Jiabs 14-1
Jiabs 14-1
Jiabs 14-1
'71
170
lIABS VOL. 14 NO. 1
goes back to Tsong-kha-pa and rests on the general principle
that for all except Consequentialists, there must exist at least
one of all existent imputations, an illustration find-
able among its bases of imputation. Just as any illustni.tion of
table-for instance, wooden table-must be a table, so the
illustration of the person must be a person. We read in Tsang_ :
kha-pa's Illumination qf the Thought (his commentary on C andra_
kIrti's MadhyamakiivatiirabhiifYa) :57 .
This master [Bhavaviveka], because he does not assert a funda_
mental consciousness [says] that the consciousness which
appropriates the body is the mental consciousness. The others
who do not assert a fundamental consciousness are similar to
him. Those who do assert a fundamental consciousness say
that it is just this fundamental consciousness. that is the illustra-
tion of the person.
Furthermore, although these [non-Consequentialist] sys-
tems [of Buddhist doctrine] assert that Hearers [fravakas] and
Solitary Realizers [pratyekabuddhas] of the Modest Vehicle [kina-
. yana] realize the non-existence of a substantially existent per-
son, they do not realize the non-existence as a substantial entity
of [either of] those two consciousnesses [i.e., the mental con-
sciousness or the fundamental consciousness]. Hence, the posi-
tion that the person is not substantially existent in the sense of .
being self-sufficient is an assertion made within the context of
the self-isolate [rang-ldag] of the person [-that is, the person
itself]. There is no such assertion made concerning the con-
sciousness which is the illustration of the person.
When it comes time to posit something which is the person
imputed to the psychophysical aggregates, an illustration must
be presented. In the case of Asanga's Yogacara School, this is
the fundamental consciousness (iilayavijfiiina). Although the
fundamental consciousness is the illustration of the imputed
person, it is itself substantially existent. Moreover, since it is an
illustration of the person, or self, it is a person or self. It must,
therefore, be said to be a substantially existent self.58 What is
being rejected by Tsong-kha-pa and his followers is a self
which is substantially existent in the sense of being self-
sufficient (rang rkya thub paJi rdzas yod).59 The substantially exis-
tent self asserted by the VatslputrIyas is said to be such a self. 60
PUDGALAV ADA IN TIBET? l7l
dGe-lugs-pas hold that Buddhist philosophers, with the
exception of Consequentialists, do not reject substantial exis-
tence-more precisely, whereas they reject one kind of substan-
tial existence, they accept another, at least for some
phenomena. At sGo-mang College, the distinction is made
between the following types of substantial existence:
51
1 substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency (rang skya
thub paJi rdzas yod), where this is taken to mean an ability on
the part of a thing to stand by itself without depending on
bases of designations or on parts;
2 substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficiently ap-
prehensible (rang rkya Hzin thub pa)i rdzas yo d) , taken to mean
the ability to appear as an object of consciousness without
reliance on an other entity, for example, the prior elimination
of an object of negation.
A pot, for example, is the second but not the first. It is self-suffi-
ciently apprehensible because it may be directly perceived (by,
for instance, a visual consciousness) without the prior elimina-
tion of an object of negation. It is, however, not self-sufficient,
because it is not established independently of its parts.
52
All of
the illustrations of the person presented by Gung-thang and
Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan on behalf of the various Buddhist doc-
trinal systems would, for sGo-mang scholars, be substantially
existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible,
but none would be substantially existent in the sense of self-
sufficiency; all depend on their parts.
We thus see dGe-lugs-pas claiming that all Buddhists save
Consequentialists assert two types of persons:
(a) an imputedly existent person
(b) a substantially existent person which is the illustration
ofthe imputed person.
The imputed person, the person itself, is an imputation made
to some basis or bases of imputation among the psychophysi-
cal aggregates. That person in no way substantially exists;
since something whose entity is other than the person-the
aggregates-must first appear as a basis for the designation
172
]IABS VOL. 14 NO. I
"person." However, the illustration of that person-the mental
consciousness or the fundamental consciousness-does sub.
stantially' exist; it is self-sufficiently apprehensible and not
merely a designation made in dependeflce on something else.
The person or self that is refuted in the doctrine of selfless.
ness is the self-sufficient person; although it appears to exist
among the aggregates that are its bases of designation, it can
be shown that there is no self-sufficient person there.
63
The
Consequentialist Middle Way School additionally refutes even
the substantially existent person the other schools accept.
They say that when an illustration of the imputedly existent
person is sought, nothing substantial will be found; there are
merely imputedly existent aggregates with no substantial
basis.
64
The Consequentialist assertion, according to dGe-Iugs.
pas, of a person which is a merely impui-ed "mere-I" (nga tsam)
serves the same function as other Buc1 ... hists' assertion of a sub ..
stantially existent consciousness or continuum of aggregates as .
the person. For, their mere-I exists on a par with other
phenomena; in Consequentialist philosophy, everything that
exists is merely imputedly existent.
The Person as Agent
Both the substantially existent illustrations of the p e r ~ o n , such
as the fundamental consciousness, and the imputedly existent
mere I of the Consequentialists are posited as transmigrators-
takers of rebirth from life to life. Thus, they are posited for the
sake of presenting a basis whereby intentional moral and
immoral actions (karma) may be connected with effects at a
later time, typically after the death of the one doi?g the action. 65
Gung-thang makes the point that whereas Sariputra's fun
damental conciol.lsness is a transmigrator, it is not a monk
(even though Sariputra, of course, is a monk). A transmigrator
is a person posited from the viewpoint of the psychophysical
aggregates as karmic fruitions; a monk, however, is an instance
of an imputed person-the monk is dependent on having a pre-
ceptor, assuming and keeping certain vows, and so forth.66
Similarly, if my own fundamental consciousness were a human
or were Joe Wilson (both of which are imputations and neither
of which are substantially existent), it would have a mother, yet
it is absurd to speak of a consciousness having a mother. 67
PUDGALAV ADA IN TIBET? 173
Gung-thang places this in the context of ethics when he says
that although Ajatasatru's fundamental consciousness is an
o that is an illustration of Ajatasatru and, thus, an ego that
illustration of a patricide, his fundamental consciousness
. a patricide.
68
To say that the fundamental consciousness
an ego that is an illustration of something is not to say that if
one searches for that thing, one finds the fundamental con-
sciousness.
69
When one says that Aj atasatru's fundamental con-
sciousness is the ego that is the illustration of a killer, this
'means that if one seeks the killer of Bimbisara, Ajatasatru will
.. be turned up, but not his fundamental consciousness. The fun-
. damental consciousness is not the killer; however, the I or ego
that is the killer is the fundamental consciousness. A funda-
mental consciousness, Gung-thang says, is neither an agent
.nor an experiencer. It can only be the ego found when the
. agent or experiencer is sought among its bases of designation.
Consequentialists disagree with other Buddhist doc-
trinalists when they say that the mere-I that is Ajatasatru's
basis of conception of I exists beginninglessly. The others say
that if the basis of designation of the imputedly existent I is
sought it will be found among the aggregates of this lifetime.
For non-Consequentialists, Ajatasatru and his aggregates are
contemporaneous.
70
Consequentialists speak of the mere-I as a
shared I that exists over many lifetimes, past, present, and
future.
7l
They say that this mere-I is the basis of the thought
"I" when someone clairvoyantly remembers a former lifetime
and is the basis of that person's acting ethically due to fear that
he will suffer in a future lifetime should he do otherwise.72 An
individual such as Ajatasatru is not this mere-I. "Ajatasatru's
I" is only a particular instance of the mere-I of his continuum;
.' Tsong-kha-pa calls it "the minor self of an individual rebirth."73
Conclusions
.Certain things have become evident in this brief examination
of assertions on selves and selflessness. First, it is clear that
there are many different senses in which the word "self" is
used, even when used in the term "selflessness."74 Within the
selflessness of persons, a division is made into coarse and sub-
tle selflessnesses. Vatslputrlyas are able to maintain their
174 jIABS VOL. 14 NO.1
standing as Buddhists because, while they do propound a self-
sufficient person, they reject the coarse self-a permanent
partless, and independent person. The Tibetan and
writers examined in this article are able to assert the existent
self as they do because they clearly differentiate it from the sub_
tle nonexistent self. That is, they interpret non-Consequen_
tialist Buddhist doctrinalists to be rejecting a self-sufficient self
but (at least from the viewpoint of sGo-mang College) to be
asserting a self-sufficiently apprehensible illustration of the per-
son. The distinctions they make within substantial existence
particularly that between self-sufficiency and
apprehensibility, seem to be novel to them; if they have their
origin in the works of such Indian scholars as Asanga, it must
be said that such origin is by way of suggestion or implication
rather than explicit indication.
I t is further apparent that there are some similarities and
some dissimilarities between the analyses of person and per-
sonal identity made by these modern Tibeto-Mongolian
philosophers and analyses of personal identity made by mod-
ern Anglo-American philosophers.
Both are clearly identifying an entity within the context of
moral responsibility, but from different viewpoints. However,
where Western philosophers regard the person as being a
rational, responsible entity, a self-aware being who is an actor
in the moral sphere,75 the Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhist
philosophers examined in this paper hold a position that
implies a different perspective. Whereas one can speak of a
designation-the imputedly existent person-which is an actor
and is therefore morally responsible, once one turns and seeks
an illustration of this person, what is found is not an actor and
therefore not morally responsible.
This is because what is found is either nothing (according
to the Consequentialists) or is a subtle type of consciousness
that is neither virtuous nor nonvirtuous-i.e., not morally
definitive (lung du ma bstan pa, myakrta) -such as the fundamen-
tal consciousness.
76
Actions are for most Buddhists really
fulfilled intentions, and thus mental in nature. 77 This, however,
is not enough: moral actions must definitively be either virtu-
ous or nonvirtuous. The substantially existent person, which is
the ground of personal continuity and thus the entity that car-
PUDGALAV ADA IN TIBET? 175
the seeds left by actions / intentions, must be neither virtu-
nor nonvirtuous. Were it otherwise, it would not be able to
while its opposite was present; for, virtuous minds
nonvirtuous minds are incompatible and cannot coexis.t at
same time in the same place.
78
Were the person one or the
it would cease as soon as its inimical opposite arose and
"UJ''''--'
that case personal continuity would be lost.
Buddhists posit substantially existent persons within the
sphere, but they are not actors. They do, however, serve
make moral responsibility possible. Illustrations of the per-
such as the fundamental consciousness, the basis carry-
the seeds left by moral and immoral actions, are merely
mechanisms by which an action can bring about a later
They are persons because they survive over time; they ,
not selves (that is, as the term is used in "selflessness")
within that continuity they change and because they
of temporally discrete parts, and therefore not
1. Journal qf Indian Philosophy 17:43-59 (1989).
2. Ibid., p. 43.
3. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
4. Matthew Kapstein, "Collins, Parfit, and the problem of personal
in two philosophical traditions-A review of Selfless Persons by Steven
and Reasons' and Persons ,by Derek Parflt" (Philosophy East and T#st 36/3
289-298), p. 295.
5. Steven Collins, Selfless Persons (Cambridge: Cambridge University
1982), p. 3.
6. Roger Corless says, in his recent book, The Vision qf Buddhism (New
York: Paragon House, 1989), p. xx: "It is my contention that history, a western,
post-Christian, academic discipline, is non-Buddhist, even anti-Buddhist ... and,
hence, any attempt to explain Buddhism primariTy by means of its history
obscures, and sometimes destroys, the reality, that is, the Buddhism that it is
trying to study and explain."
7. "Buddhist Hybrid English: Some Notes on Philology and Hermeneu-
tics for Buddhologists" (pp. 17-32 in Journal qf the International Association qf Bud-
Studles4/2 [1981]), p. 20.
8. The former extreme may be seen in many translations published by
Western centers of Tibetan Buddhism, whereas the latter is seen in Kapstein's
article, on the Fallacies of Personalistic Vitalism."
176
lIABS VOL. 14 NO.1
9. On Being Mindless. Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem (La
Salle, IL: Open Court, 1986), p. XIX. . . . . "
10. "Who Will Speakfor the RehglOus TradltlOns? (Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 57: 699-717), p. 701. Wilkens is quoting Doniger in "The
Uses and Misuses of Other Peoples' Myths" Uournal of the American Academy if
Religion 54: 219-239).
11. Griffiths, "Buddhist Hybrid English," p. 21.
12. See 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, Grub mtha' chen'mo, 131b.6-132a.l_
there he distinguishes the or Distinctionalist School from the Sau_
trantika or Sutra School; the former reject only a permanent, partless, and inde_
pendent self whereas the latter also reject a substantial self. See also Joe vVilso
n
,
Chandrakfrti's Sevenfold Reasoning: Nfeditation on the Selflessness of Persons (Dharam_
sala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1980), p. 14.
13. Candraklrti, Madhyamakiivatiirabhiirya-the commentary on the basic
verses (Madhyamakiivatiira) 1.3-4; see the translation ofTsong-kha-pa's commen_
tary in Jeffrey Hopkins, Compassion in, Tibetan Buddhism (Valois, New York:
Gabriel! Snow Lion, 1980), pp. 116-125. Santideva implies that an understanding
of selflessness underlies compassion in his discussion of self and other at Bodhi-
ciiryiivatiira 8.99ff. (pp. 162ff. in the Bibliotheca Indica edition ofVidhushekhara
Bhattacharya [Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1960]).
14. The Tibetan is given here prior to the Sanskrit following a format
suggested by Leah Zahler ("Meditation and Cosmology: The Physical basis of
the Concentrations and the Formless Absorptions According to dGe-lugs Tibetan
Presentations," pp. 53-78 in Journal of the International Association of Buddhist
Studies 13/1 [1990]), note 1, p. 73). I am not presenting Tibetan philosophical
analyses merely as an aid to an understanding of Indian Buddhist writers, but
in their own right. The Sanskrit is given as a point of reference for the conveni-
ence of those with no Tibetan.
15. See, for example, Etienne Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien (Lou-
vain-la-neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1976), p. 671.
16. 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, Grub mtha' chen mo, 126a.5-6 and 130b.3-4.
Vasubandhu's commentator Yasomitra (in the commentary on the ninth-chapter
refutation of the self in the Abhidharmakofa) seems to equate the Vatslputrlyas
and the Sal!lmatlyas. See Yasomitra, Abhidharmakofasphu{iirthavyiikhyii (edited by
Swami Dwarikadas Shastri [Bauddha Bharati Series No.5] as Abhidharmakofa &
Bhiirya of Acharya Vasubandhu with Sphutiirtha Commentary of Acarya Yafomitra
[Banaras: Bauddha Bharati, 1970]).
17. dKon-mchog-'jig-med-dbang-po, Precious Garland of Tenets (Grub pa'i
mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i 'phreng ba [Mundgod, India: Drepung Loseling
Printing Press, 1980], p:7) identifies the self asserted by the Vatslputrlyas as
one that exists substantially in the sense of being self-sufficient. 'Jam-dbyangs-
bzhad-pa discusses this in Grub mtha' chen mo (13 7b.l-139a.5). The relevant an-
notation is in Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, Annotations for (jam-yang-s,..hi-ba's [Jam-
dbyangs-bzhed-paJ) "Great Exposition of Tenets," Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points,
a Precious Jewel of Clear Thought (Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad ndud grol
blo gsal gces nor [Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964]), vol. dngos,
PUDGALAV ADA IN TIBET? 177
.16a.4-
21b
.6. On this school, see also A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi:
. 11 tilal Banarsidass, 1980), pp. 240-242.
o 18. See, for example, dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, Grub mtha rin che
;hhreng ba, p. 17.
19. Kapstein's translation of atman as "substantial self" seems ill consi-
ered, given that Buddhist differentiate among so many different
)rts of atman, only one of whIch IS a rdzas yod kyi bdag.
20. See Lamotte, Histoire, pp. 600, 673-4.
21. The main source for the assertions on personal identity presented in
:Us article is Gung-thang's On a variety qf Responses to Questions on Doctrinal Asser-
ons (literally, various Answers to Questions Concerning Assertions in the Four Tenet
,rns-Grub mtha' bzhi'i 'dod tshul sogs dris lan sna tshogs kyi skoT, pages 127-170 in
ne Collected liVorks qf Gun-than Dkon-mchog-bstan-pa'i Sgron-me [New Delhi: Nga-
rang Gelek Demo, 1972], Volume III)-abbreviated as Grub mtha' dris lan. The
laterial relevant to personal identity is seen at 3b.4-7a.3 (that is, pp. 132-139).
I.ilother important source is Gung-thang's Textbook on Fundamental Consciousness
KY.ngzhi'iyig cha). The full name ofthis work is A Fordfor the WIse: An Explanation
(the Difficult Topics qf (Tsong-kha-pa's) "[Extensive Commentary on the Difficult ToPics
o Mentality and Fundamental Consciousness" (Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka'i gnad rnam par
shad pa mkhas pa'i 'jug ngog [Buxa: 1965 J). I t has been translated in Joe Wilson,
rhe Meaning qf Mind in the Buddhist Philosophy qf Mind-On{Y (doctoral dissertation:
lniversity of Virginia, 1984). My source for Ngag-dbang-dpal-Idan's positions
s his Annotations for Uam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa's ['jam-yang-sM-baJ) "Great Exposition
f Tenet!;," Freeing the Knots qf the Difficult Points, a Precious Jewel qf Clear Thought
'Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gees nor [Sarnath: Plea-
ure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964])-abbreviated hereafter as Annotations.
22. 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, Explanation qf [the Basic Verses Called] "Tenets,"
:Un oj the Land qf Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All qf Our Own and Others'
renets and the Meaning qfthe Profound, An Ocean qfScripture and Reasoning Fu{filling All
30pes qf All Beings (Grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don
mchog tu gsal ba kun b.zang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong
[Musoorie: Dalarna, 1962])-known as (and abbreviated here as) Grub mtha'
'chen mo.
23. dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, Precious Garland qfTenets (Grub pa'i
mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i 'phreng ba [Mundgod, India: Drepung Loseling
Printing Press, 1980J)-known as (and abbreviated here as) Grub mtha rin che
'phreng ba.
24. Stephan Beyer, The Cult oj Tara: Magic and Ritual in Tibet (Berkeley;
University of California Press, 1973), p. xvi-quoted in Paul Griffiths, On Being
Mindless, p. 146 (note 8). Griffiths confesses to difficulty with this idea, asserting
that Buddhist texts are as much a part of the study of Buddhism as Buddhists.
25. According to 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa (Grub mtha' chen mo, p. 132a.l-5),
the word vaibhajika derives both from the fact that these writers are followers of
.', the Mahavibhaja and from the fact that they make distinctions among subs tan-
, tial entities (rdzas, dravya).
26. See 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, Grub mtha' chen mo, 124b.6-126a.3.
178
JIABS VOL. 14 NO.1
27. Many positions are identified in ambiguous ways-as those of kha ci
("someone"), or la la ("someone"), or bod pa snga ma ("a previous Tibetan"), e t c ~
28. Websters' Third New International Dictionary (Chicago: Merriam-Webster
1981). '
29. Ngag-dbang-dpa1-1dan, Grub mtha'mchan, vol. stod, 20.4-6.
30. 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, Grub mtha' chen mo, 249.5.
31. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, Grub mtha' mchan, vol. stod, 20.7.
32. dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, Grub mtha rin che 'phreng ba, p. 45.
See also Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Cutting Through Appearances:
Practice and Theory if Tibetan Buddhism (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1989), pp. 260-267.
33. dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, ibid., page 50.
34. Grub mtha' bzhi'i 'dod tshul sogs dris lan sna tshogs kyi skor (pages 127-170
in The Collected U0rks if Gun-than Dkon-mchog-bstan-pa'i Sgron-me [New Delhi:
Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972J, Volume III), 3b.6-4a.l (that is, pp. 132-133).
35. The full name of this book is A FordJor the Wise: An Explanation if the
Difficult Topics if (Tsong-kha-pa's) "[Extensive Commentary on the Difficult ToPics qfj
Mentality and Fundamental Consciousness" (Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka'i gnad rnam par
bshad pa mkhas pa'i 'jug ngog [Buxa: 1965 J. It has been translated in Joe Wilson,
The Meaning if Mind in the Buddhist Philosophy if Mind-Only (doctoral dissertation:
University of Virginia, 1984). See especially pages 513-519 and 561-581 of the
translation.
36. Gung-thang, Grub mtha' dris lan, 4a.1 (p. 133.1). Gung-thang's source
for this passage is probably Candraldrti's NIadhyamakiivatiirabhiiva (commentary
on Madhyamakiivatiira 6.135ab, where this as well as the immediately preceding
verse of the sutra are quoted. The Tibetan (Dharamsala edition [Tibetan Pub-
lishing House, 1968], p. 198.7-9; Bibliotheca Buddhica edition of Poussin, p.
258) reads: Ji ltar yan lag tshogs rnams lal brten nas shing rtar brjod pa ltar I de bzhin
phung pa rnams brten nas I kun rdzob sems can zhes bya'o I. The original is San:zyuttani-
kqya I, page 135 (Pali Text Society edition [reprinted 1973J): yatha hi angasamb-
hara II hoti saddo ratha iti I I evam khandhesu santesu I I hoti satto ti sammuti I I .
37. The Vzsuddhi-Magga if Buddhaghosa, edited by C.A.F. Rhys Davids
(London: Pali Text Society, 1975), p. 593; translation in Bhikkhu Nyanamoli,
Path if Purification (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1986), p. 688 (Visuddhimagga
XVIII,25-26) .
38. Ibid., XVIII, 28; Pali text, p. 594.
39. Madhyamakiivatiirabhiiva (Dharamsala edition), p. 198; commentary
on Madhyamakiivatiira 6.135. See Tsong-kha-pa, Illumination if the Thought: An
Extensive Explanation if (Candrakirti's) Madhyamakiivatiira (Dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya
cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal [P6142, volume 154J-Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant
Sayings Press, 1973), pp. 379-80. Abbreviated hereafter as Dgongs pa rab gsal.
40. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom Publi-
cations, 1983), p. 415.
41. Gung-thang, Kun gzhi'i yig cha, 21a.4-5. The passage quoted is trans-
lated following the citation in the Buxa edition and not the Lhasa edition which
erroneously reads brdzad pa for brjod pa. I have been unable to find this quotation
in Mkhas-grub's Stong thun mig 'byed; however cf. 214b.2 in Lha-mkhar Yons-
PUDGALAV ADA IN TIBET? 179
B"stanpa-rgyal-mtshan [ed.], Stoh thun chen mo qf Mkhas-grub Dge-legs-dpal-
.. :g and other texts on Madhyamika philosophy (New Delhi: 1972).
t,an 42. Gung-thang, Grub mtha' dris lan, p. 133.2-3.
43. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, Grub mtha'mchan, vol. dbu 25b.8-26a.l.
44. Gung-thang, Grub mtha' dris lan, p.l33.3-S.
45. Ibid.'
46. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, Grub mtha'mchan, vol. dbu 26a.l.
47. See Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, pp. 170, 173, 192.
48. Gung-thang, Grub mtha' dris lan, pp.l33.S-134.2.
49. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, Grub mtha' mchan, vol. dbu 26a.l.
50. Ibid., 26a.l-2.
51. Gung-thang, Grub mtha' dris lan, pp.l34.l-2.
52. Gung-thang presents the Prasangika refutation of the other systems
mtha'dris lan, ,4b.2-5a.4.
53. See Wilson, Chandrakrrti's SeverifOld Reasoning.
54. Tsong-kha-pa, Dgongs pa rab gsal (Sarnath), p. 373.6-8.
55. Tsong-kha-pa, Ocean qf Reasoning: An Explanation qf (Niigiirjuna's)
on the Middle Wlry" (Dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i mam
ad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho [Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973]),
'.215.8-10. Abbreviated hereafter as Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho.
56. This is the definition of person (gang zag) presented orally by contem-
IWi,nnr,"rv dGe-lugs-pa scholars.
Tsong-kha-pa, Dgongs pa rab gsal, p. 368.3-9.
Gung-thang, Kun gzhi'i yig cha, 49b.6.
See Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, p. 303; Wilson, Chandrakrrti's
pp. 16-17; and Gung-thang, Kungzhi'iyig cha, 50a.3-Sla.3.
Gung-thang, Kun gzhi'i yig cha, SOa.4-5.
Ibid., SOb.S-6.
Ibid.,50b.6-Sla.l.
See Tsong-kha-pa, Dgongs pa rab gsal, p. 368.l0ff., 391.12ff.
Ibid., pp. 404.17-405.6.
See Gung-thang, Kun gzhi'i yig cha, 28a.1-2, 28b.5-29a.2.
Ibid., 27b.5-6.
lowe this insight to the Abbot Emeritus of Go-mang College, Geshe
... ,,, Nyima.
68. Gung-thang, Kun gzhi'i yig cha, 24b.3.
69. Ibid., 24b.1.ff.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 28b.6-29a.2-quoting Tsong-kha-pa, Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho,
pp. 237.16-238.l.
72. Gung-thang, Kun gzhi'i yig cha, 28b.5-6.
73. Tsong-kha-pa, Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho, 21S.l2-13-quoted in Gung-thang,
cha, 28b.S.
See Wilson, Chandrakirti's SeverifOld Reasoning, pages 13-15 for an
See, for example, Daniel Dennett, "Conditions of Personhood" (pp.
in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty [ed.], The Identities qfPersons [Berkeley: Uni-
180
JIABS VOL. 14 NO.1
versity ofCa1ifornia Press, 1976J), pp. 177-178 where six "familiar themes" are
enumerated: (1) persons are rational beings; (2) persons are beings to which
states of consciousness are attributed; (3) persons are treated in certain special
ways; (4) persons are capable of reciprocating this treatment; (5) persons are
capable of verbal communication; (6) persons are distinguishable from other
entities by being conscious in some way.
76. Concerning the morally neutral nature of the fundamental conscious_
ness, see Gung-thang, Kun gzhi'iyig cha, pp. II b.6-12a.l and30a.l-30b.1.
77. See Etienne Lamotte, "Le traite de l'acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasid_
dhiprakaraI).a" (pp. 151-288 in Melanges chino is et bouddhiques 4 (1935-36)),
pp. 166--171.
78. This is, according to the Mind-Only philosophers, one of the reasons
one must assert a fundamental consciousness or something functionally equiva_
lent to it. See Wilson, "Meaning of Mind," pp. 321-325.
II. REVIEWS
The Dawn if Chinese Pure Land Buddhist Doctrine: Ching-ying Hui-yuan's
Commentary on the Visualization Sutra, by Kenneth K. Tanaka,
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. 304 pages, Appen-
dL'(, Notes, Glossary, Bibliography, Index.
This book is an important study in the history of Chinese Pure Land
Buddhism. It clarifies the role of the oldest surviving commentary on
the Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo ching (Visualization Svira, Contemplation Sutra,
or Meditation Sutra) ,1 the Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching i-shu, compiled by
the sixth century Buddhist exegete Ching-ying Hui-yuan (523-592).
It corrects a biased assessment of Ching-ying Hui-yuan and of his
relation to the better known Pure Land master Shan-tao (613-68l) .
. It raises several interesting issues in the history of Chinese Pure
Land piety, some intentionally and some unintentionally. And it con-
tributes an accurate and readable translation of an influential
Chinese Buddhist text, Ching-ying Hui-yuan's commentary on the
Kuan ching.
Ching-ying Hui-yuan was one of the most prominent clerics of
his age. He is called Ching-ying Hui-yuan-Hui-yuan ofChing-ying
Temple-to distinguish him from his more illustrious predecessor,
Lu-shan Hui-yuan (334-416), Hui-yuan of Mount Lu. A disciple of
Sangha Supervisor Fa-shang (495-580), Ching-ying Hui-yuan was
a prolific writer and important thinker. His works include commen-
taries on a n u m ~ e r of important texts such as the Nirviir;a Sutra, the
Vimalakfrti, the Srzmiiliidevf, the Sukhiivatzvyuha and the Awakening if
Faith in the Mahifyiina, and, of course, on the Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo
ching. In addition, he compiled a large encyclopedia of Buddhist
terms, the Ta-ch'eng i-cha'T!g. He survived the suppression of Buddhism
during the years 577-580 to emerge as one of the so-called Six
Worthies of the early Sui Dynasty (581-618). While Ching-ying Hui-
. yuan has traditionally been associated with the She-lun or Ti-lun
schools, Tanaka maintains that this ascription is inaccurate and that
he is more correctly described as an eclectic thinker interested in
. Yogacara thought who preceded and provided a transition to the
more narrowly focused founders of the Buddhist schools of the early
T'ang period (618-906).
Although Tanaka translates the title of the Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo
ching ("Sutra of Contemplation/Visualization on [the Buddha of]
Immeasurable Life") as Visualization Sutra, we will refer to this text
181
182
JIABS VOL. 14 NO.1
as the Contemplation Sutra> a title used by Tanaka himself elsewhere
(Fujita 1990).2 Ching-ying Hui-yuan's Commentary on the Contemplation
Sutra is the oldest surviving commentary on this text, and is a work
which, as Tanaka demonstrates, had a major impact on Pure Land
devotionalism in China. It is one of two Pure Land works produced
by Ching-ying Hui-yuan. The other, as mentioned above, is a Com-
mentary on the Sukhiivativyuha or Larger Pure Land Sutra> or more
exactly, on the fifth century translation of the Sukhiivatzvyuha titled
Wu-liang-shou ching.
In spite of his impact on Chinese Pure Land piety, the character
of and the motivation for Ching-ying Hui-yuan's interest in Pure
Land devotionalism-a subordinate interest at most-remains ob-
scure. According to Tanaka, Ocho Enichi and others have proposed
that the severe persecution of Buddhism to which Hui-yuan was sub-
jected convinced him of the arrival of the final age of the dharma> and
that this stimulated his interest in Pure Land piety. Tanaka rejects
this motivation, however, because Hui-yuan's writings do not
express a belief in the advent of the final age of the dharma. Tanaka
proposes instead that Hui-yuan's association with the Hui-kuang
lineage helps account for his interest in Pure Land piety. Hui-kuang
(468-537) was a disciple ofBodhiruci-the same Bodhiruci who con-
verted the well-known Pure Land master T'an-Iuan (c. 488-554) to
Pure Land faith-and a teacher of Fa-shang, C h i n g ~ y i n g Hui-yuan's
teacher. Although both Fa-shang and Hui-yuan were more inter-
ested in Yogacara teachings than any other, Hui-kuang apparently
aspired to rebirth in Amitabha's Pure Land, and Tanaka points out
that Hui-kuang and his lineage had considerable interest as well in
another important Pure Land text, the Wu-liang-shou-ching yu-po-t'i-
she yuan-sheng chieh ("Discourse on the Sutra ofImmeasurable Life and
Verse on Rebirth") ascribed to Vasubandhu, the eminent Yogacara
master. Tanaka does not discuss, however, the character ofHui-yuan's
Pure Land piety. We will return to this point below. (In passing, we
should note that in his Glossary Tanaka mistakenly assigns the
graphs for Hui-ch'ung to Hui-kuang. In fact, the whole sequence of
graphs between "Hui-ch'ung" and "Hui-kuang" is misaligned.)
The major contribution of Tanaka's book is to show how Ching-
ying Hui-yuan's Commentary on the Contemplation Sutra enhanced the
status of the Contemplation Sutra and contributed substantially to the
subsequent discourse on Pure Land themes derived from that siUra.
The Contemplation Sutra is a well-known text, interesting for both its
origins and contents. Tanaka, summarizing the researches of Fujita
Kotatsu and Yamada Meiji, presents convincing evidence that it is
an apocryphal work.
3
Although Tanaka does not come to this conclu-
REVIEWS 183
. 'on it seems clear from his discussion of the research on the subject
this text was compiled in China by the Central Asian mission-
.. ry-m
onk
Kalayasas and a Chinese assistant between 424 and 442,
several kir:ds of pre-exist:nt Asian Chinese n:ate-
ials. Tanaka pomts out that whIle thIS sutra was wIdely used for htur-
purposes, prior to its treatment by Ching-ying Hui-yuan it had
as yet attracted little scholarly interest. In the approximately one
.. >hundred years between its compilation and Hui-yuan's commentary
it had received only the attention ofT'an-luan, who refers to and dis-
cusses it several times in his commentary on the Discourse on the Sutra
of Immeasurable Lift and verse on Rebirth ofVasubandhu, and of Ling-yu
(518-605), apparently authored a on the Contem-
plation Sutra may have preceded Hm-yuan s commentary but
no longer survIVes.
The Contemplation Sutra opens with a dran:atic prologue on the
tragic situation of Lady Vaidehi, presents Sakyamuni Buddha's
. instructions to her on forming thirteen contemplations on various
aspects ofthe Pure Land, Amitabha Buddha and his bodhisattvas, and
then presents three additional "contemplations," which are actually
descriptions of the rebirths into the Pure Land of nine grades of per-
sons. The first thirteen contemplations are instructions in contem-
plative buddha-reflection (kuan-fo), and the nine grades present vari-
ous means or causes of rebirth, such as meritorious acts, types of
faith and especially invocational buddha-reflection (ch 'eng-ming nien-
fl). It is thus a text very rich in instructions on praxis, including
forms of ethical conduct, the cultivation of devotional attitudes and
descriptions of buddha-reflection, and moreover praxis ranging in
difficulty from detailed visualizations culminating in buddha-reflec-
tion samadhi [nien-fo san meiJ to simple utterance of the name of
Amitabhajust ten times.
Subsequent to Ching-ying Hui-yuan's commentary, the Contem-
plation Sutra became the subject of considerable scholarly attention.
Commentaries and treatments by Chi-tsang (549-623), Tao-ch'o
(562-645), Shan-tao and others followed in rapid succession.
Tanaka lists twelve extant commentaries or treatments dating
through the Sun period (960-1279). And from the Sui period on, the
Contemplation Sutra became a basic scripture of the lay devotional
movement led by Tao-ch'o, Shan-tao and their successors. The Con-
templation Sutra was therefore at the very center of the development of
Pure Land piety in China.
Tanaka's study of Ching-ying Hui-yuan's Commentary on the Con-
templation Sutra clarifies the process of this development in a number
of ways. Tanaka claims that Hui-yuan's commentary interjected the
184
JIABS VOL. 14 NO. I
Contemplation Sutra into Buddhist scholarly discourse. In spite of the
fact that thissutra had not received much scholarly attention hereto_
fore, Ching-ying Hui-yuan gave it the same careful treatment and
subjected it to the same formal commentarial format as he had
already applied to several major Mahayana texts. Tanaka points Out
that this tended to give to the Contemplation Sutra the same high status
as these major texts and bring it to the serious attention of other
scholars. Tanaka further claims that Hui-yuan's commentary inte-
grated the Contemplation Sutra into Mahayana doctrine, first by giving
it a "doctrinal classification" (Fan-chiao )-a position within a sys-
tematic schema of all Buddhist doctrines-and secondly by assign_
ing to the persons of the nine grades of rebirth locations upon tradi-
tional Buddhist soteriological path-structures.
In addition to enhancing the status of the Contemplation Sutra,
Tanaka points out that in his Commentary Hui-yuan made important
contributions to Pure Land thought as well. One type of contribution
was in defining the major problems or issues to be treated in the
sutra. Another was devising the nomenclature utilized in his own and
subsequent commentaries on the sutra. Some of the major problems
or issues defined by Hui-yuan were the essential teaching (tsung) of
the sutra; the soteriological status of the interlocutor, Lady Vaidehi;
the types of sentient beings for whom the sutra was preached; the
causes of the rebirth of the nine grades of persons; the soteriological
status of the nine classes of persons reborn; and the ontological
status of the Pure Land and its Buddha. Nomenclature utilized by
Hui-yuan which subsequently became standard for Pure Land doc-
trinal discourse include such terms as "ordinary person" (fan-ju) .
and "saint" or "sage" (sheng:jen), and meditative good works (ting-
shan) versus non-meditative good works (san-shan). These issues and
terms were utilized not only in subsequent commentaries on the Con-
templation Sutra which agreed with Hui-yuan's interpretation, such as
the Chi-tsang and T'ien-t'ai commentaries, but also in commen-
taries and treatments such as the Shan-tao commentary and Tao-
ch'o's An-lo chi which disagreed with many of the conclusions of the
Hui-yuan commentary.
Finally, a third form of influence wielded by Hui-yuan's com-
mentary upon the Pure Land movement was to offer interpretations
of the sutra which endured and became widely accepted, even by the
popular or lay Pure Land movement led by Tao-ch'o and Shan-tao.
Tanaka points out, for example, that contrary to the view of most
modern scholars, Ching-ying Hui-yuan considered the Contemplation
Sutra a teaching for ordinary persons and not for saints or sages, and
moreover that he designated invocation of the name of Amitabha
Buddha as one of several possible causes of rebirth in the Pure Land.
REVIEWS 185
An additional concern of this book is to clarify the relation of
Ching-ying Hui-yuan's commentary on the Contemplation Sutra to the
'better known commentary of the T'ang period Pure Land Buddhist
Shan-tao. Shan-tao. is the most important Chinese Pure. Land
thinker and evangehst. From around 650 C.E. he took up resIdence
in the capital and vigorously propagated Pure Land piety. In addi-
tion to composing several liturgical works setting out hymns and
''rituals for congregational worship and painting dozens of depictions
of Amitabha and the Pure Land as objects of devotion, he produced
'an extensive commentary on the Contemplation Sutra. This commen-
,tary and Shan-tao's other writings vigorously propagated Pure Land
,.faith and also clarified and systematized Pure Land doctrines and
practices.
Shan-tao's commentary presents a quite different interpretation
of the Contemplation Sutra than that found in the Hui-yuan commen-
tary. Tanaka discusses in detail the major differences between the
two. From this discussion and an examination of the two commen-
taries it is clear that whereas Ching-ying Hui-yuan interpreted the
. sutra primarily as instruction in meditation for advanced practicers,
. though also as encouragement to aspiration for rebirth, Shan-tao
interpreted it as a revelation of the availability of Pure Land rebirth
for even the most unworthy, as well as instruction in meditation. Yet,
although Shan-tao's view ofthe soteriological import ofthe sutra was
quite different from Hui-yuan's, Tanaka points out that the Shan-tao
commentary owes a great debt to Hui-yuan. First of all, since Hui-
. yuan's commentary had established the Contemplation Sutra as the pri-
mary vehicle for discourse on Pure Land themes, Shan-tao's very
choice of the Contemplation Sutra as a text to elucidate was probably
, influenced by the Hui-yuan commentary. Moreover, consistent with
the influence of Hui-yuan's work on subsequent treatments of the
Contemplation Sutra, Shan-tao's commentary utilizes nomenclature
devised by Hui-yuan, treats many of the same problems as had Hui-
yuan, and even adopts some ofHui-yuan's interpretations.
The above points constitute the major contributions of this
book. While making these observations, Kenneth Tanaka also en-
deavors to correct a bias in Pure Land Buddhist studies which has
not only obscured Ching-ying Hui-yuan's contributions to the
Chinese Pure Land movement, but has also distorted our under-
standing of the scope and process of development of that movement.
Tanaka points out that most modern scholarship on Chinese Pure
Land has been conducted by Japanese scholars, and by Japanese
scholars affiliated with the major Japanese Pure Land denomina-
tions, the Jodo Shu and theJodo Shinshu. For these denominational
scholars authentic or "orthodox" Chinese Pure Land tends to be con-
186
lIABS VOL. 14 NO. 1
fined to the thinkers who have been designated as the patriarchs and
forerunners of these denominations. Consequently, figures, not
included in this lineage, such as Ching-ying Hui-yuan, have been
neglected or misunderstood. For most Japanese Pure Land Buddhist
scholarship, Ching-ying Hui-yuan has been seen as merely a mis-
taken interpreter of the Contempation Siitra whose views were sub-
sequently corrected by the Pure Land patriarch accepted by the
Japanese, Shan-tao.
This study thus applies a valuable corrective to a field which has
long been dominated by biased sectarian scholarship. Unfortu_
nately, however, Tanaka's study itself is cast in a sectarian mold. In
reaction to the sectarian bias he so laudably and capably corrects
Tanaka shapes his own study around a distinction between figure;
he calls "orthodox Pure Land Buddhists" and "those of Pure Land
Buddhism." (Tanaka defines Pure Land Buddhism as "a set of
beliefs and practices that espouses for its aspirants the realization of
the stage of non-retrogression ... either in the present life or through
rebirth in a Buddha land or realm ... called 'Sukhavat!' .... ") The
orthodox Pure Land Buddhists, he identifies as T'an-Iuan, Tao-ch'o
and Shan-tao. Those categorizable under "the larger rubric Pure
Land Buddhism" he designates as Lu-shan Hui-yuan, Fa-chao
(c. 763-804), and other figures such as Ching-ying Hui-yiian who,
though not related to the Japanese denominational lineages, wrote
Pure Land commentaries or treatises. While Tanaka realizes that the
"orthodox Pure Land Buddhists ... neither espoused a uniform set of
ideas ... nor constituted a direct line of transmission," nonetheless
his application of this termilJology to Chinese Buddhist history is
distorting.
The problem is partly that the term orthodox means much more
than "espousal ofa uniform set of ideas," or constitutive of "a direct
line of transmission." It means true teachings and implies normative
status within an established religious community. While the figures
Tanaka labels orthodox Pure Land Buddhists are certainly accorded
such status by Japanese Pure Land Buddhists, they held no such posi-
tion in China. Quite the contrary, the three figures called orthodox
Pure Land Buddhists by Tanaka were in general not well-known in
their own times, were not patronized by the state as were the founders
ofT'ang period schools, and their thought was criticized as deviant
by exponents of other Buddhist traditions.
4
The use of the term
orthodox to describe these Chinese figures tends to shape Chinese
religious history according to a Japanese paradigm and to that
extent to distort the Chinese phenomena. Though Tanaka has
adopted this terminology primarily for purposes of providing "con- .
REVIEWS 187
. uity with past scholarship and a common framework for carrying
U:
t
the objectives of this analysis," nonetheless its use is regrettable.
o Tanaka's larger goal is to broaden our understanding of the Pure
,.' Land tradition by including within its boundaries figures such as
'. Ching-ying Hui-yuan who have generally been excluded by sectar-
. 'an scholarship. This is commendable and a necessary corrective.
~ d here again there is a problem. While both the "orthodox Pure
. Land Buddhists" and "those of Pure Land Buddhism" were no doubt
'. participating in the same broad movement, there remain important
differences betwen them. That Honen and Shinran perceived their
. origins in the thinkers Tanaka refers to as "orthodox Pure Land Bud-
dhists" reflects not only their subjective judgments, but also actual
differences in the religious messages of these "patriarchs" versus the
teachings of other figures not accorded patriarchal status. In other
words, perceptions are not substance, but can-and in this case do-
reveal substance. It is becoming increasingly clear that in the his-
. . tory of Chinese Buddhism there was a broad movement characteriz-
..... able as Pure Land devotionalism which encompassed a spectrum of
views and practices ranging on the one extreme from those who were
concerned primarily with the Pure Land rebirth of the vast majority
,.of humankind, the laity, through the agency of the compassionate
...... savior Amitabha Buddha, to those on the other extreme who utilized
.' Amitabha-centered meditative or devotional practices chiefly as a
. propaeudeutic-as a preparatory or preliminary means-for achiev-
ing personal religious objectives more highly valued than Pure Land
rebirth. The former orientation we can tentatively call lay Pure Land
piety, the latter, monastic Pure Land piety. In more detail, these
orientations differed in the following ways:
(1) In the breadth of their concern: Lay-oriented Pure Land
piety, though led by clergy, focused on the spiritual well-being of the
average person involved in the ordinary life of society, whereas those
.. who participated in monastic Pure Land piety were clergy con-
cerned primarily with their own spiritual progress.
(2) In their views of history and the human condition: Whereas
lay Pure Land piety was convinced that the final age of the dharma
had arrived and that almost all contemporary persons were ordinary
mortals destined, unless they availed themselves of Amitabha's com-
passion, to endless sarp.saric suffering, those involved in monastic
Pure Land piety either rejected the identification of their age with
the final age of dharma or, in the conviction that spiritual. realization
through self-effort was nonetheless quite possible, insisted on the
necessity for even greater effort during such a degenerate time.
(3) In their practices, especially forms of buddha-reflection (nien-
fl): While both forms of Pure Land devotionalism valued a broad
188
JIABS VOL. 14 NO. 1
ar:ay of on lay
orIented pIety emphasIzed the aVaIlabIlIty and effectIveness of invo_
cational buddha-reflection, the practice of calling on the name of
Amitabha, and monastic piety favored contemplative buddha-reftec_ .
tion, i.e., meditating upon an icon or a mental image of Amitabha.
( 4) In their soteriology: Pure Land piety addressed to the laity
sought first and foremost Pure Land rebirth, emphasizing the vows
of Amitabha as the primary enabling condition, a sOteriology which
can be characterized as posthumous and bestowed; monastic Pure
Land piety sought a hierarchy of soteric goals, first and foremost a
transforming mystical insight characterizable as an imnianentalist
soteriology, but also Pure Land rebirth as a lesser objective.
This is an ideal typology, and very few historical figures would
conform exactly to either orientation. Even Shan-tao, a typical rep-
resentative oflay Pure Land piety, was very interested in buddha-con_
templation (kuan-.fo).
The final point we would like to make is that the Pure Land
piety of Ching-ying Hui-yuan was clearly of the monastic orienta-
tion, and was thus quite different from that of Shan-tao. Yet, in spite
of their differences, we must be cognizant, as Kenneth Tanaka has
so ably demonstrated, that these two leaders of differing orientations
to Pure Land piety interacted in a creative fashion.
This book enhances our understanding of Pure Land Buddhism
in China in a number of ways, and this reviewer for one is grateful
for the insights and valuable resources it provides for thinking and
rethinking the character and history of this field of study.
Allan A. Andrews
NOTES
I. See References for bibliographic details.
2. While Tanaka renders kuan as "visualization," nien-fi as "Buddha-
contemplation" and ch'eng (-ming) as "recitation" ("of the Buddha's name"), we
prefer "contemplation" for kuan, "buddha-reflection" for nien-fi and "invocation
of" or "calling on" ("the name of the Buddha") for cheng (-ming).
3. This research is summarized in Fujita 1990 and Ryukoku 1984.
4. Though Shan-tao was given a governmental appointment late in his
life, it seems that is was in recognition of his stature as an artist and not as a
leader oflay Pure Land piety.
REVIEWS 189
REFERENCES
An-lo chi ("Passages on the Land of Peace and Bliss"), T #1958, by Tao-ch'o.
Buswell, Robert E. Jr., ed. 1990. Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha. Honolulu: Univer-
. sity of Hawaii Press.
Commentary on the Contemplation Siitra by Ching-ying Hui-yiian.
See Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching i-shu.
Commentary on the Contemplation Siitra by Shan-tao.
See Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo ching shu.
Commentary on the Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo ching.
See Commentary on the Contemplation Siitra by Ching-ying Hui-yiian.
Contemplation Siitra.
See Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo ching.
Discourse on the Siitra of Immeasurable Life and Mrse on Rebirth.
See Wu-liang-shou-chingyu-po-t'i-she yuan-sheng chieh.
Fujita Kotatsu. 1990. "The Textual Origins of the Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching: A
Canonical Scripture of Pure Land Buddhism," Translated by Kenneth K.
Tanaka, in Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, edited by Robert E. Buswell,Jr.
Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo ching ("Sutra of Contemplation on the Buddha of Im-
measurable Life"), T #365.
Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching i-shu ("Commentary on the Sutra of Contemplation on
the Buddha ofImmeasurable Life"), T #1745, by Ching-ying Hui-yiian.
". Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo ching shu ("Commentary on the Sutra of Contemplation on
the Buddha ofImmeasurable Life"), T #1753, by Shan-tao.
Ryukoku University Translation Center, trans. 1 9 8 ~ . The Siitra of Contemplation on
the Buddha of Immeasurable Life as Expounded by Siikyamuni Buddha. Translated
and annotated by the Ryukoku Translation Center under the direction of
Meiji Yamada. Kyoto: Ryukoku University.
T See Taisko shinshii daizokyo.
Ta-ch'eng i-chang ("Mahayana Encyclopedia"), T #1851, by Ching-ying Hui-yiian.
Taisko shinshii daizokyo. 1924-32. ("TaishO Period Revised Edition of the Chinese
Buddhist Canon"). Ed. by Takakusu Junjir6 and Watanabe K., 100 vols.
Tokyo: TaishO Shinshu Daiz6ky6 Kank6kai.
Visualization Siitra.
See Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo ching.
Wu-liang-shou ching ("Sutra of [the Buddha of] Immeasurable Life"), T #360.
Wu-liang-shou-ching yu-po-t'i-she yuan-sheng chieh ("Discourse on the Sutra of
Immeasurable Life and Verse on Rebirth"), T #1524.
190
]IABS VOL. 14 NO. 1
CHARACTER LIST
ch'eng-ming nien-fo
fan-fu
}L:1<::
fIui-ch'ung .R
Hui-kuang
IC/.'
kuan
kuan-fo
nien-fo san-mei
nien-fo
p'an-chiao
san-shan
sheng-jen
ting-shan
,=..
tsung
Three Recent .Collections: The Buddhist Heritage, ed. Tadeusz
Chinese Buddhzst Aprocrypha, ed. Robert E. Buswell, Jr.; and Rejlectzons
on Tibetan Culture, ed. Lawrence Epstein and Richard Sherburne
What follows is not actually a review-probably no Buddhologist
.. ould claim the competence to review three such disparate vol-
\nes-but simply a listing ofthe contents of three unusually promis-
recent collections of articles, in hopes that such a list may be of
. value to the Journal's readers .
. ' The Buddhist Heritage: Papers delivered at the of the same name
convened at the School of Oriental and A.frican Studies, University of London,
November 1985, ed. Tadeusz Skorupski. Tring, UK.: The Institute of
Buddhist Studies, 1989, xi + 276 pages.
D.L. Snellgrove, "Multiple Features ofthe Buddhist Heritage"
H. Bechert, "Aspects of Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka and
Southeast Asia"
KR. Norman, "The Pali Language and Scriptures"
.AH. Christie, "Buddhism in Southeast Asia: An Anecdotal
.. Survey"
JK. Locke, S.]., "The Unique Features ofNewar Buddhism"
E. Zurcher, "The Impact of Buddhism on Chinese Culture in an His-
torical Perspective"
R. Whitfield, "Buddhist Monuments in China and Some Recent
Finds"
L.R. Lancaster, "The Rock Cut Canon in China: Findings at Fang-
shan"
Youngsook Pak, "Excavations of Buddhist Temple Sites in Korea
Since 1960"
Ree-Sung Keel, "Word and Wordlessness: The Spirit of Korean Bud-
dhism"
T. Kubo, "Contemporary Lay Buddhist Movements in Japan: A
Comparison between the Reiyukai and the Soka Gakkai"
A. Piatagorsky, "Buddhism in Tuva: Preliminary Observations on
Religious Syncretism"
D. Seyfort Ruegg, "The Buddhist Notion of an 'Immanent Absolute'
(tathagatagarbha) as a Problem in Hermeneutics"
Russell Webb, "Contemporary European Scholarship on Buddhism"
191
192
JIABS VOL. 14 NO.1
Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, ed. Robert E. Buswell, Jr. Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawaii Press, 1990. ix + 342 pages. Appendix, list of Con_
tributors, General Index, Index of Texts.
Robert E. Jr., Prolegomenon to the Study.
of BuddhIst Apocryphal Scnptures"
Kyoko Tokuno, "The Evaluation of Indigenous Scriptures in
Chinese Buddhist Bibliographical Catalogues"
Michel Strickmann, "The Consecration Siitra: A Buddhist Book of
Spells"
Stephen R. Bokenkamp, "Stages of Transcendence: The Ehiimi Con-
cept in Taoist Scripture"
Kotatsu Fujita (tr. Kenneth K. Tanaka), "The Textual Origins of the
Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching: A Canonical Scripture of Pure Land .
Buddhism"
Whalen Lai, "The Chan-ch'a ching: Religion and Magic in Medieval
China"
Mark Edward Lewis, Suppression of the Three Stages Sect:
Apocrypha as a Political Issue"
Antonino Forte, "The Relativity of the Concept of Orthodoxy in
Chinese Buddhism: Chih-sheng's Indictment of Shih-Ii and the
Proscription of the Dharma Mirror Siitra"
Paul Groner, "The Fan-wang ching and Monastic Discipline in
Japanese Tendai: A Study of Annen's Futsiijubosatsukai koshaku"
Ronald M. Davidson, "[Appendix:] An Introduction to the Stan-
dards of Scriptural Authenticity in Indian Buddhism"
Rdlections on Tibetan Culture: Essays in Memory if Turrell V. /i:1jilie, ed.
Lawrence Epstein & Richard F. Sherburne. Studies in Asian
Thought and Religion, vol. 12. Lewis.ton [N.Y.] / Queenston [On-
tario] /Lampeter [Wales, U.K.]: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.
xiv + 350 pages. Abbreviations, References.
[Geography]
Elena De Rossi Filibeck, "A Guide-Book to Tsa-ri"
Jeffrey D. Schoening, "The Religious Structures at Sa-skya"
[History]
Hugh E. Richardson, "The Mgar Family in Seventh Century Tibet"
Leo E. Rose, "Modern Sikkim in an Historical Perspective"
Elliot Sperling, "Ming Ch'eng-tsu and the Monk Officials of Gling-
tshang and Gon-gyo"
REVIEWS 193
[Philosophy and Textual History]
William L. Ames, "A Translation of Chapter Sixteen, 'Examination of
Bondage and Liberation,' from Tsong-kha-pa's Rigs pa'i rgya
mtsho"
David P. Jackson, "The Earliest Printings ofTsong-kha-pa's Works:
The Old Dga'-ldan Editions"
Per Kvaerne, "A Preliminary Study of the Bonpo Deity Khro-bi
Gtso-mchog Mkha'-'gying"
Karen Christina Lang, "Spa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags and the Introduc-
; tion ofPrasangika Madhyamaka into Tibet"
janos Szerb, "Two ~ o t e s on the Sources ofthe Chos-'byung of Buston
: Rin-chen-grub
Mark Tatz, "Whom is Tsong-kha-pa Refuting in His Basic Path to
Awakening?"
[Language]
W. South Coblin, "A Reexamination of the Second Edict ofKhri-s
rong-Ide-btsan
Roy Andrew Miller, "Case-grammar in the First Two Tibetan Gram-
. matical Treatises"
[Monasticism]
.Ter Ellingson, "Tibetan Monastic Constitutions: The Bca'-yig"
Melvyn C. Goldstein, "Religious Conflict in the Traditional Tibetan
State"
Ngawang 1. Nornang, "Monastic Organization and Economy at
Dwags-po Bshad -gru b-gling"
[Foreign Scholars]
Nancy Moore Gettelman, "Karma-bstan-skyong and the Jesuits"
Joseph M. Kitagawa, "Kawaguchi Ekai: A Pious Adventurer and
Tibet"
cRichard F Sherburne, "A Christian-Buddhist Dialog? Some Notes on
Desideri's Tibetan Manuscripts"
[Comparative Studies]
.. Christopher!. Beckwith, "The Medieval Scholastic Method in Tibet
. and the West"
,Lawrence Epstein, "A Comparative View of Tibetan and Western
Near-death Experiences"
CONTRIBUTORS
Prof. Allan A. Andrews
Dept. of Religion
University of Vermont
Burlington, VT 05405
Mr. Daniel Boucher
Dept. of Oriental Studies
Williams Hall 847
Univ.ofPennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6305
Prof. Robert F. Campany
Dept. of Religious Studies
Indiana University
Sycamore Hall 230
Bloomington, IN 47405
Prof. Roger Jackson
Dept. of Religion
Carleton College
Northfield, MN 55057
Prof. Koichi Shinohara
Dept. of Religious Studies
McMaster University
1280 Main Street West
Hamilton, Ontario
Canada L8S 4K1
Prof. Joe Bransford Wilson
Dept. of Philosophy and Religion
Univ. of North Carolina at Wilmington
Wilmington, NC 28403
195