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East African Community: the Challenges Ahead

Author(s): Mohabe Nyirabu


Source: The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International
Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 1/2 (2002), pp. 21-36
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/45419722
Accessed: 30-11-2024 10:43 UTC

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African Review, Vol . 31, No. 1 61 2, 2002: 21-36

East African Community: the Challenges Ahead

Mohabe Nyirabu "

Introduction

"Doors of opportunity have been opened. The movement of people


across our national borders to facilitate increased trade is now
possible. But it is one thing to open a door; it is another to get
people to walk through it."
President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi of Kenya

"If indeed some kind of devil was responsible for the break up of
the (defunct) East African Community, by these signatures we are
sending the devil back to hell."
President Benjamin William Mkapa of Tanzania

"The Treaty that we have just signed should serve the interests of
our people. We must therefore ensure the peoples full involvement
and create the necessary environment for them to conduct their
business."
President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda1

The lure of a regional approach to economic development has been


strong in Africa, even before the formation of the Organization of
African Unity in 1963. Since then numerous regional organisations
have seen the light of day. One lesson that can be drawn from past
experiences is that although a great number of these regional
organisations have been long sustained, they have not been
successful in making progress towards the larger goal of African
cooperation and integration. The economic crisis facing Africa
explains the increasing voices for regional integration as one way
out of the mess of underdevelopment. This was especially evident

* Department of Political Science and Public Administration,


University of Dar es Salaam;
[email protected]
1 All these statements are excerpts of the Joint Communiqué of the
East African Heads of State Summit, Arusha, Tanzania, 30
November 1999
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Mohabe Nyirabu

when, in 1980, the OAU adopted the Lagos Plan of Action to


spearhead continent-wide cooperation.

On June 3, 1 99 1 , at the 27th Summit of the Organization of African


Unity in Abuja, Nigeria, 35 heads of state and government (the
largest such attendance since the founding of the OAU in 1963)
signed the treaty establishing the African Economic Community
(AEC), with a timetable for the phased removal of barriers to inter-
African trade. At this gathering it was also agreed to strengthen
existing regional initiatives towards African co-operation, eventually
leading to the creation of an Africa-wide monetary union and
economic community by the year 2025. To achieve these objectives,
the AEC Treaty intends, among other things, to strengthen existing
regional economic communities, establish other communities where
they do not exist, and conclude agreements on harmonisation and
co-ordination of policies between existing sub-regional and regional
economic communities. It is within this broad African goal that the
new East African Community was formed.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the challenges and prospects


of the new East African Community (EAC). First, a brief overview of
the history of East African cooperation is highlighted. This is followed
by a discussion of the efforts that led to the launching of the treaty
for EAC in J emu ary 2001. Thirdly, a discussion of the challenges is
undertaken. The paper concludes with an analysis of the prospects
for EAC to drive regional economic growth.

The East African Experience: An Overview


In 1921, the colonial territories of Kenya and Uganda united to
form a free trade area, which Tanganyika joined two years later. In
1927, the three territories became a customs union with a common
external tariff having been adopted earlier in 1922. From 1926 to
1950 various services common to the three colonies evolved under
joint control and formed the nucleus of the East African High
Commission, established in 1948, and later renamed the East
African Common Services Organization. Until 1965 a common
currency, the East African shilling, was the legal tender in the three
countries as well as in Aden and Zanzibar. Arguably, these were
the first attempts to create economic integration, although
admittedly under British colonial sponsorship. During the
nationalist struggles for political independence between the 1950s
and the early 1960s, calls for an East African Federation were

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East Ąfrican Community: The Challenges Ahed

strongly voiced. This was never achieved, and the three colonies -
Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya - became independent in 1961,
1962, and 1963 respectively.

The second attempt to consolidate East African co-operation was a


result of Uganda and Tanganyika's complaints concerning losses
accrued by the virtue of their membership in the common market.
In 196 1, as a result of the Report of the East African Economic and
Fiscal Commission (the Raisman Commission), a scheme was
suggested to redistribute tax revenue as a means to make good for
the loss of revenue for the competing partners. In 1964, when all
three countries were already politically independent, the Kampala
Agreement was negotiated with the main aim of decreasing trade
deficits and the industrial imbalance between Tanzania and Uganda,
on the one hand, and Kenya, on other. Unfortunately, the agreement
did not take off, partly because Kenya never ratified it, insisting,
among other things, that the single currency be maintained in East
Africa, a condition that was unacceptable to the other partners. In
June 1966 Tanzania created its own central bank and publicly
announced plans to introduce its own currency. A period of
deterioration in East African co-operation followed.

The third attempt to foster economic integration in East Africa


occurred on December 1, 1967 when the Treaty for East African
Co-operation, anchored on three broad categories - economic policy,
common institutions, and a common market - was signed in
Kampala, Uganda. The treaty was, essentially, founded upon the
goal of a more equal distribution of the benefits of economic
integration and accepted that free trade was not beneficial to the
three East African countries. Indeed, the Treaty advocated a
restricted trade (e.g. imposition of transfer tax system) for short-
term goals, but with a longer-term objective of eventually moving to
free trade within a common market arrangement.

In 1977 the East African Community collapsed, almost a decade


after it was established. In 1984 the three countries signed an
agreement for the division of the assets and liabilities of the former
East African Community. Ironically, it was during the division of
assets and liabilities that the three states agreed to explore and
identify future areas of cooperation, thus providing the genesis for
the current effort. However, with regard to the current effort to
promote regional integration, a haunting question remains: will
history repeat itself?

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Mohabe Nyirabu

The New East African Community


On 30th November 1993, the heads of state of Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania met in Arusha, Tanzania, and signed an agreement to
revive co-operation among the three states - 16 years after the
collapse of the East African Community, and nine years after the
countries agreed on the division of assets and liabilities. This meeting
was pursuant to Article 14.02 of The East African Community
Mediation Agreement of 1984, which provided for the exploration
and identification of areas of future co-operation. As a beginning,
the leaders established a Permanent Tripartite Commission for Co-
operation to promote co-operation in various fields, including
political, economic, social, cultural and security, among the states
for their mutual benefit. In addition, the leaders urged the
Commission to speed up the process of resolving outstanding issues
of the defunct East African Community, as stipulated in the East
African Community Mediation Agreement of 1984 (United Republic
of Tanzania (URT), 1993).

On 14 March 1996, the Secretariat for the Permanent Commission


was launched with the headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. In April
1998 the Secretariat circulated a Draft Treaty for the Establishment
of the East African Community for debate by East Africans. On 30
November 1999, President Moi of Kenya, President Museveni of
Uganda, and President Mkapa of Tanzania finally signed the Treaty
establishing the East African Community. On 15 January 2001
the East African Treaty was officially launched in Arusha after
ratification by the three countries. To further the process of
consolidating integration efforts, the three presidents inaugurated
the East African Legislative Assembly, and the East African Court
of Appeal on 30 November 200 1 .

A careful reading of the Treaty suggests that gradualism is the


strategy to realize its aims. The principles that govern the
institutional decision-making call for political consensus among
the partner states. In evaluating the prospects of the new East
African Community, a retrospective examination of integration
efforts in East Africa is necessary to do justice to the question: how
are the East African states going to prevent a repeat performance
of the past? The experiences of African undertakings in regional
integration suggest that national performances will be affected by
both global and internal factors.

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East African Community: The Challenges Ahed

The Global Scene


Of course, prediction is most hazardous, and only the foolhardy
would presume to be forecasting confidently the new shape of the
East African co-operation in this increasingly globalized world. These
are hard times for regional integration schemes in Africa. This is
not the first time that African leaders have shown an interest in
regionalism. The record on implementation has been as
disappointing as has the general performance of African economies
since independence. To a large extent, East African co-operation
will be shaped by developments at three interrelated levels: global
economy, regional economy, and individual member state's
economy.

The new East African Community is being created at a time of


enormous change in the international system that is dominated by
post-cold war era politics and globalisation. The overriding influence
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the
regional economy and the resource constraints faced by East African
countries has necessitated the adoption of structural adjustment
programs and reforms. These are to a large extent defining the
parameters in which issues of regional integration and cooperation
have to be discussed. Globalisation for Africa is not a new
phenomenon, but the continuation of developments that have been
in train for some considerable time. It is a process that can be
traced to the end of the 19th century during the growth of monopoly
capitalism where, for example, the economies of Africa were
integrated into, and exploited by, the capitalist system as colonies.
Thus, despite winning politiceli independence, African countries have
never convincingly been able to address the economic problems of
the African continent (Amoako, 2001).

Current discourse on globalisation refers to a process, which


progressively integrates national commodity, capital, financial and
currency markets into a single global market, operating according
to a set of rules in which transnational corporations, multi-lateral
institutions, and the governments of advanced industrialised
countries are in the driver's seat in the context of huge technological
developments, particularly in information and communications.
These developments have transformed the way in which the
dominant forces in the global economy define their interests outside
their home base. Among others, globalisation seeks to ensure access
to cheap raw materials, removal of barriers, free movement of
commodities and capital across national borders, and free location

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Mohcúje Nyiràbu

of production processes in any part of the world. Of critical


importance to note here is that the East African countries face
pressures through the rules of the World Trade Organisation and
the conditionalities of international financial institutions to go along
with this process. In short, regional cooperation in East Africa will
be pursued within the parameters of global capitalism, with further
regional marginalisation on the agenda.

A decade ago, the South Commission Report noted that the world
is in a process of rapid transition in which political alignments,
economic systems, and social values are being transformed. The
bottom .me of these changes is the acceleration of scientific and
technological advancement, which has propelled the move toward
globalisation. Increasing globalisation has, in particular, been
characterised by the growing role of transnational corporations aided
by growth in international private financial flows. As a result, direct
foreign investment is influencing both the location of exporters and
trade patterns. An important message put across is that
technological differences are a fundamental force in national
development. Like so much that is apparent, Africa gains only
marginally, and in some cases the trends are negative (South
Commission, 1990).

Furthermore, significant developments in the global trading system


have resulted in the creation of powerful trading blocs, which present
challenges to Africa's trade prospects. These include the European
Union, whose countries have moved closer to unity after a series of
treaties. EU enlargement profoundly changes previous trading
arrangements particularly the Lome Conventions that have shaped
relations with Africa for the past thirty years (Gibb, 2000). Following
the collapse of the Soviet communist system, a new dimension has
been created. In the past, some African countries enjoyed being
wooed by cold war blocks but with the enlargement of the EU trading
bloc and its increasing attention to Eastern Europe, it is likely that
this will lead to further EU disengagement from the African scene.
Africa is progressively viewed as high risk with undeveloped financial
markets and poor infrastructure.

The Ekist African Condition


An important lesson that has to be deduced from the history of
East African cooperation is the relevance of political reform as the
basis for effective economic reform. A democratic political consensus
is essential for the successful initiation and consummation of
workable regional integration. A stable foundation for legitimate

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East African Community: The Challenges Ahed

and formal democratic procedures provides a climate in which


longer-term economic reforms can be pursued. Despite the eloquent
articulation of multi-partyism, the state in East Africa is neo-colonial
and a politically independent entity within a basically unchanged
economic system. It therefore makes sense to argue that political
leadership can only pursue the people's interest by adopting a
development strategy that must begin by addressing inherited
institutions. To put it differently, unless the structure of the state
is changed, the created regional arrangement will not flourish to
serve the interests of East Africans.

If there is any lesson to be learnt from previous East African


experience it is the lack of popular participation or empowerment
of the people effectively in structures and in designing policies and
programmes. Participation is dependent on the nature of the state,
and the ability of a government to respond to popular demands.
The fact is that the state in Africa has not yielded political space for
people's participation. Consequently, there is a need to involve civil
society, galvanize and tap people's energy, and promote
accountability in the new East African Community.

The experience of the defunct East African Community


demonstrated that the institution depended on national political
leaders: heads of state, cabinet ministers, members of parliament,
and political appointees. However, the fact is that politicians are
sometimes more concerned with short-termism: public image,
amassing power, political clientelism, and wealth accumulation. In
the words of Gasarasi (1992):
"African economic co-operation is a long-term matter. The
principal agents of such a long-term project ought not to be
politicians, lest it be trivialised and overshadowed by their
mundane culture: ceremonials, whim, rhetoric, manipulation,
intrigue, etc. When conflict breaks out between two or more
African political leaders, one of the areas, which suffer, is
economic co-operation."
To continue to assume that politicians will champion economic co-
operation is to forget the lessons of history. It may be recalled that
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania refused to sit at the same table with
Iddi Amin of Uganda at a critical time for the survival of the defunct
East African Community. Suppose politicians' interests are selfish?
In a way, President Moi's past call on politicians in Kenya is indicative
of what politicians can or cannot do.

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Mohabe Nyirabu

"I call on all Ministers, Assistant Ministers and every other person
to sing like parrots on issues I have mentioned. During Kenyatta's
period, I persistently sang the Kenyatta tune until people said
this fellow has nothing to say except sing for Kenyatta. I say I
didn't have ideas of my own. Who was I to have my own ideas? I
was in Kenyatta's shoes and, therefore, I had to sing whatever
Kenyatta wanted. If I had sung another song, do you think
Kenyatta would have left me alone? Therefore, you ought to sing
the song I sing. If I put a full stop, you should also put a full
stop. This is how this country will move forward. The day you
will become a big person, you will have the liberty to sing your
song and everybody else will sing it" (Akivaga, 1993). ,
Suppose President Moi's song did not have a favourable verse on
The East African Community? Would other politicians in Kenya
compose a favourable East African song? The real issue here is
whether we should always accept the claim by politicians that they
are working for the interests of the people, and therefore entrust
them with the task of building a new community.

Indeed the case of Tanzania is also illustrative and interesting.


During Nyerere's presidency, politicians sang the song of Ujamaa
(African socialism) for two decades. When Mwinyi became the
president in 1985, politicians sang a different song of liberalization,
marketisation and privatisation until Mwinyi's term ended in 1995.
When President Mkapa came into power, the song of reform and
foreign investment was composed. Although the monolithic system
is slowly giving way to a pluralist tradition, the only competition
that is on the agenda is capturing state power. As for Kenya, the
current "majimboism" debate (creation of regional governments more
or less based on ethnicity) is an indicator of political determination
to cling to power. Indeed, even the return to monarchical traditions
in Uganda is an effort to create political space to hold on to state
power.

This view strengthens the argument that new efforts towards co-
operation have to begin by exploding the myth that politicians should
have the monopoly in overseeing co-operative undertakings. Clearly,
the new wave of co-operation would have to empower other actors
"'n the political arena. This shift not only results from the limited
intellectual exposure of politicians, but is due to changes in East
African behaviour which have, on important occasions, eroded faith

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EcLSt African Community: The Challenges Ahed

in the usefulness of politicians. In short, the issue is the domination


of politics by the manipulation of state resources that form the
base on which patron-client networks are constructed for the
purpose of political hegemony and legitimacy. The result is the
transformation of the state into self-serving prebendai institutions,
giving rise to the personalisation of leadership and authoritarianism
(Francois, 1991).

There is also a concern about the conflict between community goals


and individual state goals. A major reason suggested for the collapse
of the East African Community in 1977 was the lack of reconciliation
of individual state sovereign desires and community desires. The
argument here is that one of the basic problems of regional
integration schemes is that the economic costs of participation for
members can be immediate, while the economic benefits normally
accrue only after a long period, are uncertain and, in most cases,
unevenly shared among member states. Typically, the costs include
a decrease in government revenues when tariffs are reduced.
Another common cost is the possibility of the collapse of local firms
as they find their survival difficult because they are unable to
compete with firms from other member countries, resulting in a
loss of income and employment. For example, in the new formulation
of the current treaty, Tanzania insisted on the exclusion of trade
protocols before signing the treaty, partly because of its dependence
on import duties for government revenue (up to 33 percent). It is
this revenue concern that explains why Tanzania has been reluctant
to ratify the double tax requirement (The East African, 2001). This
kind of situation leads to the perception that the poorer members
of an integration scheme are losing opportunities for
industrialization, and therefore demand some form of compensation.

In light of this, current efforts must not overlook deep-seated and


long-standing rivalries in development among the three countries.
No doubt, these rivalries are rooted in the conception that national
economic development is a zero-sum game. During the defunct East
African Community days, this point was well-articulated by Dr.
Gikonyo Kiano, then Kenya's Commerce and Industry Minister:
"Every time we wanted to take a decision, a firm decision in the
field of economics, we had to get the approval directly or indirectly
from our neighbours, and if they did not believe the way we did,
well that just had to be put on the shelf' (Hazlewood, 1975).
There is no doubt that the pace of regional cooperation was
stonewalled by the absence of strong institutions with powers to

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Mohabe Nyirabu

enforce collective decisions, including the provisions of the treaty.


For example, if there was one member that did not agree, decisions
on the issues were postponed until a consensus was reached. This
meant that those countries that moved the slowest dictated the
speed of economic integration. This excuse would go on year in and
out to the downright dissatisfaction of states honouring decisions.
Indeed, among other things, the failure to honour decisions led to
the disintegration of East African Community (Chussi, 2000).

ł must be emphasized that the other context in which East African


community will be developed will also depend on the general regional
economy. First, it has to take into account other integration schemes
in the region such as the Common Market for East and Southern
Africa (COMESA) to which Uganda and Kenya belong but from which
Tanzania withdrew in 2001; the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), in which only Tanzania is a member and the
Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in which
Kenya and Uganda are members. Because of this, there is the issue
of multiple loyalties. Tanzania's recent decision to withdraw from
COMESA is a clear expression of conflicting multiple loyalties. In
the words of Hon Jakaya Kikwete, then Tanzania's Minister for
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation:

"We were faced with the option of either getting out of SADC or
COMESA.... We therefore opted to pull out of COMESA because
we have already invested so much in SADC.... We opted to stay
in SADC because unlike COMESA whose thrust is to create a
common market for selling goods, SADC's emphasis is to develop
capacity building for producing goods" (The Guardian, 1999).

Against these factors it must be accentuated that the dismantling


of apartheid in South Africa and the emergence of a new democratic
South Africa has brought in an important actor in regional politics.
Recently, Rowlands has pointed out that on the important measures
of national power - people, land, military might and economic activity
and knowledge - South Africa's dominance is beyond question in
the region. For example, it accounts for almost 75% of the goods
and services produced in SADC (Rowlands, 1998). A major reason
for South Africa's dominance is because of a more diversified
production structure leading to complementarity between South
Africa and hei neighbouring countries. Indeed, South African's
presence in Tanzania led one newspaper. The East African, to
proclaim "the South Africanization of the Tanzanian economy."

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East African Community: The Challenges Ahed

South Africa's decision to join SADC was strategy based on the


emphasis on investment and industrial integration of the region
rather than on market integration preferred by COMESA. In short,
the East African region should be ready for both regional and
international competition.

It may be rather disheartening to note that there is a belief among


East African political leaders that integration efforts should be
anchored in lowering tariffs. But, at the very least, a case can be
made that the existence of tariffs is not the sole, or even the primary
impediment to trade among the countries of East Africa. In a major
respect, the reason for the low level of trade is found in the economic
structures of the countries. The economies of virtually all of them
are directed to the export of primary produce, and the import of
manufactured goods. By and large, the countries cannot satisfy
the import requirements of an East African country, and therefore
intra-regional trade as a proportion of total trade is very small.

Table 1: EAC Countries - Selected Basic Indicators


Pop- Area GDP in GNP per Total Main Perce
ulation in sq million capita $ Debt $ export ntage
km $ 1999 billion Commo value
(000s) dities of debt
to export

Kenya 29.84 580 9095 327 6,893 Tea, coffee 177


fruits,
vegetables

Tanzania 32 945 3602 251 7,603 Tea, coffee, 484


cotton,

Uganda 22 236 5655 308 3,674 Coffee, 492

Source: Jubilee 2000 UK, 2000.


Note: *According to The World Bank, if a country's ratio of its
external debt to its export of goods and services is more
than 275%, then it is severely indebted and this meets one
criterion for classification as a HIPC.

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Mohabe Nyiràbu

It is clear from Table 1 that the present economic situation in East


Africa is not very conducive to integration and expansion of intra-
regional trade. The three economies are not complementary: they
produce the same range of primary commodities exported to the
industrialized countries, and import manufactured goods; leaving
a shaky foundation for intra-regional trade. Second, the wave of
liberalisation, privatisation, reforms and the adoption of structural
adjustment programmes will have an important bearing on the
process of integration. Unfortunately, much of the required economic
adjustment such as civil service retrenchment and further jobs cuts
in the wake of privatisation entails dislocations with a high potential
of creating instability. Conversely, if these countries do not follow
reforms agreed with the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund expeditiously, they face the prospect of losing any access to
external resources, including debt rescheduling.

The other factor to note from the Table 1 is that Kenya, Tanzania,
and Uganda are classified as High Indebted Poor Countries.
Furthermore, these countries are ranked 123rd, 140th, and 141st
respectively out of 162 countries in the 2001 Human Development
Index (a composite of three basic components of human
development: longevity, knowledge and standard of living) compiled
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2001). What
all this means is that the road to regional integration will not be an
easy one.

As with global and regional developments, what happens at the


national level is critical to achieving regional integration. This
includes peace and political stability, provision of reliable and
adequate infrastructure, and sound management of the economy.
It is true that the Kampala Forum on Security, Stability,
Development and Cooperation in Africa acknowledged that every
African state is sovereign. However, the document pointed out that
the security, stability and development of every African country is
inseparably linked with those of neighbouring countries (Africa
Report, 1991). In short, the instability of one African country is
likely to affect the stability of another African country.

Another point that needs attention is Fukuyama's observation on


efforts towards successful business. According to Fukuyama,
successful business needs a series of supportive underlying
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East African Community: The Challenges Ahed

attitudes including trust, reciprocity and mutuality - and these


attitudes are at the veiy foundation of the development process. If
these attitudes are present, economic growth and political
democracy can be expected; where they are absent, economic
atrophy and authoritarian rule are likely (Fukuyama, 1995).
Fukuyama's observation should be viewed in light of the pervasive
corruption problem in the East African countries. According to the
Corruption Perception Index 2001 that reflects the degree to which
corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians,
Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda scores 2.2, 2, 1.9 respectively out of 10
(highly clean). Out of 91 countries ranked, Tanzania, Kenya, and
Uganda are viewed as being more corrupt and are ranked 82nd,
84th, and 88th respectively ( Business Times, 2001). To achieve
successful results in overall development, this negative factor must
be overcome.

Lessons from Past Experience


After some postponing, the essential framework for the East African
Community has at last been put in place. The challenge now is to
give content to the Treaty. At the signing ceremonies of the East
African Treaty, the three presidents gave good speeches. Can these
leaders, who were not at the helm of leadership at the creation of
the first East African Community, confound the pessimists about
East African co-operation? In the light of what has been discussed
above, one may argue that if the above issues can be resolved,
those enthusiastic for co-operation might hope for an advance to
further East African co-operation. For the moment, the Treaty
suggests three possible future roads: closer economic integration,
movement toward an East African Federation, or building common
institutions.

The institutional road looks the least promising. The daring ideas
of the early days of the East African Community were right when
national sentiments were not very strong among East Africans.
Today, nobody would take seriously the notion of a East African
Legislative Assembly or the various East African Corporations as a
nucleus for further integration in East Africa. The existing East
African Legislative Assembly comprising 27 members and three ex-
officio members, which was inaugurated on 30 November 2001, is
viewed as a key organ to articulate the concerns of citizens and

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Mohabe Nyirabu

give legal direction. However, the manner in which members are


elected in their respective countries does not render them directly
accountable to the people. Rather, they are accountable to national
legislatures. Furthermore, as the Treaty stands now, it is clear that
the Assembly is given a mandate to discuss all matters pertaining
to the Community but is not empowered. The emphasized feature
in the Treaty is that the summit comprising the three presidents
and it retains the final authority in all matters. But as a strategy to
improve institutional capacity, the voice and partnership of the
public and other non-governmental actors should be
institutionalised to provide feedback to the states on their
performance.

Second, is greater political co-operation the likely road? Perhaps


this would be the best road to cement co-operation initiatives.
However, the spirit of the Treaty is the respect of the sovereignty of
the partner states. Obviously, it seems that states are reluctant to
surrender their sovereignty to a supranational organization. While
it is stated that the ultimate aim is to establish a political federation,
it should be emphasized that political will - discipline and
commitment to pursue and implement what has been agreed upon
and to accept decisions reached - will be much needed. If the
foundation is not well-built, what lies ahead could be political
disintegration (witness for example, the never ending debate in
Tanzania over the need to have a Tanganyika government).

The third road is through economic integration, and it is the one


that the East African leaders agreed to pursue when they signed
the Treaty for the establishment of the East African Community.
The defunct East African Community was still had a long way to
march to an East African Common Market, although it had a
program to smash the uncommon market. In the current
arrangement the aim is to have a customs union by 2004, and create
tariff free regional trade with a common external tariff. This is a
tough call in view of the feeling that Kenya has the advantage over
Tanzania and Uganda in trade terms. Indeed, in October 2001
Tanzania announced more goods that will attract a 20% duty
charged over and above the preferential tariff rates in force among
the three partner states ( Family Mirror, 2001). The experience gained
indicates that the best way to create a genuine common market is
not to rely on harmonisation of trading rules alone. These measures
have to be accompanied by policies to increase the productivity of

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East African Community: The Challenges Ahed

goods among the trading partners. In short, a credible viable and


fundamental transformation of their national orders is required and,
thereafter, it might be possible to talk of transforming the region
through co-operation and integration.

Conclusion
This paper presented an overview of the new effort to develop regional
cooperation among the three East African countries. The first
conclusion is that while the creation of the East African Community
is in line with the overall objectives of the African Economic
Community in terms of consolidating cooperation with a view to
bringing about equitable development and thereby uplifting the
living standards of East Africans, promoting the sustainable
utilisation of the region's resources and maintenance of peace and
security in the region: the challenges ahead have to be faced with
political will and commitment. This is the message contained in the
words of the three East African presidents but which have been
lacking in the past. Secondly, past economic practice is not
encouraging. Therefore the current optimism that creating a trade
regime to remove tariffs will lead to increased trade integration is
not convincing.

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