Court of Appeal Chancery Division 21 December 1880 21 December 1880

[1880 S. 1184.] (1880-81) L.R. 16 Ch. D. 544

James , Cotton , and Lush , L. JJ. Jessel , M.R. 1880 Dec. 18, 21 1880 Dec. 4 PracticeActionMotionAppointing Receiver after Final JudgmentWhether New Action necessaryCause or Matter pending Judicature Act, 1873, s. 24 Rules of Court, 1875, Order XLII. BankruptcyExecution CreditorEquitable ExecutionReceiver Bankruptcy Act, 1869(32 & 33 Vict. c. 71), s. 95, subs. 2; s. 125, subs. 5 . Held, by the Master of the Rolls, that so long as the final judgment in an action remains unsatisfied, the action is a cause or matter pending within the meaning of sect. 24, sub-sect. 7, of the Judicature Act, 1873 , and that consequently, in an action by a creditor against a debtor in which the Plaintiff has obtained final judgment, the Court has power, under that subsection, in order to satisfy the judgment, to grant equitable execution against the Defendant by appointing a receiver upon motion in that action, although the writ may not have been indorsed with a claim for a receiver; it being unnecessary in such case to bring another action for the purpose. S. recovered judgment for a debt against C. and issued an elegit . The *545 sheriff returned that the debtor had no lands which he could seize. C. had leasehold property which was subject to mortgages. S. thereupon obtained the appointment of a receiver of the rents of the leasehold property without prejudice to the rights of the prior incumbrancers. On the same day a petition for adjudication in bankruptcy was filed against C. , and a receiver was appointed in bankruptcy a few minutes before the appointment of the receiver in the action. C. afterwards filed a petition for liquidation, the same receiver was appointed in the liquidation as had been appointed in the bankruptcy, and resolutions were passed for liquidation of his

affairs by arrangement. S. had not, until some day after the appointment of his receiver, any notice that C. had committed an act of bankruptcy, or that any proceedings in bankruptcy were pending against him: Held, by the Master of the Rolls and by the Court of Appeal, that as, at the time when S. obtained equitable execution by the appointment of a receiver, the property was legally though not actually in the possession of the receiver appointed by the Court of Bankruptcy, the equitable execution was ineffectual, and was not protected by sect. 95, sub-sect. 2, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 . THIS was an action commenced by Salt and others against Cooper in the Queen's Bench Division for goods sold and delivered, and on the 2nd of September, 1880, judgment was signed for 165 14s., and costs. On the same day a writ of elegit was issued, and lodged with the sheriff of Yorkshire . It appeared that all Cooper's property was in mortgage, the mortgagees being in possession, and the sheriff returned that there were no lands, goods, or chattels which he could seize. The Plaintiffs, on the 14th of September, obtained from Mr. Justice Stephen , sitting in Chambers, an order appointingCorbidge to be a receiver of the rents and profits of Cooper's leasehold property, such appointment to be without prejudice to the rights of any prior incumbrancers, and if any prior incumbrancer was in possession, then without prejudice to such possession. The writ in the action did not claim a receiver. On the same 14th of September a petition for adjudication in bankruptcy against Cooper was filed in the county Court at Huddersfield by a creditor, grounded on an act of bankruptcy committed on the 13th of September, and on the same day Carter was appointed receiver and manager by an order of the County Court. The mortgagees shortly afterwards sold the property, and a surplus remained in their hands after payment of the mortgage *546 debts. Previously to the sale, and before the commencement of the liquidation proceedings, both receivers had given notice of their appointments to the mortgagees. On the 24th of September Cooper filed a petition for liquidation, and on the next day Carter was appointed receiver in the liquidation. On the 18th of October resolutions for liquidation by arrangement were passed, and trustees were appointed. The bankruptcy petition was not further proceeded with. The Plaintiffs had no notice until the 29th of September of the bankruptcy petition or of the liquidation proceedings, or of Cooper's having committed any act of bankruptcy. On the 23rd of October an order was made transferring the action to the Chancery Division, and attaching it to the Court of the Master of the Rolls, and on the 29th of

October an order was made adding the trustees in liquidation as parties to the proceedings. On the 3rd of November the Plaintiffs gave notice of motion that the order appointing Corbidge receiver might, if and so far as necessary, be extended, so as to enable him to receive all surplus moneys in the hands of the mortgagees arising from the sale of the Defendant's leasehold estates, after payment of all moneys due on their securities, and that the receiver might be directed out of such moneys to pay to the Plaintiffs their debt and costs, and to pay the balance to the trustees under the liquidation. The motion was heard before the Master of the Rolls on the 4th of December, 1880. In the course of the argument on the motion before the Master of the Rolls, a discussion arose as to which of the two receivers was appointed first on the 14th of September. It was proved by affidavit that the order appointing the bankruptcy receiver was made by the County Court at a quarter to four in the afternoon, and it was ultimately admitted by the Plaintiffs' counsel that Mr. Justice Stephen's order appointing the Plaintiffs' receiver was made not earlier than four o'clock. Ince , Q.C., and W. Fooks , for the Plaintiffs, contended that the appointment of their receiver operated as a good delivery in execution: *547 Rules of Court, 1875, Order XLII.; Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies 1 ; Hatton v. Haywood 2 ; Ex parte Evans 3 . Macnaghten , Q.C., and Oswald , for the trustees in liquidation: We submit that the appointment of the Plaintiffs' receiver was irregular, for a receiver cannot be appointed after final judgment, and here the Plaintiffs did not ask for a receiver by their writ. In Colebourne v. Colebourne 4 ViceChancellor Hall held that the writ should be indorsed with a claim for a receiver where that is a substantial object of the action: though the point seems to have been considered an open one in Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies . There is no instance of the old Court of Chancery having made an order in a suit for payment of money, and then having, in the same suit, appointed a receiver. To obtain a receiver it was necessary to institute a new suit; and we submit that that practice has not been altered by the Judicature Acts. Moreover, the receiver here was appointed of the rents and profits only: the Plaintiffs cannot therefore now ask that he may receive the proceeds of sale. But there is another objectionand a fatal oneto the Plaintiffs' motion. It now appears that the bankruptcy receiver was appointed before the Plaintiffs' receiver: the title of the trustees in liquidation is the title of the receiver in bankruptcy, and relates back to the date of the act of bankruptcy. [They were stopped by the Court.] Ince , in reply:

I submit that the title of the receiver in bankruptcy ceased to exist when the resolutions for liquidation were passed; so that the title of our receiver then intervened. The liquidation proceedings were distinct from the bankruptcy proceedings, and commenced at the date of the appointment of trustees: Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 125, sub-s. 5 . As we had no notice of the bankruptcy at the time our receiver was appointed, our equitable execution was valid under sect. 95, sub-sect. 2 . Macnaghten :The title of the receiver in bankruptcy did not necessarily cease, for under the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, rule 260 , *548 the Court may, at any time after the presentation of a petition, allow any proceedings, whether in progress at the filing of the petition, or subsequently commenced, to proceed upon such terms as the Court may think just.

JESSEL, M.R.:
The present motion raises points of great importance, and, I must say, also of very great difficulty. The first question is, whether, in an action brought in the High Court of Justice, where judgment has been obtained against a debtor and it appears that the debtor is possessed of property, either freehold or leaseholdhere it is leaseholdwhich, by reason of the existence of a prior mortgage vesting the legal estate in some prior mortgagee, cannot be taken by the sheriff under a writ of elegit , the Court or the Division of the Court in which the action is brought can give what is called equitable execution, that is, can grant a receiver, on motion only in the original action; or whether it is absolutely necessary and indispensable that before making a motion for a receiver, there should be another piece of paper issued called a writ, with the same plaintiff and the same defendant, but indorsed with a claim for that equitable execution. That is the question I have to decide. It is by no means so trivial as it looks when so stated, because we must not forget that in our law in former times, and not so very long ago, formality produced enormous effects on men's rights. For instance, I need not mention in this Court the magical effect of a seal as regards the operation of writings on various interesting occasions. So that it by no means follows that this is an unimportant question, although, if decided one way, the only result would be that practitioners in future would expend the necessary 5s. for the purpose and issue a second writ: and, indeed, until the question is decided by the Court of Appeal, I should advise practitioners to do so, although my own opinion is that it is not necessary. The question really depends, in my opinion, upon the construction to be put on the Judicature Act of 1873 ; and in putting a construction upon that Act one must have regard to the purview of the Act, and especially to the expressed intention of the Legislature in passing it. I must, first of all, dispose of an argument *549 which has been addressed to me by counsel as to the application and effect of Order XLII of the Rules of Court, 1875. In the first place, I accede so far to that argument that I think Order XLII. does not affect this question at all. I think this Order meant to prescribe how execution may be issued by the parties. Though the Order does not

say so in so many words, you will see at once, on looking at it, that execution may be enforced in any of the modes in which the judgment might have been enforced at the time of the passing of the Act. Then you find what those modes of enforcement arewrit of possession, writ of sequestration, writ of attachment or committal: then, under rule 6, writs of execution are to include fieri facias, elegit , and all subsequent writs which may be issued for giving effect thereto; and then the rule goes on to say any such process, and so on, evidently referring, in my opinion, to the writs. Then we are thrown back upon the Act itself, and we must recollect, first of all, what the main object of the Act was. It is stated very plainly that the main object of the Act was to assimilate the transaction of Equity business and Common Law business by different Courts of Judicature. It has been sometimes inaccurately called the fusion of Law and Equity; but it was not any fusion, or anything of the kind; it was the vesting in one tribunal the administration of Law and Equity in every cause, action, or dispute which should come before that tribunal. That was the meaning of the Act. Then, as to that very small number of cases in which there is an actual conflict, it was decided that in all cases where the rules of Equity and Law were in conflict the rules of Equity should prevail. That was to be the mode of administering the combined jurisdiction, and that was the meaning of the Act. To carry that out, the Legislature did not create a new jurisdiction, but simply transferred the old jurisdictions of the Courts of Law and Equity to the new tribunal, and then gave directions to the new tribunal as to the mode in which it should administer the combined jurisdictions. That being the position of the tribunal, let us see what the directions were which were given to it. The new tribunal consisted of two divisions, the High Court of Justicethe Court of first instanceand the Court of Appeal. Now let us look, first of all, at sect. 24 , *550 which is the main section as to the combined jurisdiction. It says that, In every civil cause or matter commenced in the High Court of Justice, law and equity shall be administered by the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal respectively, according to the rules following: and so forth. Then it says (sub-sect. 1) that if a plaintiff or petitioner wants equitable relief, the said Courts respectively, and every Judge thereof, shall give to such plaintiff or petitioner such and the same relief as ought to have been given by the Court of Chancery in a suit or proceeding for the like purpose properly instituted before the passing of this Act. Then the 4th sub-section says the Courts shall take notice of all equitable estates, titles, rights, and so on; then the 6th says that the Courts shall give effect to legal rights; and then comes the 7th sub-section, which appears to me to have a very important bearing on the present question, and therefore I will read it. The High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal respectively, in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in them by this Act in every cause or matter pending before them respectively, shall have power to grant, and shall grant, either absolutely or on such reasonable terms and conditions as to them shall seem just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any and every legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them respectively in such cause or matter; so that, as far as possible, all matters so in controversy between the said parties respectively may be

completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters avoided. Those are very large terms. The clause clearly applies to any remedy whatever; for it says the Court shall grant all such remedies whatsoever. The claim must be brought forward in the cause, and must relate to the matter in dispute in the cause; but beyond that I see nothing to qualify the clear indication of intention that multiplicity of legal proceedings is to be avoided. I may mention also that it says distinctly, as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any and every legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them respectively in the cause or matter. It is not merely the original claim; it is any claim that may be brought forward in the matter; that is to say, *551 any claim as regards the cause or matter pending. A cause is still pending even though there has been final judgment given, and the Court has very large powers in dealing with a judgment until it is fully satisfied. It may stay proceedings on the judgment, either wholly or partially, and the cause is still pending, therefore, for this purpose, as it appears to me, and must be considered as pending, although there may have been final judgment given in the action, provided that judgment has not been satisfied. And, indeed, an interpretation has been put by the Court on the word proceedings in sub-sect. 5 of the same section with regard to a stay of proceedings in any cause or matter pending, namely, that that must, of course, be construed to mean a stay of execution on a judgment, although that judgment might not be satisfied; so that the party must apply in the cause or matter pending, and cannot bring a new action for the purpose. I think, therefore, that the words of the 7th sub-section are large enough to include the case before me. The case before me is simply this. It is an action for a money demand, in which the plaintiff asks a Court of Justice to compel the defendant, by means of legal process, to pay what is due to him. That is the meaning of the action. The plaintiff comes to the Court for no other purpose than to ask the Court to use that constraint which the law can impose upon the defendant to compel payment to the plaintiff of his money demand. The question in dispute in such an action may sometimes be the amount due, but it more often is the mode of obtaining payment. That being so, the Court gives judgment against the defendant, by which it declares and ascertains the amount due, and orders the defendant to pay it. The defendant disobeys the order of the Court, and then the Court is asked to compel him to pay; and the only mode which, as a general rule, the law now recognises of compelling him to pay, is by taking away his property, realizing it, and applying the proceeds in payment of the plaintiff's demand. I leave out of consideration the exceptional case of attachment, because, as a general rule, that is not the mode necessary to be adopted. The mode I have stated of compelling payment, we call execution; it is the obtaining in some shape or other, by legal process, possession of the defendant's lands or goods, selling *552 them, paying the consequent expenses, and out of the proceeds paying the demand. This mode of enforcing payment seems to me to be plainly a proceeding in the cause or matter; and the claim brought forward by the plaintiff that he may be paid the amount of his demand out of the proceeds of the goods or lands of his debtor, when the possession of or title to those lands or goods is disputed, is certainly a claim brought forwardand I should say properly brought forwardin the cause or matter. Then there were

various modes of attaching the lands or goods of the defendant known to the law and within the jurisdiction of the courts, which jurisdiction was amalgamated by the Judicature Act and made exerciseable by any single Court. One of the modes was by writ of fieri facias : another mode was by writ of elegit : a third mode was by the appointment of a receiver by the Court of Equity, when the other modes proved ineffectual by reason of the imperfection of the statutes which authorized the sheriff to deal with the property of the debtor. This mode of proceeding by the appointment of a receiver was called equitable execution. It was a mere mode of doing that which the plaintiff asks the Court in every action to do, namely, to realize the debtor's property so as to produce the sum demanded. Prior to the Judicature Act , the Courts of Equity, before granting equitable execution, required to be satisfied of two things, first, that the Plaintiff in the action had tried all he could to get satisfaction at law; and then that the debtor was possessed of that particular equitable interest which could not be attached at law. As a rule, your right to recover a money demand could only be fully recognised in a Court of Law. Most money demands were only cognizable there; and therefore, as a rule, when you had a mere money demand, you were compelled to bring an action in a Court of Common Law to recover it; and then, when you had got your judgment, you were compelled to bring a new actionthen called a suit in Equityby bill to enforce the judgment. Now that appears to me to be the very imperfection which the Judicature Act was intended to remedy: you were not to be obliged to go from one Court to another upon such a simple matter as the enforcement of a judgment, butto quote the words of the 7th sub-section of the 24th sectionthe Court is to grant *553 all such remedies as the parties may be entitled to in the matter pending, so that, as far as possible, all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters avoided. The very object of transferring the jurisdiction to one Court was that it might do everything without the necessity of going to another Court; and that being so, where is the necessity of going to another Court, when you find that the Act itself not only prevents another Court interfering in the action after judgment, but drives you to apply to the Court in which the original action was brought, even though the ground of the application may be a subject of equity? Before the Judicature Act , if there was an equity which could only be brought before a Court of Equity, you could file a bill to restrain judgment, and that might have been done even after judgment recovered; but all that has been put an end to, and you must now go to the same Court to deal with the judgment. Upon the same principle you ought to go to the same Court to deal with its own judgment when you are not staying it, but seeking to carry it out and enforce it. Upon the whole, I think that I should be deciding against what appears to me to be the plain view of the Act of Parliament were I to decide that the issuing of another writ was essential in order to obtain the full effect of a judgment of the Court which originally pronounced it. Passing from that, I come now to another question, which is one of some singularity. The creditors in the action issued their writ of elegit , and they could get

nothing by it, because the land in question was vested, as to the legal estate, in the mortgagee. Thereupon they applied to Mr. Justice Stephen in Chambers, sitting as a Judge of the Queen's Bench Divisionin which the action was broughtfor a receiver; the application being made upon an affidavit of facts. There can be no doubt that, before the Judicature Act , if the Plaintiffs had filed a bill stating those facts, they would have got their receiver; nor is it suggested that, except for this ceremony of issuing a writ between the same persons and asking for a receiver, there was anything that was wanting. But they only got this receiver about, but not earlier *554 than, four o'clock on the afternoon of the 14th of September; and it is proved by affidavit that on the very same day, at a quarter to four o'clock, the Huddersfield County Court, which had jurisdiction over the matter, had made an order granting a receiver and manager; so that that order was quite complete about a quarter of an hour before the order of Mr. Justice Stephen was made, and the debtor was liable to be committed, if he interfered with the receiver appointed under that order, he having committed an act of bankruptcy on the previous day, the 13th of September; and therefore there was ample jurisdiction in the County Court of Huddersfield to grant the order appointing this receiver. What, then, was the effect of the receivership so created by the County Court? It appears to me it gave that receiver a legal right against everybody except the mortgagees, who were in actual possession. If Mr. Justice Stephen had been made aware, st four o'clock on that day, that a receiver had been appointed at a quarter to four on the same day by the County Court of Huddersfield , that Court having jurisdiction to make the order, he would have been bound to refuse, and would have refused, to make the order he did: he could not have made an order for a receiver to interfere with the receiver of the Court of Bankruptcy: the order would not have had any effect whatever. A receiver was sometimes appointed by the Court of Chancery, and I suppose may still be appointed by the Chancery Division, not to act until some other receiver, who had been appointed in some other proceeding, was discharged. That might perhaps have been done in this case, and that would still have been equitable execution in the way of seizing the property. Still nothing of the kind was done, and Mr. Justice Stephen's order was properly made on the information before him, because it saved the rights of the prior incumbrancers. That being so, if the bankruptcy proceedings had gone on, there could, in my opinion, have been no question at all. The bankruptcy receiver was in possession, and properly in possession, before the appointment of a receiver in the action; and it is impossible, therefore, that the receiver in the action could have got possession under Mr. Justice Stephen's order, or that it could have amounted to an equitable execution against the receiver in bankruptcy. But what occurred was this: the bankruptcy went on up to a *555 certain point, but on the 24th of September the bankruptcy proceedings were turned into a liquidation. I may say here that it appears in evidencethough I do not think anything material turns upon itthat the receiver of the Plaintiffs gave notice to the mortgagees a few days after his appointment, but before the 24th of September, and that the mortgagees afterwards sold the property and out of the proceeds paid themselves. They have a surplus, and the contest before me is as to that surplus. It is the fact that neither of the receivers got any rents. Then, on the 25th of September, the bankruptcy proceedings having been turned into proceedings for

liquidation by arrangement, the same manthough I do not think anything turns upon thatis made receiver in the liquidation as was receiver in the bankruptcy. The trustees are appointed, and the proceedings for liquidation by arrangement are completed, so that the bankruptcy proceedings have come to an end. It is suggested on the part of the Plaintiffs in the action that the effect of those liquidation proceedings was to destroy the appointment of the receiver in the bankruptcy, so far as that receiver would intercept the rights of the Plaintiffs, and it is said that that was equivalent to a discontinuance of the bankruptcy proceedings and a discharge of the receiver ab initio . In order to try that question, one must ascertain for whom the bankruptcy receiver would have received under the existing circumstances. The bankruptcy receiver was not appointed until the 14th of September. There was an act of bankruptcy committed by the debtor on the 13th of September, and the title of the trustee under the liquidation proceedings therefore related back to the 13th of September, and he would consequently be entitled to take from the bankruptcy receiver anything he received, or might have received, from and after that date. Can it be possibly said that the jurisdiction in bankruptcy is so absurd that, when a receiver has been appointed in the proceedings in bankruptcy to protect the property of the debtor for the creditors, and those proceedings are turned into liquidation proceedings giving a title to the trustees to the very property co protected, that is to operate, not as a discharge of the receiver from the time the trustees were appointedas it doesbut as a discharge of that*556 receiver ab initio , so that the property which he was appointed to preserve shall not pass to the creditors whose title was intended to be protected and maintained by that very appointment? Independently of the rule in bankruptcy which says that the Court may adopt the bankruptcy proceedingsand of course it mayI think that the very facts themselves shew an adoption. The moment the receiver is discharged he has to pass his accounts to the Court which appointed him, and that assumes that he is to pay the balance to the person to whom it belongs. If he had received the money from the mortgagees under the notice to them, it would have belonged to the trustees in the liquidation: he would have passed his accounts in the bankruptcy, and would have paid over the balance to them. Can it be said that by the mere fact that the sale did not take place till subsequently the rights of the parties changed, and that the right of the receiver in bankruptcy therefore ceased? I should be casting ridicule upon the procedure in bankruptcy if I were to so decide. I think, therefore, it must be held that the receivership in bankruptcy was still a good receivership until the receiver was discharged, and that all the property of which he took actual or legal possession, or such possession as he could obtain as he did by the simple notice to the mortgagees to pay, would be received by him and held by him for the benefit of the person entitled to those proceedsin this case the trustees. Consequently the trustees must be held to be entitled to the surplus moneys in question. The Plaintiffs appealed. The appeal came on for hearing on the 18th of December. Winslow , Q.C., and Fooks , for the Appellants:

The appointment of a receiver on the application of the Plaintiffs was a good equitable delivery in execution: Hatton v. Haywood 5 ; Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies 6 ; Ex parte Evans 7 . Now, before delivery in execution there must have been a seizure in fact or in law There is, therefore, a seizure in law by the *557 appointment of a receiver. Under an extent, there is a seizure in law by the finding of the jury. Atkinson on Sheriffs 8 . Under sect. 95, sub-sect. 2, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1868 , our equitable seizure, therefore, is good, the Plaintiffs not having had any notice of a prior act of bankruptcy, and the Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of sect. 12 , and to have such an order made as they ask. [JAMES, L.J.:In Chancery, when a receiver had been appointed, though he was not actually in possession, a third person could not interfere with the property. How could you take in execution property which was in the hands of the Court of Bankruptcy? COTTON, L.J.:I do not see why your receiver is to take precedence over the bankruptcy receiver, whose appointment was prior in time.] Macnaghten , Q.C., and Oswald, contr ;, were not called upon. JAMES, L.J.: I am of opinion that the decision of the Master of the Rolls was right. The question is whether a receiver appointed on the application of an execution creditor can lawfully seize property of which the Court of Bankruptcy has taken possession by the appointment of a receiver. The main object of appointing a receiver in bankruptcy is to protect the assets from execution creditors. The 95th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, sub-sect. 2 , when it speaks of an execution executed by seizure before the date of adjudication, must be taken as speaking only of an execution lawfully executed by lawful seizure; and a seizure by the sheriff after the Court of Bankruptcy has taken possession of the property by appointing a receiver is not a lawful seizure. COTTON, L.J.: The execution creditors, on the 14th of September, got an order for a receiver of the rents and profits of the debtor's leasehold property, which was subject to mortgages. This, if there had been nothing more in the case, would have been a good *558 equitable execution, but at an earlier hour on the same day the Court of Bankruptcy had appointed a receiver. The object of appointing such a receiver is to keep out execution creditors, and his holding the property prevented the execution creditors from getting what they would otherwise have got. I can see no reason for postponing the receiver appointed by the Court of Bankruptcy to the receiver appointed at the instance of the execution creditor. The receiver of the Court of Bankruptcy had legal though not actual possession from the moment of his appointment, and the property being thus in the hands of the Court of Bankruptcy, the subsequent equitable execution was ineffectual. I am of opinion that the decision is right.

LUSH, L.J.: I am of the same opinion. The object of appointing a receiver in bankruptcy is to protect the property for the benefit of the creditors in case the proceedings should terminate in bankruptcy. The second clause of sect. 95 of the Act must be read in connection with the other parts of the Act, and must be taken to proceed on the assumption that the Court of Bankruptcy has not got possession of the property. Here the property was already in the hands of the Court, and the equitable execution cannot affect it.

Representation
y

Solicitors: Stevens & Co. ; Layton & Jaques .

1. 9 Ch. D. 275 . 2. Law Rep. 9 Ch. 229 . 3. 13 Ch. D. 252 . 4. 1 Ch. D. 690 . 5. Law Rep. 9 Ch. 229 . 6. 9 Ch. D. 275 . 7. 13 Ch. D. 252 . 8. 5th Ed. p. 251. 2012 Sweet & Maxwell

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