Special Third Division

G.R. No. 195580. January 28, 2015.
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,

TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and
McARTHUR MINING, INC., petitioners, vs. REDMONT
CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Moot and

Academic; The Supreme Court (SC) may still take cognizance of an
otherwise moot and academic case, if it finds that (a) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of
exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved;
(c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.—We
can assume for the nonce that the controversy had indeed been
rendered moot by these two events. As this Court has time and
again declared, the “moot and academic” principle is not a magical
formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case.
The Court may still take cognizance of an otherwise moot and
academic case, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. The Court’s April 21, 2014 Decision
explained in some detail that all four (4) of the foregoing
circumstances are present in the case. If only to stress a point, we
will do so again.
Corporations; Grandfather Rule; The Grandfather Rule was
originally conceived to look into the citizenship of the individuals
who ultimately own and control the shares of stock of a
corporation for purposes of determining compliance with the
constitutional requirement of Filipino ownership.—Sec. 2, Art. XII
of the Constitution reserves the exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources to Filipino citizens and
“corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens.”
_______________
* SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION.
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. vs. Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corp.
Similarly, Section 3(aq) of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995

considers a “corporation x x x registered in accordance with law at
least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by citizens of
the Philippines” as a person qualified to undertake a mining
operation. Consistent with this objective, the Grandfather Rule
was originally conceived to look into the citizenship of the
individuals who ultimately own and control the shares of stock of
a corporation for purposes of determining compliance with the
constitutional requirement of Filipino ownership. It cannot,
therefore, be denied that the framers of the Constitution have not
foreclosed the Grandfather Rule as a tool in verifying the
nationality of corporations for purposes of ascertaining their right
to participate in nationalized or partly nationalized activities.
Same; Same; To arrive at the actual Filipino ownership and
control in a corporation, both the direct and indirect shareholdings
in the corporation are determined.—As further defined by Dean
Cesar Villanueva, the Grandfather Rule is “the method by
which the percentage of Filipino equity in a corporation
engaged in nationalized and/or partly nationalized areas of
activities, provided for under the Constitution and other
nationalization laws, is computed, in cases where corporate
shareholders are present, by attributing the nationality of
the second or even subsequent tier of ownership to
determine the nationality of the corporate shareholder.”
Thus, to arrive at the actual Filipino ownership and control in a
corporation, both the direct and indirect shareholdings in the
corporation are determined.
Same; Same; The method employed in the Grandfather Rule
of attributing the shareholdings of a given corporate shareholder
to the second or even the subsequent tier of ownership hews with
the rule that the “beneficial ownership” of corporations engaged in
nationalized activities must reside in the hands of Filipino
citizens.—The method employed in the Grandfather Rule of
attributing the shareholdings of a given corporate shareholder to
the second or even the subsequent tier of ownership hews with
the rule that the “beneficial ownership” of corporations engaged
in nationalized activities must reside in the hands of Filipino
citizens. Thus, even if the 60-40 Filipino equity requirement
appears to have been satisfied, the Department of Justice (DOJ),
in its Opinion No. 144, S. of 1977, stated that an agreement
that may distort the actual economic or
457
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 457

beneficial ownership of a mining corporation may be

struck down as violative of the constitutional requirement.
Same; Same; If the subject corporation’s Filipino equity falls
below the threshold sixty percent (60%), the corporation is
immediately considered foreign-owned, in which case, the need to
resort to the Grandfather Rule disappears.—The Grandfather
Rule, standing alone, should not be used to determine the Filipino
ownership and control in a corporation, as it could result in an
otherwise foreign corporation rendered qualified to perform
nationalized or partly nationalized activities. Hence, it is only
when the Control Test is first complied with that the
Grandfather Rule may be applied. Put in another manner, if
the subject corporation’s Filipino equity falls below the threshold
60%, the corporation is immediately considered foreign-owned, in
which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule
disappears. On the other hand, a corporation that complies
with the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity requirement can
be considered a Filipino corporation if there is no doubt as
to who has the “beneficial ownership” and “control” of the
corporation. In that instance, there is no need for a
dissection or further inquiry on the ownership of the corporate
shareholders in both the investing and investee corporation or
the application of the Grandfather Rule. As a corollary rule,
even if the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity ratio is apparently met
by the subject or investee corporation, a resort to the
Grandfather Rule is necessary if doubt exists as to the
locus of the “beneficial ownership” and “control.” In this
case, a further investigation as to the nationality of the
personalities with the beneficial ownership and control of the
corporate shareholders in both the investing and investee
corporations is necessary.
Same; Same; While the Grandfather Rule was originally
intended to trace the shareholdings to the point where natural
persons hold the shares, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) had already set up a limit as to the number of corporate
layers the attribution of the nationality of the corporate
shareholders may be applied.—Parenthetically, it is advanced
that the application of the Grandfather Rule is impractical as
tracing the shareholdings to the point when natural persons hold
rights to the stocks may very well lead to an investigation ad
infinitum. Suffice it to say in this regard that, while the
Grandfather Rule was originally intended to trace the
458

shareholdings to the point where natural persons hold the

shares, the SEC had already set up a limit as to the number of
corporate layers the attribution of the nationality of the corporate
shareholders may be applied. In a 1977 internal memorandum,
the SEC suggested applying the Grandfather Rule on two (2)
levels of corporate relations for publicly-held corporations or
where the shares are traded in the stock exchanges, and to three
(3) levels for closely held corporations or the shares of which are
not traded in the stock exchanges. These limits comply with the
requirement in Palting v. San Jose Petroleum, Inc., 18 SCRA 924
(1966), that the application of the Grandfather Rule cannot go
beyond the level of what is reasonable.
Same; Same; Mines and Mining; Panel of Arbitrators; In
resolving disputes “involving rights to mining areas” and
“involving mineral agreements or permits,” the Panel of
Arbitrators (POA) has jurisdiction to make a preliminary finding
of the required nationality of the corporate applicant in order to
determine its right to a mining area or a mineral agreement.—The
April 21, 2014 Decision did not dilute, much less overturn, this
Court’s pronouncements in either Gonzales v. Climax Mining
Ltd., 452 SCRA 607 (2005), or Philex Mining Corp. v. Zaldivia, 43
SCRA 479 (1972), that POA’s jurisdiction “is limited only to
mining disputes which raise questions of fact,” and not judicial
questions cognizable by regular courts of justice. However, to
properly recognize and give effect to the jurisdiction vested in the
POA by Section 77 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and in
parallel with this Court’s ruling in Celestial Nickel Mining
Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corp., 541 SCRA
166 (2007), the Court has recognized in its Decision that in
resolving disputes “involving rights to mining areas” and
“involving mineral agreements or permits,” the POA has
jurisdiction to make a preliminary finding of the required
nationality of the corporate applicant in order to determine its
right to a mining area or a mineral agreement.
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Corporations; Grandfather Rule; Panel of Arbitrators; View
that it is error for the majority to rule that petitioners are foreign
corporations proceeding from the actions of a body which never
had jurisdiction and competence to rule on the judicial question of
nationality.—I maintain that the Panel of Arbitrators of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR Panel
of Arbi-
459
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 459

trators) never had jurisdiction to rule on the nationalities of

petitioners Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. (Narra),
Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. (Tesoro), and McArthur
Mining, Inc. (McArthur) and on the question of whether they
should be qualified to hold Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSA). It is error for the majority to rule that
petitioners are foreign corporations proceeding from the actions of
a body which never had jurisdiction and competence to rule on the
judicial question of nationality.
Same; Same; View that the Grandfather Rule finds no basis in
the text of the 1987 Constitution.—The Grandfather Rule finds no
basis in the text of the 1987 Constitution. It is true that the
records of the Constitutional Commission “indicate an affirmative
reference to the Grandfather Rule.” However, whatever references
these records make to the Grandfather Rule is not indicative of a
consensus among all members of the Constitutional Commission.
At most, these references are advisory and not binding on this
court. Ultimately, what is controlling is the text of the
Constitution itself. This text is silent on the precise means of
reckoning foreign ownership. In contrast, the Control Test is
firmly enshrined by congressional dictum in a statute,
specifically, Republic Act No. 8179, otherwise known as the
Foreign Investments Act (FIA). As this court has pointed out,
“[t]he FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the
Philippines, irrespective of the nature of business and area of
investment.”
Same; Same; Control Test; Philippine National; Words and
Phrases; Section 3(a) of the Foreign Investments Act (FIA) defines
a “Philippine national” as including “a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty percent
(60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned
and held by citizens of the Philippines.”—Section 3(a) of the
Foreign Investments Act defines a “Philippine national” as
including “a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital
stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by
citizens of the Philippines.” In my Dissent to the April 21, 2014
Decision: This is a definition that is consistent with the first part
of paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules, which [originally
articulated] the Control Test: “[s]hares belonging to corporations
or partnerships at least 60 percent of the capital of which is
owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine
nationality.” The
460

Control Test serves the rationale for nationalization of

economic activities. It ensures effective control by Filipinos and
satisfies the requirement of beneficial ownership.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Gatmaytan, Yap, Patacsil, Gutierrez & Protacio for
petitioners.
Reynaldo Melendres for Redmont Consolidated Mines
Corporation.
Legaspi, Barcelo & Salamera Law Office collaborating
counsel for Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of its

April 21, 2014 Decision, which denied the Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 jointly interposed by
petitioners Narra Nickel and Mining Development Corp.
(Narra), Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. (Tesoro),
and McArthur Mining, Inc. (McArthur), and affirmed the
October 1, 2010 Decision and February 15, 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109703.
Very simply, the challenged Decision sustained the
appellate court’s ruling that petitioners, being foreign
corporations, are not entitled to Mineral Production
Sharing Agreements (MPSAs). In reaching its conclusion,
this Court upheld with approval the appellate court’s
finding that there was doubt as to petitioners’ nationality
since a 100% Canadian-owned firm, MBMI Resources, Inc.
(MBMI), effectively owns 60% of the common stocks of the
petitioners by owning equity interest of petitioners’ other
majority corporate shareholders.
461
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 461

In a strongly worded Motion for Reconsideration dated

June 5, 2014, petitioners-movants argued, in the main,
that the Court’s Decision was not in accord with law and
logic. In its September 2, 2014 Comment, on the other
hand, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp.
(Redmont) countered that petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is nothing but a rehash of their arguments
and should, thus, be denied outright for being pro forma.
Petitioners have interposed on September 30, 2014 their
Reply to the respondent’s Comment.
After considering the parties’ positions, as articulated in
their respective submissions, We resolve to deny the
motion for reconsideration.
I.
The case has not been rendered moot and academic
Petitioners have first off criticized the Court for

resolving in its Decision a substantive issue, which, as
argued, has supposedly been rendered moot by the fact that
petitioners’ applications for MPSAs had already been
converted to an application for a Financial Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA), as petitioners have in fact
been granted an FTAA. Further, the nationality issue, so
petitioners presently claim, had been rendered moribund
by the fact that MBMI had already divested itself and sold
all its shareholdings in the petitioners, as well as in their
corporate stockholders, to a Filipino corporation — DMCI
Mining Corporation (DMCI).
As a counterpoint, respondent Redmont avers that the
present case has not been rendered moot by the supposed
issuance of an FTAA in petitioners’ favor as this FTAA was
subsequently revoked by the Office of the President (OP)
and is currently a subject of a petition pending in the
Court’s First Division. Redmont likewise contends that the
supposed sale of MBMI’s interest in the petitioners and in
their “holding companies” is a question of fact that is
outside the Court’s province to verify in a Rule 45 certiorari
proceedings. In any case,
462

assuming that the controversy has been rendered moot,

Redmont claims that its resolution on the merits is still
justified by the fact that petitioners have violated a
constitutional provision, the violation is capable of
repetition yet evading review, and the present case
involves a matter of public concern.
Indeed, as the Court clarified in its Decision, the
conversion of the MPSA application to one for FTAAs and
the issuance by the OP of an FTAA in petitioners’ favor are
irrelevant. The OP itself has already cancelled and revoked
the FTAA thus issued to petitioners. Petitioners curiously
have omitted this critical fact in their motion for
reconsideration. Furthermore, the supposed sale by MBMI
of its shares in the petitioner-corporations and in their
holding companies is not only a question of fact that this
Court is without authority to verify, it also does not negate
any violation of the Constitutional provisions previously
committed before any such sale.
We can assume for the nonce that the controversy had
indeed been rendered moot by these two events. As this
Court has time and again declared, the “moot and
academic” principle is not a magical formula that
automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case.1 The
Court may still take cognizance of an otherwise moot and
academic case, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; (b) the situation is of exceptional
character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.2 The Court’s April 21, 2014 Decision ex-
_______________
1 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the

Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. No. 183591,
October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402, 460.
2 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489
SCRA 160; citing Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May
27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736; Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil. 78; 357 SCRA 756
(2001); Albaña v. COMELEC, 478 Phil. 941; 435
463
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 463

plained in some detail that all four (4) of the foregoing

circumstances are present in the case. If only to stress a
point, we will do so again.
First, allowing the issuance of MPSAs to applicants that
are owned and controlled by a 100% foreign-owned
corporation, albeit through an intricate web of corporate
layering involving alleged Filipino corporations, is
tantamount to permitting a blatant violation of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. The Court simply cannot
allow this breach and inhibit itself from resolving the
controversy on the facile pretext that the case had already
been rendered academic.
Second, the elaborate corporate layering resorted to by
petitioners so as to make it appear that there is compliance
with the minimum Filipino ownership in the Constitution
is deftly exceptional in character. More importantly, the
case is of paramount public interest, as the corporate
layering employed by petitioners was evidently designed to
circumvent the constitutional caveat allowing only Filipino
citizens and corporations 60%-owned by Filipino citizens to
explore, develop, and use the country’s natural resources.
Third, the facts of the case, involving as they do a web of
corporate layering intended to go around the Filipino
ownership requirement in the Constitution and pertinent
laws, require the establishment of a definite principle that
will ensure that the Constitutional provision reserving to
Filipino citizens or “corporations at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens” be effectively
enforced and complied with. The case, therefore, is an
opportunity to establish a controlling principle that will
“guide the bench, the bar, and the public.”
Lastly, the petitioners’ actions during the lifetime and
existence of the instant case that gave rise to the present
contro-
_______________
SCRA 98 (2004); Acop v. Guingona, Jr., 433 Phil. 62; 383 SCRA 577
(2002); SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, 466 Phil. 482; 421 SCRA 656
(2004).
464

versy are capable of repetition yet evading review

because, as shown by petitioners’ actions, foreign
corporations can easily utilize dummy Filipino corporations
through various schemes and stratagems to skirt the
constitutional prohibition against foreign mining in
Philippine soil.
II.
The application of the Grandfather Rule
is justified by the circumstances of the case
to determine the nationality of petitioners
To petitioners, the Court’s application of the

Grandfather Rule to determine their nationality is
erroneous and allegedly without basis in the Constitution,
the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA), the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995,3 and the Rules issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). These laws and rules
supposedly espouse the application of the Control Test in
verifying the Philippine nationality of corporate entities for
purposes of determining compliance with Sec. 2, Art. XII of
the Constitution that only “corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
[Filipino] citizens” may enjoy certain rights and privileges,
like the exploration and development of natural resources.
The application of the Grandfather Rule in the

present case does not eschew the Control Test.
Clearly, petitioners have misread, and failed to

appreciate the clear import of, the Court’s April 21, 2014
Decision. Nowhere in that disposition did the Court
foreclose the application of the Control Test in determining
which corporations may be considered as Philippine
nationals. Instead, to borrow Justice Leonen’s term, the
Court used the Grandfather Rule
_______________
3 Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, effective April 14, 1995.
465
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 465

as a “supplement” to the Control Test so that the intent

underlying the averted Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution
be given effect. The following excerpts of the April 21, 2014
Decision cannot be clearer:
In ending, the “control test” is still the prevailing mode of

determining whether or not a corporation is a Filipino
corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution, entitled to undertake the exploration, development
and utilization of the natural resources of the Philippines. When
in the mind of the Court, there is doubt, based on the
attendant facts and circumstances of the case, in the 60-40
Filipino equity ownership in the corporation, then it may apply
the “grandfather rule.” (emphasis supplied)
With that, the use of the Grandfather Rule as a

“supplement” to the Control Test is not proscribed by the
Constitution or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
The Grandfather Rule implements the intent of the
Filipinization provisions of the Constitution.
To reiterate, Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution reserves

the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources to Filipino citizens and “corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens.” Similarly, Section 3(aq) of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 considers a “corporation
x x x registered in accordance with law at least sixty
percent of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the
Philippines” as a person qualified to undertake a mining
operation. Consistent with this objective, the Grandfather
Rule was originally conceived to look into the citizenship of
the individuals who ultimately own and control the shares
of stock of a corporation for purposes of determining
compliance with the constitutional requirement of Filipino
466

ownership. It cannot, therefore, be denied that the

framers of the Constitution have not foreclosed the
Grandfather Rule as a tool in verifying the nationality of
corporations for purposes of ascertaining their right to
participate in nationalized or partly nationalized activities.
The following excerpts from the Record of the 1986
Constitutional Commission suggest as much:
MR. NOLLEDO: In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee

stated local or Filipino equity and foreign equity; namely, 60-40 in
Section 3, 60-40 in Section 9, and 2/3-1/3 in Section 15.
MR. VILLEGAS: That is right.
xxxx
MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you.
With respect to an investment by one corporation in another
corporation, say, a corporation with 60-40 percent equity invests
in another corporation which is permitted by the Corporation
Code, does the Committee adopt the grandfather rule?
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes, that is the understanding of the
Committee.
As further defined by Dean Cesar Villanueva, the

Grandfather Rule is “the method by which the
percentage of Filipino equity in a corporation
activities, provided for under the Constitution and other
nationalization laws, is computed, in cases where
corporate shareholders are present, by attributing
the nationality of the second or even subsequent tier
of ownership to determine the nationality of the
corporate shareholder.”4 Thus, to arrive at the actual
Filipino ownership and control in a corpora-
_______________
4 Villanueva, Cesar Lapuz, Philippine Corporate Law, p. 54 (2001).

Emphasis and italicization supplied.
467
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 467

tion, both the direct and indirect shareholdings in the

corporation are determined.
This concept of stock attribution inherent in the
Grandfather Rule to determine the ultimate ownership in a
corporation is observed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) in applying Section 127(B)5 of the National Internal
Revenue Code on taxes imposed on closely held
corporations, in relation to Section 96 of the Corporation
Code6 on close corpora-
_______________
5 SEC. 127. Tax on Sale, Barter or Exchange of Shares of Stock

Listed and Traded through the Local Stock Exchange or through
Initial Public Offering.—
(B) Tax on Shares of Stock Sold or Exchanged Through Initial Public
Offering.—There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale,
barter, exchange or other disposition through initial public offering of
shares of stock in closely held corporations, as defined herein, a tax at the
rates provided hereunder based on the gross selling price or gross value in
money of the shares of stock sold, bartered, exchanged or otherwise
disposed in accordance with the proportion of shares of stock sold,
bartered, exchanged or otherwise disposed to the total outstanding shares
of stock after the listing in the local stock exchange:
xxxx
For purposes of this Section, the term ‘closely held corporation’ means
any corporation at least fifty percent (50%) in value of the outstanding
capital stock of all classes of stock entitled to vote is owned directly or
indirectly by or for not more than twenty (20) individuals.
For purposes of determining whether the corporation is a closely held
corporation, insofar as such determination is based on stock ownership,
the following rules shall be applied:
(1) Stock not Owned by Individuals.—Stock owned directly or
indirectly by or for a corporation, partnership, estate or trust
shall be considered as being owned proportionately by its
shareholders, partners or beneficiaries. x x x
6 Sec. 96. Definition and applicability of Title.—
A close corporation, within the meaning of this Code, is one whose
articles of incorporation provide that: (1) All the corporation’s issued stock
of all classes, exclusive of treasury shares, shall be held
468

tions. Thus, in BIR Ruling No. 148-10, Commissioner

Kim Henares held:
In the case of a multi-tiered corporation, the stock

attribution rule must be allowed to run continuously along
the chain of ownership until it finally reaches the
individual stockholders. This is in consonance with the
“grandfather rule” adopted in the Philippines under
Section 96 of the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68)
which provides that notwithstanding the fact that all the issued
stock of a corporation are held by not more than twenty persons,
among others, a corporation is nonetheless not to be deemed a
close corporation when at least two thirds of its voting stock or
voting rights is owned or controlled by another corporation which
is not a close corporation.7
In SEC-OGC Opinion No. 10-31 dated December 9, 2010

(SEC Opinion 10-31), the SEC applied the Grandfather
Rule even if the corporation engaged in mining operation
passes the 60-40 requirement of the Control Test, viz.:
_______________
of record by not more than a specified number of persons, not

exceeding twenty (20); (2) all the issued stock of all classes shall be subject
to one or more specified restrictions on transfer permitted by this Title;
and (3) The corporation shall not list in any stock exchange or make any
public offering of any of its stock of any class. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, a corporation shall not be deemed a close corporation
when at least two-thirds (2/3) of its voting stock or voting rights is
owned or controlled by another corporation which is not a close
corporation within the meaning of this Code.
Any corporation may be incorporated as a close corporation,
except mining or oil companies, stock exchanges, banks, insurance
companies, public utilities, educational institutions and corporations
declared to be vested with public interest in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.
7 Dated December 17, 2010; emphasis supplied. See also BIR Ruling
Nos. 072-97, July 2, 1997 and 055-81, March 23, 1981.
469
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 469

You allege that the structure of MML’s ownership in

PHILSAGA is as follows: (1) MML owns 40% equity in MEDC,
while the 60% is ostensibly owned by Philippine individual
citizens who are actually MML’s controlled nominees; (2) MEDC,
in turn, owns 60% equity in MOHC, while MML owns the
remaining 40%; (3) Lastly, MOHC owns 60% of PHILSAGA, while
MML owns the remaining 40%. You provide the following figure
to illustrate this structure:
xxxx
We note that the Constitution and the statute use the concept
“Philippine citizens.” Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
provides who are Philippine citizens: x x x This enumeration is
exhaustive. In other words, there can be no other Philippine
citizens other than those falling within the enumeration provided
by the Constitution. Obviously, only natural persons are
susceptible of citizenship. Thus, for purposes of the Constitutional
and statutory restrictions on foreign participation in the
exploitation of mineral resources, a corporation investing in a
mining joint venture can never be considered as a Philippine
citizen.
The Supreme Court En Banc confirms this [in]… Pedro R.
Palting v. San Jose Petroleum, [Inc.]. The Court held that a
corporation investing in another corporation engaged in a
nationalized activity cannot be considered as a citizen for
purposes of the Constitutional provision restricting foreign
exploitation of natural resources:
xxxx
Accordingly, we opine that we must look into the citizenship of
the individual stockholders, i.e., natural persons, of that investor-
corporation in order to determine if the Constitutional and
statutory restrictions are complied with. If the shares of stock of
the immediate investor corporation is in turn held and controlled
by another corporation, then we must look into the citizenship of
the individual stockholders of the latter corporation. In other
words, if there are layers of intervening corporations
investing in a mining joint venture,
470

we must delve into the citizenship of the individual

stockholders of each corporation. This is the strict
application of the grandfather rule, which the Commission has
been consistently applying prior to the 1990s.
Indeed, the framers of the Constitution intended for the
“grandfather rule” to apply in case a 60%-40% Filipino-
Foreign equity corporation invests in another corporation
engaging in an activity where the Constitution restricts
foreign participation.
xxxx
Accordingly, under the structure you represented, the joint
mining venture is 87.04% foreign-owned, while it is only 12.96%
owned by Philippine citizens. Thus, the constitutional
requirement of 60% ownership by Philippine citizens is violated.
(emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the eponymous Redmont Consolidated

Mines Corporation v. McArthur Mining Inc., et al.,8 the
SEC En Banc applied the Grandfather Rule despite the
fact that the subject corporations ostensibly have satisfied
the 60-40 Filipino equity requirement. The SEC En Banc
held that to attain the Constitutional objective of
reserving to Filipinos the utilization of natural
resources, one should not stop where the percentage
of the capital stock is 60%. Thus:
[D]oubt, we believe, exists in the instant case because

the foreign investor, MBMI, provided practically all the
funds of the remaining appellee-corporations. The records
disclose that: (1) Olympic Mines and Development Corporation
(“OMDC”), a domestic corporation, and MBMI subscribed to 6,663
and 3,331 shares, respectively, out of the authorized capital stock
of Madridejos; however, OMDC paid nothing for
_______________
8 SEC En Banc Case No. 09-09-177, March 25, 2010.
471
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 471

this subscription while MBMI paid P2,803,900.00 out of its

total subscription cost of P3,331,000.00; (2) Palawan Alpha South
Resource Development Corp. (“Palawan Alpha”), also a domestic
corporation, and MBMI subscribed to 6,596 and 3,996 shares,
respectively, out of the authorized capital stock of Patricia Louise;
however, Palawan Alpha paid nothing for this subscription while
MBMI paid P2,796,000.00 out of its total subscription cost of
P3,996,000.00; (3) OMDC and MBMI subscribed to 6,663 and
3,331 shares, respectively, out of the authorized capital stock of
Sara Marie; however, OMDC paid nothing for this subscription
while MBMI paid P2,794,000.00 out of its total subscription cost
of P3,331,000.00; and (4) Falcon Ridge Resources Management
Corp. (“Falcon Ridge”), another domestic corporation, and MBMI
subscribed to 5,997 and 3,998 shares, respectively, out of the
authorized capital stock of San Juanico; however, Falcon Ridge
paid nothing for this subscription while MBMI paid P2,500,000.00
out of its total subscription cost of P3,998,000.00. Thus, pursuant
to the aforequoted DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule must be
used.
xxxx
The avowed purpose of the Constitution is to place in
the hands of Filipinos the exploitation of our natural
resources. Necessarily, therefore, the Rule interpreting the
constitutional provision should not diminish that right
through the legal fiction of corporate ownership and
control. But the constitutional provision, as interpreted and
practiced via the 1967 SEC Rules, has favored foreigners contrary
to the command of the Constitution. Hence, the Grandfather
Rule must be applied to accurately determine the actual
participation, both direct and indirect, of foreigners in a
corporation engaged in a nationalized activity or business.
The method employed in the Grandfather Rule of

attributing the shareholdings of a given corporate
shareholder to the second or even the subsequent tier of
ownership hews with the rule that the “beneficial
ownership” of corporations
472

engaged in nationalized activities must reside in the

hands of Filipino citizens. Thus, even if the 60-40 Filipino
equity requirement appears to have been satisfied, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), in its Opinion No. 144, S. of
1977, stated that an agreement that may distort the
actual economic or beneficial ownership of a mining
corporation may be struck down as violative of the
constitutional requirement, viz.:
In this connection, you raise the following specific questions:

1. Can a Philippine corporation with 30% equity owned by
foreigners enter into a mining service contract with a foreign
company granting the latter a share of not more than 40% from
the proceeds of the operations?
xxxx
By law, a mining lease may be granted only to a Filipino
citizen, or to a corporation or partnership registered with
the [SEC] at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens and possessing x x x. The sixty percent
Philippine equity requirement in mineral resource
exploitation x x x is intended to insure, among other
purposes, the conservation of indigenous natural
resources, for Filipino posterity x x x. I think it is implicit in
this provision, even if it refers merely to ownership of stock in the
corporation holding the mining concession, that beneficial
ownership of the right to dispose, exploit, utilize, and
develop natural resources shall pertain to Filipino
citizens, and that the nationality requirement is not
satisfied unless Filipinos are the principal beneficiaries in
the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. This
criterion of beneficial ownership is tacitly adopted in Section 44 of
P.D. No. 463, above quoted, which limits the service fee in service
contracts to 40% of the proceeds of the operation, thereby
implying that the 60-40 benefit-sharing ra-
473
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 473

tion is derived from the 60-40 equity requirement in the

Constitution.
xxxx
It is obvious that while payments to a service contractor may
be justified as a service fee, and therefore, properly deductible
from gross proceeds, the service contract could be employed
as a means of going about or circumventing the
constitutional limit on foreign equity participation and
the obvious constitutional policy to insure that Filipinos
retain beneficial ownership of our mineral resources. Thus,
every service contract scheme has to be evaluated in its entirety,
on a case to case basis, to determine reasonableness of the total
“service fee” x x x like the options available to the contractor to
become equity participant in the Philippine entity holding the
concession, or to acquire rights in the processing and marketing
stages. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The “beneficial ownership” requirement was

subsequently used in tandem with the “situs of control” to
determine the nationality of a corporation in DOJ Opinion
No. 84, S. of 1988, through the Grandfather Rule, despite
the fact that both the investee and investor corporations
purportedly satisfy the 60-40 Filipino equity requirement:9
This refers to your request for opinion on whether or not there

may be an investment in real estate by a domestic corporation
(the investing corporation) seventy percent (70%) of the capital
stock of which is owned by another domestic corporation with at
least 60%-40% Filipino-Foreign Equity, while the remaining
thirty percent (30%) of the capital stock is owned by a foreign
corporation.
xxxx
_______________
9 Dated April 26, 1988.
474

This Department has had the occasion to rule in several

opinions that it is implicit in the constitutional provisions, even if
it refers merely to ownership of stock in the corporation holding
the land or natural resource concession, that the nationality
requirement is not satisfied unless it meets the criterion of
beneficial ownership, i.e., Filipinos are the principal
beneficiaries in the exploration of natural resources, (Op.
No. 144, S. 1977; Op. No. 130, S. 1985) and that in applying the
same “the primordial consideration is situs of control,
whether in a stock or non-stock corporation” (Op. No. 178,
S. 1974). As stated in the Register of Deeds v. Ung Sui Si Temple
(97 Phil. 58), obviously to insure that corporations and
associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit
natural resources “shall be controlled by Filipinos.” Accordingly,
any arrangement which attempts to defeat the con
stitutional purpose should be eschewed. (Op. No 130, S.
1985)
We are informed that in the registration of corporations with
the [SEC], compliance with the sixty per centum requirement is
being monitored by SEC under the “Grandfather Rule” a method
by which the percentage of Filipino equity in corporations
activities provided for under the Constitution and other national
laws is accurately computed, and the diminution if said equity
prevented. (SEC Memo, S. 1976) The “Grandfather Rule” is
applied specifically in cases where the corporation has
corporate stockholders with alien stockholdings,
otherwise, if the rule is not applied, the presence of such
corporate stockholders could diminish the effective
control of Filipinos.
Applying the “Grandfather Rule” in the instant case, the result
is as follows: x x x the total foreign equity in the investing
corporation is 58% while the Filipino equity is only 42%, in the
investing corporation, subject of your query, is disqualified from
investing in real estate, which is a nationalized activity, as it does
not meet the
475
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 475

60%-40% Filipino-Foreign equity requirement under the

Constitution.
This pairing of the concepts “beneficial ownership” and

the “situs of control” in determining what constitutes
“capital” has been adopted by this Court in Heirs of Wilson
P. Gamboa v. Teves.10 In its October 9, 2012 Resolution, the
Court clarified, thus:
This is consistent with Section 3 of the FIA which provides that

where 100% of the capital stock is held by “a trustee of funds for
pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits,” the
trustee is a Philippine national if “at least sixty percent (60%) of
the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals.”
Likewise, Section 1(b) of the Implementing Rules of the FIA
provides that “for stocks to be deemed owned and held by
Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not
enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial
ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting
rights, is essential.” (emphasis supplied)
In emphasizing the twin requirements of “beneficial

ownership” and “control” in determining compliance with
the required Filipino equity in Gamboa, the En Banc Court
explicitly cited with approval the SEC En Banc’s
application in Redmont Consolidated Mines, Corp. v.
McArthur Mining, Inc., et al., of the Grandfather Rule, to
wit:
Significantly, the SEC En Banc, which is the collegial body

statutorily empowered to issue rules and opinions on behalf of
SEC, has adopted the Grandfather Rule in determining
compliance with the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of
Filipino citizens mandated by the Constitution for certain
economic activities. This prevailing SEC ruling, which the
SEC cor-
_______________
10 G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 397.
476

rectly adopted to thwart any circumvention of the

required Filipino “ownership and control,” is laid down in
the 25 March 2010 SEC En Banc ruling in Redmont Consolidated
Mines, Corp. v. McArthur Mining, Inc., et al. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
Applying Gamboa, the Court, in Express Investments III

Private Ltd. v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.,11 denied
the foreign creditors’ proposal to convert part of Bayantel’s
debts to common shares of the company at a rate of 77.7%.
Supposedly, the conversion of the debts to common
shares by the foreign creditors would be done, both
directly and indirectly, in order to meet the control
test principle under the FIA. Under the proposed
structure, the foreign creditors would own 40% of the
outstanding capital stock of the telecommunications
company on a direct basis, while the remaining 40% of
shares would be registered to a holding company that shall
retain, on a direct basis, the other 60% equity reserved for
Filipino citizens. Nonetheless, the Court found the
proposal noncompliant with the Constitutional
requirement of Filipino ownership as the proposed
structure would give more than 60% of the ownership of
the common shares of Bayantel to the foreign corporations,
viz.:
In its Rehabilitation Plan, among the material financial

commitments made by respondent Bayantel is that its
shareholders shall relinquish the agreed-upon amount of common
stock[s] as payment to Unsecured Creditors as per the Term
Sheet. Evidently, the parties intend to convert the
unsustainable portion of respondent’s debt into common
stocks, which have voting rights. If we indulge petitioners
on their proposal, the Omnibus Creditors which are
foreign corporations, shall have control over 77.7% of
Bayantel, a public utility company. This is precisely
_______________
11 G.R. Nos. 174457-59, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 50.

477
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 477

the scenario proscribed by the Filipinization provision

of the Constitution. Therefore, the Court of Appeals acted
correctly in sustaining the 40% debt-to-equity ceiling on
conversion. (emphasis supplied)
As shown by the quoted legislative enactments,

administrative rulings, opinions, and this Court’s decisions,
the Grandfather Rule not only finds basis, but more
importantly, it implements the Filipino equity
requirement, in the Constitution.
Application of the Grandfather Rule with the Control

Test.
Admittedly, an ongoing quandary obtains as to the role

of the Grandfather Rule in determining compliance with
the minimum Filipino equity requirement vis-à-vis the
Control Test. This confusion springs from the erroneous
assumption that the use of one method forecloses the use of
the other.
As exemplified by the above rulings, opinions, decisions
and this Court’s April 21, 2014 Decision, the Control Test
can be, as it has been, applied jointly with the Grandfather
Rule to determine the observance of foreign ownership
restriction in nationalized economic activities. The
Control Test and the Grandfather Rule are not, as it
were, incompatible ownership-determinant methods that
can only be applied alternative to each other. Rather, these
methods can, if appropriate, be used cumulatively in
the determination of the ownership and control of
corporations engaged in fully or partly nationalized
activities, as the mining operation involved in this case or
the operation of public utilities as in Gamboa or Bayantel.
The Grandfather Rule, standing alone, should not be
used to determine the Filipino ownership and control in a
corporation, as it could result in an otherwise foreign
corporation rendered qualified to perform nationalized or
partly nationalized activities. Hence, it is only when the
Control Test is
478

first complied with that the Grandfather Rule may

be applied. Put in another manner, if the subject
corporation’s Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%,
the corporation is immediately considered foreign-owned,
in which case, the need to resort to the Grandfather Rule
disappears.
On the other hand, a corporation that complies with
the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity requirement can
be considered a Filipino corporation if there is no
doubt as to who has the “beneficial ownership” and
“control” of the corporation. In that instance, there
is no need for a dissection or further inquiry on the
ownership of the corporate shareholders in both the
investing and investee corporation or the application of
the Grandfather Rule.12 As a corollary rule, even if the
60-40 Filipino to foreign equity ratio is apparently met by
the subject or investee corporation, a resort to the
Grandfather Rule is necessary if doubt exists as to
the locus of the “beneficial ownership” and “control.”
In this case, a further investigation as to the nationality of
the personalities with the beneficial ownership and control
of the corporate shareholders in both the investing and
investee corporations is necessary.
As explained in the April 21, 2012 Decision, the “doubt”
that demands the application of the Grandfather Rule in
addition to or in tandem with the Control Test is not
confined to, or more bluntly, does not refer to the fact that
the apparent Filipino ownership of the corporation’s equity
falls below the 60% threshold. Rather, “doubt” refers to
various indicia that the “beneficial ownership” and
“control” of the corporation do not in fact reside in
Filipino shareholders but in foreign stakeholders. As
provided in DOJ Opinion No. 165, Series of 1984, which
applied the pertinent provisions of the Anti-Dummy Law in
relation to the minimum Filipino equity requirement in the
Constitution, “significant indicators of the dummy status”
have been recognized in view
_______________
12 See SEC-OGC Opinion No. 03-08 dated 15 January 2008.
479
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 479

of reports “that some Filipino investors or businessmen
are being utilized or [are] allowing themselves to be used as
dummies by foreign investors” specifically in joint ventures
for national resource exploitation. These indicators are:
1. That the foreign investors provide practically all the funds

for the joint investment undertaken by these Filipino
businessmen and their foreign partner;
2. That the foreign investors undertake to provide practically
all the technological support for the joint venture;
3. That the foreign investors, while being minority
stockholders, manage the company and prepare all economic
viability studies.
Thus, In the Matter of the Petition for Revocation of the

Certificate of Registration of Linear Works Realty Develop
ment Corporation,13 the SEC held that when foreigners
contribute more capital to an enterprise, doubt
exists as to the actual control and ownership of the
subject corporation even if the 60% Filipino equity
threshold is met. Hence, the SEC in that one ordered a
further investigation, viz.:
x x x The [SEC Enforcement and Prosecution Department

(EPD)] maintained that the basis for determining the level of
foreign participation is the number of shares subscribed,
regardless of the par value. Applying such an interpretation, the
EPD rules that the foreign equity participation in Linearworks
Realty Development Corporation amounts to 26.41% of the
corporation’s capital stock since the amount of shares subscribed
by foreign nationals is 1,795 only out of the 6,795 shares. Thus,
the subject corporation is compliant with the 40% limit on
foreign equity participation. Accordingly,
_______________
13 SEC En Banc Case No. 07-10-205, November 25, 2010.
480

the EPD dismissed the complaint, and did not pursue any
investigation against the subject corporation.
xxxx
x x x [I]n this respect we find no error in the assailed order
made by the EPD. The EPD did not err when it did not take into
account the par value of shares in determining compliance with
the constitutional and statutory restrictions on foreign equity.
However, we are aware that some unscrupulous
individuals employ schemes to circumvent the
constitutional and statutory restrictions on foreign equity.
In the present case, the fact that the shares of the
Japanese nationals have a greater par value but only have
similar rights to those held by Philippine citizens having
much lower par value, is highly suspicious. This is because a
reasonable investor would expect to have greater control
and economic rights than other investors who invested
less capital than him. Thus, it is reasonable to suspect that
there may be secret arrangements between the corporation and
the stockholders wherein the Japanese nationals who
subscribed to the shares with greater par value actually
have greater control and economic rights contrary to the
equality of shares based on the articles of incorporation.
With this in mind, we find it proper for the EPD to investigate
the subject corporation. The EPD is advised to avail of the
Commission’s subpoena powers in order to gather sufficient
evidence, and file the necessary complaint.
As will be discussed, even if at first glance the

petitioners comply with the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity
ratio, doubt exists in the present case that gives rise to
a reasonable suspicion that the Filipino shareholders do
not actually have the requisite number of control and
beneficial ownership in petitioners Narra, Tesoro, and
McArthur. Hence, a further investigation and dissection of
the extent of the ownership of
481
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 481

the corporate shareholders through the Grandfather

Rule is justified.
Parenthetically, it is advanced that the application of
the Grandfather Rule is impractical as tracing the
shareholdings to the point when natural persons hold
rights to the stocks may very well lead to an investigation
ad infinitum. Suffice it to say in this regard that, while the
Grandfather Rule was originally intended to trace the
shareholdings to the point where natural persons hold the
shares, the SEC had already set up a limit as to the
number of corporate layers the attribution of the
nationality of the corporate shareholders may be applied.
In a 1977 internal memorandum, the SEC suggested
applying the Grandfather Rule on two (2) levels of
corporate relations for publicly-held corporations or where
the shares are traded in the stock exchanges, and to three
(3) levels for closely held corporations or the shares of
which are not traded in the stock exchanges.14 These limits
comply with the requirement in Palting v. San Jose
Petroleum, Inc.15 that the application of the Grandfather
Rule cannot go beyond the level of what is reasonable.
A doubt exists as to the extent of control and

beneficial ownership of MBMI over the petitioners
and their investing corporate stockholders.
In the Decision subject of this recourse, the Court

applied the Grandfather Rule to determine the matter of
true ownership and control over the petitioners as doubt
exists as to the actual extent of the participation of MBMI
in the equity of the petitioners and their investing
corporations.
_______________
14 Supra note 4.
15 No. L-14441, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 924.
482

We considered the following membership and control

structures and like nuances:
Tesoro
Supposedly Filipino corporation Sara Marie Mining, Inc.

(Sara Marie) holds 59.97% of the 10,000 common shares of
petitioner Tesoro while the Canadian-owned company,
MBMI, holds 39.98% of its shares.
In turn, the Filipino corporation Olympic Mines &
Development Corp. (Olympic) holds 66.63% of Sara Marie’s
shares while the same Canadian company MBMI holds
33.31% of Sara Marie’s shares. Nonetheless, it is admitted
that Olympic did not pay a single peso for its shares. On
the contrary, MBMI paid for 99% of the paid-up capital of
Sara Marie.
_______________
16 Emphasis supplied.
483
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 483

The fact that MBMI had practically provided all

the funds in Sara Marie and Tesoro creates serious
doubt as to the true extent of its (MBMI) control and
ownership over both Sara Marie and Tesoro since, as
observed by the SEC, “a reasonable investor would expect
to have greater control and economic rights than other
investors who invested less capital than him.” The
application of the Grandfather Rule is clearly called for,
and as shown below, the Filipinos’ control and economic
benefits in petitioner Tesoro (through Sara Marie) fall
below the threshold 60%, viz.:
Filipino participation in petitioner Tesoro: 40.01%
_______________
484

Foreign participation in petitioner Tesoro: 59.99%
With only 40.01% Filipino ownership in petitioner

Tesoro, as compared to 59.99% foreign ownership of its
shares, it is clear that petitioner Tesoro does not comply
with the minimum Filipino equity requirement imposed in
Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution. Hence, the appellate
court’s observation that Tesoro is a foreign corporation not
entitled to an MPSA is apt.
McArthur
Petitioner McArthur follows the corporate layering

structure of Tesoro, as 59.97% of its 10,000 common shares
is owned by supposedly Filipino Madridejos Mining
Corporation (Madridejos), while 39.98% belonged to the
Canadian MBMI.
_______________
485
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 485

In turn, 66.63% of Madridejos’ shares were held by
Olympic while 33.31% of its shares belonged to MBMI. Yet
again, Olympic did not contribute to the paid-up capital of
Madridejos and it was MBMI that provided 99.79% of the
paid-up capital of Madridejos.
Again, the fact that MBMI had practically

provided all the funds in Madridejos and McArthur
creates serious doubt as to the true extent of its
control and ownership of MBMI over both
Madridejos and McArthur.
_______________
486

The application of the Grandfather Rule is clearly called

for, and as will be shown below, MBMI, along with the
other foreign shareholders, breached the maximum limit of
40% ownership in petitioner McArthur, rendering the
petitioner disqualified to an MPSA:
Filipino participation in petitioner McArthur: 40.01%

As with petitioner Tesoro, with only 40.01% Filipino
ownership in petitioner McArthur, as compared to 59.99%
foreign ownership of its shares, it is clear that petitioner
McArthur does not comply with the minimum Filipino
equity requirement imposed in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the
Constitution. Thus, the appellate court did not err in
holding that petitioner McArthur is a foreign corporation
not entitled to an MPSA.
Narra
As for petitioner Narra, 59.97% of its shares belonged to

Patricia Louise Mining & Development Corporation
(PLMDC), while Canadian MBMI held 39.98% of its
shares.
487
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 487

PLMDC’s shares, in turn, were held by Palawan Alpha

South Resources Development Corporation (PASRDC),
which subscribed to 65.96% of PLMDC’s shares, and the
Canadian MBMI, which subscribed to 33.96% of PLMDC’s
shares.
_______________
488

Yet again, PASRDC did not pay for any of its subscribed
shares, while MBMI contributed 99.75% of PLMDC’s paid-
up capital. This fact creates serious doubt as to the
true extent of MBMI’s control and ownership over
both PLMDC and Narra since “a reasonable investor
would expect to have greater control and economic rights
than other investors who invested less capital than him.”
Thus, the application of the Grandfather Rule is justified.
And as will be shown, it is clear that the Filipino ownership
in petitioner Narra falls below the limit prescribed in both
the Constitution and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Filipino participation in petitioner Narra: 39.64%
489
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 489

With 60.36% foreign ownership in petitioner Narra, as
compared to only 39.64% Filipino ownership of its shares, it
is clear that petitioner Narra does not comply with the
minimum Filipino equity requirement imposed in Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, the appellate
court did not err in holding that petitioner McArthur is a
foreign corporation not entitled to an MPSA.
It must be noted that the foregoing determination and
computation of petitioners’ Filipino equity composition was
based on their common shareholdings, not preferred or
redeemable shares. Section 6 of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines explicitly provides that “no share may be
deprived of voting rights except those classified as
‘preferred’ or ‘redeemable’ shares.” Further, as Justice
Leonen puts it, there is “no indication that any of the
shares x x x do not have voting rights, [thus] it must be
assumed that all such shares have voting rights.”22 It
cannot therefore be gainsaid that the foregoing
computation hewed with the pronouncements of Gamboa,
as implemented by SEC Memorandum Circular No. 8,
Series of 2013, (SEC Memo No. 8)23 Section 2 of which
states:
Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe

the constitutional or statutory requirement. For purposes of
determining compliance therewith, the required percentage of
Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total
outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors; AND (b) the
_______________
22 Dissenting Opinion, p. 499.

23 Otherwise known as the “Guidelines on Compliance With the
Filipino-Foreign Ownership Requirements Prescribed in the Constitution
and/or Existing Laws By Corporations Engaged in Nationalized and
Partly Nationalized Activities,” dated May 20, 2013 and published on May
22, 2013.
490

total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not

entitled to vote in the election of directors.
In fact, there is no indication that herein petitioners
issued any other class of shares besides the 10,000 common
shares. Neither is it suggested that the common shares
were further divided into voting or nonvoting common
shares. Hence, for purposes of this case, items a) and b) in
SEC Memo No. 8 both refer to the 10,000 common shares of
each of the petitioners, and there is no need to separately
apply the 60-40 ratio to any segment or part of the said
common shares.
III.
In mining disputes, the POA has jurisdiction to pass
upon the nationality of applications for MPSAs
Petitioners also scoffed at this Court’s decision to uphold

the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) since the POA’s determination of petitioners’
nationalities is supposedly beyond its limited jurisdiction,
as defined in Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd.24 and Philex
Mining Corp. v. Zaldivia.25
The April 21, 2014 Decision did not dilute, much less
overturn, this Court’s pronouncements in either Gonzales
or Philex Mining that POA’s jurisdiction “is limited only to
mining disputes which raise questions of fact,” and not
judicial questions cognizable by regular courts of justice.
However, to properly recognize and give effect to the
jurisdiction vested in the POA by Section 77 of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995,26
_______________
24 492 Phil. 682; 452 SCRA 607 (2005).

25 150 Phil. 547; 43 SCRA 479 (1972).
26 Section 77 of RA 7942:
Within thirty (30) days, after the submission of the case by the parties
for the decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the following:
491
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 491

and in parallel with this Court’s ruling in Celestial

Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corp.,
27
the Court has recognized in its Decision that in resolving
disputes “involving rights to mining areas” and “involving
mineral agreements or permits,” the POA has jurisdiction
to make a preliminary finding of the required nationality of
the corporate applicant in order to determine its right to a
mining area or a mineral agreement.
There is certainly nothing novel or aberrant in this
approach. In ejectment and unlawful detainer cases, where
the subject of inquiry is possession de facto, the jurisdiction
of the municipal trial courts to make a preliminary
adjudication regarding ownership of the real property
involved is allowed, but only for purposes of ruling on the
determinative issue of material possession.
The present case arose from petitioners’ MPSA
applications, in which they asserted their respective rights
to the mining areas each applied for. Since respondent
Redmont, itself an applicant for exploration permits over
the same mining areas, filed petitions for the denial of
petitioners’ applications, it should be clear that there exists
a controversy between the parties and it is POA’s
jurisdiction to resolve the said dispute. POA’s ruling on
Redmont’s assertion that petitioners are foreign
corporations not entitled to MPSA is but a necessary
incident of its disposition of the mining dispute presented
before it, which is whether the petitioners are entitled to
MPSAs.
_______________
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits.
27 565 Phil 466; 541 SCRA 166 (2007). The Court held: “The phrase
‘disputes involving rights to mining areas’ refers to any adverse claim,
protest, or opposition to an application for mineral agreement. The POA
therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim, protest, or
opposition to a pending application for a mineral agreement filed with the
concerned Regional Office of the MGB. This is clear from Secs. 38 and 41
of the DENR A 96-40 x x x.”
492

Indeed, as the POA has jurisdiction to entertain

“disputes involving rights to mining areas,” it necessarily
follows that the POA likewise wields the authority to pass
upon the nationality issue involving petitioners, since the
resolution of this issue is essential and indispensable in the
resolution of the main issue, i.e., the determination of the
petitioners’ right to the mining areas through MPSAs.
WHEREFORE, We DENY the motion for
reconsideration WITH FINALITY. No further pleadings
shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due
course.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Mendoza and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I dissent from the majority’s Resolution denying with

finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.
I maintain the positions I articulated in my Dissent to the
April 21, 2014 Decision.
I welcome the majority’s statements clarifying the
relative applicability of the Grandfather Rule in relation to
the Control Test. I particularly welcome the clarification
that “it is only when the Control Test is first complied with
that the Grandfather Rule may be applied.”1 This is in line
with the position I articulated in my Dissent to the April
21, 2014 Decision that the Control Test should find priority
in applica-
_______________
1 Narra Nickel v. Redmont, G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA
382, 506 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Special Third Division Resolution].
493
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 493

tion, with the Grandfather Rule being applicable only as

a “supplement.”2
However, I maintain that the Panel of Arbitrators of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR Panel of Arbitrators) never had jurisdiction to rule
on the nationalities of petitioners Narra Nickel Mining and
Development Corp. (Narra), Tesoro Mining and
Development, Inc. (Tesoro), and McArthur Mining, Inc.
(McArthur) and on the question of whether they should be
qualified to hold Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA). It is error for the majority to rule that petitioners
are foreign corporations proceeding from the actions of a
body which never had jurisdiction and competence to rule
on the judicial question of nationality.
Likewise, I maintain that respondent Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont) engaged in blatant
forum shopping. This, the lack of jurisdiction and
competence of the DENR Panel of Arbitrators, and the
error of proceeding from the acts of an incompetent body
are sufficient grounds for granting the Petition and should
suffice as bases for granting the present Motion for
Reconsideration.
I
The DENR Panel of Arbitrators had no competence
to rule on the Petitions filed by Redmont
The jurisdiction of the DENR Panel of Arbitrators is

spelled out in Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942,
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (the
“Mining Act”):
Section 77. Panel of Arbitrators.—. . . . Within thirty (30)

working days, after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision, the panel shall have exclusive
_______________
2 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, id.
494

and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the

following:
(a) Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

(b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permit;
(c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires; and
(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at
the date of the effectivity of this Act.
The April 21, 2014 Decision sustained the jurisdiction of

the DENR Panel of Arbitrators, relying on pronouncements
made in Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corporation v.
Macroasia Corp.3 which construed the phrase “disputes
involving rights to mining areas” as referring “to any
adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an application for
mineral agreement.”4
However, the Decision interpreted Section 77 of the
Mining Act in a manner that runs afoul of this court’s
pronouncements in its Decision penned by Associate
Justice Dante Tinga in Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd.5
and in its Decision penned by Associate Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Philex Mining Corp. v. Zaldivia.6
As pointed out in my Dissent to the April 21, 2014
Decision, “Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd.,7 ruled on the
jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators as follows”:
_______________
3 565 Phil. 466; 541 SCRA 166 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second
Division].
4 Id., at p. 499; p. 199.
5 492 Phil. 682; 452 SCRA 607 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
6 150 Phil. 547; 43 SCRA 479 (1972) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
7 Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd., supra.
495
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 495

We now come to the meat of the case which revolves mainly

around the question of jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators:
Does the Panel of Arbitrators have jurisdiction over the complaint
for declaration of nullity and/or termination of the subject
contracts on the ground of fraud, oppression and violation of the
Constitution? This issue may be distilled into the more basic
question of whether the Complaint raises a mining dispute or a
judicial question.
A judicial question is a question that is proper for
determination by the courts, as opposed to a moot
question or one properly decided by the executive or
legislative branch. A judicial question is raised when the
determination of the question involves the exercise of a judicial
function; that is, the question involves the determination of what
the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect
to the matter in controversy.
On the other hand, a mining dispute is a dispute involving (a)
rights to mining areas, (b) mineral agreements, FTAAs, or
permits, and (c) surface owners, occupants and
claimholders/concessionaires. Under Republic Act No. 7942
(otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995), the
Panel of Arbitrators has exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear
and decide these mining disputes. The Court of Appeals, in its
questioned decision, correctly stated that the Panel’s
jurisdiction is limited only to those mining disputes which
raise questions of fact or matters requiring the application
of technological knowledge and experience.8 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)
Philex Mining Corp. v. Zaldivia9 settled what “questions
of fact” are appropriate for resolution in a mining dispute:
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 692-693; pp. 619-620, as cited in J. Leonen, Dissenting

Opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, supra note 1 at pp. 452-453.
9 Philex Mining Corp. v. Zaldivia, supra note 6.
496

We see nothing in [S]ections 61 and 73 of the Mining Law that

indicates a legislative intent to confer real judicial power upon the
Director of Mines. The very terms of [S]ection 73 of the Mining
Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 4388, in requiring that the
adverse claim must “state in full detail the nature, boundaries
and extent of the adverse claim” show that the conflicts to be
decided by reason of such adverse claim refer primarily to
questions of fact. This is made even clearer by the explanatory
note to House Bill No. 2522, later to become Republic Act 4388,
that “[S]ections 61 and 73 that refer to the overlapping of claims
are amended to expedite resolutions of mining conflicts * * *.”
The controversies to be submitted and resolved by the
Director of Mines under the sections refer ther[e]fore only
to the overlapping of claims and administrative matters
incidental thereto.10 (Emphasis supplied)
The DENR Panel of Arbitrators, as its name denotes, is

an arbitral body. It is not a court of law. Its competence
rests in its capacity to resolve factual issues arising
between parties with competing mining claims and
requiring the application of technical expertise.
In this case, Redmont has not even shown that it has a
competing mining claim. It has asked only that petitioners
be declared as not qualified to enter into MPSAs.
By sustaining the jurisdiction of the DENR Panel of
Arbitrators, the majority effectively diminishes (if not
totally abandons) the distinction made in Gonzales and
Philex between “mining disputes” and “judicial questions.”
Per Gonzales and Philex, judicial questions are cognizable
only by courts of justice, not by the DENR Panel of
Arbitrators.
The majority’s reference to Celestial takes out of context
the pronouncements made therein. To reiterate what I
have
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 553-554; p. 484, as cited in J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion

in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, supra note 1 at p. 454.
497
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 497

stated in my Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision,

“[t]he pronouncements in Celestial cited by the ponencia
were made to address the assertions of Celestial Nickel and
Mining Corporation (Celestial Nickel) and Blue Ridge
Mineral Corporation (Blue Ridge) that the Panel of
Arbitrators had the power to cancel existing mineral
agreements pursuant to Section 77 of the Mining Act. . . .
These pronouncements did not undo or abandon the
distinction, clarified in Gonzales, between judicial
questions and mining disputes.”11
The crux of this case relates to a matter that is beyond
the competence of the DENR Panel of Arbitrators. It does
not pertain to the intricacies and specifications of mining
operations. Rather, it pertains to the legal status of
petitioners and the rights or inhibitions accruing to them
on account of their status. It pertains to a judicial question.
II
On the applicability of the Grandfather Rule
I maintain the position I elucidated in my Dissent to the

April 21, 2014 Decision. The Control Test, rather than the
Grandfather Rule, finds priority application in reckoning
the nationalities of corporations engaged in nationalized
economic activities.
The Grandfather Rule finds no basis in the text of the
1987 Constitution. It is true that the records of the
Constitutional Commission “indicate an affirmative
reference to the Grandfather Rule.”12 However, whatever
references these records make to the Grandfather Rule is
not indicative of a consensus among all members of the
Constitutional Commission. At most, these references are
advisory and not binding on this
_______________
11 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, id.

12 Id., at p. 489.
498

court.13 Ultimately, what is controlling is the text of the

Constitution itself. This text is silent on the precise means
of reckoning foreign ownership.
In contrast, the Control Test is firmly enshrined by
congressional dictum in a statute, specifically, Republic Act
No. 8179, otherwise known as the Foreign Investments Act
(FIA). As this court has pointed out, “[t]he FIA is the basic
law governing foreign investments in the Philippines,
irrespective of the nature of business and area of
investment.”14
Section 3(a) of the Foreign Investments Act defines a
“Philippine national” as including “a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty
percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled
to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines.” In
my Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision:
This is a definition that is consistent with the first part of

paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules, which [originally articulated]
the Control Test: “[s]hares belonging to corporations or
partnerships at least 60 percent of the capital
_______________
13 To reiterate what I stated in my Dissent in Narra Nickel v.

Redmont, id., at p. 491:
In the final analysis, the records of the Constitutional Commission do
not bind this court. As Charles P. Curtis, Jr. said on the role of history in
constitutional exegesis:
The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we
could discover what it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the
Constitution, that is to say, what they meant when they did not say it,
surely that has no binding force upon us. If we look behind or beyond what
they set down in the document, prying into what else they wrote and what
they said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may sit in at our
councils. There is no reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs.
14 Heirs of Wilson P. Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, October 9,
2012, 682 SCRA 397, 435 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
499
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 499

of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of
Philippine nationality.”15
The Control Test serves the rationale for nationalization

of economic activities. It ensures effective control by
Filipinos and satisfies the requirement of beneficial
ownership.
On the matter of control, my Dissent to the April 21,
2014 Decision explained that:
It is a matter of transitivity16 that if Filipino stockholders

control a corporation which, in turn, controls another corporation,
then the Filipino stockholders control the latter corporation,
albeit indirectly or through the former corporation.
An illustration is apt.
Suppose that a corporation, “C,” is engaged in a nationalized
activity requiring that 60% of its capital be owned by Filipinos
and that this 60% is owned by another corporation, “B,” while the
remaining 40% is owned by stockholders, collectively referred to
as “Y.” Y is composed entirely of foreign nationals. As for B, 60%
of its capital is owned by stockholders collectively referred to as
“A,” while the remaining 40% is owned by stockholders
collectively referred to as “X.” The collective A, is composed
entirely of Philippine nationals, while the collective X is composed
entirely of foreign nationals. (N.b., in this illustration, capital is
understood to mean “shares
_______________
15 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, supra

note 1 at p. 493.
16 I.e., “([o]f a relation) such that, if it applies between successive
members of a sequence, it must also apply between any two members
taken in order. For instance, if A is larger than B, and B is larger than C,
then A is larger than C” <http://www.oxford
dictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/transitive>.
500

of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors,” per the

definition in Gamboa).17 Thus:
By owning 60% of B’s capital, A controls B. Likewise, by
owning 60% of C’s capital, B controls C. From this, it follows, as a
matter of transitivity, that A controls C; albeit indirectly, that is,
through B.
This “control” holds true regardless of the aggregate foreign
capital in B and C. As explained in Gamboa, control by
stockholders is a matter resting on the ability to vote in the
election of directors:
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to
participate in the control or management of the corporation. This
is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it
is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation.
18
B will not be outvoted by Y in matters relating to C, while A
will not be outvoted by X in matters relating to B. Since all
actions taken by B must necessarily be in conformity with the will
of A, anything that B does in re-
_______________
17 Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011, 652 SCRA 690,
723 and 726 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc] as cited in J. Leonen, Dissenting
Opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, supra note 1.
18 Id., at p. 725.
501
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 501

lation to C is, in effect, in conformity with the will of A. No

amount of aggregating the foreign capital in B and C will enable
X to outvote A, nor Y to outvote B.
In effect, A controls C, through B. Stated otherwise, the
collective Filipinos in A, effectively control C, through their control
of B.19
From the definition of “beneficial owner or beneficial

ownership” provided by the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (amended 2004) of Republic Act No. 8799,
otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, “there
are two (2) ways through which one may be a beneficial
owner of securities, such as shares of stock: first, by having
or sharing voting power; and second, by having or sharing
investment returns or power.”20 The Implementing Rules
use “and/or”; thus, these are alternative means which may
or may not concur.
On the first — voting power — my Dissent to the April
21, 2014 Decision pointed out that:
Voting power, as discussed previously, ultimately rests on the

controlling stockholders of the controlling investor corporation. To
go back to the previous illustration, voting power ultimately rests
on A, it having the voting power in B which, in turn, has the
voting power in C.21
On the second — investment returns or power — the

same Dissent pointed out that:
As to investment returns or power, it is ultimately A which

enjoys investment power. It controls B’s investment decisions —
including the disposition of securities held by B — and (again,
through B) controls C’s investment decisions.
_______________

note 1 at pp. 496-498.
20 Id., at p. 502.
21 Id.
502

Similarly, it is ultimately A which benefits from investment

returns generated through C. Any income generated by C
redounds to B’s benefit, that is, through income obtained from C,
B gains funds or assets which it can use either to finance itself in
respect of capital and/or operations. This is a direct benefit to B,
itself a Philippine national. This is also an indirect benefit to A, a
collectivity of Philippine nationals, as then, its business — B —
not only becomes more viable as a going concern but also becomes
equipped to funnel income to A.
Moreover, beneficial ownership need not be direct. A
controlling shareholder is deemed the indirect beneficial owner of
securities (e.g., shares) held by a corporation of which he or she is
a controlling shareholder. Thus, in the previous illustration, A,
the controlling shareholder of B, is the indirect beneficial owner of
the shares in C to the extent that they are held by B.22
However, 60 percent equity ownership is but a
minimum. It is in this regard that the Dissent to the April
21, 2014 Decision recognized that the Grandfather Rule
properly finds application as a “supplement” to the Control
Test:
Bare ownership of 60% of a corporation’s shares would not

suffice. What is necessary is such ownership as will ensure control
of a corporation.
In Gamboa, “[f]ull beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting
rights, is required.”23 With this in mind, the Grandfather
Rule may be used as a supplement to the Control Test, that
is, as a further check to ensure that control and beneficial
ownership of a corporation is in fact lodged in Filipinos.
_______________
22 Id.
23 Gamboa v. Teves, supra note 17 at p. 730, as cited in J. Leonen,
Dissenting Opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, id., at p. 500.
503
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 503

For instance, Department of Justice Opinion No. 165, Series of

1984, identified the following “significant indicators” or badges of
“dummy status”:
1. That the foreign investor provides practically all the funds
for the joint investment undertaken by Filipino businessmen and
their foreign partner[;]
2. That the foreign investors undertake to provide practically
all the technological support for the joint venture[; and]
3. That the foreign investors, while being minority
stockholders, manage the company and prepare all economic
viability studies2424
In instances where methods are employed to disable Filipinos
from exercising control and reaping the economic benefits of an
enterprise, the ostensible control vested by ownership of 60% of a
corporation’s capital may be pierced. Then, the Grandfather Rule
allows for a further, more exacting examination of who actually
controls and benefits from holding such capital.25
The majority’s Resolution denying the present Motion

for Reconsideration recognizes that the Grandfather Rule
alone does not suffice for reckoning Filipino and foreign
equity ownership in corporations engaged in nationalized
economic activities. The majority echoes the
characterization of the applicability of the Grandfather
Rule as only supplementary26 and explains:
The Grandfather Rule, standing alone, should not be used to

determine the Filipino ownership and control
_______________
24 Sec. of Justice Op No. 165, S. 1984, as cited in J. Leonen,

Dissenting Opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, id., at p. 506.
25 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Narra Nickel v. Redmont, id., at
pp. 506-507.
26 Id.
504

in a corporation, as it could result to an otherwise foreign

corporation rendered qualified to perform nationalized or partly
nationalized activities. Hence, it is only when the Control Test
is first complied with that the Grandfather Rule may be
applied. Put in another manner, if the subject corporation’s
Filipino equity falls below the threshold 60%, the corporation is
immediately considered foreign-owned, in which case, the need to
resort to the Grandfather Rule disappears.
On the other hand, a corporation that complies with the
60-40 Filipino to foreign equity requirement can be
considered a Filipino corporation if there is no doubt as to
who has the “beneficial ownership” and “control” of the
corporation. In that instance, there is no need for a
dissection or further inquiry on the ownership of the corporate
shareholders in both the investing and investee corporation or
the application of the Grandfather Rule. As a corollary rule,
even if the 60-40 Filipino to foreign equity is apparently met by
the subject or investee corporation, a resort to the Grandfather
Rule is necessary if doubt exists as to the locus of the
“beneficial ownership” and “control.”27
III
Proceeding from the actions of the
DENR Panel of Arbitrators is improper
Following the above quoted portion in its discussion, the

majority states that “[i]n this case, a further investigation
as to the nationality of the personalities with the beneficial
ownership and control of the corporate shareholders in both
the investing and investee corporations is necessary.”28
_______________
27 Narra Nickel v. Redmont, id. Emphasis and underscoring from the

original, citation omitted.
28 Id.
505
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 505

The majority then proceeds to an analysis of the equity

structures of petitioners. The analysis notes that 59.97% of
Narra’s 10,000 shares29 is held by Patricia Louise Mining
and Development Corporation (Patricia Louise), 65.96% of
whose shares is, in turn, held by Palawan Alpha South
Resources Development Corporation (PASRDC). It adds
that 59.97% of Tesoro’s 10,000 common shares is held by
Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (Sara Marie), a Filipino
corporation, 66.63% of whose shares is, in turn, held by
Olympic Mines and Development Corporation (Olympic),
another Filipino corporation. Finally, 59.97% of McArthur’s
10,000 common shares is held by Madridejos Mining
Corporation (Madridejos), a Filipino corporation, 66.63% of
whose shares is, in turn, held by Olympic.
The majority also notes that 39.98% of Narra’s shares is
held by Canadian corporation MBMI Resources, Inc.
(MBMI), while 39.98% of Tesoro’s and McArthur’s common
shares is held by MBMI.30 It adds that in the case of the
majority shareholder of Narra (i.e., Patricia Louise),
33.96% of its shares is owned by MBMI, while in the cases
of the respective majority shareholders of Tesoro and
McArthur (i.e., Sara Marie, and Madridejos, respectively),
33.31% of their shares is held by MBMI.
The respective Filipino majority shareholders of Patricia
Louise, Sara Marie, and Madridejos (i.e., PASRDC in the
case of Patricia Louise, and Olympic in the cases of Sara
Marie and Madridejos) did not pay for shares. Instead,
MBMI paid for their respective paid-up capital. The
majority concludes, applying the Grandfather Rule, that a
foreign corporation — MBMI — breached the permissible
maximum of 40% foreign equity participation in the three
(3) petitioner corporations and that
_______________
29 The majority’s Resolution fails to specify if these are all common

shares.
30 The majority’s Resolution also fails to specify if these are all
common shares.
506

petitioners are foreign corporations not entitled to

mineral production sharing agreements.
My Dissent to the April 21, 2014 Decision noted the
inadequacy of relying merely on the denomination of shares
as common or preferred:
Proceeding from the findings of the Court of Appeals in its

October 1, 2010 decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109703, it appears
that at least 60% of equities in Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur is
owned by Philippine nationals. Per this initial analysis, Narra,
Tesoro, and McArthur ostensibly satisfy the requirements of the
Control Test in order that they may be deemed Filipino
corporations.
Attention must be drawn to how these findings fail to indicate
which (fractional) portion of these equities consist of “shares of
stock entitled to vote in the election of directors” or, if there is
even any such portion of shares which are not entitled to vote.
These findings fail to indicate any distinction between common
shares and preferred shares (not entitled to vote). Absent a basis
for reckoning nonvoting shares, there is, thus, no basis for
diminishing the 60% Filipino equity holding in Narra, Tesoro, and
McArthur and undermining their having ostensibly satisfied the
requirements of the Control Test in order to be deemed Filipino
corporations qualified to enter into MPSAs.31
It is the majority’s position that the mere reckoning of

how shares are denominated — whether common or
preferred — suffices. I, however, proffer an analysis that
requires looking into the actual voting rights vested on
each class of shares. While it is true that preferred shares
are generally viewed as nonvoting shares, a conclusion that
the preferred shares involved in this case are totally bereft
of voting rights is not warranted by a cursory consideration
of how they are denominated.
_______________

note 1 at pp. 507-508.
507
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 507

The same Dissent conceded that a “more thorough

consideration . . . could yield an entirely different
conclusion.”32 This is what the majority endeavors to
embark on. However, it is improper to proceed, as the
majority does, from the action of a body without
competence and jurisdiction as well as the imprudent acts
of forum shopping of Redmont, and, in the process, lend
legitimacy to the DENR Panel of Arbitrators’ and
Redmont’s illicit actions:
Having made these observations, it should not be discounted

that a more thorough consideration — as has been intimated in
the earlier disquisition regarding how 60% Filipino equity
ownership is but a minimum and how the Grandfather Rule may
be applied to further examine actual Filipino ownership — could
yield an entirely different conclusion. In fact, Redmont has
asserted that such a situation avails.
However, the contingencies of this case must restrain the
court’s consideration of Redmont’s claims. Redmont sought
relief from a body without jurisdiction — the Panel of
Arbitrators — and has engaged in blatant forum shopping.
It has taken liberties with and ran amok of rules that
define fair play. It is, therefore, bound by its lapses and
indiscretions and must bear the consequences of its
imprudence.33
IV
Redmont engaged in blatant forum shopping
It would be remiss of this court to overlook Redmont’s

acts of forum shopping. To do so would enable Redmont to
profit from its own imprudence and for this court to
countenance a manifest disrespect for courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. As
_______________
32 Id., at p. 514.
33 Id.
508

extensively discussed in my Dissent to the April 21,

2014 Decision:
Redmont has taken at least four (4) distinct routes all seeking
substantially the same remedy. Stripped of their verbosity and
legalese, Redmont’s petitions before the DENR Panel of
Arbitrators, complaint before the Regional Trial Court, complaint
before the Securities and Exchange Commission, and petition
before the Office of the President all seek to prevent Narra,
Tesoro, and McArthur as well as their corespondents and/or co-
defendants from engaging in mining operations. Moreover, these
are all grounded on the same cause (i.e., that they are disqualified
from doing so because they fail to satisfy the requisite Filipino
equity ownership) and premised on the same facts or
circumstances.
Redmont has created a situation where multiple tribunals
must rule on the extent to which the parties adverse to Redmont
have met the requisite Filipino equity ownership. It is certainly
possible that conflicting decisions will be issued by the various
tribunals over which Redmont’s various applications for relief
have been lodged. It is, thus, glaring that the very evil sought to
be prevented by the rule against forum shopping is being foisted
by Redmont.
....
It strains credulity to accept that Redmont’s actions have not
been willful. By filing petitions with the DENR Panel of
Arbitrators, Redmont started the entire series of events that have
culminated in: first, the present petition; second, the de-
consolidated G.R. No. 205513; and third, at least one (1) more
petition filed with this court.34
Following the adverse decision of the Panel of Arbitrators,
Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur pursued appeals before the Mines
Adjudication Board. This is all but a logical consequence of the
POA’s adverse decision. While
_______________
34 Arising from Redmont’s Petition with the Office of the President.
509
VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 509

the appeal before the MAB was pending, Redmont filed a

complaint with the SEC and then filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court to enjoin the MAB from proceeding.
Redmont seems to have conveniently forgotten that it was its own
actions that gave rise to the proceedings before the MAB in the
first place. Moreover, even as all these were pending and in
various stages of appeal and/or review, Redmont still filed a
petition before the Office of the President.
Consistent with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the actions subject of these consolidated petitions must
be dismissed with prejudice.35
Apart from the Petition subject of the present Motion for

Reconsideration, two (2) other cases involving the same
parties are now pending with this court. The first, G.R. No.
205513, relates to a Complaint for Revocation of the
certificates of registration of Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur
filed by Redmont with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. G.R. No. 205513 was consolidated but later
de-consolidated with this case. The second is a case
pending with this court’s First Division. This relates to the
Petition filed by Redmont with the Office of the President
in which it sought the cancellation of the financial or
technical assistance agreement (FTAA) applications of
Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur.
That there are now three (3) simultaneously pending
Petitions with this court is the result of Redmont’s
contemporaneously having sought remedies from:
1. The DENR Panel of Arbitrators;
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission;
3. The Regional Trial Court, Quezon City; and
4. The Office of the President.
While this and the two other cases pending with this
court diverge as to the procedural routes they have taken,
they all
_______________
35 Id., at pp. 53-55.
510

boil down to the central issue of the nationalities of

Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. It is manifest that Redmont
engaged in blatant forum shopping. The April 21, 2014
Decision effectively rewarded Redmont’s abuse of court
processes. Worse, maintaining the status quo of having a
multiplicity of cases reinforces the stance of leaving
Redmont to reap the benefits of its unconscionable scheme.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to grant the Motion for
Reconsideration. I reiterate my vote to GRANT the
Petition for Review on Certiorari subject of G.R. No.
195580. The assailed Decision dated October 1, 2010 and
the assailed Resolution dated February 15, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals Seventh Division in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
109703, which reversed and set aside the September 10,
2008 and July 1, 2009 Orders of the Mines Adjudication
Board, should be SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL
AND VOID. The September 10, 2008 Order of the Mines
Adjudication Board dismissing the Petitions filed by
Redmont Consolidated Mines with the DENR Panel of
Arbitrators must be REINSTATED.
Motion for Reconsideration denied with finality.
Basically, there are two acknowledged tests in

determining the nationality of a corporation: the control
test and the grandfather rule. (Narra Nickel Mining and
Development Corp. vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp.,
722 SCRA 382 [2014])
——o0o——
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G.R. No. 195580. January 28, 2015.

NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Moot and

* SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION.

Similarly, Section 3(aq) of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995

VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 457

beneficial ownership of a mining corporation may be

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

shareholdings to the point where natural persons hold the

VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 459

trators) never had jurisdiction to rule on the nationalities of

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Control Test serves the rationale for nationalization of

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of its

VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 461

In a strongly worded Motion for Reconsideration dated

Petitioners have first off criticized the Court for

462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

assuming that the controversy has been rendered moot,

1 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the

VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 463

plained in some detail that all four (4) of the foregoing

464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

versy are capable of repetition yet evading review

To petitioners, the Court’s application of the

The application of the Grandfather Rule in the

Clearly, petitioners have misread, and failed to

3 Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, effective April 14, 1995.

VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 465

as a “supplement” to the Control Test so that the intent

In ending, the “control test” is still the prevailing mode of

With that, the use of the Grandfather Rule as a

To reiterate, Sec. 2, Art. XII of the Constitution reserves

466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ownership. It cannot, therefore, be denied that the

MR. NOLLEDO: In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee

As further defined by Dean Cesar Villanueva, the

4 Villanueva, Cesar Lapuz, Philippine Corporate Law, p. 54 (2001).

VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 467

tion, both the direct and indirect shareholdings in the

5 SEC. 127. Tax on Sale, Barter or Exchange of Shares of Stock

468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tions. Thus, in BIR Ruling No. 148-10, Commissioner

In the case of a multi-tiered corporation, the stock

In SEC-OGC Opinion No. 10-31 dated December 9, 2010

of record by not more than a specified number of persons, not

VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 469

You allege that the structure of MML’s ownership in

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

we must delve into the citizenship of the individual

Similarly, in the eponymous Redmont Consolidated

[D]oubt, we believe, exists in the instant case because

8 SEC En Banc Case No. 09-09-177, March 25, 2010.

VOL. 748, JANUARY 28, 2015 471

this subscription while MBMI paid P2,803,900.00 out of its

The method employed in the Grandfather Rule of

472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED