e9073a0f-en (2)

Financing SMEs
and Entrepreneurs 2022

AN OECD SCOREBOARD
Financing SMEs
and Entrepreneurs
2022
AN OECD SCOREBOARD
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over
any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of
such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in
the West Bank under the terms of international law.
Note by Turkey
The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single
authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey
shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union
The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The
information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
Please cite this publication as:

OECD (2022), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2022: An OECD Scoreboard, OECD Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/e9073a0f-en.
ISBN 978-92-64-41902-5 (print)

ISBN 978-92-64-72059-6 (pdf)
ISBN 978-92-64-54473-4 (HTML)
ISBN 978-92-64-62024-7 (epub)
Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs

ISSN 2306-5257 (print)
ISSN 2306-5265 (online)
Photo credits: Cover © Shutterstock/Roman Gorielov.
Corrigenda to publications may be found on line at: www.oecd.org/about/publishing/corrigenda.htm.

© OECD 2022
The use of this work, whether digital or print, is governed by the Terms and Conditions to be found at https://www.oecd.org/termsandconditions.
|3
Preface
The COVID-19 crisis delivered an unprecedented shock to the global economy, and SMEs and
entrepreneurs have been at the heart of the impact. In 2020 and through 2021, depressed demand from
repeated lockdowns, travel restrictions, and weakening consumer confidence, alongside disruptions to
supply chains, significantly impacted business operations and balance sheets. These impacts ultimately
resulted in liquidity constraints that were particularly acute among SMEs. During this time, measures
implemented by governments, monetary policy authorities and public financial institutions were very
important in providing SMEs with liquidity and other types of support, for example wage subsidies, to help
them weather the crisis.
Nearly two years into the pandemic, the global recovery is underway. However, the war in Ukraine, whilst
first and foremost a humanitarian crisis, is also having significant economic impacts. It is affecting financial
and energy markets, supply chains and trade, and driving inflation, especially in energy prices and
downstream sectors, all of which have important implications for SME operations and performance.
These impacts are exacerbating previous risks that already threatened a balanced recovery from
COVID-19. They also reinforce the importance of financing investments that can boost the capacity of
SMEs and entrepreneurs to build more resilient economies, and the need for government recovery
packages to continue to provide targeted support to viable SMEs and entrepreneurs in need.
This 10th anniversary edition of Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2022: An OECD Scoreboard outlines
the unprecedented increases in SME bank lending supported by governments, particularly in 2020, and
shows that there has been a fall in alternative forms of debt. It examines the evolution of SME support
during the course of the COVID-19 crisis, revealing that the volume of SME-focused policies in recovery
packages is diminishing, compared to measures taken earlier in the COVID-19 crisis.
Our findings show that efforts to diversify SME financing instruments and sources must continue in order
to strengthen SME resilience to current and future shocks and enable them to optimise the strength and
the quality of the recovery and future growth. The forthcoming update of the G20/OECD High-Level
Principles on SME Financing can help. Efforts to address the challenge of accelerating the green transition,
which cannot succeed without the participation of SMEs and entrepreneurs, must also be stepped up. The
new OECD Platform on Financing SMEs for Sustainability will make an important contribution in this
regard.
In this complex environment, the OECD will continue to monitor closely the trends in SME and
entrepreneurship finance. We will pursue efforts to enrich our analysis through increased country coverage
and the collection of more granular data on different financing instruments and specific segments of the
SME population. In this way, we will enhance our support to governments to ensure responsive policies
that keep pace with the rapid developments in SME and entrepreneurship finance.
Mathias Cormann
OECD Secretary-General
FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

4
Foreword
Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2022: An OECD Scoreboard provides a comprehensive framework
for policy makers and other stakeholders to monitor access to finance by SMEs and entrepreneurs. It also
constitutes a valuable tool to support the design and evaluation of policy measures, and to monitor the
implications of financial reforms on access to finance and financing conditions for SMEs more generally.
The 2022 report analyses the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the SME financing landscape in the
Scoreboard countries, sheds light on the instrumental and unprecedented role that Government policy
responses played in ensuring the continued flow of financing to liquidity-constrained SMEs, and analyses
the trends and possible implications of the evolving policy landscape from the rescue to the recovery phase
of the pandemic. It builds on the November 2020 special edition of the Scoreboard, which documented the
initial impacts of the crisis on SME and entrepreneurship finance. Based on data collected for the country
profiles and information from demand-side surveys, it includes indicators on debt, equity and asset-based
finance, as well as on financing framework conditions complemented by summaries of public and private
initiatives to support SME access to finance.
The 2022 report marks 10 years of this flagship report, which has become the international reference for
information on SME and entrepreneurship finance trends and policies. It presents trends and policies for
48 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the People’s Republic of China, Colombia,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States 1.
Chapter 1 focuses on developments in SME financing through 2020 and ongoing policy responses,
drawing on data received from experts from participating countries, as well as from external sources.
Chapter 2 focuses on the evolution of SME and entrepreneurship support measures from the rescue to
the recovery phases and draws implications and critical questions for policy makers on how the recovery
packages can best support SMEs in their recovery, growth and transition toward green and digital
objectives. Chapter 3 contains profiles of SME and entrepreneurship developments, as well as relevant
policies, for all 48 participating countries. The print edition of this publication includes a snapshot view with
key facts and figures, while more detailed profiles can be accessed online.
This publication was prepared by the Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Tourism Division of the Centre for
Entrepreneurship, SMEs, Regions and Cities (CFE/EST) under the guidance of the OECD Committee on
SMEs and Entrepreneurs (CSMEE) and the CSMEE Informal Steering Group on SME and
Entrepreneurship Financing. The initial findings were discussed at the meeting of the CSMEE Informal
Steering Group on SME Finance on 9-10 September 2021, and a more advanced version of the report
was presented at the first meeting of the CSMEE on 14-15 October 2021. The final report was approved
by written procedure on 1 March 2022 [CFE/SME(2021)18/CHAP1/FINAL,
CFE/SME(2021)18/CHAP2/FINAL, CFE/SME(2021)18/CHAP3/ADD/FINAL and
CFE/SME(2021)18/ANN/FINAL].
Note
1
Aggregate calculations include data for Belarus and Russia when available.

5
Acknowledgements
This report was produced by the OECD Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs, Regions and Cities (CFE),
led by Lamia Kamal-Chaoui, Director, as part of the programme of work of the Working Party on SMEs
and Entrepreneurship. The development of Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2022: An OECD
Scoreboard is possible thanks to the country experts from participating OECD member and non-member
countries who provided information for the country profiles (see below).
The development of the Scoreboard also benefited from the inputs of Delegates of the OECD Committee
on SMEs and Entrepreneurship (CSMEE), chaired by Martin Godel (State Secretariat for Economic Affairs,
Switzerland), and members of its Informal Steering Group on SME and Entrepreneurship Financing,
chaired by Professor Salvatore Zecchini (Italy).
Data and input provided by Bryan O’Callaghan and Luke Heeney (Oxford Global Recovery Observatory),
Helena Mölter (Wuppertal Institute), Felix Haas (European Association of Guarantee Institutions), Helmut
Kraemer-Eis and Frank Lang (European Investment Fund), and Bryan Zhen Zhang (Cambridge Centre for
Alternative Finance) are gratefully acknowledged. Matt Adey (British Business Bank) provided information
on SME and entrepreneurship policies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the United Kingdom.
This report was prepared by María Camila Jiménez (Policy Analyst, CFE/EST), Stephan Raes (Policy
Analyst, CFE/EST), Marija Kuzmanovic (Policy Analyst, CFE/EST), and Cosimo Pacciani (Trainee,
CFE/EST), with input from Marco Marchese (Policy Analyst, CFE/EST), under the supervision of Miriam
Koreen (Senior Counsellor, CFE/EST) and Celine Kauffmann (Head of Division, CFE/EST). Heather
Mortimer-Charoy provided technical support. Support from the CFE Communications and Public Affairs
unit is gratefully acknowledged: Pilar Philip and François Iglesias for the production process, Shayne
MacLachlan and Pauline Arbel for advice on promotion and Lukasz Lech for outreach efforts.
Country expert team
Australia Pourus Bharucha Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources

Austria Florian Eichberger Federal Ministry for Digital and Economic Affairs
Belgium Christophe Herinckx Federal Ministry of Economy, SMEs, Self-employed and Energy
Brazil Alfredo Gonçalves Nascimento Special Secretary for Micro and Small Enterprises (SEMPE)
Pedro Henrique Rincon Amaral Special Secretary for Micro and Small Enterprises (SEMPE)
Canada Patrice Rivard Innovation Science and Economic Development Canada
Chile Manuel López Bugueño Ministry for the Economy, Development, and Tourism
China Wu Bao China Institute for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Renyong Chi China Institute for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Chenfei Jin China Institute for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Colombia Jose David Quintero Nieto Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Czech Republic Lukeš Zdenek Ministry of Industry and Trade
Denmark Rasmus Borup Nielsen Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs
Estonia Karel Lember Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications
Finland Rasmus Reinkainen Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment
France Jean-Pierre Villetelle Banque de France
Simon Verna General Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry and Services
Georgia Elene Mindadze Enterprise Georgia
Ketevan Chapidze Ministry Economy and Sustainable Development
Greece Timotheos Rekkas Hellenic Ministry for Economy and Development
Hungary Annamária Szukics Ministry of Innovation and Technology

6
Laura Kanizsai Ministry of Innovation and Technology

Róbert Aradi-Beöthy Ministry of Innovation and Technology
Indonesia Citra Lestari Ministry of Cooperative and SMEs
Yonas Dian Hermanu Ministry of Cooperative and SMEs
Ireland Leona Cantillon Department of Finance, Banking Policy Division
Israel Nir Ben-Aharon Small and Medium Business Agency, Ministry of Economy
Italy Sabrina Pastorelli Bank of Italy
Japan Kazuya Shintani Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry
Kazakhstan Anuar Ospanov Damu Entrepreneurship Fund
Korea Meeroo Kim Korea Development Institute
Latvia Kristīne Priedīte Ministry of Economics
Aneta Strautmane Ministry of Economics
Signija Zandere Ministry of Economics
Lithuania Paulius Morkūnas Bank of Lithuania
Luxembourg Cesare Riilio National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies
Malaysia Kala Darshini Danesekaran SME Corporation Malaysia
Czariff Chai Abdullah SME Corporation Malaysia
Mexico Ivana Fernández Stohanzlova Ministry of Economy
Netherlands Floran Amelsfort Ministry of Economic Affairs
Samuel Struijker Boudier Ministry of Economic Affairs
New Zealand Emma Belworthy Lewthwaite Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
Peru Lourdes del Pilar Álvarez Ministry of Production
Poland Martyna Wieczorek Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology
Portugal António Almeida Office of the Secretary of State of Economy and Regional Development
Serbia Marija Jokic National Bank of Serbia
Ana Ivkovic National Bank of Serbia
Slovak Republic Jakub Lukác National Agency for SME Development
Slovenia Tine Janžek Bank of Slovenia
South Africa Tebogo Maake National Treasury, Financial Sector Policy Unit
Nontobeko Lubisi National Treasury, Financial Sector Policy Unit
Spain Víctor García-Vaquero Bank of Spain
Sweden Simon Falck Swedish Agency for Growth Policy Analysis
Switzerland Samuel Turcati State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Markus Willimann State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Thailand Sanuttanunn Sungsittiwong Bank of Thailand
Turkey Utku Macit Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology
Ukraine Olena Kravchenko SME Development Office
Oleksandr Melnychenko SME Development Office
United Kingdom Zach Witton British Business Bank
Matt Adey British Business Bank
United States Colin Leach Department of Commerce

7
Table of contents
Preface 3
Foreword 4
Acknowledgements 5
Reader’s guide 12
Acronyms and abbreviations 16
Executive summary 20
1. Recent trends in SME and entrepreneurship financing 23
2. SME finance in COVID-19 recovery packages: Assessment and implications 71
Country snapshots 121
3. Australia 122
4. Austria 125
5. Belgium 127
6. Brazil 130
7. Canada 132
8. Chile 135
9. Colombia 138
10. Czech Republic 141
11. Denmark 144
12. Estonia 146

8
13. Finland 148

14. France 151
15. Georgia 154
16. Germany 157
17. Greece 161
18. Hungary 164
19. Indonesia 167
20. Ireland 169
21. Israel 172
22. Italy 174
23. Japan 177
24. Kazakhstan 179
25. Korea 181
26. Latvia 183
27. Lithuania 186
28. Luxembourg 188
29. Malaysia 190
30. Mexico 192
31. The Netherlands 194
32. New Zealand 197
33. People’s Republic of China 200
34. Peru 203
35. Poland 205
36. Portugal 208
37. Serbia 211

9
38. Slovak Republic 214

39. Slovenia 217
40. South Africa 219
41. Spain 222
42. Sweden 224
43. Switzerland 226
44. Thailand 228
45. Turkey 230
46. Ukraine 233
47. United Kingdom 236
48. United States 239
Annex A. Methodology for producing the national Scoreboards 243
Annex B. Methodology for analysing COVID-19 policy trackers 265
Tables
Table 1. Core indicators in Financing SMEs and entrepreneurs, 2022 12
Table 2.1. Recovery packages in selected OECD countries 74
Table 2.2. SME-related policies in global recovery and rescue packages 79
Table 2.3. Share of SME-related policies in European recovery packages 80
Table 2.4. SME-related policies in rescue and recovery packages by SME type 81
Table 2.5. SME related policies in 22 European recovery packages by SME type 81
Table 2.6. Guarantee extensions to support SMEs in selected countries 84
Table 2.7. SME-related policies by type of instrument 88
Table 2.8. Types of SME finance support by number of policies and financial value 94
Table 2.9. SME related policies by policy domain 99
Table 2.10. Recovery Plans and SME digitalisation (in billion Euro and %) 103
Table 3.1. Scoreboard for Australia 123
Table 4.1. Scoreboard for Austria 126
Table 5.1. Scoreboard for Belgium 128
Table 6.1. Scoreboard for Brazil 131
Table 7.1. Scoreboard for Canada 133
Table 8.1. Scoreboard for Chile 136
Table 9.1. Scoreboard for Colombia 139
Table 10.1. Scoreboard for the Czech Republic 143
Table 11.1. Scoreboard for Denmark 145
Table 12.1. Scoreboard for Estonia 146
Table 13.1. Scoreboard for Finland 149
Table 14.1. Scoreboard for France 152
Table 15.1. Scoreboard for Georgia 156
Table 17.1. Scoreboard for Greece 162

10 
Table 18.1. Scoreboard for Hungary 165

Table 19.1. Scoreboard for Indonesia 168
Table 20.1. Scoreboard for Ireland 170
Table 21.1. Scoreboard for Israel 173
Table 22.1. Scoreboard for Italy 175
Table 23.1. Scoreboard for Japan 178
Table 24.1. Scoreboard for Kazakhstan 180
Table 25.1. Scoreboard for Korea 182
Table 26.1. Scoreboard for Latvia 184
Table 27.1. Scoreboard for Lithuania 187
Table 28.1. Scoreboard for Luxembourg 189
Table 29.1. Scoreboard for Malaysia 191
Table 30.1. Scoreboard for Mexico 193
Table 31.1. Scoreboard for the Netherlands 195
Table 32.1. Scoreboard for New Zealand 199
Table 33.1. Scoreboard for the People’s Republic of China 201
Table 34.1. Scoreboard for Peru 204
Table 35.1. Scoreboard for Poland 206
Table 36.1. Scoreboard for Portugal 209
Table 37.1. Scoreboard for Serbia 212
Table 38.1. Scoreboard for the Slovak Republic 215
Table 39.1. Scoreboard for Slovenia 218
Table 40.1. Scoreboard for South Africa 221
Table 41.1. Scoreboard for Spain 222
Table 42.1. Scoreboard for Sweden 225
Table 43.1. Scoreboard for Switzerland 227
Table 44.1. Scoreboard for Thailand 229
Table 45.1. Scoreboard for Turkey 232
Table 46.1. Scoreboard for Ukraine 234
Table 47.1. Scoreboard for the United Kingdom 237
Table 48.1. Scoreboard for the United States 240
Table A A.1. Preferred definitions for core indicators 244

Table A A.2. Difference between national statistical and financial definitions of SMEs 252
Table A B.1. Word search on SME orientation and type 267
Table A B.2. Word search on policy domains 267
Table A B.3. Word search on financial instruments and support types 268
Figures
Figure 1.1. December 2021 real GDP per capita growth projections 24
Figure 1.2. New SME loans 28
Figure 1.3. Growth in new SME lending, 2008-20 29
Figure 1.4. Growth in outstanding SME business loans 30
Figure 1.5. Growth in outstanding SME loans, 2008-20 32
Figure 1.6. SME loan shares 33
Figure 1.7. Share of long-term SME loans 34
Figure 1.8. SME interest rates, 2020 35
Figure 1.9. SME interest rates, growth rate 36
Figure 1.10. Interest rate spreads between loans to SMEs and to large firms 37
Figure 1.11. Interest rate spreads between loans to SMEs and to large firms, by groups of countries 37
Figure 1.12. Collateral requirements 38
Figure 1.13. SME loan applications 39
Figure 1.14. Rejection rates 40
Figure 1.15. ECB Survey on SME access to finance 42
Figure 1.16. Lending attitudes in Japan 43
Figure 1.17. Leasing and hire purchases growth rate by country 45
Figure 1.18. Median factoring growth rate for Scoreboard countries 46
Figure 1.19. Factoring growth rate by country 47

 11
Figure 1.20. Venture capital investments 48

Figure 1.21. Growth in online alternative finance volumes 50
Figure 1.22. Total volume of alternative finance activity by region, 2019 and 2020 50
Figure 1.23. Payment delays by country and evolution 51
Figure 1.24. SME bankruptcies, growth rate 52
Figure 1.25. Median rate of NPLs by firm type, 2007-20 53
Figure 1.26. NPL rates for SMEs, 2019-20 54
Figure 1.27. Changes in the SME financing policy landscape since the Global Financial Crisis 55
Figure 1.28. SME support measures introduced as a response to the COVID-19 crisis by group of countries
according to their income levels (February 2020 - February 2021) 56
Figure 1.29. Median growth of SME government loan guarantees 57
Figure 1.30. Government guaranteed loans as a share of loan stock 58
Figure 1.31. Direct loans, growth rate by country 59
Figure A B.1. Visualisation of the approach for analysing the trackers 266
Boxes
Box 1. Recommendations for improving the reporting of core indicators 14
Box 1.1. Spotlight on new SME lending in selected economies 27
Box 1.2. Spotlight on outstanding stock of SME loans in selected economies 31
Box 2.1. Identifying SME-related policies in recovery packages: sources and methodology 78
Box 2.2. Accelerator 2 Programme in Lithuania 98
Box 2.3. Examples of SME-related green policies in recovery packages 100
Box 2.4. Examples of SME-related digitalisation policies in recovery packages 102
Box 2.5. Examples of SME-related skills policies in recovery packages 104
Box 2.6. Examples of SME-related policies in innovation 106
Box A A.1. What is an SME? 251
Follow OECD Publications on:

http://twitter.com/OECD_Pubs
http://www.facebook.com/OECDPublications
http://www.linkedin.com/groups/OECD-Publications-4645871
http://www.youtube.com/oecdilibrary
Alerts
http://www.oecd.org/oecddirect/
This book has... A service that delivers Excel® files from the printed page!
Look for the StatLinks2at the bottom of the tables or graphs in this book.
To download the matching Excel® spreadsheet, just type the link into your Internet
browser, starting with the https://doi.org prefix, or click on the link from the e-book
edition.

12 
Reader’s guide
Indicators
SME and entrepreneurship financing trends are monitored through core indicators, listed in Table 1,
selected on the criteria of usefulness, availability, feasibility and timeliness (see Annex A for a detailed
description). In detail, the core indicators describe and monitor the following key dimensions:
Table 1. Core indicators in Financing SMEs and entrepreneurs, 2022

Core indicators Unit What they show
The allocation and structure of bank credit to SMEs
Outstanding
business loans, Volumes in national currency
SMEs SME demand for and access to bank credit.
Outstanding A stock indicator measuring the value of an asset at a given point in time, and thus
business loans, Volumes in national currency reflecting both new lending, as well as bank loans that have accumulated over time
total along with loan repayments.
Share of SME
% of total outstanding loans
outstanding loans
New business
Volumes in national currency
lending, total
SME demand for and access to bank credit.
New business
Volumes in national currency A flow indicator, measured over one year, which tends to capture more strongly
lending, SMEs
short-term developments and is therefore more volatile than stocks.
Share of new SME
% of total new lending
lending
Short-term loans, The structure of SME debt, i.e. the share of outstanding credit with an initial maturity
SMEs of less than one year and more than one year, respectively. This could be considered
Long-term loans, as a proxy to gauge the purpose of SME bank loans, i.e. for operational and
Volumes in national currency investment needs.
SMEs
Extent of public support for SME finance
Government loan
guarantees, SMEs
Government
These indicators illustrate the extent and uptake of government programmes and
guaranteed loans, Volumes in national currency
instruments supporting SMEs' access to finance.
SMEs
Direct government
loans, SMEs
Credit costs and conditions
Interest rate, SMEs %
Interest rate, large
% The cost of SME loans and how it compares to large firms.
firms
Interest rate spread Percentage points
% of SMEs needing collateral to Proxies the conditions SMEs face when applying for bank credit.
Collateral, SMEs
obtain bank lending
Percentage of SME SME loan applications/ total
loan applications number of SMEs, in % The (unmet) demand for and utilisation of credit by SMEs, and willingness of banks to
1-(SME loans authorised/ lend.
Rejection rate
requested), in %

 13
SME loans used/ authorised, in

Utilisation rate
%
Non-bank sources of finance
Venture and growth
and year-on-year growth rate
capital investments
in % The take-up and ability to access non-bank finance instruments, including external
Leasing and hire equity for start-up, early development and expansion stages, as well as asset-based
purchases finance, such as leasing, hire purchases, factoring and invoice discounting.
Factoring and
invoice discounting
Financial health
Non-performing
% of total business loans
loans, total The incidence of late or non-payments for SME loans, compared to the overall
Non-performing corporate sector. This proxies the (relative) riskiness of lending to SMEs.
% of total SME loans
loans, SMEs
Payment delays, The occurrence of payment delays in the B2B sector, i.e. the difficulty in paying and
Number of days
B2B being paid, to capture the extent of cash flow problems.
Bankruptcies, Number and year-on-year A proxy for the overall business environment in which SMEs operate and the ability of
SMEs growth rate in % small firms to survive economic downturns and credit crunches.
Data collection
The Scoreboard data are provided by experts designated by participating countries. Most of the indicators
are derived from supply-side data provided by financial institutions, statistical offices and other government
agencies. This is supplemented by national and regional demand-side surveys in order to provide a more
comprehensive view of the evolution in financing trends and needs. Indicators cover access to finance for
employer firms, that is, for SMEs which have at least one employee, and are operating a non-financial
business. The data in the present edition cover the period 2007 to 2020, assessing trends over the medium
term, both in the pre-crisis period (2007), the financial crisis (2008 and 2009) and the period afterwards.
Specific attention is placed on developments occurring in 2019, 2020 and the first half of 2021. In addition,
information on government policies to ease SMEs’ access to finance is also collected on a systematic
basis.
The published print version includes a chapter on emerging trends in SME and entrepreneurship finance,
drawing on information provided by participating countries, a thematic chapter, focusing for this edition on
how SME financing needs and instruments are reflected in the COVID-19 recovery packages, annexes,
and a two-page snapshot for every participating country. This snapshot summarises the state of play
regarding SME access to finance in each country, while the full country profiles will be available on the
OECD website only.
Cross-country comparability
At the individual country level, the Scoreboard provides a coherent picture of SME access to finance over
time and monitors changing conditions for SME financing, as well as the impact of policies. There are limits
to possible cross-country comparisons, however. Firstly, the statistical definition of an SME differs among
participating countries; while the European Union definition is the most commonly used, participating
countries outside of the Union usually define an SME differently, which complicates cross country
comparisons (see Annex A for detailed definitions of SMEs across participating countries).
In addition, differences in definition and coverage for indicators hamper comparability, with a number of
countries not able to adhere to the “preferred definition” of the core indicators. A proxy has been adopted
in these instances. For this reason, all country profiles include a table, which provides the definition adopted
for each indicator and a reference to the data source. Despite these limitations, it is still possible to compare
general trends across countries, as the differences in the exact composition of the single indicator are
muted when evaluating rates of change. Country profiles in the printed edition of this publication are

14 
abbreviated to two pages with key facts and the table with core indicators, while the full profiles remain
available online.
Methodological advances and recommendations for data improvements

There have been important methodological and structural improvements in recent editions of this report.
More detailed information regarding the sources and definitions of core indicators have been provided for
participating countries. Since June 2016, the Scoreboard data are available on the OECD.Stat website.
Data on core indicators can be consulted, downloaded and put to further use, thereby addressing a
longstanding demand to improve access to the data, and exposure of the publication to a wider audience.
In addition, more information is provided on the uptake of financial instruments other than straight debt,
and further endeavours will be undertaken in this area for future editions of the publication.
Efforts are also underway to include more disaggregated data on SME and entrepreneurship financing,
given the significant heterogeneity of the SME population and the impact that these underlying
characteristics have on access to finance and financing conditions. Based on the results of a survey among
country experts four dimensions are being explored: sector of operation, firm size, gender of principal
owner and geographical location. A better understanding of SME and entrepreneurship finance trends
along these dimensions would significantly strengthen the usefulness of the Scoreboard, contribute to a
better understanding of the heterogeneity of SME segments, enrich the evidence base and support policy
efforts focused on SME and entrepreneurship financing.
Finally, efforts are ongoing to increase the coverage of participating countries and to harmonise the data
from already participating countries.
A summary of recommendations to further improve data collection and reporting of core indicators are
outlined in Box 1 (see Annex A for a more detailed discussion). Actions in these areas can enable countries
to progress in the harmonisation of definitions and facilitate inter-temporal and cross-country analysis of
trends in SME and entrepreneurship finance.
Box 1. Recommendations for improving the reporting of core indicators

1. Improve reporting of SME loan variables by:
 Systematically separating reporting of financial information for non-employer and employer-
firms;
 Providing both stock and flow data for SME loans;
 Detailing the loan composition, indicating the different underlying products (e.g. overdrafts /
lines of credit / leases / business mortgages or credit cards / securitised loans), and disclose
such elements in the loan definition.
2. Fill gaps in available data and work towards more comprehensive information for other core
indicators in the Scoreboard, including:
 Offer more comprehensive information on government programmes that ease SME access to
finance:
‒ In the context of the COVID-19 government policy response, provide information on new or
expanded government schemes, including information on eligibility criteria and duration;
‒ Specify the figures that can be attributed to schemes in response to the COVID-19 crisis
(e.g. new government guarantee schemes, new lines of direct lending) in the reporting of
Scoreboard indicators.

 15
 Provide data on non-performing loans for SMEs and for large firms, the latter to be used as a
benchmark;
 Provide more comprehensive data on venture capital investments, including trends by stage
and sector;
 Compile SME-specific information on the uptake and use of asset-based finance (versus other
beneficiaries);
 Collect information on SME loan fees, in addition to interest applied on the loans;
 Detail the definition of collateral and improve reporting, using demand-side surveys to
compensate for lack of supply-side data;
 Advance efforts to compile more disaggregated data on the Scoreboard core indicators, notably
by sector of operation, firm size, gender of principal owner and geographical location.
3. Work to improve data collection on additional non-bank financing instruments, such as online
alternative finance, as well as to provide more comprehensive data on alternative sources of
equity financing, including business angel investments, with a view to incorporating this
information in the set of core indicators in the future.

16 
Acronyms and abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank

AECM European Association of Mutual Guarantee Societies
ARS Argentine Peso
AUD Australian dollar
AWS Austrian Economic Service
B2B Business-to-Business
BBLS Bounce Back Loan Scheme
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BMKB SME credit guarantee scheme (Netherlands)
BRL Brazilian rial
CAD Canadian dollar
CCI Chambers of Commerce and Industry
CEBA Canada Emergence Business Account
CGS Credit Guarantee Scheme
CHF Swiss franc
CLO Collateralised debt obligation
CLP Chilean peso
CMA Chambers of Trades and Crafts
CNY Chinese renminbi
COP Colombian peso
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019
CSMEE Committee on SME and Entrepreneurship
CZK Czech koruna
DKK Danish krone
EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC European Commission
ECB European Central Bank

 17
EETE Companies engaged in ecological transition (France)

EIB European Investment Bank
EIF European Investment Fund
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority
EU European Union
EUR Euro
EVCA European Venture Capital Association
FAE-MYPE Business Support Fund for micro and small businesses (Peru)
FCI Factors Chain International
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FSB Federation of Small Businesses
FOA Funding Opportunity Announcement
FOGAPE Small Business Guarantee Fund (Chile)
FOSIS Social Solidarity and Investment Fund (Chile)
G20 Group of 20
GBP British pound
GDP Gross domestic product
GEL Georgian lari
GPFI Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion
GRO Global Recovery Observatory
HRK Croatian Kuna
HUF Hungarian forint
IDR Indonesian rupiah
ICO Official Institute of Credit (Spain)
IFC International Finance Corporation
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IP Intellectual Property
IPO Initial public offering
ISK Iceland Krona
IT Information technology
JEREMIE Joint European Resources for Micro, Small and Medium-sized enterprises
JPY Japanese yen
KKC Small Credits for Corona Guarantee Scheme (Netherlands)
KRW Korean won
KZT Kazakhstani tenge
MFI Micro-finance institution

18 
MSME Micro, small and medium-sized enterprise

MXN Mexican peso
MYR Malaysian ringgit
NGEU Next Generation European Union
NIS Israeli new shekel
NOK Norwegian krone
NPL Non-performing loan
NZD New Zealand dollar
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OUERP Oxford University Economics Recovery Project
PAE-MYPE Business Support Programme for micro and small businesses (Peru)
PE Private equity
PEN Peruvian nuevo sol
PLN Polish zloty
PPP Paycheck Protection Program (United States)
R&D Research and development
RLS Recovery Loan Scheme (United Kingdom)
RRP Rescue and Recovery Packages
RSD Serbian dinar
RSI Risk Sharing Instrument
SACE Italian Export Credit Agency
SAFE Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises
SBIR Small Business Innovation Research
SIVA Industrial Development Corporation of Norway
STIP Science, technology and innovation policies
STTR Small Business Technology Transfer
SIHAK Slovak Investment Holding anti-corona capital instrument
SIHAZ Slovak Investment Holding anti-corona guarantee
SBA Small Business Administration
SCARP Small Companies Administrative Rescue Process (Ireland)
SEK Swedish krona
SDG Singapore Dollar
SJPP Guarantee Schemes by the Government (Malaysia)
SME Small and medium-sized enterprise
SSBCI State Small Business Credit Initiative (United States)
TANKAN Business Short-Term Economic Sentiment Survey (Japan)
THB Thai baht

 19
TRY Turkish lira

UAH Ukrainian hryvnia
UBB United Bulgarian Bank
UF Unidad de Fomento
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USD United States dollar
VC Venture capital
WB World Bank
WTO World Trade Organization
ZAR South African rand
ISO Country Abbreviations

AUS Australia JPN Japan
AUT Austria KAZ Kazakhstan
BEL Belgium KOR Korea
BRA Brazil LTU Lithuania
CAN Canada LUX Luxembourg
CHE Switzerland LVA Latvia
CHN People's Republic of China MYS Malaysia
CHL Chile MEX Mexico
COL Colombia NLD Netherlands
CZE Czech Republic NZL New Zealand
DNK Denmark NOR Norway
ESP Spain PER Peru
EST Estonia POL Poland
FIN Finland PRT Portugal
FRA France SRB Serbia
GBR United Kingdom SVK Slovak Republic
GEO Georgia SVN Slovenia
GRC Greece SWE Sweden
HUN Hungary THA Thailand
IDN Indonesia TUR Turkey
IRL Ireland UKR Ukraine
ISR Israel USA United States
ITA Italy ZAF South Africa

20 
Executive summary
Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2022: An OECD Scoreboard provides information on SME financing
trends and policies for 48 countries around the world for the period 2007 through the first half of 2021. The
Scoreboard includes indicators on debt, equity, asset-based finance and framework conditions for SME
and entrepreneurship finance, complemented by demand-side information and recent developments in
public and private initiatives to support SME finance. Taken together, these indicators form a
comprehensive framework for policy makers and other stakeholders to evaluate the financing needs of
SMEs. The Scoreboard also constitutes a valuable tool to support the design and evaluation of policy
measures, and to monitor the implications of financial reforms on access to finance and financing
conditions for SMEs over time.
The 2022 edition of the Scoreboard provides evidence of unprecedented developments in SME and
entrepreneurship finance. The COVID-19 pandemic delivered a significant economic shock in 2020, with
a global GDP contraction of 3.4% and a decline in global trade of 8.5% in real terms (OECD, 2021[1]).
SMEs and entrepreneurs were at the centre of the crisis impact. Prolonged business shutdowns,
depressed demand, and value chain disruptions created considerable operational and financial pressures
on SMEs, threatening the survival of many viable enterprises and entrepreneurs (OECD, 2021[2]) . While
the global economy rebounded in 2021, growing by 5.6%, the recovery remains uneven and risks of
renewed outbreaks and related shutdowns persist (OECD, 2021[1]). Furthermore, SMEs are facing
additional challenges related to the war in Ukraine. Inflation, in particular in the price of energy and raw
materials, volatility in financial markets and disruptions in supply chains and trade, are having negative
impacts on SME operations and performance, jeopardising their recovery. The medium- and long-term
impacts on SME finance remain to be seen.
As the COVID-19 crisis unfolded, the significant policy response ensured that financing continue to flow to
the economy, including to liquidity-strapped SMEs and entrepreneurs. Credit conditions relaxed in
response to large-scale fiscal and monetary stimulus: in 2020 interest rates registered record lows in a
large number of countries, interest rate spreads narrowed considerably in most Scoreboard countries, and
collateral requirements declined across the board. In this context, new lending increased in about half of
the Scoreboard countries, further supported by credit guarantee schemes and a notable rise in direct
lending by public institutions. But even in economies where the growth of new loans was subdued or
negative, complementary measures such as payment deferrals and debt moratoria provided relief for SME
liquidity pressures. The combination of these measures also accounted for the sharp increase in the stock
of outstanding SME loans, which grew at a rate never before registered in the history of the Scoreboard
(4.9% in 2020 compared to an average annual increase of 1.2% in the previous five years).
In most economies, the majority of support measures was broad-based and accessible to all SMEs. This
enabled most enterprises to continue to operate; as a result, bankruptcies declined in the majority of
Scoreboard countries in 2020, with the median bankruptcy rate down by 11.7%. Nonetheless, in some
countries, particularly those in the European Union, efforts were made to target lending and grant support
measures to SMEs that were not in financial distress prior to the crisis, which appears to have minimised
the distortive effects in these countries.

 21
Alternative sources of finance, whose uptake by SMEs had been growing significantly prior to the crisis,
declined significantly in 2020. For example, the drop in both leasing and hire purchases and factoring was
unprecedented. The decline in leasing represented a reversal of the pre-crisis positive trend, while the
drop in factoring intensified the pre-crisis slowdown of this activity.
Evidence on equity finance shows a fairly resilient venture capital sector despite the COVID-19 pandemic.
Half of the countries that provided data for this indicator registered positive growth in 2020, in particular
those with an already large market share, and this trend continued in 2021.
Online alternative finance activities have also continued to rise rapidly in most economies, spurred in part
by new opportunities opened up by the crisis.
Chapter 2 of the report assesses SME financing support in national recovery packages that aim to
accelerate growth and foster structural transformation in the aftermath of the pandemic. Comparisons are
made with rescue measures implemented to stave off the economic and social impacts of the COVID-19
pandemic. The analysis shows only a modest focus on SMEs in recovery packages, with SME-related
polices representing just 4.1% of total policy measures, and SME-specific funding just 2.2% of total funding
(compared to 17% and 25.5% respectively in rescue packages).
The significant decline in liquidity support in the recovery phase is particularly notable. Measures aimed at
boosting SME liquidity through debt, grants and deferral instruments carry less weight in recovery
packages (4.5% of the total volume of finance) than in crisis measures (43.2%), and are increasingly
targeted to viable firms and underserved companies owned by vulnerable groups. Recovery packages
also have a stronger focus on start-ups, with policies in this area accounting for nearly a quarter of all SME-
related policies (compared to 2% in rescue packages).
In terms of policy focus, recovery packages place emphasis on innovation, digitalisation and greening, with
innovation accounting for the highest number of SME-related policies and digitalisation for the highest
volumes of financial support. On the other hand, explicit SME-related policies related to greening and
sustainability represent only 2.44% of financial support in this area according to the analysis of policy
trackers, although figures for Europe are higher (approximately 5%). This evidence highlights the need for
additional measures to ensure that SMEs are equipped to finance actions to reduce their carbon footprint
and contribute to sustainability objectives. The new OECD Platform on Financing SMEs for Sustainability
will advance these objectives by providing a forum for knowledge-sharing and policy dialogue on
sustainable finance for SMEs.
Given their continued focus on traditional finance, recovery packages are not likely to be a key mechanism
to kick-start improvements in the uptake of alternative sources of finance for SMEs. Going forward,
governments may wish to consider other mechanisms to foster diversification of SME finance instruments,
in line with the G20/OECD High-Level Principles on SME Financing. Fintech may hold particular promise
to help SMEs thrive in the post-pandemic recovery, which is likely to be characterised by continued high
levels of SME debt and challenges in risk assessment for certain firms and sectors.
There may also be a need to take additional steps to address the challenges of SME insolvency, which
are only modestly covered in recovery packages through measures such as debt restructuring solutions
and actions to strengthen the capacities of insolvency systems.

 23
1 Recent trends in SME and

entrepreneurship financing
This chapter reports on trends and conditions in SME access to finance. It

analyses the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on SME and
entrepreneurship financing in 2020 and 2021 based on national data and
demand-side surveys. It first provides a brief overview of macroeconomic
conditions and the business environment since 2020. It then analyses the
provision of SME financing through different instruments, as well as trends
in credit conditions, bankruptcies, payment delays and non-performing
loans. It concludes with an overview of recent trends in SME finance
support policies.

24 
Business environment and macroeconomic context
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant economic impact. Global GDP declined by 3.5% in 2020
as a result of confinement-related shutdowns, depressed demand and disruptions in value chains. (OECD,
2021[1]). In contrast to the great financial crisis, the economic contraction provoked by the COVID-19
pandemic hit developed and developing countries alike, with almost all economies reporting negative
growth in 2020 (OECD, 2021[2]). Despite global GDP rebounding to 5.6% in 2021, the recovery differs
significantly across countries and is projected to continue to diverge. Most advanced economies and
emerging economies have already reached pre-crisis real GDP per capita levels, while other developing
countries are expected to reach these levels by 2022 (Figure 1.1, left panel). However, the shortfalls
relative to the November 2019 projections for real GDP per capita remain relatively high in emerging and
developing economies, reflecting largely the relatively lower speed of vaccine rollouts as well as the
relatively lower levels of fiscal support that can be deployed to support the recovery efforts (Figure 1.1,
right panel).
However, these projections have been impacted by the war in Ukraine. While the most important
consequences have been the lives lost and the humanitarian crisis associated with the huge numbers of
besieged and displaced people, there are also significant economic implications. The economic impact of
the conflict is highly uncertain, but as of March 2022, it is estimated that it could reduce global growth
projections by 1% in the first full year after the start of the conflict, while global inflation could rise by close
to 2½ percentage points (OECD, 2022[3]).
Figure 1.1. December 2021 real GDP per capita growth projections
Note: Advanced OECD is OECD minus Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Turkey. Emerging comprises the latter five OECD countries
plus the BRIICS plus Argentina, Bulgaria and Romania. Other is all countries excluding the above, the Dynamic Asian economies (Chinese
Taipei, Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), and a number of oil-exporting countries. The Other grouping
mostly consists of lower-income developing economies
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 2021 (OECD, 2021[4]).
StatLink 2 https://doi.org/10.1787/888934304970
The pandemic has had a particularly strong impact on SMEs. At the height of the crisis, over 50% of SMEs
reported a strong drop in revenue and were at risk of being put out of business in less than three months,
according to more than 40 business surveys conducted in 2020 around the world. Micro and small
enterprises were particularly hard hit, with nearly two thirds of these firms reporting significant impacts from
the crisis, compared to about 40% of large enterprises (International Trade Centre, 2020[5]). SMEs in
developing countries were even more affected due to the limited scale of government support1 or to the

 25
allocation of resources to large companies (World Bank, 2021[6]).Informal SMEs have also been greatly
affected (ILO, 2020[7]).
Trade and business investment
The pandemic significantly disrupted world trade, which was already under considerable strain over the
previous decade. In 2020, global trade registered an 8.5% decline in real terms (OECD, 2021[1]). In 2021,
it rebounded, increasing 9.3% with respect to 2020 (OECD, 2021[4]). However, trade in services was
particularly impacted by the crisis, declining by 21% in 2021 on account of a sharp decline in travel (-81%
y-o-y in Q2 2020 and -68% y-o-y in Q3 and Q4 of 2020) and transport services (-20% y-o-y in Q2 and -
14% y-o-y in Q3 of 2020) (WTO, 2021[8]). Trade in goods also contracted, though by a more moderate
5.8%, having rebounded following a 25% y-o-y decline in second quarter of 2020 (WTO, 2021[9]).
SMEs were impacted strongly by trade disruptions along the value chain. The biggest disruptions occurred
in Q2 of 2020, with strict lockdown measures in many economies, but frictions have persisted through 2020
and into 2021. In China, exports fell about 21% in February 2020 compared to the same period in 2019,
before beginning to recover (International Trade Centre, 2020[5]). In the last quarter of 2020, 69% of SMEs
in Europe reported having difficulties in importing materials, goods and services, and 46% reported
specifically facing disruptions to supply chains, which led to shortages of goods. SMEs also incurred
additional financial costs due to these disruptions, with 26% reporting paying higher prices, and 39% facing
late payments compared to the same period in 2019 (European Commission, 2021[10]). In 2022, SMEs in
some sectors are encountering challenges as a result of increased volatility and price increases in
commodity markets. Russia and Ukraine together account for about 30% of global exports of wheat, 20%
of corn, mineral fertilisers and natural gas, and 11% of oil. (OECD, 2022[3]). SMEs that rely on these inputs,
particularly European SMEs, are likely to be affected.
Supply chain disruptions persisted in 2021 and early 2022. The sharp rise in the demand for goods, in
combination with the re-introduction of pandemic restrictions including China’s zero-COVID policy, has
congested the world busiest ports and exhausted shipping capacity. With important ports closing, and the
restriction on movement causing significant shortage of workers and drivers, in October 2021, the global
delivery time index registered the worst month on record. This has impacted inventories, causing shortages
and affecting manufacturers worldwide (Reuters, 2022[11]). As a result global shipping costs have soared,
increasing by 343% y-o-y as October 2021 according to the Freghtos Baltic Index (CFR, 2021[12]).
The strong financial impact on enterprises, as well as the uncertainty that gripped the world in the midst of
the pandemic, also had a strong impact on investment. Measured as gross fixed value formation,
investment declined sharply in Q2 of 2020 (-11.5% y-o-y in OECD countries), but it has rebounded since
in most advanced economies and emerging markets. (OECD, 2021[13]) (OECD, 2021[4]). According to
surveys, SME fixed investment has followed the same trend (ECB, 2021[14]). Meanwhile, foreign direct
investment (FDI) was particularly strongly hit, declining by 42% in 2020 (UNCTAD, 2021[15]). In the first
half of 2021 however, global FDI rebounded strongly, with inflows in the first two quarters of 2021
recovering more than 70% of 2020 losses (UNCTAD, 2021[16]).
Financial conditions
Financial conditions did not deteriorate significantly in 2020 and 2021, in large part due to swift and strong
action of governments and monetary authorities around the world. Almost all central banks implemented
monetary easing to swiftly inject liquidity into the economy. In high income countries with already record
low interest rates, central banks took unconventional measures such as large emergency purchases of
securities, and easing of collateral standards and capital requirements for financial institutions to prevent

26 
a credit crunch (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2020[17]) (ECB, 2020[18]). In many economies, these
measures were accompanied by temporary regulatory easing for commercial banks as well as moratoria
on principal and/or interest payments for enterprises. Complementary fiscal measures, including credit
guarantee schemes, subsidised lending, tax deferrals, etc., were also introduced to keep credit flowing
and stave off a potential solvency crisis (see more under Government Policy Responses section).
In 2022, conditions are tightening in financial markets around the world, reflecting greater risk aversion
and uncertainty. A tighter monetary policy stance to counter inflation is leading to higher interest rates,
which are likely to impact the conditions for SME borrowing (OECD, 2022[3]).
Lending to SMEs
The COVID-19 crisis and related policy interventions had a significant impact on the dynamics of lending
to SMEs in 2020. At the beginning of the crisis, SME liquidity needs soared due to significant revenue
shortfalls. While some of these shortfalls were offset by lower expenses due to temporary closures, as well
as relief measures such as tax deferrals, wage subsidies and moratoria on debt repayments, remaining
gaps had to be filled with new financing. Moreover, many SMEs sought to build up precautionary liquidity
buffers in light of the uncertain evolution of the pandemic. (Falagiarda, Prapiestis and Rancoita, 2020[19]).
New SME loans
Many economies recorded an increase in new SME lending in 2020, supported by accommodative
monetary policy and government support measures, including credit guarantees, direct lending through
public banks, and other instruments (see Section 0 Government policy responses in 2019-20).
In a few economies, new lending surged in 2020: Greece (+179.5%), United Kingdom (+72.44%),
Kazakhstan (+41%), Chile (+38%), Slovenia (38%), the Slovak Republic (+27.6%) and the Czech Republic
(+24.7%) (Figure 1.2). In these economies, strong demand from liquidity-constrained SMEs - many
operating in highly impacted sectors such as tourism, wholesale and retail trade, transport, etc. - was met
with the expansion of existing SME-related government support programmes2 and the introduction of new
crisis-related measures (see Government policy responses). The increase in lending also reflected an
increase in precautionary borrowing spurred by favourable credit conditions and relatively faster and easier
access to bank loans. Last but not least, in some economies, the significant restructuring and renegotiation
of loans introduced under the COVID-related debt moratoria contributed to the increase in new loans (see
Box 1.1 and Section on Government policy responses in 2019-20).
On the other hand, in many other Scoreboard economies, new lending was either subdued or declined
despite significant liquidity support provided by monetary and fiscal authorities (Figure 1.2). This did not
necessarily mean that liquidity needs of SMEs went unmet. As noted earlier, lower demand for new loans
can also explain the observed decline in new lending. Lower investment needs, recourse to public financing
schemes (direct lending, grants, equity, etc.) and reliance on alternative liquidity support measures
(deferrals, wage subsidies, debt moratoria, etc.) limited SMEs’ need for bank credit (see Box 1.1). This
was especially the case in more advanced economies where ample fiscal and monetary support was
provided to avoid a credit crunch3 (Falagiarda, Prapiestis and Rancoita, 2020[19]) (see Box 1.1).
That said, SME surveys also pointed to supply-side constraints in the banking sector as well. For example,
in Australia, which registered the highest decline in new lending across the Scoreboard countries, a study
covering 1 750 Australian SMEs found that the SME financing gap widened considerably between 2019
and 2021, increasing by AUS 4.6 billion to AUS 94.3 billion. The survey found that 1 in 4 SMEs, most of
which bank with the four largest banks in Australia, were not able to secure a loan in 2020 (Judo Bank,
2021[20]) In Denmark, too, credit declined despite increased demand for new loans among SMEs (see
Denmark country profile). In Serbia, new lending to SMEs fell considerably despite the introduction of a

 27
new credit guarantee scheme. The sharp rise in rejection rates further suggests that the increased demand
for new lending among Serbian enterprises might not have been fully met by the banking system (see
section on Rejection rates).
Box 1.1. Spotlight on new SME lending in selected economies

In Chile, the high growth in new lending reflects the significant boost of funding (USD 3 billion) and
lower access requirements to the Small Business Guarantee Fund (FOGAPE)’s through the newly
established COVID-19 scheme. The sharp increase also reflects a relatively low base: SMEs account
for just 21% total outstanding business loans (see Chile country profile).
In Greece, the sharp rise in lending also reflected the relatively low base of lending prior to the crisis.
New SME lending (as all other enterprise lending) had been on a downward trend since the start of the
global financial crisis, constrained by a weak post-recession recovery and a high and rising share of
SME non-performing loans (NPLs) (36% of total loans in 2019). Thus, at EUR 3.5 billion, new SME
loans in 2020 still accounted for just above a quarter of the value of new SME loans in 2008 (EUR 12.5
billion). The surge in new demand for loans in Greece likely also reflected the relatively high share of
SMEs in sectors strongly affected by the crisis, such as tourism (see Greece country profile).
In Slovenia, 2020 saw an increase in precautionary borrowing as evidenced by the value of approved
credit lines which have largely remained undrawn. New lending was further boosted by renegotiated
and restructured loans under the legislative moratoria related to Covid-19, which are classified as new
loans under the methodology of the Bank of Slovenia. This explains in part the divergence between the
strong increase in new lending (23% y-o-y, inflation adjusted) and the decline in the outstanding stock
of SME loans (see section below on Outstanding stock of SME loans; Slovenia country profile).
In the United Kingdom, the high spike in new lending to SME reflects significant precautionary borrowing
by SMEs against 100% government guarantees in the Bounce Back Loan scheme (BBLS) to build up
liquidity buffers: 23% of applicants in the scheme had used none of the facilities (Klahr et al., 2021[21]).
Similarly, the provision of BBLS loans with broad eligibility criteria, a swift application process (loans
approved within 24 to 72 hours), a long grace period and a 100% government guarantee may have
contributed to a larger number of SMEs receiving loans compared to other Scoreboard economies
(National Audit Office, 2020[22]).
In the United States, unprecedented financial support was provided to SMEs through the Paycheck
Protection Programme (PPP) (USD 525 billion through 5,460 lenders) and other programmes. However
the lending provided through the programme was subject to forgiveness upon proof of retained
employment which resulted in most financial support (over USD 600 billion) being eventually extended
in grant form (see United States country profile). This accounts for the relatively limited growth in new
lending in 2020.
Source: Scoreboard country profiles.

28 
Figure 1.2. New SME loans

Year-on-year growth rate, as a percentage
2020 2019
190
140
90
40
-10
-60
-110
Note: All data are adjusted for inflation using the OECD GDP deflator. Data for non-OECD countries were extracted from the World Development
Indicators from the World Bank.
Source: Data compiled from the individual country profiles.
Most upper middle income economies recorded a decline in new SME lending – with the median lending
rate declining by 5.47% (Figure 1.3).This likely reflected the more limited government support relative to
advanced economies and/or more limited transmission of the support measures. For example, advanced
economies spent 8.4 % of GDP on average on stimulus measures, compared to 6.4% of GDP in middle
income economies (UNCTAD, 2020[23]). Some middle-income countries also had limited scope for
loosening monetary policy given inflationary pressures, potential capital outflows and upward pressures
on exchange rates (OECD, 2020[24]), which had implications for interest rates and credit growth.
Furthermore, in middle-income economies, the risks associated with lending to SMEs and enterprises in
general are comparatively higher and banks can be less incentivised to lend, especially in a crisis situation.
Therefore, even if instruments were deployed by governments to enhance new lending for SMEs, this
lending did not always materialise at the expected rate unless credit guarantee schemes fully transferred
the risks of new lending from banks to the government, which was not the case in all Scoreboard upper-
middle income countries. Finally, the lower increase in new lending may also be attributable to lower
demand for loans due to shorter and less strict lockdowns in some of these economies, as well as the
availability of alternative sources of liquidity support (i.e. deferrals, subsidies and grants etc.) (Figure 1.2)
(ECB, 2020[25]).

 29
Figure 1.3. Growth in new SME lending, 2008-20

Median year-on-year growth rate, as a percentage
Scoreboard EU High income Upper middle income

15
10
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Note: All data are adjusted for inflation using the OECD GDP deflator. GDP deflators for non-OECD countries were extracted from the World
Development Indicators from the World Bank.
Source: Data compiled from individual country profiles.
Outstanding stock of SME loans
In most Scoreboard countries (27 out of 41 countries that provided data for this indicator), the stock of
outstanding SME loans increased in 2020 (Figure 1.4). In many economies, such as France, Kazakhstan,
Turkey and the United Kingdom, this reflects the significant growth in new SME lending, as discussed the
previous section. However, changes in outstanding SME loans also reflect other dynamics that were
impacted by the pandemic and related measures, including the pace of loan repayments and changes in
the maturity of loans. The large use of debt moratoria, for example, affected the pace of loan repayments
across most Scoreboard economies (29 out of 46 countries), and the extensions of loan maturities as part
of debt restructuring schemes resulted in many SME loans remaining on bank balance sheets longer than
they would have otherwise (OECD, 2021[2]).

30 
Figure 1.4. Growth in outstanding SME business loans

Year-on-year growth rate, as a percentage
2020 2019
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
-10
-20
-30
In 2020, many countries (14 out of 41 countries that provided data for this indicator) recorded a decline in
the stock of loans. Contributing factors include sluggish growth or declines in new lending due to limited
investment opportunities and/or recourse to public crisis-related financing schemes, coupled with
(accelerated) debt repayment. In some countries, the decline also reflected continued deleveraging of the
private sector following the global financial crisis, and the sale and/or restructuring of NPLs and other loans
(the latter as part of the debt moratoria schemes) (see Box 1.2).

 31
Box 1.2. Spotlight on outstanding stock of SME loans in selected economies

In France, the stock of SME loans rose sharply on account of a strong increase in new lending through
government-supported programmes and debt moratoria. French SMEs had increased their equity and
had deleveraged significantly prior to the crisis, which enabled them to take on more debt in 2020. Data
from the Bank of France show that the share of equity in total financial resources had risen from 37.8%
in 2007 to 44% in 2019. This gave SMEs greater borrowing capacity to increase their liquidity in the
midst of the crisis. The Bank of France shows that indeed in 2020, SMEs requested state-guaranteed
loans worth EUR 95 billion, representing 75% of loans approved as of December 2020 (Banque de
France, 2021[26]).
In Greece, the stock of SME loans declined despite a strong increase in new lending (170%, inflation
adjusted). This was mainly the result of significant removal of NPLs from Greek banks’ balance sheets
(from 36.1% of total loans in 2019 to 28.5% of total loans in 2020) through the introduction in late 2019
of the “Hercules” asset-protection scheme. The scheme, which was extended in mid-2021, enabled the
sale of NPLs to a private securitisation vehicle that could subsequently sell more senior securities
backed by these assets and guaranteed by the state (see Greece country profile).
In Ireland, the decline in new SME lending and the stock of outstanding loans in 2020 represented a
continuation of a long-term deleveraging trend following the global financial crisis. According to the SME
Credit Demand Survey, SMEs’ demand for loans declined in 2020, dampened by prolonged closures
and the availability of alternative Government support that helped businesses reduce their expenditures
(direct grants and payments to closed or impacted businesses, tax warehousing, support for wage
payments). Data from the Central Bank of Ireland showed a significant increase in the deposits of
private enterprises, including SMEs, which further confirms that the most likely reason SMEs did not
access credit was the sufficient availability of internal funds.
In Italy, the State guarantee system was boosted by giving SACE, the Italian export credit agency whose
tasks were redefined, the role of providing public guarantees to large firms. The initiative was also
extended to SMEs that had exhausted their ability to access the Central Guarantee Fund. This, in
combination with other provisions, such as the roll-out of a debt moratorium to help firms cope with
temporary liquidity shortages, dampened the demand for bank credit. Italy thus saw only a modest
increase in the outstanding stock of SME loans.
In Korea, the stock of SME lending rose by 10.6% compared to 2019. The increase is explained by
government support measures, including the extension of loan maturities as well as debt moratoria of
principal and interest of loans (worth KRW 209.7 trillion – from April 2020 to July 2021) provided to
SMEs affected by the COVID-19 crisis. The deferral of principal payment was further extended with
KRW 12.1 trillion, and the deferment of interest payments with KRW 209.7 billion.
In Peru new SME lending increased by 13.8% in real terms, and the outstanding stock of SME loans
grew by a remarkable 60% in real terms. This marked a notable change in a multi-year trend of relatively
subdued or negative growth in the stock of loans. The government support programmes Reactiva Peru
and Fondo de Apoyo Empresarial- FAE-MYPE) gave a significant boost to new SME lending. The stock
of loans was further boosted by the introduction of alternative liquidity support measures, such as a
credit rescheduling programme, which was implemented to limit the risks of default, but also enabled
loans to remain on banks’ balance sheets longer.
In Poland, bank surveys indicated that there is limited demand for new lending due to the use of
government support programmes. This was accompanied by high debt repayment rates (94.5% of
companies declared timely settlement of credit liabilities), which resulted in a net decline in the stock of
loans.
Source: Country profiles.

32 
All of these factors contributed to a notable increase in the stock of outstanding SME loans: the median
year-on-year growth for all Scoreboard countries rose to 4.94%, the highest in the Scoreboard’s history.
The largest increase was registered in upper middle-income countries (12.7% increase in the group
median), which marked a sharp reversal of the pre-crisis trend of declining outstanding stock of loans. The
European Union experienced the smallest increase among all groups, at 0.97%, though the positive growth
represented a reversal of a three-year trend of declining stock of outstanding SME loans (Figure 1.5).
Figure 1.5. Growth in outstanding SME loans, 2008-20

Median year-on-year growth rate, as a percentage
15
10
-5
-10
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Indicators from the World Bank. The other high-income country category in this sample are Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, Japan, New Zealand,
Switzerland and the United States.
Source: Data compiled from information received from individual country Scoreboards.
SME loan shares
The composition of enterprise lending between SMEs and large enterprises did not change significantly in
2020 in most Scoreboard countries (Figure 1.6). This means that, contrary to what might have been
expected, the COVID-19 crisis did not shift lending away from riskier clients like SMEs and toward larger
enterprises. This also suggests that the strong policy response and focus on SME support in COVID-19
rescue packages likely shifted the balance in favour of SMEs, especially in the provision of liquidity support,
if not financing for investment (see Chapter 2). A BIS study found that measures that strengthen bank’s
lending capacity by encouraging flexibility in loss accounting and by preserving their capital, contributed to
lending growth, with SMEs being the main beneficiaries. Likewise, increases in the coverage of guarantee
programmes was associated with banks reporting accommodative lending standards and high lending to
SMEs (BIS, 2021[27]).
In countries that saw the share of SME lending increase in 2020 (Figure 1.6), the driving factors differed.
In Lithuania, for example, the share of SME loans increased by 17.1 percentage points in 2020, but this
was mainly on account of large enterprises’ lower demand for loans tempered by postponed investments,
reserved sales and alternative state support (e.g. tax deferrals) (see Lithuania country profile). In other
countries, like Brazil and Peru, new lending to SMEs, which was largely government provided or backed,
accounted for most of the increase in the relative share of SME loans in 2020 (see Brazil and Peru country

 33
profiles). In Peru, for example, 98.6% of the beneficiaries of the Reactiva Peru programme were SMEs
(see Peru country profile).
In 2020, the share of outstanding SME business loans ranged from around 20% or less in Canada, Italy,
Estonia, Indonesia, Chile and France, to more than 70% in Latvia, the Czech Republic, Switzerland,
Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Korea (Figure 1.6). Interestingly, it is in the first group of countries
(where the proportion of SME lending is lower compared to large firms) that there is less variation of the
group median between 2019 and 2020, when compared to the second group of countries. This can be
explained by the structure of the corporate sector in such economies where the presence of large firms is
stronger (OECD, 2020[28]), and thus cyclical disruptions do not have a large impact on lending rates.
SME loan shares generally remain lower in developing and middle-income countries (Figure 1.6). This
reflects, among other factors, higher levels of informality. In Colombia and South Africa, for example, an
estimated 60% and 58% of businesses respectively operate informally (see country profiles). This high
prevalence of informality also contributes to the lack of access to finance, as the benefits of formalisation
are not well known and understood by business owners. Informality also contributes to financial exclusion
from formal financial services: in South Africa, for example, about 28% of enterprises are informally served,
while 15% are financially excluded (see South Africa country profile). The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to
have exacerbated the challenges of informality, as a large share of formal businesses closed during the
pandemic but many of these likely continued to operate informally (see more in Section 1.6.2 on
Bankruptcies).
The relatively lower share of SME loans in developing and emerging countries can also be explained by
the large proportion of SME owners that request credit on their personal accounts, to be used for business
purposes. In South Africa, only 34% of businesses use formal financial accounts in the business’ name.
This not only increases the risk of excessive personal indebtedness and affects the owners’ credit profile
and history, but it also means that these businesses do not benefit from access to adequate financial
products. This also impedes banks’ adequate monitoring of corporate credit (see South Africa country
profile).
Figure 1.6. SME loan shares
As a percentage of total outstanding business loans
2020 2019
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Source: Data compiled from the individual country profiles

34 
Short-term versus long-term lending

Short-term loans are defined as loans with maturities of less than a year, and are often used to provide
working capital. Long-term loans, meanwhile, are more often used to finance investments, but can also
indicate a strategy used by SMEs to lock in lower interest rates (Banque de France, 2018[29]). As
documented by previous editions of the SME financing Scoreboard, there has been a progressive shift in
the SME loan portfolio from short-term loans to loans with longer maturity periods, and 2020 data show a
continuation of this trend (OECD, 2020[28]). Nearly seven out of ten new loans for SMEs in 2020 were long-
term loans (Figure 1.7). This trend is likely to continue as COVID-19 debt restructuring schemes tend to
extend loan maturities to loans provided in 2020 as a way to give SMEs the time to recover (OECD, 2021[2]).
Figure 1.7. Share of long-term SME loans

Median values, as a percentage of all SME loans
New Loans Long-term Outstanding Long-term
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Credit conditions for SMEs
This section describes credit conditions for SMEs and entrepreneurs based on the data on the cost of bank
finance, collateral requirements and rejection rates. It also draws on findings from supply-side and
demand-side surveys.
Interest rates
Interest rates continue to vary across Scoreboard countries, with upper middle-income economies
demanding relatively higher borrowing costs for SMEs compared to advanced economies. In seven
economies, SME interest rates exceeded 10%. The high interest rates reflect in some cases, the banks’
significantly higher operating costs and credit risk associated with SME operations. SMEs tend to have a
low degree of organisation, operate in the local market and lack financial information regarding their
activities. In Peru, for example, around 57.9% of SMEs do not keep a record of their cash flows and 80%
do not prepare a financing plan for their activities (see Peru country profile). In other countries, like

 35
Kazakhstan, interest rates are high for both SMEs and large enterprises, reflecting broader
macroeconomic conditions (see Kazakhstan country profile).
Figure 1.8. SME interest rates, 2020

Nominal rates, as a percentage
25
20
15
10
Note: The median calculation includes data for Russia and Belarus.
When looking at the changes in SME interest rates in 2020 compared to the previous year, it is apparent
that central banks made use of this monetary policy tool to swiftly reduce the cost of credit as a response
to the COVID-19 restrictions. Interest rates declined in almost all reporting economies (34 out of 42), and
in the others, they increased only marginally (less than 1% in all remaining countries) (Figure 1.9).
Inflationary pressures and concerns about potential capital outflows brought on by the crisis likely limited
interest rate decreases in some countries (OECD, 2020[24]).
The decline in interest rates is also explained by significant recourse to public lending or guarantee
schemes. For example, the Brazilian National Program to Support Micro and Small Enterprises –
Pronampe – programme provided financing for SMEs at significantly lower rates compared to the otherwise
double-digit market lending rates (see Brazil country profile). In Chile, likewise, the FOGAPE lending
scheme established a cap on interest rates for covered credit operations (they could not exceed the
monetary policy rate by more than 3% in nominal terms) (see Chile country profile). These schemes
resulted in some of the largest declines in interest rates ever recorded in the Scoreboard history
(Figure 1.9).

36 
Figure 1.9. SME interest rates, growth rate

Nominal rates, percentage points
2020 2019
-1
-2
-3
19
-19 -5
-4

The median SME interest rate for the Scoreboard countries declined by 0.4 percentage points in 2020, the
largest drop recorded in the Scoreboard for this indicator since 2009. Upper middle-income economies
registered the largest decline, with 1.47 percentage points, albeit from a higher base. High-income
countries, many of which already had record low interest rates prior to this crisis, registered a smaller
decline in the median rate of 0.2 percentage points (Figure 1.9).
The interest rate spread between loans to SMEs and large companies offers additional insights regarding
SME credit conditions. Given the inherently riskier profiles that SMEs have as borrowers, they are usually
charged higher interest rates compared to large enterprises. As such, a narrowing interest rate spread
generally indicates more favourable lending conditions for SMEs, while a widening spread indicates tighter
lending conditions (OECD, 2012[30]).
The 2020 data on interest rate spreads show that SME credit conditions were overall more favourable
compared to the run-up to the crisis: spreads were narrower in 27 countries out of 40 providing data for
this indicator (Figure 1.10).
In 2020, Latin American countries registered the largest declines in interest rate spreads (Figure 1.10).
This reflects a sharp drop in lending rates to SMEs that otherwise face very high market rates.

 37
Figure 1.10. Interest rate spreads between loans to SMEs and to large firms
Nominal rates, percentage points
2020 2019
16
8
-1
Note: The median calculation includes data for Russia and Belarus.
The trend of the median value of interest rate spreads by income group offers further insights into SME
credit conditions in 2020. Narrower spreads were registered in almost all groups of countries. Upper
middle-income countries registered the strongest decline with 1.03 percentage points and the lowest
median value since 2009 (0.42). This continues the pre-crisis trend of narrowing spreads in these
economies. High-income countries also registered a decline of 0.09 percentage points and a median value
0.61 percentage points. In contrast, European Union countries’ median value stood unchanged compared
to 2019, at 0.78 percentage points (Figure 1.11).
Figure 1.11. Interest rate spreads between loans to SMEs and to large firms, by groups of countries
Median value, percentage points

3
2.5
1.5
0.5
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020


38 
Collateral requirements
Data on collateral requirements come from demand-side surveys, whose methodology, sample and
questions asked differ from one country to the other. Cross-country comparisons should, therefore, be
made with caution, and reporting improvements are needed to better assess the evolution in SME financing
conditions in this respect.
Evidence from 15 Scoreboard countries that provide data on this indicator shows that collateral
requirements, expressed as a percentage of SMEs requiring collateral to access bank credit, declined
significantly in 2020. Ten out of the 15 countries registered a fall in collateral requirements (Figure 1.12,
left panel) The decrease was strongest in the United States (-41.10 percentage points), followed by the
United Kingdom (-24 percentage points). Other high-income countries also registered a decline in collateral
requirements, but to a lesser extent (Figure 1.12, left panel).
The decline likely reflects the increased use of credit guarantee schemes in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. For instance, as of February 2021, 46 out of 55 countries applied credit guarantees to respond
to the COVID-19 crisis (OECD, 2021[2]).
The evolution of the median value for this indicators shows that the 2020 decline in collateral requirements
was a continuation of the pre-crisis trend. However, the median share of loans requiring collateral in 2020
declined considerably more compared to the trend in the run-up to the crisis, reflecting the importance of
the government support schemes. (Figure 1.12, right panel)
Figure 1.12. Collateral requirements

By country (left), median growth rate (right)
2020 2019
100 8
90
6
80
70
4
60
50 2
40
30 0
20
-2
10
0
-4
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

SME loan applications
Similar to data on collateral, data on application rates are usually gathered from demand-side surveys,
with limited comparability across countries.
Despite the pandemic, new loans applications did not increase significantly in many countries: the 2020
median value of SME loan applications was 31%, only 6 percentage points higher than the 2019 median
(Figure 1.13). As discussed in Section 1.1 on new SME loans, despite the liquidity constraints imposed by
the crisis, demand for new loans in many countries was dampened by postponed investments as well as

 39
the introduction of additional support measures like tax deferrals, debt moratoria, employment retention
schemes, etc. Use of public financing schemes was another factor that negatively impacted the demand
for bank credit. (ECB, 2020[31]).
On the other hand, in countries that did register an increase in SME loan applications, the growth rates
were unprecedented. This is the case of Austria (+13.48 percentage points), Colombia (+10 percentage
points), Spain (+8.57 percentage points), Greece (+7.34 percentage points) and the United Kingdom (+5
percentage points) (Figure 1.13). In Austria, for example, the big rise in SME loan applications reflected a
sharp increase in the need for new financing compared to the previous years which were marked by a
reported negative financing gap (i.e. the available finance was higher than the financing needs of SMEs)
(ECB, 2019[32]).
Figure 1.13. SME loan applications

Share of total number of SMEs
2020 2019
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
GBR NLD IRL FIN LUX SVK GRC Median BEL AUT COL FRA ESP CHN USA

Rejection rates
Data on rejection rates are usually collected from demand-side surveys for which comparability across
countries is often limited. Nevertheless, this indicator helps shed light on the supply of credit to SMEs and
provides evidence on the overall financing conditions they face. Higher rates of rejection are indicative of
constraints in the credit supply. A high number of loan application rejections thus illustrates that loan
demand is not being met, either because the terms and conditions of the loan offers are deemed
unacceptable, the average creditworthiness of loan applications has deteriorated, or banks are rationing
credit (OECD, 2012[30]).
Credit standards (bank loan approval criteria) tightened in most countries in the context of the COVID-19
crisis, even if the tightening was relatively smaller compared to the global financial crisis, in part due to the
significant fiscal and monetary support measures implemented in response to the crisis (ECB, 2020[31]).
This resulted in an increase in rejection rates across over half the countries that provided data for this
indicator (10 out of 17), while in the others rejection rates remained unchanged compared to 2019. The
median value of the 17 countries showed an increase of 6.67 percentage points, reversing the trend seen
in 2019 when the median rejection rates decreased 0.7 percentage points. This indicator remains high and
with low variation between 2019 and 2020 in Lithuania and the United States, with 43.5% and 32.4% of

40 
SMEs being rejected respectively, and increased considerably in Serbia (+12.78), Greece (+7.34), and
New Zealand (+5.24) (Figure 1.14).
The United Kingdom and in the Slovak Republic were the only two countries that reported a decline in
rejection rates in 2020 compared to 2019. In the United Kingdom this was likely driven by the Bounce Back
Loan Scheme (BBLS) (Figure 1.14). The scheme provided a 100% credit guarantee against the
outstanding balance (capital and interest) on small business loans extended through the scheme, which
significantly reduced the risk of lending to SMEs (see United Kingdom country profile). In the Slovak
Republic, two guarantee schemes were implemented: “SIHAZ 1”, with a 80% coverage of individual credits
from 50 % of the portfolio, and “SIHAZ 2a”, with a 90% coverage of all new credits (see Slovak Republic
country profile).
In countries with stable low rejection rates, public interventions such as credit mediation can explain
continued low levels in 2020. In France for example, the credit mediation scheme ensures that banks
reconsider the rejection of loans and ease the provision of financing to companies facing temporary
difficulties (European Monitoring Centre on Change, 2020[33]). In 2020, 14 147 French firms asked for credit
mediation support, a figure that is 14 times higher than in 2019. According to the Bank of France, the
scheme unblocked a total of EUR 2.98 billion of credit and preserved an estimated 77 815 jobs in 2020
(see France country profile).
Figure 1.14. Rejection rates

As a percentage
2020 2019
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
FRA CHN AUT ESP ITA SVK BEL FIN Median IRL GBR NZL SRB NLD COL GRC USA LTU
Source: Data compiled from individual country profiles.

Additional evidence on credit conditions from survey data
Survey data further illustrates that in 2020, debt finance remained relatively affordable and available, no
doubt as a result of the strong policy response to tackle the COVID-19 crisis. Interest rates declined to
record lows, and loan guarantees expanded significantly in European countries, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Although these surveys provide important insights on the conditions of
the supply and/or demand of credit, the comparability across surveys is limited.

 41
Euro area
The European Central Bank Survey on SME access to finance in euro area countries (SAFE Survey),
undertaken twice a year, provides insights into how credit conditions are perceived by SMEs in the region.
The survey, that covered the period of April to September 2020, indicates that access to finance remained
among the least important concerns in the euro area as a whole, with some country heterogeneity,
however. SMEs in Greece and Italy reported that the lack of finance continued to have a strong impact on
them (ECB, 2021[14]). The survey covering the same period in 2021 showed that across the Euro area, the
share of SMEs reporting access to finance as a major concern declined further and stood at 7% (ECB,
2021[34]).
As illustrated in Figure 1.15, the demand for bank loans increased significantly in H1 2020 (20% from 8%),
but decreased to 12% in H2 2020 and to 1.6% in H1 of 2021, explained by the large availability of non-
debt public support schemes. The availability of bank loans showed some fluctuation in 2020: while the
first half saw a slight increase in available bank loans by 6%, the second half saw a decline by 3%. Notably,
while large companies signalled a return to pre-COVID-19 levels, micro firms indicated a decline in
availability of bank loans. In contrast, in H1 2021, the availability of bank loans increased 6.4%, with almost
all firm sizes (except medium-sized companies) reporting a return to pre-pandemic levels of loan
availability (ECB, 2021[34]). Looking by country, SMEs in Belgium reported reduce availability of bank loans
(ECB, 2021[14]).
The price, terms and conditions for bank financing reported in general an increase. The only exception is
a decrease in interest rates in the first half of 2020, in line with the results of the Scoreboard. However, in
the second half of 2020 and the first half of 2021, SMEs reported an increase in interest rates. Other
financing costs, such as charges, fees and commissions reported an increase throughout the year (ECB,
2021[14]).
The survey data also shows a slight decrease in SMEs applying for a loan in H1 2021 at 22%, down from
27% from H2 2020. The share of loan applications granted in full in 2021 maintained the same levels
registered in the previous round at 72.4% , while rejection rates increased to 6% (from 4% in H2 2020)
(ECB, 2020[35]).

42 
Figure 1.15. ECB Survey on SME access to finance

Selected indicators, as a percentage of total SMEs surveyed
Availability of loans (net)

Interest rate (net) Collateral requirements (net)
Need for bank loans (net)
25 60
20 50
40
15
30
10
20
5
10
0
0
-5
-10
-10 -20
-15 -30
-20 -40
Application rejected Applied for amount granted in full Applied for a loan
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1 H2 H1
2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018 2019 2019 2020 2020 2021
Note: The net percentage is the difference between the percentage of firms reporting that the given factor has improved and the percentage
reporting that it has deteriorated, or the difference between the percentage reporting that it had increased and the percentage reporting that it
has decreased. H1 2020 refers to round 23 (April to September 2020), published in November 2020. H2 2020 refers to round 24 (October 2020
to March 2021), published in May 2021. H1 of 2021 refers to round 25 (April to September 2021), published in November 2021. The timeline is
the same for previous rounds.
Source: European Central Bank, 2021.
United States
Survey data from The Senior Loan Officer Survey captures the opinion of senior bank officials on lending
practices in the United States. The data captured in Q3 2021 show looser standards in the terms of
corporate loans for all firm sizes, which contrasts to survey results from the same period in 2020, where
standards were significantly tighter. In Q3 2021, most banks reported easing loan rates for all firm sizes.
For SMEs specifically, easing requirements were related to reducing the cost of loans and increasing the
maximum size of credit lines. Demand for loans fluctuated between 2020 and 2021. While in 2020 bank
officials reported a weaker demand for corporate credit, in Q3 2021 the demand for loans rebounded;

 43
however demand from SMEs remained unchanged (Federal Reserve Bank, 2020[36]) (Federal Reserve
Bank, 2021[37]).
The Small Business Lending Survey, conducted quarterly, captures the perception of commercial banks
of their small business lending activities in the United States. Survey responses captured in the third
quarter of 2021 indicate an ease in credit standards, although with mixed loan terms, evidenced by
tightened interest rate floors but an ease in spreads of loan rates and maximum maturity of credit lines
(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2021[38]). This behaviour contrasts with survey results from the
same period in 2020, where credit standards and all loan terms were significantly tighter (Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, 2020[39]).
Japan
In Japan, the TANKAN survey, a quarterly poll on business confidence conducted by the Bank of Japan,
shows that in the first two quarters of 2020 financing conditions for small firms and for large firms diverged.
While lending attitudes for small businesses loosened slightly, for large business they tightened strongly,
particularly in the first quarter of 2020 (Figure 1.16). In contrast, in 2021 lending attitudes for SMEs and for
large firms started to converge, with the index value for both size classes being the closest in the last
quarter of 2021. It is also noteworthy that the lending attitudes towards medium-sized enterprises replicate
to a certain extent the attitude towards large enterprises; however it did not tighten at the same rate,
remaining closer to the small firms index value in the last quarter of 2020 and through 2021 (Bank of Japan,
2021[40]).
Figure 1.16. Lending attitudes in Japan

Diffusion index, in percentage points
Small Enterprises Medium-sized Enterprises Large Enterprises
35
"Accommodative"
30
25
20
15
10
"Severe"
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Note: Diffusion index of "Accommodative" minus "Severe", percentage points.

Source: Bank of Japan, 2021 (Bank of Japan, 2021[40])
United Kingdom
The Credit Conditions Survey of the Bank of England documents the opinion of bank officials regarding
capital availability for loans and overall credit conditions on a quarterly basis. According to the survey data,
availability of credit to the corporate sector increased for all firm sizes in 2020. In 2021 the availability of
credit remained stable for SMEs, but increased slightly for large firms in the first three quarters. On the

44 
other hand, the demand for loans from SMEs in 2020 fluctuated. As expected, considering the impact of
the pandemic, demand for loans from all business sizes increased in the second quarter of 2020, and only
in Q4 did SME demand for credit decline (Bank of England, 2020[41]). In 2021, demand for credit from small
businesses declined, while demand from large businesses increased. Demand from medium-sized
companies was broadly stable in 2021, with the exception of Q2 and Q3 where demand decreased slightly
(Bank of England, 2021[42]).
Asset-based finance
Leasing and hire purchases
Leasing and hire purchases activity declined in 2020, reversing the positive trend seen in previous years.
This decline can be explained by the weaker demand for new leasing services (ECB, 2020[35]) as well as
by lower payment capacity on leases (BDO, 2020[43]) both impacted by the lower economic activity in the
context of the pandemic. Data from Leaseurope, a sector organisation, show a decline in leasing activity
in the first half of 2020 compared to the same period in 2019, and the information captured from the
individual country profiles confirms this negative trend in 2020 for 11 out of 19 countries in the Scoreboard
that reported this data (Figure 1.17). The United Kingdom shows one of the largest declines, reflecting a
significant contraction in business investment in the midst of pandemic and following the exit from the
European Union, as well as by a potential replacement of the use of asset-based finance by government
guarantee lending (see United Kingdom’s country profile). In Estonia, leasing and hire purchases in 2020
represented only 75% of the 2019 volumes, the lowest volume in the last 5 years, reflecting a significant
decline in new leases (EESTI LIISINGUHINGUTEV LIIT, 2021[44]).
On the other hand, a few countries saw an increase in leasing activity in 2020. Most notably, Kazakhstan
registered an increase of 33%, which continues a trend of strong growth in the leasing finance segment
over the past decade (eight-fold since 2010) (Figure 1.17).
The SME Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) Survey reported the evolution of leasing activities
through 2020 and 2021 in the European Union. While in 2020 across the EU member states, the growth
in leasing needs significantly surpassed the growth in the availability of such financing, in 2021 leasing
activities return to positive growth (European Commision, 2020[45]). In the first quarter of 2021, the
percentage of SMEs that indicated higher availability of leasing increased (to 6% from 3%). However, this
positive growth did not reach pre-crisis levels of leasing activity (15% in 2019). In the second and third
quarters, the likelihood of use of leasing was correlated with firm size, with 42% of large firms using leasing
compared to 20% of SMEs in the Euro area (ECB, 2021[34]).

 45
Figure 1.17. Leasing and hire purchases growth rate by country

As a percentage
2020 2019
40
30
20
10
-10
-20
-30
-40
Source: Data from Austria, Czech Republic. Denmark, Italy, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Norway and Poland is compiled from Leaseurope Annual
Statistics 2021; the data for other countries is compiled from the individual country profiles.
Factoring
Scoreboard data on factoring volumes is complemented with data from Factors Chain International (FCI),
a sector organisation. In 2020, factoring activities saw an unprecedented decline, with the Scoreboard
median declining by 16.27% (Figure 1.18). In Europe, the largest contributor to factoring activities, which
represents 68% of the market, factoring turnover declined by 5.4%. This was the first decrease in 11 years
and mirrored the decline in GDP (-6.4%). The largest declines experienced in the region were registered
in the Slovak Republic (-21%), Slovenia (-12%), Italy (-10%) and France (-8%). Likewise, in the United
States, factoring declined by 23.4% in 2020 compared to 4.6% in 2019 (FCI, 2021[46]).
Data from the Scoreboard country profiles, sourced from national accounts provided by country experts as
a complement to the above-mentioned data from FCI, show that 11 out of 14 countries that provided data
for this indicator documented a decline in factoring activities between 2019 and 2020. The largest declines
from this data source were seen in Lithuania (-51%), Portugal (-41%) and the United Kingdom (-36.6%).
On the other hand, there was a modest increase in Turkey (14%) and China (6%) (Figure 1.19).
In 2020, the negative performance in factoring activities reflects significant reduction in economic output
and trade as a result of COVID-19 related restrictions (FCI, 2021[46]). This represents a continuation of the
pre-crisis trend of a slowdown in factoring activity (since 2017) further accelerated by the crisis. The broad
trend has reflected the rising trade tensions between the United States and China as well as the uncertainty
accompanying the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. In many economies, sector-specific
aspects also explain this trend. For example, factoring remains the preferred method of short-term
financing in the automotive industry, which was strongly impacted by the pandemic in 2020 (OECD,
2015[47]).

46 
Figure 1.18. Median factoring growth rate for Scoreboard countries

Year-on-year growth, as percentage
15
10
-5
-10
-15
-20
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Country-specific reforms accounted for the growth observed in factoring in some countries. For example,
in Ukraine, factoring activity increased by 37% in 2020 on account of the creation of the so-called Factoring
Hub, an online platform that facilitates the electronic application for factoring to SMEs so they can have
quick working capital to fulfil government orders: with the Factoring Hub SMEs are able to obtain finance
within two days and with a minimal request of financial documents (SCM, 2020[48]). The increase in Turkey
is a product of a favourable regulatory environment that strengthened the sector since 2013 (see Turkey’s
country profile). Similarly, in China, the increase can also be explained by the enhancement of the legal
system though the National Civil Code and regulatory changes of the China Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission, where despite a reduction in the number of factoring companies and branches,
the factoring volume increased exceeding EUR 433.2 billion (see China’s country profile).
European survey data from 2021 show that factoring has not yet rebounded, with only 2% of SMEs using
it and 8% considering it a relevant source of finance as of Q3 2021 (ECB, 2021[34]).

 47
Figure 1.19. Factoring growth rate by country

Year-on-year growth, as percentage
2020 2019
50
30
10
-10
-30
-50
-70
Source: Data from, Chile, China, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Peru, Portugal, Turkey, and United Kingdom are compiled
from the individual country profiles; the data for other countries are from Factors Chain International (2021).
Equity instruments
Venture capital
Trends in venture capital financing diverged across countries and stages in the Scoreboard in 2020 and
2021. In half of the countries providing data on this indicator, VC investment declined. On the other hand,
2020 VC investments grew strongly in a number of countries in the Scoreboard, including Turkey (+428
percentage points), Mexico (+199 percentage points) and Ireland (+110 percentage points) (Figure 1.20).
In viewing these growth rates, it is important to keep in mind that data on VC investments are highly volatile,
especially in smaller economies and countries with relatively underdeveloped VC markets, where a large
single deal can impact overall volumes considerably.
In regions with significant VC market shares, data generally show a resilient VC sector despite the
pandemic. In Europe, for example, VC saw an increase of 15% year on year, reaching a total deal value
of EUR 42.8 billion. Similarly, in the United States, the sector saw in 2020 an increase of 13% year on year
reaching a new record in total deal value of USD 156.2 billion, and a decline of 10% in the total number of
deals, however (National Venture Capital Association - Pitchbook, 2020[49]) (Centre for Entrepreneurs,
2021[50]).
The marked growth in the European region can be explained by the acceleration of the growth of the digital
economy, propelled by lockdown measures in 2020, as well as highly digitalised companies that offered
online services taking advantage of the upsurge of demand. This is particularly the case for companies
closing deals with sizes of over EUR 25 million (Pitchbook, 2020[51]). Government intervention also played
an important role in supporting the dynamism of venture capital markets. For example, in Hungary,
Hiventures, a state owned venture capital fund, set up the start-up rescue programme with a budget of
HUF 41 billion (Hiventures Venture Capital Fund, 2020[52]). France and Germany, as part of their policy
responses, included the establishment of a start-up fund of respectively EUR 4 billion and EUR 2 billion
(with additional resources from public venture capital investors) (OECD, 2021[2]). Supranational financial

48 
institutions have also played an important role in supporting the VC sector during the pandemic. For
example, the European Investment Fund mobilised up to EUR 5 billion, modified terms and conditions and
included a EUR 100 million window for ease SME to access equity financing during the pandemic (EIF,
2021[53]).
In median terms, venture capital experienced weak but positive growth in 2020 compared to previous years
(Figure 1.20). However, 2021 saw a strong rebound in VC funding, which increased by 92% y-o-y (totalling
USD 643 billion in 2021 compared to USD 335 billion in 2020) (Crunchbase, 2021[54]) Looking at the
development by stages in 2020, the crisis took a heavier toll on seed and early stage funding than
investments in later stage funding. While seed funding closed the year with a decline of 27% y-o-y, and
early stage funding declined by 11% y-o-y, later stages closed with an increase of 4% y-o-y (Crunchbase,
2021[55]). In 2021, early stage funding also experienced a sharp increase, rising by 100% y-o-y. On the
other hand, seed funding experienced weaker growth increasing 56% y-o-y (Crunchbase, 2021[54]).
In the Netherlands, for example, the average funding round in 2020 was 1.5 times higher in 2020 compared
to 2019 and this trend has continued into 2021. However, this growth has been observed mainly in the
later stage venture companies, with early stage and seed capital declining during this period (see
Netherlands country profile).
In the United States in 2020, in terms of number of deals seed and angel funding declined by 10% and
early stage VC declined 20%, as opposed to late stage which registered growth of 4% (see United States
country profile). This slight decline is likely driven by lower start-up rates at the beginning of the pandemic,
as well as the inherently riskier profile of such investments (National Venture Capital Association -
Pitchbook, 2020[49]).By the third quarter of 2021, global early stage venture capital started experiencing a
recovery registering a growth of 104% in terms of volume raised (Crunchbase, 2021[56]).
Figure 1.20. Venture capital investments

Year-on-year growth rates, as a percentage
2020 2019
428
195
145
95
45
-5
-55
-105
Note: Data is year-on-year change of current USD volumes, at the exception of Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Turkey and
Ukraine for which the indicator captures variations of volumes in current local currencies.
Source: OECD Entrepreneurship at a Glance; based on Entrepreneurship Finance Database, and data compiled from the individual country
profiles of Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2022 when the information was not otherwise provided.

 49
Online alternative finance
Online alternative finance is a means of soliciting funds from the public for a project / firm through an
intermediate platform, usually through the Internet. The online alternative finance ecosystem comprises
debt, equity and non-investment models that allow entities to raise funds through an online digital market
place. Debt-based models cover P2P / marketplace lending, and include both secured and unsecured
loans, bonds and debtor notes. Equity-based models, including equity-based crowdfunding, relate to
activities where businesses, particularly start-ups, raise capital by issuing unlisted shares or securities.
Non-investment based models are models in which individuals or firms raise capital but they are not obliged
to provide a monetary return to the individuals or institutions that funded the project. They include reward-
based and donation-based crowdfunding (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, 2021[57]).
In 2020, there were significant changes in the volumes of online alternative finance transactions compared
to previous years. In terms of total volume, the United States’ alternative finance market grew by 71.7%
from USD 48.9 billion in 2019 to USD 84 billion in 2020. The Czech Republic and Japan registered the
largest increases in volumes transacted compared to 2019 with a rise of 108% and 105% respectively,
although from a lower base. Also, in Japan, the sharp increase reflects in large part an rise from low
volumes in alternative finance prior to the crisis, as it had declined by more than 100% between 2018
and2019. In Chile, which accounts for 15% of all Latin American activity in this market, online alternative
finance volumes increased by 64% (Figure 1.21). In France, funds raised by crowdfunding platforms
soared in the 2018-2020 period, from EUR 402 million to EUR 1 020 million. In 2020, the funds raised
allowed for the financing of 13 796 SMEs (see France country profile).
On the other hand, China’s market has declined significantly in recent years, from USD 177 billion in 2018,
to USD 84.3 billion in 2019, to just USD 1.15 billion in 2020 (Figure 1.21). The dramatic decline in the
volume and market share of China’s alternative finance relates to significant changes in local regulations
as a result of fraud complaints and defaults of improperly licenced platforms (FCI, 2021[46]). The Chinese
authorities implemented a long-term supervision mechanism of internet finance to mitigate future internet
financial risks. As a result, by June 2020 the number of online lending platforms declined from 5000 to just
29 (See China’s country profile). Consequently, the United States’ and Canada’s overall market share
grew dramatically (Figure 1.22). Other declines were witnessed in the Netherlands and New Zealand (by
82% and 33% respectively) (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, 2021[58]). The decline in these
countries can be in part explained by the lower volumes in alternative models of lending associated with
the uncertainty of the pandemic.

50 
Figure 1.21. Growth in online alternative finance volumes

As a percentage, year-on-year growth
2020 2019
157 207 554 535 341
95
45
-5
-55
-105
CHN NLD NZL GBR CAN KOR AUS FIN EST MEX IDN BRA DEU ESP ITA COL FRA SWE LTU CHL USA JPN CZE
Source: Cambridge Centre for Online Alternative Finance, 2021.

Figure 1.22. Total volume of alternative finance activity by region, 2019 and 2020
Latin America and the Caribbean Asia-Pacific excluding China

Europe China %
United Kingdom United States and Canada
3% 5%
5%
6% 8%
7% 9%
48% 1%
11%
65%
30%
2019 2020
Source: Regional reports of the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance at the University of Cambridge, 2021

 51
Payment delays, bankruptcies and non-performing loans
Payment delays
The COVID-19 pandemic brought about a large disruption in mobility and trade, affecting supply chains
and payments. This strongly impacted SMEs, which generally have less bargaining power to enforce
payment conditions compared to large firms and are often obliged to settle for unfavourable payment terms.
2020 saw a considerable variation in this indicator across countries. In 2020, 12 countries for which data
are available reported an increase in payment delays, and 6 reported a decrease (Figure 1.23 left panel).
These delays likely compounded SMEs’ liquidity shortages when the pandemic hit. Survey data from
Europe, for example, show that 69% of SMEs accepted unfavourable payment terms to protect their client
relationships (Intrum, 2021[59]).
On the other hand, looking at the Scoreboard median value, aggregate payment delays did not increase
significantly in 2020: the median value stood at 14 days compared to 12.4 days in 2019 (Figure 1.23 right
panel). The decline in the payment gap 4 in 2020 can be explained by the strong government support that
eased SME liquidity constraints and allowed them to meet their payment obligations. However, as some
of the public support measures are phased out, more SMEs foresee a higher risk of late or non-payments
due to persistent debtors’ liquidity challenges. In Europe in particular, 65% of SMEs perceived this risk in
2021 versus 46% in 2020 (Intrum, 2021[59]) (Intrum, 2020[60]).
Figure 1.23. Payment delays by country and evolution

Number of days (left panel), median value growth in number of days (right panel)
2020 2019 B2B increase in number of days

70 2.5
60 2
50 1.5
1
40
0.5
30
0
20 -0.5
10 -1
0 -1.5
-2
-10
Note: Definitions differ across countries. Detailed information on sources and definitions is available in the full country profiles.
Bankruptcies
In 2020, the number of bankruptcies decreased in the majority of Scoreboard countries, despite the crisis.
Of 32 countries that provided data for this indicator, 26 reported a decline in bankruptcies (Figure 1.24),
and the median value registered a decline of 11.7%. This can be explained in part by the changes in
bankruptcy procedures and requirements implemented by several governments that allowed insolvent
SMEs to have more time to recover without having to file for bankruptcy (Bruegel, 2021[61]). For example,
in Austria, which saw one of the highest declines in bankruptcy in 2020 (-40.7% y-o-y), the obligation to
declare insolvency was temporarily suspended in 2020. In Italy, the decline in bankruptcies in 2020 was

52 
the highest recorded in more than a decade (-30.1%), partly explained by the moratorium on bankruptcies,
in force from the beginning of March to the end of June, and the general slowdown in court activity due to
the pandemic containment measures. In 2020, Japanese SMEs recorded the lowest number of
bankruptcies in the past 30 years (see Japan country profile).
The decline in bankruptcy rates can also be explained by the unprecedented financial support provided to
SMEs. No doubt, these measures also provided liquidity to some SMEs that in the absence of the
pandemic would have ceased to exist in 2020, leading to a reduction in bankruptcy rates (Euler Hermes,
2020[62]). In Finland for example, even though government support was largely conditioned on enterprises
not having been in financial distress at the end of 2019, this condition was waved for micro and small
enterprises. These enterprises could be granted support if they were not in bankruptcy or reorganisation
proceedings at the time the support was granted and had not received rescue or restructuring aid (see
Finland country profile).
In light of the gradual phasing out of governmental support in some countries, it is likely that this indicator
will rise going forward. In Israel, for example, the number of businesses that closed in 2021 increased by
84% y-o-y, after a 13.6% decline in 2020 attributed to the large government support (Israel Hayom,
2022[63]). However, in some countries, with the re-introduction of support measures to tackle the
emergence of COVID-19 variants, bankruptcies continued to be lower compared to 2019 levels. For
instance, in 2021 in France, bankruptcies were 12.7% lower than in 2020 and started to increase only in
Q4 of 2021 (Banque de France, 2022[64]).
On the other hand, countries with a lower range and scope of governmental support generally reported an
increase in bankruptcy rates in 2020. This includes mainly middle-income countries, including Peru,
Kazakhstan, China and Colombia (Figure 1.24). In Peru, the number of SMEs declined by a remarkable
25% according to data from tax authorities. This reflects the seizing of operations of many enterprises that
were strongly impacted by the strict lockdown measures, but likely also a notable share of enterprises that
have continued their operations informally (see Peru country profile).
Figure 1.24. SME bankruptcies, growth rate

As a percentage
2020 2019 368.6
80
60
40
20
-20
-40
-60
Note: Definitions of the indicator vary across jurisdictions. In addition to this, some countries provide bankruptcy data for all firms rather than for
SMEs.
Source: Data compiled from the individual country profiles

 53
Non-performing loans (NPLs)
A temporal analysis of data on non-performing loans shows that they are generally more prevalent among
SMEs than among the overall business population, with the median value of NPLs for SME lending
systematically higher than the value for all corporate lending (Figure 1.25). The median rate shows that
NPLs for all firms have generally declined since 2009, but SME NPLs are more volatile and do not exhibit
a clear declining trend. In 2020, the divergence between NPLs for SMEs and for all firms was larger than
the one recorded in 2019, which can also be attributed to the fact that SMEs were concentrated in the
sectors that were most affected by the crisis (OECD, 2020[65]). In addition, the changes that some countries
underwent in national insolvency regimes may have also contributed to the accumulation of non-performing
loans (see Government policy responses in 2019-20).
Figure 1.25. Median rate of NPLs by firm type, 2007-20

As a percentage
Median for SMEs Median for all firms

7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Looking at the percentage of SME NPLs over all SME loans by country in 2020, there is no uniform trend:
SME NPLs declined in 15 countries and increased in 11 other countries (Figure 1.26). Greece and Italy
remained the countries with largest NPL ratios, a legacy from the global financial and Eurozone crises, but
they recorded a notable decline in 2020. In both countries, large-scale sales of these assets accounted for
their removal from banks’ balance sheets. On the other hand, NPLs increased in a number of countries,
including Thailand (+2.34 percentage points), Ireland (+1.2 percentage points), Poland (+1.02 percentage
points) (Figure 1.26). In Thailand, despite the requirement of not marking SMEs in debt rescheduling as
NPLs (as was done prior to the crisis), non-performing exposures increased due to the expiration of most
government support in Q3 2020, which prompted many companies in financial difficulty to file for
restructuring and bankruptcy, increasing NPL levels (Thai Enquirer, 2021[66]). In Ireland, the increase in
NPLs is to a large extent explained by the change in the definition of defaults, in combination with the
pandemic’s impact on SMEs particularly in hospitality and retail. This was indicated by Ireland’s two largest
banks that reported an increase in non-performing exposures in those portfolios (Fitch Ratings, 2021[67]).

54 
Figure 1.26. NPL rates for SMEs, 2019-20

As a percentage
2020 2019
40
35
30
25
20
15
10

Government policy responses in 2019-20
In 2020, the policy landscape for supporting SME access to finance evolved significantly in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic. As with the global financial crisis, governments played a critical role in the crisis
response by boosting direct financial support for SMEs, while simultaneously mobilising a strong increase
in the financing channelled through private financial institutions, primarily banks. In doing so, governments
increased the deployment of already existing policy instruments, which, in the pre-crisis period, had served
to address structural constraints to SME finance. However, they also introduced new short-term measures
to provide urgent liquidity support with a clear goal of phasing them out at the end of the crisis. This section
examines policy responses during the pandemic and explores how they altered the pre-crisis SME finance
policy landscape. Further information on policy responses can be found in Chapter 2, which assesses how
recovery packages are being used to channel SME financing support.
In the run-up to the crisis, governments continued to make use of credit guarantee
schemes and increasingly supported alternative finance instruments for SMEs
As noted in the 2020 edition of the financing SMEs and entrepreneurs Scoreboard, in the immediate
aftermath of the global financial crisis, many governments set up or expanded guarantee schemes, direct
lending, credit mediation and other measures to ease SME access to credit (OECD, 2020[28]). While these
measures largely remained in place in later years, the emphasis of policies shifted as the recovery took
hold. Equity instruments gained more traction as the crisis subsided, and credit measures (credit
guarantees, direct loans) were increasingly targeted to specific subgroups of the SME population, including
innovative firms, women entrepreneurs, start-ups, etc. (OECD, 2021[2]). This reflected the shift from
counter-cyclical support during the crisis to addressing long-term structural constraints to SME access to
finance in the aftermath (OECD, 2021[2]).

 55
Figure 1.27. Changes in the SME financing policy landscape since the Global Financial Crisis
Source: Adapted from OECD, (2020)[44].
The response to the COVID-19 pandemic represented a return to primarily counter-cyclical support, but
due to the nature and scale of the crisis, a significant range of new and short-term policy instruments were
introduced to ease liquidity pressures on crisis-stricken SMEs (Figure 1.28) These measures included
primarily the deferrals of payments (taxes, rents and utilities, pension and social security, etc.), which were
used to reduce the operational expenses for the broad population of SMEs as well as larger enterprises.
Subsidies and grants were also used to provide support for payments, employment retention, and to aid
the self-employed (Figure 1.28).

56 
Figure 1.28. SME support measures introduced as a response to the COVID-19 crisis by group of
countries according to their income levels (February 2020 - February 2021)
Measures for self-employed 25%

schemes
77%
related
Labour
75%
Wage subsidies 92%
95%
(Partial) redundancies 33%
56%
25%
Debt moratorium 75%
Deferral measures
62%
50%
Rent /utilities 58%
69%
25%
Social security and pension contributions 58%
38%
50%
Value Added Tax (VAT) 50%
49%
100%
Income / corporate tax 92%
90%
25%
Equity instruments 17%
44%
instruments
25%
Financial
Grants and subsidies 33%

82%
75%
Direct lending to SMEs 100%
85%
25%
Loan guarantees 67%
95%
Sustainability Measures
38%
50%
Structural policies
Policies dedicated to Start-ups 25%

44%
50%
Training and redeployment 50%
49%
25%
Innovation 58%
56%
50%
Teleworking / digitalisation 50%
64%
25%
Access to new markets 42%
49%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
number of countries
Lower middle income Upper middle income High income
Note: The bars show the number of countries per income group that introduced a measure. The percentage label on the graph corresponds to
the share of countries that use the measure in that income group. The country classification by income is based on World Bank data. 39 countries
whose policy response was tracked by the OECD are classified as high income, 12 as upper middle income and 4 countries as lower middle
income.
Source: (OECD, 2021[2])
In the first phase of the pandemic, alternative finance instruments were used to a lesser extent than the
more traditional support channels. The urgent response to enterprises’ acute liquidity needs required swift
action, and the use of traditional channels of support like direct lending or government-backed lending by
private banks was often the fastest way to reach as many SMEs as possible. And while alternative finance
had limited use as a counter-cyclical support instrument during the crisis (e.g. through quasi-equity
instruments such as subordinated loans, convertible loans and debt and equity crowdfunding), it continued
to be used primarily to provide structural support for innovative SMEs and start-ups. This type of support
was further enhanced as the pandemic became more prolonged and more severe, particularly in H2 2020.
As Chapter 2 notes, the recovery phase has been marked by changes in the structural support to SMEs.
Support is not only aimed at addressing traditional market failures that impact SMEs, but more emphasis
is put also on financing SMEs’ contribution to “build back better.” Thus, significant new financing support
is linked to investment in digitalisation, sustainability, skills and innovation. The challenges that policy
makers face in the near term is how to balance the continuation of liquidity support and avoid a premature
withdrawal, which risks harming viable SMEs, with enhanced structural support in order to ensure that
SMEs take part in the digital and green transition.

 57
Credit guarantees have remained the dominant form of support for SME access to
finance through the COVID pandemic
Guarantees incentivise private bank lending to SMEs by transferring all or some of the credit risk from the
private lenders to the government. Prior to the pandemic, the use of credit guarantee schemes was
widespread in Scoreboard economies as a means of mobilising private debt financing for SMEs: more than
half of the Scoreboard countries registered increases in guaranteed loans over 2009-19. In 2020-21,
governments turned to credit guarantee schemes to provide swift access to external financing for liquidity-
strapped SMEs. Government loan guarantees rose in all 27 countries providing this data in the Scoreboard,
with a median increase of 110% between 2019 and 2020 (compared to an increase of 0.32% between
2018 and 2019). This marks an unprecedented increase in guaranteed lending since the start of the
Scoreboard data collection (OECD, 2020[28])
Figure 1.29. Median growth of SME government loan guarantees

As a percentage
Scoreboard High income Upper middle income OECD EU

159
150
130
110
90
70
50
30
10
-10
-30
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

However, unlike during the global financial crisis when credit guarantees were provided to a broad
population of SMEs, guarantee schemes in the COVID-19 crisis in some countries, particularly in the EU,
were more targeted to maximise benefits while minimising market distortions. Given the high level of
coverage of the guarantee schemes - most offered guarantees of between 70% and 90% with some
countries (e.g. Italy and Germany) offering up to 100% guarantees targeted mainly at SMEs and
entrepreneurs – conditions on lenders and beneficiaries were introduced to minimise market distortions
and fiscal risks. Some of these conditions included the provision of financing only to firms and
entrepreneurs that had been strongly impacted by the crisis but which had not already been experiencing
financial difficulties in 2019. In some countries, the guarantees also came with strict conditions for
beneficiaries such as prohibition for distributing dividends, limits on the compensation of managers and
employment retention commitments (OECD, 2020[65]).

58 
Figure 1.30. Government guaranteed loans as a share of loan stock

Year-on-year growth rate
2020 2019
74
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
BEL CZE SRB MEX SVK LTU BRA ISR KOR KAZ EST IDN POL TUR PRT HUN GBR FRA COL CHL ITA
There is evidence that the design of the schemes has contributed to limiting the distortive effects of this
policy instrument. A recent empirical study of the credit guarantee schemes in EU member countries show
that the credit guarantee schemes implemented in 2020 had significant positive impact by providing
liquidity support to viable enterprises that were hit hard by the crisis, while minimising the support for
unproductive firms. Notably, the study found that the schemes reduced the share of SMEs facing liquidity
shortages by up to 8% from an estimated 32% in the absence of this policy intervention. Moreover, the
schemes provided effective protection for productive firms; 40% of the SMEs facing liquidity shortages
absent the credit guarantee schemes would have been firms with productivity levels higher than the median
productivity level of liquid SMEs (Demmou, 2021[68]). Additional literature supports the finding that the
schemes mainly supported viable firms (Laeven et al., 2020; Schivardi et al., 2020; ECB, 2021).
That said, in other high-income countries participating in the Scoreboard, notably the United Kingdom and
the United States, the eligibility criteria for accessing these instruments remained relatively broad, allowing
a large population of SMEs to gain access to finance. Many emerging markets in Latin America also
loosened eligibility criteria for credit guarantee schemes to enable as many SMEs as possible to gain
access to much needed working capital (see Country profiles).
Direct lending was also ramped up to support the SME crisis response
In addition to providing guarantees to commercial banks to support their SME lending, most governments
also increased direct lending to SMEs. In 2020, the growth in direct loans was positive in 12 out of 14
countries that provided data for this indicator.
The approach to the provision of new lending during the crisis was different across the Scoreboard
countries. In some countries (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States), new loan
instruments were set up targeting mainly highly impacted SMEs. In some (e.g. Austria, Colombia, Brazil,
Spain), new lending schemes were introduced targeting the most vulnerable sectors. Countries also
opened up existing instruments for disaster relief to SMEs affected by the COVID-19 crisis. They also
expanded funds for direct lending through existing channels (e.g. Brazil, Japan, United States) or eased

 59
the accessibility of loan schemes through expansion of the group of potential beneficiaries, simplification
and acceleration of loan procedures, and offer of more favourable terms and reduced interest rates (e.g.
Canada) (OECD, 2020[29]).
Figure 1.31. Direct loans, growth rate by country

As a percentage
2020 2019
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
-20
-40
-60
FIN KAZ MEX PER AUT CZE HUN SVK IDN BRA CAN GBR KOR ESP SWE ITA

Governments made significant use of temporary crisis measures, such as deferred

payments and grants, to support the urgent liquidity needs of SMEs
In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 Great Financial crisis, deferred payments, grants and subsidies
were commonly used short-term tools to provide liquidity to SMEs. Deferral of payments as well as tax
reductions were used to prevent depletion of SMEs’ working capital. Similarly, grants and subsidies were
used to help SMEs maintain investment levels. For instance, several countries introduced subsidies to
industries that were affected by the economic crisis, but conditional on progress and clear production
targets. Such subsidies were also restricted in size and their duration was limited to the crisis period
(OECD, 2020[28]).
During the COVID-19 crisis, deferral measures allowed SMEs and entrepreneurs to postpone payments,
thereby alleviating acute pressures on their liquidity. Deferrals on corporate and income tax were used in
90% of Scoreboard countries to relieve liquidity pressures for SMEs, especially at the time of the start of
the crisis and the first lockdowns. A smaller share also included deferral of value added tax (47%), and
social security and pension contributions (40%) (OECD, 2021[2]). In some countries, like France and the
US, these measures were complemented with earlier repayments of tax refunds from the previous year.
For enterprises providing goods and services to public institutions, measures were put in place to reduce
payment times to get liquidity faster into SMEs’ accounts (OECD, 2020[69]). The scope of deferrals has also
been gradually extended beyond tax and social security payments. For instance, financial institutions
backed by governments introduced debt repayment and fee/interest moratoria. This instrument was used
in about 60% of the Scoreboard countries.

60 
In most countries, tax deferrals were extended to all companies regardless of size, and only some schemes
specifically targeted SMEs. Likewise, most of these schemes did not target only viable firms: even
companies that had faced financial distress prior to 2020 could benefit from support in the form of deferred
payments. (OECD, 2020[69]). This is consistent with the finding that bankruptcies declined in most
Scoreboard economies in 2020, with many economies recording record low bankruptcies in decades. And
while insolvencies are on the rise in some countries, they have often not increased as much as expected
given the severity of the crisis. That said, as a result of these interventions, insolvencies could be expected
to rise in the near future.
Grants and subsidies were also used extensively to alleviate SME liquidity constraints and support the
build up of cash buffers in the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis. As the pandemic developed,
the provision of grants became even more widely used by governments, and its design varied considerably
between countries (OECD, 2021[70]). Despite the large variation, at the beginning of the pandemic this type
of support was generally used to relieve SMEs’ operating expenses and working capital needs. Grant
schemes that aimed to target sectors in need (e.g. hospitality and cultural sector) were introduced in
Greece, Belgium, Estonia (OECD, 2021[70]). In the Netherlands, schemes initially targeted micro and small
enterprises in hard-hit sectors but gradually broadened the coverage to other sectors and company sizes
(Government of the Netherlands, 2021[71]).
A key advantage of grant schemes is the broad range of beneficiaries that can be reached, as opposed to
debt and equity finance where the provision is largely contingent on market-driven criteria. Grants have
thus been mainly used to target microenterprises that are underserved through the traditional financing
channels but were also in acute need of liquidity support. Microenterprise-targeting grant schemes were
introduced in Chile, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands (OECD, 2021[70]). In some emerging
economies, grants schemes were also used to support informal SMEs given their limited access to bank
finance and uncertain repayment capacity (Schwettmann, 2020[72]). Grants also have the benefit of
providing relief without adding to SME debt.
As the pandemic evolved and governments started to introduce structural objectives in their policy support,
grants and subsidies were also used as a tool to support the structural transition toward more digitalised,
innovative and green economies (see Chapter 2). For example, vouchers were used to boost SMEs’ and
access to consultancy services to innovate and diversify markets as well as to provide entrepreneurs with
access to digital trainings in Ireland and New Zealand. In Germany, the KfW Climate action campaign
introduced grants to incentivise investments in the manufacture and use of sustainable systems and
products (OECD, 2020[65]).
Public support for equity financing in 2020 was strong, but not as strong as the support
provided through other instruments
In the run-up to the COVID-19 crisis, there were significant improvements in the development and uptake
of alternative sources of finance for SMEs. Government support played an important role in the
development of the SME equity finance industry in the period after the great financial crisis and before the
COVID-19 pandemic. In the case of venture capital, public funding in new investment funds contributed to
mobilising private investors and boosting investment volumes (Helmut Kraemer-Eis, Simone Signore and
Dario Prencipe, 2016[73]). Some of the measures implemented included the establishment of funds of
funds, direct investment or co-investment, and the development of regulatory frameworks to enhance the
industry (OECD, 2020[28]). Funds of funds, for example help distribute finance between large investors
(which can include institutional investors) and firms that seek private equity, by grouping funds to invest in
small VC funds rather than firms (OECD, 2020[28]). This strengthened the participation of smaller actors in
the industry and helped in the diversification of asset allocation. Co-investment, on the other hand, helped
mobilise private investment through risk-sharing (Group of Thirty, 2020[74]). A large number of countries

 61
implemented measures to strengthen the VC industry in 2019. For example, 40 out of 46 countries had
policies that supported private equity financing for SMEs.
Support for business angel finance for SMEs was another tool governments used in the run-up to the
pandemic. This type of investor was increasingly recognised by policy makers as important complements
to venture capital. Not only are they important sources of finance in the early stages, but also given their
large involvement in the management and strategy of the companies they invest in, they positively impact
the success of these firms (OECD, 2016[75]). Policies such as tax incentives (Turkey, Italy, Japan),
government co-investments (Netherlands, United Kingdom), the creation of online platforms (Austria) and
the formalisation of the Business Angel sector (Brazil) (OECD, 2020[28]) were important trends in the period
prior to the COVID-19 crisis.
Despite the popularity of equity support measures prior to the COVID-19 crisis, these measures were not
strongly used as a way to support SME access to finance during the pandemic. From a sample of 55
countries, only 20 implemented equity measures, versus 48 out of 55 that used direct lending and 46 out
of 55 that used government guarantees (OECD, 2021[2]). This is in line with the data captured in other
sources such as the Oxford Recovery Policy Observatory, which show that alternative sources of finance
for SMEs were less used by governments than other more traditional sources of finance to combat the
impact of the crisis. Only 60 rescue policies were related to alternative finance for SMEs compared to 450
rescue policies related to other, mainly debt-related sources (see Chapter 2).
The lower use of equity compared to other instruments at the outset of the crisis can be explained by
several factors. First, the VC market tends to be highly cyclical and given that the COVID-19 pandemic
disrupted solid business models and brought large uncertainty to the investment community, channelling
initial governmental support through VC channels might not guarantee the value for money compared to
providing support through more traditional and less volatile channels. Second, prior to the COVID-19 crisis,
banks were the preferred sources of finance for SMEs compared to equity channels 5. This is because
there is a large proportion of SMEs, particularly family-owned SMEs, which are reluctant to cede ownership
of their companies and to share voting rights to external investors (Ritch L. Sorenson, Andy Yu and Keith
H. Brigham, 2013[76]). Third, some of the measures to inject equity to SMEs can be costly, given the need
to assess and follow up risks (OECD, 2020[24]).
Nonetheless, equity measures were increasingly introduced in the second half of 2020 and in 2021 (see
Chapter 2), as governments acknowledged the need to continue to provide liquidity support to firms without
adding to their debt burden, as well as the need to reach young and highly innovative SMEs and start-ups.
These enterprises had not been able to access government support in the first wave of the pandemic, as
eligibility criteria principally took into account proof of existence and profits in the years prior to the
pandemic (OECD, 2021[2]).
Fintech firms played a role in channelling support, but have further potential to support
SME access to finance
Prior to the pandemic, several government measures were put in place to facilitate the development of the
Fintech industry given its important contribution to the diversification of sources of finance, particularly for
SMEs. For example, governments introduced innovation hubs that provide Fintech firms non-binding
guidance on business model and licensing requirements. They also provided regulatory sandboxes
allowing Fintech firms to test innovative financial products under regulatory supervision (ESMA, 2018[77]).
These policy measures were implemented in 21 countries of the European Union. Similarly, several
countries have set up and expanded information infrastructures for credit risk assessment, such as credit
registries and credit bureaus (OECD, 2018[78]) (OECD, forthcoming[79]).
Despite the growth that Fintech firms experienced prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, their involvement in
the delivery of COVID-19 related relief has been limited. Interestingly, the sector shows higher growth in

62 
countries where more stringent COVID-19 measures were in place. This can indicate that these firms
offered solutions for firms and households when banks could not (e.g. digital payments, digital identity), in
the context of restricted mobility. Nonetheless, against expectations, with a significant amount of firms
facing large shortages in their liquidity, digital lending showed a global decline of 6% y-o-y, in contrast with
the positive growth of all other Fintech subsectors. These data are likely impacted by the limited
government recourse to Fintech in the delivery of COVID-19 support. In fact, only 13% of Fintech were
able to participate in the delivery of government job retention measures, and 7% participated in the delivery
of stimulus funding for MSMEs, despite a significant willingness to participate, where survey data indicate
that 30% of Fintech were interested in delivering public support to SMEs (Cambridge Centre for Alternative
finance, 2021[80]).
Despite the overall limited participation of Fintech as a delivery partner of COVID-19 related measures in
2020, in some regions Fintech solutions were used to increase the speed of delivery or to tap into different
sources of finance (Cambridge Centre for Alternative finance, 2021[80]). For instance, in the United
Kingdom, equity crowdfunding platforms delivered government matched funding, providing start-ups with
convertible loans at reduced interest rates. In Latin America Fintech solutions were also used by the
government to provide support to informal SMEs, reaching 38% of informal workers in in Chile and 21% in
Colombia (El Cronista, 2021[81]).
The post-COVID policy landscape will be shaped by the recovery agenda and the need to
increase SME resilience, including through continued financial diversification
Going forward, SME finance policy developments will likely be shaped by megatrends such as the green
transition, globalisation, and digitalisation, as well as by geopolitical developments. The economic effects
of the war in Ukraine, including rising prices in energy and raw materials and volatility in financial markets,
coupled with continued inflationary pressures, are likely to lead to an increase in the price of credit going
forward6. This could be particularly challenging for highly leveraged SMEs that took on additional debt to
weather the COVID-19 crisis. Against this backdrop, it is important to continue efforts to strengthen SME
financial positions. These efforts can go hand in hand with support to “build back better”, as part of recovery
packages across Scoreboard economies (see Chapter 2). Support for SME access to finance may
therefore be increasingly geared towards the priorities governments attach to structural transformations
such as the green transition, globalisation and digitalisation.
Likewise, for SMEs to thrive in the recovery, significant attention needs to be given to the long-standing
challenges these firms face in access to finance. SME access to both traditional and non-traditional
sources of finance continues to be limited, compared to larger firms, making them more vulnerable to
economic disruptions. Notably, the over-reliance of SMEs on bank finance and their vulnerability to
changing credit conditions during times of crisis or economic downturn once again played out during the
COVID-19 crisis. Similarly, growth in SME uptake of other types of finance, such as asset-backed financing
and equity, was also impacted. Although the strong and swift policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic
were effective in mitigating the fallout from the crisis, such measures did not significantly mobilise
alternative instruments and sources of finance for SMEs (see Chapter 2), leading to a situation in which
many SMEs now face high and sometimes unsustainable levels of debt.
As governments continue to roll out recovery measures, it will be important to further consider the need to
better balance SME debt and alternative instruments in the financing mix, in line with the Updated
G20/OECD High-Level Principles on SME Financing to be released in 2022. Fostering the diversification
of financing sources for SMEs through the support for alternative finance solutions which provide SMEs
with financing adapted to their needs can also be an important source of SME resilience going forward.
This Scoreboard will continue to monitor developments in the SME financing and policy landscape, in order
to support governments in developing SME financing policies that are effective in meeting current and
future challenges.

 63
References
Bank of England (2021), Credit Conditions Survey, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/credit- [42]

conditions-survey/2021/2021-q4.
Bank of England (2020), Credit Conditions Survey, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/credit- [41]

conditions-survey/2020/2020-q4.
Bank of Japan (2021), Tankan Survey, https://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/tk/yoshi/index.htm/. [40]
Banque de France (2022), Corporate bankruptcies - France, December 2021, [64]

https://www.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/webstat_pdf/def_ent_2244_en-
gb_si_defaillances_202112_en_vfinale.pdf.
Banque de France (2021), Bank of France Annual Report 2020, https://www.banque- [26]
france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/bdf-ar_2020_web.pdf.
Banque de France (2021), Business failures | Banque de France, https://www.banque- [84]

france.fr/en/statistics/key-figures-france-and-abroad/business-failures (accessed on
22 September 2021).
Banque de France (2018), Relationship lending and SMEs’ funding costs over the cycle: why [29]
diversification of borrowing matters, https://www.banque-
france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/wp705.pdf.
BDO (2020), IMPLICATIONS OF COVID-19 FOR LESSORS, [43]

https://www.bdo.nz/getmedia/9df0e97e-38ef-443e-9a9a-ef05f54153e0/IFRB-2020-12-
Implications-of-COVID-19-for-lessors.aspx.
BIS (2021), Covid-19 policy measures to support bank lending, [27]
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2109d.htm.
Bruegel (2021), Corporate insolvencies during COVID-19: keeping calm before the storm | [61]
Bruegel, https://www.bruegel.org/2021/01/corporate-insolvencies-during-covid-19-keeping-
calm-before-the-storm/ (accessed on 27 September 2021).
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (2021), Global Alternative Finance Benchmarks, [58]
https://ccaf.io/gafb/digital_lending/total_global_ranking (accessed on 27 September 2021).
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (2021), The 2nd Global Alternative Finance Market [57]
Benchmarking Report, https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/centres/alternative-
finance/publications/the-2nd-global-alternative-finance-market-benchmarking-report/.
Cambridge Centre for Alternative finance (2021), Global COVID-19 FinTech Market Rapid [80]
Assessment Study, https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-research/centres/alternative-
finance/publications/2020-global-covid-19-fintech-market-rapid-assessment-study/.
Centre for Entrepreneurs (2021), Covid startups kick off entrepreneurial recovery, [50]
https://centreforentrepreneurs.org/releases/covid-startups-kick-off-entrepreneurial-recovery/
(accessed on 27 September 2021).
CFR (2021), What Happened to Supply Chains in 2021?, https://www.cfr.org/article/what- [12]

happened-supply-chains-2021.

64 
Crunchbase (2021), 2021 Global Venture Capital Report Record Funding monthly recap, [56]
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/q3-2021-global-venture-capital-report-record-funding-
monthly-recap/.
Crunchbase (2021), Global VC Report 2020: Funding And Exits Blow Past 2019 Despite [55]
Pandemic Headwinds, https://news.crunchbase.com/news/global-2020-funding-and-exit/.
Crunchbase (2021), Global Venture Funding And Unicorn Creation In 2021 Shattered All [54]
Records, https://news.crunchbase.com/news/global-vc-funding-unicorns-2021-monthly-
recap/.
Demmou, L. (2021), From hibernation to reallocation: Loan guarantees and their implications for [68]
post-COVID-19 productivity | OECD Economics Department Working Papers | OECD
iLibrary, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/from-hibernation-to-reallocation-loan-
guarantees-and-their-implications-for-post-covid-19-productivity_2f4a4c20-en (accessed on
20 January 2022).
Didier, T. et al. (2020), Financing Firms in Hibernation During the COVID-19 Pandemic, World [89]
Bank, http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/33611.
ECB (2021), Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises - April to September 2021, [34]
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/safe/html/ecb.safe202111~0380b0c0a2.en.htm
l#toc12.
ECB (2021), Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises - October 2020 to March 2021, [14]
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/safe/html/ecb.safe202106~3746205830.en.htm
l#toc9 (accessed on 20 September 2021).
ECB (2020), Pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP), [18]
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html (accessed on
27 September 2021).
ECB (2020), Public loan guarantees and bank lending in the COVID-19 period, [25]
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-
bulletin/focus/2020/html/ecb.ebbox202006_07~5a3b3d1f8f.en.html.
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/safe/html/index.en.html (accessed on
27 September 2021).
ECB (2020), The euro area bank lending survey – Fourth quarter of 2020, [31]
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/html/ecb.blssurvey2020q
4~e89c77d212.en.html (accessed on 16 September 2021).
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/safe/html/ecb.safe201911~57720ae65f.en.html
EESTI LIISINGUHINGUTEV LIIT (2021), Review of Estonian leasing market, [44]
https://www.liisingliit.ee/statistics.
EIF (2021), Coronavirus: The EIB Group’s initiatives to address its economic consequences, [53]
https://www.eif.org/what_we_do/covid-19-response/index.htm (accessed on
27 September 2021).

 65
El Cronista (2021), Distribución de ayuda social punto de inflexión en la región para la inclusión [81]
financiera, https://www.cronista.com/finanzas-mercados/distribucion-de-ayuda-social-punto-
de-inflexion-en-la-region-para-la-inclusion-financiera/.
ESMA (2018), Fintech: regulatory sandboxed and innovation hubs, [77]

https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/jc_2018_74_joint_report_on_regulatory
_sandboxes_and_innovation_hubs.pdf.
Euler Hermes (2020), Calm before the storm Covid19 and the business insolvency time bomb, [62]
https://www.eulerhermes.com/en_global/news-insights/economic-insights/Calm-before-the-
storm-Covid19-and-the-business-insolvency-time-bomb.html (accessed on
27 September 2021).
European Commision (2020), SME access to finance in the EU countries 2020, [45]
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/43869 (accessed on 27 September 2021).
European Commission (2021), Annual report on European SMEs, [10]

https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/sme-strategy/performance-review_en.
European Commission (2021), State aid: Commission approves prolongation of market conform [86]
asset protection scheme for banks in Greece,

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_1661.
European Monitoring Centre on Change (2020), Credit mediation scheme for businesses in [33]
France, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/erm/support-instrument/credit-
mediation-structure.
Falagiarda, M., A. Prapiestis and E. Rancoita (2020), Public loan guarantees and bank lending in [19]
the COVID-19 period, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-
bulletin/focus/2020/html/ecb.ebbox202006_07~5a3b3d1f8f.en.html (accessed on
15 September 2021).
FCI (2021), FCI Annual Review 2021, https://fci.nl/en/annual-review. [46]
Federal Reserve Bank (2021), Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, [37]
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/sloos/sloos-202110.htm.
Federal Reserve Bank (2020), Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, [36]
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/sloos/sloos-202007.htm.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2021), Small Business Lending Survey - December 2021, [38]
https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/8562/Small-Business-Lending-Survey-Small-
Business-C-I-Loans-Decline-December-2021.pdf.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2020), Small Business Lending Survey - December 2020, [39]
https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/7550/SmallBusLendingSurvey_Dec2020.pdf.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2020), Statement Regarding Treasury Securities, Agency [17]
Mortgage-Backed Securities, and Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
Operations - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_200610 (accessed on
27 September 2021).

66 
Fitch Ratings (2021), Irish banks non-performing loans to rise as borrower help ends, [67]
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/banks/irish-banks-non-performing-loans-to-rise-as-
borrower-help-ends-18-03-2021.
Government of the Netherlands (2021), Support and recovery package substantially expanded, [71]
https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2021/01/21/support-and-recovery-package-
substantially-expanded.
Greece Ministry of Finance (2019), “HERCULES” PROGRAM - Questions and Answers, [87]
https://www.minfin.gr/web/guest/-/programma-erakles-eroteseis-kai-
apanteseis?inheritRedirect=true.
Group of Thirty (2020), Reviving and Restructuring the Corporate Sector Post-Covid, [74]
https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_Reviving_and_Restructuring_the_Corp
orate_Sector_Post-Covid.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2021).
Helmut Kraemer-Eis, Simone Signore and Dario Prencipe (2016), The European venture capital [73]
landscape: an EIF perspective Volume 1 the impact of EIF on the VC ecosystem,
https://www.eif.org/news_centre/publications/eif_wp_34.pdf (accessed on
24 September 2021).
Hiventures Venture Capital Fund (2020), Hiventures: A Patient Equity Financing Partner for the [52]
Hungarian Startup and SME Sector Even in a Crisis,
https://www.prnewswire.com/de/pressemitteilungen/hiventures-a-patient-equity-financing-
partner-for-the-hungarian-startup-and-sme-sector-even-in-a-crisis-889172434.html.
ILO (2020), “Answering key questions around informality in micro and small enterprises during [7]
the COVID-19 crisis Question 1: Why should informal enterprises be supported during and
after the pandemic?”.
International Trade Centre (2020), “COVID-19: The Great Lockdown and its Impact on Small [5]
Business”, http://www.intracen.org (accessed on 27 September 2021).
Intrum (2021), European Payment Report 2021. [59]
Intrum (2020), European Payment Report 2020, https://www.intrum.com/media/8918/european- [60]
payment-report-2020_final.pdf.
Israel Hayom (2022), 70,000 businesses in Israel failed to survive 2021, report shows, [63]
https://www.israelhayom.com/2022/01/18/70000-businesses-in-israel-failed-to-survive-2021-
report-shows/.
Judo Bank (2021), The critical gaps affecting SME businesses, https://www.judo.bank/sme- [20]
insights/sme-banking-insights-2021.
KFW (2021), SMEs continue to recover from the coronavirus crisis, but complaints about supply [82]
chain disruptions are on the rise, https://www.kfw.de/KfW-Group/Newsroom/Latest-

News/Pressemitteilungen-Details_656192.html.
Klahr, R. et al. (2021), Bounce Back Loan Scheme Finance Survey Report 2020, [21]
https://www.british-business-bank.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2021/04/BBLS_Finance_Survey_2020_Report_to_Publish_110321_updated
07APR.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2021).

 67
Leaseurope (2021), Leaseurope Index Q3 2021, https://www.leaseurope.org/leaseurope-index- [90]

q3-2021.
National Audit Office (2020), Investigation into the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, [22]
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Investigation-into-the-Bounce-Back-
Loan-Scheme.pdf.
National Venture Capital Association - Pitchbook (2020), Q4 2020 Pitchbook NVCA Venture [49]
Monitor, https://nvca.org/research/pitchbook-nvca-venture-monitor/.
NHK (2021), BOJ decides to extend support for smaller business, [85]
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20211217_21/.
OECD (2022), OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report March 2022: Economic and Social [3]
Impacts and Policy Implications of the War in Ukraine, https://www.oecd-

ilibrary.org/sites/4181d61b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/4181d61b-en#figure-
d1e260.
OECD (2021), “An in-depth analysis of one year of SME and entrepreneurship policy responses [2]
to COVID-19: Lessons learned for the path to recovery”, OECD SME and Entrepreneurship
Papers, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2021), OECD Database. [13]
OECD (2021), OECD Economic Outlook - A Balancing Act, https://www.oecd.org/economic- [4]

outlook/.
OECD (2021), OECD Economic Outlook, No Ordinary Recovery, Navigating the Transition, [1]
https://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook/.
OECD (2021), OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook 2021, [70]
https://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-sme-and-entrepreneurship-outlook-2021-97a5bbfe-
en.htm.
OECD (2020), Coronavirus (COVID-19): SME policy responses, OECD Policy responses to [65]
Coronavirus, http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/coronavirus-covid-19-sme-
policy-responses-04440101/ (accessed on 19 August 2020).
OECD (2020), COVID-19 Government Financing Support Programmes for Businesses, OECD, [69]
Paris, http://www.oecd.org/finance/COVID-19-Government-Financing-Support-Programmes-
for-Businesses.pdf. (accessed on 28 February 2021).
OECD (2020), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2020 and OECD Scoreboard, [28]
https://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/financing-smes-and-entrepreneurs-23065265.htm.
OECD (2020), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs: An OECD Scoreboard Special edition: The [24]
impact of COVID-19, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/ecd81a65-

en.pdf?expires=1632508802&id=id&accname=ocid84004878&checksum=08BBE361900735
3E500B795FCDD3AD23 (accessed on 24 September 2021).
OECD (2018), Key Issues Paper - Ministerial Conference on SMEs, https://www.oecd- [78]
ilibrary.org/docserver/90c8823c-
en.pdf?expires=1632112831&id=id&accname=ocid84004878&checksum=2E1E6C4CE7AF9
45700BE577A58885025.

68 
OECD (2016), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2016: An OECD Scoreboard -The role of [75]
business angel investments in SME finance, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and-
services/financing-smes-and-entrepreneurs-2016/the-role-of-business-angel-investments-in-
sme-finance_fin_sme_ent-2016-6-en.
OECD (2015), New Approaches to SME and Entrepreneurship Financing: Broadening the range [47]
of instruments, https://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/New-Approaches-SME-full-report.pdf.
OECD (2012), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs: An OECD Scoreboard, https://www.oecd- [30]
ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264166769-
en.pdf?expires=1642780623&id=id&accname=ocid84004878&checksum=4819854D0B9433
7D33984AF86D7FCDA9.
OECD (forthcoming), Secured lending for SMEs: making effective use of registries and [79]
intangibles – a case study approach.
Pitchbook (2020), 2020 Annual European Venture Report, [51]

https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/2020_Annual_European_Venture_Report.pdf.
Reuters (2022), Supply chain disruption: is the worst over?, [11]
https://www.reuters.com/business/global-markets-supply-pix-2021-11-03/.
Reuters (2021), U.S. bankruptcy filings hit 35-year low thanks to government pandemic aid | [83]
Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy-bankruptcy-idUSKBN29A264
Ritch L. Sorenson, Andy Yu and Keith H. Brigham (2013), The Landscape of Family Business - [76]
Google Libros,
https://books.google.fr/books?id=BdAMAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA66&lpg=PA66&dq=family+owned
+firms+reluctant+to+give+up+control+to+investors&source=bl&ots=o15MmRjJEs&sig=ACfU3
U0lh2FCzwj5t286R-61uzdhZqNmyw&hl=es-
419&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiM05HWvpDzAhXEzIUKHbZQDDoQ6AF6BAgTEAM#v=onepage
&q=family%20owned%20firms%20reluctant%20to%20give%20up%20control%20to%20inves
tors&f=false (accessed on 24 September 2021).
Schwettmann, J. (2020), COVID-19 and the Informal Economy, https://library.fes.de/pdf- [72]
files/iez/16414.pdf.
SCM (2020), New opportunities for businesses with FUIB and FACTORING HUB, [48]
https://www.scm.com.ua/en/news/novi-mozhlivosti-dlya-biznesu-z-pumb-ta-faktoring-hab.
Thai Enquirer (2021), Rising NPLs in the financial sector takes its toll on the Thai economy, [66]
http://dx.doi.org/ttps://www.thaienquirer.com/20249/rising-npls-in-the-financial-sector-takes-
its-toll-on-the-thai-economy/.
The Guardian (2021), Global supply chain crisis could last another two years, warn experts, [88]
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/dec/18/global-supply-chain-crisis-could-last-
another-two-years-warn-experts.
UNCTAD (2021), Global foreign direct investment fell by 42% in 2020, outlook remains weak | [15]
CNUCED, https://unctad.org/fr/node/31924 (accessed on 20 September 2021).

 69
UNCTAD (2021), Global investment flows rebound in first half of 2021, recovery highly uneven, [16]
https://unctad.org/news/global-investment-flows-rebound-first-half-2021-recovery-highly-
uneven.
UNCTAD (2020), Unprecedented COVID-19 stimulus packages are not being leveraged to [23]
accelerate SDG investment | UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/news/unprecedented-covid-19-
stimulus-packages-are-not-being-leveraged-accelerate-sdg-investment (accessed on
15 September 2021).
World Bank (2021), Small and Medium Enterprises in the Pandemic: Impact, Responses and the [6]
Role of Development Finance,
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34552/Small-and-Medium-
Enterprises-in-the-Pandemic-Impact-Responses-and-the-Role-of-Development-
Finance.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
WTO (2021), \World Trade Statistical Review 2021, [9]

https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2021_e/wts21_toc_e.htm (accessed on
20 September 2021).
WTO (2021), “First Quarter 2021 Trade in Services”, http://dx.doi.org/10.000000. [8]
Notes
1
From a sample of 124 countries that have implemented SME related support, 40% are high income
countries, compared to 33% upper-middle income, 21% lower-middle income and only 6% in low income
countries.
2
Expansion or modification of existing programmes included for example: more funding for direct lending;
an increase in total guarantee volumes and maximum guarantee volumes per beneficiary; an increase in
the guaranteed share of loans; expansion of the scope of sectors covered by guarantees; relaxation or
expansion of eligibility criteria to access these programmes; implementation of digital delivery systems and
fast-track procedures to simplify and ensure quick access, etc.
3
In the first half of 2020 nearly half of high-income countries had equity measures in place in the policy
response to COVID-19 (OECD, 2021[2])
4
Number of days between agreed payment terms and the receipt of funds (Intrum, 2021[59])
5
In 2019 only 10% of SMEs preferred equity as external source of finance, while 70% preferred overdrafts
and 55% preferred bank loans (Helmut Kraemer-Eis, Simone Signore and Dario Prencipe, 2016[73])
6
Simulations from the March 2022 Interim Economic Outlook project an increase in interest rates of a little
over 1 percentage point on average in the major advanced economies and 1½ percentage points in the
major emerging-market economies (OECD, 2022[3]).

 71
2 SME finance in COVID-19 recovery

packages: Assessment and
implications
This chapter examines the evolution of SME and entrepreneurship

financing support measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, from the
rescue to the recovery phases. It assesses how national recovery packages
are addressing the challenges SMEs face in terms of liquidity and solvency,
the types of financing instruments used to channel support and the
contribution of these packages to meeting SME financing needs for
investments in digitalisation, greening, innovation and skills.

72 
Overview
Many countries around the world have launched recovery packages in order to help their economies return
to economic growth and face the major challenges of the future with greater resilience. These packages
vary greatly in format, type of support and size across countries. Given their magnitude, it is relevant to
understand how these packages can contribute to helping SMEs and entrepreneurs meet their financing
and investment challenges.
Through this lens, the chapter seeks to assess explicit SME related policies in their number and
expenditure in recovery packages. It aims to understand the extent to which these packages can be a
vehicle to enhance SME access to diverse financing instruments and sources. The assessment is based
on an analysis of different databases that track the diverse policies announced since the start of the
pandemic. The focus of the chapter is largely on measures at national level.
Findings show that, although there is large heterogeneity in their design, recovery packages have, in
general, a relatively modest explicit SME orientation. An analysis building on several sources shows that
the share of SME-related polices in recovery packages was 4.07% as a share of the number of policies,
and 2.21% as a share of the amount of funding. To put this into perspective, the share of SME-oriented
policies in rescue packages was 17.25% in terms of the number of policies, and 25.51% as a share of the
amount of public funding invested.
Another significant finding is that, contrary to crisis measures, recovery packages focus significantly on
start-ups. Start-up related policies account for 23.53% of SME-related policies in recovery packages,
compared to just 2.22% in rescue packages. Conversely, the share of policies focusing on the self-
employed is much lower in the recovery phase than in the rescue phase.
The report also assesses the type of financial instruments used to channel support to SMEs in recovery
plans. The use and design of debt instruments for SME liquidity support in recovery packages varies across
countries. While some loan schemes target viable firms, others aim to reach underserved companies
owned by vulnerable groups. Similarly, although a large number of SME guarantee schemes were
extended until the end of 2021 and beyond, their coverage varies.
The decreased attention to SMEs in the recovery packages is also evident in liquidity support. Efforts to
boost SME liquidity through debt, grants and deferral instruments carry less weight in the recovery
packages (5.78%) compared to crisis measures (30.73%) in terms of number of policies.
In general, and in particular at the outset of the crisis, rescue measures did not mobilise alternative sources
and instruments of finance for SMEs. In the recovery, this situation broadly persists, indicating that these
packages are not likely to be a key mechanism to kick-start improvements in the uptake of alternative
financing for SMEs, which had gained significant ground in the run-up to the COVID-19 crisis, but which
suffered in 2020 and 2021.
Despite the limited use of alternative finance policies in the recovery packages for SMEs, alternative
finance instruments that are present include factoring, leasing and hire purchases, trade finance, and
equity and quasi-equity tools. The recovery strategies also include regulatory changes in order to foster
the use of such instruments.
Going forward, governments may wish to consider other mechanisms to foster diversification of SME
finance instruments, including Fintech, which can help SMEs thrive in a post-pandemic recovery likely to
be characterised by continued high levels of SME debt and challenges in risk assessment for certain types
of firms and sectors.
There may also be a need to take additional measures to address the challenges of SME insolvency. Some
recovery packages do include policies on insolvency, but these instruments are even less present than

 73
liquidity measures (debt, deferral, grants) and alternative finance. Insolvency measures include debt
restructuring solutions, as well as improvements in the capacity of insolvency systems.
In terms of channelling support, banks continue to be an important partner in the deployment of recovery
packages, along with digital platforms, given their effectiveness in reaching a broader range of
beneficiaries.
Looking at policy domains in the recovery packages, innovation is the policy area with the highest number
of SME-related policies, although digitalisation receives the highest volume of financial support among
explicit SME-related policies.
Despite the high priority governments and business attach to the issues of greening and sustainability,
these are clearly the areas where explicit SME-related policies are least prevalent in terms of number and
financial value of policies. According the analysis of policy trackers, the value of SME-related policies on
greening against the total value of greening policies appears to be particularly low (2.44%), although
databases focused on European recovery plans show a higher share of approximately 5% (OECD, 2021[1]).
While SMEs can benefit from generic (not SME-targeted) greening measures in recovery packages, the
limited explicit emphasis on SMEs in this central policy area calls for further reflection on additional
measures to ensure that SMEs are equipped to finance actions related to reducing their carbon footprint
and contributing to sustainability objectives.
Introduction
SMEs and entrepreneurs have been hard hit by the economic impacts of the pandemic. They are strongly
represented in the sectors most affected by the crisis, they often lack the cash reserves to weather
economic downturns and generally have been less able to adopt the technologies and working methods
to adjust to the new circumstances.
At the start of the pandemic, governments responded swiftly and robustly to support SMEs and
entrepreneurs to avoid a liquidity crisis, through a combination of loans, loan guarantees and grants, as
well as deferral of payments and job retention schemes. While these measures helped to avoid an increase
in SME bankruptcies, their focus on debt finance also contributed to rising SME debt levels in a number of
countries, and made the already existing need for a diversification of SME finance more manifest. The
developments in SME finance in 2020, as well as policy support measures, are discussed in Chapter 1.
Rising numbers of COVID-19 cases and the emergence of new variants in the second half of 2021 led to
new containment measures in various countries, and the extension or re-introduction of rescue measures
to support SMEs and other businesses.
As the pandemic continued in 2020 and 2021 governments increasingly focused on support for recovery,
in addition to rescue and liquidity. In the earlier days of the pandemic, this took the form of a gradual
increase in the inclusion of structural support measures, focused particularly on digitalisation in the policy
mix (OECD, 2020[2]). Since June 2020, and in particular in the first half of 2021 (OECD, 2021[3]), a large
number of OECD countries launched recovery packages that aim to pave the way for recovery (OECD,
2021[4]). These recovery packages vary in size, focus and timing, but they all include investments in
infrastructure, greening, digitalisation, innovation and skills.
This chapter focuses on how these recovery packages address the financing challenges faced by SMEs -
with respect to the ongoing impacts of the pandemic on their liquidity and solvency position, the instruments
used to channel support and the investments needed to strengthening resilience for the future. It examines
in particular the following aspects of recovery packages:
 Their potential to address SME financing needs, including those that emerged during the
pandemic;

74 
 The extent to which the packages might influence the evolution of SME finance markets over the
longer term, including diversification of SME financing instruments and sources;
 How these packages may contribute to meeting SME financing needs for investments in
digitalisation, greening, innovation and skills.
The chapter first provides an overview of the different recovery packages that have been launched in
OECD and Scoreboard countries, examining the extent to which they include an SME focus. Then, the
chapter discusses the type of SME finance instruments and sources the packages use to channel support,
against the backdrop of developments and challenges in SME finance that have been discussed in
previous Scoreboard editions. Finally, the chapter explores how the recovery packages support SME
finance needs in four key policy areas: greening, digitalisation, skills and innovation.
The SME orientation of recovery packages
Many countries have launched recovery packages
From June 2020 onwards, various OECD countries launched recovery packages to counter the impact of
COVID-19. Recovery packages differ from the rescue measures launched immediately after the outbreak
of the pandemic, which largely aimed to avoid a liquidity crisis. Recovery packages aim to strengthen
structural and sustainable growth and resilience through short-term measures (such as fostering demand
via income support measures, vouchers and tax rebate schemes) and longer-term measures (structural
policies with a focus on digitalisation, greening, skills, innovation and infrastructure investments). However,
in practice, the distinction between rescue and recovery support is not so easily made. Some countries
include aspects of rescue and liquidity support in their recovery packages, or had included structural policy
support measures as part of their initial rescue support, while others continue to operate rescue support in
parallel to the recovery packages. Some countries reintroduced or extended rescue measures over the
course of 2021 in response to a resurgence of the pandemic, in parallel with the recovery packages
introduced. Finally, some countries have not launched a comprehensive stand-alone recovery package,
but introduced a series of recovery measures over the course of the pandemic.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the timing, size and focus of the recovery plans introduced in OECD
countries.
Table 2.1. Recovery packages in selected OECD countries

Country Recovery package Size Focus
Australia Federal budget 2021/22 (May 2021) (Government of Australia, 5% GDP Digitalisation, greening, infrastructure,
2021[5]) skills, tax cuts.
The Economic Recovery Plan (Australian Government, 2021[6]) AUD 507 billion
Austria Rescue and investment package (June 2020) EUR 15 billion Digitalisation, greening, innovation,
Recovery and Resilience Plan (June 2021) (Government of EUR 3.5 billion investment, skills.
Austria, 2021[7]) (grants)
Belgium Plan National pour la Reprise et la Résilience (June 2021) EUR 5.9 billion Digitalisation, greening, innovation,
(Cabinet du Secrétaire d’Etat à la Relance et aux (grants) mobility, productivity, public finance,
Investissements Stratégiques, en charge de la Politique skills, social cohesion.
Scientifique, 2021[8])
Canada Recovery Plan for jobs, growth and resilience (April 2021) 5% GDP Digitalisation, greening, jobs, small
(Department of Finance Canada, 2021[9]) businesses, women, young
Canadians.
Chile Social and Economic Recovery Plan (June 2020) (OECD, USD 12 billion Greening, income support,
2021[10]) infrastructure, innovation, investment,
Paso a Paso Chile se Recupera (October 2020) (Government jobs, SME support, tourism.
of Chile, 2021[11])

 75

Colombia Compromiso por el Futuro de Colombia (July 2020) COP 100 billion Digitalisation, greening, health,
(Government of Colombia, 2020[12]) (USD 29 million) housing, infrastructure, jobs, skills
Czech National Recovery Plan (July 2021) (Ministerstva průmyslu a CZK 191 billion Digitalisation, greening, mobility, skills,
Republic obchodu, 2021[13]) social services
Denmark Danish Recovery Plan (April 2021) (Danish Minister of DKK 11.6 billion Digitalisation, exports, greening,
Finance, 2021[14]) health.
Estonia Recovery and Resilience Plan (June 2021) (Eelarvenõukogu, EUR 982.5 million Digitalisation, greening, health,
2021[15]) (grants) mobility, social protection.
Finland Sustainable Growth Programme (May 2021) (Government of EUR 238 million Digitalisation, greening, health, jobs,
Finland, 2021[16]) social inclusion.
France France Relance (September 2020) EUR 100 billion Digitalisation, greening, health,
Plan National de Relance et Résilience (June 2021) EUR 39.4 billion innovation, skills.
(Government of France, 2021[17]) (grants)
Germany Fighting Corona, Securing Prosperity, Strengthening EUR 130 billion Demand stimulus, digitalisation,
Sustainability (June 2020) greening, infrastructure, innovation,
Recovery and Resilience Plan (April 2021) (Bundesministerium EUR 25 billion
der Finanzen, 2021[18]) (grants)
Greece Greece 2.0 (April 2021) (Ministry of Finance, 2021[19]) EUR 60 billion Digitalisation, greening, innovation,
investment.
Hungary Hungary Recovery Plan (May 2021) (Miniszterelnökség, EUR 16.8 billion (of Digitalisation, greening, mobility, skills.
2021[20]) which 7.17 grants)
Iceland Fiscal Plan 2022-2025 (March 2021) (Government of Iceland, ISK 260 billion Greening, infrastructure, innovation,
2021[21]) jobs, skills, social cohesion.
Fiscal Budget Proposal for 2022 (December 2021)
(Government of Iceland, 2021[22])
Ireland National Recovery and Resilience Plan (June 2021) EUR 989 million Digitalisation, greening, skills.
(Department of Public Spenditure and Reform, 2021[23]) (grants)
Israel Economic plan for coping with the coronavirus crisis NIS 80 billion Digitalisation, health, innovation, jobs,
(September 2020) (Ministry of Finance, 2020[24]) mobility, skills.
Italy National Recovery and Resilience Plan (June 2021) EUR 191.5 billion (of Digitalisation, greening, innovation and
(Government of Italy, 2021[25]) which 68.9 grants) start-ups , mobility, skills, social
cohesion.
Japan Comprehensive Economic Measures to Secure People's Lives JPY 40 trillion Access to finance, digitalisation,
and Livelihoods towards Relief and Hope (December 2020) disaster prevention and mitigation,
(Government of Japan, 2020[26]) greening, innovation.
Korea Korean New Deal (July 2020, revised in July 2021) (Ministry of KRW 220 trillion Digitalisation, greening, social safety
Economy and Finance, 2021[27]) net.
Latvia Latvia Recovery Fund plan (June 2021) (Government of EUR 1.8 billion Digitalisation, greening, skills,
Latvia, 2021[28]) (grants) sustainable mobility.
Lithuania New Generation Lithuania: Recovery plan (Government of EUR 2.2 billion Digitalisation, greening, health, skills,
Lithuania, 2021[29]) (grants) social protection.
Luxembourg Plan pour la Reprise et la Résilience (June 2021) (Ministère EUR 93 million Digitalisation, greening, jobs, mobility,
des Finances, 2021[30]) (grants) skills
Mexico Acciones para Reactivación Económica (January 2021) Digitalisation, greening, jobs,
(Secretaría de Economía, 2021[31]) international trade, investment
promotion.
Poland National Reconstruction Plan (June 2021) (Government of EUR 36 billion (of Digitalisation, greening, health,
Poland, 2021[32]) which 23.9 grants) innovation, mobility.
Portugal Recovery and Resilience Plan (April 2021) (Government of EUR 16.6 billion (of Access to finance, digitalisation,
Portugal, 2021[33]) which 13.9 grants) greening, innovation.
Slovak Recovery and Resilience Plan (April 2021) (Úrad Vlády EUR 6.3 billion Digitalisation, greening, health, social
Republic Slovenskej Republiky, 2021[34]) (grants) cohesion.
Slovenia Recovery and Resilience Plan (April 2021) (Republika EUR 2.5 billion (of Digitalisation, greening.
Slovenija - Služba vlade za razvoj in evropsko kohezijsko which 1.8 grants)
politiko, 2021[35])
Spain Recovery, transformation and resilience plan (October 2020) EUR 72 billion (of Digitalisation, greening, jobs, skills.
(Government of Spain, 2020[36]) which 69.5 in grants)

76 

Sweden Recovery Plan (May 2021) (Swedish MInistry of Finance, SEK 34 billion Digitalisation, greening, jobs, social
2021[37]) (grants) cohesion.
Switzerland Education and Research Budget (December 2020) CHF 28 billion Innovation, research, skills.
(Government of Switzerland, 2020[38])
United Build Back Better plan for growth (March 2021) (Government GBP 65 billion Digitalisation, greening, health,
Kingdom of United Kingdom, 2020[39]) infrastructure, innovation, skills.
United American Families Plan (April 2021) (Government of the USD 2 trillion Income support, infrastructure, skills.
States United States of America, 2021[40])
American Jobs Plan (March 2021) (Government of the United USD 2.3 trillion
States of America, 2021[41])
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (November 2021) USD 1.2 trillion
(Government of the United States of America, 2021[42])
Source: Authors, based on government announcements
The packages share common overarching objectives but differ in focus
As Table 2.1 shows, many of the recovery plans have similar objectives, for instance in the areas of
digitalisation, skills, greening, innovation and investment. However, within those broad areas, their focus
varies significantly. In non-EU OECD countries, the emphasis in recovery packages is on skills and
infrastructure, whereas recovery packages of EU countries include a strong focus on greening and
digitalisation, in line with European Commission requirements that these should amount to at least 37%
and 20% of recovery packages respectively. In Austria, Denmark, Germany, and Luxembourg (all countries
that receive a relatively small amount of recovery and resilience support from the EU in relation to their
GDP), virtually all funding goes towards green and digital measures. Countries that receive larger amounts
presented more diverse plans with higher ‘other’ (non-green and non-digital) shares of spending (Bruegel,
2021[43]). In Austria, Germany, and Lithuania, the share of spending on digitalisation is highest among the
policy mix, whereas in Belgium, Denmark, France, and Luxembourg the share of green spending ranks
highest. In absolute terms France, Germany, Italy, and Spain spend most on digital, and France, Italy,
Poland, and Spain on greening. Non-EU countries that put strong emphasis on greening as a share of
recovery packages include Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, whereas in Australia and the
United States the share is below 10% (UNDP - Nature, Climate and Energy, 2021[44]).
The format, types of support and size of packages differ across countries
Furthermore, the format and types of support of the recovery packages differ. For example, the recovery
plans of EU countries often build on the Next Generation European Union fund (NGEU), agreed upon in
July 2020 (European Commission, 2021[45]). The deal included an allocation by country of grants and loans
of the total of EUR 806.9 billion, with only few countries making use of the loan element in NGEU in
practice. In addition, some EU countries hit by new coronavirus outbreaks in late March and April 2021
approved supplementary budgets or extended fiscal support for businesses, affected workers, and the
health care system (France, Germany, Italy). Moreover, although during 2021 various countries were
phasing out liquidity support programs for businesses, these have been extended or re-introduced in
several countries (for instance, Italy, Portugal) in response to the resurgence of the pandemic late 2021
(The New York Times, 2021[46]).
In other countries, the packages were launched through large self-standing initiatives (United States) and
supplementary budgets (Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, United Kingdom) with a greater variety in focus.
In some of these countries (such as Australia, Korea and Japan), emergency support was extended or
intensified in response to renewed lockdowns, whereas in others (New Zealand, United Kingdom), rescue
support was gradually phased out.

 77
A key difference among the recovery packages is size, as illustrated in Table 1. The July 2021 IMF
Economic Outlook and the December 2021 OECD Economic Outlook document differences in the pace of
economic recovery across countries, often in line with their level of resources. For example, higher-income
countries continue to provide fiscal support to their economies, with fiscal measures announced to fight
the pandemic estimated at USD 16.5 trillion as of early July 2021. Whereas USD 4.6 trillion of advanced
economies’ pandemic-related revenue and expenditure measures were still to be utilised in 2021 and
beyond, most measures in emerging market economies and low-income developing countries expired in
2020 (IMF, 2021[47]).
Rescue packages had a strong focus on SMEs
SMEs were hard hit by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the SME focused policy response was
unprecedented. Measures were directed in particular towards avoiding a liquidity crisis among SMEs by
providing deferral of payments, support for wage payments, loans, loan guarantees and grants. The World
Bank has counted a staggering 1 600 SME-oriented support measures launched during the pandemic
world-wide, with an emphasis on debt finance, employment support and tax measures (World Bank,
n.d.[48]). By July 2020, McKinsey calculated on the basis of IMF data that support to SMEs in 50 countries
amounted to USD 1.2 trillion (10% of total fiscal policy support provided), 83% of which consisted of loans
and loan guarantees (McKinsey & Company, 2020[49]).
This strong SME orientation in the rescue phase of the policy response to the pandemic was confirmed by
two OECD surveys on financing support programmes for businesses during the crisis conducted in 2020.
The first survey in April 2020 (with responses from 32 OECD countries) showed that 55 out of 98 policy
measures identified were directed towards SMEs (56%) (OECD, 2020[50]). In a second wave of the survey,
held in December 2020 with responses from 21 countries, that figure dropped to 46 out of 117 measures
(39%) (OECD, 2021[51]). Box 2.1 explains the sources and methodology used to identify the SME
orientation of policy measures.

78 
Box 2.1. Identifying SME-related policies in recovery packages: sources and methodology
The assessment of the SME-orientation of recovery packages relies on the analysis of five trackers
and databases:
 The Global Recovery Observatory of the Oxford University Economics Recovery Project
(OUERP), which includes 7.584 rescue and recovery policies of 91 countries, accessed in
October 2021 (O’Callaghan, 2020[52]).
 The Bruegel Recovery and Resilience Plans dataset of 22 EU countries recovery packages
which includes 1763 policies, accessed in July 2021 (Bruegel, 2021[43]).
 The results of two surveys among OECD countries on financial support measures for business
with responses from 26 (June 2020) and 21 countries (December 2020), and including in total
215 policies ( (OECD, 2020[50]) (OECD, 2021[51])).
 The OECD Green Recovery Database, which includes 857 greening policies in recovery
packages in 44 countries, accessed in September 2021 (OECD, 2021[53]).
 The Green Recovery Tracker developed by the Wuppertal Institute and E3G, which includes
996 recovery policies in 17 EU countries and assesses these in terms of their green impact,
accessed in September 2021 (Wuppertal Institute, E3G, 2021[54]).
The aim of the tracker analysis is to assess if and how policies in the trackers are ‘SME-related’. For
the purposes of this chapter, the term “SME-related“ refers to policies that explicitly target SMEs or
reference them as one of the target groups. Where possible, the share of SME-related policies was
assessed by number and value of policies in both rescue and recovery packages at large, as well as
in specific policy domains (digitalisation, greening, skills and innovation) and aspects of SME finance
such as the use of types of financial instruments (debt, deferral, grants) or more broadly type of support
(liquidity, insolvency, alternative finance). Where possible, SME-related policies were differentiated by
focus on firm age (e.g start-ups), self-employed, type of entrepreneurs and firm size per se.
The identification of SME-related policies took place along three steps:
 First, relevant existing classifications within the databases were used, for instance archetype C
(liquidity for SMEs) in the Oxford database, or classifications regarding policy domains.
 Second, a word search was done on the descriptions of policies in the databases (where
available), using targeted search terms to identify policies.
 Third, a manual check was done on all the policies identified, to verify that they indeed fall into
the right category. Moreover, outlier policies (in terms of financial value) were omitted to avoid
bias in the analysis.
The results of the tracker analysis should be interpreted with the following limitations in mind:
 The databases are a work in progress that are continuously updated.
 The databases differ in objectives and methodologies, and are therefore not fully comparable.
 The tracker analysis aims to map SME-related policies in rescue and recovery packages, but
is not intended to compare rescue and recovery packages as such, given their different
objectives and nature. It does not aim to make a normative interpretation of how high or low the
share of SME-related policies should be. Furthermore, while the analysis provides relevant
insights on the SME orientation of policies, it does not suggest that policies that are not SME-
related are not relevant for SMEs. Many financial support measures open to the business sector
at large can also be relevant for SMEs.

 79
Data on the values of policies should be carefully considered. The policies in the databases mostly
refer to the announcement of measures, not expenditure; not all policies have financial values attached.
Notes: See Annex B for a more detailed overview of the methodology used.
However, recovery packages have a less explicit focus on SMEs
While SMEs took the centre stage in rescue support, this shifted in the recovery phase. Countries
continued to include policies that aim to support the recovery and resilience of SMEs through more targeted
measures for SMEs, examples of which are discussed in the Key policy objectives in recovery plans: the
SME dimension section. However, the emphasis in recovery packages on measures and budgets with an
explicit SME orientation declined – even though emergency support measures remained in place in various
countries when lockdowns and restrictions continued. This shift can be explained in part by the fact that
with reopening of economies, the need for SME focused emergency support declined, and that countries
increasingly became concerned about the negative effects of long-term liquidity support. Furthermore, the
focus in recovery packages on structural and future-oriented policy objectives gave a more prominent place
to more horizontal measures, such as for digital infrastructure or innovation – which can also benefit SMEs.
Finally, in some cases, rescue policies had a longer-term horizon and impact, and therefore it was not
necessary to include these policies again in recovery plans.
The shift in focus from rescue measures to recovery packages is shown in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 which
make use of data from the Global Recovery Observatory (O’Callaghan, 2020[52]) (Table 2.2), the Bruegel
think tank (Bruegel, 2021[43]) and the Green Recovery Tracker (Wuppertal Institute, E3G, 2021[54])
(Table 2.3). Table 2.2 shows that of the total number of policies in the database by October 2021, 1033
(13.62%) were SME-related. In terms of the value of support, SME-related policies account for USD 3,942
billion (20.21%). The share of SME-related policies in the total number of rescue policies as of October
2021 was 17.25%; the share in the value of SME relevant support was even higher: almost 25.51%.
However, the share of SME relevant recovery policies is significantly lower: 4.07% as a share of the
number of policies, and 2.21% as a share of the amount of funding.
This reflects two developments. Not only were a large number of policies in the rescue phase focused on
SMEs, they also often included relatively high budgets compared to other policy types such as loans and
loan guarantees. In the recovery phase, a lesser focus on SMEs can be observed, using instruments that
on average had smaller budgets than non-SME-related policies. In absolute terms, spending on SME-
related policies dropped from USD 3 862.02 billion in the rescue packages to USD 78.15 billion in recovery
packages.
Table 2.2. SME-related policies in global recovery and rescue packages

Number of policies and financial value
Total (rescue and recovery) Rescue packages Recovery packages

Number Value (billion USD) Number Value (billion USD) Number Value (billion USD)
SMEs related 1033 3942.84 945 3862.02 85 78.15
policies
Other policies 6551 15567.16 4533 11278.33 2002 3451.78

Total policies 7584 19510 5478 15140.35 2087 3529.93
Share of SMEs 13.62% 20.21% 17.25% 25.51% 4.07% 2.21%
related policies
Source: Global Recovery Observatory (O’Callaghan, 2020[52])

80 
Table 2.3 shows the results from a similar analysis on recovery packages in Europe (Bruegel, 2021[43])
(Wuppertal Institute, E3G, 2021[54]). The share of SME-related policies by value is higher in European
recovery packages, ranging from approximately 2.29% and 4.65% (compared to 2.21% globally), although
these funds are concentrated in a smaller number of policies.
Table 2.3. Share of SME-related policies in European recovery packages

Bruegel Recovery and Resilience Plans data Wuppertal Institute Green Recovery Tracker
set*
Number Value (billion EUR) Number Value (billion EUR)
SME-related policies 57 11.02 41 31.89
Other policies 1706 470.98 955 653.49
Total number / value of policies 1763 482.00 996 685.38
Share in total 3.23% 2.29% 4.12% 4.65%
*Note: The value includes only grants in the recovery packages, not loan elements. Bruegel dataset consider the data for 22 European countries,
while Wuppertal Institute consider 17 European countries.
Source: Bruegel Recovery and Resilience Plans dataset (Bruegel, 2021[43]) and Green Recovery Tracker (Wuppertal Institute, E3G, 2021[54])
Recovery packages also saw a shift in the types of SMEs targeted
A relevant distinction is on which types of SMEs the support packages focus: on existing SMEs, on new
SMEs and start-ups, on the self-employed and/or on types of entrepreneurs. Out of the 1 033 policies
identified as SME-relevant, the vast majority (55.37% by numbers, 92.03% by funding) focus on existing
SMEs, followed by self-employed (14.81% by number and 12.55% by funding). Start-ups and new ventures
account for 3.97% in the number of policies and 0.55% in funding, and entrepreneurs 8.52% and 1.8%
respectively (Table 2.4).
The table also documents the changing share of SME-related policies for different types of SMEs in the
rescue versus recovery packages. It shows that recovery packages focus more on start-up oriented
policies than previous crisis measures. Start-up related policies accounted for 23.53% of the number of
SME-related policies in the recovery packages, compared to 2.22% in the rescue packages. Conversely,
the share of policies focusing on the self-employed is much lower in the recovery phase. For policies
related to types of entrepreneur, the share increased from 7.51% in rescue packages to 20% for recovery
packages, with an even stronger increase by share of value, although their number and value in absolute
terms declined.

 81
Table 2.4. SME-related policies in rescue and recovery packages by SME type
Number of policy references Financial value in USD billion

SME Start-up Entrepreneur Self- SME Start-up Entrepreneur Self-
employed employed
Total (rescue and recovery packages)
Number/value of policies by SME type 572 41 88 153 3,245.11 19.49 63.59 442.67
Share of SMEs related policies by SME 55.37% 3.97% 8.52% 14.81% 92.03% 0.55% 1.80% 12.55%
type*
Rescue packages
Number/value of policies by SME type 520 21 71 145 3,172.43 15.93 56.82 439.57
type*
Recovery packages
Number/value of policies by SME type 50 20 17 8 72.14 3.56 6.77 3.1
type*
Notes: *The shares are calculated over the total of SME related policies (1033) amounting to USD 3942.8 billion. The shares do not add up to
100% because some SME-related policies are not related to one of the four types. Not all policies by SME type include information on whether
they are part of rescue or recovery packages.
The Bruegel database on recovery packages in the EU confirms the significant share of start-up oriented
policies in the recovery packages (over 30% of SME-related policies), and the very low share of policies
for the self-employed in recovery packages (less than 2% of SME-related policies) (Table 2.5).
Table 2.5. SME related policies in 22 European recovery packages by SME type
SME Start-up Entrepreneurship Self-employed

Number of policies 13 18 5 1
Value of funding (billion EUR) 6.37 0.28 0.55 0.01
Share of SME-related policies by SME type 22.81% 31.58% 8.77% 1.75%
(number) (%)*
Share of SME-related policies by SME type 57.78% 2.58% 4.99% 0.09%
(value) (%)*
Note: The shares do not add up to 100% because some SME-related policies are not related to one of the four types
Source: Bruegel Recovery and Resilience Plans dataset (Bruegel, 2021[43])
SME financing instruments in recovery packages
The 2020 special edition of the Scoreboard noted the need to preserve the progress made in financial
diversification for SMEs documented in recent years, in light of the strong emphasis on credit in crisis
measures. This section assesses the extent to which recovery packages can contribute to this objective.
As countries strive for recovery, SME liquidity needs remain significant. As noted in the OECD in-depth
analysis of one year of SME policy responses to COVID-19, the provision of liquidity was key in the rescue
aid to SMEs from the start of the pandemic, and was largely successful in avoiding a wave of SME

82 
bankruptcies (OECD, 2021[3]). However, especially in countries where lockdowns were introduced in 2021,
liquidity remains a challenge for recovery. For instance, a study conducted by Euler Hermes finds that the
support provided by governments reduced the number of SMEs insolvencies by more than 8000 in
Germany, France and the United Kingdom. However, the risk of insolvency in a sample of 525 000 SMEs
is still present in 7% of SMEs in Germany, 12% in France and 15% in the United Kingdom. This is slightly
lower than pre-pandemic levels, indicating the impact of government support in avoiding a wave of
bankruptcies (Euler Hermes, 2021[55]). In addition, the emergence of new variants and the continued
uncertainty about the strength of the recovery in some sectors has pressed governments around the world
to continue to provide financial support to businesses. In 2021, many SMEs continued to be in a very
vulnerable position. In addition to continuing to drain funds given market uncertainty, low demand and
rising inflation, they also generally face a risk of insolvency caused by the extensive use of debt support
through the banking system in the first phases of the pandemic. In the rescue phase, the established
relationship between banks and SMEs allowed policymakers to reach a large number of SMEs swiftly. On
the other hand, an overreliance of the policy response to the pandemic on traditional financing, as well as
the pro-cyclical nature of early stage equity finance, contributed to an increase in SME indebtedness.
Against this backdrop, this section examines the extent to which the recovery packages mobilise different
financing instruments and policy tools for SMEs, and assesses how they can contribute to tackling SME
short- and long-term finance needs in the recovery, as well as the reduction of SME reliance on debt.
Debt instruments continue to be an integral part of recovery packages, with a shift in

design and focus
Looking at the different debt instruments to enhance liquidity of SMEs in the recovery packages, there is
some heterogeneity in their use. For example, some loan schemes target viable firms, while others aim to
target companies owned by vulnerable groups. Similarly, although a large bulk of guarantee schemes were
extended until the end of 2021, the extent of the coverage that benefit SMEs varies. Furthermore,
intangible based finance is included in several recovery packages.
The design of some recovery loan schemes are more stringent in their eligibility criteria
Considering the reliance of SMEs on debt finance, loan schemes continue to be present in the recovery
mix. While in the rescue phase, the aim was to distribute support quickly and ensure large uptake and
coverage, the eligibility criteria to receive support was broad. However, given the increasing risk of over
indebtedness, eligibility criteria tend to be more stringent and narrow in the recovery schemes, where the
aim is to target viable but illiquid businesses.
In Australia, for example, the SME Recovery Loan Scheme launched in May 2021 is only open to
companies that passed the so-called Decline in Turnover Test. The aim of the test is to evaluate viability
prior to the COVID-19 crisis and ensure that beneficiary companies had a decline in turnover caused solely
by the pandemic. To pass the test a company must have a decline of 15%, 30% or 50% in a quarter in
2020 compared to the same quarter in 2019 (Australian Government - Taxation Office, 2020[56]).
In the United Kingdom, the Recovery Loan Scheme (RLS) launched in March 2021 requires the business
to not be in collective insolvency proceedings, and to show it would be viable if it were not for the pandemic.
The scheme also considers lending provided by previous schemes (Bounce Back Loan Scheme, or
Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme) and can limit the amount borrowed under the RLS
(British Business Bank, 2021[57]). The SME needs to have a borrower proposal which has to be considered
viable by the lender. The scheme also require borrowers to pay fees and interest from the beginning
(although interest rates will not be high as the scheme benefit from an 80% state guarantee) (Ashurst,
2021[58]). The payment of interest from the outset can limit uptake; however, it ensures that the companies
that take it have repayment capacity.

 83
In Greece, in September 2021, the government announced that a portion of funding under the Recovery
Fund Loan Scheme would benefit SMEs, providing them with low interest loans. However, eligible SMEs
need to show that they merged, undertook an acquisition or have entered into long-term cooperation for at
least five years (HMEPHΣIA, 2021[59]). This may direct resources towards business models that are in a
more stable financial position with a higher repayment capacity.
Other loan schemes target SMEs that are disadvantaged in their access to finance
Some schemes target firms that have not benefited from other support programmes or face greater barriers
to access. For instance, in the United States, the extension of the Paycheck Protection Programme,
announced in February 2021, takes a more targeted approach to reach under-banked businesses. It
includes a special 14-day window in which only businesses with fewer than 20 employees can apply and
have a revised loan formula, which allows more money to flow to sole proprietors, independent contractors
and self-employed people (of which 70% are owned by women and people of colour (Government of the
United States of America, 2021[60])). From the USD 7 billion of the PPP extension, USD 1 billion was set
aside for businesses without employees located in low and moderate income areas. Data from the SBA in
March 2021 indicate that loans to minority-owned businesses were up by 20%, reaching an additional
thousand minority-owned businesses each day. Loans to women owned businesses were up by 14%,
reaching an additional of 600 women-owned business each day, and loans to small businesses in rural
areas were up by 12% during the special 14-day window (CBS News, 2021[61]).
Similarly, the State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) was re-launched in March 2021 as part of the
American Rescue Plan with USD 10 billion (US Department of the Treasury, 2021[62]), of which USD 1.5
billion was set aside specifically for socially and economically disadvantage businesses. The programme
also allocates USD 308 million in funding specifically to rural southern states. The programme was
originally launched in 2010 as a recovery strategy for the Great Financial Crisis. The current version of the
programme has six times more funding than in 2010 and allocates three times more funding to rural
southern states (Hope Policy Institute, 2021[63]). Another case in point is the San Francisco loan
programme that provides working capital specifically to SMEs not reached by previous programmes, and
recently created SMEs that do not have a credit history. The programme offers zero interest rate loans of
up to USD 100 000, making it the largest SME loan programme offered in the city to date (California News
Times, 2021[64]).
In Canada, the 2021 Budget provides CAD 80 million in 2021 and 2022 for the Community Futures Network
of Canada and regional development agencies (Government of Canada - Department of Finance, 2021[65]).
The Community Futures Network Canada provides support in the form of loans and training to small
businesses in rural communities (Community Futures - Network of Canada, n.d.[66]).
Youth-led businesses were also greatly affected by the crisis. In order for help this vulnerable group around
the world, the Youth Business International initiative launched the COVID-19 Rapid Response and
Recovery Programme which collaborates with national authorities and SME organisations to help young
entrepreneurs (aged 18 to 35 years), women and migrant entrepreneurs to recover from the crisis across
32 countries. In the Netherlands, for example, it collaborate with Qredits, a microfinance institution
supported by the government to offer advice and training (Youth Business International, n.d.[67]).
Guarantee schemes continue to be an important tool to support SMEs in the recovery
Government guarantees continue to be important to ensure SMEs have the liquidity they need to recover
from the crisis, thanks to their risk-mitigating and counter-cyclical nature. In addition, through the pandemic,
credit guarantees have been effective in allocating public support towards viable firms that were most
affected by the pandemic. An OECD study shows that in 2020, only a small share of companies that
benefited from loan guarantees were in financial distress in 2019 (Demmou and Franco, 2021[68]). Likewise,
a study from the European Investment Bank that linked policy support with firm characteristics, shows that

84 
firms that experienced larger sales losses (most of them SMEs) were the ones that benefited the most
from the policy support (including subsidised or guaranteed credit), with no evidence that these firms were
weak before the crisis (EIB, 2022[69]). Guarantee schemes therefore continue to be instrumental for an
effective allocation of financial support for SMEs in the recovery. For example, the Pan-European
Guarantee Fund has registered significant activity in 2021. From December 2020 to December 2021, 287
guarantee agreements were approved to support SMEs and mid-caps in the European Union (EIB,
2021[70]). With the objective to pool risk among member states, it offers harmonised support to SMEs
across member states, avoiding an uneven distribution of support linked to government capacities. The
target amount is EUR 25 billion with the aim to mobilise private funding reaching EUR 200 billion.
Individual countries have also extended their guarantees schemes to continue to benefit SMEs specifically.
Most of these guarantees were established in 2020 and were set to expire in the first half of 2021.
Acknowledging the importance to continue to provide liquidity, they were extended in most cases until the
end of 2021, and in some cases to mid-2022 considering the emergence of COVID-19 variants and related
restrictions. Table 2.6 provides information on guarantee extensions and guarantee coverage.
Table 2.6. Guarantee extensions to support SMEs in selected countries

Announcement
Country Extension
Guarantee name date of Type of beneficiary Type / Level of coverage
period
extension
Argentina Fondo de Garantía Jun-21 Until 30 SMEs 100% guarantee rate. Loans of up to ARS 15
Argentino September million per project with a term of 7 years and
2021 fixed annual interest rate of 18%.
Australia SME Loan 13 December Until June 2022 SMEs Loans are available from 1 April 2021 until 31
Scheme 2021 December 2021 with a Government guarantee
of 80%. Under the 2022 Scheme expansion,
loans are available from 1 January 2022 until 30
June 2022, with a Government guarantee of
50%.
Austria Bridging Jun-21 Until December SMEs and self- 100% guarantee rate for a loan of up to EUR
Guarantees (AWS) 2021 employed, tourism 500,000. 90% guarantee rate for a loan of up to
companies with finance EUR 27.7 million. 80% guarantee rate for a loan
requirement of more of up to EUR 1.5 million. Guarantee period max.
than EUR 4.4 million, 5 years.
large companies with
financing requirement of
up to EUR 0.5 million
Belgium Second Guarantee Jun-21 Until December SMEs 80% guarantee. The guarantee will only apply
2021 for new loans and credit lines and not for
existing loans.
Chile FOGAPE- Feb 2021 Until December MSMEs 80% coverage to small enterprises and 85% to
REACTIVA 2021 micro and small enterprises. The interest rate is
programme fixed (0.6% monthly rate) to avoid exceeding
monetary policy rate.
France Government Apr-21 Until December All firms 90% of the loan for all SMEs. For companies
Guarantee 2021 with more than 5 000 employees or a turnover
above 1.5 billion, the coverage guaranteed by
the State is 70% or 80%.
Greece COVID-19 Loan Until December Micro-sized enterprises 80% of the loan amount, to cover liquidity needs
Guarantee Fund 2021 resulting from the COVID-19 crisis. Loans are
(Phase 3) of up to EUR 50 0000 and have a duration of up
to 5 years.
Italy Central Guarantee Jul-21 Until December SMEs Maximum coverage of 80% for direct
Fund 2021 guarantees and 90% for indirect guarantees.
Adjustments up to 90% and 100% respectively
upon authorization of the European
Commission. The maximum guaranteed
amount for each SME is EUR 5 million and no

 85
Announcement
Country
Extension
Guarantee name date of Type of beneficiary Type / Level of coverage
period
extension
fees or commissions are payable.
Italy Guarantee Italy Jun-21 Until December SMEs that have The coverage percentages increases from 70%
Programme 2021 exhausted their ability to to 90% as firm size decreases.
access to the Central
Guarantee Fund
Latvia Credit Holiday Until December SMEs and large 50 % guarantee. Up to EUR 500,000 per
Guarantee 2021 enterprises company. Term up to 6 years for financial
leasing and investment loan financial services,
up to 3 years – for working capital financial
services.
Malaysia Syarikat Jaminan Jul-21 Until 2022 SMEs Guarantee ceiling increased amounting to RM
Pembiayaan 20 billion (The Sun Daily, 2021[71]).
Perniagaan Bhd
(SJPP)
Netherlands SME credit Mar-21 Until December SMEs The share covered by the guarantee increased
guarantee scheme 2021 from 45% to 67.5% (excluding start-ups and
(BMKB-C, in small credit requests as they already benefitted
Dutch) by a 67.5% guarantee) and the duration of the
guarantee is extended from 2 to 4 years. The
guarantee budget increased from EUR 765
million to EUR 1.5 billion. The commission
charged decreased.
Netherlands Small Corona Mar-21 Until December SMEs 95% of state guarantee for loans between EUR
Bridging loans 2021 10,000 and EUR 50,000. The term is at most 5
(KKC in Dutch) years and 4% maximum interest rate.
Netherlands Business Loan Mar-21 Until December SMEs and large The share covered by the guarantee increased
Guarantee 2021 corporates from 50% to 80% for large companies and to
Scheme (GO-C) 90% for SMEs. The guarantee budget
increased to EUR 150 million. Excludes
agriculture, real state, financial services and
healthcare providers.
Poland Minimis Guarantee July 2021 Until December SMEs The maximum coverage of the guarantee
2021 increased from 60% to 80%. In 2020, Minimis
guarantees provided support worth more than
29 billion PLN of financing value to more than
50 thousand MSMEs.
Spain ICO guarantee May-21 Until December SMEs and self- 80% guarantee rate for SMEs and Self-
scheme 2021 employed employed persons. For other companies 70%.
Extension of guarantee budget for EUR 10,000
for SMEs.
Sweden Government Jun-21 Until 30 SMEs and large 70% guarantee rate, the guarantee budget for
guarantee September corporates the extension is SEK 50 billion.
programme for 2021
companies
(Företagsakuten)
Note: Authors based on government announcements and information provided in the Country Profiles.

86 
Some guarantee schemes and other instruments are used to target sectors that are still in
distress
In the recovery phase, there are a number of countries increasing their guarantees to benefit specific
sectors that are still facing challenges as a consequence of COVID-19 variants and related restrictions.
For example, in Argentina, the Argentinian Guarantee Fund supports cultural SMEs and self-employed in
the tourism sector, with 100% coverage. The support has a 0% rate in the first year and an 18% interest
rate in the second year (Ministerio de Desarrollo Productivo, 2021[72]). In February 2021, the Danish
alternative finance provider Reinvent, signed a guarantee agreement with the European Investment Fund
to support SMEs in the cultural and creative sectors. The guarantee amount to up to EUR 26 million and
supports SMEs in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The support is distributed through
bridge financing loans, minimum guarantees and content development loans (European Commission,
2021[73]). In March 2021, the Hungarian Foundation for enterprise promotion (Magyar
Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány) signed a guarantee agreement with the European Investment Fund to
support SMEs in the cultural and creative sector with EUR 8.2 million (European Commission, 2021[73]).
With the emergence of COVID-19 variants, a number of financial packages have been re-introduced to
help companies in sectors that needed to comply with restrictions in late 2021. For example, in France in
January 2022, the government lowered the threshold for companies to claim public support to compensate
for turnover losses; the policy particularly benefits companies in the tourism sector (Reuters, 2022[74]).
Similarly, the Slovak Republic government restored the measures within the First Aid+ package in
December 2021, to help companies in the gastronomy and tourism sector that suffered 40% or more
decline in revenues in late 2021 (The Slovak Spectator, 2021[75]). In South Korea, the Finance Ministry
announced in December 2021, a new stimulus package worth KRW 4.3 billion to support SMEs and the
self-employed that face difficulties from the re-introduction of tougher COVID-19 measures (US News,
2021[76]). In the United Kingdom, a new grant scheme worth GBP 1 billion has been introduced to help
SMEs affected by COVID-19 variant related restrictions in the leisure and hospitality sectors (HM Treasury,
2021[77]).
Intangible-based finance is also included in some recovery strategies
Intangible assets are assets that lack physical substance. It not only refers to key drivers for innovation,
such as investments in R&D, patents or software, but also includes other types of assets that can be key
for a firm’s success, such as databases, designs, managerial skills, and organization and distribution
networks, among others (OECD, 2021[78]). Although SMEs and start-ups increasingly own a larger share
of intangible assets, and multiple studies have shown the impact that these assets have in business growth
and productivity, this does not translate into better access to debt financing (OECD, 2018[79]). Recovery
plans attach large importance to the digitalisation of SMEs, the improvement of technological skills in
employees and the enhancement of innovation in businesses (see Sections on Digitalisation, Skills, and
Innovation). To help achieve these objectives, the recovery plans seek to foster an increased use of
intangible assets in SMEs to drive productivity and economic growth. As such, the inclusion of intangible
assets as collateral in the provision of finance is important as a complementary policy in the recovery
strategy of SMEs and start-ups. For example, in Canada the 2021 budget presented in April 2021 aims to
improve the Canada Small Business Financing Programme by expanding loan class eligibility to include
lending against intangibles such as intellectual property and start-up assets and expenses. The maximum
loan amount was also expanded from CAD 350,000 to CAD 500,000. Similarly, in Singapore, the IP
Strategy 2030, published in April 2021, aims at strengthening IP financing schemes for businesses and
supporting IP-rich companies based in Singapore (Brassell and Boschmans, forthcoming[80]). Yet liquidity
support for SMEs through debt, grants and deferrals carries less weight in recovery packages than in crisis
measures.

 87
Yet liquidity support for SMEs through debt, grants and deferrals carries less weight in
recovery packages than in crisis measures
This section examines the weight in terms of number of policies and financial value of liquidity support
instruments in recovery packages. In a context of significant continued SME liquidity concerns, the
recovery packages can be assessed by looking at financial commitments to proxy the weight that
governments give to different finance instruments in each phase of the pandemic. To do so, data on
COVID-19 related policies and fiscal spending from the Global Recovery Observatory (O’Callaghan,
2020[52]) was analysed through the methodology explained in Box 2.1.
Table 2.7 shows SME-related policies by type of instrument (debt, deferral and grants) in both rescue and
recovery packages (and in total), in terms of number of policies and financial value in USD billion. When
looking at the aggregate of these three instruments, the results show that there is a large share of SME-
related policies to support liquidity, both in terms of number of policies and value. However, when
comparing rescue and recovery packages, liquidity support was more significant in rescue than in recovery:
30.73% versus 5.78% respectively in terms of number of policies. In terms of financial value, the difference
is also significant: out of USD 3 135.59 billion of SME related policies invested in liquidity, USD 3 101.05
billion were allocated to rescue support, while USD 31.87 billion are put forward for SME liquidity in
recovery.
Looking at the type of instrument in the Global Recovery Observatory database, Table 2.7 shows that there
is less frequency in the use of the selected instruments that benefit SMEs compared to other types of
beneficiaries (which can include other firm sizes and households), despite the fact that SMEs were strongly
impacted by the crisis. In terms of number of SME policies, between the three types of financial tools
studied, there is a larger use of debt compared to grants and deferral tools. The share of debt was 39.04%
versus 29.02% of deferral instruments and 15.64% of grants and subsidies. However when looking at the
financial value invested through those instruments, deferral instruments have a slightly larger share of
investment for SMEs 49.43% compared to 42.85% of debt instruments and 18.96% of grants. Looking at
rescue and recovery packages, it is notable that all instruments are largely used in rescue and less in
recovery, which can in part be explained by the short-term nature of liquidity support.

88 
Table 2.7. SME-related policies by type of instrument


Debt Deferral Grants and Debt Deferral Grants and
subsidies subsidies
SMEs-related policies 349 56 139 2708.05 222.54 371.95
Other policies 545 137 750 3612.29 227.65 1590.04
Total policies by financial instrument 894 193 889 6320.34 450.19 1961.99
Share of SMEs-related policies by financial 39.04% 29.02% 15.64% 42.85% 49.43% 18.96%
instrument
Rescue packages
SME-related policies 338 56 131 2706.29 222.54 338.63
Other policies 442 134 582 3060.19 227.41 973.42
Total policies by financial instrument in rescue 780 190 713 5766.48 449.95 1312.05
packages
instrument
Recovery packages
SME-related policies 10 0 7 1.22 0 31.19
Other policies 101 3 168 551.93 0.24 616.62
Total policies by financial instrument in recovery 111 3 175 553.15 0.24 647.81
packages
instrument
Note: The methodology is explained in Box 1 and Annex B.

Source: Global Recovery Observatory (O’Callaghan, 2020[52]).
Alternative finance
In the run-up to the COVID-19 crisis there were significant improvements in the development and uptake
of alternative sources of finance for SMEs. However, in the initial stages of the pandemic, many alternative
instruments remained out of reach for SMEs relative to debt. There are several explanations for this
phenomenon. First, debt finance continues to be the preferred source of finance for SMEs, compared to
other alternative sources. In addition, governments sought to leverage pre-existing relationships between
SMEs and banks to channel their liquidity support swiftly, thereby contributing SME uptake of credit.
In this context, several types of alternative finance registered a large drop in 2020 (see Chapter 1) and
some of these sources continue to present some difficulties in 2021; for example, factoring volumes
declined by 6.6% globally in 2020 (FCI, 2021[81]), and even though levels rebounded in the first quarter of
2021 in some regions (FCI, 2021[82]), the growth is strongly linked to the recovery of commercial activities
which have been affected by the emergence of COVID-19 variants late 2021. In Europe, the net percentage
of SMEs reporting easier access to leasing and hire purchases decreased from 12% to 3% between April
and September 2020 (ECB, 2020[83]). Between April and September 2021, 20% of SMEs reported access
to leasing (8 percentage points higher than in 2020) (ECB, 2021[84]); however, this share is lower than pre-
crisis levels (24%) (ECB, 2020[85]). Global venture capital in early stages was also disrupted in 2020 but
started to rebound in 2021, increasing by 92% y-o-y. Seed funding closed 2020 with a decline of 27%
y-o-y, and early stage funding declined by 11% y-o-y (Crunchbase, 2021[86]) However, in 2021 early stage
experienced a sharp increasing, rising by 100% y-o-y, while seed funding experienced weaker growth,
increasing 56% y-o-y (Crunchbase, 2021[87]).

 89
In the recovery, alternative financing instruments are of great importance for SMEs to thrive in the post-
pandemic context. Not only do they offer more flexibility than traditional lending (in terms of time to access
capital, requirements and expansion of capital limit), but they can also finance young and innovative SMEs
and start-ups that have a limited credit history or riskier business models.
In addition, in a period when many SMEs are over-indebted, alternative finance instruments are very useful
for SMEs, as they can provide working capital more easily to highly leveraged firms or firms that have
experienced recent losses. The close monitoring that alternative finance providers do of the secured
assets’ value and underlying collateral becomes very useful for SMEs to access capital in periods with
large market uncertainty. This is more challenging for conventional lenders, as they usually do not rely on
specific assets to support loans as opposed to alternative financiers that accept stocks or inventory, plant
and machinery, property, or intangibles such as brands and intellectual property to secure loans (OECD,
2015[88]).
Furthermore, equity finance such as venture capital and business angel finance, can offer mentoring,
business advice and access to networks, which can improve the success rate of start-ups and SMEs
(OECD, 2016[89]). In addition, it can provide entrepreneurs with useful resources to better adapt to new
business conditions and consumer behaviour changes as a result of the pandemic.
Recovery packages include a range of measures on alternative finance. Of the measures launched in
2021, some make use of instruments such as factoring, leasing and hire purchases, trade finance, and
equity and quasi-equity tools. The recovery strategies also include regulatory changes in order to enhance
such instruments, particularly in regard to equity and quasi-equity.
Factoring is one of the instruments used in recovery packages to enhance SME liquidity
Factoring is a key instrument to enhance SME liquidity in the recovery. It allows businesses to sell their
account receivables at a discount and helps them to maintain financial liquidity when they need it most. In
July 2021 in India, the Factoring Regulation Act 2011 amendment was approved to increase the number
of entities undertaking factoring activities and help SMEs deal with late payments by monetising their
receivables in an easier way. During the lockdown restrictions, survey data showed that over 83,000 SMEs
reported late payments as of July 2021. Factoring allows non-banking finance companies other than those
whose principal business is factoring, to discount invoices. The regulation also seek to reduce time for
registration of invoices, increasing the flow of credit and lowering its cost to SMEs (Financial Express,
2021[90]).
In Italy, in July 2021, the European Investment Bank and Intesa Sanpaolo signed an agreement to provide
liquidity lines via factoring. The agreement unlock more than EUR 18 billion benefiting around 50 000
SMEs and 150 large corporates and mid-caps. The focus of the investment is to strengthen supply chains
by financing working capital through reverse factoring. This instrument allow companies in supply chains
to cash in their trade receivables in advance. The Pan-European Guarantee Fund is the instrument through
which the EIB will channel support. Considering the amount of liquidity supplied to businesses, this is the
largest operation supported by the guarantee fund in the European Union as a whole.
Leasing and hire purchases are also fostered through recovery plans in some countries
In the case of leasing, SME owners can acquire liquidity by providing the right to use an asset it owns in
exchange for payments for a specified period. In the recovery, while the economy and consumer demand
get back on track, leasing can enable businesses to have liquidity while they return to pre-pandemic level
of operations. Romania and Spain have implemented some measures to boost leasing operations. In
Romania, in February 2021, the Deutsche Leasing Romania and the EIB signed their first cooperation
agreement to unlock EUR 370 million of private financing to provide cheaper leasing finance to SMEs,
especially to increase finance for agricultural and equipment investment in rural areas. In Spain, in April

90 
2021, the EU investment plan for Europe announced a EUR 50 million scheme to provide long-term
financing through leasing facilities (European Commission, 2021[73]). As part of the Polish recovery
package, a measure to provide SMEs with guarantees on financial leasing and leasing loans was
presented in May 2021 for the European Commission approval. The investment will be of EUR 300 million
and will be channelled through leasing companies. The measure will be financed with national resources
but will benefit from a counter-guarantee by the Pan-European Guarantee Fund to cover part of the risk
(European Commission, 2020[91]).
Trade finance is receiving support, often outside of recovery packages
One of the most common forms of trade finance is short-term trade finance. Short-term finance products
enable deferred payment over a period of less than one year. The COVID-19 crisis has affected
significantly the supply of this type of finance, for example increasing the price of short-term financing for
SMEs (International Chamber of Commerce, 2020[92]). Record demand for short-term products from Export
Credit Agencies suggests that even though commercial lenders have sufficient liquidity to provide financing
to exporters, the ongoing uncertainty in trade behaviour has weakened the risk appetite of private suppliers,
limiting the availability of trade finance and requiring governments to act through Export Credit Agencies
(OECD, 2021[93]).
To spur recovery, some Export Credit Agencies have expanded programmes in the form of export credit
insurance or guarantees that can benefit SMEs specifically. For example, in Australia, the COVID-19
Export Capital Facility from Export Finance Australia provides assistance to SMEs through access to credit
and financial relief. The agency was amended to remove limits on the number of times that it could provide
support to any customer, streamlining SME access to financing (see Australia’s Country Profile). In
January 2021, the French government announced support to strengthen the short-term reinsurance
system with EUR 5 billion, allowing Bpifrance to maintain stable international trade of SMEs and mid-sized
companies. The measure also enlarges the list of export countries. Additionally, measures to strengthen
the insurance-prospect instrument (an instrument that helps target beneficiaries for the BpiFrance
Assurance Export), and provides financial support to SMEs and mid-sized companies that buy export
services are also part of the recovery strategy (Goodwin, 2021[94]). Similarly, the Croatian Recovery and
Resilience Plan includes strengthening the guarantee fund for export credit to support exporter
entrepreneurs and enhance SME internationalization (The Government of the Republic of Croatia,
2021[95]). As another case in point, in Bulgaria the United Bulgarian Bank (UBB) signed an agreement with
the European Investment Fund in February 2021 for a new guarantee programme called the JEREMIE
Trade Financing COVID-19 (JEREMIE stands for Joint European Resources for Micro, Small and Medium-
sized enterprises). The programme will allow UBB to offer preferential pricing and lenient security
requirements up to 50% of the reduced amount and refinancing of up to 30% of the loan amount (SME
banking, 2021[96]).
Looking at the Global Recovery Observatory (O’Callaghan, 2020[52]), findings show that trade finance is
not a common policy tool in the recovery packages proper. Of the total policies captured, only 11 were
trade finance related, with only one policy targeting SMEs. This policy was a rescue policy by Denmark,
which provides a liquidity guarantee for Denmark’s Export Credit of up to DKK 1.25 billion in new loans
that target SME exporters.
The majority of generic trade finance policies found in the tracker were rescue policies from South Korea
which provide guarantees, export insurance measures and export financing through loan extensions and
interest payment suspensions.
Equity and quasi-equity instruments take different forms within recovery packages
Equity and in particular quasi-equity tools in recovery packages seek to fund SMEs in ways that are
adapted to their needs :

 91
 Participative loans: This instrument refers to loans whose remuneration is linked to the firm’s
performance. It can be linked to a firm’s sales, turnover or profits, and both interest rate and capital
repayment can be contingent to the firm’s results (OECD, 2015[97]). For the recovery process, and
while the economic environment remains uncertain, this instrument can be beneficial for firms as it
reduces the burden of making fix payments to investors and ensures companies pay as much as
they are able. Once the economy recovers however, investors are also able to receive larger
returns. As part of France’s Relance package, EUR 14 billion were launched in the form of
participating loans in early March 2021 (FirmFunding, 2021[98]) to support SMEs. The government
support takes the form of a 30% guarantee to investors and banks that will refinance the loans.
The maturity period is longer than traditional loans with eight years, a grace period of four years
and the same period for amortization. This design provides an opportunity for eligible SMEs and
mid-caps to have a considerable amount of time to recover from the crisis before they need to start
repayment (at the beginning of the fifth year after acquiring the loan) (Daf-Mag.fr, 2021[99])
(Ministère de l'économie, des finances et de la relance, 2021[100]).
 Subordinated bonds: These refer to unsecured bonds and offer the investor periodical interest
payments and full redemption at maturity (OECD, 2015[97]). The France Relance Programme will
have EUR 6 billion to provide to SMEs in subordinated bonds. The so-called “relance bonds” are
distributed by equity investors, providing a 30% state guarantee and a 5 to 6% interest rate. For
the recovery, this instrument is useful for firms as they will only need to pay the interest during an
eight-year period and the full amount at the end of the eight years (FirmFunding, 2021[98]), providing
them with significant amount of time to recover from the crisis.
 Equity funds: Government investment in equity or quasi-equity funds were part of the rescue policy
mix in several countries, as a way to provide liquidity to early-stage risky business models that
otherwise could not find liquidity through debt.
In the recovery period, the use of equity funds continues to be relevant. For instance, in March
2021, Australia’s government invested AUS 100 million to fund the Business Growth Fund
(Government of Australia - The Treasury, 2020[101]). Four banks joined the investment with AUS 20
million each, bringing the total size of the fund to AUS 540 million considering previous
investments. The objective of the recent investment is to increase the pool of “patient equity
capital”. Patient capital allows SMEs to pay investors after a prolonged period (usually after 5
years). The fund aims to target viable SMEs, as they need to demonstrate three years of revenue
growth before COVID-19 (InnovationAus, 2021[102]).
In Italy, the SME asset fund was extended for the first half of 2021 with an endowment of
EUR 1 billion, purchase bonds and debt securities from SMEs with a turnover between EUR 10
and 50 million, and that have made a capital increase of at least EUR 250 000 between 20 May
and 30 June 2021 (White & Case, 2021[103]). In addition, the company needs to provide periodic
statements to certify compliance with the conditions (Invitalia, 2021[104]).
The Central Bank of Malaysia, under the 2022 budget, created the Business Recapitalisation
Facility to strengthen capital structure of SMEs and help them manage their indebtedness levels.
With a total amount of MYR 1 billion, the facility will provide equity or hybrid financing, the latter in
partnership with third party equity financiers (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2021[105]).
In the United Kingdom, in March 2021 the government announced a continuation of the Future
Fund Initiative with an endowment of GBP 375 million to the renewed Future Fund: Breakthrough
initiative (Growthbusiness.co.uk, 2021[106]). While the first version of the fund focused on innovative
businesses in pre-revenue stages, the renewed version of the Fund aims to provide equity to scale-
up tech companies. The scheme aims to achieve strong participation from the private sector, with
matching state and private investments (British Business Bank, 2021[107]).
 Forgivable loans: Some governments included in their rescue strategies loans that turn totally or
partially into subsidies if the company complies with certain conditions. The recovery strategies

92 
includes an expansion of such measures. For instance, in December 2020, the Canada Emergence
Business Account (CEBA) increased forgivable loans from CAD 40,000 to 60,000 and expanded
the application deadline for the first half of 2021. If a business repays its loans by December 2022,
up to a third of the loan is forgiven (Government of Canada - Department of Finance, 2021[65]). The
Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) in the United States forgave the principal of loans used for
working capital for eight weeks if the business maintained pre-crisis employment levels. In its
extension in January 2021, the process for writing off PPP loans was streamlined. Business owners
requesting loans of USD 150 000 or less only need to attest on a one-page form that they used the
funds for payroll and other eligible businesses expenses. This has resulted in 81% of the total PPP
loan value forgiven, amounting to USD 645 billion, as of December 2021 (SBA, 2021[108]).
 Debt for equity swaps: This is an instrument used by companies and shareholders to exchange
debt for shares to resize debt and improve the capital position of the borrower. When the swap is
made, debt is written off (reducing a company’s leverage) and in return the lender will have a share
that once the business recovers is sold or floated. Considering the large number of companies
looking to restructure their balance sheets, debt for equity swaps are relevant instruments for the
recovery (Travers Smith, 2020[109]). For instance in the United Kingdom, debt for equity swaps are
being proposed by the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) and Ownership at work to swap
“bounce back” debt for employee ownership trusts. The “shares for debt recovery plan” outline the
path to convert bounce back loans worth up to GBP 50 000 into employee equity. The private
lenders will write off loans and claim a 100% state guarantee. According to the FSB this will have
the dual effect of protecting viable businesses and jobs and boosting productivity (FSB - Federation
of Small Businesses, 2021[110]) (Small Business Charter, n.d.[111]).
Regulatory changes to incentivise equity for SMEs are also present in recovery strategies
Notwithstanding the measures mentioned above, recent developments in capital markets suggest that
equity markets provide fewer opportunities for SMEs than for large firms. This is the case as the number
of IPOs and the number of listed companies have declined while the overall capitalisation of equity markets
has been rising in a number of countries. This trend suggests a concentration in large firms and high
barriers to entry for SMEs, given the high costs associated with going public (OECD, 2021[78]). As part of
the recovery strategy, and with the aim to mobilise long-term savings accumulated during the pandemic,
governments have changed regulatory frameworks to facilitate equity investment for SMEs. A case in point
is the legislative changes that took place under the Capital Markets Recovery Package approved by the
European Parliament in March 2021 (Clifford Chance, 2021[112]). One of the reforms approved aims at
easing the process of issuing capital from SMEs and making it easier for investors to access SME
information. Under the prospectus regulation of 2017, the European Parliament lays down the
requirements for writing, approval and distribution of the prospectus when securities are offered. For SMEs
especially, this implied high compliance costs given the large disclosure of information required. However,
with the new “EU Recovery prospectus”, only “essential information is required for investors to make an
informed investment decision” (Council of the European Union, 2020[113]). This new short-form prospectus
is easier to produce by smaller issuers, easy to understand by retail investors and facilitates monitor by
regulators, which allows for increasing the investor pool for SMEs while reducing compliance costs
(Council of the European Union, 2020[113]). This reform is limited to the recovery phase and will apply until
December 2022 after which it will be reviewed.
Another important reform approved by the European Union aims to improving the visibility of SMEs to
investors. Under the regulation, banks and financial firms can access SME information by paying jointly for
the provision of research and execution services for companies that have a market capitalisation of less
than EUR 1 billion. Research is crucial to help small issuers connect with investors increasing the level of
investment towards SMEs (Council of the European Union, 2020[114]).

 93
New Zealand is another example where regulatory changes have been implemented to ease SME access
to capital markets. In 2021, the Minister of Commerce and Consumer Affairs issued a financial product
market license to Catalist Markets. This market is New Zealand’s stock exchange designed for SMEs. It
provides alternative disclosure provisions and reporting requirements and reduces the compliance costs
for SMEs(see New Zealand’s country profile).
Overall, alternative finance measures for SMEs are not prominent in the recovery packages
Analysing the Global Recovery Observatory (O’Callaghan, 2020[52]), alternative sources of finance are not
prevalent. There are in total 74 policies that promote alternative finance sources, while 1833 policies
promote liquidity through debt, deferral and grants instruments (Table 2.8). Alternative finance also has
the lowest share in terms of investment, with 33 percentage points less than the funds allocated to liquidity
investment to SMEs through debt, grants and deferrals.
In addition, from the 74 policies on alternative finance, 39.19% are SME-related policies but they make up
only 6.76% in terms of financial value. This suggests relatively small-scale programmes based on
alternative finance compared to the number of policies put forward in that policy domain.
Furthermore, many of the policies documented in alternative finance for SMEs were part of rescue policies.
24 out of 29 policies are rescue, concentrating USD 15.06 billion of funding for SME-related policies on
alternative finance. The small emphasis in number of policies and funding for SMEs through alternative
finance, particularly in the recovery phase, suggests an area of opportunity going forward. This is not only
relevant to avoid the risk of reversing the trend of diversification of SME financing sources, but also
because of the effectiveness that alternative finance can have compared to other types of support. Policy
simulations show that from targeting liquidity support, equity and quasi-equity instruments can be over four
times more effective than other types of support (IMF, 2021[115]).

94 
Table 2.8. Types of SME finance support by number of policies and financial value

Liquidity Promotion of alternative Liquidity Promotion of alternative
sources of finance sources of finance
SME-related policies 495 29 3135.59 15.74
Other policies 1338 45 4758.7 217.24

Total policies by type of 1833 74 7894.29 232.98
support
Share of SME-related 27.00% 39.19% 39.72% 6.76%

policies by type of support
Rescue packages
Other policies 1075 32 4075.92 179.63

support in rescue packages
Recovery packages
Other policies 261 13 682.61 37.61

support in recovery packages
Note: The liquidity category include policies that used debt, deferral and grants to alleviate corporate cash flow. Not all policies include information
on being part of rescue or recovery packages. The methodology is explained in Box 2.1 and Annex B.
Source: Global Recovery Observatory (O’Callaghan, 2020[52]).
Insolvency
Debt overhang and insolvency are an increasing threat to recovery. In the immediate aftermath of the
crisis, governments provided liquidity to SMEs through grants and equity, but mainly relied on debt
channels. This, in combination with the fact that several countries implemented temporal adjustments to
insolvency regimes to protect companies from bankruptcy by pausing insolvency proceedings, or by
preventing creditors from initiating insolvency procedures, for example, could increase the risk of a wave
of insolvencies once such time-bound measures are phased out. According to Euler Hermes, global
insolvencies are projected to rise by 15% in 2022, but this is still 4% lower compared to the pre-crisis
figures (Euler Hermes, 2021[116]).
Some of the measures to counter insolvency that have been implemented so far in recovery packages
include insolvency and debt restructuring tools, dedicated out of court restructuring mechanisms, and
simplified reorganisation for SMEs. In the Netherlands, for example, the Time Out Arrangement (TOA)
scheme offers restructuring loans to entrepreneurs with the prerequisite of having creditors’ agreement
and a restructuring plan describing financial feasibility and viable start. The TOA credit amounts to a
maximum of EUR 100 000 which can be used for working capital or necessary assets to restart the

 95
business (Qredits, 2021[117]). In Singapore, the Simplified Insolvency Programme was launched to smooth
the way for SMEs to restructure. The programme includes one application for the High Court, instead of
two (which was common previously), automatic moratorium, and creditor approval threshold lowered from
three quarters to two thirds. The Irish Recovery and Resilience Plan proposes the Small Companies
Administrative Rescue Process (SCARP). The process provides options to viable but illiquid SMEs to
simulate the “examinership process”, reducing court oversight, improving efficiency and reducing
timeframe of restructuring procedures. In Q4 2021, the Irish government passed the Rescue Process for
Small and Micro companies Act, which allows businesses to appoint insolvency professionals to oversee
the administrative rescue process, determine whether the company can survive and prepare a rescue plan.
In the meantime, it gives companies legal protection against creditors (Irish Times, 2022[118]).
In Spain, the Recovery and Resilience Plan includes support for SMEs to restructure their debt. Three
main measures were approved, the possibility to: i) defer the amortization period up to 12 years, ii) convert
the loan into a participative loan, iii) negotiate a reduction of the total debt that benefits from a state
guarantee. While the company can request the first measure, the last two measures are decided by the
bank, which considers, among other criteria, a fall in revenue of minimum 30% in 2020. When the bank
agrees on the reduction of the debt, the bank will request the government to transfer the remaining amount
of the debt under the guarantee. For that purpose, the government announced an investment of EUR 3
billion (El Païs Economía, 2021[119]).
The recovery also calls for strengthening the capacity of insolvency systems to effectively manage and
process the volume of the upcoming wave of restructuring procedures. In Portugal, the Recovery and
Resilience plan proposes the creation of an integrated Insolvency Platform that aims to dematerialise
processes and reduce the administrative burden to SMEs. It proposes also to modernise the Judicial
System and undertake a review of the legal framework for insolvency. A similar objective is proposed in
the Croatian Recovery and Resilience Plan, where HRK 20 million will be invested to the improvement of
the bankruptcy framework. The investment includes IT tools to improve the methodology of data collection
on restructuring, insolvency and debt repayment procedures allowing for better monitoring. The investment
will also automate some parts of the proceedings, reducing timeframes, and predict duration of the process
and costs. Fees will be able to be paid electronically.
SME-related policies on insolvency might deserve increased attention going forward
Information from the Global Recovery Observatory (O’Callaghan, 2020[52]) shows that insolvency policies
have not been significantly used when compared to other policy domains. Only 5 policies were registered
as SME-related insolvency policies and 9 policies target other types of businesses. This suggests a limited
response compared to the projections of rising number of insolvencies in most economies, and the larger
risk among SMEs, calling for increasing attention going forward.
Looking into rescue and recovery policy categorisation, none of the SME insolvency policies is recovery;
all of them are rescue policies. This can be explained by the short-term nature of most insolvency measures
that aimed to temporarily change bankruptcy legal procedures. However, long-term insolvency measures
will be needed to respond to SME needs. These measures can include the reduction of the administrative
burden of insolvency procedures, or measures that could support “second chance entrepreneurship” to
allow bona fide entrepreneurs to restart, which will increasingly become a priority for policy makers to
incentivize business dynamism (OECD, 2021[3]).
Channels to support SME recovery
The banking system continues to be a commonly used transmission mechanism for support
Since the COVID-19 crisis started, the banking system has been the preferred transmission mechanism
for governmental support. Central banks instituted several policies to improve lending conditions and

96 
channel liquidity to the economy through banks. Monetary policy included a significant decrease in interest
rates, generally reaching values close to zero in most advanced economies, and a large expansion of
asset purchase schemes1, to encourage lending. Regulatory policy involved changes in the supervisory
requirements, by easing collateral standards, relaxing capital requirements, and suspending dividend
payments (Group of thirty, 2020[120]). Additionally, lending was further incentivised by government
guarantees to values close to 100% in various advanced economies. Survey results on government crisis
financing programmes for businesses, conducted in June 2020 by the OECD Committee on Financial
Markets, show that indeed bank channels were used in almost half (48%) of the policies used to tackle the
crisis (OECD, 2020[50]).
In the recovery, banks continue to be an important channel of support for SMEs, in part evidenced by the
significant expansion of loan guarantees in 2021 and 2022 (Table 6: Guarantee Extensions to support
SMEs). However, their role in the recovery has also included other aspects beyond channelling support.
In some recovery loan schemes, banks are helping governments target support to viable businesses,
potentially increasing the effectiveness of resource allocation. For example in the United Kingdom, through
the Recovery Loan Scheme, borrowers need to present a borrowing plan to lenders in order to prove the
viability of their businesses and their repayment capacity in the future. It is at the banks’ discretion to lend
based on the assessment of the borrowing plan (British Business Bank, 2021[57]).
Another aspect of banks’ role in the recovery is in supporting the creation of new instruments to help over-
indebted companies (Oliver Wyman, 2021[121]). The Spanish Recovery and Resilience Plan empowers
banks to decide whether borrowers can convert their existing loans into participative loans, which allow
companies to repay according to their business performance, or whether borrowers can benefit from state
guarantees for part of their debt (El Païs Economía, 2021[119]).
Digital platforms are on the rise
In the rescue phase, some countries that had digital delivery systems were able to channel support through
platforms in an effective manner. Notably, in Switzerland and Korea support was effectively channelled
through easy-to-use digital portals (OECD, 2021[3]). In the recovery, governments are increasingly
implementing digital infrastructures or channelling support through existing digital platforms to ensure
effectiveness in delivery. For example, in Malaysia, the Ministry of Finance launched the National Supply
Chain Finance Platform called “JanaNiaga” in July 2021. With an endowment of MYR 300 million and an
expected growth of MYR 1.2 billion, the platform aim to benefit SMEs by providing very low interest rate
loans (3.5% per annum). The platform will also decrease considerably the amount of time to access to
finance, as SMEs apply online and receive approval within 24 hours.
Another case in point is the investment made by the European Investment Fund, the Amsterdam Trade
Bank and BNP Paribas in January 2021. EUR 40 million was the endowment to the Creditshelf Platform
to provide debt finance to German SMEs. In July 2021, the endowment was extended to EUR 60 million
after the success in delivering loans to SMEs without compromising credit criteria.
Digital platforms are also used as a way to incentivise private financing from retail investors. For instance,
the Lithuanian National Development Institution for Investment and Business Guarantees allocated EUR
10 million to the measure “Raspberry”. The state funds will be channelled through crowdfunding platforms
in the form of debt. The loans are funded up to 40% by the state with a ceiling of EUR 10 000 per company,
while the remaining 60% needs to be raised from retail investors. Another case in point is the emerging
crowdfunding ecosystem in Turkey. With equity-based crowdfunding legalised in 2017 and debt-
crowdfunding in 2020, the government foresees significant potential for early stage ventures and start-ups
to access finance from a multitude of investors with less administrative burden. As of November 2021, five
companies obtained a licence to operate as equity-based crowdfunding platforms and as of December
2021, 15 campaigns were conducted and funded successfully (see Country Profile of Turkey).

 97
Private investor funds also hold potential to finance SMEs in the recovery
The unprecedented support provided to the corporate sector to face liquidity challenges has impacted the
health of public finances. For this reason, recovery strategies have placed more emphasis on incentivising
private funds not only as a distribution channel, but also as a tool to mobilise long-term savings from private
investors and the private sector’s knowledge and expertise at the service of SMEs. For example, in France,
the participative loans and subordinated bonds from the France Relance Plan is distributed by banks, but
is backed mainly by institutional investors. Banks keep 10% of the debt, while the remaining 90% is
transferred to the fund “Prêts Participatifs Relance” which is supported by 18 insurer companies, several
banking groups and the Caisse des Dépôts et des Consignations. The part transferred to the fund
supported by private investors benefits from a state guarantee of up to 30%, which has helped to mobilise
EUR 11 billion from institutional investors in the first round (Fédération Bancaire Française, 2021[122]).
Asset managers selected by the French Insurance Federation manage the fund (French Insurance
Federation, 2021[123]). Another case in point is New Zealand’s recently created Fund of Funds (2020),
where the Government committed more than USD 150 million in early stage venture capital and was
matched by USD 420 million of private capital as of December 2021 (Business Desk, 2021[124]).
The Singapore Situation Fund for Start-ups where the government co-invests and catalyse private
investments and expertise to support high-potential start-ups facing cash flow or fundraising problems. In
June 2021, the Economic Development Board and Enterprise Singapore announced that the fund raised
SDG 216 million with more than half of the funds being from private investors (The Business Times,
2021[125]).
In the United Kingdom, the London Stock Exchange is building a GBP 300 million SME investment fund to
help SMEs that continue to be challenged by the pandemic. The fund will include the participation of three
large asset manager companies to oversee three strands of investment: private equity, listed small-cap
companies and venture capital. The idea of the fund is to mobilise seed capital from large companies that
have seen their businesses grow after the pandemic, such as supermarkets and online retailers
(Growthbusiness.co.uk, 2021[106]).
Combining financial and non-financial support
The G20/OECD High-Level Principles on SME Financing call for the enhancement of SME financial skills
and strategic vision. In the context of recovery, the improvement of financial skills through the provision of
non-financial services can help SMEs to strengthen their ability to allocate financial resources
appropriately. It can also impact on the health of the financial system through improved loan repayments.
Randomised control trials conducted by International Labour Organization on 5000 Indonesians SMEs
found that 46% of SMEs in the treatment group included cash flow analysis to record financial transactions,
which impacted positively on loan repayments (late loan payment was reduced by 7.2%). Subgroups of
treated SMEs also saw an increase in revenue by approximately IDR 22 331 million (USD 1595) at the 1%
significance level (Government of France, 2021[17]).
The importance of blending financial and non-financial services was already recognised in previous
editions of the OECD financing Scoreboard. In the 2018 edition, 27 Scoreboard countries reported that
they had a non-financial support tool in place as part of their policy range for SME finance (OECD,
2018[126]).
Non-financial services in the form of advice, consultancy, and education have been provided as part of the
policy mix to help SMEs navigate the crisis. A survey conducted by the Montreal Group that explored the
support provided by member state-owned banks during the COVID-19 pandemic shows that the provision
of non-financial services was a crucial part of the help to SMEs. Members’ responses show how the need
for information on cash flow management, available financial aid, re-adaptation of business models, and
relaunching of activities became more pressing for SMEs as a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis. To

98 
provide the support SMEs needed, state banks that did not have a long-lasting portfolio dedicated to non-
financial services readapted their business model and explored channels to deliver such services to their
small clients (The Montreal Group, 2021[127]).
In the recovery phase, non-financial services are even more crucial. Not only can they help SMEs allocate
more effectively the financial resources they receive from government support but they directly impact on
SME resilience by building skills to face adverse business environments. In this regard, as part of the
recovery strategy, countries are combining the provision of finance with the offer of non-financial services
such as education and training for entrepreneurs to adapt to the post-COVID. The United Kingdom’s 2021
Budget includes the launch of two new schemes to boost SMEs’ productivity by improving their
management and digital skills. The Help to Grow: Management and the Help to Grow: Digital schemes will
benefit 100 000 SMEs. The Help to Grow: Management initiative provides sessions designed by world-
class business schools to senior managers, 90% funded by the government. The objective is not only to
improve the management skills of senior managers but also to produce a growth plan for their business
and build resilience to future shocks (Small Business Charter, n.d.[128]). Another example is the Lithuanian
Accelerator 2 programme that combines acceleration services with the provision of funding (see Box 2.2).
Box 2.2. Accelerator 2 Programme in Lithuania

In May 2021, the Lithuanian National Development Institution for Investment and Business Guarantees
and the Ministry of Economy of Lithuania announced an investment of EUR 18 million for the
Accelerator 2 Programme. The programme consists of selecting two financial intermediaries to set up
two Venture Capital funds (pre-seed and seed) and combines the provision of capital with mentoring,
counselling and education for companies in early stages of development.
The pre-seed fund will benefit from an endowment of EUR 6.5 million and will implement two
programmes:
 Pre-acceleration program: target individuals working in innovations and who wish to start a
business, to form teams and generate business ideas.
 Acceleration program: designed to strengthen teams of partially or fully established companies.
It includes mentor and counselling to grow competences among the participants.
All eligible companies will be provided with initial venture capital investments.
The seed fund will have an endowment of EUR 2.7 million. It aim to fund SMEs with venture capital.
However, at least 70% of the allocated funds will need to be invested in companies that have
participated in the pre-seed stage of the fund’s acceleration programme (INVEGA, 2021[129]).
Key policy objectives in recovery plans: the SME dimension
The SME orientation of recovery packages varies by policy domain
This section examines how support in recovery packages corresponds to financial needs that SMEs face
to “build back better” in the key policy areas of digitalisation, greening, skills and innovation. As mentioned
earlier, recovery packages seek to foster greater economic resilience by addressing major medium- to
long-term policy challenges through the provision of investments and non-financial support. To gain further
insight into the distribution of resources targeted to SMEs in recovery packages across policy domains,
Table 2.9 shows explicit SME-related policies in greening, digitalisation, skills and innovation, in both
rescue and recovery packages (and in total). Innovation is the policy area with most SME-related policies.

 99
Digitalisation is the area where SME-related policies are least prevalent in absolute numbers, although by
value this policy domain ranks second. The share of SME-related policies in the total number of policies
by policy area is significantly higher than the share in value, suggesting that the average value of SME-
oriented policies is relatively small. Finally, the table documents that the share of SME-related policies (by
number and by value) is considerably lower in recovery packages than in rescue packages in all four policy
domains, and in particular for greening.
Table 2.9. SME related policies by policy domain

Numbers, value (billion USD) and shares (in number of policies and value)

Greening Digitalisation Skills Innovation Greening Digitalisation Skills Innovation
SME-related 39 26 46 70 38.2 56.98 21.93 74.38
policies
Other 767 251 530 359 1,525.49 616.06 698.70 617.35
policies
Total policies 806 277 576 429 1,563.69 673.04 720.63 691.73
by policy
domain
Share of 4.84% 9.39% 7.99% 16.32% 2.44% 8.47% 3.04% 10.75%
SME-related
policies by
policy
domain
Rescue packages
SME-related 20 10 22 35 13.63 7.97 8.84 32.41
policies
Other 127 24 229 106 164.35 27.11 400.03 186.09
policies
Total policies 147 34 251 141 177.98 35.08 408.87 218.50
by policy
domain in
rescue
packages
Share of 13.61% 29.41% 8.76% 24.82% 7.66% 22.72% 2.16% 14.83%
SME-related
policies by
policy
domain
Recovery packages
SME-related 19 16 23 35 24.57 49.01 13.09 41.97
policies
Other 640 227 301 252 1361.14 588.95 298.67 431.26
policies
Total policies 659 243 324 287 1385.71 637.96 311.76 473.23
by policy
domain in
rescue
packages
Share of 2.88% 6.58% 7.10% 12.20% 1.77% 7.68% 4.20% 8.87%
SME-related
policies by
policy
domain
Note: Not all policies by policy domain specify whether they are part of rescue or recovery packages

100 
Greening
SME-related greening policies focus on eco-innovation and on scaling up of climate friendly

technologies
The various recovery packages include SME-related policy initiatives to support greening. They include
both grant and loan elements, and focus on eco-innovation and start-ups, as well as the wider greening of
business processes, including energy saving, the circular economy and hydrogen. Box 2.3 provides
examples of green SME-related policies in recovery packages.
Box 2.3. Examples of SME-related green policies in recovery packages

 In Austria, EUR 4.4 million will be made available for the seed program from the Federal
Ministry for Climate Action, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and Technology to
support EcoTech start-ups.
 Canada supports start-ups and scale-up companies to enable pre-commercial clean
technologies to successfully demonstrate feasibility and support early commercialisation efforts
(Government of Canada, 2021[130]).
 The Danish recovery plan includes EUR 80 million in SME support measures for energy
renovation, supporting SMEs to grow and create local employment with projects such as energy
renovation of buildings or boosting energy efficiency for industry (European Commission,
2021[131]).
 France introduced a support mechanism to provide financial assistance to young
entrepreneurs, volunteering in green companies (Government of France, 2020[132]). France also
launched measures to support the environmental transition and energy renovation of MSMEs,
(Government of France, 2021[17]), including a refundable tax credit for the energy renovation of
building in which MSMEs operate. The tax credit amounts to 30% of expenses for eligible
actions and is capped at EUR 25 000 per company (total cost: EUR 105 million); support for
artisans, traders and independent workers, in partnership with the chambers of trades and crafts
(CMA) and chambers of commerce and of industry (CCI), up to EUR 15 million; support in the
form of State aid of EUR 45 million to companies engaged in the environmental transition
(EETE). This measure aims to finance a share of the actions or investments involving MSMEs
in the green transition; support in the form of State aid of EUR 35 million for MSMEs, in the form
of a lump sum to initiate or accelerate an eco-design process.
 In Germany, the KfW and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy launched the
programme Climate action campaign for SMEs. Through low-interest loans and grants, it
incentives investments in the manufacture and use of sustainable systems and products,
helping SMEs in their efforts to transition to climate change mitigation, environmental protection
and resource efficiency. The programme will provide up to EUR 100 million per year, over a
period of three years (KFW, 2020[133]).
 In Norway, the Nordic Project Fund (Nopef), launched a fast track green recovery financing for
Nordic SMEs. The aim of the loan programme is to scale up green solutions from SMEs. The
loan can be used for investments, business development and working capital with the requisite
that the SME must commercialise green technologies to apply for finance; it includes energy
efficiency renewable energy, circular economy, sustainable food production and agriculture
(Nopef, n.d.[134]).
 In the United Kingdom, a new GBP 100 million scheme was launched to help households and
small businesses invest in low carbon heating systems, and consulting on introducing a Green

 101
Gas Levy to increase biomethane production for the gas grid (Government of the United
Kingdom, 2020[135]).
 The United States Department of Energy (DOE) in August 2021 announced a plan to provide
USD 37 million for small businesses pursuing climate and energy research and development
(R&D) projects as well the development of advanced scientific instrumentation through a
funding opportunity announcement (FOA). The projects, in support of efforts to build the
American economy back better, typically range from atmospheric science and critical materials
to quantum information sciences and accelerator technologies. This funding will be
administered by DOE’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business
Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, which were established to encourage participation of
diverse communities in technological innovation, as well as to increase technology transfer
between research institutions and small businesses (US Department of Energy - Office of
SCIENCE, 2021[136]).
 The Slovenian recovery plan includes various references to SMEs with regard to greening,
such as the fostering of cooperation between energy-intensive industries and innovative SMEs
to strengthen energy efficiency, promoting environmental management systems in SMEs,
raising awareness among SMEs of energy efficiency, demonstration projects with SMEs,
retrofitting of buildings with specific SME reference, and supporting innovation in SMEs and
start-ups. The plan also includes a ‘support for SMEs in the circular economy’ initiative.
 Belgium and Poland include measures regarding SMEs and the circular economy.
 Finland and Spain reference SMEs in the context of hydrogen. Lithuania and Italy put emphasis
on eco-innovation and start-ups.
…and contribute to SME investments to reach climate objectives
There are important implications for SME financing needs from greening targets, and in particular the
ambition to reach net zero by mid-century. Various estimates (Trinomics, 2019[137]) exist on the investment
needed for reaching green ambitions in general. However, no data are available that specifically focus on
the investment costs for SMEs to reach net zero. Given the fact that on aggregate they contribute
significantly to greenhouse gas emissions (50-70% in business sector emissions and 10-30% of energy
consumption (OECD, 2021[1]), it is likely that SMEs will need to invest significantly to reach net zero.
As indicated in Table 9, the share of greening spending that focuses on SMEs is, however, modest,
representing USD 38.2 billion and amounting to 4.84% of the total number and 2.44% of the value of
policies. Looking at recovery packages only, the share of SME-related policies in total greening policies is
2.88% in the number of policies and 1.77% in value.
This limited emphasis on SMEs in greening support within recovery packages is confirmed by other data.
For instance, the OECD Green Recovery Database (OECD, 2021[53]) provides a similar picture, with the
share of SME oriented policies and amounting to 4.2% (OECD, 2021[1])of total policies. However, the
Green Recovery Tracker from the German Wuppertal Institute (looking at policies with an expected positive
or very positive green impact) shows a higher share of SME-related policies, both in number of policies
(4.9%) and value (5.1%) (Wuppertal Institute, E3G, 2021[54]).
Given the specific circumstances of smaller companies, an important challenge is to ensure that financial
support is provided according to their needs. As a report on private investment in climate adaptation
suggests, ‘the problem is that existing direct instruments as well as international donors are more suited
to supporting large companies (CAN - Climate Action Network, 2013[138]).’ The new OECD Platform on
Financing SMEs for Sustainability aims to help bridge the gap for SMEs.

102 
Digitalisation
SME-related finance for digitalisation focuses on skills and the adoption of basic and more
advanced digital technologies
The various recovery plans include policies to support SME digitalisation, including both grant and loan
elements and non-financial support (see Box 2.4).
Box 2.4. Examples of SME-related digitalisation policies in recovery packages

 The Danish recovery plan includes an SME Digitalisation and Exports facility which aims to
invest DKK 65 million in the SME digital transition. The facility supports SMEs in digital transition
and e-commerce through grants for co-financing purchases of counselling on the development
of the companies’ e-export capacity, implementation of new e-commerce solutions and
technical support for upstart, development and integration of digital sales for new international
markets. (Danish Minister of Finance, 2021[14]).
 The Spanish SME Digitalisation Plan includes EUR 3 billion and will directly impact 1.5 million
SMEs. The objective of this plan is to integrate digital technologies into the business models of
SMEs in Spain as a catalyst for change that will help them face future and current crises
(Government of Spain, 2021[139]).
 The Belgian recovery plan includes measures through the Belgium Cyber Secure and Resilient
Digital Society to enhance cybersecurity particularly focused on SMEs. The plan includes the
launch of a website to support SMEs to assess and improve their cybersecurity.
 Korea invests 0.8tn won for high speed internet in 1 300 remote villages, WiFi in 41 000 public
places, security testing and consulting for 25 000 SMEs, security checks for railroad and airline
aviation, creating 15 000 jobs. It allocates 1.4tn won to set up WiFi in schools, replacing 200K
laptops, old servers and network devices, provide remote care to 120K elderly, and 160K SMEs
with vouchers to access remote work systems, creating 28K jobs. Furthermore, it invests 4.8tn
won for smart infrastructure, and information centres, encouraging SMEs to jointly build smart
logistics centres, creating 65K jobs.
 In Australia, the Government will provide funding for its Digital Business Plan to further drive
progress towards Australia becoming a leading digital economy by 2030 and to improve
productivity, income growth and jobs by supporting the adoption of digital technologies by
Australian businesses. The measures cover the following pillars: modern digital infrastructure,
reduced regulatory barriers, SME support and capability and a digital government with which it
is easier to do business.
 The German recovery plan references the Mittelstand Digital initiative, which provides
information and resources for SMEs to strengthen their digitalisation (Bundesministerium für
Wirtschaft und Energie, 2021[140]).
 Ireland’s recovery plan includes EUR 85 million to support the digitisation of businesses,
primarily focused on SMEs.
 The Italian plan includes EUR 13.4 billion for the digitalisation of businesses, promoting the
uptake of digital technologies by companies through a tax credit scheme aimed at supporting
and accelerating their digital transformation.
 The Latvian recovery plan includes EUR 125 million for the digitalisation of business,
supporting businesses in introducing digital technologies; supporting the introduction of e-
commerce solutions, innovation and new products; digital mentoring.

 103
 The Polish plan includes SME-oriented measures regarding blockchain and teleworking.
 The Portuguese plan includes EUR 650 million for dedicated measures for SME digitalisation,
with tailored digital skills trainings and tailored coaching to help them make the best use of
digital, and provides e-commerce support for micro enterprises.
 The Slovak plan includes EUR 102 million for digitalising businesses, including the building of
a supercomputer and a network of digital hubs to assist businesses with digitalising their
processes; and providing training for digital skills.
 The New Zealand Small Business Digital Boost initiative supports small business owners to
realise the benefits of digitising their business. This NZD 20 million digital package includes
showcasing successful case studies, skills training and support, and a directory collecting tools,
products and services into one depository.
Achieving ambitions regarding SME digitalisation requires substantial resources
The pandemic provided a boost for SME digitalisation, especially in the adoption of e-commerce and
teleworking practices. However, SMEs continue to lag behind larger firms in the adoption of digital
technologies, especially those of a more advanced nature, which reflects – among other issues –
underinvestment by SMEs (OECD, 2021[141]).
Estimates of the investment needs for SME digitalisation can be derived by examining how current
investment levels relate to targets set by policies Table 2.10 (Deloitte, 2021[142]). For instance, the
European Union set the following targets with respect to SME digitalisation: i) raising the share of SMEs
with basic digital intensity from 60% (2019) to 90% in 2030, and ii) raising the share of cloud/AI/big data
users from 18% (2020) to 75% in 2030. Current investment in SME digitalisation in the EU27 according to
the European Investment Bank amounts to EUR 57 billion per annum (2018, projected to rise to EUR 65
billion by 2022) (European Commission, 2019[143]), which according to the targets formulated would require
a significant increase. Table 2.10 identifies 26 SME-related policies on digital (9.4% of total digitalisation
policies) amounting to USD 56.98 billion (8.47%). The share in recovery packages alone is 6.58% by
number of policies and 7.68% by value. Interestingly, the share both in number of policies (29.41%) and
value (22.72%) of SME-related policies on digitalisation was significantly higher during the rescue phase,
suggesting that during the rescue phase there was a stronger emphasis on SMEs for structural as well as
crisis policies.
A study by (Deloitte, 2021[142]) provides further background on investment in SME digitalisation in European
recovery plans. According to the study, digital spending in recovery packages amounts to EUR 154 billion
(27% of total RP spending in 20 member states), with support for SME digitalisation in 20 plans amounting
to EUR 40 billion for digital and greater cloud use (26% of total digital expenditure). Table 2.10 shows the
investment in selected European countries. Support for basic SME digitalisation in the recovery packages
is higher than for more advanced digital applications such as cloud and Artificial Intelligence.
Table 2.10. Recovery Plans and SME digitalisation (in billion Euro and %)
Digital in RP (amount and SME/business in digital SME basic digital Cloud / AI / big data
share) intensity
Czech Republic 1.5 (23%) 0.4 (27%) 0.37 0.03
France 22.1 (25%) 5.2 (24% 3.1 2.1
Germany 10.5 (50%) 2.9 (28%) 2.1 0.8
Greece 4.5 (25%) 0.5 (11%) 0.5 -
Hungary 1.4 (23%) 0.0005 (0.4%) 0.0005 -
Italy 43.3 (27%) 14.7 (34%) 14.6 0.1
Poland 7.5 (22%) 1.6 (21%) 1.6 0.5

104 
Portugal 4 (20%) 0.7 (18%) 0.7 -

Romania 4.3 (20%) 0.9 (21%) 0.8 0.1
Spain 25.4 (30%) 12.3 (48%) 3.6 8.7
Source: (Deloitte, 2021[142]).
Skills
SME-related skills policies in recovery packages focus on digital and management skills…
The recovery packages include various measures to support SME skills development, many including a
grant element, and often with a focus on digital skills and management skills (see Box 2.5).
Box 2.5. Examples of SME-related skills policies in recovery packages

 The Australian government will provide 231 million USD over four years for the “Second
Women’s Economic Security Package”, which includes STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering and Mathematics) educational support.
 Chile invests 30 million USD in the Social Solidarity and Investment Fund (FOSIS) to offer
positions in entrepreneurship and employment programs. These programs include training and
financial support.
 The Irish recovery plan includes EUR 114 million in support for upskilling and reskilling,
developing a range of additional educational and training programmes with a strong focus on
green, digital and future-proof skills, to support those most affected by the pandemic and foster
the resilience of the economy.
 The Colombian recovery plan supports young people between 14 and 28, providing training in
entrepreneurship, sustainability and innovation through the work of speakers and academics.
 France allocated USD 790 billion to create job opportunities for young people, providing
counselling support, founding of entrepreneurial networks and training funds, and increasing
the beneficiaries of the “youth guarantee” allowance and employment initiative contracts, both
of which support employers hiring new people
 Korea invests 5tn won to improve job security. Of this, 0.5tn for internships for young adults,
retraining for middle-aged, and start-ups, creating 92k jobs. Additionally, a job seeker
preparation plan, contributing to job training and start-up support for people in their 40s and to
addresses job market mismatches by providing support designed by age group.
 In Spain, a 2021 – 2025 Digitalisation of SMEs promotes business training for executives in
digital skills with the purpose of enhancing a disruptive innovation and entrepreneurship.
 The United Kingdom recovery plan supports SMEs to grow through two new schemes to boost
productivity: Help to Grow: Management, a new management training offer, and Help to Grow:
Digital, a new scheme to help 100 000 SMEs save time and money by adopting productivity-
enhancing software, transforming the way they do business (Government of the United
Kingdom, 2021[144]). Furthermore, the Export Academy, which will provide a series of activities
to build the capabilities of smaller businesses to trade internationally.
…and contribute to the needs for reskilling of SMEs and their employees
As indicated in Table 2.9, there are 46 (8%) SME-related skills policies in the rescue and recovery
packages combined, reaching USD 21.93 billion (3.04% of total spending on skills). While the share of

 105
the number of SME-related skills policies in total skills policies decreased from 8.76% in rescue packages
to 7.10% in recovery packages, by value the share actually increased (from 2.16% to 4.20%).
It is clear that skills development (from entrepreneurial skills to management and vocational skills for
entrepreneurs and their employees) is of essential importance for SME productivity growth. Before the
pandemic, skills shortages ranked high among the concerns of SMEs, according to various surveys.
Similarly, to enable their recovery and resilience, strengthening SME skills is important, including for
dealing with challenges regarding digitalisation and greening as well as more generally in transforming
business models and working methods for the post-pandemic economy. Skills shortages are flagged by
SMEs as a main concern in the recovery (SMEUnited, 2021[145]).
Estimates of the economic costs of the skills gap underline this importance. A 2018 report by Deloitte and
the Manufacturing Institute suggests that between 2018 and 2028 the economic impact of the skills gap
may amount to USD 2.5 trillion in the US manufacturing sector alone (Deloitte, 2018[146]). According to the
European Commission a ‘massive investment in skills is needed’ to reach the targets set, including through
the recovery plans but also through the European Social Fund (EUR 61.5 billion), Erasmus (EUR 16.2
billion) and InvestEU (EUR 4.9 billion) (European Commission, 2021[147]).
Innovation
SME innovation constitutes an important aspect of recovery packages…
The recovery packages include a variety of policies that aim to support SME innovation. These policies
often focus on innovative start-ups but also include examples of wider innovation support of relevance to
SMEs. Various innovation policies aim to support vaccine development and other COVID-19 related
innovation. Box 2.6 provides examples of such policies.

106 
Box 2.6. Examples of SME-related policies in innovation

 Budget 2021 proposes to improve the Canada Small Business Financing Program to increase
annual financing by CAD 560 million, supporting approximately 2 900 additional small
businesses, alongside other enhancements that will increase the eligibility for this financing and
permit lending against intellectual property and start-up assets and expenses.
 The Innovation Fund Denmark has received an additional DKK 350 million to be granted to
innovative and knowledge-based projects through the Fund’s Innobooster programme. The
programme targets SMEs and start-ups (Kromann Reumert, 2020[148]).
 The Finnish Sustainable Growth Plan includes targeted finance for growth of innovative SMEs,
research-based entrepreneurship and systematic support for the internationalisation capacity
of SMEs.
 The Italian recovery plan places strong emphasis on innovation for SMEs and innovative
entrepreneurship, for instance through measures to help SMEs internationalise and make
supply chains function better for SMEs. The plan also includes a section on innovative start-
ups.
 The Lithuanian recovery plan includes a focus on entrepreneurship and start-ups,
acknowledging that new and innovative start-ups and existing SMEs need to be supported to
grow, scale and become more innovative. For instance, the plan lists support for start-ups in
finance for AI, blockchain, robotics and automation. Regarding entrepreneurship, the plan puts
emphasis on promoting entrepreneurship, education (focus on seniors and students),
deregulation and business climate, and e-government.
 The Norwegian Government will allocate NOK40 million to the Industrial Development
Corporation of Norway (SIVA) in order to help support innovative SMEs and start-ups during
and after COVID-19 (SIVA - The Industrial Growth Company, 2020[149]).
 The Polish recovery plan puts strong emphasis on access to finance challenges for SMEs, also
in the COVID-19 context as well as on innovation. Furthermore, it takes a sector perspective,
where for certain sectors (agriculture & food, creative industries, aviation, telecommunications)
it takes an explicit SME perspective in support.
 The Portuguese plan references SMEs and start-ups in the context of access to finance, the
strengthening of (financial) resilience and innovation, including for instance promoting SME
engagement in the blue economy. It also mentions fostering the scale up of SMEs and start-
ups in the context of relations with larger companies and in trade zones.
 In Switzerland, the Suisse Innovation Program intends to specifically stimulate science-based
innovation projects by SMEs. The flagship initiative will give impetus to systemic innovations
that are central to current economic and social challenges in Switzerland (The Federal Council,
2021[150]).
…which is important for strengthening the capacity of SMEs for recovery and resilience
As shown in Table 2.9, SME-related innovation policies in rescue and recovery packages combined
number 70 (16.32%), amounting to USD 74.38 billion (10.75%). However, the share of SME-related
innovation policies in total innovation policies in recovery packages amount to 12.20% (number of policies)
and 8.87% (value). This is considerably lower than their share in rescue packages (24.82% and 14.83%
respectively), suggesting that like for digital policies, there was a stronger SME focus on structural policies
during the rescue phase than the recovery phase.

 107
Conclusions
Since July 2020, the policy response to COVID-19 has shifted from rescue measures through provision of
liquidity to measures that support recovery and resilience, including for SMEs, although the resurgence of
the pandemic in 2021 led to renewed emphasis on rescue support alongside recovery. Many countries
within and outside the OECD have put in place recovery packages that provide investment in infrastructure,
greening, digitalisation, skills and innovation, although the timing, size and focus of these packages varies.
From the perspective of SME finance, these packages include a number of important measures that
enhance the access to finance for SMEs and entrepreneurs. Debt finance instruments continue to take
centre stage, although the use and design of these instruments for SME liquidity support in recovery
packages vary across countries.
In general, rescue measures have not mobilised alternative sources of finance for SMEs in a significant
way, particularly at the outset of the crisis. In the recovery, this situation broadly persists, indicating that
these packages are not likely to be a key mechanism to kick-start improvements in the uptake of alternative
sources of finance for SMEs, which had gained significant ground in the run-up to the COVID-19 crisis.
This suggests that going forward, governments’ consideration of other mechanisms to foster diversification
of SME finance instruments, including Fintech, will be key to avoid SME over-reliance on debt and enable
them to thrive, invest and grow in the post-pandemic recovery. The 2022 update of the G20/OECD High-
Level Principles on SME Financing will support these efforts. There may also be a need to take additional
measures to address the challenges of SME insolvency.
Where alternative finance instruments are present in recovery packages, they include factoring, leasing
and hire purchases, trade finance and equity and quasi-equity tools.
Findings also show that although there is large diversity in their design, recovery packages generally have
a relatively modest explicit SME orientation, and do not constitute a silver bullet to address the range of
financing challenges SMEs continue to face. This is to some extent a reflection of the nature of recovery
measures, which focus on strengthening the capacity for recovery in the broader economy. SMEs can also
benefit from more generic measures such as digital infrastructure investments or support measures for the
business population at large. However, it is important to ensure that recovery plans and accompanying
measures take the circumstances and financing needs of SMEs sufficiently into account, in order to foster
their recovery from the crisis, as well as to strengthen their capacity to invest in greening, digitalisation,
skills and innovation.
References
Ashurst (2021), The Recovery Loan Scheme – final bridge to the ’New Normal’?, [58]
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/comparing-the-uks-covid-19-
emergency-loan-schemes-april-2021/.
Atradius (2021), 2021: A turn of the tide in insolvencies, http://dx.doi.org/2021: A turn of the tide [163]
in insolvencies | Atradius.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2021), Business Conditions and Sentiments, [159]

https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/business-indicators/business-conditions-and-
sentiments/latest-release.
Australian Government (2021), The Economic Recovery Plan, https://ourcomeback.gov.au/. [6]

108 
Australian Government - Taxation Office (2020), Actual decline in turnover test, [56]
https://www.ato.gov.au/general/jobkeeper-payment/in-detail/actual-decline-in-turnover-test/.
Australian Government - The Treasury (2021), SME Recovery Loan Scheme, [160]
https://treasury.gov.au/coronavirus/sme-recovery-loan-scheme.
Bank Negara Malaysia (2021), Additional assistance for SMEs and individuals under Budget [105]
2022, https://www.bnm.gov.my/-/additional-assistance-budget-2022.
Brassell, M. and K. Boschmans (forthcoming), Secured lending for SMEs: making effective use [80]
of registries and intangibles - a case study approach.
British Business Bank (2021), Future Fund Approves £1.2 Billion of Convertible Loan [107]
Agreements, https://www.british-business-bank.co.uk/future-fund-approves-1-2-billion-of-
convertible-loan-agreements/.
British Business Bank (2021), Recovery Loan Scheme, https://www.british-business- [57]
bank.co.uk/ourpartners/recovery-loan-scheme/.
Bruegel (2021), European Union countries’ recovery and resilience plans, [43]
https://www.bruegel.org/publications/datasets/european-union-countries-recovery-and-
resilience-plans/.
Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2021), German reocnstruction and recovery plan, [18]
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Europa/DARP/
deutscher-aufbau-und-resilienzplan.html.
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (2021), Mittelstand Digital Initiative, [140]
https://www.mittelstand-digital.de/MD/Navigation/DE/Home/home.html.
Business Desk (2021), NZGCP want billion dollar venture funds, [124]
https://businessdesk.co.nz/article/markets/nzgcp-wants-billion-dollar-venture-funds.
Cabinet du Secrétaire d’Etat à la Relance et aux Investissements Stratégiques, en charge de la [8]

Politique Scientifique (2021), Plan national pour la reprise et la résilience,
https://dermine.belgium.be/sites/default/files/articles/FR%20-
%20Plan%20national%20pour%20la%20reprise%20et%20la%20re%CC%81silience.pdf.
California News Times (2021), Coronavirus Impact: SF small businesses can now apply for [64]
loans up to $100K, https://californianewstimes.com/coronavirus-impact-sf-small-businesses-

can-now-apply-for-loans-up-to-100k/432674/.
CAN - Climate Action Network (2013), Climate change adaptation and the role of the private [138]
sector, https://www.coursehero.com/file/65599541/climate-change-adaptation-and-the-role-of-
private-sector-can-europe-reportpdf/.
CBS News (2021), Senate approves extending PPP deadline to May 31, [61]
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bipartisan-lawmakers-push-extend-ppp-paycheck-protection-
program/.
Clifford Chance (2021), INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY UPDATE, [112]
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2021/03/IRU%2022-
26%20March%202021.pdf.

 109
Community Futures - Network of Canada (n.d.), Supporting Canada’s 267 Community Futures [66]
organizations, https://communityfuturescanada.ca/.
Council of the European Union (2020), Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN [114]
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/47469/st13798-ad01-en20.pdf.
Council of the European Union (2020), Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN [113]
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/47470/st13798-ad02-en20.pdf.
Crunchbase (2021), Global VC Report 2020: Funding And Exits Blow Past 2019 Despite [86]
Pandemic Headwinds, https://news.crunchbase.com/news/global-2020-funding-and-exit/.
Crunchbase (2021), Global Venture Funding And Unicorn Creation In 2021 Shattered All [87]
Records, https://news.crunchbase.com/news/global-vc-funding-unicorns-2021-monthly-
recap/.
Crunchbase (2021), The Q3 2021 Global Venture Capital Report: Record Funding Trend Held [170]
Strong, https://news.crunchbase.com/news/q3-2021-global-venture-capital-report-record-
funding-monthly-recap/.
Daf-Mag.fr (2021), Prêts Participatifs Relance : ce que vous devez savoir, https://www.daf- [99]
mag.fr/Thematique/fonction-finance-1242/financements-innovations-2124/Breves/Prets-
Participatifs-Relance-que-vous-devez-savoir-359941.htm#.
Danish Minister of Finance (2021), Danish recovery plan to support the green transition, [14]
https://fm.dk/nyheder/nyhedsarkiv/2021/april/dansk-genopretningsplan-skal-understoette-den-
groenne-omstilling/.
Deloitte (2021), The contribution of National Recovery and Resilience Plans to achieving [142]
Europe’s Digital Decade ambition, https://www.vodafone.com/sites/default/files/2021-
06/deloitte-llp-europe-digital-decade-rrf-gap-analysis.pdf (accessed on 20 July 2021).
Deloitte (2018), Skills gap in manufacturing study, [146]

https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/manufacturing/articles/future-of-manufacturing-skills-
gap-study.html.
Demmou, L. (2021), From hibernation to reallocation: Loan guarantees and their implications for [171]
post-COVID-19 productivity | OECD Economics Department Working Papers | OECD
iLibrary, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/from-hibernation-to-reallocation-loan-
guarantees-and-their-implications-for-post-covid-19-productivity_2f4a4c20-en (accessed on
20 January 2022).
Demmou, L. and G. Franco (2021), From hibernation to reallocation: Loan guarantees and their [68]
implications for post-COVID-19 productivity, https://www.oecd-

ilibrary.org/docserver/2f4a4c20-
en.pdf?expires=1643281292&id=id&accname=ocid84004878&checksum=7BF6E75FF09164
7BC22A3EB334FB1B2B.
Department of Finance Canada (2021), A Recovery Plan for Jobs, Growth and Resilience, [9]
https://www.budget.gc.ca/2021/home-accueil-en.html.

110 
Department of Public Spenditure and Reform (2021), Ireland’s National Recovery and Resilience [23]
Plan, https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/d4939-national-recovery-and-resilience-plan-2021/#.
Diez, F. et al. (2021), “Insolvency Prospects Among Small and Medium Enterprises in Advanced [154]
Economies: Assessment and Policy Options”, IMF Staff Discussion Notes, No. 2021/002,
IMF, Washington DC.
Diputación de Palencia (2021), The Provincial Council of Palencia promotes a plan endowed [161]
with € 3 M to favor the business sector in the province,
https://www.diputaciondepalencia.es/noticia/20210224/prepyme-recuperacion-autonomos-
pymes-medio-rural.
ECB (2021), Survey on the access to finance of enterprises, [84]

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/safe/html/ecb.safe202111~0380b0c0a2.en.htm
l#toc12.
ECB (2020), SAFE report 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/38462. [85]
ECB (2020), Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) in the Euro Area, [83]
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/safe/html/ecb.safe202011~e3858add29.en.htm
l.
ECMI - European Capital Markets Institute (2021), How (more) equity financing for SMEs can [162]
become reality,
https://www.ceps.eu/download/publication/?id=32077&pdf=how_more_equity_financing_for_s
mes_can_become_reality-1.pdf.
Eelarvenõukogu (2021), TAASTE- ja VASTUPIDAVUSKAVA, https://rrf.ee/wp- [15]

content/uploads/2021/06/RRP-Taastekava-170621-VIISi.pdf.
EIB (2022), Firm-level policy support during the crisis: So far, so good?, [69]
https://www.eib.org/attachments/publications/economics_working_paper_2022_01_en.pdf.
EIB (2021), Fonds de garantie européen, [70]
https://www.eib.org/fr/products/egf/index.htm?q=&sortColumn=boardDate&sortDir=desc&pag
eNumber=0&itemPerPage=25&pageable=true&language=FR&defaultLanguage=FR&abstract
Project=true&orabstractProject=true&orCountries=true&orBeneficiaries=true&orWebsite=true.
El Païs Economía (2021), El BOE publica los requisitos para que las pymes puedan pedir [119]
ayudas y reestructurar su deuda,
https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2021/05/13/companias/1620905010_357298.html.
Euler Hermes (2021), Euler Hermes Report: After two years of decline, global insolvencies to [116]
rise in 2022 (+15%), https://www.eulerhermes.com/en_global/news-insights/news/euler-
hermes-report-after-two-years-of-decline--global-insolvenc.html.
Euler Hermes (2021), European SMEs: 7-15% at risk of insolvency in the next four years, [55]
https://www.eulerhermes.com/content/dam/onemarketing/ehndbx/eulerhermes_com/en_gl/er
d/publications/the-watch/2021_09_01_EuropeanFragileSMEs.pdf.
European Commission (2021), Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion, [147]

https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1223&langId=en.

 111
European Commission (2021), Laying the foundation for recovery: Denmark, [131]
https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/denmark-recovery-resilience-factsheet_en.pdf.
European Commission (2021), Recovery plan for Europe, [45]

https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_en#background.
European Commission (2021), Supporting European businesses during the pandemic, [73]
https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/jobs-and-economy-during-
coronavirus-pandemic/supporting-european-businesses-during-pandemic_en.
European Commission (2020), Recommendation of the Commission, [91]

https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/recommendation_vouchers_fr.pdf.
European Commission (2019), Financing the digitalisation of Small and Medium-sized [143]
enterprises,
https://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/financing_the_digitalisation_of_smes_summary_en
.pdf.
European Commission (2019), Gap analysis for small and medium-sized enterprises financing in [153]
the European Union; Final report, European Commission.
FCI (2021), FCI 2021 Annual Review, https://online.fliphtml5.com/uzvev/oinx/#p=1. [82]
FCI (2021), FCI reports 6.6% drop in global factoring statistics in 2020, [81]
https://www.tradefinanceglobal.com/posts/fci-reports-6-6-drop-in-global-factoring-statistics-in-
2020/.
Fédération Bancaire Française (2021), Launch of the Stimulus Equity Loans: A tool to help the [122]
recovery by investing in SMEs and Mid-cap companies, http://fbf.fr/en/press-
room/coronavirus-covid-19/launch-of-the-stimulus-equity-loans--a-tool-to-help-the-recovery-
by-investing-in-smes-and-mid-cap-companies.
Financial Express (2021), Lok Sabha passes Factoring Regulation (Amendment) Bill; to help [90]
expedite MSME payments, https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/sme/msme-fin-lok-
sabha-passes-factoring-regulation-amendment-bill-to-help-expedite-msme-
payments/2297989/.
FirmFunding (2021), €20 billion in financing distributed to SMEs and SMIs in the form of equity [98]
loans and subordinated bonds, https://www.firmfunding.com/en/news/recovery-plan-equity-

loans-and-subordinated-bonds.html.
Fitch Ratings (2021), SME Bankruptcies to Rise Once Policy Support is Scaled Back, [164]
http://dx.doi.org/SME Bankruptcies to Rise Once Policy Support is Scaled Back

(fitchratings.com).
French Insurance Federation (2021), Insurers are getting involved with the ‘Relance’¹ Equity [123]
Loans for the recovery of SMEs and employment, https://www.ffa-

assurance.fr/en/news/insurers-are-getting-involved-relance-1-equity-loans-recovery-smes-
and-employment.
FSB - Federation of Small Businesses (2021), Swap bounce back debt for employee equity to [110]
pave way for recovery, new report urges, https://www.fsb.org.uk/resources-page/swap-
bounce-back-debt-for-employee-equity-to-pave-way-for-recovery-new-report-urges.html.

112 
G20 and OECD (2015), G20/OECD HIGH-LEVEL PRINCIPLES ON SME FINANCING, OECD, [152]
G20.
Goodwin (2021), Mesures de soutien public à l’assurance-crédit domestique et l’assurance- [94]

crédit export, https://www.goodwinlaw.com/-/media/files/paris-covid19/fr-docs/covid19--
memo-17-fr.pdf?la=en.
Government of Australia (2021), Budget Strategy and Outlook, https://budget.gov.au/. [5]
Government of Australia - The Treasury (2020), Launch of the Australian Business Growth Fund, [101]
https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/josh-frydenberg-2018/media-releases/launch-
australian-business-growth-fund.
Government of Austria (2021), Public consultation on the National Building and Resilience Plan, [7]
https://www.oesterreich.gv.at/nachrichten/allgemein/EU-Aufbauplan.html.
Government of Canada (2021), A Healthy Environment and a Healthy Economy, [130]
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2020/12/a-healthy-environment-
and-a-healthy-economy.html.
Government of Canada - Department of Finance (2021), Budget 2021 Support for Small [65]
Business, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2021/04/budget-2021-support-
for-small-business.html.
Government of Chile (2021), Plan Paso a Paso Chile se Recupera, [11]

https://www.gob.cl/chileserecupera/.
Government of Colombia (2020), Colombia se recupera, https://compromisoporcolombia.gov.co/. [12]
Government of Finland (2021), Suomen kestävän kasvun ohjelma, [16]
https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/163176/VN_2021_52.pdf?sequence
=4&isAllowed=y.
Government of France (2021), Plan Nationale de Relance et Résilience, [17]

https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/plan-de-
relance/PNRR%20Francais.pdf.
Government of France (2020), France Rélance, [132]
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/plan-de-relance/annexe-fiche-
mesures.pdf.
Government of Iceland (2021), Fiscal Budget Proposal for 2022, [22]
https://www.government.is/news/article/2021/11/30/Fiscal-budget-proposal-for-2022-/.
Government of Iceland (2021), Fiscal plan 2022-2026: The right measures delivered progress [21]
and a positive outlook, https://www.government.is/diplomatic-missions/embassy-
article/2021/03/22/Fiscal-plan-2022-2026-The-right-measures-delivered-progress-and-a-
positive-outlook/.
Government of Italy (2021), Piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza, [25]
https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/PNRR.pdf.
Government of Japan (2020), Comprehensive Economic Measures to Secure People’s Lives, [26]
https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai1/keizaitaisaku/2020-2/20201208_economic_measures_all.pdf.

 113
Government of Latvia (2021), The Recovery and Resilience Facility Plan, [28]
https://www.esfondi.lv/normativie-akti-1.
Government of Lithuania (2021), EKONOMIKOS GAIVINIMO IR ATSPARUMO DIDINIMO [29]

PRIEMONĖ “NAUJOS KARTOS LIETUVA”,
https://finmin.lrv.lt/uploads/finmin/documents/files/Naujos%20kartos%20Lietuva_2021_05_14.
pdf.
Government of Poland (2021), National recovery plan, [32]

https://www.gov.pl/web/planodbudowy/kpo-wyslany-do-komisji-europejskiej.
Government of Portugal (2021), Recovering Portugal, Building the Future - Recovery and [33]
Resilience Plan, https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc22/comunicacao/documento?i=recuperar-
portugal-construindo-o-futuro-plano-de-recuperacao-e-resiliencia.
Government of Spain (2021), Plan de digitalización de PYMEs, [139]
https://portal.mineco.gob.es/RecursosNoticia/mineco/prensa/noticias/2021/210127_np_pyme.
pdf.
Government of Spain (2020), Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan, [36]
https://planderecuperacion.gob.es/.
Government of Switzerland (2020), Research and education plan, [38]

https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/switzerland-budgets-chf28-billion-for-research-and-education--
/46225010.
Government of the United Kingdom (2021), Build Back Better: our plan for growth (HTML), [144]
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/build-back-better-our-plan-for-growth/build-back-
better-our-plan-for-growth-html#net-zero.
Government of the United Kingdom (2020), Budget 2020: What you need to know, [135]
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/budget-2020-what-you-need-to-know.
Government of the United States of America (2021), FACT SHEET: Biden-⁠Harris Administration [60]
Increases Lending to Small Businesses in Need, Announces Changes to PPP to Further

Promote Equitable Access to Relief, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/02/22/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-increases-lending-to-small-
businesses-in-need-announces-changes-to-ppp-to-further-promote-equitable-access-to-
relief/.
Government of the United States of America (2021), Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, [42]
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/15/bill-signed-h-r-
3684/.
Government of the United States of America (2021), The American Families Plan, [40]
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-the-
american-families-plan/.
Government of the United States of America (2021), The American Jobs Plan, [41]
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-
american-jobs-plan/.

114 
Government of United Kingdom (2021), The Tourism Recovery Plan, [169]

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/992974/Tourism_Recovery_Plan__Web_Accessible_.pdf.
Government of United Kingdom (2020), Build Back Better: our plan for growth, [39]
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/build-back-better-our-plan-for-growth.
Group of thirty (2020), Reviving and Restructuring the Corporate Sector Post-Covid, [120]
https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_Reviving_and_Restructuring_the_Corp
orate_Sector_Post_Covid.pdf.
Growthbusiness.co.uk (2021), Future Fund: Breakthrough – £375m fund for tech scale-ups to [106]
launch, https://www.growthbusiness.co.uk/future-fund-breakthrough-375m-fund-for-tech-
scale-ups-to-launch-2558849/.
Growthbusiness.co.uk (2021), Rishi Sunak review moots £1bn fintech growth fund, [165]
https://www.growthbusiness.co.uk/rishi-sunak-review-moots-1bn-fintech-growth-fund-
2558696/.
HM Treasury (2021), £1 billion in support for businesses most impacted by Omicron across the [77]
UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/1-billion-in-support-for-businesses-most-impacted-
by-omicron-across-the-uk.
HMEPHΣIA (2021), Recovery Fund: On what condition will low-interest loans be given to SMEs, [59]
https://www.imerisia.gr/oikonomia/trapezes/23382_tameio-anakampsis-me-poia-proypothesi-
tha-dothoyn-hamilotoka-daneia-stis.
Hope Policy Institute (2021), The State Small Business Credit Initiative: A $3 Billion Opportunity [63]
for the Deep South, http://hopepolicy.org/blog/the-state-small-business-credit-initiative-a-3-
billion-opportunity-for-the-deep-south/.
IMF (2021), Fault Lines Widen in the Global Recovery, [47]

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/07/27/world-economic-outlook-update-
july-2021.
IMF (2021), Insolvency Prospects Among Small-and-Medium-Sized Enterprises in Advanced [115]
Economies, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-
Notes/Issues/2021/03/25/Insolvency-Prospects-Among-Small-and-Medium-Sized-
Enterprises-in-Advanced-Economies-50138.
InnovationAus (2021), $540m Business Growth Fund ready to flow, [102]
https://www.innovationaus.com/540m-business-growth-fund-ready-to-flow/.
International Chamber of Commerce (2020), Priming trade finance to safeguard SMEs and [92]
power a resilient recovery from covid-19,

https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/11/memo-g20-recommendations-smes.pdf.
INVEGA (2021), INVEGA is establishing two new start-up accelerators - investing 18 million euro [129]
to a new venture capital instrument, https://invega.lt/en/news/108/invega-is-establishing-two-

new-startup-accelerators-investing-18-million-euros-to-a-new-venture-capital-
instrument:1141.
Invitalia (2021), FONDO PATRIMONIO PMI, https://www.invitalia.it/cosa-facciamo/rafforziamo- [104]

le-imprese/fondo-patrimonio-pmi/come-funziona.

 115
Irish Times (2022), Small business rescue scheme becomes law, [118]
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/small-business-rescue-scheme-becomes-law-
1.4750061.
KFW (2020), New KfW promotional programme helps SMEs to invest in climate change [133]
mitigation and sustainability, https://www.kfw.de/KfW-Group/Newsroom/Latest-
News/Pressemitteilungen-Details_573120.html.
Kromann Reumert (2020), COVID-19: Additional aid to entrepreneurs and growth businesses, [148]
https://kromannreumert.com/en/news/covid-19-additional-aid-to-entrepreneurs-and-growth-
businesses.
McKinsey & Company (2020), Setting up small and medium-size enterprises for restart and [49]
recovery, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/setting-
up-small-and-medium-size-enterprises-for-restart-and-recovery#.
Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de la relance (2021), Les prêts participatifs Relance et [100]
les obligations Relance : soutenir l’investissement des PME et ETI françaises,
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2021/03/04/les-prets-participatifs-relance-et-les-
obligations-relance-soutenir-l-investissement-des-pme-et-eti-francaises.
Ministère des Finances (2021), Plan pour la Reprise et la Résilience, [30]

https://mfin.gouvernement.lu/fr/dossiers/2021/planderelance.html.
Ministerio de Desarrollo Productivo (2021), Desarrollo Productivo extiende el plazo para que [72]
más PyMES puedan financiarse a tasas subsidiadas,
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/desarrollo-productivo-extiende-el-plazo-para-que-mas-
pymes-puedan-financiarse-tasas.
Ministerstva průmyslu a obchodu (2021), Národny plán obnovy, https://www.planobnovycr.cz/. [13]
Ministry of Economy and Finance (2021), Korea New Deal, [27]

https://www.korea.kr/special/policyCurationView.do?newsId=148874860#L3.
Ministry of Finance (2021), National Recovery and Resilience Plan, [19]

https://www.minfin.gr/web/guest/tameio-anakampses.
Ministry of Finance (2020), Economic plan for coping with the coronavirus crisis, [24]
https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/Guides/mof_economic_plan?chapterIndex=1.
Miniszterelnökség (2021), Recovery and Resilience Tool (RRF), [20]
https://www.palyazat.gov.hu/helyreallitasi-es-ellenallokepessegi-eszkoz-rrf#.
Nopef (n.d.), Nordic Environment Finance Corporation - NEFCO, https://nopef.com/news/new- [134]

green-recovery-financing-for-nordic-small-and-medium-sizedcompanies/.
O’Callaghan, B. (2020), Global Recovery Observatory, [52]
https://recovery.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/tracking/.
OECD (2021), An in-depth analysis of one year of SME and entrepreneurship policy responses [3]
to COVID-19: Lessons learned for the path to recovery, https://www.oecd-

ilibrary.org/economics/an-in-depth-analysis-of-one-year-of-sme-and-entrepreneurship-policy-
responses-to-covid-19_6407deee-en.

116 
OECD (2021), Bridging the gap in the financing of intangibles to support productivity: [78]
Background paper, https://www.oecd.org/global-forum-productivity/events/Bridging-the-gap-
in-the-financing-of-intangibles-to-support-productivity-background-paper.pdf.
OECD (2021), COVID-19 Government Financing Support Programmes for Business [51]
[DAF/CMF(2021)6/REV2], http://dx.doi.org/OECD (2021) COVID-19 Government Financing
Support Programmes for Business [DAF/CMF(2021)6/REV2].
OECD (2021), Focus on green recovery, https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/themes/green- [53]

recovery#climate-action.
OECD (2021), “No net zero without SMEs: Exploring the key issues for greening SMEs and [1]
green entrepreneurship”, OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Papers, No. 30, OECD, Paris,
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/no-net-zero-without-smes_bab63915-en (accessed on
30 November 2021).
OECD (2021), OECD Economic Surveys: Chile 2021, https://www.oecd- [10]

ilibrary.org/sites/e5a68274-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/e5a68274-en.
OECD (2021), SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook 2021, OECD, Paris. [4]
OECD (2021), The Digital Transformation of SMEs, OECD Studies on SMEs and [141]
Entrepreneurship, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/bdb9256a-en.
OECD (2021), Trade finance in the Covid era: current and future challenges, [93]
https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/trade-finance-in-the-covid-era-current-
and-future-challenges-79daca94/.
OECD (2020), Coronavirus (COVID-19): SME policy responses, OECD Policy responses to [2]
Coronavirus, http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/coronavirus-covid-19-sme-
policy-responses-04440101/ (accessed on 19 August 2020).
OECD (2020), Corporate sector vulnerabilities during the Covid-19 outbreak: Assessment and [156]
policy responses, Tackling Coronavirus Series, http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-
responses/corporate-sector-vulnerabilities-during-the-covid-19-outbreak-a6e670ea/
(accessed on 22 June 2020).
OECD (2020), The impact of COVID-19 on SME financing - A special edition of the OECD [168]
Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs Scoreboard, https://www.oecd-

ilibrary.org/fr/economics/financing-smes-and-entrepreneurship-an-oecd-
scoreboard_ecd81a65-en.
OECD (2018), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and- [126]

services/financing-smes-and-entrepreneurs-2018_fin_sme_ent-2018-en.
OECD (2018), Fostering the use of intangibles to strengthen SME access to finance, [79]
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/729bf864-
en.pdf?expires=1630235826&id=id&accname=ocid84004878&checksum=D85ADCD3D2C6F
1BFEB0B45FB359CF378.

 117
OECD (2017), Evaluating publicly supported credit guarantee programmes for SMEs, [172]
http://www.oecd.org/finance/Evaluating-Publicly-Supported-Credit-Guarantee-Programmes-
for-SMEs.pdf.
OECD (2016), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and- [89]

services/financing-smes-and-entrepreneurs-2016/the-role-of-business-angel-investments-in-
sme-finance_fin_sme_ent-2016-6-en.
OECD (2015), Hybrid finance instruments for SMEs, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and- [97]

investment/new-approaches-to-sme-and-entrepreneurship-financing/hybrid-finance-
instruments-for-smes_9789264240957-9-en#page1.
OECD (2015), New Approaches to SME and Entrepreneurship Financing: Broadening the Range [88]
of Instruments, https://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/New-Approaches-SME-full-report.pdf.
Oliver Wyman (2021), Ready to lead - How banks can drive the European recovery, [121]
https://www.oliverwyman.com/our-expertise/insights/2021/jul/european-banking-sector-
outlook-2021.html.
Qredits (2021), Have you been affected by the corona crisis and do you need money to [117]
restructure?, https://qredits.nl/toa-krediet/.
Republika Slovenija - Služba vlade za razvoj in evropsko kohezijsko politiko (2021), Recovery [35]
and resilience plan, https://www.eu-skladi.si/sl/po-2020/nacrt-za-okrevanje-in-krepitev-
odpornosti.
Reuters (2022), France will widen financial aid for companies hit by pandemic, [74]
https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/business/story/France_will_widen_financial_aid_for_compa
nies_hit_by_pandemic-TR20220103nS8N2SV04DX2/.
Revoltella, D. (2021), Jump-starting investment for a strong and even recovery: A call for more [158]
equity finance for EU firms, https://voxeu.org/article/jump-starting-investment-strong-and-
even-recovery.
Revoltella, D., L. Maurin and R. Pal (2020), EU firms in the post-COVID-19 environment, VOX, [151]
CEPR Policy Portal, https://voxeu.org/article/eu-firms-post-covid-19-environment (accessed
on 25 June 2020).
SBA (2021), Forgiveness Platform Lender Submission Metrics | December 12, [108]
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
12/2021.12.12_Weekly%20Forgiveness%20Report_Public-508.pdf.
Secretaría de Economía (2021), Acciones para la reactivación economíca, [31]

https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/622431/Presentacio_n_TCC.pdf.
SIVA - The Industrial Growth Company (2020), NOK 40 million for investments in innovation [149]
companies, https://siva.no/2020/05/13947/.
Small Business Charter (n.d.), Help To Grow Management, [128]
https://smallbusinesscharter.org/help-to-grow-management/.
Small Business Charter (n.d.), Rescuing and resetting the UK economy after COVID-19 via debt- [111]
to-equity swaps, https://smallbusinesscharter.org/business-advice/rescuing-and-resetting-the-
uk-economy-after-covid-19-via-debt-to-equity-swaps/.

118 
SME banking (2021), United Bulgarian Bank offers JEREMIE Trade Financing COVID-19 for [96]
SMEs, https://smebanking.club/united-bulgarian-bank-offers-jeremie-trade-financing-covid-
19-for-smes/.
SME Finance Forum (2021), Member Pulse Survey 2021 Q1 on the Impact of COVID-19, [155]
https://www.smefinanceforum.org/post/member-pulse-survey-2021-Q1-on-the-impact-of-
covid-19.
SMEUnited (2021), Further skills development remains a key priority for SMEs, [145]
https://www.smeunited.eu/news/further-skills-development-remains-a-key-priority-for-smes-.
STIP Compass (2020), Query Builder, https://stip.oecd.org/stip/query-builder. [167]
Swedish MInistry of Finance (2021), Sweden’s recovery plan, [37]
https://www.regeringen.se/rapporter/2021/05/sveriges-aterhamtningsplan/.
The Business Times (2021), Special fund for startups has facilitated S$216m in funds raised, [125]
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/garage/special-fund-for-startups-has-facilitated-s216m-in-
funds-raised.
The Federal Council (2021), Coronavirus: Innosuisse launches two new funding initiatives, [166]
https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-81902.html.
The Federal Council (2021), Innovation projects: impulse programme Swiss Innovation Power, [150]
https://www.innosuisse.ch/inno/en/home/start-your-innovation-project/innovation-
projects/impulse-programme-innovation-switzerland.html.
The Government of the Republic of Croatia (2021), National Recovery and Resilience Plan [95]
2021-2023, https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/zelena-
akcija.production/zelena_akcija/document_translations/1259/doc_files/original/nrrp.pdf.
The Montreal Group (2021), NON-FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SMES IN TIME OF CRISIS, [127]
https://www.themontrealgroup.org/DATA/DOCUMENTATION/27_en~v~non-financial-support-
for-smes-in-times-of-crisis.pdf.
The New York Times (2021), Europe’s Pandemic Aid Is Winding DOwn. Is Now The Best Time?, [46]
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/05/business/europe-coronavirus-economy.html.
The Slovak Spectator (2021), State will assist small businesses that need to be closed, [75]
https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22803031/state-will-assist-small-businesses-that-need-to-be-
closed.html.
The Sun Daily (2021), Govt to announce PPN continuation, fine-tune economic recovery [71]
measures during 12MP, Budget 2022 tabling - PM (Updated),

https://www.thesundaily.my/local/govt-to-announce-ppn-continuation-fine-tune-economic-
recovery-measures-during-12mp-budget-2022-tabling-pm-updated-NF8117843.
Travers Smith (2020), JIBFL: Debt for equity swaps: a key restructuring tool in the post COVID- [109]
19 era, https://www.traverssmith.com/knowledge/knowledge-container/jibfl-debt-for-equity-
swaps-a-key-restructuring-tool-in-the-post-covid-19-era/.
Trinomics (2019), Issue Paper 5: Estimates of the Environmental Investment Gap, [137]
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/action-programme/pdf/IP5-Env_Investement_Gap-
%20Final.pdf.

 119
UNDP - Nature, Climate and Energy (2021), Green Recovery SPending by Country, [44]
https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/undp.nature.climate.and.energy/viz/GRTrackerDataExtr
acted/GlobalView.
United States Census Bureau (2021), Small Business Pulse Survey: Tracking Changes During [157]
The Coronavirus Pandemic, https://www.census.gov/data/experimental-data-products/small-
business-pulse-survey.html.
Úrad Vlády Slovenskej Republiky (2021), Plán obnovy, https://www.planobnovy.sk/. [34]
US Department of Energy - Office of SCIENCE (2021), DOE Announces $37 Million to Small [136]
Businesses for Climate, Energy and Scientific R&D,
https://www.energy.gov/science/articles/doe-announces-37-million-small-businesses-climate-
energy-and-scientific-rd.
US Department of the Treasury (2021), State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI), [62]
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/small-business-programs/state-small-business-credit-
initiative-ssbci.
US News (2021), S.Korea’s Fin Min to Prepare $3.6 Billion COVID-19 Stimulus Package, [76]
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-12-16/s-koreas-fin-min-to-prepare-3-6-
billion-covid-19-stimulus-package.
White & Case (2021), State of the art of the Italian liquidity measures - Keeping Italian [103]
Companies Alive?, https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/state-art-italian-liquidity-
measures-keeping-italian-companies-alive-2021.
World Bank (n.d.), Map of SME-SUpport Measures in Response to COVID-19, [48]

https://dataviz.worldbank.org/views/SME-
COVID19/Overview?%3Aembed=y&%3AisGuestRedirectFromVizportal=y&%3Adisplay_coun
t=n&%3AshowAppBanner.
Wuppertal Institute, E3G (2021), Green Recovery Tracker, [54]
https://www.greenrecoverytracker.org/.
Youth Business International (n.d.), COVID-19 Rapid Response and Recovery Programme [67]
supported by Google.org, https://www.youthbusiness.org/initiative/covid-19-rapid-response-

and-recovery-programme.
Note
1
The European Central Bank through the European Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme bought
assets with an overall envelop of EUR 750 billion and later enlarged to EUR 1 350 billion. The Federal
Reserve in the United States purchased Treasury Securities and agency mortgage-backed securities of
billions worth of dollars. Furthermore, from USD 600 billion in SME loans, the Fed purchased a stake of
95% of each SME loan (OECD, 2020[168]).

 121
Country snapshots

122 
3. Australia
Key facts on SME financing
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), there were 2,418,037 small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) in Australia in 2019-20. SMEs account for 99.8% of all enterprises in Australia and
employed more than 7.6 million people in 2018-19, which equates to around 66% of employment in the
private sector.
The Australian economy fell by 0.3% in 2019-20 due to the COVID-19 lockdown recession, after 28
consecutive years of economic growth. The economy continues to recover, and had reversed 85% of the
decline from its pre-COVID level of output by the end of 2020.
Interest rates are historically low for both SMEs and large businesses. SME interest rates in Australia have
gradually declined from 8.6% in 2007 to 3.4% in 2020. The interest rate spread between SME loans and
large enterprise loans increased from 71 basis points in 2007 to 170 basis points in 2008, and remained
high at 185 basis points in 2017. However, the interest rate spread has declined somewhat to 177 basis
points in 2020.
New lending to SMEs declined sharply from AUD 185.2 billion in 2019 to AUD 80 billion in 2020, in the
wake of COVID-19. In 2020, the share of SME outstanding loans stood at 42.68% of total outstanding
business loans.
The total amount of venture capital invested by registered Early Stage Venture Capital Limited
Partnerships (ESVCLPs) and Venture Capital Limited Partnerships (VCLPs) increased in 2017-18 by
32.96%, totalling AUD 1.3 billion, decreased in 2018-19 by 10.56% to AUD 1.1 billion, before rising to a
high of AUD 1.6 billion in 2019-20, an increase of 43.28%. Leasing and hire purchase volumes dropped
from AUD 9,245 million in 2007 to a low of AUD 6,549 million in 2010. Leasing and hire purchase volumes
have recovered since, rising to AUD 10,530 million in 2020, an increase of about 5% over the previous
year.
The number of bankruptcies per 10,000 businesses increased from 45 in 2007 to 50 in 2010. It since
reached a ten-year low of 29 in 2019, before falling even further to 19 in 2020 in response to COVID-19
related policies. In March 2020, the Australian Government announced a series of temporary changes to
bankruptcy law to protect otherwise viable businesses from bankruptcy. These included a new formal debt
restructuring process, and a simplified liquidation pathway; with the new processes available to
incorporated businesses with liabilities of less than AUD 1 million.
The Australian Government has a comprehensive SME agenda aimed at promoting growth, employment
and opportunities across the economy. Its policies for promoting SMEs focus on improving the operating
environment for businesses, increasing incentives for investment, and enhancing rewards and
opportunities for private endeavour. Policies aiming to increase long-term opportunities for SMEs include
innovative finance and crowd-sourced equity funding; competition and consumer policies; taxation and
business incentives; export financing; and small business assistance.

 123
Table 3.1. Scoreboard for Australia

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding AUD billion 189 204.6 204.7 225.2 235.9 239.9 243.1 251.4 261.5 271.4 281.4 283.7 426.6 421.2
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding AUD billion 699.9 767.3 713.2 689.2 712.7 732.5 744.8 778.2 831.8 875.1 903.9 954.2 976.2 986.9
business loans,
total
Share of SME % of total 27.03 26.66 28.71 32.68 33.11 32.76 32.64 32.30 31.44 31.01 31.13 29.73 43.71 42.68
outstanding loans outstanding
business
loans
New business AUD billion 375.0 336.1 265.5 265.8 310.7 273.8 292.4 360.5 391.7 341.8 346.0 346.9 .. ..
lending, total
New business AUD billion 77.5 79.9 69.6 82.5 81.6 73.7 79.1 85.4 91.2 86.7 79.7 76.7 185.2 80
lending, SMEs
Share of new SME % of total 20.67 23.77 26.20 31.04 26.25 26.91 27.06 23.69 23.27 25.37 23.03 22.11 .. ..
lending new lending
Non-performing % of all 0.50 2.07 3.27 3.55 3.16 2.68 2.03 1.39 1.01 1.13 0.78 0.81 0.92 1.02
loans, total business
loans
Interest rate, % 8.66 8.04 7.60 8.40 8.02 7.13 6.54 6.27 5.63 5.36 5.28 5.33 4.18 3.40
SMEs
Interest rate, large % 7.95 6.34 5.94 7.02 6.74 5.50 4.77 4.60 3.90 3.49 3.43 3.72 2.48 1.63
firms
Interest rate % points 0.71 1.70 1.66 1.38 1.28 1.62 1.77 1.67 1.73 1.86 1.85 1.61 1.70 1.77
spread
Non-bank finance
Venture and AUD billion 0.46 0.28 0.24 0.30 0.59 0.96 0.98 1.30 1.16 1.67
growth capital
Venture and %, Year-on- -39.05 -13.17 23.36 96.35 63.45 1.76 32.96 -10.56 43.28
growth capital year growth
(growth rate) rate
Leasing and hire AUD billion 9.25 9.28 6.73 6.55 6.90 8.75 7.34 8.77 9.86 8.89 10.14 9.71 9.98 10.53
purchases
Factoring and AUD billion 54.76 64.99 63.10 58.66 61.42 63.36 63.27 62.39 64.40 .. .. .. .. ..
invoicing
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of .. .. .. .. 22 20 20 15 13 14 12 11 10 11
B2B days
Bankruptcies, Number 5 045 4 427 4 426 5 616 5 266 5 858 4 761 4 007 4 088 4 350 4 168 4 291 3815 3 353
Unincorporated
Bankruptcies, Per 10 000 42 36 36 45 43 50 42 35 34 36 34 36 26 23
Unincorporated enterprises
Bankruptcies, Number 7 489 9 067 9 465 9 605 10 439 10 583 10 854 8 822 10 093 8 511 7 819 8 052 8 324 4 943
Corporates
Corporates companies
Total businesses
Invoice payment Number of 53 56 54 53 54 53 54 53 47 .. .. .. .. ..
days, average days
Outstanding AUD billion 111 117 119 122 125 131 136 142 150 157 164 165 244 246
business credit,
Unincorporated
business

124 
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Outstanding AUD billion 500 555 514 500 514 524 531 556 592 626 636 663 619 621
business credit,
Private trading
corporations
The full country profile is available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/e9073a0f-en

 125
4. Austria
As in many EU countries, SMEs contribute substantially to Austria’s economy. In 2019, 99.7% of all firms
were SMEs employing approximately 66.8% of the labour force.
The capital structure of SMEs in Austria is traditionally biased towards debt financing, whereas limitations
on access to risk-finance are still apparent. Bank lending is therefore an important factor affecting the
availability of external financing for SMEs. However, access to finance is generally not a major concern for
Austrian SMEs. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, which severely affected the economic environment, only
8% (compared to 10% of European SMEs) stated in 2020 that access to finance is one of their main
concerns.
Following the COVID-19 pandemic, Austria showed an increase in medium- and long-term loans, as
government guarantees typically covered loans with medium-term maturities and up to EUR 1 million. This
reflected a shift in the financing needs of businesses, since loans were taken to bridge liquidity shortages
and build up liquidity buffers. However, loan growth differed across industries depending on how much
they were affected by the pandemic. Overall, the share of new SME loans (i.e. up to EUR 1 million)
increased by more than 3 percentage-points to 15.3%.
To mitigate the negative economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Austrian as well as European
governments provided unprecedented (fiscal) stimulus programs to non-financial corporations including
SMEs following the modified EU “Temporary Framework to support the economy in the context of the
coronavirus outbreak”. The enlargement of loan guarantee programmes offering bridge-financing and
special lending conditions resulted in a sharp decline of the spread between SME loans (i.e. loans with a
volume of up to EUR 1 million) and loans to large firms down to 0.23%. In comparison, this spread has
been rather stable over the last years reaching 44 basis points (0.44%) on average until 2019.
In Austria, limitations on access to risk-finance (e.g. Venture Capital) are still apparent and have always
been considered to be a particular weakness of the Austrian innovation system. Official data reported by
Invest Europe show no clear trend over time, with frequent ups and downs.
Bankruptcies (per 1 000 enterprises) fell sharply by -40.7% in 2020 compared to 2019, reaching the
number of 3 106. This development can be explained by a wide range of fiscal and other crisis response
measures set up by the Austrian Federal Government to help affected companies through the crisis quickly
and accurately. For example, the obligation to declare insolvency has been temporarily suspended. For a
sustainable recovery after a recession, it is essential to ensure structural change, improve business
dynamics and strengthen firms’ equity ratios. A catch-up effect and the realization of an insolvency backlog
have to be considered once the policy measures end or are phased out.
In 2020, initiatives and supporting measures of the Austrian Government concentrated primarily on tackling
the economic and financial consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and on helping affected companies
through the crisis quickly and accurately. In order to mitigate the economic disadvantages, the financial
aids ensure the liquidity of companies and focus on:

126 
 Mitigating revenues losses stemming from the crisis: e.g. non-repayable grants to cover fixed costs
and revenue losses.
 Measures facilitating economic recovery -- e.g. Loan guarantees for bridge-financing loans.
 Stimulating labour market: e.g. Corona short-time work.
Table 4.1. Scoreboard for Austria

Indicator Unit 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding business EUR billion 135.5 138.8 140.4 140.3 136.6 137.2 135.6 143.8 153.0 162.9 169,8
loans, total
New business loans, EUR 74 896 73 041 80 867 73 460 73 126 61 711 55 543 64 418 64 438 71266 60096
total (flows) million
New business loans, EUR 9 414 9 476 9 347 8 884 8 237 8 116 7 499 8 304 8 182 8 639 9214
SMEs (flows) million
Share of new SME loans % of total 12.57 12.97 11.56 12.09 11.26 13.15 13.50 12.89 12.70 12.12 15.33
business
loans
short-term loans, SMEs EUR 5 139 4 944 4 901 4 536 4 016 3 345 3 010 2 539 1 998 1 969 1640
(flow) million
long-term loans, SMEs EUR 4 275 4 532 4 446 4 348 4 221 4 771 4 489 5 765 6 184 6 670 7574
(flow) million
Share of short-term SME in % 54.59 52.17 52.43 51.06 48.76 41.21 40.14 30.58 24.42 22.79 17.80
lending
Government loan EUR 173 143 158 167 172 204 192 279 301 366 4898*
guarantees, SMEs million
Government guaranteed EUR 226 185 207 211 225 258 282 414 395 568 5508*
loans, SMEs million
Government direct EUR 607 633 539 594 490 543 454 744 690 749 793
loans, SMEs million
Interest rate, SME, loans in % 2.43 2.92 2.46 2.28 2.27 2.02 1.92 1.80 1.82 1.80 1.59
up to EUR 1m
Interest rate, large firms, in % 1.96 2.55 1.98 1.77 1.74 1.61 1.54 1.45 1.38 1.32 1.36
loans over EUR 1m
Interest rate spread in % 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.44 0.48 0.23
Non-performing loans, In % .. 2.71 2.81 2.87 3.74 3.39 2.67 2.37 1.88 1.77 1.58
total
Non-bank Finance
Venture and growth EUR 43 97 44 59 60 112 57 108 86 81 102
capital (seed, start-up, million
later stage)
capital (growth capital) million
capital (total) million
Venture and growth In % -31.53 177.61 -66.31 17.76 22.56 87.97 -56.63 235.47 -52.96 24.98 48,72
capital (growth rate)
Other
Payment delays, B2B Days 11 12 11 12 13 4 4 2 1 1 14
Payment delays, B2C Days 11 11 9 9 9 1 4 1 1 5 9
Bankruptcies, total Number 6 657 6 194 6 266 5 626 5 600 5 422 5 534 5 318 5 224 5235 3106
Bankruptcies, per Number 18 17 17 15 15 11 12 11 11 11 7
1 000 firms
* Note: this temporary increase is related to COVID-19 crisis response measures

 127
5. Belgium
In 2018, SMEs dominated the business enterprise landscape in Belgium, accounting for 99.85% of all
firms.
The outstanding stock of SME loans expanded by 2% in 2020, 3.6 percentage points down from its growth
rate of the previous year. SME interest rates continued to decrease and averaged 1.55% in 2020. The
interest rate spread between loans charged to large enterprises and loans charged to SMEs was 15 basis
points in 2020.
Survey data illustrates that lending conditions eased between 2013 and 2015 and remained relatively
stable until the end of 2018. A deterioration of credit conditions has been reported since the fourth quarter
of 2018, through the end of 2020.
After having expanded moderately in 2019 (+5.17%), leasing volumes receded by 8.14% in 2020. Overall,
factoring continues to be widely used by Belgian companies. However, this source of financing stands out
in 2020 and shows a downward trend for the first time since 2007, decreasing by 3.66% during the year.
Factoring has an average growth rate of 6.85 over the period 2015-2020 and contributed to almost 18% of
GDP in 2020, as opposed to only 6.3% of GDP in 2008.
Venture and growth capital investments continue to show considerable variations due to the small number
of deals completed every year. Total venture and growth capital investments were stable in 2020, after
having increased by 44% in 2019.
Average payment delays for business to business transactions decreased steadily during the last ten
years, dropping from a 17-day average in 2009 to a 3-day average in 2020.
The number of registered failures dropped to 7 203 (-32%) in 2020. This figure is much lower than usual
and can be explained by the moratorium on bankruptcies introduced in Belgium in the context of the Covid-
19 crisis.
Policy initiatives to ease SMEs’ access to finance are taken both at the federal and regional levels. Policy
measures in 2020 were primarily aimed at protecting healthy businesses in the context of the covid-19
crisis. In the framework of the Flemish recovery plan, PMV (the Flemish investment body) is reinforcing its
investments in companies through loans, capital and guarantees. The Brussels-Capital Region is offering
companies a low-interest loan to support all sectors affected by the crisis. With the Covid-19 crisis and the
partial or full closure of a number of businesses, the Walloon Government has decided from March 2020
to support SMEs and self-employed in sectors affected by the crisis through a lump sum compensation.
An additional compensation based on the loss of turnover has been introduced since September 2020.
At the federal level, the government introduced a debt moratorium on corporate loans and activated a EUR
50 billion new guarantee for all new loans until 31 December 2020. A second guarantee scheme, which
only applies to SMEs for loans taken before end-June 2021, was also activated.

128 
Table 5.1. Scoreboard for Belgium
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR billion 82.8 89.1 88.9 93.9 100.0 109.6 109.5 100.7 104.4 108.0 115.7 123.9 130.9 133.6
business loans,
SMEs
business loans,
total
business loans
short-term loans,
SME
Outstanding long- EUR billion 59.7 66.1 72.2 77.2 79.3 82.5 83.9 80.3 84.8 90.8 97.8 103.4 109.6 115.5
term loans, SME
Share of short- % of total 38.52 37.91 32.08 31.45 31.50 29.48 28.74 28.08 26.71 26.05 25.58 25.95 28.93 26.00
term lending, total business
lending
Government loan EUR million .. 156.5 411.9 553.9 317.5 266.0 480.2 265.6 448.2 398.3 458.4 612.2 520 777
guarantees,
SMEs
Government EUR million .. 312.7 832.7 888.4 561.7 484.3 826.1 476.7 805.6 735.9 828.3 1130.3 993 1 318
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Direct EUR million .. 113.7 142.2 141.9 148.3 170.5 235.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
government
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, % 5.45 5.70 3.01 2.51 2.88 2.32 2.06 2.09 1.83 1.72 1.66 1.60 1.58 1.55
SMEs
firms
Interest rate % points 0.73 0.65 0.92 0.81 0.66 0.58 0.30 0.32 0.23 0.38 0.26 0.25 0.27 0,15
spread
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs .. .. .. 74.30 71.90 78.60 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME loan .. .. 22.22 26.46 30.20 29.33 29.36 39.33 36.61 36.71 37.18 35.38 33.87 33.072
SME loan applications/
applications total number of
SMEs
Rejection rate (SME loans .. .. 0.52 5.13 6.44 10.40 10.91 5.88 5.71 6.13 5.07 2.75 3.39 7.62
authorised/
requested)
Utilisation rate SME loans 77.80 79.05 80.69 80.07 80.16 77.45 77.79 79.76 79.62 80.01 79.86 80.39 80.64 80.61
used/
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR million 502.26 507.83 618.05 363.60 411.11 445.36 438.09 580.86 548.18 843.14 767.18 837.50 1207.3 1208.1
growth capital

 129
Venture and %, year-on- .. 1.11 21.70 -41.17 13.07 8.33 -1.63 32.59 -5.63 53.81 -9.01 9.17 44.16 0.07
(growth rate) rate
Leasing and hire EUR million 4405.9 4856.4 3756.4 4005.5 4439.0 4450.2 4121.7 4356.9 4800.5 6009.6 5800.1 668.4 6382 5863
purchases
Factoring and EUR million 19.2 22.5 23.9 32.2 36.9 42.4 47.7 55.4 61.2 62.8 69.6 76.3 84.8 81.7
invoicing
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of days .. .. 17 17 15 19 18 19 13 10 8 9 7 3
B2B
Bankruptcies, Number 7.680 8.476 9.420 9.570 10.224 10.587 11.740 10.736 9.762 9.170 9.968 9.878 10.598 7.203
total
Bankruptcies, %, year-on- .. 10.36 11.14 1.59 6.83 3.55 10.89 -8.55 -9.07 -6.06 8.77 -0.90 7.29 -32.03
total (growth rate) year growth
rate
Bankruptcies, Number 7 650 8 445 9 392 9 527 10 188 10 539 11 694 10 678 9 728 9 134 9 935 9 860 10 567 7 176
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, year-on- 10.39 11.21 1.44 6.94 3.45 10.96 -8.62 -8.90 -6.11 8.77 -0.75 7.17 -32.09
SMEs (growth year growth
rate) rate

130 
6. Brazil
Micro and small enterprises (MSEs) form an essential part of the Brazilian economy, accounting for 98.5%
of all legally constituted companies (11.5 million), for 27% of GDP, and for 41% of the total payroll.
The reference interest rate of Banco Central do Brasil (Special Clearance and Escrow System - SELIC)
has been gradually declining, from 14.15% per annum in December 2015 to 6.4% in December 2018. The
previous period of rate hike (from 7.25% in March 2013 to 14.25% in September 2016) led to high interest
rates on loans for large corporate borrowers (14.8%) and SMEs (30.6%), leading to a shrinking demand
for new SME loans. Interest rates have increased more for micro-enterprises and SMEs than for large
businesses. However, this trend was reversed when the Central Bank decreased its rate at the end of
2016, thus decreasing interest rates for SMEs. In 2020 the Central Bank decided to lower the SELIC rate
from 4.25% in February and 3.75% in March to 2.0% in August). In March 2021 the SELIC rate was
increased to 2.75% p.a., achieving 3.50% in May 2021.
The stock of SME loans fell in 2015 and new lending to SMEs declined in 2014 and 2015. Both
observations are in contrast with lending to large businesses, where the outstanding stock of loans, as well
as new lending was up in 2014 and 2015. A sharp rise was observed in 2020 due to measures adopted in
the context of the Covid-19 pandemic (see more under Government policy response).
Since 2008, large companies have received a larger share of business loans than SMEs. The government
has taken on a more active role in this area, often with the aim to provide financial services to small
businesses excluded from traditional financial institutions. Developments include a micro-credit
programme, a quota to use 2% of demand deposits of the National Financial System to finance loans to
low-income individuals and micro entrepreneurs, and a strong increase in the number of agencies where
financial services are provided.
In the area of equity finance, the regulatory framework for angel investors was revised in 2016 and further
adjusted in 2017, removing some long-standing barriers for investors in SME markets, in particular by
offering more legal protection in the case of company closures, more flexibility in the type of investment
and more information sharing between recipients and investors. In addition, new regulations concerning
investment-based crowdfunding and Fintech were introduced in 2017 and 2018.

 131
Table 6.1. Scoreboard for Brazil

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding BRL billion 251 332 365 448 533 609 666 711 682 586 510 500 536 731
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding BRL billion 501 682 775 930 1.107 1.279 1.460 1.623 1.734 1.565 1.436 1.441 1.427 1.753
business loans, total
business loans
New business BRL billion 1 240 1 267 1 266 1 281 1 138 1 043 1 170 1 334 1 620
lending, total
New business BRL billion 786 783 782 727 623 551 587 685 838
lending, SMEs
Share of new SME % of total business 63.43 61.78 61.75 56.79 54.80 52.83 50.15 51.39 51.72
lending lending
Outstanding short- BRL billion 89 98 90 107 136 146 150 145 133 109 101 107 116 98
term loans, SMEs
Outstanding long- BRL billion 147 198 232 292 369 459 515 564 548 473 406 391 417 630
term loans, SMEs
Share of short-term % 37.69 33.04 28.08 26.83 26.94 24.20 22.51 20.50 19.49 18.80 19.86 21.42 21.80 13.42
SME lending
Government BRL billion 40 46 93 51 705 810 705 2 777 3 420 3 918 2 081 486 199 44
guaranteed loans, 087
SMEs
Direct government BRL billion 17 24 26 27 31 35 36 43 46 39 33 26 20 25
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all business 1.54 1.55 2.67 1.84 2.02 2.22 1.84 1.88 2.39 3.15 2.99 2.45 2.08 1.20
loans, total loans
Non-performing % of SME loans 2.83 2.83 4.99 3.56 3.95 4.4 3.7 3.8 5.4 6.6 5.97 4.55 3.55 2.07
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, SMEs % 19.7 23.8 25.3 35.0 32.0 25.19 21.70 24.89 6.00
Interest rate, large % 10.2 13.8 14.4 17.5 17.5 9.85 8.91 8.73 5.91
firms
Interest rate spread % points 9.5 10.0 10.9 17.5 14.5 15.3 12.8 16.2 0.1
Note: Regarding the government guaranteed loans indicator, the 2020 figure considers two of the emergency credit programmes launched by
the federal government in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic (National Program to Support Micro and Small Enterprises – Pronampe, and
Emergency Employment Program – Pese). In both cases, relevant federal government guarantees are provided for loans.

132 
7. Canada
In 2020, Canadian small businesses (1-99 employees) constituted 98.0% of all businesses and employed
7.7 million individuals, or 67.7% of the private sector labour force.
Supply-side survey data show that outstanding debt held by all businesses increased in 2020 to CAD 1,007
billion. Lending to small businesses increased to CAD 117.9 billion. As a result, small businesses’ share
of total outstanding business loans was 11.7%.
Small business credit conditions have remained relatively stable since 2011. The average interest rate
charged to small businesses in 2019 decreased to 5.3%, with an average business prime rate of 3.6%.
The business risk premium stood at 1.7%, the lowest level since the 2009 recession reflecting an easing
in access to financing for small businesses in Canada.
Bank of Canada survey results indicate that lenders reported that overall business lending conditions
eased towards the end of the second half of 2020. Borrowers also reported an easing of credit conditions
during the same period.
In 2020, the small business 90-day loan delinquency rate reached 0.78%, its highest level since 2010.
Total venture capital (VC) investment levels in Canada reached a peak of CAD 6.1 billion in 2019 followed
by a decline to CAD 4.1 billion in 2020. These are the highest levels of VC investment recorded in Canada
since 2001.
In 2020-21, the Government of Canada continued its commitment to support entrepreneurship and the
growth of SMEs. The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC), a crown corporation with the
mandate to support Canadian entrepreneurship had CAD 36.5 billion in financing and investments, as of
31 March 2020, committed to 62 000 clients operating across Canada. In response to the COVID-19
pandemic, BDC delivered the Business Credit Availability Program and the Highly Affected Sectors Credit
Availability Program on behalf of the Government. Through these programmes, Canadian businesses
could access term loans of up to CAD 60 million for operational cash flow requirements. Additionally, BDC
extended new working capital loans, expanded its online financing platform, and launched the BDC
Venture Capital Bridge Financing Program to support existing clients and increase the availability of capital
in the market.
The Government of Canada has also invested CAD 371 million through the original Venture Capital
Catalyst Initiative (VCCI) to increase late-stage venture capital available to Canadian entrepreneurs.
Selected fund managers under the original VCCI will inject more than CAD 1.8 billion over the coming
years into the innovation capital market by leveraging funds from the public sector and private sector.
Building on this momentum, the Government introduced in Budget 2021 that it has made available up to
CAD 450 million through a renewed VCCI to support future venture capital investments.
The Government of Canada has established a number of programmes to provide support targeted to
entrepreneurs from underrepresented groups. The Government has made total investments of nearly CAD
6 billion in the Women Entrepreneurship Strategy (WES); of up to CAD 272.8 million in the Black

 133
Entrepreneurship Program (BEP); and of CAD 58.1 million for Futurpreneur, a program to support youth
entrepreneurs.
To help simplify and streamline the Government’s support programmes and to help equity-deserving
entrepreneurs access funding and capital, mentorship, financial planning services, and business training,
the Government will launch the Small Business and Entrepreneurship Development Program (SBED),
investing CAD101.4 million over 5 years in a tool which will facilitate continued support of small businesses
and entrepreneurs across Canada.
Table 7.1. Scoreboard for Canada

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding CAD billion 83.4 83.4 86.4 85.7 90.1 87.7 92.2 93.5 97.4 99.6 104.1 105.7 109.8 117.9
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding CAD billion 479.8 534.0 482.3 489.5 514.4 557.3 602.1 658.5 739.0 774.7 834.1 918.2 984.9 10007
business loans,
total
outstanding outstanding
loans business loans
New business CAD billion .. .. .. .. 126.2 141.6 151.0 168.7 188.4 204.0 233.9 269.7 285.7 287.7
lending, total
New business CAD billion .. .. .. .. 20.2 21.7 22.8 23.2 24.0 22.8 25.2 27.2 26.8 26.7
lending, SMEs
Share of new % of total new .. .. .. .. 15.99 15.30 15.10 13.74 12.73 11.16 10.78 10.08 9.39 9.30
SME lending lending
Outstanding CAD billion 15.1 .. 6.9 .. .. 15.6 .. .. 24.2 .. .. ..
short-term loans,
SMEs
Outstanding CAD billion 21.1 .. .. .. 12.8 .. .. 12.4 .. .. 32.4 .. .. ..
long-term loans,
SMEs
Share of short- % of total SME 41.62 .. 43.40 36.30 35.13 39.00 46.00 55.71 47.20 36.20 42.8 30.10 19.50 ..
term SME lending
lending
Government CAD billion 1.20 1.30 1.20 1.30 1.30 1.08 1.06 1.01 1.11 1.30 1.54 1.75 1.89 3.28
loan guarantees,
SMEs
Direct CAD billion 4.40 4.10 5.50 4.70 6.00 5.80 4.60 6.50 6.70 7.9 8.0 8.4 8.10 ..
government
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, % 7.50 .. 6.20 5.80 5.30 5.40 5.60 5.10 5.10 5.30 5.20 5.70 5.30 ..
SMEs
Interest rate, % 6.10 .. 3.10 2.60 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.80 2.70 2.90 3.64 3.60 2.70
large firms
Interest rate % points 1.40 .. 3.10 3.20 2.30 2.40 2.60 2.10 2.30 2.60 2.30 2.06 1.70 ..
spread
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs 47.7 .. 56.1 66.7 64.8 76.0 56.0 66.6 80.0 74.0 64.1 70.0 72.73 ..
needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME loan 17.0 .. 14.0 18.0 24.0 26.0 30.0 27.0 23.0 26.0 26.0 27.0 26.71 ..
SMEs

134 
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans .. .. .. 9.0 8.0 7.0 9.0 12.8 7.0 9.0 9.5 9.0 8.3 ..
authorised/
requested)
Non-bank finance
Venture and CAD billion .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.88 2.06 2.30 3.61 3.61 3.42 6.09 4.14
growth capital
Venture and %, Year-on-year .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.57 11.65 56.9 0 -5.3 78.07 -32.02
growth capital growth rate
(growth rate)
Other Indicators
90-Day % 0.70 1.16 1.56 0.88 0.62 0.53 0.40 0.39 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.45 0.78
Delinquency
Rate Small
business
90-Day % 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.15
Delinquency
Rate Medium
business
Leasing request % 20.8 .. 1.00 2.00 7.00 8.00 11.0 7.90 8.00 9.00 7.2 9.00 13.00 ..
rate
Leasing % 93 .. 76 97 97.3 95 95 98.6 94 94 97.6 96.0 96.0 ..
approval rate
Bankruptcies, Per 1 000 firms 7.00 6.60 5.90 4.60 4.30 3.80 3.60 3.40 3.30 3.10 2.84 2.79 2.81 2.14
SMEs with employees
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on-year .. -5.71 -10.6 -22.0 -6.52 -11.6 -5.26 -5.56 -2.94 -6.06 -8.39 -1.76 0.72 -23.84
SMEs (growth growth rate
rate)

 135
8. Chile
2020 was marked by coronavirus outbreak which impacted the economy and led to an unprecedented
decrease of activity.
Despite advances in Chile’s economic recovery, GDP closed 2020 with an annual decline of 5.8%, but the
growth projection for 2021 is raised to a range between 6.0% and 7.0%, while for 2022 it remains between
3.0% and 4.0%.
Since March 2020, Chile has developed a robust economic relief plan through the “Emergency Economic
Plan”, which has 49 economic and social measures to support different people and firms. This Emergency
Economic Plan, along with the 2020 “Step by Step Plan, Chile recovers”, seeks to gradually reactivate the
economic activity through measures that encourage investment, infrastructure development, in addition to
a special plan to simplify bureaucratic procedures, in order to promote and accelerate innovation and
investment.
The foregoing, with a marked focus on the recovery of employment and the reactivation of micro, small
and medium enterprises through tax measures, subsidy programs, financing and capacity development
programs. In total, these plans mobilised resources that represent 9.7% of GDP.
According to the Central Bank, the supply of credit to SMEs is less restrictive and, with respect to the
segment of large companies, there are no significant changes. However, the SME share of outstanding
loans reached 21.4%, a historical peak, and the interest rate spread between large firms and SMEs fell
from 4.0% in 2019 to 2.3% in 2020.
2020 marked an important step forward in terms of domestic financial schemes, presenting historic capital
injections, strongly expanding the Small Business Guarantee Fund (or “FOGAPE” for short) by USD 3
billion, which aimed at expanding the financing coverage. Additionally, this fund will help to provide
financing for enterprises with annual sales of up to USD 36 million, therefore increasing the current
threshold which stands at around USD 12 million.
In terms of the guarantees granted by the Production Development Corporation (CORFO), such as
COBEX, Pro Inversión and FOGAIN, there have been more than 62 000 guarantee operations, amounting
to more than USD 2 billion.
In regard to non-bank finance, there have been actions undertaken to reduce the funding gap faced by
micro-enterprises. In this sense, the “MSME Credit”, operated by CORFO, received a capital injection of
USD 178 million and by the end of 2020 there were more than 54 000 credit operation via this scheme,
amounting to USD 68 million.
With respect to venture capital funds, CORFO and Start-Up Chile’s programmes are the main instruments
of SME capital financing, although other private and public initiatives have also developed. After two years
of sustained increase in 2018 and 2019, 2020 marked a drop of 12% in venture capital investments,
reaching an investment of CLP 54.9 in 2019 and CLP 48.3 in 2020.

136 
In 2020, the Superintendence of Insolvency and Re-entrepreneurship (SUPERIR) implemented the

Economic Insolvency Advisory program (AEI). This is a procedure by which an advisor is made available
to smaller companies, free of charge, in order to propose improvement actions that allow them to overcome
the state of insolvency, such as recovery agreements, search for new sources of financing, among others.
During the period that the advisory lasts, the company has financial protection that suspends possible legal
actions for a period of 90 days. The process was carried out first through the relocation of funds from
Superir to Sercotec during 2020, with the objective of financing 498 AEI. By the end of 2020, a total of 321
AEI had been initiated.
Finally, the Commission for the Financial Market (CMF) is leading the proposal for a Fintech bill for the
stock market. The Commission's preliminary draft seeks, among others, to provide a legal and regulatory
framework for collective financing platforms and other Fintech activities related to the stock market. The
preliminary draft proposal also incorporates an update of part of the current security market legislation in
order to adapt it and preserve regulatory coherence between the new Fintech players and the players that
operate today under the regulation and supervision of the CMF.
Table 8.1. Scoreboard for Chile
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding business
CLP billion 6.8 7.6 8.1 9.3 10.1 11.5 11.8 13.7 15.8 17.3 18.7 19.8 20.8 23. 9
loans. SMEs
CLP billion 40.9 49.9 46.3 48.1 57.2 64.6 69.8 76.4 84.9 88.7 90.3 99.5 108.5 111. 8
loans. total
% of total
Share of SME
outstanding 16.7 15.2 17.5 19.3 17.7 17.9 16.9 18.0 18.6 19.5 20.7 19.9 19.2 21.4
outstanding loans
business loans
New business lending.
CLP billion .. .. .. 53.3 58.0 58.0 58.1 63.9 67.8 67.4 67.7 71.4 77.1 70.8
total
New business lending.
CLP billion .. .. .. 2.6 3.1 3.8 3.8 4.4 5.1 5.1 5.6 5.63 5.8 8.7
SMEs
Share of new SME % of total new
.. .. .. 4.9 5.3 6.5 6.6 6.8 7.5 7.6 8.2 7.8 7.5 12.3
lending lending
Outstanding Short-term
CLP billion .. .. .. 1.6 2.0 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.1
loans. SMEs
Outstanding Long-term
CLP billion .. .. .. 1.0 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.2 3.3 3.8 3.8 4.0 7.6
loans. SMEs
Share of short-term % of total SME
.. .. .. 60.2 63.3 60.3 47.8 41.9 36.9 35.8 32.8 33.3 31.0 12.6
SME lending lending
Government loan
CLP billion 0.2 0.3 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 7.7
guarantees. SMEs
Government
CLP billion 0.3 0.5 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.9 3.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 10.3
guaranteed loans. SME
Direct Government
CLP billion .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
loans. SMEs
Non-performing loans. % of all business
… … 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.1
total loans
Non-performing loans.
% of all SME loans .. .. 5.9 6.1 5.5 5.4 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.3 5.2 5.9 5.9 4.7
SMEs
Interest rate. SMEs % .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.8 10.3 9.3 9.3 8.4 8.3 7.7 5.4
Interest rate. large
% .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.7 4.0 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.1
firms
Interest rate spread % points .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.1 6.3 5.5 5.3 4.7 4.5 4.0 2.3

 137
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
% of SMEs
needing collateral
Collateral. SMEs 44.0 .. 49.8 .. .. .. 72.8 .. 68.1 .. 59.9 .. .. ..
to obtain bank
lending
SME loan
Percentage of SME
applications/ total 32.9 .. 32.4 .. .. .. 26.4 .. 24.6 .. 26.2 .. .. ..
loan applications
number of SMEs
1-(SME loans
Rejection rate authorised/ 41.4 .. 15.0 .. .. .. 12.3 .. 14.7 .. 9.4 .. .. ..
requested)
SME loans used/
Utilization rate 86.6 .. 91.0 .. .. .. 87.9 .. 96.7 .. 89.3 .. .. ..
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth
CLP billion 26.7 19.3 22.2 27.1 33.9 43.1 30.8 43.2 34.7 40.0 21.9 39.2 54.9 48.3
capital
Venture and growth %. Year-on-year
.. -27.8 15.3 22.0 25.1 27.0 -28.5 40.1 -19.6 -100 -45.3 79 18.3 -12.0
capital (growth rate) growth rate
Leasing and hire
CLP billion 3.0 3.6 3.5 3.8 4.5 5.0 5.6 6.2 6.6 6.7 7.8 8.2 8.7 8.4
purchases
Factoring and invoicing CLP billion 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.8 4.4 4.7 4.4
Other indicators
Payment delays. B2B Number of days .. .. .. 75.8 74.9 56.7 52.7 55.2 58.0 54.9 56.0 51.8 60.5 53.8
Bankruptcies. SMEs Number 122 127 125 136 146 146 164 6 154 295 285 397 368 368
Bankruptcies. SMEs % year-on-year
.. 4.1 -1.6 8.8 7.4 0.0 12.3 -96.3 2 467 91.6 -3.4 39.0 15.36 0.00
(growth rate) growth rate

138 
9. Colombia
Access to finance is one of the main conditions for the growth of micro, small and medium-sized
companies. Financing allows them to make investments to increase their productivity, competitiveness,
and consolidation in the market. However, when there are difficulties in accessing sources of formal
financing, it is more difficult for MSMEs to make a choice between investing to modernise their operations
and innovate, or face crisis situations.
During 2020, and as the COVID-19 pandemic intensified this situation got worse given difficulties in the
development of markets and the impact of the pandemic on Colombian businesses (99% of which are
micro, small and medium-sized companies). As a result of the pandemic, the Colombian government
implemented lockdowns that led to a widespread decline in economic activity in most sectors.
Survey results from “Gran Encuesta Pyme - GEP 2020-1” for the first semester of 2020 from the National
Association of Financial Institutions show a significant deterioration in entrepreneurs’ perception about the
evolution of their businesses and consumer demand during the first half of the year. This was a radical
change from the recovery trend experienced in the pre-crisis years. The unfavorable perception is
explained by the shock caused by Covid-19 and the subsequent measures implemented to contain it, with
severe negative impacts on business activity and job creation.
Although the survey “Gran Encuesta Pyme - GEP 2020-1” is as comprehensive as possible (the sample
size of 1 957 companies with coverage in 18 of the 32 departments in which the country is politically
divided), the informal sector is difficult to capture. Despite the fact that there are few sources for the
estimates of the informal sector, from the Household Survey1 it is possible to affirm that informality
constitutes about 60% of companies.
Given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, SMEs undertook actions to continue their operations and
business obligations. Some of these actions were: (i) use of company’s cash; (ii) renegotiation of contracts
with suppliers; (iii) renegotiation of debts; (iv) negotiation with employees to advance vacation periods; and
(v) negotiation of layoffs with employees.
Some of the economic measures implemented for SMEs by the financial system and the government were:
longer grace periods and terms of existing credits; providing access to payroll and/or employee benefits
subsidies; tax benefits from national or territorial entities. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on
production levels and the economy as a whole, required the implementation of financial measures to
support companies from the National Government. This support focused on rediscounting credit lines,
through Bancóldex development bank, and the expansion of guarantee lines so that entrepreneurs who
did not have guarantees or collateral could make credit applications backed by the National Guarantee
Fund. The application of these measures to benefit business owners influenced the volume of credit
operations requested. Thus, in the industrial sector, the percentage of credit applications to the formal
financial system increased to 36% during the first half of 2020, in the commercial sector it increased by
38% and in the service sector it increased by 32%, compared to the figures presented in 2019.

 139
However, despite the growth in the volume of credit operations requested, the approvals of these requests
showed a decrease in the three macro sectors of the economy. In the industry sector, the approval rate
fell from 89% registered in 2019 to 72% in 2020; in the commercial sector it declined from 91% in 2019 to
71% in 2020; and in the service sector it fell from 84% in 2019 to 68% in 2020, caused by the greater
perception of risk on the part of the financial system. In addition, for the cut-off of the information presented
(first semester of 2021), the support that the government established to boost the supply of credit had not
yet come into operation.
Regarding the use of credit, most SMEs in the three sectors used it to finance working capital. The second
most frequent use of debt was the consolidation of liabilities, and the third was the purchase or rental of
machinery, particularly in companies from the industry sector.
The percentage of SMEs that accessed formal credit to satisfy their financing requirements declined from
42% in 2019 to 24% in 2020. The COVID-19 crisis intensified the already low participation of alternative
sources (such as leasing or factoring) in the financing of SMEs.
In 2020 due to COVID-19 pandemic, Colombia had the largest drop in production. In the second quarter
of 2020, Colombia's GDP fell 15.8% compared to the same period in 2019. Likewise, for the month of April
there was a drop in employment of 5.4 million people, which implies a reduction of employment of 24.5%
compared to the same period in 2019 according to the National Association of Financial Institutions.
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on production levels and the economy as a whole required the
implementation of financial measures to support companies from the National Government. This support
focused on rediscounting credit lines, through Bancóldex development bank, and the expansion of
guarantee lines so that entrepreneurs who did not have guarantees or collateral could make credit
applications backed by the National Guarantee Fund.
Table 9.1. Scoreboard for Colombia

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding COP billion 25.61 28.59 26.58 29.12 39.97 46.76 51.6 55.23 58.17 62.09 64.88 68.50 63.9 68.0
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding COP billion 78.4 94.7 95.9 113.8 134.8 152.8 171.3 197.2 226.3 243.2 251.8 253.6 261.2 272.4
Share of SME % of total 32.67 30.19 27.70 25.58 29.66 30.61 30.11 28.01 25.70 25.53 25.77 27.01 24.48 25
business
loans
New business COP billion 67.7 76.0 77.2 79.0 77.7 95.4 104.0 117.0 117.7 117.3 153.3 160.09 118.6 112.5
lending, total
New business COP billion 13.2 13.5 15.22 16.91 21.09 23.53 23.57 24.69 25.53 25.3 34.11 35.48 29.68 25.44
lending, SMEs
Share of new SME % of total 19.50 17.76 19.71 21.39 27.13 24.67 22.65 21.10 21.70 21.57 22.25 22.05 25.03 22.6
lending new lending
Outstanding short- COP billion 4.98 7.52 6.14 6.41 10 11.55 12.36 12.93 13.8 13.59 14.44 12.86 11.39 11.26
term loans, SMEs
Outstanding long- COP billion 20.63 21.07 20.44 22.71 29.97 35.22 39.24 42.3 44.37 48.5 50.44 55.63 52.62 56.77
term loans, SMEs
Share of short-term % of total 19.45 26.30 23.10 22.01 25.02 24.70 23.95 23.41 23.72 21.89 22.26 18.78 17.69 16.6
SME lending SME
lending
Government loan COP billion 0.56 1.39 1.82 1.94 5.46 6.19 7.14 7.51 7.72 10.52 11.53 9.40 11.48 15.20
guarantees, SMEs

140 
Government COP billion 2.23 2.59 2.98 3.16 7.26 9.12 10.81 11.96 12.69 15.37 16.51 15.22 16.27 23.66
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
loans
loans, SMEs SME loans
Interest rate, SMEs % 20.09 23.13 20.43 18.66 14.34 14.68 13.24 13.54 14.69 16.87 15.37 13.03 13.34 12.3
firms
Interest rate spread % points 5.13 5.43 5.45 5.06 5.64 6.24 5.77 6.02 6.92 7.20 6.21 6.71 7.30 7.0
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs 79.25 87.54 86.28 87.31 90.04 90.12 90.02 89.30 91.04 91.71 92.15 91.75 91.92 93.3
needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME SME loan 49 53 44.6 49.6 47 44 43.3 39.6 42.6 34 40 40 25 35
loan applications applications
/ total
number of
SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME 2 4 9 5 3 4 7 3 7.5 4 8 7 26 30
loans
authorised/
requested)
Utilisation rate SME loans 98 96 91 95 97 96 93 97 92.5 96 92 93 88 70
used/
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth COP billion .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.83 2.91 4.23 5.61 5.70 ..
capital
Venture and growth %, Year-on- .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 59 .3 45 .5 32.69 1.57 ..
capital (growth rate) year growth
rate
Leasing and hire COP billion .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 33.34 39.45 41.98 50.17 .. ..
purchases
Factoring and COP billion 5.77 6.04 7.15 7.01 12.85 10.55 17.56 23.75 31.47 25.77 25.53 26.58 .. ..
invoice discounting
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of 49 50 61 62 59 55 56 65 66 85 95 101 80.01 ..
B2B days
Bankruptcies, SMEs Number 1 12 18 40 59 76 83 85 131 193 443 608 661
Bankruptcies, SMEs %, Year-on- .. 1100 50 122.2 47.50 28.81 9.21 2.41 54.12 47.33 129.5 37.25 8.72
(growth rate) year growth
rate
Note
1
The Great Integrated Household Survey is a survey prepared by the National Department of Statistics of
Colombia, which requests information on the conditions of employment of people (whether they work, what
they work on, how much they earn, whether they have social security in health or whether they are looking
for employment). In addition to the general characteristics of the population such as sex, age, marital status
and educational level and it captures information about their sources of income.

 141
10. Czech Republic
The approach of SMEs to the financing of their business activities can be assessed as favorable for
established companies due to high bank liquidity. Banking and non-banking institutions, private individuals,
venture capital funds offer a wide portfolio of financial products. Established entrepreneurs do not have
a problem with access to bank loans, leasing and factoring. Alternative sources of financing include venture
capital, angel investments, bond issuance, crowdfunding and state support. However, the Czech Republic
is characterised by a weaker investment environment, which undermines the establishment of new
companies and the financing of new SME projects. While crowdfunding has become a popular tool for
obtaining the necessary financial resources, capital financing is underdeveloped compared to similarly
sized EU economies. There is a lack of willingness to invest in the early stages of business development
(pre-seed, seed, start-up and later stage venture). The market for angel investments is barely visible,
fragmented. However, the situation for innovators in the idea phase or start-ups is more complicated.
Investments in these entities appear to be high risk for investors and banks, mainly due to the absence of
relevant corporate history, lack of collateral or lack of information to assess their credit risk or valuation of
their intangible assets.
SMEs are very vulnerable, especially in terms of financing, and have a higher perception of financial risk
due to more frequent rejections of loan applications. The situation in this area has significantly improved
over the last few years. The 2019 EC survey states that the share of SMEs in the Czech Republic, which
cite the access to finance as the most significant problem, decreased from 12% in 2011 to 8% in 2019, to
increase again to 10% in 2020 as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. In terms of access to common
methods of financing, the Czech Republic is above average in several indicators showing the quality of
SMEs' access to finance. The most important direct sources of external financing for SMEs are credit lines
or overdrafts (52%), bank loans (43%) and leasing (50%). So far, capital financing is relevant for only 1%
of companies. In terms of the use of financing, between 2019 and 2020, investment in the development of
new products or services remained almost constant (around 25%). Most sources of finance are intended
to finance either fixed investments or inventories and working capital.
In 2020, there were roughly 1.18 million active enterprises in the Czech Republic. 99.85% of these firms
were SMEs with less than 250 employees each. Micro-firms dominated the business landscape,
comprising 96.4% of all SMEs in 2020. The total number of SME employees decreased by 42.8 thousand
in 2020 compared to 2019, i.e. by 1.8% to a total of 2.35 million employees. Given the situation caused by
the coronavirus epidemic, this decrease can be considered moderate.
Interest rates for SMEs decreased by 14.1% in 2020 compared to 2019. This decrease does not reach the
level of the minimum rates from 2016 and 2017. The interest rate spread between SMEs and large firms
increased by 0.43% to 1.13%. The recent development in interest rates was probably also due to the
response by the Central National Bank to the COVID-19 crisis, by proposing a banking package containing
a proposal to amend the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR-COVID). The measures also include the
application of a factor supporting SMEs.

142 
Venture capital investments reached their lowest level in 2016. Since then, they gradually increased until
2019, when VC investments reached EUR 24.3 million and re-investments jumped to EUR 125.5 million.
According to preliminary data, VC investments returned to pre-2019 levels in 2020. They reached EUR
14.2 million in VC, and reinvestments fell even more sharply, from EUR 125.5 million in 2019 to EUR 25.0
million in 2020.
Government support for SMEs and entrepreneurs primarily consists of measures in the areas of
developmental and operational financing, export support, support of the energy sector, development of
entrepreneurial skills and financial literacy of entrepreneurs, technical education and research, and
development and innovation.
The SMEs Support Strategy in the Czech Republic for the period 2021-2027 (SME 2021+) aims to
increase the productivity and competitiveness of SMEs, and at the same time to strengthen their
international position, inter alia in the field of research and innovation or the use of advanced technologies
and skills. The Strategy represents the key strategic document for the preparation of the European Union
(EU) cohesion policies over the 2021–27 programming period in the area of enterprise development. This
includes the Operational Programme Technologies and Applications for Competitiveness (OPTAC).
SME 2021+ includes several tools, such as government loan guarantees (National Development Bank –
former Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank), financing and insuring schemes for exporting
SMEs (Czech Export Bank and Export Guarantee and Insurance Corporation) and innovative businesses
(INOSTART programme), as well as a programme to draw financial resources from the EU Structural
Funds (Operational Programme Technologies and Applications for Competitiveness) which provides
support to SMEs through grants, preferential loans and guarantees.
As of 21 April 2020, the Ministry of Industry and Trade had announced three calls for the COVID
programme based on credit and guarantee instruments. Due to the emergence of COVID-19 and related
preventive measures, the COVID II program was launched in the spring 2020 as part of the EXPANSION-
guarantee program. Another program that tackles the effects of the pandemic is the COVID III program,
designed for SMEs and large enterprises. Other loan programs in 2020 were the ENERG program and the
ENERGY SAVINGS program. The goal of both programs is to reduce energy consumption
Within the COVID I program, the volume of loans provided was CZK 928 million. In the COVID II -
guarantees program, the volume of guaranteed loans was CZK 14.6 billion. In the COVID Prague
guarantees program, the volume of guaranteed loans was CZK 1.6 billion. COVID III program is intended
for companies with up to 500 employees, without distinction of SMEs; the volume of guaranteed loans was
CZK 18.1 billion.

 143
Table 10.1. Scoreboard for the Czech Republic

Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding CZK billion 555.03 527.55 550.08 587.91 589.68 610.79 621.39 652.59 702.81 725.63 762.99 794.7 829,8
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding CZK billion 850.76 784.07 783.54 831.21 840.59 871.58 890.23 935.36 994.86 1036.1 1097.39 1133.1 1135.1
business loans,
total
Share of SME % of total 65.24 67.28 70.20 70.73 70.15 70.08 69.80 69.77 70.64 70.03 69.53 70.14 73,10
business
loans
New business CZK billion 866.11 780.87 667.98 599.09 694.94 500.50 544.73 607.59 510.58 457.94 461.84 521.11 590.21
lending, total
New business CZK billion 207.24 147.74 123.40 124.12 129.83 86.66 97.76 118.28 100.46 101.24 97.92 92.27 119.82
lending, SMEs
Share of new % of total new 23.93 18.92 18.47 20.72 18.68 17.31 17.95 19.46 19.68 22.11 21.20 17.71 20,30
SME lending lending
Outstanding short- CZK million .. .. 73 626 72 433 77 853 45 531 40 360 41 742 36 974 33 918 29 835 22 107 20 917
term loans, SMEs
Outstanding long- CZK million .. .. 49 772 51 684 51 977 41 129 57 404 76 475 63 490 67 325 68 090 70 166 98 904
term loans, SMEs
Share of short- % of total .. .. 59.67 58.36 59.97 52.54 41.28 35.31 36.80 33.50 30.47 23.96 17,46
term SME lending SME lending
Government loan CZK million 3 529 6 369 6 593 472 1 534 3 251 4 010 6 913 3 530 4 014 6 485 9 786 22 423
guarantees, SMEs
Government CZK million 5 094 9 550 10 070 630 2 215 4 616 5 771 9 947 5 055 5 758 9 287 13 534 30 431
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Direct government CZK million 286 209 629 1 090 782 101 86 65 7 291 1 440 2 407 2 627
loans, SMEs
Non-performing CZK million 35 340 61 904 70 166 67 876 61 480 62 032 58 694 52 677 50 307 43 225 38 596 35 871 46 615
loans, total
Interest rate, % 5.57 4.64 4.01 3.73 3.48 3.13 3.76 2.70 2.50 2.50 3.14 3.80 3,26
SMEs
Interest rate, large % 4.84 3.46 3.34 2.63 2.43 1.89 2.00 1.80 1.80 1.90 2.62 3.10 2,13
firms
Interest rate % points 0.73 1.18 0.67 1.10 1.05 1.24 1.76 0.90 0.70 0.60 0.52 0.70 1,13
spread
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR million 104.0 219.7 153.8 18.3 9.5 23.3 34.6 12.4 9.4 16.3 18.7 149.8 39,21
growth capital
Venture and %, Year-on- .. 111.2 -30.0 -88.1 -48.1 145.4 48.3 -64.0 -24.6 73.9 14.8 800.1 -73,83
(growth rate) rate
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of 18.00 19.00 14.00 14.00 15.00 14.00 14.00 14.00 19.00 16.00 38.00 23.50 39,00
B2B days
Bankruptcies, Number 873 1 280 1 301 1263 1345 1379 1228 1001 904 769 649 680 609
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- .. 46.62 1.64 -2.92 6.49 2.53 -10.95 -18.49 -9.69 -14.93 -15.60 4.78 -10,44
rate) rate

144 
11. Denmark
In 2019, not counting non-employer enterprises, SMEs accounted for 98.7% of all enterprises and 39.1%
of all full-time employees in Denmark.
Lending to SMEs from financial institutions declined from DKK 68 billion to 56 billion between 2019 and
2020. The 2020 level was, however, higher than in the years 2016-2018. The share of new SME lending
compared to total new lending was 11.03% in 2020, slightly below the average of 11.68% in the period
2010-2020.
Survey data illustrates that credit conditions concerning corporate lending from banks to SMEs in Denmark
almost consistently tightened between 2018 and 2021, after having relaxed between 2014 and 2018. In
addition, the demand for new loans by new SME customers increased substantially between the first
quarter of 2020 and the first quarter of 2021, while the demand by existing SME customers was stable.
Interest rates for SMEs as well as for large firms have steadily declined since 2008, but the interest rates
for SMEs increased slightly in 2020, from 1.85% to 1.93%, resulting in a widening interest rate spread.
However, with the exception of 2019, the 2020 interest rate spread of 0.90% is the lowest since 2007.
Venture and growth capital financing from Danish private equity firms decreased in 2019 and 2020, after
reaching a record high of EUR 699 million in 2018. However, particularly the level of venture investments
remained high in historical comparison despite the effects of COVID-19 in 2020.
Due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the average payment delays increased dramatically to 20
days in 2020, after having been at an all-time low of 2 days in 2017 and 3 days in 2018 and 2019. However,
as a result of the extensive government support measures, the number of bankruptcies among SMEs
decreased from 2 153 in 2019 to 1 841 in 2020.
The COVID-19 support measures have, among other things, included loan and guarantee schemes
targeting SMEs. The loan schemes have allowed Vækstfonden (The Danish Growth Fund) to match the
investments of professional investors with a loan of three times the amount of the investment. The
guarantee schemes have allowed Vækstfonden and EKF (Denmark's Export Credit Agency) to cover 90%
of the risk on new loans from commercial banks to SMEs.
In 2020, government loan guarantees increased from DKK 512 million to 1 948 million, and government
guaranteed loans increased from DKK 1 246 million to 2 934 million.

 145
Table 11.1. Scoreboard for Denmark

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding DKK 732 809 814 812 809 830 860 914 940 989 1 033 1 080 1 126 1 168
business billion
loans, total
New business DKK 332 385 318 313 292 241 303 474 519 508 521 570 597 507
lending, total billion
New business DKK 41 35 28 35 34 39 37 55 73 51 52 49 68 56
lending, SMEs billion
Share of new % of total 12.29 9.15 8.96 11.21 11.70 16.25 12.07 11.51 14.10 10.12 10.08 8.60 11.36 11.03
SME lending new
lending
New short- DKK 26 26 22 23 24 20 22 34 35 31 29 27 24 26
term loans, billion
SMEs
New long-term DKK 14 9 6 23 10 19 15 21 38 21 23 22 44 30
loans, SMEs billion
term SME SME
lending lending
Government DKK 210 178 209 769 1 192 1 222 783 658 668 620 514 529 512 1 948
loan million
guarantees,
SMEs
Government DKK .. .. .. .. 17 61 286 746 1 076 1 257 1 377 1 225 1 246 2 934
guaranteed million
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, % 5.97 6.59 5.33 4.39 4.38 3.91 3.78 3.44 2.99 2.74 2.36 2.27 1.85 1.93
SMEs
Interest rate, % 5.23 5.68 3.63 2.49 2.40 2.14 1.73 1.65 1.53 1.34 1.23 0.98 1.07 1.03
large firms
spread
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR 263 205 159 280 186 270 241 230 339 554 532 699 475 424
growth capital million
Venture and %. Year- .. -22.34 -22.45 76.57 -33.49 45.13 -10.81 -4.73 47.66 63.33 -4.03 31.47 -32.03 -10.90
growth capital on-year
(growth rate) growth
rate
Other indicators
Payment Number 7.2 6.1 12.0 12.0 13.0 12.0 10.0 9.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 20.0
delays, B2B of days
Bankruptcies, Number .. .. 2 563 2 583 1 938 1 958 1 698 1 328 1 584 1 853 1 888 2 013 2 153 1 841
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %. Year- .. .. .. 0.78 -24.97 1.03 -13.28 -21.79 19.28 16.98 1.89 6.62 6.95 -14.49
SMEs (growth on-year
rate) growth
rate

146 
12. Estonia
In 2019, Estonian SMEs employed 79% of the workforce and accounted for 79.5% of total value added.
91.9% of all firms were micro-enterprises, i.e. firms with less than 10 employees, employing 33% of the
workforce and accounting for 29.2% of total value added in 2019.
Outstanding business loans to SMEs have been decreasing for 3 consecutive years. Even during the
COVID-19 crisis, SME outstanding loans declined despite the provision of cheap guarantees and direct
loans from the government. This can be explained by the increase in SME interest rates in 2020, as well
as the provision of public support through non-debt channels such as employment support and the deferral
of taxes and instalments. Furthermore, under the Estonian corporate income tax system all reinvested
profits are tax-free. Thus, companies have a strong incentive to re-invest their profits, which may be an
explanation for the low demand for loans. Loans under EUR 1 million, which are used as a proxy to describe
SME loans, may have become unreliable to depict SME activities. This is because the high inflation rates
in recent years may have pushed SMEs to contract larger loans.
The base interest rate on SME loans (up to EUR 1 million) decreased steadily from 4% in 2012 to slightly
below 3% in 2016. Since then, interest rates have started increasing again, reaching 3.28% in 2018 and
4.08% in 2020. For larger loans, the interest rate also moved upward to 2.77%. In 2020, the interest rate
spread reached a high for the last decade at 1.31%.
Venture and growth capital has been growing steadily in recent years. Estonia has a well-developed start-
up community that has good potential for raising venture capital. 2020 was a record year, with companies
raising EUR 453 million, a 72% year-on-year growth.
Leasing and hire purchases turnover declined sharply during the COVID-19 crisis, by about one-quarter
on a year-on-year basis, due to the general slowdown of economic activity and investment decisions being
postponed.
Table 12.1. Scoreboard for Estonia

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding
business loans, EUR billion 2.44 2.49 2.13 1.90 1.68 1.61 1.65 1.70 1.67 1.71 1.81 1.70 1.56 1.508
SMEs
Outstanding
business loans, EUR billion 6.80 7.20 6.86 6.46 5.95 6.15 6.25 6.44 6.80 7.34 6.93 7.17 7.18 7.518
total
% of total
Share of SME outstanding
35.83 34.55 31.01 29.37 28.28 26.24 26.45 26.40 24.56 23.23 26.1 23.7 21.7 20.06
outstanding loans business
loans

 147
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
New business
EUR billion 8.55 7.31 4.46 4.26 5.06 5.61 6.17 6.41 6.68 6.99 7.19 7.92 8.15 7.368
lending, total
New business
EUR billion 3.60 3.52 2.13 1.87 1.96 2.12 2.37 2.46 2.25 2.37 2.55 2.63 2.91 2.587
lending, SMEs
Share of new SME % of total
42.09 48.21 47.70 43.82 38.63 37.80 38.43 38.42 33.73 33.84 35.5 33.26 35.65 35.11
lending new lending
Short-term loans,
EUR million 480.5 475.1 377.1 317.8 325.9 302.3 317.4 333.4 300.8 314.8 320.1 299 263 199
SMEs
Long-term loans,
EUR billion 1.96 2.01 1.75 1.58 1.36 1.31 1.34 1.37 1.37 1.39 1.49 1.40 1.30 1.308
SMEs
Share of short- % of total
19.73 19.09 17.74 16.76 19.39 18.74 19.20 19.62 18.00 18.46 17.7 17.63 16.86 13.22
term SME lending SME lending
Government loan
EUR million 15 23 52 66 53 60 52 66 66 93 61 72 75 112.60
guarantees, SMEs
Government
guaranteed loans, EUR million 27 39 86 122 116 122 100 111 112 171 100 118 145 188.13
SMEs
Direct Government
EUR million 85.1
loans,SMEs
% of all
Non-performing
business 0.61 3.71 8.76 8.53 5.91 3.79 2.01 1.97 1.56 1.62 1.35 0.81 0.70 0.59
loans, total
loans
Non-performing % of all SME
0.95 3.59 7.36 8.17 6.31 5.18 3.27 2.96 2.79 2.88 1.94 1.99 2.19 2.09
loans, SMEs loans
Interest rate,
% 6.11 6.71 5.34 5.06 4.92 4.02 3.41 3.36 3.04 2.96 2.99 3.28 3.85 4.08
SMEs
Interest rate, large
% 5.68 6.13 4.21 3.90 3.76 3.05 2.86 2.68 2.05 2.08 2.12 2.13 2.56 2.77
firms
Interest rate
% points 0.43 0.58 1.14 1.16 1.16 0.98 0.56 0.68 0.99 0.88 0.87 1.15 1.29 1.31
spread
Non-bank finance
Venture and
EUR million .. 4.74 4.51 17.8 5.53 16.6 10.9 68.7 96. 6 105.7 272.6 329 364 453
growth capital
Venture and %, Year-on-
growth capital year growth .. .. - 5.00 293.7 - 68.8 200.2 - 34.3 530 40.6 9.4 157.9 19.3 -19 71.9
(growth rate) rate
Leasing and hire
EUR million 891.2 709.6 222.8 281.3 519.4 649.6 545.7 537.2 543 676 718 811 729 545
purchases
Factoring and
EUR billion 1.29 1.41 0.99 0.91 1.13 1.92 1.98 2.09 2.239 2.09 2.29 3 034 3451 2582
invoicing
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of
9 8.1 12.7 12.8 10.2 10.1 9.4 7 6.9 6 5.5 .. 6.4 ..
B2B days
Bankruptcies, Number 202 423 1055 1028 623 495 459 428 376 335 343 273 271 341
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- .. 109.4 149.4 - 2.56 - 39.4 - 20.5 - 7.27 - 6.75 - 12.1 - 10.9 2.39 -20.4 -1 25.8
rate) rate

148 
13. Finland
The Finnish economy had seen five years of continuous growth before the COVID-19 pandemic. The
COVID-19 pandemic and the uncertainty in the global economy resulted in a recession in Finland as GDP
declined 2.9% in 2020. The Finnish Government supported companies, investments and the availability of
financing during the pandemic.
About 99.1% of all employer firms are SMEs in Finland (79 435 companies), employing 57% of the labour
force. The SME share in employment goes up to 64% if non-employers are also included in the count. The
vast majority of SMEs (76.3%) are micro-enterprises with less than 10 employees. The decline in the
number of employer firms has continued in recent years, while the number of the self-employed has
increased.
The volume of new lending to SMEs increased in 2020, almost approaching its pre-financial crisis (2008)
level. New business lending to SMEs grew by 11.2% in 2020 in comparison to the previous year. Total
new lending to all enterprises increased 14.8%. SMEs’ strong demand for loans was supported by COVID-
19 economic measures to prevent bankruptcies, because restrictions on mobility and business activity
affected demand in Finland in 2020.
The average interest rate on small loans of up to EUR 1 million, which is used as proxy for the interest rate
on loans to SMEs, decreased between 2011 and 2020. The average interest rate was 2.0% in 2020. The
average interest rate charged on loans over EUR 1 million has remained at around 1.3% for two
consecutive years. The credit spread between small and large business loans indicates a loosening of
credit terms for SMEs compared to large enterprises. The interest rate spread was 0.69% in 2020, while it
was 0.97% in 2018.
According to the Finnish Venture Capital Association (FVCA), a record-high figure of EUR 951 million was
invested in start-ups and early-stage growth companies in Finland in 2020. The growth is seen as a
continuation of long-term efforts which have led to increasingly high quality start-ups and stronger VC
industry in Finland. Of the total sum, foreign investments accounted for EUR 543 million. Finnish Venture
Capital (VC) funds invested EUR 223 million and business angels invested EUR 36 million. Finland had
the most Venture Capital investments per GDP in 2018, 2019 and 2020.
Average payment delays surged to 17 days in 2020. There was a significant increase in payment delays
following the COVID-19 pandemic and during the economic downturn in Finland.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Business Finland and the Centres for Economic Development, Transport
and the Environment (ELY Centres) distributed coronavirus subsidies to companies (including SMEs) for
development activities. With these subsidies, companies were able to explore their development needs
and implement their development projects. For example, companies have used the support for
digitalisation.
In addition, the government also provided liquidity support to businesses. The business cost support is
intended for firms whose turnover has fallen significantly (-30%) as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

 149
The third application round for business cost support took place from 27 April to 23 June 2021, which is
used to cover firm’s fixed costs and wages. The aim of the cost support is to help businesses to withstand
the challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and to reduce the number of bankruptcies. SMEs can
receive support even if they were in difficulties 1 before January 2020. However, they are granted support
if the company is not in bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings at the time the support is granted and
has not received rescue or restructuring aid. The fourth application round for business cost support took
place from 17 August to 30 September 2021.
The number of bankruptcies decreased markedly by 19% in 2020 from the previous year. A part of the
decline is explained by temporary amendment of the bankruptcy law (May 1st 2020), which prevented
bankruptcies of those enterprises whose financial difficulties would most likely be temporary due the
COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.
Table 13.1. Scoreboard for Finland

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
business loans,
total
New business EUR billion 42.7 54.4 50.9 54.4 37.4 34.9 39.5 35.5 34.6 35.9 36.4 35.2 35.6 40.9
lending, total
lending, SMEs
Share of new SME % of total new 27.11 21.85 19.56 15.25 21.11 22.23 18.55 18.99 23.37 23.87 24.54 25.85 24.39 23.63
lending lending
Short-term loans, EUR million .. .. .. 839 1615 1613 1312 1149 1301 1361 1374 1359 1124 1414
SMEs
Long-term loans, EUR million .. .. .. 3 314 6 287 6136 6018 5583 6789 7219 7561 7747 7566 8249
SMEs
Share of short- % of total SME .. .. .. 20.20 20.44 20.82 17.90 17.07 16.08 15.86 15.38 14.92 12.93 14.63
term SME lending lending
Government loan EUR million 416 438 474 447 497 408 379 476 522 570 540 563 611 1100
guarantees, SMEs
Direct government EUR million 385 468 593 397 369 342 284 287 385 275 241 203 183 105
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all business .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.96 1.47 1.27 3.72 3.75 3.91
loans, total loans
Non-performing EUR million .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 423 1 119 994 3 170 3416 3785
loans, total
(amount)
Interest rate, % 5.39 5.58 3.02 2.66
3.23 2.86 2.81 2.74 2.39 2.23 2.14 2.21 2.13 2.02
SMEs
firms
Interest rate % points
0.56 0.50 0.78 0.73 0.64 0.79 0.90 0.82 0.93 0.90 0.79 0.97 0.80 0.69
spread
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs .. .. .. 33 34 36 42 41 38 36 33 31 30 30
needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
SMEs

150 
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans .. .. 6.98 4.92 3.12 8.08 7.06 6.71 6.24 5.59 6.76 4.15 6.11 8.74
authorised/
requested)
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR million 189 218 146 351 148 185 173 168 190 219 203 338 640 371
growth capital
Venture and %, year-on-year .. 15.34 -33.0 140.4 -57.8 25.0 -6.49 -2.89 13.10 15.26 -7.31 66.50 89.35 -42.0
(growth rate)
Leasing and hire EUR million .. .. 1 067 1 361 1 658 1 765 1 658 1 858 .. .. .. .. .. ..
purchases
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of days 6 5 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 2 17
B2B
Bankruptcies, Number 2 254 2 612 3 275 2 864 2 947 2 961 3 131 2 986 2 574 2 408 2 168 2 546 2623 2135
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, year-on-year .. 15.9 25.4 -12.5 2.9 0.5 5.7 -4.6 -13.8 -6.4 -9.97 17.44 3.02 -18.6
SMEs (growth growth rate
rate)
Note
1
A company in difficulty refers to a company in accordance with Article 2(18) of the General Block
Exemption Regulation of the EU.

 151
14. France
France has approximately 3.9 million small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which account for
99.9% of the total business population.
Outstanding SME loans increased by more than 27.24% between 2019 and 2020, reaching EUR 336 440
million in 2020 as a result of government support measures. Since 2014, the interest rate spread has
decreased from 0.8% to 0.3%. Furthermore, SMEs’ access to bank lending remained high in 2020: around
86% of SME requests for cash credits were fully or almost fully granted and 96% of SME requests for
investment loans were fully or almost fully served, a figure which has remained stable since the beginning
of 2017. The rejection rate has continued to decline (2.38% in 2020).
Private equity investments in French firms decreased in 2020 to EUR 17.8 billion, a drop of 8% compared
to 2019. 2 027 firms were financed via venture capital funds in 2020. The number of financing operations
by business angels decreased by 20% in 2020 (336 versus 422 in 2019).
Funds raised by crowdfunding platforms soared in the 2018-2020 period, from EUR 402 million to EUR
1 020 million. In 2020, funds raised through crowdfunding financed 13 796 SMEs.
Factoring volumes decreased by 7.5% in 2020 to EUR 323.5 billion, after increasing continuously since
2009. This fall can be linked to the decline in NFCs’ (non-financial corporations) turnover by 7.8% in 2020
compared to 2019, together with some sectoral aspects. Factoring remains the preferred method of short-
term financing in the car industry and since this sector was particularly hit by the pandemic, the recession
in this industry caused part of the fall in factoring volumes.
Payment delays reached 12.8 days in 2020, the highest since 2015. The increase started in 2020Q2 and
a high level of uncertainty led to a sharp increase in Q3, up to 14.4 days, before receding rapidly in Q4.
However, this fall was not enough to compensate for the rise of the previous quarters.
The number of SME bankruptcies collapsed by 38% in 2020, at around 31 000, thanks to the measures
implemented by the Government to face the economic consequences of the pandemic.
In terms of government SME financing policies, a government loan guarantee scheme was put in place to
respond to the cash needs of SMEs impacted by the COVID-19 crisis. The state guarantee covers 90% of
the loan for all SMEs. In May 2021, 673 139 firms had obtained government-guaranteed loans, for a total
amount of EUR 136.8 billion. The rejection rate was only 2.9%.
Moreover, several measures were put in place by the French government to strengthen firms’ balance
sheets in the context of economic downturn in 2020. First, the Economic and Social Development Fund
was provided with EUR 1 billion and equity loans were created to support firms with less than 49 employees
impacted by the pandemic. The French Government support for SMEs financing also took the form of a
guarantee provided to investors that provide equity loans or bonds. Furthermore, a recovery label was
created in order to mobilise the savings of the French.

152 
Credit mediation continued to assist French enterprises via an online platform. The number of requests
has skyrocketed in comparison with previous years, mostly due to the liquidity problems caused by the
global health crisis. In 2020, credit mediation benefited 6 332 SMEs and unlocked a total of EUR 2.98
billion of credit.
Table 14.1. Scoreboard for France

Indicator Unit 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR Billion 199 590 210 186 213 930 216 473 219 505 224 774 233 279 243 926 254 074 264 399 336 440
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding EUR Billion 974 126 1 012 381 1 009 868 1 026 203 1 036 865 1 079 436 1 131 289 1 195 722 1 262 083 1 339 620 1 510 342
business loans,
total
Share of SME % of total 20.5 20.8 21.2 21.1 21.2 20.8 20.6 20.4 20.1 19.7 22.3
business
loans
New business EUR Billion 9 052 34 600 7 752 1 565 18 942 35 009 43 799 56 141 58 737 51 560 141 309
lending, total
Outstanding short- EUR Billion 38 085 40 329 41 069 42 779 43 249 43 481 43 852 44 701 44 859 44 454 99 998
term loans, SMEs
Outstanding long- EUR Billion 104 029 111 576 118 952 125 477 129 902 132 779 137 234 144 177 153 378 153 144 238 694
term loans, SMEs
Share of short-term % of total 26.8 26.5 25.7 25.4 25.0 24.7 24.2 23.7 22.6 22.5 29.5
SME lending SME lending
Government loan EUR Billion 11 883 9 826 8 465 8 925 7 800 8 000 8 400 8 900 8 700 8 500 6 200
guarantees, SMEs
Government EUR Billion 5 326 4 231 4 157 4 394 4 783 4 984 5 229 5 103 5 095 4 805 5 873
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Non-performing % of all 4.6 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.3 2.5 2.4
loans
Interest rate, SMEs % 2.5 3.1 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.0
Interest rate, large % 1.6 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7
firms
Interest rate spread % points 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs 9.4 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.2 4.3 4.2 3.8 3.6
needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME SME loan 38.4 35.6 35.7 37.9 37.9 37.2 36.7 36.3 39.3
loan applications applications/
total number
of SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans 11.12 8.00 6.61 7.55 6.21 5.14 4.36 2.55 2.38
authorised/
requested)

 153
Utilisation rate SME loans 86.4 87.0 87.6 87.3 87.5 87.2 87.0 86.8 86.8 87.0 88.7
used/
authorised
Non-bank Finance
Venture and growth EUR Billion 2 915 3 537 2 389 2 469 3 234 4 610 4 727 4 378 5 073 6 240 6 425
capital
Venture and growth %, Year-on- 22.2 21.3 -32.5 3.3 31 42.5 2.5 -7.4 15.9 23.0 3.0
capital (growth year growth
rate) rate
Leasing and hire EUR Billion 8 472 8 125 6 591 6 086 5 713 7 122 7 654 7 827 8 361 8 665 9 028
purchases
Factoring and EUR Billion 20 654 22 457 22 596 24 798 25 568 27 968 31 042 36 101 37 592 39 813 35 020
invoice discounting
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of 12.0 12.2 11.8 12.1 12.2 13.3 11.9 11.1 10.9 11.3 12.8
B2B days
Bankruptcies, Number 60 288 59 446 61 062 62 503 62 369 62 985 58 013 54 428 53 917 51 100 31 238
SMEs (thousands)
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- -4.5 -1.4 2.7 2.4 -0.2 1.0 -7.9 -6.2 -0.9 -6.1 -42.1
SMEs (growth rate) year growth
rate

154 
15. Georgia
As of 2020, 99.6% of active enterprises in Georgia were SMEs1, which accounted for 59.3% of business
sector employment, 40.8% of business sector turnover and 58.0% (GEL 25.2 million) of output in the
business sector (GEL 43.5 million).
In recent years, credit to SMEs rose significantly, amounting to a staggering 407.5% increase from GEL 1
400 million in 2010 to GEL 7 105 million in 2020.2 Throughout this period, total business loans grew by
more than 298.9%, and the proportion of SME loans as a percentage of total business loans grew from
33.8% to 43%. During 2019-2020, real growth of SME loans amounted to 16.9%, while total business loans
grew by 15.9%.
The average interest rate charged to SMEs in Georgia is high by OECD standards, but it has significantly
declined over the last decade, from 17.5% in 2010 to 9.3% in 2020. Despite the pandemic-related
challenges, due to the increasing efforts to support access to finance for SMEs. Between 2019 and 2020
the interest rate charged to SMEs declined by 0.6 percentage points. As for the interest rate spread
between large enterprises and SMEs, it declined to 0.9% in 2020 from 1.2% in 2019 and 2.6% in 2010.
Although precise data on the availability and use of alternative financial instruments is lacking, available
evidence strongly suggests that Georgian SMEs are very dependent on the banking sector for meeting
their financing needs and that non-bank instruments still play a very marginal role. However, the rapid
growth of micro-financing organisations should not be neglected.
According to the World Bank Group's Doing Business indicator, Georgia ranked 7th in 2020 “ease of doing
business”. The Ease of Doing Business 2020 report shows that Georgia has increased public access to
information and thus improved in building quality control in 2018/2019. Currently, the country has the lowest
number of procedures required to start a business and register a property. Also, in getting credit indicator
Georgia ranked 15th in Doing Business 2020.
Georgia facilitated the enforcement of contracts by introducing random and automatic assignment of cases
to judges across courts. Most notably, the country improved its insolvency framework by making insolvency
proceedings more accessible for debtors and creditors, improving provisions on the treatment of contracts
during insolvency, and granting creditors greater participation in important decisions during the
proceedings. According to the information from the Public Registry Agency, after a 35.95% growth in the
number of liquidation procedures in 2019, the indicator saw a 29.33% decrease in 2020, reaching 147
cases total.
In 2020, due to Covid-19 global pandemic, the overall volume of non-performing SME loans exceeded
GEL 974 million (143% increase from 2019), the highest level since 2010, and the share of non-performing
SMEs loans is now at 9.8% (4.8% increase from the last year). Although, it needs to be noted, that in 2020
the total volume of non-performing loans increased by 126% (from 4.93% in 2019 to 9.75% in 2020) out
of which, the contribution of SMEs non-performing loans was 40.6 percentage points, and other loans
contribution was 85.9 percentage points. The lowest level of SME share of non-performing loans was in
2014 when it reached 4.2%.

 155
The government of Georgia has prioritised SME development as the main source of private sector growth,
job creation and innovation. For instance, the Innovation and Entrepreneurship Policy is one of the
successful reforms the Georgian Government has conducted.. Through the budgetary support, in 2014,
the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia established two sister agencies,
Georgia’s Innovation and Technology Agency (GITA) and Enterprise Georgia, with the main objective of
promoting SME development and strengthening SME competitiveness. Both agencies provide financial
support to SMEs, as well as a broader range of services that includes access to special infrastructure,
mentoring, trainings and various advisory services. In addition to the establishment of these two agencies,
the government of Georgia has introduced several private sector development programmes, which include
financial and technical assistance components to support SMEs at different stages of development.
The Covid-19 pandemic has delivered the largest economic shock the world economy has witnessed in
decades. Response measures such as lockdowns and travel restrictions, have negatively affected
consumption, investments, financial and commodity markets, global trade and tourism.
Like the rest of the world, Georgia’s positive economic trajectory has also been interrupted. In 2020, the
economy shrank by 6.8%. In 2021 strong economic recovery was observed in Georgian economy, in
January-September economic growth amounted to 11.0 percent. The preliminary results of economic
activity in 2021 are more positive than previously forecasted and Government of Georgia expects 10%
economic growth in 2021. According to IMF projections, Georgia is projected to have the fastest economic
recovery in the medium term among regional peers and European countries. Consequently, in 2021-2026
average annual growth is projected at 5.8% supported by infrastructure spending and sustained structural
reforms to increase productivity and enhance private sector-led growth.
The Government’s Anti-Crisis Economic Plan consisted of various emergency measures to support the
economy and mitigate the effects of the pandemic. These measures included income tax payment
deferrals, automatic VAT refund mechanism, granting businesses opportunity to restructure loans,
providing commercial banks with long-term resources to solve liquidity problem, reshaping existing or
developing new government programmes to support individual economic sectors based on their needs,
and specific support measures in tourism, agriculture and construction sectors. Georgia has also facilitated
contract enforcement by introducing random and automatic assignment of cases to judges across courts.
Importantly, Georgia has improved its insolvency framework by making insolvency proceedings more
accessible for debtors and creditors, improving provisions on the treatment of contracts during insolvency,
and granting creditors greater participation in important decisions during the proceedings. According to
information from the Public Registry Agency, after a 35.95% growth in the number of liquidation procedures
in 2019, this indicator saw a 29.33% drop in 2020, reaching 147 cases in total.

156 
Table 15.1. Scoreboard for Georgia

Indicators Units 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Business loans, GEL million
..
SME 1 400 1 548 1 738 2 051 2 422 3 621 3 992 5 176 6 620 8 121 9 987
Business loans, GEL million
3 097
total 4 145 4 821 5 344 6 080 7 268 9 575 10 500 12 000 14 687 19 070 23 242
Business loans, % of total
SMEs business .. 33.8% 32% 32% 33.7% 33.3% 38% 38% 43.1% 45.1% 42.6% 43.0%
loans
Non-Performing GEL million
926
Loans, total 784 666 810 791 988 1 202 1 380 1 337 1 480 1 414 3 203
Non-performing GEL million
..
loans, SMEs 145 134 111 102 101 161 206 221 407 400 974
Non-performing % of all
loans, total business .. 16.1% 11% 12% 10.7% 10.6% 9.8% 10.1% 7.7% 6.6% 4.9% 8.4%
loans
Non-performing % of total
.. 10.3% 8.7% 6.4% 5.0% 4.2% 4.4% 5.2% 4.3% 6.1% 4.9% 9.8%
loans, SMEs SME loans
Interest rate, SME % .. 17.5% 16% 15% 12.9% 11.6% 13% 10.2% 10.4% 10.5% 9.9% 9.3%
Interest rate, large %
.. 14.9% 15% 13% 11.4% 10.2% 10% 9.6% 9.3% 9.3% 8.7% 8.4%
firms
Interest rate
.. 2.6% 1.0% 2.3% 1.5% 1.4% 2.4% 0.6% 1.0% 1.2% 1.2% 0.9%
spread
Collateral, SMEs % .. .. .. .. 95.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Rejection rate % .. .. .. .. 4.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Utilization rate % .. .. .. .. 95.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Other indicators
Procedures of Number 52 2 094 3 176 2 524 1 775 1 785 1 560 229 293 153 208 147
enterprises'
liquidation (incl.
bankruptcy)
Procedures of Year-on-year -14.75 3 926.9 51.67 -20.5 -29.68 0.56 -12.6 -85.3 28 -47.78 35.95 -29.33
enterprises' growth rate
liquidation (incl. (%)
bankruptcy)
Notes
1
According to a new methodology introduced by the Georgian National Statistics Office in 2016 to gather
statistics on the country’s SMEs and in pursuant of the National Strategy of SME development.
2
Figures are inflation-adjusted with 2010 as the base year.

 157
16. Germany
Policy developments
The financing situation of medium-sized companies was still very good in the first two months of
2020.However, with the onset of the Corona pandemic at the end of the first quarter of 2020, companies
were faced with dramatic revenue shortfalls.
In order to counteract the negative economic effects of the Corona crisis, the German government very
quickly initiated extensive measures. With the “Corona Shield”, the federal government stabilized the
economy, mobilized massive financial resources for employees, the self-employed and companies. A
central pillar is the KfW Special Programme, which ensured companies quick access to urgently needed
liquidity loans. The programme will run until the end of 2021.
As part of the Corona Shield, a package of measures for start-ups and SMEs have also made an important
contribution to stabilising the market for equity capital in Germany. This package of measures is available
in addition to the existing equity and venture capital financing instruments from the ERP Special Fund.
Now, even after the targeted measures to avert the economic consequences of the pandemic have or will
come to an end, the task is to help the German economy emerge safely from the crisis. To this end, the
differentiated range of support programmes funded by the ERP Special Fund is available and is being
continuously refined.
Programmes
Credit-based financing for start-ups until the end of 2021
The ERP Special Fund provides for a differentiated and well-established system of promotional loan
instruments for different start-up phases. The loan programmes – ERP-Gründerkredit Startgeld (ERP Start-
Up Loan-Start-Up Money), Gründerkredit Universell (ERP Start-Up Loan-Universal) and ERP-Kapital für
Gründung (ERP Capital for Start-Ups) – provide particularly low-interest loans with a long maturity for start-
ups as well as business succession. In some of these programmes, banks providing the financing are
relieved from a portion of the credit default risk. ERP-Capital for Start-Ups provides subordinated loans
with favourable interest rates in order to strengthen the company's equity base and thereby to facilitate
further external financing.
The COVID-19 pandemic has put many companies in economic distress. In many cases, corporate
financing is facing major challenges. In order to cushion the effects of the pandemic, the large-volume KfW
Special Programme for medium-sized and large companies was available from 23 March 2020 until end-
December 2021. It provided access to liquidity loans for companies that were temporarily in difficulty due
to the crisis. It was open to commercial enterprises of all sizes and to the liberal professions. The KfW
Special Programme is based on the [ERP-Gründerkredit Universell] # ERP Start-up Loan - Universal and
[KfW-Unternehmerkredit] # KfW Entrepreneur Loan programmes, the conditions of which have been
modified and expanded. Working capital loans as well as investment loans are granted. A key element of

158 
success here is that the German Promotional Bank (KfW) exempts banks and savings banks from up to
90% of the credit default risk. This means that the state assumes this level of credit risk, making it easier
for banks and savings banks to grant loans.
As a variant of the KfW Special programme, the KfW [KfW-Schnellkredit 2020] # Fast Loan 2020 has been
available since 15 April 2020 with a 100% release from liability of the house banks. The aim is to support
companies regardless of the number of employees and the self-employed through small-sized KfW loans
with fast lending.
Credit-based financing post-Corona pandemic for start-ups from 2022
In order to provide the best possible support for SMEs in the post-pandemic period and in their
transformation to a sustainable and digital economy, ERP funding will be restructured and further
developed in the area of commercial SME financing from 2022. The core components are a simplification
of the funding programmes and an improvement of the conditions. The re-organisation is intended to put
almost all groups of companies in a better position, particularly with regard to interest rate reductions.
Equity and venture capital financing
KfW Capital
On the basis of a decision by the Bundestag, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of
Finance and the KfW drafted an overall concept for an organisationally independent, growth-oriented
venture capital company; it started operations as “KfW Capital” in October 2018. KfW Capital plans to
double the annual amount of funding to EUR 400 million from 2021 onwards. This takes place via
investments in venture capital funds, particularly as part of the ERP-VC Fund Investments programme as
well as of the ERP/Future Fund Growth Facility as a module of the ‘Zukunftsfonds’. KfW Capital aims to
improve the quality of venture capital funding. The aim is to develop a product structure in which the
individual financing phases are coordinated throughout the entire company lifecycle.
ERP-Financing-Instruments in cooperation with the European Investment Fund

(EIF)
ERP Special Fund and EIF have been cooperating very successfully in the field of equity and mezzanine
financing for over 15 years. This makes an important contribution to ensuring that innovative start-ups in
Germany have access to capital. The financing instruments include the ERP/EIF Venture Capital Fund of
Funds with a total fund volume of EUR 3.7 billion (including the European Angels Fund Germany with a
volume of EUR 400 million); the ERP/EIF/Länder Mezzanine Fund of Funds with a total fund volume of
EUR 600 million; and the co-financing of the GFF-EIF Growth Facility (total volume of up to EUR 3.5
billion).
Zukunftsfonds (Future Fund)
The Zukunftsfonds, set up by the Federal Government in 2021, is providing EUR 10 billion for a venture
capital fund for forward-looking technologies (‘Future Fund’) to the KfW to foster the German venture
capital market over the next 10 years. Taking into account the contributions from private and public-sector
partners, this new Future Fund, with financial contributions from the ERP Special Fund, aims to mobilise
at least EUR 30 billion in start-up funding. The overarching principle of the Future Fund is to broaden the
German VC market by requiring a substantial private-sector investment contribution, also for the sake of

 159
market principles and in compliance with European competition and state-aid rules. The new fund
addresses all development phases of start-up financing – with a special focus on start-ups going through
the capital-intensive scale-up phase – with a set of closely interlinked modules, comprising both a
qualitative and quantitative expansion of existing instruments and the development of new modules to
increase start-up funding.
Within the Future Fund, the ERP/Future Fund Growth Facility will provide a total of EUR 2.5 billion to
increase fund volumes and facilitate larger financing rounds for the period up to 2030. In the same vein,
the new GFF-EIF Growth Facility, with a volume of up to EUR 3.5 billion, as well as the DeepTech Future
Fund, have been established. A fund-of-funds for growth capital, for example, aims in particular to mobilise
capital of institutional investors for start-ups. Further instruments and components of the Future Fund will
be planned and implemented throughout 2022, such as a separately managed account module with a
planned volume of up to EUR 2 billion and the expansion of the Venture Tech Growth Financing
programme.
High-Tech Gründerfonds (HTGF)
The High-Tech Gründerfonds (HTGF) is an early-phase funding programme for highly innovative and
technology-oriented companies whose operative business activities started less than three years ago. To
be eligible for financing, projects must have shown promising research findings, be based on innovative
technology, and have strong market prospects. In addition to providing capital, the fund ensures that the
management of young start-ups receives the necessary help and support. An initial funding amount of up
to EUR 1 million is provided, with a total of up to EUR 3 million usually being available per company. In the
first phase of the fund (up to November 2011), a total of EUR 272 million was made available. The follow-
up fund (HTGF II) provided total funding of EUR 304 million. A third fund, HTGF III, was launched in autumn
2017. In addition to the support from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and KfW Capital, more than
30% of the EUR 319.5 million fund has been provided by 33 private investors – either well-established
SMEs or large corporations. In 2021 preparations for a follow-up fund (HTGF IV) were started.
DeepTech Future Fonds
The DeepTech Future Fonds (DTFF) is a new high-tech (deep-tech) investment fund that is financed by
the Zukunftsfonds (Future Fund) and the ERP Special Fund. It has been launched with the task of helping
deep-tech companies with validated business models to achieve sustainable growth while retaining their
independence. The DTFF will always invest together with private investors. Acting as an anchor investor,
its goal is to guide deep-tech companies on their journey towards capital market readiness. Based on this
long-term perspective, the fund aims to bolster Germany’s profile as a hub of innovation and enhance its
appeal for high-tech firms in the long term. Over the next ten years, the DTFF will be able to leverage a
prospective total investment volume of up to EUR 1 billion. The fund will run for at least 25 years, with
High-Tech Gründerfonds assuming responsibility for its management.
Coparion
Since 2018 Coparion has provided funding for young and innovative companies at the same commercial
terms as its private-sector lead investors. The investment of Coparion is limited to EUR 15 million per
company. Coparion is able to allocate the maximum amount over several financing rounds. As a result,
the EUR 275 million fund enables innovative young companies to draw on funding worth at least EUR 550
million. This makes Coparion an important player in the German venture capital market. The fund’s

160 
resources are provided by the ERP Special Fund, KfW Capital and the European Investment Bank (EIB).
Currently Coparion has 44 companies in its portfolio.
Mikromezzaninfonds (Micro-Mezzanine Fund)
The Micro-Mezzanine Fund was launched in 2013 and provides dormant equity of up to EUR 50 000 for
small companies and business starters and up to EUR 150 000 for companies within the special target
group. The fund’s special target group are companies that provide training, are operated by women or
people with a migrant background, or were founded by people who were formerly unemployed. Social
enterprises operating commercially are also eligible to apply for financing on the terms of the special target
group, as are companies with a focus on environmentally-compatible production. Both the European Social
Fund (ESF) and the ERP Special Fund finance the fund. The volume of the first fund was EUR 74.5 million.
The current fund (MMF II) has a volume of EUR 153.2 million.
Venture Tech Growth Financing
At the end of 2018, the KfW programme Venture Tech Growth Financing (VTGF) commenced operations.
As part of this programme, KfW can issue EUR 50 million of venture capital loans to innovative fast-growing
tech companies each year. Until 2022, up to EUR 500 million in funding will be made available together
with private-sector investors to start-ups in the growth phase. Beyond this period, the VTGF programme is
to be expanded up to a volume of EUR 1.3 billion with contributions from the Future Fund.
INVEST–Zuschuss für Wagniskapital (INVEST – Grant for Venture Capital)
INVEST is a grant programme run by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. It was set up in 2013 and
further developed in 2017 to support private investors who want to acquire a stake in young and innovative
companies. Under this programme, business angels who invest in innovative start-ups receive an
acquisition grant worth 20% of the sum invested. In addition, natural persons can receive an exit grant if
they sell their shares. The amount provided is equivalent to 25% of the capital gains from the sale and thus
more or less covers the tax imposed on the profit from the sale. The shares must be held for a minimum
of three years. Both grants are tax-free for the investor. Funding can be provided for a maximum of
EUR 500 000 of investment per investor and per year. The maximum amount eligible for funding that can
be invested in a single company per year is EUR 3 million.

 161
17. Greece
94.6% of Greek businesses (680 038) are micro-enterprises employing less than 10 employees, 4.8% (34
701) are small enterprises, 0.5% (3 819) are medium-sized enterprises, and 0.1% (522) are large
enterprises
During 2020 and during the first quarter of 2021, economic activity declined significantly due to the COVID-
19 pandemic and measures to reduce it. Real GDP shrank by 8.2% in 2020, mainly due to declining service
exports and private consumption. The decline in consumer demand also resulted in the depletion of SMEs’
liquidity, which swiftly turned to different sources of finance. As a result, in 2020, new business lending to
Greek SMEs increased 1.75 times in relation to 2019. The significant acceleration of bank lending to
enterprises was also facilitated by the improvement of the conditions under which banks derived financial
resources from the Eurosystem, as well as by the significant support provided by bank lending/co-financing
schemes and guarantees offered by the Hellenic Development Bank.
However, despite the increase in new lending, outstanding credit to all businesses and to SMEs fell for the
eighth year in a row, reaching EUR 66.6 billion in 2020. The continual decline of SME outstanding stock of
loans coincided with a moderate economic recovery between 2014 and 2019. Nonetheless, in 2020 the
decline in the outstanding stock of SME loans was driven by a significant removal of non-performing loans
(NPLs) from Greek banks’ balance sheets (from 36.1% of total loans in 2019 to 28.5% of total loans in
2020) through the introduction in late 2019 of the “Hercules” asset-protection scheme.
Interest rates for both SMEs and large firms fell for the eighth year in a row in 2020, reaching 3.94% and
2.83% respectively, but the spread between the two increased (1.11) compared to 0.85 in 2018. This
explains the risk-averse approach of Greek banks against SMEs particularly during the pandemic. Credit
conditions tightened significantly and access to finance continues to be a central problem for Greek SMEs,
according to the most recent ECB Survey on Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), with 18% of Greek
SMEs citing access to finance as the most important problem they currently face, compared to an EU-28
average of 9%. Furthermore, Greece shows the highest percentage of SMEs reporting difficulties in
accessing bank loans (22%) and the highest proportion of SMEs reporting fear of application rejections in
the EU.
The proportion of Greek SMEs that required collateral when they applied for a loan to a bank continued to
decrease, to 18.4% in 2020 compared to 20.7% in 2018. The rejection rate declined to 12.3% compared
to 2018 (20.5%) but increased slightly compared to 2019 (11.4%).
In 2020, alternative sources of finance were hard hit in Greece. Factoring decreased to EUR 1.89 million
compared to EUR 1.96 million in 2019, leasing and hire purchase activities also decreased in 2020,
reaching EUR 3.3 billion compared to EUR 4.2 billion in 2017. Venture capital was also strongly hit
compared to 2019, declining by 46.7% in 2020 and reaching EUR 78.8 million from EUR 148.3 million in
2019.
The percentage of SME non-performing loans related to all SME loans was 28.5% in 2020 and has
declined for the fifth year in a row since 2016, when it had reached 43.2%. Such decline is explained by

162 
public programmes such as the Hercules Programme that assists commercial banks in securitising and
removing NPLs from their balance sheets. Despite this, in 2020, almost 20% of all business loans were
non-performing in Greece.
As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Greek government put in place several measures to tackle
the impact of the crisis on SMEs. One of the measures in place was the “COVID-19 guarantee Fund”
providing a guarantee coverage of up to 80% per loan. During the first cycle, the guarantee rate was set
at 80% per loan, while the maximum guarantee was set at 40% for a loan portfolio to SMEs and 30% for
a loan portfolio to large companies. An additional budget of EUR 780 million was added on the second
cycle of the COVID guarantee fund, so the total available funds of the two cycles amounted to EUR 1.78
billion. In the second cycle of the Fund the provision of the guarantee paid by the companies is fully
subsidised. 75% to 90% of the new loans of the second cycle of the Guarantee Fund are addressed with
priority to MSMEs.
Table 17.1. Scoreboard for Greece

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR billion .. .. .. 44.9 41.6 39.1 48.1 48.1 46.9 48.4 44.7 41.1 35.2 32.0
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding EUR billion 102 124 124 117 113 101 97 95 89 88 82 76.4 67.3 66.6
Share of SME % of total outstanding .. .. .. 38.5 36.8 38.8 49.7 50.6 52.6 55.3 54.4 53.8 52.3 48.1
outstanding loans business loans
New business EUR billion .. 36.5 36.3 20.7 29.4 21.8 24.3 14.9 6.9 5.8 7.3 11.4 7.9 16.2
lending, total
New business EUR billion .. 12.5 13.0 4.4 5.2 4.1 3.7 2.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 3.5
lending, SMEs
Share of new SME % of total new lending .. 34.2 35.6 21.4 17.8 18.9 15.0 15.6 17.0 18.4 15.5 10.18 16.05 31.8
lending
Outstanding short- EUR billion .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.1 17.6 18.8 17.0 15.1 13.4 9.5
term loans, SMEs
Outstanding long- EUR billion .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 30.1 29.3 29.6 27.7 25.9 21.7 22.5
term loans, SMEs
Share of short-term % of total SME lending .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 37.6 37.6 38.9 38.0 58.4 61.6 42.3
SME lending
Government loan EUR billion .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.37 0.31 0.24 0.56 1.08 1.2 1.3 3.9
guarantees, SMEs
Non-performing % of all business loans 4.60 4.30 6.70 8.70 14.2 23.4 31.8 29.4 31.0 30.3 30.5 28.6 25.5 19.1
loans, total
Non-performing % of all SME loans .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 41.2 44.1 43.2 42.5 38.1 36.1 28.5
loans, SMEs
firms
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs needing .. .. 51.4 40.5 49.4 46.7 45.9 46.2 49.2 39.8 25.7 20.7 18.5 18.4
collateral to obtain
bank lending
Percentage of SME SME loan applications/ .. .. 37.9 39.6 30.8 29.9 21.4 25.5 18.8 21.5 17.5 23.0 23.9 31.3
loan applications total number of SMEs
authorised/ requested)

 163
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Utilisation rate SME loans used/ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth EUR million 19.0 32.7 16.7 25.0 10.1 .. 4.8 12.6 36.8 38.0 44.5 84.1 147.1 78.8
capital
Venture and growth %, Year-on-year .. 72 -49 50 -60 .. .. 160 193 3 17 88.8 74.87 -46.86
Leasing and hire EUR billion 7.28 7.87 7.50 7.28 6.85 6.22 3.36 4.08 4.72 4.40 4.25 3.96 3.39 3.32
purchases
Factoring and EUR billion 1.28 1.73 1.77 1.73 1.49 1.53 1.41 1.69 1.69 1.72 1.74 1.93 1.96 1.89
invoice discounting
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of days .. 25 34 30 35 40 43 41 36 47 47. 33 17 ..
B2B
Bankruptcies, SMEs Number 513 359 355 355 445 415 392 330 189 108 123 114 63 ..
Bankruptcies, SMEs %, Year-on-year .. -30 -1 0 25 -7 -6 -16 -43 -43 14 -7 -23.17 ..

164 
18. Hungary
According to the preliminary data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, at the end of 2019, 836 020
enterprises operated in Hungary, 97.72% of which (817 012 enterprises) qualified as SMEs. Based on the
European Commission’s data on the business economy that ensures comparability between EU member
states, the number of persons employed by Hungarian SMEs somewhat exceeds the EU average.
Meanwhile the value added generated by these SMEs stands slightly below the EU average.
Hungary had a significantly lower economic downturn in 2020 (-5.0%) than the EU average (- 6.2%), partly
due to the economic protection measures and industry's favourable performance in comparison to the rest
of the EU.
Despite the coronavirus outbreak, investment rates remained high in Hungary at 27.5% as a percentage
of GDP. The pick-up in investment performance was mainly driven by real estate (+12%), public
administration (+33%), education (+31%) and, partly related to the epidemic, health (+45%) branches. The
high level of investment can also be the result of conditional grants to enterprises based on the
implementation of projects within a limited timeframe, which may have incentivised and accelerated
investment decisions from SME owners.
The share of high-tech companies in exports is high in Hungary, providing a good basis for increasing the
share of high value added activities.
The unemployment rate in Hungary (4.3%) was the 5th lowest in April among EU member states. There is
a strong labour market with sufficient labour market reserve for restarting the economy.
SME loans (loans up to EUR 1 million) expanded by 13.2% in 2020. The average interest rate of forint
SME loans experienced a slight increase, at 2.6% by the fourth quarter of 2020. The average interest rate
of high-amount HUF loans increased to 2% by the end of 2020.
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic shock, venture activity experienced a strong increase throughout Europe
and in Hungary in 2020 compared to the previous year. During 2020, EUR 226.3 million was invested into
Hungarian companies through 236 transactions. There was a 15% increase in the total number of
transactions, and 36% increase in the total invested amount compared to 2019. In 2020 the total amount
of newly raised funds took a hit.
In case of Hungarian companies receiving investments, the two largest sectors by total invested amount
were Financial and Insurance activities and ICT (Information and communications technology), which
together accounted for 52% of total investment value and 41% of total number of investments. In 2020,
the largest transactions (considering average deal size) occurred in the Financial and Insurance activities
and Transportation, with average deal size of EUR 4.1 million and EUR 2.0 million respectively. The most
significant difference between industry and market statistics were reported in the Financial and Insurance
sector, showing a larger interest for companies operating in this sector by foreign investors. In this sector,
the average deal size was EUR 4.1 million according to market statistics versus 1.4 million according to
the industry statistics.

 165
As a response to the COVID-19 crisis, the measures introduced by the Government (under the Economic
Protection Action Plan) had the objective of preserving jobs and supporting businesses with liquidity
problems. Since March 2020, the government mobilised in total HUF 9 500 billion through various
measures to stimulate the economy, which could enter the economy by the end of 2021.
In 2020, it was decided to launch investment support programmes with an amount of nearly HUF 1 000
billion, which could lead to nearly HUF 2 000 billion development in the near future.
The Economic Relaunch Action Plan was designed to gradually ease conditions and relaunch economic
activities in three phases. In the first phase, HUF 100 billion in Interest Free Restart Fast Loan were
provided by the Hungarian Development Bank (MFB). The second phase focuses on strengthening higher
education, and the third phase concentrates on enhancing green energy, circular economy construction
and full digitisation of the economy.
Table 18.1. Scoreboard for Hungary
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding business HUF Billion 5 280 5 823 5 379 4 783 4 797 5 014 5 064 4 831 4 942 4 411 4 674 4 691 5 122 5 626
loans, SMEs
Outstanding business HUF Billion 8 466 9 613 8 959 8 770 8 825 7 892 7 648 7 761 7 355 7 073 7 545 8 562 8 715 9 836
loans, total
Share of SME % of total outstanding 62.36 60.58 60.05 54.54 54.36 63.53 66.21 62.25 67.20 62.37 59.31 54.7 58.77 57.2
New business lending, HUF Billion 3 851 4 384 3 660 3 531 3 585 3 870 4 662 4 302 3 665 4 187 4 443 3 743 4 670 4 738
SMEs
Short-term loans, SMEs HUF Billion 2 473 2 966 2 832 2 775 2 767 3 052 2 654 2 570 2 424 2 708 2 727 2 002 2 417 2 113
Long-term loans, SMEs HUF Billion 1 377 1 418 828 756 818 818 2 008 1 732 1 241 1 478 1 274 1 741 2 252 2 624
Share of short-term % of total SME 64.23 67.66 77.37 78.59 77.18 78.86 56.93 59.75 66.14 64.69 68.16 53.48 51.77 44.61
SME lending lending
Government loan HUF Billion 308.8 352.1 409.2 377.1 343.4 251.9 350.0 346.2 348.7 469.3 525.7 725.5 707.1 1 193
guarantees, SMEs
Government HUF Billion 381.4 436.4 600.3 472.0 437.2 314.8 458.0 433.8 429.4 568.6 731.0 894.2 934.8 1 561
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Non-performing loans, HUF Billion .. .. .. 832 1 155 1 272 1 124 961 697 577 526 472 334 336
total (amount)
Non-performing loans, % of all business 3.10 4.70 10.10 12.8 17.4 17.7 16.1 13.7 9.6 5.4 3.3 5.5 3.83 3.42
total loans
Non-performing loans, % of all SME loans 5.40 8.90 12.8 15.9 20.5 18.6 20.7 13.7 6.3 4.4 3.5 6.18 1.39
SMEs
Interest rate, large firms % 8.97 10.28 11.07 .. .. 8.9 5.9 4.1 2.4 2.8 1.8 2.0 1.3 1.58
Interest rate spread % points 1.22 0.97 1.24 .. .. 0.80 1.50 1.00 2.30 1.40 1.50 0.44 1.67 0.30
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs needing .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 71 64.5 60.1 53.4 ..
bank lending
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans .. .. .. .. .. .. 68.8 67 84.4 71.6 49.2 ..
authorised/
requested)
Utilisation rate SME loans used/ .. .. .. .. .. .. 81.5 .. .. .. .. ..
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth HUF Million ('000 3 949 13 782 720 6 982 11 19 15 18 27 12 11 28 661 28
capital 000) 308 361 880 759 742 070 470 803

166 
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Venture and growth %, Year-on-year .. 249.00 -94.8 869.72 61.96 71.22 -18 18.13 47.89 -56.5 -4.97 149.88
Leasing and hire HUF Million ('000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 490 483 538 677 734
purchases 000) 531 259 370 449 320
Factoring and invoicing HUF Million ('000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 46 107 66 718 55 41
000) 472 852 208 448
Other indicators
Payment delays, B2B Number of days 16.30 19.00 19.00 15.00 22.00 20.00 .. 17.40 17.40 4 -1 5 1 18
Bankruptcies, total Number 153 168 212 232 279 301 376 644 488 377 322 401 370 225
Bankruptcies, total %, Year-on-year .. 10.35 25.65 9.5 20.4 7.9 24.7 71.3 -24.2 -22.9 -14.4 24.34 -8 -39

 167
19. Indonesia
Based on data published by the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs of the Republic of Indonesia, there
were 64 194 056 SMEs in 2019, which made up 99.99% of the total business population and employed
96.9% of the total workforce. In this report, SMEs consist of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.
Outstanding loans to all businesses declined by 3.2% year on year (y-o-y) in 2020 (IDR 6,069.39 trillion),
with 20.43% of this amount (IDR 1 240.23 trillion) allocated to SMEs. Despite the decrease in 2020,
outstanding loans in the past ten years (2011-20) still experienced growth with an average yearly growth
rate of 13.38%.
In the last three years (2018-20), non-performing loans (NPLs) have been increasing both for SMEs (from
3.35% to 3.95%) and for total businesses (from 2.40% to 3.03%). The COVID-19 pandemic is believed to
have contributed to this increase. Nevertheless, NPLs are still well managed and remain under 5%.
The share of short-term loans for SMEs over total short-term loans fell by 16.43% in the 2011-2020 period,
from 25.4% in 2011 to 8.96% in 2020. While in 2011 the amount of short-term outstanding loans for SMEs
was IDR 120 trillion, in 2020 it stood at IDR 131.66 trillion; this represents an increase of 9% in the 2011-
20 period. However, long-term loans in the same period experienced much stronger growth, rising from
IDR 354.9 trillion in 2011 to IDR 1 084 trillion in 2020, which corresponds to a compound growth rate of
205.44% and an annual average growth rate of 14.54%. The increasing trend in long-term loans illustrates
lenders’ higher trust in Indonesian SMEs.
In the period from 2011-2020, interest rates on loans declined for all business, by 3.8% for SMEs (from
14.53% to 10.69%) and 2.92% for large companies (from 12.28% to 9.36%). Although interest rates are
declining in Indonesia, they are still very high compared to the average in other countries.
Venture capital financing shows a significant increase, reaching IDR13.40 trillion in 2020, a 208% increase
compared to 2012. In the 2012-2020 period, the amount of financing grew positively, with an average
growth rate of 16.73%.
Other non-bank finance indicators show a slight decline in 2020 compared to 2019. Leasing and hire
purchases decreased by 13% in 2020. Factoring activities also exhibit a similar trend, decreasing by 24%
in 2020.
Accessing finance is still challenging for most SMEs in Indonesia. Especially during the COVID-19
pandemic, many SMEs have been affected by financial problems. After successfully launching the People
Business Credit Programme or Kredit Usaha Rakyat (KUR) in 2007, the Indonesian government launched
the National Economy Recovery Program in 2020 to overcome the crisis caused by the COVID-19
pandemic, with total support for MSME and corporation financing amounting to IDR 173.17 trillion in 2020
and 186.81 trillion in 2021.

168 
Table 19.1. Scoreboard for Indonesia

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding IDR trillion 110.1 127.0 127.4 389.0 476.8 551.5 637.3 733.0 792.1 952.2 1 059 1 168 1 262 1 240
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding IDR trillion 1 001.9 1 307.7 1 307.8 1 777.8 2 217.5 2 726.8 3 321.2 3 707.7 4 093.9 4 908.4 5 320.1 5 931.6 6 270.4 6 069.4
business loans,
total
business loans
Outstanding short- IDR trillion .. .. .. 102.6 120.8 141.7 195.0 215.4 100.1 115.0 94.3 101.11 106.3 131.66
term loans, SMEs
Outstanding long- IDR trillion .. .. .. 286.1 354.9 408.7 440.9 516.5 623.8 729.0 901.0 1 038.1 1 120.4 1 084
term loans, SMEs
Share of short- % of total SME .. .. .. 26.40 25.39 25.74 30.67 29.43 13.83 13.63 9.47 8.88 8.67 8.96
term SME lending lending
Government IDR trillion .. .. .. 17.23 29 34.23 40.9 40.3 22.75 94.4 96.71 123.8 139.9 198.5
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Direct government IDR trillion .. 0.04 0.41 1.07 1.15 1.25 1.43 1.15 1.56 1.25 0.41 0.04 1.72 1.99
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all business 4.08 3.20 3.35 2.55 2.16 1.87 1.77 2.16 2.49 2.40 2.63 2.40 2.51 3.03
loans, total loans
Non-performing % of all SME 4.80 3.87 4.22 3.97 3.43 3.23 3.19 4.00 4.20 3.35 3.89 3.35 3.36 3.95
loans, SMEs loans
Interest rate, % 16.30 16.79 16.60 14.89 14.53 13.99 14.14 14.54 13.99 12.69 13.06 12.69 12.57 10.69
SMEs
Interest rate, large % 12 13 13 12.73 12.28 11.60 11.88 12.48 12.51 11.01 11.39 11.01 10.62 9.36
firms
spread
Non-bank finance
Venture and IDR trillion .. .. .. .. .. 4.3 6.0 6.9 7.2 8.5 7.1 8.46 12.72 13.40
growth capital
Venture and %, Year-on-year .. .. .. .. .. .. 38.70 14.68 4.38 17.69 -16.26 18.93 50.40 5.29
(growth rate)
Leasing and hire IDR trillion 36.5 50.7 46.5 53.7 76.6 105.1 117.4 111.0 105.4 97.7 104.8 112.20 106.93 92.64
purchases
Factoring and IDR trillion 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.3 3.9 5.1 7.7 9.4 10.7 11.5 13.3 15.48 16.17 12.28
invoice
discounting
Note: This table contains data from both bank and non-bank sources. Due to availability, post-2016 data includes non-bank data. Another table
that includes only non-bank data can be found in the “Non-bank sources of SME financing” part of the full profile. Data for venture and growth
capital, leasing and hire purchases, factoring and invoice discounting are for all businesses, including large enterprises.

 169
20. Ireland
Key Facts on SME Financing
Irish SMEs account for 99.8 percent of all active enterprises and to 68% of those employed.
Debt levels of Irish businesses are declining steadily, and have reduced 53% since 2010, from EUR 27.1
billion to EUR 12.8 billion in 2020.
Gross new lending to core SMEs was EUR 2.9 billion in 2020, representing a 20% annual decrease. This
decline is likely driven by a demand-side challenge. Survey data from the SME Credit Demand Survey
show that SMEs in Ireland are choosing less to access bank credit. In 2020 this is explained by the size of
direct governmental support during the COVID-19 crisis, which included direct grants and payments to
closed or impacted businesses, tax warehousing, the Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWISS) within
others.
Loan approval rates continue to be stable, with 85% of all applications for the period March – October 2020
(excluding “still pending”) either being fully or partially approved.
The interest rate spread was 1.94, between large (2.23%) and small loans (4.17%), a slight decrease from
2019 levels.
The amount of venture capital raised by Irish SMEs increased in 2020, to EUR 820 million, marking an
11% increase on 2019 figures, this growth represents the same percentage increase as from 2018 to 2019
and is explained by base effects of the significant decrease from 2017 to 2018. Figures for Q1 2021 show
continued increase in activity, with 74 companies receiving funding compared to 43 in the same quarter
last year.
Significant progress has been made towards resolving SME NPLs in recent years and though there has
been a slight increase in NPLs over the course of the COVID-19 crisis in general terms trends continue to
move in a downward trajectory.
The Irish Government has implemented a range of measures to assist SMEs in dealing with the
consequences of COVID-19 restrictions, and to ensure that SMEs continue to have access to sufficient
liquidity. These include tax measures and loan schemes to assist SME, as well as direct support including
the Employment Wage Subsidy Scheme (EWSS) and Covid Restriction Support Scheme (CRSS).
Ireland’s National Promotional Bank, the Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland has worked closely with
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine
and the Department of Finance in the design of and implementation of a number of credit related support
schemes including schemes aimed at SMEs affected by COVID-19 restrictions, such as;
 the COVID-19 Working Capital Scheme;
 the Future Growth Loan Scheme; and
 the COVID-19 Credit Guarantee Scheme

170 
The overriding objective of these schemes is that credit is available at competitive prices for those firms
that require it.
Credit Review was established in 2010 to assist SME or farm borrowers who have been refused bank
credit, including a SBCI product. It helps SMEs who have had an application for credit of up to EUR 3
million declined or reduced by the main banks, and who feel that they have a viable business proposition.
This is a strictly confidential process between the business, the Credit Review and the bank.
Table 20.1. Scoreboard for Ireland

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR Billion .. .. .. 27.1 27.34 25.7 24.52 21.4 19.31 16.11 15.82 15.06 14.25 12..79
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding EUR Billion 56.08 59.57 52.5 42.42 40.31 38.06 36.65 31.79 29.82 28 27.74 29.55 28.80 25.58
business loans,
total
Share of SME % of total .. .. .. 63.89 67.82 67.51 66.89 67.32 64.78 57.54 57.04 50.96 49.47 50.02
loans
New business EUR Million .. .. .. 2 284 2 211 1 990 1 905 2 401 2 646 3 235 3 682 3 468 3618 2914
lending, SMEs
Outstanding EUR Billion 17.26 15.02 10.93 6.05 3.81 3.06 3.02 2.39 1.79 2.03 2.52 2.45 2.52 2.43
short-term loans,
SMEs
Outstanding EUR Billion 2.12 1.93 1.34 0.93 0.58 0.54 0.6 0.78 1.09 1 0.73 0.81 0.69 0.46
long-term loans,
SMEs
Share of short- % of total SME 89% 88% 89% 86% 87% 85% 83% 75% 61% 67% 77% 75% 80% 84%
term SME lending
lending
Non-performing % of all .. .. .. .. 14 7.4 4.7 5.4
loans, total business loans
Non-performing % of all SME .. .. .. .. .. 41 41 27 26 18.7 22.6 11.1 6.8 8
loans, SMEs loans
Interest rate, % 6.23 6.67 3.98 3.88 4.68 4.34 4.3 4.78 4.77 4.65 4.28 4.3 4.2 4.17
SMEs
Interest rate, % 5.95 6.19 3.22 2.86 3.33 2.81 2.76 2.96 2.37 2.18 2.24 2.15 2.47 2.23
large firms
spread
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 41 40 46 41 39 42 34
needing
collateral
Percentage of SME loan .. .. .. .. 36 39 36 31 30 23 21 20 20 18
applications total SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans .. .. .. .. 30 24 20 14 15 16 15 14 14 15
authorised/
requested)
Utilisation rate SME loans .. .. .. .. .. .. 81 82 84 75 75 83 76
used/
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR Million 226 243 288 310 274 269 285 401 522 888 994 738 820 925
growth capital

 171
Venture and %, Year-on- .. 7.53 18.61 7.67 -11.54 -2 5.95 40.65 30.3 70.1 11.92 -25.75 11.1 12.8
(growth rate) rate
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, Number 344 613 1 245 1 386 1 410 1 317 1 119 1 007 816 642 720 543 678 492
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- .. 78.2 103.1 11.33 1.73 -6.6 -15.03 -10.01 -18.97 -21.32 12.15 -24.58 24.86 -27.43
rate) rate

172 
21. Israel
As of 2021, there were 625 267 businesses in Israel, 99.5% of which were SMEs (i.e. companies
employing up to 100 workers). In an average year, 55 000-60 000 businesses are created and about
50 000 close down. In 2020, 51 436 new companies were established and 38 209 were closed. Removal
of government support measures might result in many enterprises shutting down in the post-crisis period.
SME and entrepreneurship policies in Israel are primarily designed by the Ministry of Economy and Industry
and implemented by the Israel Innovation Authority (IIA) and the Small and Medium Business Agency
(SMBA). While the IIA (formerly known as the Chief Science Office) focuses on leading technology-based
start-ups and SMEs, the SMBA caters to all SMEs in Israel’s main economic sectors through business
management training and coaching, subsidized access to finance (for example, through the national loan
guarantee program) and the work of the business development centres (MAOF centres).
2020 was a very challenging year for Israel's economy due to the COVID-19 crisis. In response, the local
government tried to reduce the negative impact of the crisis through the provision of grants, government-
guaranteed loans and other relief programs in order to prevent massive deterioration in the local economy.

 173
Table 21.1. Scoreboard for Israel

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding ILS billion 169.3 171.2 161.6 173.8 177.7 187.0 186.7 211.9 244.6 259.6 266.1 281.8 273.7 280.1
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding ILS billion 413.9 460.9 425.2 438.9 458.6 450.4 445.7 447.9 415.6 435.5 444.4 476.9 488.2 512.36
business loans,
total
business loans
Government loan ILS million 27 17 121 164 116 116 215 232 257 184 144 166 220 4 170
guarantees, SMEs
Government ILS million 170 109 757 1 028 890 1 057 1 951 2 112 2 340 1 838 1 618 1 618 1 887 21 951
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Non-performing % of all business .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.77 2.18 1.57 1.25 1.55 1.76
loans, total loans
Non-performing % of all SME loans .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.13 1.77 1.5 1.31 1.52 1.77
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, SMEs % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.96 3.83 4.02 4.06 4.02 3.81
Interest rate, large % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.95 2.97 3.05 2.98 2.88 2.45
firms
Interest rate spread % points .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.02 0.86 0.97 1.08 1.14 1.36
Non-bank finance
Venture and USD billion 1.76 2.08 1.12 1.22 2.08 1.88 2.95 3.77 4.75 5.10 4.86 6.35 8.30 ..
growth capital
Venture and %, year-on-year .. 18.0 -46.1 8.8 70.3 -9.5 28.0 41.8 26.4 12.2 7.3 30.7 30.7 ..
(growth rate)
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of days .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 57.2 53 28 28 ..
B2B
Bankruptcies, Number .. .. 2 061 2 834 3 737 5 000 5 610 5 322 5 175 7 900 .. .. .. ..
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, year-on-year .. .. .. 37.51 31.86 33.8 12.2 -5.13 -2.76 52.66 .. .. .. ..
SMEs (growth rate) growth rate

174 
22. Italy
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) account for the vast majority of Italian firms, providing nearly
80% of the industrial and service labour force and generating about two-thirds of turnover and value added.
The impact of the pandemic led to disruptions in business activity and liquidity shortages. Credit markets
were buttressed by the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy measures, flanked by the financial support
initiatives adopted by the Government. Lending increased at a sustained pace for large enterprises and,
after many years of contraction, also for small companies.
Lending standards remained broadly relaxed in 2020. Business borrowing rates stood at low levels, and
collateral requirements declined, partly as a result of the widespread recourse to public guarantee
schemes.
Credit quality improved further, benefitting from the financial support measures adopted by the
Government after the outbreak of the pandemic. The ratio of SME new non-performing loans to outstanding
loans reached the lowest level in fifteen years. The stock of non-performing exposures dropped
significantly, as a result of their further disposal during the pandemic.
Equity financing for SMEs, provided in the form of early stage and expansion capital, increased moderately,
entirely driven by a sustained growth in the early stage segment; by contrast, resources devoted to large
firms decreased markedly, after remaining virtually unchanged in the previous year.
Business-to-business payment delays, on a declining path after the sharp upswing recorded during the
global financial crisis, started rising again at the outbreak of the health emergency; payment patterns
returned close to pre-pandemic levels at the end of 2020.
Bankruptcies dropped for the sixth year in a row, down by more than 30% with respect to 2019: the sharp
decline can be partly explained by the moratorium on insolvencies and the slowdown in court activity due
to the pandemic containment measures.
The Government unleashed a broad policy effort to counter the unprecedented challenges faced by SMEs
during the pandemic through a wide range of financial support measures. These initiatives, originally
focused on liquidity relief, were progressively matched by broader recovery packages.
Credit guarantee schemes have traditionally played a crucial role in easing SME access to finance. During
the pandemic the Central Guarantee Fund was further strengthened, by widening the range of potential
beneficiaries, raising the coverage ratios of loans, increasing capital endowments and simplifying
procedures. The State guarantee system was boosted by giving SACE, the Italian export credit agency
whose tasks were redefined, the role of providing public guarantees to large firms; the initiative was also
extended to SMEs that had exhausted their ability to access the Central Guarantee Fund.
Other provisions included the roll-out of a debt moratorium to help firms cope with temporary liquidity
shortages due to the abrupt fall in production. This measure allowed SMEs to obtain the freezing of
uncommitted credit facilities, an extension on maturing loans, and the suspension of instalment payments.

 175
The emergency measures were later flanked by more selective initiatives, aimed at avoiding imbalances
in the financial structure of firms. Measures aimed at encouraging a greater inflow of equity into the
productive system envisaged a wide range of instruments to strengthen capitalisation and promote the
recovery of economic activity.
Table 22.1. Scoreboard for Italy

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding business EUR billion 187 191 193 210 206 204 196 192 188 175 170 166 160 168
loans, SMEs
Outstanding business EUR billion 998 1067 1057 1122 1134 1118 1061 1025 1016 985 960 961 931 984
loans, total
Short-term loans, EUR billion 59 56 52 50 48 47 42 39 35 31 28 27 26 19
SMEs
Long-term loans, EUR billion 115 120 125 136 133 128 122 115 112 103 101 100 97 114
SMEs
Total short and long- EUR billion 174 177 177 186 181 175 164 155 147 134 130 127 123 133
term loans, SMEs
Share of short-term % of total short 34.0 31.9 29.3 26.9 26.4 26.6 25.7 25.3 23.8 22.9 22.0 21.3 21.0 14.0
loans, SMEs and long-term
SME loans
Direct government EUR million 337 373 255 276 272 252 390 597 392 418 431 671 540 1 187
loans, SMEs
Government EUR million, 2 300 2 353 4 914 9 119 8 378 8 190 10 811 12 935 15 065 16 703 17 462 19 314 19 376 124 387
guaranteed loans, flows
SMEs (CGF)
Government loan EUR million, 1 146 1 160 2 756 5 225 4 435 4 036 6 414 8 392 10 216 11 570 12 260 13 731 13 342 105 921
guarantees, SMEs flows
(CGF)
Non-performing loans, EUR million .. 22 866 27 953 35 247 38 042 43 814 48 384 53 726 56 199 54 959 50 614 47 422 45 583 42 468
SMEs
Non-performing loans, % of total SME .. 12.0 14.5 16.8 18.4 21.5 24.6 28.0 30.0 31.4 29.9 28.6 28.4 25.2
SMEs loans
firms
Interest rate spread % 0.6 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.7 0.8
Collateral, SMEs % 54 54 52 53 55 54 56 56 57 58 58 57 57 53
Rejection rate % of firms 3.1 8.2 6.9 5.7 11.3 12.0 8.9 8.4 6.0 4.0 4.2 4.6 4.1 6.1
reporting that
they had not
obtained some
or all of the
credit requested
used /
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture capital EUR million 66 115 98 89 82 135 82 43 74 103 133 324 270 355
investments (early
stage), SMEs
Growth capital EUR million 295 440 260 263 500 504 438 230 170 155 161 125 143 133
investments
(expansion), SMEs

176 
Growth capital EUR million 641 796 371 583 674 926 914 1179 333 710 337 816 896 354
investments
(expansion), total
Other indicators
Payment delays, B2B Average .. 20.4 21.3 17.3 16.2 17.5 17.3 16.1 15.0 13.4 12.3 12.2 12.4 13.4
(all firms) number of days
Bankruptcies, total Number 5 986 7 331 9 222 11 120 12 039 12 450 14 054 15 635 14 694 13 481 12 015 11 203 11 096 7.647
Bankruptcies, total %, Year-on- .. 22.5 25.8 20.6 8.3 3.4 12.9 11.2 -6.0 -8.3 -10.9 -6.8 -1.0 -31.1
year growth
rate
Incidence of per 10 000 11.5 13.7 17.0 20.3 21.6 22.0 25.0 27.9 26.4 24.1 21.5 20.0 19.7 13.4
insolvency, total enterprises

 177
23. Japan
Japanese SMEs accounted for 99.7% of all businesses and employed 32 million individuals, or
approximately 68.8% of the private sector labour force, in 2016.
Lending to SMEs declined every year between 2007 and 2012, reaching a total decrease of 6.6% over
that period. In 2013, outstanding SME loans rose by 1.5%, and have continued to increase since then:
JPY 286.6 trillion in 2019 and JPY 314.9 trillion in 2020.
Average interest rates on new short-term loans in Japan have been very low and continuously declined
between 2007 and in 2017, more than halving from 1.64% to 0.61%, as a result of easing monetary policy.
Long-term interest rates on new loans followed a broadly similar pattern, declining from 1.7% in 2007 to
0.76% in 2020.
Japanese venture capital investments peaked in FY 2007 at JPY 193 billion, before decreasing by 29.5%
and 36% in FY 2008 and 2009 respectively. Since 2009, VC investments have been inconsistent. Since
2014 VC investments increased and reached JPY 289 billion in 2019, which was the highest value since
2007.The amount of investment in 2020 declined by 22.4 %, amounting to JPY 224 billion. One of the
possible reasons behind this drop is that some of the VC funds could not make their investment decisions
during the first half of 2020 because of the effects of the COVID-19 crisis. This might be resolved in the
second half of the year by using online communication methods.
Leasing volumes to SMEs plummeted in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, dropping by almost
40% between 2007 and 2009. Subsequently, with the recovery of domestic capital investment demand,
the volumes have been on an upward trend and recovered to 2.7 trillion in 2019. In 2020, leasing volumes
fell to JPY 2.3 trillion due to a sharp drop in capital investment demand for machine tools and industrial
machinery by Japanese companies as a result of the COVID-19 crisis.
SME bankruptcies, which account for more than 99% of all bankruptcies in Japan, decreased between
2007 and 2020. In 2020, the number of cases was below 8 000 for the first time in 30 years.
Total non-performing business loans have continuously declined since 2013, after having experienced
erratic movement over the 2007-12 period. In 2019, total NPLs amounted to JPY 10 326 billion.
The Japanese Government offers financial support for SMEs in the form of a credit guarantee programme
and direct loans. In March 2018, the total amount of outstanding SME loans was approximately JPY 267
trillion (provided by domestically licensed banks and credit associations); the outstanding amount of the
credit guarantee programme was JPY 22.2 trillion (covering 1.3 million SMEs); and the outstanding amount
of the direct loan programme was JPY 21.2 trillion, (covering 1 million of Japan’s 3.81 million SMEs). In
2020, as a response to the COVID-19 crisis, government-affiliated and private financial institutions offered
interest-free and unsecured loans of up to 5 years, and provided JPY 100 trillion yen in business scale and
JPY 12.5 trillion in budget.

178 
Table 23.1. Scoreboard for Japan

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
JPY trillion 260.8 259.1 253.1 248.3 245.6 243.6 247.2 251.7 258.4 265.6 275.4 281.4 286.6 314.9
loans, SMEs
JPY trillion 374.5 385.0 379.3 366.1 366.9 370.4 369.7 387.2 395.2 405.1 415.5 426.6 435.03 482.15
loans, total
% of total
Share of SME
outstanding 69.64 67.31 66.72 67.82 66.94 65.76 66.87 65.00 65.38 65.57 66.29 65.96 65.88 65.31
outstanding loans
business loans
Value of CGCs loan
guarantees
JPY trillion 29.4 33.9 35.9 35.1 34.4 32.1 29.8 27.7 25.8 23.9 22.2 21.08 20.8 40.5
(Government loan
guarantees, SMEs)
Non-performing loans,
JPY trillion 17.1 17.1 16.8 16.6 17.2 17.3 15.3 13.9 12.8 11.8 10.5 10.3 10.3 ..
total (amount)
Non-performing loans, % of all
4.56 4.45 4.42 4.54 4.68 4.66 4.14 3.60 3.23 2.91 2.52 2.41 2.37 ..
total business loans
Prime lending rate for
% 1.88 1.68 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48 1.48
short-term loans
Prime lending rate for
% 2.30 2.40 1.65 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.10 1.10 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00
long-term loans
New short-term
interest rate (Not only % 1.64 1.53 1.23 1.10 1.04 1.02 0.91 0.88 0.80 0.67 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.47
for businesses)
New long-term
for businesses)
Outstanding short-
term interest rate (Not % 1.67 1.49 1.26 1.19 1.10 1.03 0.88 0.85 0.78 0.62 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.48
only for businesses)
Outstanding long-term
for businesses)
Non-bank finance
Venture capital
investments (all JPY billion 193 136 87 113 124 102 181 117 130 152 197 277 289 224.
stages total)
Venture capital %, year-on-
investments (all year growth .. -29.53 -36.03 29.89 9.73 -17.74 77.45 -35.36 11.11 16.92 30 41 4 -22.49.
stages total) rate
Venture capital (seed % (share of all
.. .. 36.80 32.50 44.30 57.80 64.50 57.20 62.80 68.30 67.80 71.40 73.7 72.1.
and early stage) stages)
Venture capital
% (share of all
(expansion and later .. .. 63.20 67.50 55.70 42.20 35.50 42.80 37.20 31.70 32.20 28.60 26.3 27.9.
stages)
stage)
Leasing, SMEs JPY billion 3 471 2 822 2 100 2 139 2 231 2 284 2 645 2 363 2 604 2 566 2 570 2664 2700 2329
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, SMEs Thousands 14.0 15.5 15.4 13.2 12.7 12.1 10.8 9.7 8.8 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.4 7.8
%, year-on-
Bankruptcies, SMEs year growth .. 10.76 -0.82 -13.96 -4.22 -4.81 -10.18 -10.37 -9.43 -4.17 -0.50 -1.93 1.74 -7.27
rate
Bankruptcies, total Thousands 14.1 15.6 15.5 13.3 12.7 12.1 10.9 9.7 8.8 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.4 7.8
%, year-on-
Bankruptcies, total year growth .. 11.04 -1.06 -13.95 -4.41 -4.79 -10.47 -10.35 -9.44 -4.15 -0.49 -2.02 1.80 -7.28
rate

 179
24. Kazakhstan

In 2020, SMEs made up 96.4% of all businesses in Kazakhstan and accounted for 38.6% of total
employment and 31.6% of national GDP.
SME lending was on the rise in Kazakhstan between 2014 and 2017, contrary to the period from 2017 to
2019 when the SME loan portfolio showed a negative trend. In 2020, the SME loan portfolio increased by
19.3% and new lending to SMEs increased by 46%. The share of SME loans out of total business loans
also rose to 32.5%. The most recent growth in SME lending is associated with the anti-crisis measures
taken by the government of Kazakhstan to support SMEs during the COVID-19 pandemic period.
Interest rates for SMEs have fluctuated over the reference period, growing steadily from a record low of
11.5% in 2014 to 14% in 2016. In 2020, the SME average interest rate was 12.7%, while for large
enterprises it was 11.2%. It should be noted that the increase of the interest rate in 2014 is explained by
the devaluation of the national currency, as well as the increase in the base rate made by the National
Bank.
Among non-bank sources of finance, leasing has the largest market and is steadily growing. In 2020,
leasing and hire purchases were almost 8 times higher compared to volumes in 2010. The development
of leasing is due to several reasons. Firstly, the growing need for industrial, transport and agricultural
enterprises to update and expand the fleet of machinery and equipment. Secondly, many enterprises have
problems with providing banks with collateral to access loans, while leasing companies are more flexible
in their collateral policy. Thirdly, the procedure for making lease payments is one of the biggest advantages
of leasing. The agreement may optimally take into account the interests of all parties, since the size and
period of payments are determined on the basis of a joint agreement.
Non-performing loans (NPL) with arrears of more than 90 days decreased to 7.6% of the total for all
business loans and to 11.9% of the total for SME loans. Commercial banks fulfil the requirement of the
National Bank of Kazakhstan that sets the maximum rate of NPLs at 10% of the total loan portfolio.
An important role in keeping up SMEs’ access to credit is played by the state, which places funds in
commercial banks to provide concessional lending to SMEs during shortages of liquidity in the market. The
largest placement of state funds for SME lending took place in 2018. Prior to this, the government provided
KZT 200 billion in 2014-2016 to support SMEs in the manufacturing industry at an interest rate of 6% per
annum, which are issued by banks on a revolving basis. Despite the fact that the largest part of the funds
was allocated in 2014-2016, these funds are still used for lending to SMEs on a revolving basis. In addition,
the State allocates new funds under new SME supporting State programmes.
Since 2010, the government, through “Damu” Entrepreneurship Development Fund, has provided interest
rate subsidies and loan guarantees for SMEs under the “Business Roadmap” Programme. A new financial
instrument in Kazakhstan, loan guarantees are becoming popular very quickly, escalating from just 3
guarantees in 2010 to over 13 000 guarantees at the end of 2020 (15 900 guarantees for the period 2010-
2020). In 2020, the Government made changes in the “Business Road Map” programme and included a
portfolio guarantee tool for banks.

180 
Table 24.1. Scoreboard for Kazakhstan

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding business KZT billion 1 508 1 571 1 708 1 389 1 341 1 412 1 283 1 788 2 060 3 105 2 789 2 364 2 109 2 515
loans, SMEs
Outstanding business KZT billion 5 220 5 605 5 879 5 892 6 849 7 534 8 110 8 532 9 027 9 234 8 568 8 348 7 771 7 742
loans, total
business loans
New business KZT billion 7 764 5 373 3 742 3 291 4 795 5 774 6 109 8 044 7 345 7 724 7 615 9 412 9 720 9 757
lending, total
New business KZT billion 1 870 1 273 753.1 690 .1 794 .5 1 050 889 .7 1 198 1 279 1 984 1 524 1 737 1 670 2 439
lending, SMEs
lending lending
Short-term loans, KZT billion 296 298 236 206 219 277 199 392 390 826 411 388 335 345
SMEs
Long-term loans, KZT billion 1 211 1 273 1 472 1 183 1 122 1 135 1 084 1 395 1 670 2 279 2 377 1 976 1 774 1 780
SMEs
SME lending lending
Government loan KZT million .. .. .. 339 2 060 3 854 3 336 7 284 11 021 11 952 17 016 21 728 33 789 103 112
guarantees, SMEs
Government KZT million .. .. .. 677 4 238 10 991 7 090 15 423 26 964 26 903 42 783 51 216 89 054 265 817
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Direct government KZT billion 5.5 125.2 257.4 132.9 82.7 78.2 85.8 188.4 236.9 247.3 230.5 272.9 239.5 207 588
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all .. .. .. .. .. 29.80 31.15 23.55 7.95 6.72 9.31 7.38 8.13 7.55
Non-performing % of all SME .. .. .. .. .. 22.33 22.40 11.74 12.69 8.79 9.58 9.33 14.58 11.90
loans, SMEs loans
firms
Interest rate spread % points 1.51 0.79 -0.03 0.62 1.41 1.52 2.39 1.47 -0.52 -0.48 1.27 1.49 1.34 1.54
Non-bank finance
Leasing and hire KZT billion .. .. .. 60.4 80.1 84.5 106.8 129.0 126.6 167.0 176.5 277.6 347.4 479.3
purchases
Factoring and KZT million .. .. .. .. .. 7 889 15 125 33 160 37 655 .. .. .. .. ..
invoicing
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, total Number 0 2 3 8 36 77 125 143 257 516 1 978 3 493 1 654 2 763
Bankruptcies, total %, year-on-year .. .. 50.00 166.67 350.00 113.89 62.34 14.40 79.72 100.78 283.33 76.59 -52.65 64.05

 181
25. Korea
In the course of responding to the COVID-19 crisis, SME loans increased significantly. From 2015 to 2019,
the average annual increase in new SME loans was about KRW 46.5 trillion, but from 2019 to 2020, SME
loans increased by about KRW 89.6 trillion. During the same period, loans to large corporations also
showed a steep increase; thus, the share of SME outstanding loans decreased slightly.
Short-term loans as a share of total loans steadily declined between 2007 (75%) and 2018 (50%).
However, since 2018, the proportion of short-term loans has shown a slight upward trend. As real estate
prices rose from 2019, the value of collateral held by companies increased. As a result, additional collateral
loan capacity was created. However, since facility loan only occurs when new facilities are purchased or
built, short-term working capital loans have increased instead.
The government has also actively provided support to respond to the COVID-19 crisis, resulting in a sharp
increase in the amount of loans covered by government guarantees compared to the past. While from
2015 to 2019 the increase in government-guaranteed loans averaged only about KRW 2 trillion per year,
from 2019 to 2020 they increased by about KRW 11.2 trillion. This is more than five times the average
annual increase in the past. The total amount of corporate loans also increased sharply during the same
period, so the ratio of government-guaranteed loans to total loans did not increase significantly.
Looking at direct government loans, figures from 2020 also show a steep increase. From 2015 to 2019,
the growth rate of direct government loans was only about KRW 0.1 trillion per year on average, while it
was about KRW 1.9 trillion from 2019 to 2020. This is more than 10 times the average annual increase in
the past.
The trend in the ratio of non-performing loans among all corporate loans continues to decline. Similarly,
the share of non-performing loans in total SME loans has also declined. In particular, non-performing loans
also dropped in 2020, when the supply shock and demand shock of the economy continued due to COVID-
19 pandemic. The reason behind this decline is not a recovery of companies’ sales or profits, but rather
because a loan principal and interest repayment deferral policy has been implemented.
Interest rates on corporate loans fell sharply in 2020. This is due to accommodative monetary policy to
respond to the economic shock caused by COVID-19, rather than a decline in corporate default rates. The
Bank of Korea's base interest rate, which was 1.75% at the end of 2018, fell to 0.5% in mid-2020, when
the Republic of Korea was directly hit by the COVID-19 pandemic.
As new start-up activities contracted due to the COVID-19 outbreak, the growth rate of venture and growth
capital was greatly reduced. While in 2018, venture and growth capital registered a growth rate of about
44%, in 2019 the growth rate was approximately 25%; in 2020 the growth in venture and growth capital
registered a steep decline, with only 0.6% y-o-y growth.

182 
Table 25.1. Scoreboard for Korea

Indicators Units 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding business KRW trillion 443 441 455 462 489 522 561 610 655 696 747 836
loans, SMEs
Outstanding business KRW trillion 531 541 586 618 654 706 756 776 817 857 906 1 020
loans, total
Share of SME % of total 83.5 81.5 77.7 74.7 74.7 74.0 74.2 78.6 80.2 81.2 82.4 82.0
Outstanding Short- KRW trillion 373 372 388 395 405 419 426 414 419 429 462 528
term loans, total;
loans for operation
Outstanding Long- KRW trillion 158 169 197 223 249 287 330 362 398 428 444 492
term loans, total;
loans for equipment
Share of short-term KRW trillion 70.3 68.7 66.3 63.9 61.9 59.3 56.3 53.4 51.3 50.1 51.0 51.8
loans; loans for
operation
Government loan KRW trillion 56 56 55 57 59 60 61 63 66 67 69 80
guarantees, SMEs
Government % of SME 12.7 12.7 12.2 12.3 12.2 11.5 10.9 10.3 10.0 9.7 9.2 9.6
guaranteed loans, business loans
SMEs
Direct government KRW billion 4 812 3 098 2 957 3 149 3 715 3 270 3 902 4 551 4 666 4 415 4 358 6 290
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all business 1.6 2.6 1.73 1.66 2.39 2.09 2.56 2.06 1.76 1.88 1.45 1.17
loans, total loans
Non-performing % of all SME 1.8 3.11 2.17 1.96 2.11 1.94 1.64 1.3 1.11 1.10 0.94 0.79
loans, SMEs loans
Interest rate, SMEs % 6.18 6.52 6.36 5.93 5.11 4.69 3.95 3.63 3.62 3.82 3.71 3.06
Interest rate, large % 5.62 5.98 5.81 5.50 4.87 4.51 3.79 3.40 3.31 3.45 3.38 2.83
firms
Interest rate spread % 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.43 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.37 0.33 0.23
Rejection rate %, 1-(SME loans .. .. .. .. .. 6.90 3.70 12.20 12.90 15.50 10.40 16.1
authorised/
requested)
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth KRW billions 867 1 091 1 261 1 233 1 385 1 639 2 086 2 150 2 380 3 425 4 278 4 305
capital
Venture and growth % 19.7 25.8 15.6 -2.2 12.3 18.4 27.2 3.1 10.7 43.9 24.9 0.63
capital
(growth rate)
Leasing and hire KRW trillions 14.4 20.4 21.6 20.6 22.6 25.5 28.3 29.5 32.9 34.7 36.1 39.0
purchases
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of days 9.9 12.1 11.7 9.1 9.7 10.0 9.2 13.3 8.9 7.4 8.4 8.5
SMEs past due date
Bankruptcies, total Number 1 998 1 570 1 359 1 228 1 001 841 720 555 494 469 414 292
Bankruptcies, growth Year-on-year -26.9 -21.4 -13.4 -9.6 -18.5 -16.0 -14.4 -22.9 -11.0 -5.1 -11.7 -29.5
rate growth rate, %

 183
26. Latvia
In the run-up to the COVID-19 pandemic Latvia experienced stable economic growth, with growth rates
exceeding the EU average. From 2011 to 2019, GDP grew by 3.3% per year on average. In 2019, the
growth of the economy became more moderate. GDP grew by 2% in 2019. In 2020, the COVID-19
pandemic had a significant impact on the global and Latvian economies. In the 2 nd quarter, GDP in Latvia
decreased by 8.9% compared to the same period in 2019. However, this appears to be a comparatively
mild decline, as in EU-27 GDP contracted by 13.9% over the same period. In Q3 and Q4 of 2020, the
economic decline slightly slowed down. Overall, in 2020, GDP decreased by 3.6%, compared to 2019. The
development of the economy in the medium term depends on the situation in the external environment and
the pace of reform implementation. The further development of the Latvian economy will be closely related
to export opportunities; therefore, the largest risk to Latvia's growth is related to the development of the
global economy, especially the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. Also, the further development of the
EU's common economic space is vitally important. Latvia's medium-term economic benefits will be mainly
based on macro-economic stability (as a result of which Latvia's credit ratings have improved), the
efficiency of the planned EU support programmes, and improvements in the business environment.
In Latvia, 99.8% of economically active merchants and commercial companies are SMEs, 92.1% of which
are micro-enterprises.
SME loans dominate the banking sector’s lending to non-financial corporations (NFCs). As SMEs play an
important role in the domestic economy, SME loans represented 73% of total loans to domestic NFCs in
2020. The outstanding amount of banking sector loans to SMEs decreased in 2020 by 7%; however the
total banking's sector loan portfolio to NFCs decreased even further, by 8.5%. To a large extent, this is
attributed to structural changes in the Latvian banking sector (for instance, the withdrawal of the credit
institution's licence). Excluding one-off effects, the SMEs loan stock slightly declined (-3.2% year-on-year).
In 2020, the new lending (flow) to SMEs was noticeably lower than in 2019 (by 20.5%), despite the increase
of total new business lending to NFCs by 5.8%.
In 2019, venture and growth capital experienced a 33.7% y-o-y growth rate caused by the increase of
finance allocated to equity. The high allocation to equity is explained by significant higher investment
returns compared to the previous year. In light of the quantitative easing strategy, pursued by the European
Central Bank (ECB), which took place in a low interest rate environment, market actors and investors have
been searching for higher yields, including in riskier areas such as venture capital. The availability of cheap
capital, low interest rates and the relative narrowing of classic investment opportunities increased investor
tolerance above medium levels, thus stimulating alternative investment opportunities. However, in 2020
venture and growth capital decline by 6.29% year on year, reflecting the uncertainties and instabilities
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the economy.
As a response to the COVID-19 crisis, the state promoted access to funding (through its micro-lending,
start-up, and loans programme) for firms lacking the financial credibility (collateral, net worth, cash flow
and credit history) that is necessary to access funding from commercial banks or private investors.

184 
Currently, state support programmes are introduced via the JSC Development Finance Institution Altum
(ALTUM), a state-owned development finance institution offering aid and financial tools to various target
groups. ALTUM develops and implements state aid programmes to compensate for market shortcomings
that cannot be resolved by private financial institutions. In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, in 2020,
ALTUM introduced several support programmes through working capital loans, other loans and credit
guarantees.
Table 26.1. Scoreboard for Latvia

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR million 7 727 8 672 8 376 7 764 7 035 6 154 5 404 4 939 4 771 4 942 4 482 4 110 3 922 3 648
business loans,
SMEs
business loans,
total
New business EUR million .. .. .. .. 1 708 1 914 1 965 1 268 1 346 1 795 1 347 1 312 1 558 1 650
lending, total
New business EUR million .. .. .. .. 1 506 1 625 1 613 1 020 947 1 399 974 1 012 1 075 855
lending, SMEs
Share of new % of total new .. .. .. .. 88.20 84.90 82.08 80.47 70.39 77.95 72.3 77.19 69.01 51.81
SME lending lending
Outstanding EUR million 2 653 3 203 3 262 3 009 2 682 2 349 1 852 1 570 1 672 1 371 1 287 1 229 1 179 975
short-term
loans, SMEs
long-term loans,
SMEs
Share of short- % of total SME 34.4 37.2 39.9 39 38.1 38.2 34.3 31.8 35.1 27.7 28.7 29.8 30.1 26.7
term SME lending
lending
Non-performing % of all SME 0.8 3.7 22.4 23.4 18.8 11.7 8.4 7.2 5.7 3.3 3.8 3.3 3.8 2.3
loans, SMEs loans
Interest rate, % 8.3 8.9 7.9 7.1 5.8 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.5 4.4 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.4
SMEs
Interest rate, % 6.6 7.1 5.2 4.3 4 3.6 3.8 3.3 3.1 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.9
large firms
spread
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR million .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 37.95 51.98 79.37 101 118 157.5 147.6
growth capital
Venture and %, Year-on- .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 36.97 52.69 27.76 16.45 33.38 -6.29
(growth rate) rate
Leasing and EUR million 1 576 1 594 1 145 841 810 867 875 864 932 939 1033.9 1102.5 1074.6 944.13
hire purchases 7

 185
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Factoring and EUR million 227.24 301.90 149.13 60.68 90.96 96.15 108.01 114.47 151.81 165.99 152.64 173.42 161.78 136.98
invoice
discounting
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, Number .. 1 292 2 202 2 714 898 884 820 959 803 731 590 592 560 374
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- .. .. 70.43 23.25 -66.91 -1.56 -7.24 16.95 -16.37 -8.85 -19.29 0.34 -5.41 -33.21*
rate) rate
Note: * The reduction of SME’s bankruptcies is justified that due to the rapid spread of Covid-19 on 12th of March 2020 the government had
declared a state of emergency which lasted until 10th of June 2020. On 9th of November 2020 repeatedly the government had declared a state
of emergency which lasted until the 6th of April 2021. During this period creditors were prohibited from submitting an application for insolvency
proceedings of a legal person.

186 
27. Lithuania
SMEs account for 99.5% of all enterprises operating in Lithuania, the majority of them (83.7%) being micro-
enterprises. Most SMEs (73.0%) have chosen the legal form of private limited liability company and are
primarily engaged in wholesale or retail trade activities (more than one-fourth of all SMEs). The share of
employees working in SMEs is around 71%, while the share of gross value added generated by SMEs is
close to 65%.
Equity capital and liabilities to non-banks (e.g. loans, trade payables) are the main sources of funding for
SMEs. As of 2020, equity capital financed around 45 % of SME assets, while liabilities financed 55%.
As a result of a decrease and structural changes in large NFCs’ (non-financial corporations) loan portfolios,
the share of SME loans over total business loans increased by 17%. Since 2019 and amounted to 59% of
the total.
SME non-bank financing has varied over time. For example, up until 2017, the use of credit unions or
crowd-funding was much lower than now: between 2017 and 2020, the credit union loan portfolio increased
by two times and the crowd-funding market evolved from EUR 1 million to around EUR 40 million. However,
according to the annual survey of non-financial enterprises conducted by the Bank of Lithuania, only 10%
of enterprises are in need of alternative financing instruments (e.g. private capital or risk funds,
crowdfunding, etc.). However, an increase in non-bank funding may be the result of tighter lending
conditions. For example, the results of the same survey indicate that the share of rejected loans for micro-
enterprises increased in 2018 and remained elevated until 2020, reaching around 60%.
The government supports SMEs by ensuring that they benefit from favourable conditions to obtain the
necessary financing to start and develop their business. Loans with preferential rates are granted under
the EU Entrepreneurship Promotion Fund. Moreover, when a company does not have sufficient collateral,
it can apply to the state-controlled enterprise UAB Investicijų ir verslo garantijos (Investment and Business
Guarantee Enterprise, INVEGA), which provides various options of loan guarantees, factoring, leasing and
export credit repayments. INVEGA also provides an option for different preferential loans through
alternative financing or crowdfunding and loans with preferential rates from the different Venture Capital
funding services. In addition, municipalities provide different support schemes to SMEs; for example, when
starting a business, entrepreneurs can expect support to cover their set-up costs, part of the interest
payments, as well as other supports.

 187
Table 27.1. Scoreboard for Lithuania

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR million .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 143 3 231 3 404 3 723 3 920 3 670 4 390
business
loans, SMEs
business
loans, total
Share of SME % of total .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 41.74 42.44 40.91 42.13 42.38 42.18 59.41
loans business
loans
New business EUR million 7 759 9 452 7 252 4 868 3 792 3 220 3 236 3 128 4 275 4 248 4 639 4 021 3 606 3 953
lending, total
Government EUR million 148.4 218.8 241.6 224.5 188.6 257.7
guaranteed
loans, SMEs
Non- % of all .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.31 8.39 6.25 5.04 4.05 2.95 3.52
performing business
loans, total loans
(NFCs)
Non- % of all SME .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17.54 14.11 11.18 8.59 6.60 4.83 4.88
performing loans
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, % 6.13 6.72 5.06 4.64 5.04 4.04 3.45 3.27 3.13 2.76 2.80 3.29 3.30 3.17
SMEs
Interest rate, % 5.70 6.27 4.32 3.90 4.17 3.24 2.74 2.66 2.35 2.18 2.16 2.56 2.91 2.81
large firms
spread
Colalteral, % of SMEs 69.80 62.10 69.00 64.50 64.40 67.70 69.90 61.20
SMEs needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans .. .. .. .. 15.4 30.8 11.5 21.3 14.3 19.4 22.5 43.2 43.8 43.49
authorised/
requested)
Non-bank finance
Leasing and EUR million .. .. .. 1 756 1 547 1 452 1 527 1 521 1 660 2 111 2 463 2 950 3 000 2 810
hire purchases
Factoring and EUR million .. .. .. 151 200 231 348 359 407 434 517 464 453 220
invoice
discounting
Other indicators
Payment Number of .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27 26 30 25 64
delays, B2B days
Bankruptcies, Number 594 925 1 787 1 614 1 254 1 391 1 537 1 672 1 974 2 727 2 972 2 078 1601 789
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- .. 55.72 93.19 -9.68 -22.30 10.93 10.50 8.78 18.06 38.15 8.95 –30.02 -22.95 -50.72
rate) rate

188 
28. Luxembourg
According to the latest available data, SMEs accounted for 99.5% of all non-financial firms in Luxembourg
in 2018. SMEs employed approximately 66% of the labour force and generated 63% of the economy’s
total value added.
New loans to all enterprises decreased in 2020 compared to 2019, marking the lowest level since data are
recorded. New loans to SMEs (defined as loans below EUR 1 million) decreased in 2020 too, but at a
slower pace than loans to all enterprises. Therefore, the share of new SME lending increased to 14%,
which is higher than the 12.1% of 2019 but below the peak of 16.1% in 2011.
Over the period 2007-2020, the average interest rates for SMEs remained systematically higher than the
average interest rate for large firms. In 2020, the interest rate for SMEs was 1.57%, compared to 1.10%
for large firms. In absolute terms, this means an interest rate spread of 0.47 percentage points. In relative
terms, interests payed by SMEs are 43.0% higher than interest payed by large firms in 2020.
Alternative forms of financing such as venture capital may hold high potential for SMEs seeking finance.
In 2020, nearly EUR 220 million of venture capital were invested in Luxembourgish firms. The largest part
of all venture capital funding is invested in firms active in the Information and Communication Technology
industry (EUR 88.3 million).
In 2021, Orbital Ventures, a public-private partnership was set up to make strides in the space economy
with an endowment of EUR 70 million. The Fund invests in early-stage companies and focuses on space
technologies including communications, cryptography, rockets and satellites.
The numbers of bankruptcies among all firms in Luxembourg stood at 1 198 in 2020, decreasing from 1
262 in 2019, the peak for the reference period.

 189
Table 28.1. Scoreboard for Luxembourg

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
New EUR million 113 817 181 792 166 287 111 898 111 568 105 854 100 444 92 349 83 076 87809 80 264 95 633 84 091 62 083
business
lending, total
New EUR million 12 800 14 555 14 754 15 441 17 979 15 593 13 713 10 765 10 142 9 395 9 698 10 440 10 184 8 682
business
lending,
SMEs
SME lending new lending
Non- % of all 0.12 0.18 0.44 0.48 0.64 0.59 0.52 0.41 0.40 0.27 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.57
performing business
loans, total loans
Interest rate, % 5.51 5.72 2.81 2.71 2.68 2.22 2.05 2.08 1.88 1.75 1.76 1.73 1.65 1.57
SMEs
Interest rate, % 4.96 4.97 2.59 2.30 2.62 1.86 1.64 1.47 1.42 1.20 1.21 1.26 1.12 1.10
large firms
spread
Percentage SME loan .. .. .. .. 18.20 .. 25.80 16.40 23.00 26.15 18.93 32.28 27.02 22.68
of SME loan applications/
applications total number
of SMEs
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR 103 343 298 650 49 021 132 917 281 484 86 212 31 090 128 472 144 368 196 346 59 145 113 098 173 872 199 386
growth thousand
capital
Venture and %, Year-on- .. 188.99 -83.59 171.14 111.77 -69.37 -55.23 230.97 13.00 34.10 -69.88 91.22 53.74 14.67
growth year growth
capital rate
(growth rate)
Factoring EUR million .. .. 349 321 180 299 407 339 .. .. .. .. .. ..
and invoice
discounting
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, Number 659 574 693 918 978 1 050 1 049 850 873 961 904 1 191 1 262 1 198
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- .. -12.90 20.73 32.47 6.54 7.36 -0.10 -18.97 2.71 10.08 -5.93 31.75 5.96 -5.07
SMEs year growth
(growth rate) rate

190 
29. Malaysia
SMEs are the backbone of the Malaysian economy, accounting for 97.2% of total business establishments,
generating 38.2% of GDP and providing employment for 7.3 million people. In the last few decades, a
comprehensive financing ecosystem has been put in place to provide diversified funding options for SMEs
from both public and private institutions. This has enabled Malaysian SMEs to continue to have access to
diversified sources of financing to address their needs at various stages of development.
However, 2020 was a year like no other. The COVID-19 pandemic plunged the world into a public health
crisis that saw many losing their lives, and the livelihoods of many more were disrupted as entire
economies were forced to a near standstill. Malaysia was not spared as the economy recorded a significant
contraction especially in the second quarter of the year. Amid these challenges, the Central Bank of
Malaysia (BNM) took swift and broad-ranging measures to cushion shocks to the financial system and the
economy. In doing so, BNM co-ordinated closely with the Government and the financial sector to preserve
both lives and livelihoods. A top priority was to mitigate the impact of the economic contraction and promote
conditions for a sustainable economic recovery. BNM reduced the Overnight Policy Rate to the lowest level
in Malaysian history and implemented measures to ensure adequate liquidity and orderly market
conditions. Debt relief measures and funding programmes for SMEs were rolled out at an unprecedented
scale to help affected borrowers and businesses to alleviate cash flow constraints and to maintain credit
flows to the economy.
Financial institutions continued to play a key role in providing assistance to SMEs by approving a total
MYR 66.8 billion in new business lending for SMEs in 2020.
Guarantee schemes perform a pivotal role in helping viable SMEs that lack collateral and track record to
obtain financing. In 2020, the Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia Berhad (CGC) recorded an approval
value of MYR 5.922 billion, which is higher than the 2019 approval value (MYR 3.968 billion). This is
evidenced by the double-digit growth of 24.4% in the number of SME accounts approved, from 10 827 in
2019 to 13 472 in 2020.
The entrepreneurship development agenda has been given greater importance with the establishment of
a dedicated ministry, known as the Ministry of Entrepreneur Development and Cooperatives (MEDAC).
Subsequently, the National SME Development Council (NSDC) is now officially known as the National
Entrepreneur and SME Development Council (NESDC), with a greater emphasis on entrepreneurship
development.
2020 saw SMEs struggling to face the challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Malaysian
Government responded to the coronavirus threat by introducing the PRIHATIN Economic Stimulus
Package and PENJANA Recovery Plan, which require SMEs to reassess and rethink the way business is
conducted, in line with the “new normal”.

 191
Table 29.1. Scoreboard for Malaysia

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding MYR billion 128.0 138.9 141.6 141.2 165.3 187.6 211.0 243.7 274.4 299.8 315.7 320.1 278.4 305.1
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding MYR billion 290.7 328.3 343.1 375.3 422.0 465.1 499.8 545.9 588.1 616.0 623.8 659.4 675.0 680.6
business loans,
total
business loans
New business MYR billion 163.1 129.0 104.9 141.1 171.4 169.5 178.8 196.4 179.3 178.7 200.0 224.9 237.6 224.7
lending, total
New business MYR billion 63.2 58.9 50.9 62.2 75.2 84.7 78.3 77.7 72.0 74.6 70.7 69.6 71.2 66.8
lending, SMEs
lending lending
Share of short-term % of total SME .. .. .. .. .. .. 28.73 26.52 24.18 23.61 24.10 23.90 23.83 20.58
SME loans lending
outstanding
Share of long-term % of total SME .. .. .. .. .. .. 71.27 73.48 75.82 76.39 75.90
SME loans loans
outstanding
Guarantee and No. of accounts 13.00 10.37 14.07 7.67 7.50 2.15 2.37 6.84 8.23 7.57 8.64 8.99 10.8 13.5
Financing (in thousands)
Schemes
Guarantee and MYR million 4 567 3 014 3 112 2 495 2 861 1 066 1 546 3 175 3 356 4 224 3 380 3 682 3 968 5 922
Financing
Schemes
Impaired financing, MYR billion .. 20.2 18.1 23.6 21.3 18.4 17.7 17.9 18.9 20.5 20.8 21.4 23.7 23.4
total (amount)
Impaired financing, % of all .. 6.16 5.29 6.28 5.05 3.97 3.55 3.27 3.21 3.32 3.33 3.25 3.51 3.44
Impaired financing, MYR billion .. 9.9 8.9 10.6 9.6 8.5 8.2 8.6 8.9 8.9 10.1 10.2 10.3 9.8
SMEs (amount)
Impaired financing, % of all SME .. 7.12 6.28 7.50 5.78 4.53 3.89 3.51 3.24 2.96 3.19 3.21 3.70 3.21
SMEs loans
Interest rate, SMEs % .. 6.39 5.50 5.69 5.74 5.72 6.06 7.18 7.81 6.60 7.00 7.71 7.86 5.78
Interest rate, large % .. 6.08 5.08 5.00 4.92 4.79 3.79 5.41 5.11 5.06 4.82 4.69 4.30 4.40
firms
Interest rate spread % points .. 0.31 0.42 0.69 0.82 0.94 2.28 1.77 2.69 1.54 2.17 3.03 3.56 1.38
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs .. .. .. .. .. .. 49.11 51.85 46.08 41.56 43.58 47.49 46.00 51.77
needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Non-bank finance
Total investment as MYR billion 1.78 1.93 2.59 3.39 3.59 2.76 3.43 3.25 2.22 2.92 2.45 3.11 2.96
at end of the period
Total investment as %, Year-on- 53.90 8.13 34.06 31.05 5.81 23.12 24.52 5.45 31.58 31.61 16.05 26.99 -4.98
at end of the period year growth
rate
Leasing and MYR million .. .. .. .. 721 918 1 099 1 170 1 086 834 1 280
Factoring
Note: Malaysia uses the term "Impaired financing" instead of “non-performing loans” and “Total investment as at end of the period” instead of
“Venture and growth capital”

192 
30. Mexico
In Mexico, before the pandemic, there were over 4.86 million micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), 96.6% of which were micro-enterprises, which generated 14.6% of national GDP and employed
nearly 50% of the workforce.
As a result of the lockdown measures due to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, many businesses were
forced to interrupt their activities, even closing definitely. Despite the disruption, some business found
economic opportunities to reconvert their activities and adapt them to the new circumstances. However,
despite some businesses adapting to new consumer behaviour, it was registered a net reduction of 8.06%
of the total SME population between May 2019 and September 2020. Currently, with the post-COVID policy
measures implemented to reactivate the economy, Mexico has 4.47 million SMEs, of which 94.1% are
micro-enterprises. However, establishments born in 2020 have an average of 2 employees, while closed
establishments during the same year had an average of 3 people employed.
In 2020, the average interest rates varied according to the loan amount and the size of the borrowing
company. For large companies, the average interest rate was approximately 6.26%; for SMEs, it was
11.72%. The average interest rates showed a downward trend related to the expansionary monetary policy
stance of the Bank of Mexico, as a measure to mitigate the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, from the second half of 2021, the central bank turned its monetary policy stance in the opposite
direction and approved several increases of the policy rate to curb inflationary pressures.
In recent years, the Mexican government has developed a range of initiatives to support entrepreneurs
and strengthen the SME access to finance. These initiatives have included programmes to promote youth
and women’s entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the government has put in place several measures to help
SMEs face the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Guarantee funds have also been used to develop more specific programmes. For example, government
initiatives have been developed to support the provision of credit to companies that previously could not
access external finance, such as construction companies, travel agencies, real estate development, rural
tourism companies, small taxpayers and government SME providers 1. Also, in the midst of the COVID-19
pandemic, the government implemented additional programs to support SMEs in strategic sectors such as
retail trade, manufacturing, lodging services, food and beverage preparation, restaurants and the dough
and tortilla industry, to contribute to economic reactivation.
Finally, the increase in competition among financial intermediaries has generated a significant
improvement in credit conditions, resulting in longer loan maturities and lower interest rate spreads.

 193
Table 30.1. Scoreboard for Mexico

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding MXN billion … … 199.0 220.9 256.8 310.9 423.6 481.7 548.1 738.1 821.3 440.8 434.0 404.9
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding MXN billion … … 975.1 1054.3 1218.7 1299.5 1424.7 1518.7 1758.3 2059.6 2357.5 2279.5 2350.4 2257.4
business
loans
New business MXN billion … … … 79.3 164.4 80.8 125.3 93.9 239.6 301.3 4301.7 4805.7 5287.2 5566.6
lending, total
New business MXN billion … … … 21.9 35.9 54.1 112.6 58.2 66.4 190.0 904.4 808.1 789.5 653.1
lending, SMEs
Share of new SME % of total … 21.7 17.9 40.1 47.3 38.2 21.7 38.7 17.4 14.4 13.0 10.5
lending new lending
Outstanding short- MXN billion 11.1 41.3 39.1 30.8 30.0 36.9 34.3 12.5 17.7 21.7 32.1 23.8 … …
term loans, SMEs
Outstanding long- MXN billion 10.8 22.4 38.5 36.6 44.2 60.1 80.9 89.0 90.1 107.1 99.1 115.3 … …
term loans, SMEs
Share of short-term % of total 50.6 64.8 50.4 45.7 40.4 38 29.8 12.3 16.4 16.8 24.5 17.1 … …
SME lending SME lending
Government loan MXN billion 0.8 1.1 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.0 3.7 4.3 3.2 2.7 1.9 4.0 0.8 1.4
guarantees, SMEs
Government MXN billion 21.9 63.8 77.7 67.4 74.3 96.9 115.1 101.6 107.8 128.8 131.2 139.1 34.0 18.6
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Direct government MXN billion … … 29.5 30.8 53.3 63.0 88.1 135.4 183.8 111.1 6.5 6.8 5.7 5.3
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.1 3.6 3.2 3.1 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9
loans
firms
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth USD billion 4.1 2.1 1.5 4.5 2.1 4.2 1.9 7.2 12.2 5.0 4.1 3.2 0.4 1.3
capital
Venture and growth %, Year-on- … -49.6 -25.3 189.4 -54.0 102.3 -53.9 276.2 69.5 -58.8 -17.7 -23.9 -89.5 208.4
rate
Note: Venture capital data were updated for previous years by AMEXCAP (association for the private equity industry in Mexico).
Note
1
Government SME providers are those SME that supply the federal government with goods or services.
Small taxpayers are related to the Tax Incorporation Regime (RIF), a new scheme of optional taxation
introduced in the Tax Reform approved in 2013 for individuals who perform business activities with income
of less than two million pesos per year.

194 
31. The Netherlands
The recovery of the Dutch economy halted in 2020 with GDP showing a year-on-year negative growth rate
of -3.7%, and unemployment increasing by 0.7 percentage points to 3.9%, though still close to the lowest
figure since 2009. The negative growth rate and the increasing unemployment rate can be explained by
the COVID-19 crisis and the consequent measures aimed to prevent the spreading of the corona virus.
New lending to SMEs stood at EUR 18.1 billion in 2020. This represents an increase compared to 2019,
when it stood at EUR 17.1 billion. Total outstanding business loans decreased slightly, from EUR 320.5
billion in 2019 to EUR 308.9 billion in 2020.
Bank loans continue to be the main source of external financing for SMEs in the Netherlands. However,
according to a 2019 policy brief by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), Dutch
SMEs had used bank finance less often than their European counterparts. On the other hand, the
percentage of requested loans that were fully authorised rose from 74% in 2015 to 84% in 2018. The
interest rate for SMEs (2-250 employees) is higher than for large firms by 1.6 percentage points
(respectively 3.3% and 1.7%). The interest rate for large firms decreased by 120 basis points in 2020.
Total venture and growth capital investments in the Netherlands have shown, with a few exceptions, steady
growth and in 2020 accelerated growth. In 2017, VC investments amounted to EUR 930 million, in 2018
EUR 1093 million, in 2019 EUR 1 224 million, and in 2020 the highest point so far with EUR 17 04 million.
Since 2014, total private equity investments have not dipped below the EUR 700 million mark.
The average number of days before receiving a B2B payment was 25 days in 2020, with the average
contractual term being 27 days. The average number of days of delay to receive a B2B payment therefore
is -2 days, a decrease by 22 days compared to 2019. In 2019 a very high number of B2B payment days of
delay was reported. The average number in 2020 is more in line with the average number in 2018,
improving it by 3 days. The number of bankruptcies decreased in 2020, with a year-on-year decrease of
15.8%. The number of bankruptcies is at a lower level than in 2018.
Several programmes are in place to support SMEs’ access to finance. These include different guarantee
schemes, such as the Guarantee Scheme for SMEs (BMKB), or Qredits, a microcredit institution which
introduced SME loans of various sizes in 2013. Furthermore, the Netherlands created a National
Promotional Institution (NPI) named Invest-NL in 2019, whose aim is to help SMEs through financing or
the development of a viable business case.
Because of the COVID-19 crisis and the consequent measures to prevent the spreading of the virus, since
March 2020 the Dutch government has put in place several new programmes to address the issue of SME
insolvencies due to over-leveraging. For example, next to an allowance for wage costs (NOW) and an
allowance for fixed costs (TVL), corona or “c” versions of the national guarantee schemes have been
introduced, such as the BMKB-C and the Guarantee Scheme Small Credits Corona (KKC). Moreover,
Qredits and regional development agencies (ROMs) have provided bridge loans.

 195
Table 31.1. Scoreboard for the Netherlands

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR billion .. .. .. .. .. .. 143.3 136.0 130.4 124.1 125.9 127.1 124.5 121.0
business loans,
SMEs
business loans,
total
Share of SME % of total .. .. .. .. .. .. 41.4 41.1 35.2 35.6 38.3 39.1 38.8 39.2
New business EUR billion .. .. .. 123.0 124.9 110.0 97.3 83.7 146.7 122.7 129.8 130.6 122.8 119.4
lending, total
New business EUR billion .. .. .. 10.2 19.5 18.7 18.8 18.0 18.2 16.0 20.9 18.2 17.06 18.1
lending, SMEs
Share of new % of total new .. .. .. 8.3 15.6 17.0 19.3 21.5 12.4 13.0 16.1 13.9 13.8 15.2
SME lending lending
short-term
loans, SMEs
long-term
loans, SMEs
Share of short- % of total SME .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.0 19.8 17.7 15.9 14.3 13.1 12.2 9.5
term SME lending
lending
Government EUR million .. 400.0 370.0 945.0 1040.0 590.0 415.0 473.0 523.0 710.0 646.0 643.0 586 1485
loan
guarantees,
SMEs
Non- % of all SME .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.0 10.8 9.5 8.1 8.8 9.2 9.6 8.7
performing loans
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, % 5.4 5.7 4.5 6.0 6.4 5.1 4.3 4.1 4.4 3.7 2.9 4.1 3.7 3.3.
SMEs
Interest rate, % .. .. .. .. 3.5 3.6 3.4 2.8 2.4 3.2 2.5 2.1 2.9 1.7
large firms
Interest rate % points .. .. .. .. 2.9 1.5 0.9 1.3 2.0 0.5 0.4 2.0 0.8 1.6
spread
Collateral, % of SMEs .. .. 47.0 45.0 44.0 47.0 50.0 43.0 29.0 34.0 40.0 59.0 55 54
SMEs needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
SMEs
authorised/
requested)
Utilisation rate SME loans .. .. 72.0 75.0 70.0 50.0 54.0 44.0 89.0 73.0 83.0 84.0 84.0 79.0
used/
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR million 498.0 691.0 526.5 291.2 612.8 417.5 398.6 681.1 788.3 727.7 930.2 1093. 1224. 1704.6
growth capital 205 128 60

196 
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Venture and %, Year-on- .. 38.7 -23.8 -44.7 110.4 -31.8 -4.53 70.86 15.7 -7.68 27.8 17.52 11.98 39,25
(growth rate) rate
Leasing and % of SMEs .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.0 16.0 12.0 21.0 23.0 20.0
hire
purchases1
Factoring and % of SMEs .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.0 3.0 1.0
invoice
discounting
Other indicators
Payment Number of 13.2 13.9 16.0 17.0 18.0 18.0 17.0 16.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 1.0 20.0 - 2.0
delays, B2B days
Bankruptcies, Number 3 589 3 842 6 942 6 162 6 117 7 349 8 376 6 645 5 271 4 399 3 291 3 144 3209 2703
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- .. 7.0 80.7 -11.2 -0.7 20.1 14.0 -20.7 -20.7 -16.5 -25.2 -4.5 2.07 -15.77
rate) rate

 197
32. New Zealand
Despite ongoing uncertainty and the challenges brought in by COVID-19, New Zealand was recognized
by the World Bank as the number one country in the world for ease of doing business for the 12th year in
a row. This is based on a number of indicators from ‘starting a business’ through to ‘reducing insolvency’
and ‘protecting minority investors’.
SME’s, when defined as businesses with 0-49 employees, made up 99% of New Zealand businesses in
2020. This is consistent with historic levels. At times in this profile it is noted that the definition of SME
varies depending on the source the data is available from.
Total lending to businesses decreased to NZD 116.3 billion in 2020, down from NZD 120.5 billion in 2019.
Lending to SME’s also decreased, to NZD 70.8 billion from NZD 72.6 billion in 2019. SME lending
decreased by a lesser proportion than total lending, meaning the share of SME lending to total business
loans increased by 0.7%, from 60.2% to 60.9%.
As a small open economy, New Zealand was exposed to considerable uncertainty in 2020. Fiscal and
monetary support, along with successful public health measures and border closures, helped prevent many
business failures and a larger rise in unemployment.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand adjusted policies to enable banks to continue lending to sound
borrowers. The Official Cash Rate was cut to a record low of 0.25%, and central and local government
bonds were purchased in large scales. Funding was also provided to banks when markets were volatile to
ensure banks remained able to support customers.
The Business Finance Guarantee scheme was launched to help SMEs access credit for cash flow, capital
assets, and projects relating to the impacts of COVID-19. 2 205 entities received support loans, totalling
NZD 1.279 billion. It should be noted that the definition of an SME differs in this case, to refer to firms with
a revenue of either less than NZD 50 million, or less than NZD 200 million (depending on the loan provider),
regardless of the number of employees.
Non-performing loans for all businesses remained stable at 0.6%, with no change from 2019. In contrast
non-performing loans for SMEs increased on the previous year from 0.7% to 1%.
Interest rates for SMEs continue to follow their fairly consistent downward trend,
decreasing by 0.6% from 2019 to 2020, from 9.0% to 8.4%.
Debt finance rejection rates increased substantially to 15.1%, up 5.2 percentage points from 9.9% in 2019.
The data for rejection rates in New Zealand only includes businesses with 6 - 49 employees. Smaller and
micro-businesses with less collateral may be likely to experience high rates of rejection, which is not
represented in the data available.
Despite some initial concerns, seed and early stage capital market growth remained strong, with NZD 158
million invested in 2020. This was a 23% increase on the previous year. This year the venture and growth
capital is also reported for the first time, defined as total investment in mature/later stage ventures and

198 
expansion. NZD 37.6 million was invested in 2020, a decrease of 62% on the previous year. It should be
noted that there is considerable volatility in the figures reported for this indicator. These figures put the
total figure for seed, early stage, venture and growth capital at NZD 195.6 million.
New Zealand has seven licensed peer to peer lenders and six licensed crowdfunding providers, which also
provided SME financing over the year.
Bankruptcies continued on their downward trend, declining by 16.5% to a new low of 1 102 bankruptcies
in 2020. This figure only includes personal insolvencies and not corporate liquidations. However, it should
be noted that many SME owners rely on their personal assets to finance their business.
The downward trend is generally attributed to a multitude of factors, including the general buoyancy of the
New Zealand economy over the last decade. More recently, this may be due to both banks and Inland
Revenue (which instigates about three quarters of liquidation applications), giving businesses more leeway
than in the past due to COVID-19. Another factor keeping liquidation at bay is that many business owners
shifted to online sales following the first lockdown so they were better prepared for the latest one. Court
applications to liquidate failing businesses have since picked up in 2021, with the 453 filed to the end of
October already surpassing applications for the whole of last year.
Payment delays for business-to-business transactions decreased to 5.9 days in 2020 from 6.6 days in
2019. SME payment delays also decreased from 6.0 days in 2019 to 5.1 days in 2020. This has occurred
alongside the governments continued promotion of e-Invoicing, intended to facilitate faster payment
stimulating cash flow through the economy.
A substantial number of policy responses to COVID-19 were implemented to support SMEs, including the
Wage Subsidy Scheme, Business Finance Guarantee Scheme, Small Business Cash flow Loan Scheme,
Carry back tax loss scheme and deferred tax payments.
The Wage Subsidy Scheme was a critical scheme for small business, totalling more than NZD14 billion
and helping to retain 1.8 million jobs. Although not directly related to access to finance, it was nevertheless
very important to the overall financial sustainability of companies, as well as bolstering domestic demand.

 199
Table 32.1. Scoreboard for New Zealand

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding NZD billion .. .. 31.6 32.4 32.1 30.9 32.4 34.2 36.5 60.4 64.6 68.2 72.6 70.8
business
loans, SMEs
Outstanding NZD billion 80.0 87.6 80.4 78.9 79.9 83.0 85.4 89.0 95.0 101.6 107.7 113.0 120.5 116.3
business
loans, total
Share of SME % of total .. .. 39.3 41.1 40.2 37.2 37.9 38.4 38.4 59.4 60.0 60.4 60.2 60.9
loans business
loans
Non- % of all .. .. 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
performing business
loans, total loans
Non- % of all .. .. 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.4 1.6 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.7 1.0
performing SME loans
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, % 12.2 11.2 9.8 10.1 10.0 9.6 9.5 10.3 9.4 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.0 8.4
SMEs
Interest rate, % 9.0 8.2 5.7 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.4 6.0 5.4 4.6 .. .. .. ..
large firms
Interest rate % points 3.2 3.0 4.1 3.8 4.0 3.5 4.2 4.3 4.0 4.6 .. .. .. ..
spread
Rejection rate % (SME 6.9 11.6 18.4 20.9 11.4 14.6 9.4 8.4 10.6 4.8 11.7 9.0 9.9 15.1
loans
rejected/
requested)
Non-bank finance
Venture and NZD million 29.5 32.6 43.2 53.1 34.8 29.9 53.1 56.4 61.2 69.0 87.0 111.3 128.7 158.0
growth capital
(seed and
early stage)
Venture and %, year-on- .. 10.3 32.8 22.8 34.5 14.1 77.6 6.3 8.5 12.6 26.2 28.0 15.6 22.8
(seed and rate
early stage)
(growth rate)
Other indicators
Payment number of .. .. .. .. 15.7 13.5 12.7 10.4 7.1 5.9 5.8 5.9 6.6
delays, B2B days
Bankruptcies, number 3 585 2 504 2 564 3 054 2 714 2 417 2 188 1 921 1 979 1 996 1 863 1 486 1 319 1,102
total
Bankruptcies, %, year-on- .. -30.2 2.4 19.1 -11.1 -10.9 -9.5 -12.2 3.0 0.9 -6.7 -20.2 11.2 -16.5
total (growth year growth
rate) rate

200 
33. People’s Republic of China
In China, there were over 140 million SMEs and self-employed in 2020. Overall, SMEs contribute over
60% of total GDP, 50% of tax income, 79% of job creation and 68% of exports. In 2020, there were about
2.52 million new companies, and the number of newly registered enterprises reached 22 000 per day.
Outstanding business loans for micro and small businesses (MSEs) increased to CNY 36 900 billion in
2019, up by 10.17% from 2018. The share of loans for MSEs remains stable, between 42.97% and 42.85%
over the period 2017-19. The ratio of short-term loans to total loans for SMEs decreased from 41.62% to
40.76 % over the period 2018-20.
In 2020, interest rates for SMEs and large firms were 4.84% and 5.06%, down respectively 0.02 and 0.05
percentage points compared to 2019. The interest rate gap between SMEs and large enterprises remains
negative, with the difference declining from 0.25 to 0.22 percentage points in 2019-2020. The negative
interest rate spread between SMEs and large firms is driven by the support from the Chinese government
to reduce the cost of SME loans, including interest rates and bank charges. In 2020, the People's Bank of
China reduced re-financing rates and set up special low-cost re-financing funds multiple times to support
SMEs. Inclusive finance loans to SMEs significantly increased and the comprehensive financing cost of
loans declined steadily. In 2019, the 1-year interest rate in the shadow banking sector ranged from 12.23%-
13.81%, with a spread of about 7.4%-8.9% compared to formal bank loans. In 2020, the shadow banking
assets reached CNY 59.2 trillion, a slight increase of CNY 200 billion. However, the share of SME loans
in shadow banking is difficult to estimate.
In 2020, the rejection rate of loan applications by SMEs was 3.79%, down 0.26 percentage points
compared to 2019. On average, only 57.94% of SMEs tried to apply for a bank loan. The utilisation rate of
SME bank loans was 84.55%.
In 2020, SMEs obtained CNY 222.6 billion from STAR Market, CNY 249.2 billion from the Shenzhen SME
Board, CNY 176.9 billion from Shenzhen Venture Board, and CNY 33.9 billion from NEEQ. Venture capital,
leasing and factoring, online lending and crowdfunding continue to remain important sources of SME
financing.
The bankruptcy rate for SMEs was 4.06% in 2020 according to survey data, up 31.39% from the previous
year. In recent years, the Chinese government has simplified the cancellation process of companies to
unblock the channels for market exit. The number of companies that closed their business and cancelled
their registration increased from 1.81 million in 2018 to 3.30 million in 2020. The ratio of cancellation cases
to new company registrations was about 1 to 2.43 in 2020. However, survey data also show that bankruptcy
rates have increased as SMEs were greatly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
In 2020, the National Financing Guarantee Fund supported 45.6 million SMEs, totalling CNY 70.91 billion.
The National Guide Fund for Venture Investment in Emerging Industries accounts for an aggregate
investment of over CNY 85 billion. Special Funds for SME Development account for over CNY 5.04 billion
in total.

 201
Facing the huge challenge of COVID-19, the Chinese government promptly proposed a series of
emergency policies to financing SMEs in earlier stage of the pandemic. Such immediate policy responses
included lowering the deposit reserve ratio, arranging special re-financing funds, and allowing SMEs to
delay the payment of overdue bank loan instalments.
Table 33.1. Scoreboard for the People’s Republic of China

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding business RMB billion .. .. 13 616 17 139 21 168 25 356 28 585 33 302 35 300 40 517 46 477 .. .. ..
loans, SMEs
Outstanding business RMB billion .. .. 24 940 30 292 35 017 39 283 44 019 52 162 53 895 62 578 71 545 78 728 86 123 ..
loans, total
Share of SME % of total .. .. 54.60 56.58 60.45 64.55 64.94 63.84 65.50 64.75 64.96 .. .. ..
business loans
Outstanding business RMB billion 30 744 33 492 36 900 ..
loans, Small and Micro
Enterprises
Share of outstanding % of total 42.97 42.54 42.85 ..
loans, Small and Micro outstanding
Enterprises business loans
Share of short-term % of total 42.12 43.12 42.4 40.35 38.06 35.77 34.35 32.86
loans outstanding
business loans
Share of short-term % of total SME .. .. .. .. .. .. 56.10 49.24 47.56 54.69 40.97 41.62 39.09 40.76
SME lending lending
Direct government RMB billion .. .. .. .. 1 550 1 813 2 082 2 470 2 820 .. .. .. .. ..
loans, SMEs
Non-performing loans, % of all business .. .. .. .. 1.26 1.21 1.25 1.49 2.04 2.07 2.05 2.29 2.24 ..
total loans
Non-performing loans, % of all SME loans .. .. .. .. 1.75 1.65 1.66 1.97 2.59 2.60 2.58 3.16 3.09 ..
SMEs
Interest rate, SMEs % .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.39 7.51 5.23 4.77 5.78 5.17 4.86 4.84
Interest rate, large firms % .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.72 7.47 5.26 4.89 5.40 5.07 5.11 5.06
Interest rate spread % points .. ... .. .. .. .. 0.67 0.04 -0.03 -0.12 0.38 0.10 -0.25 -0.22
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs needing .. .. .. .. 51.59 52.98 54.52 54.76 55.67 52.05 50.28 50.38 .. ..
bank lending
Collateral, Small and % of Small and 55.83 56.96 58.00 54.21 52.38 52.5 53.2 ..
Micro Enterprises Micro Enterprises
needing collateral to
obtain bank lending
Percentage of SME SME loan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 69.88 63.06 53.09 58.36 54.79 57.94
loan applications applications/ total
number of SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.19 11.97 11.72 6.13 4.07 3.69 4.05 3.79
authorised/
requested)
Utilisation rate SME loans used/ .. .. .. .. .. .. 93.51 94.75 94.48 94.03 89.91 86.26 84.32 84.55
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth RMB billion 111 146 161 241 320 331 264 293 336 377 411 476.9 563.6 ..
capital (stock)
Venture and growth %, Year-on-year .. 30.80 10.26 49.93 32.88 3.59 -20.34 11.15 14.59 12.02 9.16 16.03 18.18 ..
capital (stock, growth growth rate
rate)

202 
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Venture and growth RMB billion .. .. .. .. .. 25.11 27.90 37.44 46.56 50.55 84.53 52.72 86.68 ..
capital (incremental)
Venture and growth %, Year-on-year .. .. .. .. .. .. 11.11 34.20 24.36 8.60 67.22 -37.63 64.42 ..
capital (incremental, growth rate
growth rate)
Leasing and hire RMB billion 24 155 370 700 930 1 550 2 100 3 200 4 440 5 330 6 060 6 650 6654 6504
purchases
Factoring and invoice EUR billion 55.0 67.3 154.6 274.9 343.8 378.1 406.1 352.9 301.6 405.5 411.5 40350 433162
discounting 4
Other indicators
Payment delays, B2B Number of days .. .. .. .. .. .. 95.91 72.31 64.44 65.21 44.00 38.00
Bankruptcies, SMEs Percentage of all .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 7 5 5 4 3 3.09 4.06

SMEs
Bankruptcies, SMEs %, Year-on-year .. .. .. .. .. .. .. -4.36 -24.59 -13.37 -21.78 -22.97 8.42 31.39

 203
34. Peru
In 2020, 99.5% of Peruvian enterprises were SMEs (including micro-enterprises, which employ fewer than
ten persons), and they employed 89.4% of the private sector’s workforce. Compared to 2019, according
to data from the National Tax Administration Bureau, the size of the SME sector decreased by 25.1% in
2020 (in terms of number of SMEs), a significant drop compared to recent years. Among these formal
enterprises, only 9.4% had access to the formal financial system in 2020, increasing from 5.5% in 2019.
This increase is due to the credit programmes implemented by the Government of Peru in order to face
the liquidity crisis suffered by companies due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru (CRB) forecast an annual growth of 10.7% in 2021, thanks to a better
performance of internal private consumption. It is also expected that the terms of trade will experience a
slight improvement, from 8.2% to 13.0%, due to an increase in export prices. In addition, the CRB expects
to maintain its interest rate low (0.25%) to foster the economic recovery, taking into account that the
inflation rate is stable at around 3.0% and that the output gap is negative.
Outstanding business loans grew by 24.4% in 2020. Based on preliminary data, outstanding SME loans
amounted to 32.7% of all outstanding business loans in 2020 (driven by the increase in new SME lending,
which grew by 18.5%), which is higher than the share observed in 2019 (24.4%). The increase in new
lending corresponds to the efforts of the Peruvian government to establish extraordinary measures that
targeted specifically SMEs, for instance through the Business Support Fund for MSMEs (FAE-MYPE) and
the Business Support Programme for micro and small businesses (PAE-MYPE). In other programmes,
such as Reactiva Peru, 98.6% of beneficiaries were SMEs.
About 2.9% of all outstanding business loans were non-performing, which is slightly lower than in 2019
(3.2%). Non-performing loans in the SME sector experienced a significant improvement, declining from
10.9% in 2019 to 6.6% in 2020. This decline is explained by the government implementing debt moratoria.
The interest rate spread between SME loans and large-company loans fell from 19.4 to 15.8 percentage
points in 2020, according to the Central Reserve Bank, which is nonetheless high by international
standards. The high interest rate spread reflects banks’ significantly higher operating costs and credit risk
associated with SME operations. SMEs, particularly those operating in the retail portfolio, tend to have a
low degree of organisation, operate in the local market and mostly lack financial information regarding their
activities. Around 57.9% of SMEs do not keep a record of their cash flows and 80% do not prepare a
financing plan for their activities.
The main financial institutions that grant loans to SMEs are private banks with 93.7% of outstanding loans,
urban credit unions with 4.2% of outstanding loans, and other types of financial institutions with the
remaining 2.1%.

204 
Table 34.1. Scoreboard for Peru

Indicator Unit 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding PEN Billion 17.18 19.75 23.23 26.62 30.14 32.44 32.46 34.11 35.56 36.48 61.92
business loans,
SMEs. As of June
30
Outstanding PEN Billion 65.99 75.04 81.49 97.20 112.21 127.37 130.02 134.62 147.30 149.53 189.21
business loans,
total. As of June 30
Share of SME % of total 26.04 26.31 28.50 27.39 26.86 25.47 24.97 25.34 24.14 24.39 32.73
business
loans
New business Number of 264 129 244 850 249 880 226 035 219 435 244 928 241 292 281 590
lending, total lending
New business Number of 241 949 224 537 228 624 207 603 201 133 225 421 222 626 263 860
lending, SMEs lending
Share of new SME % of total new 91.6 91.7 91.5 91.8 91.7 92.0 92.3 93.7
lending lending
Government loan PEN Billion .. .. .. .. .. .. 400 .. .. .. ..
guarantees, SMEs
Direct government PEN Billion 30.98 49.06 59.57 219.92 365.33 369.45 389.18 320.85 399.83 367.95 387.01
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all 2.20 1.78 1.65 1.96 2.14 2.37 2.46 3.33 3.40 3.15 2.93
loans
Non-performing % of all SME 7.83 6.33 5.19 6.30 7.11 8.42 9.03 8.69 10.53 10.94 6.63
loans, SMEs loans
Interest rate, SMEs % 27.63 27.09 25.96 24.66 23.41 25.59 26.37 26.57 26.31 25.28 20.23
Interest rate, large % 4.98 6.03 6.60 6.49 6.37 6.29 6.86 6.75 6.00 5.93 4.39
firms
Interest rate spread % points 22.65 21.06 19.35 18.17 17.04 19.30 19.52 19.82 20.31 19.35 15.84
Percentage of SME SME loan .. .. .. .. 38.52 51.02 43.26 48.39 43.40
total number
of SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans .. .. .. .. 5.06 5.77 4.63 5.93 4.00
authorised/
requested)
Utilisation rate SME loans .. .. .. .. 94.94 94.23 95.37 94.07 96.00
used/
authorised
Non-bank finance
Leasing and hire PEN Billion 3 374 3 846 4 301 3 978 4 128 3 966 3 530 3 440 3 110 3 000 3 204
purchases
Factoring and PEN Billion 768.98 754.27 719.99 779.45 809.13 819.41 835.50 833.89 1006.19 947.14 724.63
invoice discounting
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, all Number 162 948 168 261 233 287 152 758 225 384 242 842 259 443 362 091 199 303 183 442 859 595
businesses

 205
35. Poland
The COVID-19 pandemic has unleashed an unprecedented health and economic crisis. Nonetheless, the
fall in national GDP has proved to be relatively small: -1.7% and -2.7% in the third and fourth quarters of
2020, compared to respective quarters in 2019. Moreover, Poland started 2021 on a strong economic
footing, and it is expected that the negative impact of the pandemic on economic activity will be temporary.
Overall, real GDP growth is projected to reach 4.8% in 2021 and 5.2% in 2022.
In 2020, the government launched a number of tools to support domestic entrepreneurs. The “Anti-crisis
Shield” included the so-called Financial Shields in the form of financial subsidies for SMEs and in the form
of the preferential financing for large companies, which were worth a combined total of PLN 71.37 billion
(July 2021). Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego provided support worth PLN 93.84 billion (July 2021) in the
form of accessible guarantees, such as de minimis guarantees (the maximum amount of this guarantee
was lifted from 60% to 80%) and liquidity guarantees (a new measure to improve the financial liquidity of
medium-sized and large companies). The Anti-crisis Shield also covered other measures such as social
insurance exemptions, subsidies to the remuneration of employees and idle- time benefits. The
government support under the Anti-crisis Shield has amounted in total to over PLN 236 billion as of July
2021. These measures have significantly mitigated the effects of the crisis in the non-financial corporate
sector.
In 2019, there were 2 211.6 thousand non-financial enterprises in Poland, which is 2.9% more than the
previous year. SMEs dominate the business landscape in Poland, constituting nearly 99.9% of all firms.
Micro-enterprises (less than 10 people employed) alone account for 97% of all companies in the country.
In 2020, the banking sector has remained stable. As a result of the reforms implemented after the 2008-
2009 global financial crisis, the Polish banking system has generally become more resilient to shocks, due
to stronger capital and liquidity buffers. In 2020, decreasing debt growth was observed among both large
companies and SMEs. The biggest decline was observed in corporate loans, which to a large extent were
replaced by the fiscal support provided by the government. At the end of 2020, the proportion of firms that
did not experience liquidity problems reached a historical high, primarily as a consequence of the state aid
liquidity measures under the Financial Shields.
The stock of outstanding business loans and SME loans slightly declined in 2020, which could be driven
by a decline in credit demand and an increase in repayment rates. From March to the end of August 2020,
a substantial increase in the value of corporate deposits was observed, explaining current lower demand
for loans. Furthermore, at the end of 2020, over 94.5% of companies declared timely settlement of credit
liabilities. There has also been a rather sustained upward trend in the volume of SME long-term loans. The
share of non-performing loans (both total and SME) increased slightly in 2020, but remained visibly below
the 2010 peaks reached after the financial crisis. The average interest rate, both for SMEs and large
companies, declined in 2020. Similarly, the interest rate spread also fell to 0.14 percentage points. This
decline can be explained by the important government support through the de minimis Guarantee Fund.

206 
Venture and growth capital investments expanded in 2020 by almost 22% compared to 2019. In 2020, the
financial results of the Warsaw Stock Exchange Group were among the best in its 30-year history. Seven
companies were newly listed on the main stock market (including two transfers from the junior market,
New Connect) and 14 companies were newly listed on New Connect.
Table 35.1. Scoreboard for Poland

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding PLN Billion .. 125.31 127.22 127.00 159.02 164.81 163.93 175.63 185.78 193.63 206.57 208.48 208.68 199.94
business loans,
SMEs
business loans,
total
Share of SME % of total .. 53.72 57.29 57.81 60.12 60.54 58.97 58.36 56.77 56.14 56.44 53.70 52.75 53.07
loans business
loans
short-term loans,
SMEs
long-term loans,
SMEs
Share of short- % of total .. 26.15 25.10 25.17 24.86 24.60 23.24 23.70 23.12 22.79 21.93 19.53 21.06 16.29
term SME SME lending
lending
Government loan PLN Billion .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.00 9.65 8.90 9.36 9.91 10.17 11.56 23.58
guarantees,
SMEs
Government PLN Billion .. .. .. .. .. .. 12.24 17.43 15.86 16.43 17.80 18.17 20.71 33.70
guaranteed
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all .. 6.50 11.58 12.40 10.37 11.78 11.61 11.33 10.31 9.11 8.28 8.70 8.43 9.00
loans
Non-performing % of all SME .. 7.46 13.35 14.59 12.33 13.06 12.99 12.75 12.29 10.97 10.04 11.32 11.16 12.18
loans, SMEs loans
Interest rate, % .. 5.37 3.82 4.31 4.57 4.86 3.85 3.52 3.00 2.86 2.95 3.43 3.77 3.07
SMEs
Interest rate, % .. 5.62 4.28 4.00 4.45 4.74 3.83 3.40 2.90 2.77 2.76 2.92 3.07 2.93
large firms
Interest rate % points .. -0.25 -0.46 0.31 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.19 0.51 0.70 0.14
spread
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38.92 30.33 .. .. ..
needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME loan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 78.55 80.12 .. .. ..
applications total number
of SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 37.20 31.78 .. .. ..
loans
authorised/
requested)

 207
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Utilisation rate SME loans .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 66.44 61.83 .. .. ..
used/
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR Million 147.5 96.4 70.7 112.7 197.5 127.1 198.2 89.3 140.3 190.7 195.8 350.4 193.7 235.8
growth capital
Venture and %, Year-on- .. -34.65 -26.70 59.44 75.28 -35.62 55.93 -54.96 57.07 35.97 2.69 78.93 -44.72 21.72
(growth rate) rate
Leasing and hire PLN Billion 27.11 24.09 21.43 23.92 27.79 26.90 30.42 34.29 37.83 51.01 58.19 66.44 61.49 50.19
purchases
Factoring and PLN Billion 30.34 45.51 53.16 88.61 95.33 113.06 129.59 152.68 171.64 192.74 222.49 269.63 315.02 311.34
invoice
discounting

208 
36. Portugal
In 2019, SMEs comprised 99.7% of enterprises in Portugal, employed 71.8% of the labour force and were
responsible for 57.7% of turnover and 82.8% of investment volumes.
In 2020, the total stock of business loans further increased by 10.4% year-on-year, below the increase in
SME lending (12.3%). The share of SME loans in total business loans has been around 80% for the last
five years.
The increase in SME lending was more pronounced for short-term SME loans, with an increase by 26%
year-on-year. This runs contrary to the trend observed over the past decade when short-term loans
declined by 64% and the share of long-term loans rose to more than 80% of total outstanding business
loans.
The share of government-guaranteed loans in total SME loans grew significantly, from 5.4% in 2009 to
23% in 2020, demonstrating the sustained public efforts to support SMEs’ access to finance. In 2020, this
instrument registered an increase of 92% compared to the previous year, largely due to the government's
intervention to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on SME financing.
The average interest rate for SME loans decreased to 2.48% in 2020, marking the sixth consecutive year
of decline, after the 2012 peak of 7.6%. The interest rate spread between SMEs and large firms increased
from 1.84 to 2.16 percentage points between 2009 and 2012, and decreased since then, to 0.78
percentage point in 2020, pointing to an improvement in SME financing conditions.
Trends in venture capital have been uneven. After a continuous decline in venture capital investments
since 2007, there were signs of recovery since 2012. Total venture capital investments in 2014 increased
to EUR 107 million, +312% compared to their 2011 value. Nevertheless in 2016, the amount of venture
capital invested dropped again to EUR 18 million, an 82% decrease from 2015, but recovered in the last
four years, and in 2020, total venture capital investments reached EUR 42 million, an increase of 133%
compared to 2016.
Payment delays rose from 35 days in 2009 to 41 days in 2011, and then almost halved again from 40 days
in 2012 to 12 days in 2020, decreasing steadily in the last five years.
Following four years of continuous increase (2009-12) in the number of bankruptcies, 2020 closed with a
decline of 2.3% compared to 2019, with 2 502 bankruptcies, despite the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on
the economy. This decline in part can be explained by government measures that have allowed companies
to avoid filing for bankruptcy during the COVID-19 crisis.
SME access to finance has been a major priority for the government. In this context, several credit lines
have been made available to facilitate access to credit for SMEs. For example, the government
programmes “SME Invest/Growth” and Capitalizar have offered credit lines since 2008. As of 2020, about
245 247 projects were eligible for these credit lines and EUR 21.6 billion were provided to 106 238 SMEs,
supporting about 1.3 million jobs.

 209
On the equity side, several venture capital funds and business-angel co-investment vehicles have been
implemented, totalling EUR 270 million for venture capital investments in the start-up and expansion
phases (2017-2021). To reinforce the entrepreneurial ecosystem, the government created in 2018 a
venture capital fund with the European Investment Fund (EIF), totalling EUR 100 million, the “Portugal
Tech”.
The Portuguese Government approved a strategic programme, called Capitalizar, to support the
capitalisation of Portuguese companies, relaunch investment and facilitate SMEs’ access to funding,
mainly through:
 Financial instruments of direct or indirect participation in companies;
 Special financing instruments of quasi-equity capital;
 Tax measures to encourage firm capitalisation.
In order to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the economy, the Portuguese government
launched a set of measures aimed at SMEs, of which the following have an impact on their financing:
 A set of credit lines backed by public guarantees; these credit lines aim to support the working
capital needs of SME, as result of the effects of the COVID-19 crisis;
 A moratorium regime with regard to the fulfilment of obligations arising from credit agreements;
 A grant programme to support lost funds due to loss of billing, within the scope of the COVID-19
pandemic;
 Direct loans;
 An exceptional and temporary regime for compliance with tax obligations and social contributions,
within the scope of the pandemic.
Table 36.1. Scoreboard for Portugal

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR billion 90.2 88.2 87.0 79.7 73.9 70.3 65.8 61.3 57.4 54.1 52.5 58.9
business
loans, SMEs
Outstanding EUR billion 102 115.8 117.8 114.6 113.8 105.3 99.3 86.5 82.2 77.3 73.1 69.5 67.0 73.9
business
loans, total
loans business
loans
New business EUR billion 64.3 61.8 46.3 45.6 45 45.6 49.1 41.2 33.8 29.8 28.8 31.6 32.7 33.5
lending, total
New business EUR billion 28.9 26.4 23.1 9 14.2 12.5 11.9 11.9 11.9 11.3 10.9 11.2 11.8 11.8
lending, SMEs
SME lending new lending
Short-term EUR billion .. .. 24.7 22.7 21.3 15.3 13.4 11.5 9.5 9.5 8.9 7.3 6.5 8.1
loans, SMEs
Long-term EUR billion .. .. 65.6 65.5 65.7 64.4 60.5 58.7 56.3 51.9 48.5 46.8 46.0 50.8
loans, SMEs
Share of short- % of total .. 27.34 27.34 25.77 24.47 19.21 18.13 16.37 14.51 15.43 15.53 13.50 12.38 13.89
lending

210 
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Government EUR billion .. .. 5 6.8 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.5 5.6 5.7 6.1 6.2 6.3 13.6
guaranteed
loans, SMEs
Non- % of all 1.50 2.20 3.90 4.10 6.00 9.40 11.80 14.20 15.20 15.00 12.70 7.80 4.60 3.32
performing business
loans, total loans
Non- % of all SME 4.67 5.00 7.33 11.76 14.82 16.50 17.89 17.62 14.65 8.83 5.15 3.87
performing loans
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, % 7.05 7.64 5.72 5.45 7.41 7.59 6.82 5.97 4.6 3.83 3.42 3.13 2.93 2.48
SMEs
Interest rate, % 5.29 5.92 3.84 3.91 5.4 5.43 4.97 4.37 3.25 2.69 2.14 1.93 1.85 1.70
large firms
spread
Collateral, % of SMEs .. .. 76.25 81.16 82.63 82.15 83.09 80.14 81.84 79.60 80.98 83.13 86.95 89.88
SMEs needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR million 129 92 70 74 26 53 106 106 102 18 29 30 69 42
growth capital
Venture and %, Year-on- .. -28.7 -23.9 5.7 -64.9 103.9 100.0 0.0 -3.8 -82.4 61.1 3.5 130.0 -39.1
(growth rate) rate
Leasing and EUR billion .. .. 5.3 5.2 3.4 3 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9
hire purchases
Factoring and EUR million .. .. 621 733 402 338 376 476 547 441 418 930 855 513
invoice
discounting
Other indicators
Payment Number of 39.9 33 35 37 41 40 35 33 21 20 20 12 18 12
delays, B2B days
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- .. 35.1 8.1 7.2 16.0 40.9 -9.8 -33.4 17.3 -23.2 -14.4 -13.1 -5.0 -2.3
rate) rate

 211
37. Serbia
SMEs dominate the Serbian business economy, accounting for 99% of all enterprises. In 2020, SMEs
employed more than 65% of the labour force and accounted for 59.2% of total gross value added and
66.4% of turnover. Sector-specific data indicates that most SMEs belong to the trade sector (23.9%),
followed by the manufacturing sector (15.1%), professional, scientific and innovative activities (13.7%),
and transportation and storage (9.7%).
Despite the unprecedented crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, preliminary results from the 2020
SME lending conditions survey conducted by the National Bank of Serbia indicate that SME financing
conditions did not deteriorate and, in some aspects, even improved. Timely and effective measures
adopted by the National Bank of Serbia and the Serbian government diminished the negative effects of
this crisis.
The National Bank of Serbia adopted the first measures to support the domestic economy even before the
state of emergency was declared (15 March 2020) by cutting the key policy rate by 50 base points, to
1.75%, in order to maintain favourable financing conditions. Since March 2020, the key policy rate was cut
by an additional 75 base points, to 1.0%.
In addition, the Serbian Government was one of the first in the world to adopt the Economic Measures
Programme to mitigate the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and support the Serbian economy.
The priorities were to help economic entities in distress and to preserve jobs and wages.
The total value of economic measures in 2020 is estimated at around 13% of GDP. The support package
consisted of nine measures, classified into four categories. These categories are tax policy measures,
direct assistance to the private sector, liquidity preservation (e.g. financial support to the corporate sector
through the Development Fund and corporate support guarantee scheme), and other measures
(moratorium on dividend payments until the end of the year and one-off assistance to all Serbian citizens
of age).
According to the preliminary results from the 2020 SME lending conditions survey conducted by the
National Bank of Serbia in 2020, the stock of SME loans in 2020 increased by 14.8% year-on-year to EUR
8.2 billion. The increase is in part explained by the deferral of principle and interest payments on loans,
which was one of the measures adopted with the goal to fight the negative economic effects of the
pandemic.
New bank lending to SMEs in 2020 amounted to EUR 4.9 billion (19% lower y-o-y basis). The share of
new SMEs loans among total corporate loans likewise decreased by 1.5 percentage points to 43.1% in
2020. This decline in new SME lending is explained by sizeable public support though non-debt channels
such as: deferred payment of income tax advances, deferred payment of payroll taxes and social
contributions in the private sector (during the state of emergency) with subsequent repayment of liabilities
in instalments (starting from 2021 at the earliest), as well as direct support in the form of payment of three
minimum wages to entrepreneurs and SMEs. The share of outstanding SME loans in total corporate loans

212 
increased to 33.3% (from 31.9% in 2019). Long-term loans increased as well and amounted to 87.6% of
total SMEs loans.
Lending conditions measured by interest rate levels continue to improve. Interest rates for SME loans in/or
indexed to foreign currencies decreased to 3.7% in 2020 (from 4.0% in 2019 and 4.3% in 2018). However,
the interest rate spread between large companies and SMEs increased slightly to 1.6 percentage points
(from 1.5 percentage points in 2019). On the Serbian dinar-denominated loans side, interest rates were
0,6 percentage points lower compared to the previous year (4,2% compared with 4,8%) and the interest
rate spread between large companies and SMEs was 1.6 percentage points.
The rejection rate (the percentage of SME loan applications that are rejected) was 19.3% in 2020 (6.5%
in 2019), while the utilisation rate (the percentage of used SME loans among all SME loans that were
approved) was 96.1% in 2020 (98.2% in 2019). At the same time, the share of loans requiring collateral
(excluding bills of exchange) was 50.5% in 2020 (50.7% in 2019).
The share of non-performing loans (NPLs) in total SMEs loans stood on a similar level as the previous
year: 4.6% in 2020 compared to 4.7% in 2019. On the other hand, NPLs for the whole corporate sector
decreased to 2.8% in 2020 from 3.2% in 2019.
Table 37.1. Scoreboard for Serbia

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR Million 2 858 3 994 3 966 4 202 4 320 4 352 4 061 4 779 5 340 5 552 5 802 6 488 7 140 8 194
business
loans, SMEs
business
loans, total
Share of SME % of total 21.02 20.97 20.58 21.25 21.57 21.27 21.20 25.52 28.59 30.24 30.30 31.12 32 33.3
New business EUR Million .. .. .. .. 8 862 9 043 7 093 6 765 8 461 10 130 10 966 12 339 13 629 11 425
lending, total
New business EUR Million 2 027 3 409 3 015 3 190 3 323 2 771 2 302 2 717 3 332 4 038 4 688 5 478 6 087 4 927
lending, SMEs
Share of new % of total new .. .. .. .. 37.49 30.64 32.45 40.16 39.38 39.86 42.75 44.53 45 43.1
SME lending lending
short-term
loans, SMEs
long-term
loans, SMEs
Share of % of total SME 34.98 31.67 34.20 34.17 30.28 28.87 34.13 29.40 25.24 24.86 25.01 22.81 19 12.4
short-term lending
SME lending
Government EUR Million 0 0 298 523 390 569 342 750 126 13 14 15 14 357
guaranteed
loans, SMEs
Non- % of all .. 14.56 19.84 20.70 22.33 19.19 24.52 24.64 21.71 17.22 10.41 5.05 3.17 2.8
performing business loans
loans, total

 213
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Non- % of all SME 6.72 10.56 18.86 21.00 22.64 26.15 28.05 27.08 26.69 20.16 9.91 6.9 4.65 4.6
performing loans
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, % 10.69 10.90 10.57 10.06 9.72 8.15 8.03 7.25 6.31 5.69 4.58 4.3 3.98 3.7
SMEs
Interest rate, % 6.32 8.04 7.23 7.36 7.88 6.60 6.34 5.18 3.87 3.13 2.78 2.2 2.56 2.1
large firms
spread
Collateral, % of SMEs 31.62 38.78 43.14 44.51 45.59 53.00 55.06 53.13 53.79 42.70 53.85 50.7 50.7 50.5
SMEs needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME loan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.94 16.46 16.89 15.46 .. ..
SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans 18.66 17.25 28.42 27.13 15.77 32.02 32.18 25.15 24.52 28.18 28.32 17.09 6.51 19.3
authorised/
requested)
used/
authorised

214 
38. Slovak Republic
SMEs dominate the Slovak economy, accounting for 99.6% of the business population (excluding self-
employed individuals). The number of SMEs increased by 0.2% in 2020, with micro-enterprises accounting
for a considerable portion of this growth, growing by 1.2% year-on-year.
Credit conditions and access to finance for SMEs improved in 2020, which was reflected not only in an
increase in the volume of existing and new bank loans but also in a decline of the average interest rate.
The financial instruments to support SMEs introduced during the pandemic have made a significant
contribution to maintaining a relatively low rate of non-performing loans (NPLs). The amount of outstanding
business loans has been growing since 2013, increasing by 6.2% over the last year, from EUR 15 255
million in 2019 to EUR 16 208 million in 2020. In the same year, more than half of SME outstanding loans
(59.6%) were long-term, while short-term loans accounted for 40.4% (EUR 6 547 million).
Favourable credit conditions and the availability of supporting financial instruments during the COVID-19
crisis increased interest in bank financing for all size categories of enterprises. The volume of new SME
lending increased year-on-year by 30.6% to EUR
4 201 million, while the share of SME loans in total new lending increased by 2.8 percentage points to
37.3%.
The share of NPLs among all SME loans was higher (4.6%) than the share of NPLs among all business
loans (3.4%) in 2020. In the year-on-year comparison, the share of NPLs among SMEs increased only
negligibly – by 0.05 percentage points.
Interest rates on SME loans fell from 3.8% in 2012 to 2.6% in 2020. The drop in the average SME interest
rate over these years has made finance available to more SMEs. Interest rates for self-employed
entrepreneurs reached 4.5% in 2020, 0.8 percentage points lower than in the previous year. These figures
indicate that financing conditions for SMEs have been gradually improving over the reference period.
For the period of 2007-2013, the amount of venture and capital investments gradually recovered. After
2017 the volume of venture and growth capital experienced a significant decline as a result of the end of
funding support under the JEREMIE initiative. In 2020, the amount of venture capital investments
increased year-on-year by 23.5%, totalling EUR 37.85 million. The majority of investments focused on
established SMEs – to expand production capacities, to develop market potential or to further develop
products and services. Compared to SME bank financing, the amount of venture capital is still negligible.
The payment discipline of enterprises has improved, as the average business-to-business (B2B) payment
delay decreased to 14 days in 2020.
SME bankruptcies totalled 177 over the year. Despite the declining trend and the significant year-on-year
drop in 2020 (-26%), the number of SME bankruptcies for 2020 remains higher than the pre-crisis
bankruptcy levels of 2008.
The government has continued to implement several policies that seek to improve SMEs’ access to finance
and introduced new instruments to support SME financing during the COVID-19 crisis. In 2020, the volume
of SME government loan guarantees, guaranteed loans and SME government direct loans increased

 215
significantly due to the launch of new financial instruments intended to minimise the adverse effects of the
pandemic and to support SMEs. The total volume of SME government loan guarantees increased from
EUR 31.7 million in 2019 to EUR 407.3 million in 2020. As a result of the increase in bank guarantees,
there was also a significant increase in the volume of guaranteed loans – from EUR 152.5 million in 2019
to EUR 774.4 million in 2020. The volume of SME government direct loans provided by the state banks
and the Slovak Business Agency grew less rapidly – by 20.1% to EUR 245.1 million.
Table 38.1. Scoreboard for the Slovak Republic

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR billion 9.1 12.1 12 12 10.6 11 10.7 11.9 13.2 13.5 14.6 15.1 15.3 16.2
business loans,
SMEs (1)
Outstanding EUR billion .. .. .. .. .. 5.9 6.7 6.9 7.4 8.7 8.9 9.2 9.7 10.7
business loans,
SMEs (2)
outstanding loans (1) outstanding
business loans
lending, total
New business EUR billion .. .. .. .. .. 2.36 2.63 2.6 3.09 3.13 3.17 3.46 3.22 4.20
lending, SMEs (2)
Share of new SME % of total new .. .. .. .. .. 20.2 22.16 20.83 26.2 36.14 33.37 32.29 34.54 37.30
lending lending
Outstanding short- EUR million 4 609 4 797 4 981 4 987 4 188 4 481 4 532 5 385 5 766 5 394 5 695 5 683 5 926 6 547
term loans, SMEs
Outstanding long- EUR million 4 527 7 295 7 051 7 059 6 412 6 557 6 202 6 517 7 404 8 129 8 832 9 437 9 329 9 661
term loans, SMEs
SME lending lending
Government loan EUR million 82 99 81 70 84 87 38 26 60 46 32 39 32 407
guarantees, SMEs
Government EUR million 115 157 143 139 167 136 157 186 244 184 88 145 153 774
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Direct government EUR million 117 160 139 146 168 209 152 159 172 177 120 132 204 245
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all business .. .. 6.8 8.4 8.3 7.9 8.3 8.6 7.4 6.5 5 4.12 3.70 3.44
loans, total loans
Non-performing % of all SME .. .. .. .. .. 10.4 9.9 10.3 9 8.1 6.65 5.68 4.55 4.60
loans, SMEs(2) loans
Interest rate, SMEs % 5.5 4.6 3 3.2 3.2 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.6
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME SME loan .. .. .. .. 17 .. 16 .. 23 18 22 17 22 28
total number of
SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans .. .. .. .. 20 .. 15 .. 13 5 13 10 12 8
authorised/
requested)

216 
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth EUR million 7 8 14.4 11.4 11.5 7 9 9 12.7 17.1 2.9 5.4 30,65 37.85
capital
Venture and growth %, year-on-year .. 14.3 80 -20.8 0.9 -39.1 28.6 -0.3 41.7 34.4 -83 85.57 467.6 23.49
Other indicators
Payment delays, Number of days 20 8 13 17 20 21 19 17 4 2 6 0 2 14
B2B
Bankruptcies, SMEs Number 169 251 276 344 363 339 377 409 350 273 285 252 241 177
Bankruptcies, SMEs %, year-on-year .. 48.5 10 24.6 5.5 -6.6 11.2 8.5 -14.4 -22 4.4 -11.6 -4.37 -26.6
Note: (1) SME loans classified according to the national/ EU definition of SMEs; (2) No EU definition used – SME loans classified based on
banking standards.

 217
39. Slovenia
Slovenian SMEs employ 73.2% of the workforce in the business economy (486 458 people) and produce
65.3% of the value added (EUR 15.8 billion). Micro firms account for more than one third of all employment
in the business economy, while the shares of large firms in both employment and value added are below
the OECD average, in line with the small size of the economy.
Firms manufacturing coke and petroleum are all SMEs. Otherwise, SMEs dominate mostly the services
sector in terms of employment. Relative to the OECD average, the employment share of SMEs is
significantly higher in the ICT sector and in the manufacture of machinery. On the other hand, employment
in textiles and apparel and in electrical equipment manufacturing is relatively more concentrated in large
companies.
In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 60% of SMEs in Slovenia applied for government support, such
as refunds for the furlough scheme. However, despite the public support deployed as a response to the
pandemic, Slovenian SMEs experienced a decline in value added by 6.2% and in employment by 0.6%.
The most significant contractions were experienced by the food and accommodation services sector
followed by the administrative and support services sector.
SME lending more than halved between 2011 and 2020, decreasing from EUR 9.8 billion in 2011 to EUR
4.69 billion in 2020. Between 2019 and 2020, new SME lending increased by 23% (inflation adjusted terms)
driven by an increase of approved credit lines and loan renegotiations and restructuring that followed a
legislative moratorium to tackle the effects of the pandemic.
Despite a further decrease of business loans from 2015 to 2020, the trend in outstanding SME loans
reversed and started to rise during this period reaching EUR 4.7 billion in 2020. As a result, the share of
SME outstanding loans in total business loans rose to 51.59% in 2020.
Interest rates for SMEs declined from 6% in 2011 to 2.5% in 2020. The interest rate spread between bank
loans to large enterprises and to SMEs fluctuated between 1.42% and 1.36% over the 2007-2013 period,
and reached 0.73% in 2020.
Due to loan restructuring and write-offs, SME non-performing loans started to decline in 2015 and reached
5% in 2020.

218 
Table 39.1. Scoreboard for Slovenia

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Outstanding EUR 7.30 8.12 7.86 9.67 9.79 9.53 5.70 4.31 4.12 4.35 4.61 4.71 4.80 4.74
business loans, billion
SMEs
Outstanding EUR 16.80 19.94 19.86 20.83 20.09 18.64 14.14 11.21 10.04 9.31 9.31 9.18 9.29 9.09
total
outstanding outstandin
loans g business
loans
New business EUR 15.29 18.57 13.71 9.42 8.60 6.98 6.07 5.22 5.65 5.32 6.25
New business EUR 5.89 7.21 5.79 3.64 3.61 2.86 2.86 2.91 2.94 2.26 3.16
Share of new % of total 59.36 57.93 63.06 56.34 54.99 58.07 56.90 63.55 58.54 53.16 51.91
SME lending new
lending
Outstanding EUR 2.09 2.53 2.15 2.76 3.09 3.19 1.74 0.79 0.61 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.72 0.63
short-term billion
loans, SMEs
Outstanding EUR 5.21 5.59 5.71 6.91 6.70 6.34 3.96 3.53 3.51 3.58 3.82 3.88 4.08 4.11
long-term billion
loans, SMEs
term SME SME
lending lending
Government EUR 3.28 22.22 45.20 32.93 19.15 3.07 1012 552.1 0.00 520 710 0.00 0.00 155.9
loan million
guarantees,
SMEs
loans
Non-performing % of SME 3.77 5.68 8.93 14.68 22.25 28.37 27.57 25.88 24.48 22.10 15.87 9.73 5.54 4.64
loans, SMEs loans
Interest rate, % 7.07 7.46 6.95 5.82 6.01 5.89 5.84 5.19 3.73 3.00 2.77 2.60 2.48 2.53
SMEs
Interest rate, % 5.55 6.07 4.61 5.02 5.17 4.87 4.52 4.19 2.92 2.19 2.26 2.05 1.64 1.79
large firms
spread

 219
40. South Africa
Of the estimated 2.6 million micro, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in South Africa, about 37% are
considered formal. Of the total, 54% are micro-enterprises and 15% are located in rural areas. The owners
include individuals who have identified a business opportunity as well as those conducting some sort of
business because of necessity, and for whom no alternative sources of income are available. Two out of
three SME owners run their own enterprises and do not have any employees, while 32% provide between
one and ten jobs. While growth in the number of SMEs over the last ten years has been lower than
economic growth, the contribution by these SMEs towards South Africa’s gross value-added (which is
equal to GDP before taxes and subsidies) increased from 18% in 2010 to 40% in 2020. 1
Overall, only 34% of the businesses use formal financial accounts in the business’ name. This blend
between consumer and commercial credit makes one type of credit indistinguishable from the other. This
causes several challenges such as: violations of company law and accounting standards; decline of
owners’ ability to borrow; impact on owners’ credit profile and history; take-up of unsuitable products
designed for a different purpose; and increase in the risk of excessive personal indebtedness. Borrowing
by SMEs is mainly driven by the entrepreneurs’ growth ambitions and prospects, which are partially led by
macroeconomic conditions in the country.
According to the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) data on bank statistics, total SME credit exposure
to banks was ZAR 631 billion at the end of 2020, which accounts for 25% of total business loans. It is
unlikely that the level of funding for SMEs will improve notably without considering other factors crucial to
ensuring their success and sustainability, including market access, business and management skills, and
financial education. A broader developmental support should be considered, especially to promote the
formalisation of SMEs.
SME non-performing loans in the banking sector have declined since 2010, falling from 5.2% to 4.9% in
2020, albeit an increase from 3.1% in 2019 at the back of the global COVID-19 pandemic.
Government funding for SMEs is provided through grants, direct loans and guarantees by development
finance institutions (DFIs). While accurate data on this has been difficult to obtain, there are indications of
growth in direct government lending to SMEs. Credit guarantees are also in use in South Africa.
The South African Government is also exploring the possibility of developing a business case for the
introduction of a movable collateral registry and credit information database. Both initiatives aim to make
lending less risky and should therefore make bank financing more widely available. These initiatives will
be complemented by another initiative focused on a redesigned partial credit guarantee scheme.
In the fourth quarter of 2019 the South African economy slipped into a recession and was already struggling
when it confronted the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the South
African government declaring a state of national disaster that led to an introduction of regulations aimed at
curbing the spread of the virus. This was followed by the implementation of a strict 21-day nationwide
lockdown on 27 March h2020. During the lockdown many businesses, including SMEs and informal
enterprises, were prohibited from operating and only a few essential businesses remained operational,

220 
albeit under strict health and safety protocols. This reduced consumer demand for goods and forced
businesses around the country to lay-off employees, cut salaries, restructure their debt, downsize their
businesses or shut down. When the initial hard lockdown was lifted many businesses still remained in a
state of partial or full lockdown, particularly those in the tourism, hospitality, beverages and entertainment
sectors. The coronavirus pandemic led to the implementation of measures to support SMEs.
 For SMEs to access debt relief from the Department of Small Business, some qualifying criteria
were put in place. These conditions include that a business must have been registered with the
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) and it must be registered and compliant
with the South Africa Revenue Service (SARS) and the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). This
situation resulted in the re-emergence of the issue of formality vs informality in the South African
context. In mid-May the SARB/NT launched the SME loan guarantee scheme of ZAR 200 billion in
partnership with all South African commercial banks.
 The Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) also launched a debt relief fund for SMEs
directly, or indirectly, negatively impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The debt relief finance
provides preferential financing (at interest rates of prime less 5%) for salaries, rent and municipal
accounts. SMEs can access the resources after registering on the national SME database and
they must have also have been registered with the CIPC by the end of February 2020 in order to
qualify. Companies must be 100% South African-owned and registered and complainant with
SARS and UIF. SMEs can register and apply online.
 The DSBD further launched the Township and Rural Entrepreneurship Programme (TREP) offering
ZAR 740 million in loans and grants targeted at informal businesses and formal micro-enterprises
operating in townships and villages in the following sectors: (a) bakeries and confectionaries, (b)
clothing and textiles, (c) automotive after-parts support, (d) fruit and vegetable traders, and (e)
spaza shops.

 221
Table 40.1. Scoreboard for South Africa

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding ZAR million .. 423 411 388 411 454 512 545 579 638 617 645 611 630
business loans, 691 212 090 280 012 504 271 823 525 846 803 293 709
SMEs
Outstanding ZAR billion .. 1 441 1 276 1 373 1 481 1 648 1 791 1 965 2 323 2 377 2 239 2 262 2 406 2 506
business loans,
total
Share of SME % of total .. 29.39 32.23 28.26 27.76 27.55 28.61 27.75 24.96 26.87 27.59 27.33 25.40 25.17
Government ZAR million 8 99 226 201 439 227 105 105 223 243 298 .. .. ..
loan guarantees,
SMEs
Direct ZAR million .. 4 829 4 909 5 915 6 900 7 383 7 269 8 748 10 565 10 898 11 481 .. .. ..
government
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all .. 1.40 2.96 2.91 2.11 1.97 1.84 1.54 1.64 1.48 1.29 1.51 1.41 2.18
Non-performing % of all SME .. 2.89 5.23 5.20 4.07 3.36 2.92 2.94 2.51 2.55 2.53 2.87 3.07 4.93
loans, SMEs loans
Non-bank finance
Venture and ZAR million 468 551 242 194 211 288 183 273 372 933 968 1067 1230 1387
growth capital
Venture and %, Year-on- .. 17.74 -56.08 -19.83 8.76 36.49 -36.46 49.18 36.26 150.8 3.75 10.23 15.28 12.76
(growth rate) rate
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, Number 3 151 3 300 4 133 3 992 3 559 2 716 2 374 2 064 1 962 1 934 1 868 1845 2042 2035
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- .. 4.73 25.24 -3.41 -10.85 -23.69 -12.59 -13.06 -4.94 -1.43 -3.41 -1.23 10.68 -0.34
rate) rate

222 
41. Spain
The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a global health, social and economic crisis unprecedented in
modern times. As a result, the government established a series of measures in order to contain the spread
of the virus. The introduction of significant restrictions on the mobility of people and the activity of certain
sectors caused GDP to contract by 10.8% in the whole of 2020. In the first quarter of 2021, GDP was still
9.4% below the level registered at the end of 2019.
National authorities in fiscal, monetary, regulatory and prudential policy have had to gradually adjust to the
evolution of the pandemic in order to tackle its impact on the private sector. As a result, financing conditions
for companies in Spain have remained relatively favourable during this crisis and the cost of new loans
has remained historically low. For instance, new business lending grew by 2.6% in 2020, reaching EUR
357 billion, and new SME lending remained stable, reaching EUR 173 billion.
In 2020, total outstanding business loans grew by 8.3% and reached EUR 471 billion, while outstanding
SME loans experienced a greater increase (10%) to total EUR 241 billion. As a result, SME loans currently
account for a greater share (51.2%) of total loans compared to large companies.
In 2020, 4.51% of loans in Spain were non-performing (NPLs). This level is the lowest since 2008 and is
the result of the governmental action in reducing non-performing loans that began in 2013.
This improvement in financing conditions is reflected in the decline of the share of SMEs needing collateral,
which stood at 20.8% in 2020, the lowest level in the observed period. Similarly, there has been an upward
trend in the percentage of SME loan applications, which reached 42.4% in 2020. This evolution is
compatible with the reduction in the loan rejection rate to 3.85% registered in the survey on the access to
finance of SMEs in the Euro area (SAFE survey).
The volume of private capital investment in Spain reached EUR 4 billion for a total of 765 investments in
2020. The sectors that received the largest volumes of investment were Communications (28%), IT
(25.4%) and Consumer Products (10%).
The number of bankruptcies stood at 3 394 in 2020, which represents a decrease of 9.3% compared to
the previous year. This decline can largely be ascribed to public support mechanisms such as ICO (Instituto
de Crédito Oficial) loans and the ERTE furlough scheme.
Table 41.1. Scoreboard for Spain

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding EUR billion .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 293 258 247 263 229 219 241
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding EUR Billion) 893 952 915 896 840 708 609 545 518 493 477 446 435 471
Share of SME % of total .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 53.79 49.85 50.10 55.14 51.35 50.34 51.17

 223
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
business loans
New business EUR Billion) 991 929 868 665 527 485 393 357 393 323 339 347 348 357
lending, total
New business EUR Billion 394 357 263 210 174 146 134 147 165 170 184 175 174 173
lending, SMEs
Share of new SME % of total new 39.76 38.43 30.30 31.58 33.02 30.10 34.10 41.18 41.98 52.63 54.28 50.43 50 48.5
lending lending
Outstanding short- EUR 379 346 246 196 166 139 126 135 154 153 163 157 156 129
term loans, SMEs
Outstanding long- EUR 15 11 17 14 8 7 9 11 12 17 21 18 17 44
term loans, SMEs
SME lending lending
Government loan EUR Million 5 550 7 700 11 000 10 100 12 000 11 000 13 000 9 100 7 600 6 500 3 110 .. .. ..
guarantees, SMEs
Government EUR Million 5 210 7 053 5 906 7 236 7 502 4 974 2 064 938 273 109 42 30 .. ..
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Direct government EUR Million 10 103 12 384 19 916 23 740 26 221 23 599 23 648 22 588 21 481 20 734 20 525 20 601 19 962 29 352
loans, SMEs
Non-performing % of all .. .. .. 5.81 7.84 10.43 13.62 12.51 10.12 9.11 7.79 5.81 4.79 4.51
firms
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs .. .. .. 35.19 34.36 31.45 30.00 31.22 28.24 25.89 26.04 24.05 23.39 20.79
needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME SME loan .. .. 38.07 36.25 34.67 31.89 31.49 34.36 33.81 32.80 28.14 28.60 33.87 42.44
total number of
SMEs
authorised/
requested)
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth EUR Million .. 3 336 3 596 3 600 2 675 2 145 1 473 2 247 1 902 1 886 2 446 2 984 4 196 4 008
capital
Venture and growth %, Year-on- .. .. 7.79 0.11 -25.69 -19.81 -31.33 52.5 -15.4 -0.8 29.7 22 40.6 -4.4
rate
Other indicators
Payment delays, B2B Number of 5 3 13 10 4 8 8 15 12 7 5 2 0
days
Bankruptcies, SMEs Number 894 2 550 4 463 4 187 4912.0 6627.0 7517.0 5096 3927 3305 3 310 3 346 3 744 3 394
Bankruptcies, SMEs %, Year-on- .. 185.23 75.02 -6.18 17.32 34.91 13.43 -32.21 -22.94 -15.84 0.15 -1.81 -11.8 -9.32
rate

224 
42. Sweden
Nearly 99% of limited liability companies with employees are SMEs. In 2019, they accounted for 60% of
total employment and 47% of GDP (non-employer firms excluded).
The stock of SME debts (long and short term) was in total SEK 1 514 billion in 2019, up by 7% from 2018.
SME debt as a share of total outstanding debt was 40%.
Inflation has been close to the Swedish central bank´s (“Riksbanken”) target of 2% since the start of 2017.
Riksbanken assesses that conditions are good for inflation to remain close to the target going forward.
Therefore, in line with the assessment in October, Riksbanken decided to raise the repo rate from -0.25%
to 0.00%.
Private equity fund investments in Swedish companies in the venture and growth stages were EUR 1 467
million in 2020, an increase of almost 250% on the previous year.
Almi is a state-owned corporation with the mission to complement the private market and ensure that
services are accessible nationwide. Almi offers loans to companies with growth potential and assists them
in their business development. This applies to businesses in the start-up phase as well as established
companies. Almi Invest provides venture capital for early-stage, emerging companies with high growth
potential and a scalable business concept. Although Almi is not limited by strict eligibility requirements in
favour of certain sectors or business phases, its focus is on SMEs with high growth potential. Almi’s lending
was SEK 2 292 million in 2019 and increased to SEK 3 930 million in 2020.
The Swedish National Export Credits Guarantee Board issued guarantees totalling SEK 2.9 billion to SMEs
in 2020, an increase of 7.4% compared to the previous year.
In 2020, bankruptcies among SMEs totalled 3 494, a decrease by 4.3% from the previous year.
The Swedish parliament adopted a proposal to address the structure of public financing for innovation and
sustainable growth in June 2016. The aim was to clarify and simplify the system for state venture capital
(VC) financing, but also to improve the efficiency of public resources and contribute to the development
and renewal of Swedish industries. A key feature was the establishment of a new joint stock company,
Saminvest AB, a fund that invests in privately managed VC firms focusing on development-stage
companies. In 2018, Saminvest AB invested in 6 VC funds, which in turn made 56 investments in growth-
oriented firms.

 225
Table 42.1. Scoreboard for Sweden

Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding SEK Billion .. .. .. .. 930 964 1 003 1 073 1 173 1 290 1 413 1514 ..
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding SEK Billion .. .. .. .. 2 683 2 722 2 812 2 901 2 962 3 189 3 831 3754 ..
business loans,
total
Share of SME % of total .. .. .. .. 34.66 35.39 35.67 36.99 39.60 40.46 36.89 40.33 ..
loans business
loans
Outstanding SEK Billion .. .. .. .. 211 217 249 262 316 339 355 397 ..
short-term
loans, SMEs
Outstanding SEK Billion .. .. .. .. 719 747 754 811 857 951 1058 1177 ..
long-term
loans, SMEs
Share of short- % of total .. .. .. .. 22.71 22.50 24.83 24.44 26.92 26.28 25.12 26.22 ..
lending
Direct SEK Million 1 716 3 231 2 112 2 023 2 161 2 200 2 354 3 241 3 324 2 559 1 857 2292 3930
government
loans, SMEs
Non- % of all 0.46 0.83 0.78 0.65 0.70 0.61 1.24 1.17 1.04 1.12 0.49 0.58 0.51
performing business
loans, total loans
Interest rate, % 5.66 2.43 2.59 4.17 4.07 3.29 2.71 1.75 1.56 1.50 1.53 1.87 2.08
SMEs
Interest rate, % 4.84 1.71 1.64 3.01 3.03 2.64 2.15 1.35 1.21 1.14 1.05 1.03 1.29
large firms
Interest rate % points 0.82 0.72 0.95 1.16 1.04 0.65 0.56 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.48 0.84 0.79
spread
Non-bank finance
Venture and Euro 504 361 699 422 335 357 375 280 290 491 549 596 1 467
growth capital Thousand 765 707 443 386 475 264 605 781 922 166 280 960 192
Venture and %, Year-on- -10.86 -28.34 93.37 -39.61 -20.58 6.50 5.13 -25.25 3.61 68.83 11.83 8.69 145.78
(growth rate) rate
Other indicators
Payment Number of .. .. .. .. 20.00 24.00 15.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 14 15 ..
delays, B2B days
Bankruptcies, Number 3 139 3 913 3 342 3 449 3 808 3 777 3 355 2 998 2822.0 3 019 3 392 3 650 3 494
SMEs 0
Bankruptcies, %, Year-on- 27.14 24.66 -14.59 3.20 10.41 -0.81 -11.17 -10.64 -5.87 6.98 12.36 7.61 -4.27
rate) rate

226 
43. Switzerland
Only 0.8% of all Swiss enterprises are large and SMEs continue to dominate the enterprise landscape,
constituting 99.2% of all firms.
Switzerland exhibited a real GDP decline of 2.9% in 2020, 0.8 percentage points more than at the time of
the financial crisis in 2009 (-2.1%).
Total outstanding SME loans rose by 5.3% in 2020, reaching CHF 487 billion, an even higher growth rate
compared to the 2019 figure of 4.9%. This increase can partly also be attributed to the package of
measures to mitigate the economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis.
Over the 2007-2020 period, SME loans expanded by 50.1%, while overall corporate lending rose by 61.3%.
Lending standards remained broadly unchanged in 2020, while household and firm demand for credit
increased according to the Surveys on bank lending of the Swiss National Bank.
The average interest rate charged to SMEs has been decreasing since 2018, reaching 1.76% in 2020,
while the interest rate spread between large and small companies decreased to its minimum since 2007,
to 47 basis points in 2020.
Venture and growth capital investments experienced in 2020 a 47.2% decrease, following a large increase
in 2019.
38 active crowdfunding platforms are currently operating in Switzerland. The volumes reported by these
platforms have again exhibited a positive trend in 2020. The market in 2020 was strongly impacted by the
COVID-19 crisis. On the one hand, volumes in the reward-based crowdfunding/crowd-donating segment
grew strongly: the fundraising, which in many cases benefited SMEs, freelancers and
institutions/associations, was conducted via existing and newly established platforms, of which there were
many. On the other hand, significantly fewer business loans were granted to SMEs and consumer loans
to private individuals in the crowd lending sector in 2020.
Payment delays in the business-to-business sector significantly increased, from 8 to 13 days in 2020,
illustrating the liquidity problems caused by the pandemic.
In Switzerland, there are four guarantee cooperatives that help promising SMEs obtain bank loans of up
to CHF 500 000. Loan guarantee volumes increased steadily over 2007-2010, declined slightly in 2011,
and continued to grow in the following six years. The Parliament recently amended the Federal Law on
Financial Aid for guarantee organisations: since 1 July 2019, the Law allows for guarantees up to CHF 1
million.
The Swiss Federal council has adopted three measures in particular to support SME’s financing during the
pandemic: bridging credits through a guarantee program, credits through a guarantee program specific for
start-ups and a hardship support program (mainly non-repayable contributions) for companies which were,
due to the nature of their economic activities, particularly affected by the consequences of the COVID-19
crisis.

 227
Table 43.1. Scoreboard for Switzerland

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding CHF 323 344 343 363 377 384 404 402 403 412 422 441 462 487
business million 093 840 866 566 630 438 793 346 681 005 065 332 978 554
loans, SMEs
Outstanding CHF 401 426 433 458 480 489 513 526 525 538 550 583 606 648
business million 647 489 485 689 922 116 631 532 042 709 365 934 497 133
loans, total
Share of SME % of 80.44 80.86 79.33 79.26 78.52 78.60 78.81 76.41 76.89 76.48 76.69 75.58 76.33 75.22
outstanding total
loans outstand
ing
business
loans
Government CHF 104 148 187 215 210 219 227 238 244 254 255 263 285 315
loan million
guarantees,
SMEs
Interest rate, % .. .. 2.21 2.11 2.08 2.01 1.99 2.05 2.07 2.04 2.09 1.96 1.83 1.76
SMEs
Interest rate, % .. .. 1.35 1.23 1.16 1.11 1.16 1.16 1.30 1.25 1.30 1.33 1.30 1.29
large firms
Interest rate % points .. .. 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.83 0.89 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.63 0.53 0.47
spread
Collateral, % of .. .. 76.00 75.01 76.56 76.75 74.86 78.78 79.64 79.88 81.86 81.70 82.92 83.93
SMEs SMEs
needing
collateral
to obtain
bank
lending
Utilisation SME 71.00 70.00 71.00 70.00 69.00 71.00 72.00 72.00 71.76 71.68 70.59 70.30 70.13 71.54
rate loans
used/
authoris
ed
Non-bank finance
Venture and EUR 319.8 300.9 308.5 330.1 227.6 245.8 216.8 237.2 394.3 452.4 1195.9 772.9 1 670 882.3
growth capital million
Venture and %, Year- .. -5.91 2.53 7.00 -31.05 8.00 -11.80 9.41 66.23 14.73 164.35 -35.37 116.07 -47.17
growth capital on-year
(growth rate) growth
rate
Other indicators
Payment Number 12 13 13 11 10 9 9 7 7 7 7 6 8 13
delays, B2B of days
SMEs
Bankruptcies, %, Year- .. -2.16 23.55 19.94 6.49 2.70 -5.06 -9.67 3.94 9.61 0.39 -6.99 -3.8 -18.44
SMEs (growth on-year
rate) growth
rate

228 
44. Thailand
In 2020, there were approximately 3.13 million SMEs in Thailand, which constituted 99.6% of all
enterprises.
According to the criteria defined by the Ministry of Industry, SMEs are categorized by the number of
employees and income.
SMEs are able to access financing through commercial bank loans. In 2020, outstanding SME loans were
THB 3,409,192 billion, representing 37.27% of all outstanding business loans. Furthermore, SMEs are able
to source funds from other financial institutions, the capital market, crowdfunding and venture capital.
Some SMEs still face problems including collateral constraints and a lack of credit history, which limit their
access to bank loans. Government policies have been put into place to address these constraints.
For example, the Thai Credit Guarantee Corporation (TCG) provides credit guarantees for viable SMEs to
ensure that SMEs with insufficient collateral have access to bank loans. In Thailand, credit guarantees are
provided in the form of portfolio guarantees, which allow Financial Institutions (FIs) to select SMEs that are
qualified as viable on their own. As a result, the viability of each individual SME is determined by their own
assessment and criteria. The outstanding guarantee amount has increased over the years and totalled
THB 451 billion at the end of 2020, covering 166 419 SMEs in TCG’s portfolio.
Moreover, the Business Collateral Act B.E. 2558 (2015) simplified the process of security interest creation
and expanded the types of collateral which SMEs can register and use to secure loans.
To proactively boost SMEs’ financial access, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) has promoted new innovative
financial services and products for SMEs, such as digital personal loan and digital factoring as well as new
infrastructure to support operational efficiency and competitive environment in financial sector, including a
central web service to deal with double-financing for invoice finance. In addition, the government has
launched and developed capacity-building programmes to enhance SMEs’ competitiveness and
opportunity for financial access.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the BOT collaborated with the government in introducing financial and
loan measures to support Thai people and businesses, particularly SMEs heavily affected by the crisis.
These measures include loan payment holidays for all SMEs to reduce their financial burden and a soft
loan facility to provide liquidity to severely affected SMEs. Furthermore, the loan facility is also supported
by a credit guarantee scheme through the TCG, with additional exemptions or reductions on relevant taxes
and fees. As part of the loan facility, the BOT will provide funding to financial institutions at low funding rate
to channel liquidity to businesses in need.

 229
Table 44.1. Scoreboard for Thailand

Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Outstanding THB billion 2 753 2 565 2 749 3 145 3 481 3 968 4 266 4 511 4 574 4 703 4 893 4 877 3 409
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding THB billion 5 117 4 863 5 298 6 080 6 723 7 473 7 774 8 017 8 066 8 362 8 726 8 652 9 146
Share of SME % of total 53.81 52.75 51.89 51.74 51.78 53.11 54.88 56.24 56.69 56.25 56.07 56.36 37.27
business loans
Government loan THB billion .. .. 73 113 180 244 270 309 331 353 373 388 451
guarantee, SMEs
Non-performing % of all 5.77 5.32 3.96 2.97 2.36 2.13 2.07 2.55 2.88 3.01 3.05 3.01 3.23
Non-performing % of all SME .. 7.11 5.38 3.97 3.46 3.29 3.11 3.5 4.35 4.51 4.56 4.63 6.97
loans, SMEs loans
Source: Bank of Thailand and Thai Credit Guarantee Corporation (Outstanding loans and non-performing loans include only Thai commercial
banks, excluding specialized financial institutions).

230 
45. Turkey
SME lending grew steadily over the whole 2007-2020 period, with the exception of a minor decline of 1.6%
in 2009. SME loans grew by 37.9% in 2020. The share of SME loans in total business loans remained
broadly stable, at 30.8%, slightly below the Scoreboard median (38%).
Venture and private equity investments show an erratic pattern. After reaching a peak in 2011, investments
remained subdued in the following years until 2017, when new investments surpassed 2011 levels for the
first time. A similar pattern was also observed between 2018 and 2020. In 2020, there was a new peak in
venture and private equity investments, which experienced a 506% increase from 2019. This large
increase can be explained by the change of the legal framework in order to support entrepreneurship in
Turkey. Similarly, tax incentives for investors who invest in venture capital and private equity funds also
supported the growth of the VC industry. `
The share of non-performing loans (NPLs) for both total business loans and SME loans decreased
significantly in 2020, to 4.69% and 6.44%, respectively. This was mostly the result of some temporary
regulation changes in the definition of NPLs and of the increase in the total amount of SME loans.
The number of bankruptcies decreased from 97 in 2019 to 68 in 2020. Company closures, including sole
proprietorships, totalled 51 088 enterprises in 2020, up from 48 086 enterprises in 2019, highlighting that
(due to lengthy legal proceedings) bankruptcies (upon court verdict) constitute a relatively uncommon
phenomenon in Turkey.
In 2012, the Turkish Government enacted a law to stimulate the development of the business angel
industry. A secondary legislation came into force in 2013. The purpose of the law and the secondary
legislation was the establishment of a legal framework and the provision of generous tax incentives for
licensed angel investors.
In 2014, the government introduced a law regarding funds of funds, which enables the Ministry of Treasury
and Finance to transfer capital to a fund of funds under certain conditions. In 2017, this law was changed
to enable the Ministry of Treasury and Finance to invest not only in funds of funds but also in venture
capital funds. Secondary legislation of Direct Investment in Venture Capital Funds came into force on 5
June 2018.
KOSGEB is the main body for executing SME policies in Turkey. It provides 13 different support
programmes and supports collateral costs for SMEs with considerable outreach throughout Turkey.
In 2018, KOSGEB made some changes in its support programmes with a view to giving priority to SMEs
that produce innovative, technological and high value-added products and that are export-oriented. In this
direction, KOSGEB introduced innovations in its support models in order to extend the technology to the
base through SMEs, strengthen the manufacturing industry, support domestic and national production of
imported products, increase internationalisation and enable large and small business cooperation.
Additionally, in the field of entrepreneurship, KOSGEB has established a new entrepreneurship model with
a focus on medium-high and high-tech fields.

 231
At the end of 2018, KOSGEB introduced a new loan interest support programme. The new modelprovides
resource efficiency, facilitates access to finance for enterprises in high value added sectors and is easily
accessible throughout the year. SMEs can be classified as Entrepreneurial Enterprises, Project-Oriented
Enterprises, Technology-Based Enterprises and Enterprises in Strategic Priority Sectors. Classified SMEs
can benefit from investment, working capital, export and emergency support loan types with subsidised
interest rates.
In 2016, Turkey passed a bill on the use of movable collateral in commercial transactions. The goal of the
reform was to increase access to finance through the pledge of valuable tangible and intangibles assets,
such as receivables, machinery, inventory and stock, which comprise 78% of SMEs' total assets. This
reform led to the creation of 26 200 security rights from 2017 to 2019 and 12 581 in 2020. The amount of
security deposits was TRY 708 billion from 2017 to 2019 (i.e. about USD 59 billion or EUR 44 billion) and
TRY 64 billion in 2020 (i.e. about USD 14 billion and EUR 10 billion).Actual financial amount for 2020 was
TRY 18 billion, USD 283 million, and EUR 276 million. The most used assets have been receivables,
machines and inventories.

232 
Table 45.1. Scoreboard for Turkey

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding TRY billion 76.5 84.6 83.3 125.5 162.8 199.7 271.4 333.3 388.7 420.5 513.2 611.3 615.3 848.8
business
loans, SMEs
Outstanding TRY billion 190.6 250.3 262.7 353.2 459.0 528.8 715.5 884.6 1 100 1 314 1 610 1 890 2 070 2756
business
loans, total
Government TRY million 72.7 236 500.6 707.5 901.6 973.2 996.1 1 261 1 950 4 205 142 55 796 51 523 124
loan 019 300**
guarantees,
SMEs
Government TRY million 113.8 340.8 670.2 981.9 1 250 1 312 1 303 1 622 2 513 5 250 157 63 809 64 018 15520
guaranteed 587 0**
loans, SMEs
Direct USD million 552 842 997 855 1 174 928 2 632 1 709 1 764 1 749 284.5. 457 200
government
loans, SMEs
Non- % of all 3.8 3.7 4.91 3.43 2.61 2.82 2.69 2.64 2.68 2.9 2.81 4.01 5.96 4.7
performing business loans
loans, total
Non- % of all SME 3.62 4.79 7.64 4.49 3.1 3.17 3.12 3.27 3.92 4.9 4.71 6.69 9.21 6.4
performing loans
loans, SMEs
Non-bank finance
Venture and TRY million 13.7 0.9 6.3 47.6 373.2 110.1 335.5 124.4 135.3 343.2 435.1 904 600 3640
growth capital*
Venture and %, year-on- .. -93.76 639.58 652.9 684.82 -70.5 204.78 -62.93 8.77 153.64 26.79 108 -33.55 506.2
(growth rate)* rate
Leasing and TRY billion 11.7 14.4 11.1 10.7 15.1 17.2 25.0 29.5 36.7 44.0 52.0 60.7 48.7 57.3
hire purchases
Factoring and TRY billion 6.2 5.6 8.4 12.4 14.2 16.3 20.1 24.7 25.0 31.0 41.6 31.4 34.0 44.6
invoice
discounting
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, Number 52 47 50 68 72 141 69 99 108 222 130 105 97 68
total
Bankruptcies, %, year-on- .. -9.6 6.4 36.0 5.9 95.8 -51.1 43.5 9.1 105.6 -41.44 -19.23 -7.62 -29.8
Total (growth year growth
rate) rate
Notes: * The data presented in this section do not refer to outstanding values but show the new investments each year.
** The data in this section (2020) refers only to the data on the guarantees and loans used under the Treasury-Backed Guarantee System,
which does not include the data that is related to KGF equity guarantees.

 233
46. Ukraine
Tight quarantine, caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, started in March 2020 with a de facto ban on the
operation of a significant part of economic activities. This led to a reduction in household incomes and
corporate profits, as well as a deterioration in consumer and business sentiment. Uncertainty about the
further development of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a decrease in public consumption, the suspension
of certain investment projects and a deep decline in all economic activities. According to the results of the
second quarter of 2020, real GDP decreased significantly by 11.2%
Against this backdrop, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) made considerable efforts to support the
business and banking sectors of Ukraine. Its activities primarily aimed at:
 Reducing the cost of financing for businesses, households and the government;
 Maintaining liquidity and expanding the resource potential of banks;
 Providing stimulus for financial institutions to expand lending;
 Stabilising the foreign exchange market;
 Anchoring inflation expectations.
The volume of corporate lending in 2020 was moderate, with heterogeneous dynamics. As a result of the
pandemic, the demand for loans by enterprises declined and the financial conditions of borrowers started
to deteriorate.
In order to reduce the negative effects of the crisis on the loan portfolio, the NBU encouraged banks to
restructure the loans of bona fide debtors who had experienced difficulties because of the pandemic. Small
enterprises remained the most vulnerable to the effects of the COVID-19 crisis in 2020. To support them,
the government introduced government programmes that provided partial interest rate compensation and
government loan guarantees. These measures and the gradual recovery of the economy contributed to
the gradual revival of corporate lending in the final part of 2020.
Therefore, following a reduction in the corporate loan volume in the first half of the year, business loans in
the national currency (hryvnia, UAH) increased in the second half of the year. Overall, net UAH business
loans increased by 4.3% in 2020. Net foreign currency loans decreased by 11.1% year-on-year in USD
terms.
Retail lending slowed sharply in 2020. The net UAH loan portfolio of individuals grew by 5.5% over the
year, against a 30% increase in 2019. This was mostly the result of falling demand for certain categories
of consumer goods and uncertainty about the dynamics of household incomes during the COVID-19 crisis.
The Ukrainian financial sector remains bank-centric: the share of non-bank financial institutions in the
assets of the financial sector is still moderate, and in 2020 it declined due to slightly lower growth rates
compared to bank assets.
In July 2020, the government introduced a “split” reform whereby the non-banking financial market was
redistributed between the two regulators: the National Bank of Ukraine and the National Securities and

234 
Stock Market Commission. This should increase the transparency of the sector, eliminate the possibility of
regulatory arbitrage and create a system of proportional regulation of the non-banking market.
In 2020, new SMEs loans accounted for 31% of total new business lending, showing a 2% drop compared
to the previous year.
An important state credit programme, called "Affordable Loans 5-7-9%", was introduced at the initiative of
the President of Ukraine in order to facilitate the access of micro and small businesses to bank lending.
The aim of the programme is to strengthen the competitiveness of Ukrainian micro and small businesses,
create new jobs, and help migrant workers return to Ukraine. The programme is implemented by the
Entrepreneurship Development Fund (formerly the German-Ukrainian Fund), established under the
Ministry of Finance, through a network of partner banks together with the Ministry of Economy and the
SME Development Office. The programme, as the name suggests, is characterised by the offer of loans
with three different interest rates: 5%, 7% and 9%. As of the end of May 2021, the programme had
disbursed 17 037 loans totalling UAH 43 955 million through 30 partner banks.
Table 46.1. Scoreboard for Ukraine

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding UAH .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 443 445 432 451
SMEs
Outstanding UAH 271 460 482 520 597 626 716 809 807 837 845 874 761 737
total
Share of SME % of total .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 52.42 50.86 56.77 61.23
outstanding loans outstandi
ng
business
loans
New business UAH 627 724 685 958 1 079 1 121 1 330 1 231 1 213 1 446 1 407 2 011 2408 2498
New business UAH .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 678 799 792
Share of new % of total .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 33.74 33.18 31.68
SME lending new
lending
Outstanding short- UAH .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 200 215 213 243
term loans, SMEs billion
Outstanding long- UAH .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 243 230 218 208

term loans, SMEs billion
Share of short- % of total .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 45.12 48.34 49.42 53.8

term SME lending SME
lending
Interest rate, % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17.35 17.51 13.84
SMEs
Interest rate, large % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.54 14.09 8.68
firms
Interest rate % .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.80 3.42 5.16
spread
Non-bank finance
Venture and UAH .. .. .. 0.020 0.024 0.059 0.089 0.039 0.132 0.088 0.259 0.337 0.510 ..
growth capital billion

 235
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Venture and % .. .. .. .. 20.00 145.8 50.85 -56.18 238.5 -33.33 194.3 30.08 51.35 ..
growth capital
(growth rate)
Leasing and hire UAH 12 8 2 3 9 9 25 6 5 10 13 22 26 26
purchases billion
Factoring and UAH 0 1 2 6 7 12 10 24 17 17 31 48 56 85
invoice billion
discounting
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, all Number .. .. .. .. .. 9 540 7 168 6 098 6 292 6 007 4 920 4 075 3260 3173
businesses of
subjects
of
entrepren
eurial
activity
Bankruptcies, all % .. .. .. .. .. .. -24.86 -14.93 3.18 -4.53 -18.10 -17.17 -20.00 -2.7
businesses
(growth rate)

236 
47. United Kingdom
Key facts on SME finance
The developments in SME finance markets in the United Kingdom in 2020 were unprecedented due to
schemes to support smaller businesses introduced by the UK government in response to the COVID-19
outbreak. The main measures of bank lending to SMEs surged to record highs, driven by the usage of UK
government-guaranteed loan schemes.
Gross flows of bank lending (excluding overdrafts), the principal component of SME finance markets, rose
by more than 80% in 2020 to GBP 103.8 billion, an unprecedented level. This, combined with a relatively
modest rise in repayments, resulted in net lending widening to a record GBP 46.5 billion. The outstanding
stock of bank lending also rose sharply to GBP 213 billion, the largest on record.
Outside of bank lending, the usage of most other types of finance fell sharply in 2020. Among the commonly
used forms of alternative finance, the value of invoice finance dropped 33% and asset finance declined
21%. There are signs that the weakness was due to factors including some SMEs temporarily pausing or
permanently ceasing trading, postponing investment, and using government-guaranteed loan or other
support schemes (such as the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme) to cover their working capital needs
rather than traditional forms (such as invoice finance) and to replace asset finance. While limited data is
available for peer-to-peer (i.e. marketplace) business lending in 2020, it is likely that lending volumes also
fell. In contrast, the UK equity finance market performed well, with the value rising 9% to a record GBP 8.8
billion and the number of deals up 5%. The main driver was venture capital, which increased by 33.3%
from 2019 to almost GBP 3 billion.
On the demand side, surveys show that overall SME demand for external finance fell in 2020. The share
of SMEs reporting using any type of repayable external finance dropped to 37%, a two-year low, from 45%
in 2019. The fall was driven by lower use of bank overdrafts, credit cards and leasing/hire purchase/vehicle
finance. The demand for these types of finance waned as some SMEs simply reduced their activity while
others used the government loan schemes or other government support schemes, such as the Coronavirus
Job Retention Scheme, instead.
The value of SME deposits, and the share of smaller businesses holding large credit balances, rose to a
record high in 2020. This is consistent with reports that the high uncertainty associated with the pandemic
led to precautionary behaviour, and that some of the SMEs accessing the government-guaranteed loans
put them on deposit, at least initially.
The UK government, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the British Business
Bank will continue to work with a wide range of partners to support businesses across the UK as they
recover and grow following the COVID-19 pandemic.

 237
Table 47.1. Scoreboard for the United Kingdom
Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding GBP billion .. .. .. 189 176 166 167 164 166 165 166 167 213
business loans,
SMEs
Outstanding GBP billion .. .. .. 504 472 448 435 430 449 466 467 489 530
Share of SME % of total .. .. .. 37.5 37.3 37.1 38.4 38.3 36.9 35.5 34.8 34.2 40.2
business
loans
New business GBP billion .. .. .. .. 146 163 190 205 234 259 273 258 325
lending, total
New business GBP billion .. .. .. 38 43 53 58 59 57 58 57 104
lending, SMEs
Share of new SME % of total .. .. .. 26.1 26.4 28.2 28.2 25.3 22.2 21.1 22 32
lending new lending
Government loan GBP million .. 61 52 32 43 51 45 34 31 32 30 30 57 612
guarantees, SMEs
Government GBP million .. 626 529 326 288 337 298 226 207 216 199 203 61 191
guaranteed loans,
SMEs
Direct government GBP million .. .. .. .. 0.8 60.6 70.7 62.0 82.6 106.8 85.5 89.8 126.4
loans, SMEs
Interest rate, SMEs % 4.54 3.47 3.49 3.52 3.71 3.60 3.43 3.33 3.22 3.16 3.44 3.29 2.15
Interest rate, large % 3.49 2.35 2.10 2.25 2.41 2.20 2.45 2.11 2.60 2.43 2.70 2.54 1.87
firms / PNFCs *
Interest rate spread % points 1.05 1.12 1.39 1.27 1.30 1.40 0.98 1.22 0.62 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.28
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs .. .. .. 25 31 31 34 40 45 56 41 39 15

needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME SME loan .. .. .. 7 6 4 5 4 3 2 2 2 7
total number
of SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME .. .. .. .. 31 32 23 18 19 20 18 22 15
loans
authorised/
requested)
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth GBP billion .. .. .. 1.5 1.9 1.9 3.0 4.1 3.9 6.8 7.1 8.1 8.8
capital
Venture and growth %, Year-on- .. .. .. 29.11 -1.42 59.02 39.36 -4.67 72.8 4.20 14.75 8.56
rate
Leasing and hire GBP billion .. .. .. 11.4 12.2 12.9 14.7 16.3 17.0 19.0 19.4 20.1 15.9
purchases
Factoring and GBP billion .. .. .. 9.4 9.5 9.9 11.1 10.6 10.8 11.8 12.0 11.8 7.9
invoice discounting

238 
Indicator Unit 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Other indicators
Bankruptcies, SMEs Thousands .. .. .. 22.3 21.4 20.0 17.6 15.9 17.9 18.5 18.7 18.5 13.3
Bankruptcies, SMEs %, Year-on- .. .. .. .. -3.9 -11.6 -6.9 -9.8 12.1 3.6 1.4 -0.8 -28.2
rate
Note: * Break in data series and definition from 2016.

 239
48. United States
Key facts on SME finance
The US economy was strongly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The demand shock that
resulted from the introduction of lockdowns, voluntary social distancing and business closures resulted in
a strong contraction in economic growth. In Q2 of 2020, GDP declined by 9.1%, the highest contraction in
quarterly GDP since tracking began in 1947. Despite some recovery in the second half of the year, annual
GDP declined by 3.5%. The pandemic also had a significant impact on the labour market: the US
unemployment rate shot up by 10.4 percentage points from March to April 2020, reaching a record high of
14.3%. This figure gradually declined to 6.7% at the end of the year and has since nearly recovered to pre-
crisis levels.
The impact of the crisis on SMEs was significant. Lockdowns led to depressed demand, business closures
and disruptions in supply chains that strongly impacted SME operations, revenues and liquidity. In the US
Census Bureau’s Small Business Pulse Survey, nearly 90% of small businesses reported a large or
moderate negative impact of the pandemic in the end of April 2020. Over this period, more than 70%
reported a decline in operating revenues, over 40% of businesses reported temporary closures, and more
than 40% noted supply chain problems. During the same period, 75% of surveyed enterprises had
requested government assistance through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) (see more below).
These impacts prevailed through most of the second quarter of 2020 and gradually declined in the second
half of 2020 as the recovery began to take shape.
Lending conditions tightened in the first six months of the crisis, but the demand for credit also declined
considerably due to significant recourse to the PPP scheme (see more below). The Federal Reserve
loosened monetary policy by lowering the federal funds rate by 50 basis points in March 2020 to a target
range of 0 to 0.25%. However, the heightened uncertainty over the evolution of the pandemic and its
economic impact led to considerable tightening of lending conditions in Q2 and Q3, as noted in the Senior
Loan Officer Survey. The October 2020 survey showed that a large proportion of banks indicated an
increase in the use of interest floors, collateralisation requirements, loan covenants and premiums charges
on riskier loans, as a result of a perception of a more uncertain outlook and worsening of industry-specific
problems. However, in both survey rounds, many bank officials also reported a weaker demand for
corporate credit.
Government support programmes were critical in limiting the economic fallout from the crisis. 2020 saw a
historic increase in government-backed financing to SMEs. The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
provided an additional USD 5.2 million in forgivable loans worth more than USD 525 billion through August
2020. The programme has since been extended twice, with the latest extension in January 2021. The
SBA’s Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) Program added another 3.6 million small business loans
valued at USD191 billion, as well as an additional 5.7 million EIDL Advances worth USD 20 billion. Loans
guaranteed through traditional SBA lending programmes exceeded USD 28 billion in Fiscal Year 2020.
These programmes account for the declining interest rates and interest rate spreads between SMEs and
large enterprises and the large decline in the share of SMEs requiring collateral to obtain a loan, despite
the crisis. They also likely play a role in the decline in bankruptcies relative to 2019.

240 
Venture Capital in 2020 registered a record high in total capital raised, with a growth of 13% compared to
2019, even if the number of deals was slightly lower than the equivalent 2019 figure. When looking by
stages, early stage financing was more adversely affected by the crisis with seed and angel number of
deals registering a decline of 11%, and early VC deals declining by 20%. In terms of total capital raised,
early VC was particularly affected, closing the year with a decline of 11%, while seed and angel closed the
year with a 1% increase.
Table 48.1. Scoreboard for the United States

Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Debt
Outstanding business USD billion 687 711 695 652 608 588 585 590 599 613 619 633 645 833
loans, SMEs. As of
June 30
Outstanding business USD trillion 2.28 2.57 2.52 2.30 2.35 2.55 2.67 2.87 3.07 3.32 3.46 3.62 3.68 ..
loans, total. As of June
30
Share of SME % of total 30.1 27.7 27.6 28.4 25.9 23.1 21.9 20.6 19.5 18.5 17.9 17.5 17.5 ..
business loans
New business lending, USD: Index 119 94 74 77 97 100 105 120 147 140 140 145 137 140
SMEs
Government loan USD billion 67 71 73 77 84 88 93 98 101 106 113 120 122 639
guarantees, SMEs
Government Number of 374 387 384 365 353 337 322 316 312 315 321 325 322 5 388
guaranteed loans, loans 996 826 626 724 743 215 572 160 851 615 167 963 161 704
SMEs
Direct Government USD billion 177
Loans, SMEs
Non-performing loans, % of all 1.22 1.88 3.91 3.46 2.01 1.34 1.00 0.80 0.87 1.57 1.33 1.12 1.06 1.24
Non-performing loans, % of all SME 2.14 2.62 3.24 2.62 1.90 1.44 1.21 1.22 1.22 1.28 1.34 1.41 1.59 1.92
SMEs loans
firms
Interest rate spread % points -0.09 0.08 0.57 0.84 0.70 0.51 0.30 0.14 0.07 -0.05 0.84 0.26 -0.24 -0.43
Collateral, SMEs % of SMEs .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 92.90 94.30 92.2 51.1

needing
collateral to
obtain bank
lending
Percentage of SME SME loan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 55.2 67.3 67.7 67.6
total number of
SMEs
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.80 32.70 32.4 32.4
authorised/
requested)
Utilisation rate SME loans .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 47.50 46.60 51.2 49.2
used/
authorised
Non-bank finance
Venture and growth USD billion 38.2 37 27.5 31.8 45.2 41.5 48.3 73.4 85 80.8 87.1 143 138 156
capital

 241
Indicator Unit 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Venture and growth %, Year-on- .. -2.88 -25.9 15.64 42.14 -8.2 16.4 51.9 15.9 -5.05 7.8 63.8 -3.22 13.11
capital (growth rate) year growth rate
Leasing and hire USD billion 595 613 508 449 361 376 395 401 416 382 388 391 401 361
purchases
Factoring and invoice USD billion .. .. .. .. 146 100 111 130 105 99 98 104 94 ..
discounting
Other indicators
Payment delays, B2B Percent of .. .. .. .. .. .. 25.9 .. 46.6 .. 40.3 .. 24 43
Domestic
Invoices
Overdue
Bankruptcies, all Number 28.3 43.5 60.8 56.3 47.8 40.1 33.2 27.0 24.7 24.1 23.2 22.2 22.7 21.6
businesses (in thousand)
Bankruptcies, all %, Year-on- 43.8 53.8 39.7 -7.5 -15.1 -16.2 -17.1 -18.8 -8.3 -2.5 -4.0 -4.0 2.46 -4.9
businesses (growth year growth rate
rate)

 243
Annex A. Methodology for producing the national

Scoreboards
Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs: An OECD Scoreboard provides a framework to monitor trends in
SMEs’ and entrepreneurs’ access to finance – at the country level and internationally – and supports the
formulation and evaluation of policies in this domain.
The individual country profiles present data for a number of core indicators, which measure trends in SME
debt and equity financing, credit conditions, solvency and policy measures. The set of indicators and policy
information provide governments and other stakeholders with a consistent framework to evaluate whether
SME financing needs are being met, to support the design and evaluation of policy measures, and to
monitor the implications of financial reforms on SME access to finance. Consistent time series for country
data permit an analysis of national trends in participating countries. It is mainly by comparing trends that
insights are drawn from the varying conditions in SME financing across countries. The focus on analysis
of changes in variables, rather than on absolute levels, helps overcome existing limitations to cross-country
comparability of the core indicators, due to differences in definitions and reporting practices.
This Annex describes the methodology for producing the national country profiles, discusses the use of
proxies in case of data limitations or deviation from preferred definitions, and addresses the limits in cross-
country comparability. It also provides recommendations for improving the collection of data on SME
finance.
Scoreboard indicators and their definitions
Core indicators
Trends in financing SMEs and entrepreneurs are monitored through 17 core indicators, which assess
specific questions related to access to finance. These core indicators meet the following criteria:
 Usefulness: the indicators must be an appropriate instrument to measure how easy or difficult it is
for SMEs and entrepreneurs to access finance and to help policy makers formulate or adjust their
policies and programmes.
 Availability: the data for constructing the indicators should be readily available in order not to
impose new burdens on governments or firms.
 Feasibility: if the information for constructing the indicator is not publicly available, it should be
feasible to make it available at a modest cost, or to collect it during routine data exercises or
surveys.
 Timeliness: the information should be collected in a timely manner so that the evolving conditions
of SME access to finance can be monitored. Annual data may be more easily available, but should
be complemented by quarterly data, when possible, to better capture variability in financing
indicators and describe turning points.
 Comparability: the indicators should be relatively uniform across countries in terms of the
population surveyed, content, method of data collection and periodicity or timeliness.

244 
Data sources and preferred definitions
The data in the national Scoreboards are supplied by country experts with access to the information
needed from a variety of supply-side and demand-side sources.
Most of the Scoreboard indicators are built on supply-side data, that is, data provided by financial
institutions and other government agencies. There are several indicators which are based on demand-side
surveys of SMEs. However, not all countries undertake such surveys. Use is made of quantitative demand-
side data, as collected by SME surveys, to complement the picture and improve the interpretative power
of the OECD Scoreboard. Whereas a plethora of qualitative SME surveys (i.e. opinion surveys) exist,
quantitative demand-side surveys are less common. Experience shows that qualitative information based
on opinion survey responses must be used cautiously. The broader perception of entrepreneurs about
access to finance and credit conditions, emanating from such opinion surveys, has its own value though
and complements the hard data provided in the quantitative analysis. Furthermore, the cross-country
comparability of national surveys remains limited, as survey methodologies and the target population
differs from country to country. Comparable demand-side surveys are undertaken on a regular basis by
the European Central Bank and the European Commission, which provide an example of the benefits that
can come from standardised definitions and methodology across countries when conducting demand-side
surveys.
In order to monitor the core indicators, data are collected for 22 variables. Each variable has a preferred
definition (see Table A A.1.), intended to facilitate time consistency and comparability. In a number of
cases, however, it is not possible for countries to adhere to the “preferred definition” of an indicator, due to
data limitations or differences in reporting practices, and a proxy is used instead. For this reason, in each
country profile the data are accompanied by a detailed table of definitions and sources for each indicator.
Table A A.1. Preferred definitions for core indicators

Indicator Definition/ Description Sources
Outstanding business loans, Bank and financial institution loans to SMEs, amount outstanding (stocks) at the Supply-side data from
SMEs end of period; by firm size using the national definition of SME or, if necessary, loan financial institutions
amounts less than EUR 1 million or an equivalent threshold that is deemed
appropriate on a case-by-case basis
Outstanding business loans, Bank and financial institution business loans to all non-financial enterprises, Supply-side data
total outstanding amounts (stocks)
New business lending, total Bank and financial institution business loans to all non-financial enterprises over an Supply-side data
accounting period (i.e. one year), flows
New business lending, SMEs Bank and financial institution loans to SMEs over an accounting period (i.e. one Supply-side data
year), flows; by firm size using the national definition of SME or, if necessary, loan
amounts less than EUR 1 million or an equivalent threshold that is deemed
appropriate on a case-by-case basis
Short-term loans, SMEs Loans equal to or less than one year; outstanding amounts or new loans Supply-side data
Long-term loans, SMEs Loans for more than one year; outstanding amounts or new loans Supply-side data
Government loan guarantees, Government guarantees available to banks and other financial institutions, stocks or Supply-side data
SMEs flows
Government guaranteed loans, Loans guaranteed by government, stocks or flows Supply-side data
SMEs
Direct government loans, SMEs Direct loans from government, stocks or flows Supply-side data
Interest rate, SMEs Average annual rates for new loans, base rate plus risk premium; for maturity less Supply-side data
than one year; and amounts less than EUR 1 million
Interest rate, large firms Average annual rates for new loans, base rate for loans equal to or greater than Supply-side data
EUR 1 million; for maturity less than one year

 245
Collateral, SMEs Percentage of SMEs that were required to provide collateral on latest bank loan Demand-side survey
Percentage of SME loan SME loan applications divided by the total number of SMEs in the country, in % Supply-side data or
applications survey
Rejection rate 1-(SME loans authorised/ requested), in % Supply-side survey
Utilisation rate SME loans used/ authorised, in % Supply-side survey
Venture and growth capital Seed, start-up, early stage and expansion capital (excludes buyouts, turnarounds, VC association (supply
investments replacements) side)
Leasing and hire purchases New production of hire purchases and leasing, which covers finance leases and Business associations
operating leases of all asset types (automotive, equipment and real estate) and also (supply side)
includes the rental of cars, vans and trucks.
Factoring and invoice Factoring turnover volumes which includes invoice discounting, recourse factoring, Business associations
discounting non-recourse factoring, collections (domestic factoring), export factoring, import (supply side)
factoring and export invoice discounting (international factoring)
Non-performing loans, total % of total business loans Supply-side data
Non-performing loans, SMEs % of total SME loans Supply-side data
Payment delays, B2B Average number of days delay beyond the contract period for the Business to Demand-side survey
Business segment (B2B)
Bankruptcies, SMEs Number of enterprises ruled bankrupt; or number bankrupt per 10 000 or 1 000 Administrative data
SMEs
Share of SME loans in total business loans: This ratio captures the allocation of credit by firm size, that is,
the relative importance of SME lending in the national credit market. The business loan data, which are
used in the construction of several indicators in the Scoreboard, include overdrafts, lines of credit, short-
term and long-term loans, regardless of whether they are performing or non-performing loans. In principle,
this data does not include personal credit card debt and residential mortgages.
Share of SME new lending in total new business lending: This ratio equally captures the allocation of credit
by firm size, but for new loans (flows). Flows, which are measured over an accounting period (i.e. one
year), are expected to reflect short-term events and are therefore more volatile than stocks, which measure
the value of an asset at a given point in time, and thus reflect latest flows, as well as values that may have
cumulated over time, net of depreciation.
Share of short-term loans in SME loans: This ratio shows the debt structure of SMEs or whether loans are
being used to fund current operations or investment and growth needs. However, caution has to be used
in interpreting this indicator, because it is affected by the composition of short-term loans versus long-term
loans in the SME loan portfolio of banks. Indeed, the share of long-term loans could actually increase
during a financial crisis, because it is easier for the banks to shut off short-term credit.
SME government loan guarantees, SME government guaranteed loans, SME direct government loans:
These indicators show the extent of public support for the financing of SMEs in the form of direct funding
or credit guarantees. By comparing government loan guarantees with guaranteed loans, information can
be drawn on the take up of government programmes and on their leverage effect.
SME interest rates and interest rate spreads: These indicators describe the tightness of the market and
the (positive or negative) correlation of interest rates with firm size.
Collateral required: This indicator also shows tightness of credit conditions. It is based on demand-side
surveys where SMEs report if they have been explicitly required to provide collateral for their last loan. It
is not available from supply-side sources, as banks do not generally divulge this information.
SME rejection rate: This indicator shows the degree to which SME credit demand is met. An increase in
the ratio indicates a tightening in the credit market as more credit applications have been turned down. A
limitation in this indicator is that it omits the impact of “discouraged” borrowers. However, discouragement

246 
and rejection seem to be closely correlated, as the number of discouraged borrowers tends to increase
when credit conditions become tighter and a higher proportion of credit applications are refused.
SME utilisation rate: This ratio also captures credit conditions, more precisely the willingness of banks to
provide credit, and is therefore sometimes used in addition to or instead of the rejection rate. An increase
of this ratio indicates that a higher proportion of authorised credit is being used by entrepreneurs and
SMEs, which usually occurs when credit conditions are tightening.
Venture capital and growth capital investments: This indicator shows the ability to access external equity
in the form of seed, start-up, early stage venture capital as well as expansion capital and is ideally broken
down by the investment stage. It excludes buyouts, turnarounds and replacement capital, as these are
directed at restructuring and generally concern larger enterprises.
Leasing and hire purchases: This indicator contains information on the use of leasing and hire purchases.
New production of leasing includes finance leases and operating leases of all asset types (automotive,
equipment and real estate) as well as the rental of cars, vans and trucks.
Factoring and invoice discounting provides information on factoring turnover volumes, including invoice
discounting, recourse factoring, non-recourse factoring, collections (domestic factoring), export factoring,
import factoring and export invoice discounting (international factoring).
SME non-performing loans/SME loans: This indicator provides information about the relative performance
of SME loans in banks’ portfolio, that is, the riskiness implied by exposure to SME loans. It can be
compared with the overall ratio of non-performing loans to all business loans to determine whether SMEs
are more risky.
Payment delays: This indicator contributes to assess SME cash flow problems. Business-to-business
(B2B) payment delays show supplier credit delays and how SMEs are coping with cash flow problems by
delaying their payments and are more relevant to assess cash flow problems compared with business-to-
consumer or business-to-government data.
SME bankruptcies or bankruptcies per 10 000 or per 1 000 SMEs: This indicator is a proxy for SME survival
prospects. Abrupt changes in bankruptcy rates demonstrate how severely SMEs are affected by economic
crises. However, the indicator likely underestimates the number of SME exits, as some SMEs close their
business even when not being in financial difficulties. Bankruptcies per 10 000 or per 1 000 SMEs are the
preferred measures, because this indicator is not affected by the increase or decrease in the total number
of enterprises in the economy.
Inflation-adjusted data
Differences in inflation levels across countries hamper comparability of trends over time. Considering this
and since 2016, indicators in the trends chapter therefore have been adjusted for inflation when
appropriate. For this purpose, the GDP deflator from the OECD Economic Outlook publication, deflating
nominal values into real values, is used. The base year used is 2007 considering that the time series
graphs found predominantly in Chapter 1 compare the median growth rate since 2008. This deflator is
derived by dividing an index of GDP (measured in current prices) by a chain volume index of GDP. It is
therefore a weighted average of the price indices of goods and services consumed by households;
expenditure by government on goods, services and salaries; fixed capital assets; changes in inventories;
and exports of goods and services minus imports of goods and services. 1 It is a very broad indicator of
inflation and, given its comprehensiveness, it is thus suitable to deflate current price nominal data into a
real terms prices basis for measures of national income, public expenditure and other economic variables
with a focus beyond consumer items.

 247
Inclusion of median values
In order to facilitate interpretation of the data, median values of core indicators are included when
appropriate in Chapter 1 of this publication. This enables a better assessment of how participating countries
are positioned in terms of the assessed core indicators on SME financing. Given the limited comparability
of some indicators, this relative position needs to be interpreted carefully and within the country-specific
context, however. Median values rather than average values are displayed because they are less sensitive
to outliers in the data.
SME target population
The SME target population of the Scoreboard consists of non-financial “employer” firms, that is, firms with
at least one employee besides the owner/ manager, which operate a non-financial business. This is
consistent with the methodology adopted by the OECD-Eurostat Entrepreneurship Indicators Programme
to collect data about business demography. The target group excludes firms with no employees or
self-employed individuals, which considerably reduces the number of firms that can be considered SMEs.
For most of the countries in the report, data are available for this target population. However, not all
countries collect data at the source and compile them in accordance with these criteria. Therefore, in a few
cases data include financial firms and/or self-employed individuals. This is mostly the case in countries
reporting financial indicators based on loan size, rather than the target population, or when sole
proprietorships/ self-entrepreneurs cannot be distinguished from the SME population at the supply-side
level of reporting.
Timeframe for data collection
The data in the present report cover the period 2007 to 2020, covering the assessment of trends over the
medium term, both in the pre-crisis period (2007), the financial crisis (2008 and 2009) and the period
afterwards. Specific attention is placed on developments occurring in 2019, 2020 and the first half of 2021,
in order to identify the most recent trends in SME finance during the COVID-19 pandemic andrelated policy
response.
Deviations from preferred definitions of indicators
Data limitations and country-level specific reporting practices imply that the national Scoreboards may
deviate from the preferred definitions of some core indicator. Some of the main deviations in definition of
variables and data coverage are discussed below.
SME loans
The OECD Scoreboard aims to collect business loan data that include overdrafts, lines of credit, short-
term loans, and long-term loans, regardless of whether they are performing or non-performing loans.
Additionally, it aims to exclude personal credit card debt and residential mortgages. However, for some
countries, significant deviations exist from this preferred SME loan definition. For instance, in some cases,
credit card debt is included in SME loans, and it cannot be determined which part corresponds to consumer
credit card debt and which part is business credit card debt. In other cases, lines of credit and overdrafts
are excluded, while a number of other products are indeed included in SME loans, such as securitised
loans, leasing and factoring.
In some countries, central banks do not require any reporting on SME lending. In these cases the SME
loans are estimated from SME financial statements available from tax authorities.

248 
SME loans requested, authorised and used
The indicators on SME loans authorised and SME loans requested, which are used to calculate the
rejection rate, are obtained from demand-side surveys. However, not all countries undertake such surveys,
or, if they do, the results are not necessarily comparable. This also constitutes an area, where substantial
data improvements could be made, such as enriching the analysis by the inclusion of an indicator on the
level of discouragement to apply for a bank loan. To capture discouragement, this indicator should ideally
be analysed in tandem with the number of loan applications. If both, loan applications and rejection rates
decrease over the same period, this would suggest a higher level of discouragement. As presumably the
least credit-worthy firms are deterred from applying for a loan, this could also be indicative of the average
riskiness of SME lending.
Another potential improvement concerns the granularity and level of detail of the data; it might be possible
to distinguish the rejection rate according to the type of loan (e.g. specific rejection rates on overdrafts,
term loans, credit card loans and so on), to separate partial rejections from full rejections, including more
analysis on the (likely) reason(s).
A similar problem holds true for the utilisation rate; which consists of SME loans used divided by SME
loans authorised. A decline in this ratio suggests that the credit market is easing, or that banks have been
providing more credit than has been used. Again, not every country has reliable survey data on the SME
loans used and caution is warranted when making comparisons across countries.
Government loan guarantees and guaranteed loans
The report includes data on government loan guarantees and on the value of loans backed by government
guarantees. Supply-side data are the best source of information on loan guarantees. There are many
sources for such guarantees: local, regional or central governments. In some countries, an important
volume of guarantees is also provided by mutual guarantee schemes. These are private schemes that
typically benefit from public support, in the form of direct funding or counter-guarantees. However, the
various loan guarantees schemes, public, private and mixed, are not always consolidated to obtain national
figures. Therefore, the OECD Scoreboard reports mostly on government loan guarantees which are readily
available at central government level. This is also a way to avoid the double-counting of guarantees that
have multiple layers, given the existence of counter-guarantees at other levels (regional or supra-national).
Still, cross-country differences exist in the degree to which the reported data include all government
guarantee programmes, or only large ones.
In some cases, lack of awareness and reporting make it difficult to collect data on guaranteed SME loans.
In fact, SMEs are not always aware that their loan is backed by a government guarantee and banks do not
usually report this information. When these guaranteed SME loans are reported, they usually represent
the full value of the loan and not the portion of the loan that is actually backed by a public institution
guarantee. Nevertheless, this figure has a value of its own when compared to the total amount of SME
loans outstanding. Also, it allows the calculation of the leverage effect of government guarantees to SMEs
(ratio of guaranteed SME loans to corresponding government guarantees).
SME credit conditions
Significant differences exist across countries in the calculation for SME interest rates. While there is
agreement that “fees” should be included in the “cost” of the SME loans, it appears to be particularly difficult
to determine which “fees”, among the various charges applied to firms, to include in the interest rates. In
most cases, the interest rate charged on SME loans, net of any fee, is reported. The additional fees,
however, represent a rather significant cost for SMEs that is not being captured by the current indicators
built on supply-side data, particularly in the case of small SME loans. In this regard, demand-side surveys
could be used to collect information on the total cost of funding.

 249
Central banks usually do not collect key pieces of information on SME access to finance, such as the
collateral required for SME loans. Banks consider this to be confidential information. A rough approximation
can be obtained from demand-side information, that is, the percentage of SMEs required to provide
collateral on new loans. This measure is currently used in the OECD Scoreboard, and more transparent
reporting by banks on the terms of their SME lending is recommended to improve information on SME
credit conditions.
Equity financing
The present report monitors external equity, that is, venture and growth capital. Venture capital is usually
reported by stage of development: seed, start-up and early expansion capital. Later stage expansion
capital, referred to as growth capital, is also reported. Buyouts, turnarounds and replacement capital are
excluded from venture and growth capital. Country classification systems do not always break down private
equity data into these categories and most do not break it down by firm size. Indeed, at present, the lack
of a standard international definition of venture capital limits cross-country comparability. Also, venture
capital data are sometimes collected by private venture capital associations, which rely on voluntary
reporting and whose membership may be incomplete. There is a need for greater standardisation of
venture capital data reporting, in terms of both the definition used for the different stages of investment,
and the methodology employed to collect data. 2
Asset-based finance
Most of the indicators of the Scoreboard relate to bank finance, although in practice SMEs and
entrepreneurs also rely on other financing options. Including statistics on the use of asset-based finance
allows for a more complete overview of trends of access to finance for SMEs and entrepreneurs. Asset-
based financing covers a variety of instruments whereby a firm obtains cash based on the value of a
particular asset, rather than on credit standing. These instruments include asset-based lending, factoring,
hire purchases and factoring.
Asset-based lending is any sort of lending secured by an asset (such as accounts receivable, inventory,
real estate, equipment). As these loans are usually issued by banks, information on asset-based loans is
already covered in the indicator on SME loans, and a separate indicator is not required. More detailed
information on the composition of bank loans would, however, shed light on the importance of asset-based
lending and what assets are most often used as a security.
The indicator on leasing covers either the new production (i.e. a flow indicator) of finance leases and
operating leases of all asset types (automotive, equipment and real estate) and also includes the rental of
cars, vans and trucks. Leasing is an agreement whereby the owner of an asset provides the right to use
the asset for a specified period of time in exchange for a series of payments. Information on hire purchases,
which are agreements where the purchaser agrees to pay for the goods in parts or percentages over a
number of months and which is very similar to leasing is also covered.. Factoring is a type of supplier
financing where firms sell their credit-worthy accounts receivable at a discount and receive immediate
cash. Data on factoring turnover volumes includes all turnover that is covered by invoice discounting,
recourse factoring, non-recourse factoring, collections (domestic factoring), export factoring, import
factoring and export invoice discounting (international factoring).
It is important to note that these data usually do not distinguish between SMEs and large corporations, and
a breakdown of data according to the size of the lessees does not exist in most countries, although
research indicates that leasing and other forms of asset-based finance are very often used by SMEs.
Increasing the number of countries providing data and deriving information on the take-up of asset-based
finance by firm size, either directly or through a proxy, constitutes an important avenue for future research.

250 
Non-performing loans
There is also a great deal of latitude in how banks define non-performing loans. The generally accepted
threshold of 90-day arrears, i.e. payments of interest and principal past due by 90 days or more, is indeed
used by many of the Scoreboard countries, but not all. Even when this same threshold is adopted, there
is a great deal of variation across countries in the measurement of SME non-performing loans. In some
cases, these are measured as a percentage of the entire SME loan portfolio and in other cases they are
not. In addition, it is common practice to classify loans that are unlikely to be repaid in full as non-
performing, even when the threshold of 90-day arrears is not met. The circumstances under which loans
are considered unlikely to be repaid, and hence deemed non-performing, vary substantially across
countries and financial institutions. Caution is therefore warranted when interpreting this data.
When compared to the non-performing loans ratio of large firms, this indicator provides a good description
of the performance of SME loans on a national level, irrespective of the particularity of the national
definition. In addition, if the changes in the non-performing ratio are analysed over time, the indicator has
value for cross-country comparisons.
Payment delays and bankruptcies
Payment delays and bankruptcy data are usually collected for all enterprises and not broken down by firm
size. Since SMEs account for more than 97% of the enterprises in the participating countries, the national
figures for payment delays and bankruptcy rates were used in this report. However, bankruptcies are hard
to compare across countries because of different bankruptcy costs, legislation and behaviour in the face
of bankruptcy. In some cases, bankruptcy procedures take a long time and so bankruptcies only show up
in later periods rather than during the crisis period.
Payment delays are reported as delays beyond the contractual date on a B2B or on a broader B2B and
B2C basis. Reporting of payment delays is important, given that it captures an additional source of cash
flow constraints for SMEs. The reporting of both indicators and the comparison of B2B with B2C delays
can also be used to uncover whether and how SMEs make use of such payment delays to resolve
short-term cash flow issues in lieu of working capital credit facilities.
Differences in definitions of an SME
One of the biggest challenges to comparability is represented by existing differences in the statistical
definition of an SME by banks and national organisations across countries. Greater harmonisation
continues to prove difficult due to the different economic, social and political concerns of individual
countries. In addition, within-country differences exist: some banks and financial institutions do not use
their national statistical definitions for an SME but a different definition to collect data on SME financing.
In many cases, the national authorities collect loan data using the national or EU definition for an SME,
based on firm size, usually the number of employees or the annual turnover (see Box A.A.1).

 251
Box A A.1. What is an SME?

While there is no universal definition of an SME and several criteria can be used in the definition, SMEs
are generally considered to be non-subsidiary firms which employ less than a given number of
employees. This number of employees varies across countries. The most frequent upper limit
designation of an SME is 250 employees, as in the European Union. However, some countries set the
limit at 200, while the United States considers SMEs to include firms with fewer than 500 employees.
Small firms are mostly considered to be firms with fewer than 50 employees while micro-enterprises
have less than 10. Medium-sized firms have between 50 and 249 employees. Turnover and financial
assets are also used to define SMEs: in the EU, the turnover of an SME cannot exceed EUR 50 million
and the annual balance sheet should not exceed EUR 43 million
Source: OECD (2006), The SME Financing Gap (Vol. I): Theory and Evidence, OECD Publishing, Paris
In other cases, the SME loan data are based not on firm size but rather on a proxy, that is, loan size. 3
However, the size of the SME loan can differ among countries and sometimes even among banks within
the same country.
Several reasons are advanced for not compiling financial statistics based on firm size including:
 Banks do not collect data by firm size;
 It is too expensive to collect such data;
 Breaking down loan data by firm size would jeopardise confidentiality and are not gathered or
communicated as a consequence.
Experience gained from the OECD Scoreboard suggests that loan data broken down by firm size are
already in the financial system but are not extracted unless banks are under a regulatory obligation to
provide them. Experience also suggests that the challenges mentioned above could be addressed quite
easily. For instance, confidentiality requirements in theory could be met through the use of judicious
sub-grouping. In this case, resolution of this issue could be found if national regulatory authorities were to
make the provision of this information mandatory for banks.

252 
Table A A.2. Difference between national statistical and financial definitions of SMEs
Country National statistical Indicator Definition of SMEs used
definition of SMEs
Australia Size of firm: less than 200 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts outstanding under AUD 2
employees million
Interest rate, SMEs Loan size: amounts outstanding under AUD 2
million
Austria Size of firm: 1 – 249 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to EUR 1 million
employees Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to EUR 1 million
Government loan guarantees and Firm size: enterprises with less than 250 employees
government guaranteed loans, SMEs
Direct government loans, SMEs Firm size: enterprises with less than 250 employees
Rejection rate Firm size: enterprises with less than 250 employees
Interest rate, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to EUR 1 million

Belgium Size of firm: less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: enterprises with less than 250 employees
employees
SME loans authorised and used Firm size: enterprises with less than 250 employees

Brazil annual turnover of up to BRL Outstanding business loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to BRL 100 million
4.8 million
Measured on a client-facility-month basis
Canada Size of firm: 1-499 employees Business loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to CAD 1 million
Short- and long-term loans, small Firm size: enterprises with 1-99 employees
businesses
Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: annual sales (turnover) lower than CAD 5
million
Direct government loans, SMEs Firm size: annual sales (turnover) less than CAD 25
million
Risk premium for small businesses Firm size: enterprises with 1-99 employees
Loans authorised and requested, small Firm size: enterprises with 1-99 employees
businesses
Collateral, small businesses Firm size: enterprises with 1-99 employees
Chile Annual sales of firm: up to UF Business loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to UF 18 000
100 000
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to UF 18 000
Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: annual sales up to UF 100 000 or annual
exports up to UF 400 000
Direct government loans, SMEs Less than 12 hectares and capital up to UF 3 500
Loans authorised and requested, SMEs Firm size: annual sales up to UF 100 000
Non-performing loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to UF 18 000
Short-term and long-term interest rate, Loan size: amounts up to UF 18 000
SMEs
Payment delays, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to UF 18 000
China The definition of SMEs differs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
according to sector.
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.

 253
Government loan guarantees, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
SME government direct loans The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Non-performing loans, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
SME loans requested, authorized and used The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
interest rates, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Collateral, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Loan fees, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Colombia Size of firm: less than 200 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: enterprises with less than 200 employees
employees
Non-performing loans, SMEs Firm size: enterprises with less than 200 employees
Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: enterprises with less than 200 employees
Interest rate, SMEs Firm size: enterprises with less than 200 employees
Collateral, SMEs Firm size: enterprises with less than 200 employees
Czech Size of firm: less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: amount up to CZK 30 million
Republic employees (New business loans, SMEs – flows) Loan size: amount up to CZK 30 million
Business loans, SMEs Firm size: up to 250 employees
(Outstanding business loans, SMEs – stock)
Interest rate, SMEs Loan size: amount up to CZK 30 million
Denmark Size of firm: less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to EUR 1 million
employees Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to EUR 1 million
Government loan guarantees, SMEs Firm size: up to 250 employees
Estonia Size of firm: less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to EUR 1 million
employees Government loan guarantees, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to EUR 1 million
Non-performing loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to EUR 1 million
Finland EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: up to EUR 1 million
employees and annual
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
turnover below EUR 50 million
and/ or balance sheet below Value of government guaranteed loans, Firm size: less than 250 employees
EUR 43 million) SMEs
Loans authorised and requested, SMEs Loan size: up to EUR 1 million
Interest rate, SMEs Loan size: up to EUR 1 million
Collateral, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees

254 
France EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: number of employees (less than 250),
employees and annual turnover (less than EUR 50 million), total assets of
turnover below EUR 50 million legal units (less than EUR 43 million) and
and/ or balance sheet below independent; bank must inform the Central Credit
EUR 43 million) Register when it grants a loan of more than EUR 25
000
Short- medium- and long-term loans Firm size: number of employees (less than 250),
turnover (less than EUR 50 million), total assets of
legal units (less than EUR 43 million) and
independent; bank must inform the Central Credit
Register when it grants a loan of more than EUR 25
000
Share of the outstanding loans of failing Firm size: number of employees (less than 250),
companies, SMEs except micro-enterprises turnover (less than EUR 50 million), total assets of
independent; bank must inform the Central Credit
Register when it grants a loan of more than EUR 25
000
Interest rate, SMEs Loan size: less than EUR 1 million

Bankruptcies, SMEs Firm size: number of employees (less than 250),
turnover (less than EUR 50 million), total assets of
independent
Georgia Less than 100 employees and Business loans, SMEs Less than 100 employees and turnover below GEL
turnover below GEL 1.5 million Non-performing loans, SMEs 1.5 million
Interest rate, SMEs

Collateral SMEs
Greece EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: number of employees (less than 250
employees and annual employees), turnover (less than EUR 50 million)
turnover below EUR 50 million and total assets (less than EUR 10 million)
and/ or balance sheet below
EUR 43 million)
Interest rate, SMEs Loan size: less than EUR 1 million
Collateral, SMEs Loan size: less than EUR 1 million
Hungary EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: number of employees (less than 250
employees and annual employees), turnover (less than EUR 50 million)
turnover below EUR 50 million and total assets (less than EUR 10 million)
EUR 43 million)
Overdraft loans, SMEs Firm size: number of employees (less than 250
employees), turnover (less than EUR 50 million)
and total assets (less than EUR 10 million)
Investment loans, SMEs Firm size: number of employees (less than 250
Direct government loans, SMEs Firm size: number of employees (less than 250

 255
Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: number of employees (less than 250
Non-performing loans, SMEs Firm size: number of employees (less than 250
Average interest rate, SMEs Loan size: amounts up to EUR 1 million

Ireland EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Loan size: less than EUR 1 million
and/ or balance sheet below Interest rates, SMEs Loan size: less than EUR 1 million
EUR 43 million)
Israel[i] Size of firm: less than 100 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: amounts of NIS differ depending on the
employees and annual bank
turnover of up to NIS 100
Interest rate small firms and medium firms Loan size: amounts of NIS differ depending on the
million
bank
Indonesia Maximum turnover of 50 billion Business loans, SMEs Firm size: Maximum turnover of 50 billion rupiah
rupiah or maximum assets
(excluding building land asset)
of 10 billion rupiah
Italy EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 20 workers
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 20 workers
and/ or balance sheet below Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
EUR 43 million) Direct government loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
Loans authorised and used, SMEs Firm size: less than 20 workers
Non-performing loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 20 workers
Interest rate, average SME rate Firm size: less than 20 workers
Collateral, SMEs Firm size: less than 20 workers
Venture and expansion capital, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
Payment delays, SMEs Firm size: turnover of up to EUR 50 million and less
than 250 employees
Japan Varies by sector Business loans, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Bankruptcies, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.

Only enterprises with debts of at least JPY10
million are included.
Kazakhstan Less than 250 employees in

addition to an annual income
criterium
Korea Varies by sector Business loans, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Government loan guarantees, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Direct government loans, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Loans authorised and requested, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.

256 
Non-performing loans, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Interest rate spread, SME and large firm The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
rates
Payment delays, SMEs The definition of SMEs differs according to sector.
Latvia EU definition (less than 250 Interest rate, SMEs Loan size: Loans of less than EUR 250000
EUR 43 million)
Lithuania EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: Less than 250 employees and annual
employees and annual turnover below EUR 50 million
EUR 43 million)
Luxembourg EU definition (less than 250 SME loans Loan size: Loans of less than EUR 1 million
SME interest rate Loan size: Loans of less than EUR 1 million
EUR 43 million)
Malaysia Manufacturing sector: Sales SME loans Firm size: Sales turnover not exceeding RM 50
turnover not exceeding RM 50 million or full-time employees not exceeding 200 for
million or full-time employees firms operating in the manufacturing sector and
not exceeding 200. Services sales turnover not exceeding RM 20 million or full-
and other sectors: Sales time employees not exceeding 75 for firms
turnover not exceeding RM 20 operating in services and other sectors,
million or full-time employees
not exceeding 75.
SME short-term loans Firm size: Sales turnover not exceeding RM 50
million or full-time employees not exceeding 200 for
firms operating in the manufacturing sector and
sales turnover not exceeding RM 20 million or full-
time employees not exceeding 75 for firms
operating in services and other sectors,
SME long-term loans Firm size: Sales turnover not exceeding RM 50

SME non-performing loans Firm size: Sales turnover not exceeding RM 50


 257
SME loans authorised Firm size: Sales turnover not exceeding RM 50

SME loans requested Firm size: Sales turnover not exceeding RM 50

SME interest rate Firm size: Sales turnover not exceeding RM 50

Mexico Firm size: up to 100 or 250 SME loans The definition depends on the number of
employees, depending on the employees and the annual revenues of the
sector borrower
SME guaranteed loans/direct loans Firm size: up to 100 or 250 employees, depending
on the sector
SME loans requested and authorized Firm size: up to 100 or 250 employees, depending
on the sector
SME interest rate Firm size: up to 100 or 250 employees, depending
on the sector
The EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: up to EUR 1 million
Netherlands employees and annual
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Loan size: up to EUR 1 million
and/ or balance sheet below Government loan guarantees, SMEs Firm size: up to 250 employees
EUR 43 million) Loans authorised and requested, SMEs Firm size: up to 250 employees
Collateral, SMEs Size of firm up to 50 employees
New Zealand No unique national definition. Interest rates, SMEs Loan size: up to NZD 1 million
Loan authorised, SMEs Firm size: enterprises with 6-19 employees
Loan requested, SMEs Firm size: enterprises with 6-19 employees
Norway EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
EUR 43 million)
Portugal EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: EU definition (less than 250 employees
employees and annual and annual turnover below EUR 50 million and/ or
turnover below EUR 50 million balance sheet below EUR 43 million, Com
and/ or balance sheet below Recommendation 2003/361/EC)
EUR 43 million)

258 
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Firm size: EU definition (less than 250 employees
and annual turnover below EUR 50 million and/ or
balance sheet below EUR 43 million, Com
Recommendation 2003/361/EC)
Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: EU definition (less than 250 employees
Loans authorised and requested, SMEs Firm size: EU definition (less than 250 employees
Non-performing loans, SMEs Firm size: EU definition (less than 250 employees
Interest rates, SMEs Loan size: up to EUR 1 million (prior to 2010) and
loans up to EUR 0.25 million (in 2010)
Collateral, SMEs Firm size: EU definition (less than 250 employees

Peru SMEs are defined by annual Outstanding business loans, SMEs Defined by annual sales of the borrower
turnover
Serbia Up to 250 employees, turnover Business loans, SMEs Firm size, in accordance with national statistical
up to EUR 10 million, total definition.
assets up to EUR 5 million
Interest rate, SMEs Loan size: up to EUR 1 million.
Slovak EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees (including
Republic employees and annual natural persons)
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees (including
natural persons)
EUR 43 million)
Government loan guarantees, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees (including
natural persons)
Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: EU definition (less than 250 employees
Direct government loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees (including
natural persons)
Direct government loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees (including
natural persons)
Collateral, SMEs Firm size: EU definition (less than 250 employees

 259
Venture capital, SMEs Firm size: EU definition (less than 250 employees
Slovenia EU definition (less than 250 Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Firm size: less than or equal to 250 employees and
employees and annual asset value less than or equal to EUR 17.5 million.
EUR 43 million) Direct government loans, SMEs Firm size: less than or equal to 250 employees and
asset value less than or equal to EUR 17.5 million.
Interest rate, SMEs Firm and loan size: enterprises with less than 250
employees and amounts less than EUR 1 million.
South Africa SMEs are defined by annual Business loans, SMEs Firm size: Businesses with turnover less than ZAR
turnover 400 million
Non-performing loans Firm size: Businesses with turnover less than ZAR
400 million where an exposure is overdue for more
than 90 days
Spain EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: less than EUR 1 million
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Loan size: less than EUR 1 million
and/ or balance sheet below Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
EUR 43 million) Interest rate, SMEs Loan size: less than EUR 1 million
Venture capital, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
Payment delays, SMEs Firm size: EU definition
Bankruptcies, SMEs Firm size: EU definition
Sweden EU definition (less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: 1-249 employees
Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Firm size: 1-249 employees
and/ or balance sheet below Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: 0-249 employees
EUR 43 million) Government loan guarantees, SMEs Firm size: 0-249 employees
Direct government loans, SMEs Firm size: 0-249 employees
Loans authorised, SMEs Firm size: 0-249 employees
Interest rates, SMEs Loan size: up to EUR 1 million
Switzerland Size of firm: less than 250 Business loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
employees
Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
Loans used, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees
Collateral, SMEs Firm size: up to 249 employees
Interest rates, SMEs Loan size: less than CHF 1 million
Thailand Number of employees and Business loans, SMEs Firm size: according to the sector, revenue and
revenue according to the number of employees.
industry: firms in
manufacturingless than 200
employees and revenue of less Short- and long-term loans, SMEs Firm size: according to the sector, revenue and
than THB 500 million number of employees
Firms in services: Less than
100 employees and THB 300 Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Firm size: according to the sector, revenue and
in revenue. number of employees
Loans authorised and requested, SMEs Firm size: according to the sector, revenue and
number of employees

260 
Non-performing loans, SMEs Firm size: according to the sector, revenue and
number of employees
Interest rate, SME average rate Firm size: according to the sector, revenue and
number of employees
Payment delays, SMEs The National definition of SMEs differs according to

sector.
Bankruptcies, SMEs The National definition of SMEs differs according to
sector.
Turkey Less than 250 employees and Business loans, SMEs Firm size
TRY 40 million in assets SME non-performing loans Firm size
Ukraine Less than 250 employees and Business loans, SMEs Firm size: Less than 250 employees and EUR 50
EUR 50 million in turnover million in turnover
Interest rates, SMEs
United Size of firm: less than 250 Business lending, SMEs Firm size: turnover of up to GBP 25 million
Kingdom employees Interest rates, SMEs Firm size: turnover up to GBP 25 million
Collateral, SMEs Firm size: less than 250 employees, including non-
employer enterprises
United States Size of firm: less than 500 Business loans, SMEs Loan size: up to USD 1 million.
employees Short-term loans, SMEs Loan size: up to USD 1 million.
Government guaranteed loans, SMEs Varies by industry
Collateral, SMEs Loan size: up to USD 1 million
Impact of diversity in definitions
The many limitations in data collection above outlined limit the possibility to make cross-country
comparisons using the raw data. However, it is possible to observe general trends for the indicators, both
within and across countries, using growth rates. When analysing trends, the differences in the exact
composition of the indicators are muted by the fact that the changes in the indicators over time are being
examined instead of levels. Additionally, if the indicators are analysed as a set, it is possible to form an
overview of the country trends in SME financing. It is precisely comparing trends that the Scoreboard sheds
light on changing market conditions and policies for financing SMEs and entrepreneurs.
However, again, caution is required in cross-country comparisons, especially as concerns the use of flow
variables and stock measures. Flows, which are measured over an accounting period (i.e. one year),
capture changes of a given variables and are therefore more volatile than stocks, which measure levels,
i.e. the value of an asset at a given point in time, and thus reflect latest flows, as well as values that may
have cumulated over time, net of depreciation. The comparison of flows and stock measures can be
particularly problematic when growth rates are considered. In fact, a negative growth rate of a flow variable
can be compatible with a positive growth rate of the same variable measured in stocks. This would be the
case if the stock variables increases over time but the absolute increase by which the stock variables
grows becomes smaller. Similarly, a negative growth rate of a loan stock does not necessarily mean a
decline in SME lending, but could be attributed to maturing loans exceeding the value of new loans granted.
Such difficulties underline the importance of complementing stock data with flows of new loans.

 261
Recommendations for data improvements
Standardised template
To enable more timely collection of data and better cross-country comparison in the future, it is necessary
for countries to advance in the harmonisation of data content and in the standardisation of methods of data
collection. The adoption of a standardised table for data collection and submission on SME finance has
contributed to improve the process of data collection for the Scoreboard, while allowing for some
customisation at the country level, and should thus be further pursued, as country coverage increases.
The systematic use of the template is furthermore intended to facilitate the timely publication of the data
on core indicators on the OECD.Stat website, from which it can then be customised, manipulated and
downloaded.
The long-term objectives of timeliness, comparability, transparency and harmonisation of data should
continue to be pursued actively by national authorities. To that end, national authorities should work with
financial institutions to improve the collection of data on SME and entrepreneurship finance, by:
 Requiring financial institutions to use the national definition for an SME based on firm size.
 Requiring financial institutions to report on a timely basis to their regulatory authorities SME loans,
interest rates, collateral requirements, by firm size and broken down into the appropriate size
subcategories, as well as those SME loans which have government support.
 Working towards international harmonisation of data on non-performing loans.
 Encouraging international, regional and national authorities as well as business associations to
work together to harmonise quantitative demand-side surveys in terms of survey population,
questions asked and timeframes; encourage the competent organisations to undertake yearly
surveys.
 Promoting the harmonisation of the definition of venture capital in terms of stages of development.
Core indicators
Since the Scoreboard pilot exercise was launched in 2009-10, important progress has been made in terms
of standardisation and comparability of information. As country coverage continues to increase, it is
important for good practices in data collection and reporting to be shared among countries, but also for
further advancement to be made in the harmonisation of core indicators. A number of areas can be
identified to improve the monitoring over time of trends at the country level and across countries.
First, it is of paramount importance to improve reporting of SME loan variables. Key areas for refinement
include:
 Separate reporting of financial information for non-employer and employer-firms, so as to
harmonise the financial data with the SME definition employed in national statistics. The separation
would also allow for a more in-depth evaluation of financing trends at the country level,
distinguishing between funding that is directed to businesses that generate employment from that
directed to self-employers, which may however represent an important share of the country’s
business activity.
 Collection of stock and flow data for SME loans. These two indicators are complementary and
should be jointly analysed in order to draw a comprehensive picture of the evolution of the SME
lending portfolio.
 Information on the composition of lending portfolios, broken down by different products (overdrafts/
lines of credit/ leases/ business mortgages or credit cards/ securitised loans). Greater granularity
in the reporting of business loans would allow for the identification of the underlying elements of

262 
the SME business loan portfolio. This represents a necessary first step towards pursuing greater
harmonisation in the definition of SME loans across countries, or, at least identifying a common
“base composition” for more meaningful cross-country comparisons.
Second, it is also necessary to fill the gaps in available data and work towards more comprehensive
information for other core indicators in the Scoreboard:
 Government guarantees: Provide consolidated figures, which take into account the entire range of
public guarantee programmes, while excluding double counting related, for instance, to the
counter-guarantee of the same lending portfolio. Include additional information on the scope and
coverage of public guarantee schemes, in particular information on the volume of outstanding
guarantees, the public contribution to the fund’s capitalisation, and the value of the loans supported
by public guarantees. The Scoreboard data should be complemented, in the policy section of
country profiles, by the monitoring of the take-ups and phasing out of these guarantee schemes.
 Government guaranteed loans: Provide the corresponding loans backed by the reported
government guarantees so as to allow for the calculation of a leverage ratio. Optimally, the
guaranteed portions of these loans should be also reported.
 Non-performing loans (NPLs): Provide the NPL ratio for SME loans, together with the overall NPL
ratio of the business loan portfolio or the NPL ratio for large firms. The latter would be used as a
benchmark against which the performance and quality of the SME loan portfolio is measured.
 Asset-based finance: Obtain data broken down by firm size or a functioning proxy of firm size.
Currently, business associations usually do not make the distinction according to the use of these
instruments by firm size, which limits the understanding of the importance of these non-bank
financial instruments for SMEs.
 SME loan fees: Provide information on the standard practice of the commercial banking sector with
respect to loan fees charged to SME loans in addition to the interest rate, at a national level. If
possible, use demand-side surveys to collect information on this indirect cost on SME lending.
 Collateral: Improve the description of what constitutes collateral and use demand-side survey
information to compensate for lack of supply-side data on collateral.
Inclusion of more disaggregated data
Efforts are underway to include more disaggregated data on SME and entrepreneurship financing in future
editions of the Scoreboard publication, given the significant heterogeneity of the SME population and the
impact that these underlying characteristics have on access to finance and financing conditions.
In order to obtain a better picture of the availability of more granular data in the Scoreboard countries, a
survey was conducted as part of a stocktaking exercise and as an input for the longer-term objective of
including more detailed information in the Scoreboard report. In total, 25 countries participated in the
survey. Based on the survey results, four levels of disaggregation are being explored:
 The geographical location of the company, where this refers to TL 2 regions (based on the OECD
nomenclature), which mostly corresponds to NUTS 2 regions in the EU.
 The gender of the principal owner, making a distinction between firms that are primarily owned (not
necessarily managed) by women and firms that are primarily owned by men; “dual-ownership” is a
third category.
 The main sector of operation, using NACE Level 1 sectors as the reference.
 Firm size, i.e. going beyond the classic dichotomy between SMEs and large companies to look into
data disaggregated by smaller size bands (e.g. micro vs. small vs. medium).
A pilot exercise is currently underway, focusing on the subnational dimension in access to finance,
exploiting synergies with another ongoing project of CFE, with support from the European Commission, on

 263
regional drivers and barriers to enterprise growth. The rest of this section explains the relevance of
including these four levels of disaggregation in the Scoreboard.
Subnational perspective
Enterprise financing conditions at the local level reflect local economic conditions. SMEs in lagging regions
typically find it more difficult to receive a loan and, when they receive one, are charged higher interest rates
than SMEs in better-off regions. This does not necessarily imply geographical discrimination, but rather
reflects financial performance of the borrower (internal factors) and/or higher perceived credit risk by the
lenders due to a less favourable local business environment (external factors), as shown for example by
higher rates of nonperforming loans in lagging regions. Equity finance is also geographically concentrated,
depriving growth-oriented SMEs and start-ups in more peripheral regions from much needed growth
capital. While technology could in principle allow for a greater distance between investors and
entrepreneurs, a recent report by the British Business Bank finds that in 82% of equity investment stakes,
the investor had an office within two hours travel time of the company that they were backing (British
Business Bank, 2021[1]).
Gender perspective
Women entrepreneurs have long-faced barriers in financial markets, and these barriers have been
persistent over time and across contexts. For example, women entrepreneurs in the EU are about 25%
less likely than their male counterparts to use bank loans to fund their business. Even when women receive
external finance, they typically receive smaller amounts, pay higher interest rates and are required to
secure more collateral. Moreover, only about 13% of governmental start-up funding (e.g. grants, loans)
goes to female founders. Even among growth-oriented businesses seeking venture capital, only about 2%
of European equity investments go to all-female founding teams, and when women do receive venture
capital investments, it is about 70% of the funding that male founders receive (Halabisky and Basille,
forthcoming[2]). While the availability of enterprise financing data by the gender of the business owner is
scarce, it would be important in the near future to work in this direction, for example by central banks asking
commercial banks to collect and share aggregate information on the distribution of business loans by the
gender of the borrower.
Sector perspective
Financing needs and access to finance opportunities change depending on the main activity and industry
in which a business operates. SMEs in sectors that rely more intensively on physical assets, such as
manufacturing, can be expected to receive credit more easily, as capital assets can be pledged as
collateral. Asset-based financing is also more easily available to these enterprises. Companies whose
business model hinges on intangible assets (IA) (e.g. patents and trademarks), on the other hand, are at
a disadvantage in credit markets, as these assets are firm-specific and difficult to use as collateral in
traditional debt relations. The availability of alternative sources of finance, from equity finance to private
debt, is particularly important for IA-intensive companies, which are often major drivers of growth. Equity
finance, in addition to being geographically concentrated, is also sector-concentrated in knowledge-
intensive industries, such as ICT, biotechnologies and medical services. Interestingly, however, the sector
distribution of high-growth firms is much less concentrated than the sector distribution of equity
investments, suggesting the existence of an industry mismatch between the allocation of equity finance
and the distribution of high-growth firms.

264 
Firm size perspective
The rationale behind the OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Financing Scoreboard is that SMEs are
disadvantaged compared to larger companies in access to external finance, making it relevant to assess
trends in the SME finance gap and policies that can bridge this gap. However, a closer look would show
that micro and small enterprises face the most constraints, whereas access to finance and financing
conditions for mid-sized companies are closer to those available for larger companies. Typical problems
of credit markets, such as information asymmetries or lack of collateral, are much more prominent among
smaller SMEs. To the extent possible, efforts should seek to go beyond the classic dichotomy of SMEs
and larger companies by collecting more granular information on credit and equity finance by smaller firm-
size classes.

 265
Annex B. Methodology for analysing COVID-19

policy trackers
This annex describes the methodology used in Chapter 2 of Financing SMEs and entrepreneurs 2022: An
OECD Scoreboard. The annex explains the objectives underlying the analysis and the different data
sources and policy trackers used. It also describes in detail the methodology used and its limitations.
Objectives
Chapter 2 aims to identify the SME orientation of policies in response to COVID-19, in order to assess how
SME financing support is channelled through recovery packages. To this end, it distinguishes between
“SME-related” and “other policies”; “SME-related” policies explicitly target SMEs or reference them as one
of the target groups. “Other policies” do not mention SMEs specifically. The analysis looked both at the
SME orientation by number and by value of policies.
This analysis of the SME orientation of policies was undertaken for both rescue and recovery measures.
Following the definition in one of the databases used, rescue measures are defined as “short-term
measures designed for emergency support to keep people and businesses alive”; recovery packages as
“long-term measures to boost economic growth” (O’Callaghan, 2021[3]). Where possible, SME-related
policies were differentiated by focus on firm age (e.g. start-ups), self-employed, type of entrepreneurs and
firm size per se.
The analysis also assesses the SME orientation of policy measures at a lower level of aggregation. First,
it provides a detailed analysis of the SME orientation of types of support (liquidity, alternative finance,
insolvency) and financial instruments (debt, deferral, grants, factoring, leasing, equity) used. These types
of financial support and instruments play a central role in rescue and recovery measures and also allow to
position the analysis in the context of wider challenges and developments in SME finance, such as the
importance of diversification of financial instruments for SMEs. Second, the analysis focuses on the SME
orientation of measures in four key policy domains in the recovery packages: greening, digitalisation, skills
and innovation.
Figure A B.1 shows the approach that was used.

266 
Figure A B.1. Visualisation of the approach for analysing the trackers
Sources of information
Chapter 2 makes use of a number of policy tracking databases that have been developed since the start
of the pandemic to monitor the policy response to the COVID-19 crisis. Some of these data sources have
a specific focus (e.g. sustainable and green policies); some focus only on rescue or recovery measures,
while others are more comprehensive in their scope, monitoring various types of policies that have
emerged since the start of the COVID-19 crisis. The databases also vary in country coverage and in the
level of detail of information they provide on policies.
The following databases were used:
 Global Recovery Observatory (GRO): This database was developed by the Oxford University
Economics Recovery Project (OUERP) and is continuously updated. It covers both rescue and
recovery measures and includes information on the number and value of policies. Data used in
Chapter 2 were last accessed in October 2021, and include 7 584 policies in 91 countries
(O’Callaghan, 2020[4]).
 Bruegel dataset EU Recovery and Resilience Facility: This dataset was developed by the
Brussels-based think tank Bruegel and provides information on the Recovery and Resilience plans
(RRF) of 22 EU countries, including 1 763 policies. The database was last accessed in July 2021
(Bruegel, 2021[5]).
 The OECD Green Recovery Database: This database provides information on recovery plans
that are likely to have significant environmental implications across 44 countries. 857 policies were
included in the database as of September 2021 (OECD, 2021[6]).

 267
 Green Recovery Tracker: This dataset was developed by the Wuppertal Institute and E3G. It
includes recovery measures in 17 EU member countries, and assesses them from the perspective
of their expected impact on climate change. 996 policies were included in the database as of
September 2021 (Wuppertal Institute, E3G, 2021[7]).
 Covid-19 Government Financing Support Programme for Businesses – OECD: This dataset
was developed by the Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs (DAF) of the OECD to support
the work of the OECD Committee on Financial Markets (CMF). Built on two waves of a survey
among CMF Delegates (one in April 2020 with 26 responses and one in December 2020 with 21
responses), this database includes 215 financial support programmes for businesses (OECD,
2020[8]) (OECD, 2021[9])).
Methodology
The analysis was conducted in three steps.
Step 1: Making use of relevant existing classifications in the databases
Each database includes a predefined set of categories or classes of policies, which have been used as a
starting point for the analysis:
 The analysis made use of the distinction between rescue and recovery measures included in the
Global Recovery Observatory database.
 To build the pool of SME-related policies, policies in Archetype C (“Liquidity for SMEs and start-
ups”) in the Global Recovery Observatory database were included.
 Furthermore, classifications on the type of policy objectives were used. This includes the use of
the “Clean archetype” in the Global Recovery Observatory database and the “Green transition” and
the “Digital transformation” classification in the Bruegel database.
Step 2: A structured text analysis
To further assess the SME orientation of policies in the databases, a structured text analysis was used
based on a word search of relevant terms with respect to SME orientation, type of SME, financial
instruments and types of financial support and policy domains. Descriptive texts on policies available in
the databases were used to this end. Tables A.B.1, 2 and 3 show the search terms used. 4
Table A B.1. Word search on SME orientation and type

SME related policies by size SME related policies by age Entrepreneurs Self-employed
SME Start-up Entrepreneur Self-empl
Small Startup Self empl
Table A B.2. Word search on policy domains

Digitalisation Greening Skills Innovation
Digit Green Skill Innovat
Cyber Electric Educat Technolog
AI / Artificial Intelligence Sustaina Competenc Research
E-comm / E comm Climat Abilit R&D
Cloud Environm Training Startup / Start-up
Connect Clean energy Vocation Smart

268 
Broadband Circular conomy Human capital Universit

5G Emission School Science
Optic fiber Biodiv
Online / On-line Pollut
Renewab
Energy efficiency
Green infrastructure
Solar
Table A B.3. Word search on financial instruments and support types

Debt Deferral Grants and subsidies Insolvency Alternative finance
Loan Moratori Grant / Grants Debt restructur Subordinated loan
Guarantee Deferral / Defer Subsidies / Subsidy Insolvenc Venture capital / VC
Debt Payment delay / Tax delay Forgivable loan Bankruptc Business Angel
Credit Payment suspension / Tax Lump-sum / lump sum Court restructur Equity
Direct lending suspension Equity fund
Lend / Lending Forebearance / Participating loan
Forbearance Lease / Leasing
Factoring
Bond
Crowdfund
Peer to peer lending /
Peer-to-peer / Peer to
peer
Alternative finance
Bridge capital
Risk capital
A set of dummy variables was built for each keyword (where 1 means that the description of the policy
contains the term selected and 0 that this is not the case). The main objective was the creation of a "macro"
dummy column which collects and takes into account the policies identified using pre-set categorisation
and using the different keywords while avoiding the double counting of these policies that, by nature,
overlap.
Step 3: Comprehensive manual check of results
To avoid any false positives, a manual check was performed on all policies in the different trackers. The
quality check consisted of scanning and reading the policy descriptions where the keyword search was
performed and testing if the methods applied produced accurate findings for each SME-related policy,
policy domain and financial instrument, followed by a correction of the false positives. On average, 15% of
the policies identified by type of SME were false positives. When looking by policy domain, 16% on average
were false positives, while 14% in financial instruments and 15% by type of financial support. Furthermore,
the manual check also focused on identifying financial outliers in the results, for instance because in some
cases policies in the databases were presented as larger packages of measures instead of individual
policies.
Limitations
The methodology used allowed for an interpretation of the SME orientation of the policy response to
COVID-19. However, the approach also has a number of limitations that needs to be taken into account
when interpreting the results:

 269
 First, at the time when the databases were accessed, they were not always fully up to date,
considering that they are continuously updated. As a consequence, not all policies put in place by
countries could be included in the analysis. For instance, in October 2021 not all recovery packages
in OECD countries had been included in the Global Recovery Observatory database.
 Second, the various databases used differ in objectives, methodologies and country coverage, and
are therefore not fully comparable.
 Third, data on the values of policies in particular should be carefully considered. The policies in the
databases mostly refer to the announcement of measures, not actual expenditure. In addition, not
all policies have financial values attached to them, which can lead to an underestimation of the
financial allocation. Moreover, values of different types of support in the databases were
aggregated, but have different meanings, for instance the use of grants compared to loan
guarantees. Last, changes in exchange rates may affect the comparability of policy values.
 Finally, while the analysis provides relevant insights on the SME orientation of policies and their
evolution, it is important to keep in mind that policies that are not “SME-related” may also be
relevant for SMEs. Many policies aim to strengthen economic structures, such as broadband
infrastructure, which benefits SMEs as well. Also, financial support measures open to the business
sector at large can also be relevant for SMEs. Furthermore, the fact that the SME orientation of
recovery policies is weaker than that of rescue policies is in part the logical consequence of a shift
towards more generic policy measures. A normative interpretation of how high or low the share of
SME-related policies should be is beyond the scope of this analysis.
References
AIFI (2020), Il mercato italiano del private equity e del venture capital, Associazione Italiana del [10]
Private Equity, Venture Capital e Private Debt,

https://www.aifi.it/visualizzaallegatodocumenti.aspx?chiave=u10jlmi71yQ3jShJ6O2Nz9nr8MV
48g.
British Business Bank (2021), Regions and Nations Trackers: Small Business Finance Markets, [1]
https://www.british-business-bank.co.uk/research/regions-and-nations-tracker-2021/.
Bruegel (2021), European Union countries’ recovery and resilience plans, [5]
https://www.bruegel.org/publications/datasets/european-union-countries-recovery-and-
resilience-plans/.
Halabisky, D. and I. Basille (forthcoming), Policy brief on access to finance for inclusive and [2]
social entrepreneurship.
NESTA (2009), The Vital 6 Per Cent: How High-Growth Innovative Businesses Generate [11]
Prosperity and Jobs, National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts,
https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/vital-six-per-cent.pdf.
O’Callaghan, B. (2021), Global Recovery Observatory Methodology, http://dx.doi.org/20210201- [3]

Global-Recovery-Observatory-Draft-Methodology-Document-.pdf (ox.ac.uk).

270 
O’Callaghan, B. (2020), Global Recovery Observatory, [4]

https://recovery.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/tracking/.
OECD (2021), COVID-19 Government Financing Support Programmes for Business [9]
[DAF/CMF(2021)6/REV2], http://COVID-19 Government Financing Support Programmes for
Businesses: 2021 Update (oecd.org).
OECD (2021), Focus on green recovery, https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/themes/green- [6]

recovery#climate-action.
OECD (2015), New Approaches to SME and Entrepreneurship Financing: Broadening the Range [12]
of Instruments, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264240957-en.
Wuppertal Institute, E3G (2021), Green Recovery Tracker, [7]

https://www.greenrecoverytracker.org/.
Notes
1
OECD (2009), OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, OECD Publishing,
Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/factbook-2009-en
2See Annex C in OECD (2013), Entrepreneurship at a Glance 2013, OECD Publishing, Paris, for a
detailed discussion on the international comparability of venture capital data.
3 Recent studies by the World Bank provide evidence that loan size is an adequate proxy for size of the
firm accessing the loan. See for instance Ardic O.P., Mylenko N., Saltane V. (2012), “Small and medium
enterprises: a cross-country analysis with a new data set”, Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 17, Issues 4,
pp. 491-513.
4
Some of the terms used in the word search method do not display the full word, as the abbreviated form
avoid different variations of the terms to not be considered. For instance, singular and plural terms
(“deferral”-s), nouns and adjective or nouns and verbs (“environment”-al, “pollut”-ion and –ing).
Considerable attention has also been given to the different ways words were mentioned in the databases,
such as “AI” and “Artificial intelligence” and “start-up” and “startup” (without the dash). Moreover, significant
efforts have been paid to avoid the misattribution of words (such as “small” and “connect”) to meanings
unrelated to their context (that is, respectively, in this case, small businesses and digitalisation). Some of
the terms contain the whole word to avoid potential confusion with similar others (as for “lease” and
“leasing” that, if abbreviated, would have been confused with expressions such as “at -leas-t”) and they
might also contain additional spaces to distinguish them from other words (“ lease ” and “ leasing ”, not to
be included in terms such as “re-lease” and “re-leasing”).

Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2022
AN OECD SCOREBOARD
The COVID‑19 crisis caused profound disruptions in the global economy, with SMEs and entrepreneurs,
particularly hard hit. Swift measures implemented by governments and public financial institutions provided
a crucial lifeline for liquidity‑strapped SMEs.
The 10th edition of Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2022: An OECD Scoreboard sheds light on the impacts
of the crisis on SME finance, tracking the latest developments in debt, equity, asset‑based finance,
and framework conditions, along with recent policy developments for 48 countries around the world. It shows
that lending continued to flow to SMEs during the pandemic, with unprecedented growth in outstanding SME
loans. What is more, credit conditions relaxed significantly: interest rates registered record lows, interest rate
spreads narrowed considerably, and collateral requirements declined in most Scoreboard countries. In contrast,
alternative sources of finance such as leasing and factoring declined significantly, in part because of the large
uptake of credit. Evidence on equity finance shows a resilient venture capital sector, with some fragility
in early‑stage finance.
The thematic chapter of this report assesses the evolution of SME financing support during the crisis, from
the rescue to recovery phases. It documents a fall in the level of SME‑related support in national recovery
packages compared to earlier rescue measures.
PRINT ISBN 978-92-64-41902-5

PDF ISBN 978-92-64-72059-6
9HSTCQE*ebjacf+

e9073a0f-en (2)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

e9073a0f-en (2)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

e9073a0f-en (2)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Financing SMEs

and Entrepreneurs 2022

Please cite this publication as:

ISBN 978-92-64-41902-5 (print)

Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs

Photo credits: Cover © Shutterstock/Roman Gorielov.

Corrigenda to publications may be found on line at: www.oecd.org/about/publishing/corrigenda.htm.

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Country expert team

Australia Pourus Bharucha Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Laura Kanizsai Ministry of Innovation and Technology

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

13. Finland 148

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

38. Slovak Republic 214

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Table 18.1. Scoreboard for Hungary 165

Table A A.1. Preferred definitions for core indicators 244

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Figure 1.20. Venture capital investments 48

Box A A.1. What is an SME? 251

Follow OECD Publications on:

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Table 1. Core indicators in Financing SMEs and entrepreneurs, 2022

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

SME loans used/ authorised, in

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Methodological advances and recommendations for data improvements

Box 1. Recommendations for improving the reporting of core indicators

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Acronyms and abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

EETE Companies engaged in ecological transition (France)

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

MSME Micro, small and medium-sized enterprise

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

TRY Turkish lira

ISO Country Abbreviations

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

1 Recent trends in SME and

This chapter reports on trends and conditions in SME access to finance. It

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Business environment and macroeconomic context

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Trade and business investment

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

New SME loans

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Box 1.1. Spotlight on new SME lending in selected economies

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Figure 1.2. New SME loans

FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2022 © OECD 2022

Figure 1.3. Growth in new SME lending, 2008-20