Dorado v.

People
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The judgment of conviction of Jerwin Dorado is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE by reason of the exempting circumstance of minority. He is hereby referred to the
local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.
He is also ordered to pay the private complainant, Ronald B onion, civil indemnity in the amount of
P30,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.,
The amounts of damages awarded shall have an interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of judgment until fully paid.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the two houses of Congress for their information and guidance in
future legislation regarding children in conflict with the laws. SO ORDERED.

FACTS:
 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside CA’ Decision and Resolution
which affirmed RTC Taguig’ Deciison, finding accused Jerwin Dorado guilty of the crime of Frustrated
Murder.
 In "Dorado v. People," Jerwin Dorado, a minor, and three others were charged with frustrated murder
and violation of R.A. No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.
 The incident occurred on March 15, 2004, in Taguig City, Metro Manila.
 Dorado, who was 16 years old, and his group allegedly attacked Ronald Bonion and his friends by
throwing stones and bottles.
 Dorado shot Ronald between the eyes with an improvised shotgun (sumpak), causing severe injuries.
 The RTC of Taguig City found Dorado guilty of frustrated murder but acquitted him of other charges
due to insufficient evidence.
 The CA affirmed the RTC's decision.
 Dorado appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that his defenses of alibi and denial were not
properly considered and that his minority status was not adequately addressed.

ISSUE/S: Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Dorado's conviction.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the judgment of
conviction due to the exempting circumstance of minority. The Supreme Court found that Dorado was a
minor at the time of the crime and should benefit from the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A.
No. 9344).

R.A. No. 9344 exempts minors from criminal liability unless they acted with discernment.

The prosecution failed to prove that Dorado acted with discernment, which is necessary to hold a minor
criminally liable. The Court notes that Dorado must benefit from the provisions of the law, even though it
was enacted after the commission of the crime.

The Court explains the provisions of R.A. No. 9344 regarding the prosecution and treatment of Child In
Conflict with the Law (CICL). Dorado was referred to the local social welfare and development officer for an
appropriate intervention program.

One of the significant features of R.A. No. 9344 is the increase of the minimum age of criminal responsibility,
to wit:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

In sum, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the following minors shall be exempt from criminal liability:

Those below fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime; and ,
Those above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted without discernment.

Thus, if a child falls under the above-cited ages, he or she shall be released and shall be subjected to an
intervention program as may be determined by a local social welfare and development officer, pursuant to
Section 20 of the said law.

Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, the said
child does not immediately proceed to trial. Instead, he or she may undergo a diversion, which refers to an
alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of the CICL without
resorting to formal court proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the other grounds provided by
law are present, then the CICL shall undergo the appropriate preliminary investigation of his or her criminal
case, and trial before the courts may proceed.

Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not immediately execute its judgment;
rather, it shall place the CICL under suspended sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied even
if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her
guilt. During the suspension, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. If the disposition measures are successful, then
the court shall discharge the CICL. Conversely, if unsuccessful, then the court has the following options: (1)
to discharge the child, (2) to order execution of sentence, or (3) to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

In other words, aside from increasing the minimum age of criminal responsibility, R.A. No. 9344 also provides
for alternative measures to address the criminal tendencies of a minor. The law endeavors that a minor
should be given several opportunities to mend his or her ways without resorting to detention and
incarceration. A judgment for conviction shall only be executed if all the alternative measures prove to be
ineffective. Indeed, the emphatic policies of R.A. No. 9344 emulate the right of every child alleged, accused
of, adjudged, or recognized, as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the
promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, taking into account the child's age and desirability of
promoting his or her reintegration.

When a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is charged with a crime, it cannot be
presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must specifically prove as
a separate circumstance that the CICL committed the alleged crime with discernment.

Guidelines for the implementation of the transitory provisions of R.A. No. 9344 and it stated that one of the
duties of the prosecution during the trial regarding the CICL was as follows:
For above 15 but below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, with pending case
but released on bail or on recognizance or under detention

• Trial may proceed for the prosecution to prove discernment.

"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor x x x who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances accorded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial."

"The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action
of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand,
discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong." As earlier stated,
the "prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical
appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's
cunning and shrewdness."

For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his
overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon
used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding
the corpus delicti.

The word "intent" has been defined as:

"(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge
as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person acts." (46 CJS
Intent, p. 1103.)

It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and
intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in
Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:

"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong ..." (italics Ours) p. 583

From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While
both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desire of one's act while
the latter relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not intend
to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the
same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that
since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act
to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time
recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.
The Court is of the view, however, that the prosecution was unable to establish the element of evident
premeditation to qualify the crime to frustrated murder. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the
following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of
his act. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered, it is indispensable to show how and when the
plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.

The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought
and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment.

In this case, evident premeditation was not established because, first, the prosecution evidence only referred
to the matters that happened during the incident, and not to the preparations undertaken by Dorado
beforehand to kill Ronald. There was no evidence on record which would indicate how and when Dorado
hatched his plan to kill Ronald. The mere fact that Dorado was seen with a sumpak at the beginning of the .
altercation does not unequivocally establish that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to murder Ronald. In
order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"
but must be "evident premeditation.

Second, the prosecution failed to show a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution
to allow Dorado to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.

Lastly, Dorado did not have a cool thought and reflection when he shot Ronald. The RTC observed that there
was an ongoing feud between Dorado's group and Ronald's group.