘Freedom on the Net 2021’ (Nigeria), 21 September 2021

Official – sensitive: Start of section

Official – sensitive: End of section

Changes from last version of this note

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