REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SPS.

ILDEFONSO ALEJANDRE AND

ZENAIDA FERRER ALEJANDRE, RESPONDENTS.

The Facts

The CA Decision narrates the antecedents as follows:

On July 18, 1991, Spouses Alejandre (applicants-spouses, for brevity) filed an application for the
registration of Lot No. 6487 under P.D. No. 1529, described in plan Ap-CAR-000007, Cad-536, with
an area of 256 square meters. They alleged that they are the owners of the subject property by
virtue of a deed of sale or conveyance; that the subject property was sold to them by its former
owner Angustia Lizardo Taleon by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on June 20, 1990; that
the said land is presently occupied by the applicants-spouses.

On September 16, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Republic, entered
its appearance.

On November 12, 1991, the Land Registration Authority (LRA, for brevity) submitted a Report
noting that there were discrepancies in the plan submitted by the applicant spouses, which
discrepancies were referred to the Lands Management Sector for verification and correction.

On January 30, 1992, the trial court issued an order of general default and allowed the
applicants-spouses to present their evidence.

On July 20, 1992, the trial court granted the applicant spouses' motion to submit original tracing
cloth plan and technical description for purposes of facilitating the approval of the re-surveyed plans
as well as the submission of the new plan for the scrutiny and approval of the LRA.

On August 10, 1992, the applicants-spouses filed their Formal Offer of Evidence. On April 26,
1993, they submitted the corrected advance plan and technical description to the trial court.

On August 20, 1993, the LRA submitted its Supplementary Report stating that the "polygon does
not close" even after the corrections effected on the bearings and distances of the technical
description were made. Hence, the LRA requested for reverification and correction.

In an Order dated December 10, 1997, the trial court deemed the case submitted for decision.

Subsequently, or on April 15, 1998, the LRA submitted its Final Report stating that it applied the
corrected technical description of the subject lot and no more discrepancy exists, however, the area
was increased by six (6) meters. As such, on August 24, 1998, the trial court ordered the submission
of publication of the amended or new technical description. On May 6, 2000, the trial court issued
another Notice setting the case for Initial Hearing on July 25, 2000.

On June 1, 2000, the Republic filed its Opposition to the application based on the following
grounds: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June
12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), x x x as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073); (2) that applicants failed to adduce any
muniment of title and/or the tax declarations with the petition to evidence bona fide acquisition of the
land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; that the tax declaration adverted to
in the petition does not appear to be genuine and the tax declaration indicates pretended possession
of applicants to be of recent vintage[;] and (3) that the subject property applied for is a portion of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private
appropriation.

After trial, the trial court rendered its Decision dated March 31, 2006 granting the application for
registration of title, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the application to be well-taken and the
same is hereby granted.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Land Registration Authority, Office of the Solicitor
General and Bureau of Lands.

SO ORDERED."

On June 12, 2008, the trial court issued the Amended Decision which increased the area subject
for land registration to two hundred sixty-two square meters (262 sqm) from two hundred fifty-six
square meters (256 sqm) from the original decision.

Disagreeing with the trial court's grant of the application for land registration, the Republic
interposed [an] appeal [to the CA].5

Ruling of the CA

The CA in its Decision6 dated February 27, 2015 denied the appeal of the Republic. The
dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Amended
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2, is SUSTAINED.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA justified that based on the allegations of the applicants spouses Ildefonso Alejandre and
Zenaida Ferrer Alejandre (respondents) in their application for land registration and subsequent
pleadings, they come under paragraph 4 of Section 14, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 15298 - those
who have acquired ownership of lands in any manner provided for by law - because they acquired
the land in question by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on June 20, 19909 from Angustia
Alejandre Taleon who acquired the land from her mother by inheritance.10

The Republic filed the instant Petition without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA on
the ground that the CA decided the Republic's appeal in gross disregard of the law and in a manner
not in accordance with the applicable decisions of the Court.11

Respondents filed their "Comment and Compliance"12 dated July 18, 2016. The Republic filed a
Reply13 dated March 3, 2017.

The Issue
 The Petition raises this sole issue: whether the CA seriously misappreciated the facts as well as
made findings which are inconsistent with, or not supported by, the evidence on record; and gravely
misapplied the applicable laws and jurisprudence.14

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The RTC Amended Decision justified the granting of the application for land registration under
the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) on these factual findings:

It appears from the evidence presented that the applicants acquired the property sought to be
registered by means of a Deed of Absolute Sale [dated June 20, 1990 (Exh. "K" to "K5")] executed
by Angustia Alejandre Taleon as vendor in favor of the petitioners spouses Ildefonso Alejandre and
Zenaida F. Alejandre as vendees. Said property was previously inherited by the vendor from her late
mother Angustia Alejandre who inherited the same property from Don Santiago Alejandre, the
grandfather of the applicant Dr. Ildefonso Alejandre.15

The CA sustained the RTC Amended Decision in this wise:

Under Section 14 of PD No. 1529, there are four (4) types of applicants who may apply for
registration of title to land[,] viz[.]:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. (Italics
and Emphasis Ours)

In the case at bar, basing from the allegations of the applicants spouses in their application for
land registration and subsequent pleadings, clearly, they come under Paragraph 4 of the quoted
section and not under Paragraph 1 of the same section. It is undisputed that they acquired the land
in question by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on June 20, 1990 from Angustia Alejandre
Taleon who acquired the land from her mother by inheritance. In other words, the applicant spouses
acquired ownership over Lot 6487 through a contract of sale, which is well within the purview of
Paragraph 4 of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529.

As a consequence, the requirement of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession

and/or occupation in the concept of an owner has no application in the case at bar. Not even the
 requirement that the land applied for should have been declared disposable and alienable applies
considering that this is just one of the requisites to be proven when applicants for land registration
fall under Paragraph 1 of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, which is not the case at bar.16

The Republic argues that under the law, citing Section 24 of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141,17 as amended by Section 4 of PD 1073,18 before an applicant can
register his title over a particular parcel of land, he must show that: (a) he, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and (b) the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.19

The Republic also argues, citing Republic v. Sayo,20 Director of Lands v. IAC21 and Director of
Lands v. Aquino,22 that in land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming
the presumption that the land sought to be registered belongs to the public domain or the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain.23

Citing Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,24 the Republic further posits that to prove that the subject
land is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports
of Bureau of Land investigators, and a legislative act or a statute, declaring the land as already
alienable and disposable.25

Pursuant to Article 419 of the Civil Code, property, in relation to the person to whom it belongs,
is either of public dominion or of private ownership. As such, properties are owned either in a public
capacity (dominio publico) or in a private capacity (propiedad privado).26

There are three kinds of property of public dominion: (1) those intended for public use; (2) those
intended for some public service; and (3) those intended for the development of national wealth. This
is provided in Article 420 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

With respect to provinces, cities and municipalities or local government units (LGUs), property
for public use "consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities."27

In turn, the Civil Code classifies property of private ownership into three categories: (1)
patrimonial property of the State under Articles 421 and 422; (2) patrimonial property of LGUs under
Article 424; and (3) property belonging to private individuals under Article 425, hence:

ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property.
 ART. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

xxxx

ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades,
and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

ART. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.

From the foregoing, property of private ownership or patrimonial property of the State may be
sub-classified into:

(1) "By nature or use" or those covered by Article 421, which are not property of public dominion
or imbued with public purpose based on the State's current or intended use; and

(2) "By conversion" or those covered by Article 422, which previously assumed the nature of
property of public dominion by virtue of the State's use, but which are no longer being used
or intended for said purpose. Since those properties could only come from property of public
dominion as defined under Article 420, "converted" patrimonial property of the State are
separate from and not a subset of patrimonial property "by nature or use" under Article 421.

With respect to lands, which are immovable property pursuant to Article 415(1) of the Civil Code,
they can either be lands of public dominion or of private ownership following the general
classification of property under Article 419.

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, classifies
lands of the public domain into five categories - agricultural lands, forest lands, timber lands, mineral
lands, and national parks. The provision states:

SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 mandates that only lands classified as agricultural may be declared alienable, and
thus susceptible of private ownership. As the connotative term suggests, the conversion of land of
⚖ - ℒαɯρhi ৷

the public domain into alienable and disposable opens the latter to private ownership.28 At that point
(i.e., upon the declaration of alienability and disposability), the land ceases to possess the
characteristics inherent in properties of public dominion that they are outside the commerce of man,
cannot be acquired by prescription, and cannot be registered under the land registration law,29 and
accordingly assume the nature of patrimonial property of the State that is property owned by the
State in its private capacity.

As noted by Justice Edgardo L. Paras:

 It is believed that forest and mining lands are properties of public dominion of the third class, i.e.,
properties for the development of the national wealth. Upon the other hand, the public agricultural
lands before being made available to the general public should also be properties of public dominion
for the development of the national wealth (and as such may not be acquired by prescription); but
after being made so available, they become patrimonial property of the State, and therefore subject
to prescription. Moreover, once already acquired by private individuals, they become private
property. x x x30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, it can be gathered from the foregoing that the subject of the land registration application
under Section 14 of PD 1529 is either alienable and disposable land of public domain or private land.
While Section 14(4) does not describe or identify the kind of land unlike in (1), which refer to
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain;" (2), which refer to "private lands"; and (3)
"private lands or abandoned river beds," the land covered by (4) cannot be other than alienable and
disposable land of public domain, i.e., public agricultural lands31 and private lands or lands of
private ownership in the context of Article 435.

This premise proceeds from the well-entrenched rule that all lands not appearing to be clearly of
private dominion or ownership presumptively belong to the State.32 Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been classified, reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to
a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable lands of public domain.33 Therefore, the
onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.34

Respondents, based on the evidence that they adduced, are apparently claiming ownership over
the land subject of their application for registration by virtue of tradition, as a consequence of the
contract of sale, and by succession in so far as their predecessors-in-interest are concerned. Both
modes are derivative modes of acquiring ownership. Yet, they failed to prove the nature or
classification of the land. The fact that they acquired the same by sale and their transferor by
succession is not incontrovertible proof that it is of private dominion or ownership. In the absence of
such incontrovertible proof of private ownership, the well-entrenched presumption arising from
the Regalian doctrine that the subject land is of public domain or dominion must be overcome.
Respondents failed to do this.

The real property tax declarations (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 20, 1990 (Exhibit "K" to "K5"), and the technical descriptions of the subject property
(Exhibit "J") are insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the land subject of
the registration is inalienable land of public domain or dominion. Thus, respondents'
application for land registration should not have been granted.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 27, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101259 and the Amended Decision dated June 12, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2 in LRC Case No. N-20 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents' application for registration in LRC Case No. N-20 is DISMISSED without
prejudice.

SO ORDERED.