Name of the University

Name of the competition, Year

UNIVERSITY LOGO

In The Honorable Supreme Court of Male-o-potamia (Jurisdiction)

In the matter of Woke AF v. Union of India (Name of the case)

Written Submission on Behalf of the Appellant

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………………..
2. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………….…
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………………………………….....
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………………………………………….....
5. ISSUES RAISED……………………………………………………………………….....
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS…………………………………………………...……......
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED……………………………………………………...…….....
8. PRAYER………………………………………………………………

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

1. Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650.

2. A.S Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P., AIR 1996 SC 1765.

3. A.S Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P., AIR 1996 SC 176

4. Ratilal Panchand v. State of Bombay, (1954) SCR 1055

5. Ismail v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605.

6. Shirur Mutt v. Commissioner, (1952) 1 MLJ 557 (587).

7. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra

Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, (1954) SCR 1005.

8. Seshammal and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 1580.

9. Commissioner of Police and Ors. vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and Anr.,
AIR 1991 Cal 263.

10. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. Respondent: State of Maharashtra and Ors.,

AIR2011SC312.

11. Shayara Bano and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors., AIR2017SC4609.

12. Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. vs. State of Kerala and Ors.,
(2017)10SCC689.

13. Riju Prasad Sarma and Ors. vs. State of Assam and Ors., ( 2015 ) 5 MLJ 727.

14. Ramesh Sharma vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2013(3)ShimLC1386

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 15. Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and Ors. vs. The Government of Tamil Nadu
and Ors., AIR2016SC209

16. Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC (LS) 244.

17. Govind A. Mane v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 1576.

18. Union of India v. Nitdip Textile Processors Pvt Ltd., (2012) 1 SCC 226.

19. Budhan Choudhry and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191.

20. Union of India v. Nitdip Textile Processors Pvt Ltd., (2012) 1 SCC 226.

21. Deepak Sibal vs. Punjab University and Anr., AIR1989SC903

22. Francis Coralie v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746

23. State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, AIR 1983 SC 803

24. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

25. Shyam Narain v. State of Delhi, AIR 2013 SC 2209.

26. Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, 13 (2009) 9 SCC 1

27. Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India . (2011)

28. Independent Thought v. Union of India w.p 2013

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

1. & – And
2. AIR – All India Reports
3. Anr. – Another
4. Art. – Article
5. art. – Article
6. Assn. – Association
7. cl. – Clause
8. Co. – Company
9. Commr. – Commander
10. Dy. – Deputy
11. i.e. – That is
12. Id. – ibidem
13. Ltd. – Limited
14. Mfg. – Manufacturing
15. No. – Number
16. Ors. – Others
17. SC – Supreme Court
18. SCC – Supreme Court Cases
19. SCR – Supreme Court Records
20. v. – versus
21. Writ – Writ Petition

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The counsel on behalf of the Appellant has approached this Honorable Supreme Court of
Male-o-potmia under Article 25 and Article 375 humbly submitting to the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court but requesting to reserve the right to challenge the maintainability of the
Petition granted

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1) over the most recent five years, Male-o-potamia has seen the ascent of a development
calling for the equivalent treatment of ladies. The development titled 'Woke About
Feminism' was the brainchild of the understudy body of the 2011 bunch of the John's
Law University of Male-optima, the country's most rumored law school. In addition
to other things, the development upheld essential opportunity of decision for all ladies
versus all domains of their lives. The development was headed by Ms. Reise Sadaf
and Ms. Avancee Misery who were the convener and co-convener of the understudy
body, individually. As the development picked up force, a non-legislation association
called 'Woke AF' was built up and enlisted under the Societies Registration Act, 1860
in Mardana, the capital city of Male-o-potamia in 2014 by Reise. Reise, who by at
that point had built up herself as a rumored advocate, ace bono spoke to a few ladies
in battling instances of inappropriate behavior and residential mishandle.

2) Avancee, then again, acknowledged a rumored lucrative occupation in a level 1 law

office in the nation and moved to Manchestair, the budgetary capital of Male-o-
potamia. Be that as it may, both Reise and Avancee kept on staying companions and
shared points of interest of their everyday lives on a normal premise. In April 2013,
Avancee educated Reise that she met a magnificent man, Mr. Menin Isteria, a built-up
agent, at a Life of Liberals (LOL) gathering held in Manchestair. Avancee was a
keynote speaker at the LOL meeting, composed by left liberals of Male-opotamia,
talking about issues, for example, budgetary freedom of ladies, self-rule over their
bodies, reproductory rights, free assent and so forth.
3) A few months into the marriage, Menin’s business began suffering huge losses, as a
result of which he took to heavy drinking. Under the influence of alcohol, Menin
began to verbally abuse his parents and wife. Heartbroken by their son’s behavior, his
parents blamed Avancee for the bad luck she had caused to the family as marrying an
orphan was considered to be ominous according to Dharmatma mythology. They also
strongly believed that her actions such as continuing to work post marriage, not
assisting in household chores, disagreeing to fulfill their wish for a grandchild etc.
was against the order of nature and Dharmatma traditions, as a result of which the
family was facing the wrath of the Dharmatma gods in the form of business losses and
familial discord.

4) . Exasperated by their conduct, in November 2016, Avancee chose to abandon her

better half and in-laws behind and move base to Mardana, moving in with Reise.
Feeling offended by her one-sided choice, her in-laws persuaded Menin to record a
request of under Section 9 of the Dharmatma Marriage Act, 1955 for the
compensation of matrimonial rights. In January, 2017, the Locale Court of Sector 66,
Manchestair, after thought of the certainties and conditions of the case, announced
compensation of matrimonial rights as it noticed that the annoying idea of in-laws and
liquor abuse of spouse was not a sensible reason to pull back from the general public
of one's life partner. The Court likewise noticed that because of an excess of
Nyayadhar v. Union of India
 modernization of the womenfolk, they were overlooking that marriage was a holy
observance under Dharmatma customs and it was the hallowed obligation of the
spouse to remain by her significant other, no matter what.

5) She, with the assistance of Reise, filed an appeal before the High Court of
Manchestair challenging the decree of the District Court as well as the constitutional
validity of Section 9 of the Dharmatma Marriage Act, 1955. In July 2017, the High
Court of Manchestair upheld the decision of the District Court, but refused to go into
the issue of constitutional validity of Section 9 of the Dharmatma Marriage Act, 1955
as it was bound by the decision of the apex court in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar
AIR 1984 SC 1562. 10. Upon the favourable decision of the High Court of
Manchestair, her husband and in-laws visited her on multiple occasions attempting to
coerce her to return to her marital home in Manchestair, as she was the sole earning
member of the family. On one such occasion, when Avancee was alone in the house,
Avancee’s husband and in-laws attempted to drag her out of the house at gunpoint.
However, Reise arrived at the house in time, driving away Menin and his parents.

6) Shocked by the event, Reise and Avancee rushed to the Old Friends Colony Police
Station, within the jurisdiction of which they resided, to file an FIR under Section
498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Upon detailing the events, including the
treatment meted out to her at her marital home, the SHO pointed out that since she
had suffered no physical violence.

7) Reise received a call from some distressed neighbours informing her about some
domestic discord at the home of her domestic help, Ms. Femme Dais. Her neighbours
informed her that Mr. Chauvin Killa, Femme’s husband had come home from workin
a foul mood and demanded intimate relations with Femme. However, Femme, being a
staunch believer of the Momin faith, refused to have intercourse with her husband as
it is against Momin customs to have intercourse before sunset. However, according to
the Dharmatma faith, to which Chauvin belonged, it was the sacrosanct duty of the
wife to please her husband. Therefore, feeling insulted by Femme’s refusal, her
enraged husband, in order to ‘teach her a lesson’ proceeded to assault and coerce her
into having intimate relations with him.

8) Enraged by what had transpired, Reise and Avancee again rushed to the Old Friends
Colony Police Station to file an FIR under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860. Upon detailing the facts and circumstances of the case, the SHO informed them
that no crime was made out under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 since a
man was legally permitted to have intercourse with his wife, unless they were
judicially separated.

9) Reise and Avancee continued to visit Femme in the hospital whenever time permitted
and paid for all the medical expenses. However, there was no progress in her health
condition. Around December 2017, Reise decided that it was better for Femme if she

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 could die a dignified and peaceful death, in accordance with her religious beliefs.
According to the religious leaders of the Momin faith, if one attempted to artificially
prolong one’s life, it would amount to challenging the authority of the Almighty,
resulting in eternal damnation. For the Momins, it is not an act directly aimed at
taking one’s life or seeking death; it is aimed at not prolonging life.

10) Accordingly a writ petition was filed by Reise through Woke AF under Article 226 of
the Constitution in the High Court of Mardana seeking directions for permitting the
withdrawal of life support of Ms. Femme Dais in accordance with her fundamental
right to freedom of religion under Article 25 of the Constitution. The High Court,
constituted a panel of doctors, who opined that they could not rule out the possibility
of revival unless a few more years have passed. The High Court, therefore, denied
permission for withdrawal of life support. However, recognizing there is a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution involved, the High Court of
Mardana granted certificate of appeal under Article 134A of the Constitution.

11) Accordingly, Woke AF filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of Male-o-potamia
under Article 132 of the Constitution challenging the decision of the High Court of
Mardana on the grounds that Femme was entitled to freedom of religion under Article
25 of the Constitution, and such right has been violated due to the forceful
prolongation of her life against her desires.

12) Further, as part of the Woke About Feminism movement and in order to ensure a life
of dignity to all women in Male-o-potamia who have had to undergo domestic
oppression, Woke AF filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court of Male-o-
potamia under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of:
(i) Section 9 of the Dharmatma Marriage Act 1955; (ii) Exception (ii) to Section 375
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

ISSSUES RAISED

1) VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 25 OF CONSTITUTION: - RIGHT TO DIE A

DIGNIFIED DEATH

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 2) WETHER SECTION 9 OF DHARMATA MARRIAGE ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT:-

3) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXEPTION (ii) TO SECTION 375 OF IPC, 1860

4) THE SC JUDGEMENT OF RAJESH SHARMA VS STATE OF UP AMOUNTS

TO JUDICIAL OVERREACH

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1) ARTICLE 25 OF CONSTITUTION:- RIGHT TO DIE A DIGNIFIED DEATH

The freedom of religion ensured by Articles 25 and 26, is planned to be a manual for a
group life and appoint each religion to act as per its social and social requests to build up
a populist social request. Articles 25 and 26, in this way, strike a harmony between the
unbending nature of appropriate to religious conviction and confidence and their inborn
limitations in issues of religion, religious convictions and religious practices and ensured
flexibility of heart to collective with his Cosmos, Creator and understand his otherworldly
self.

2) WETHER SECTION 9 OF DHARMATA MARRIAGE ACT IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT:-
section 9 of the Dharmatma marriage Act, is liable to be struck down as violative of the
fundamental rights in part III of the Constitution of India, more particularly articles 14, 19
and 21 in asmuch as the statutory relief under the said provision, namely restitution of
conjugal rights offends the guarantee to life, personal liberty and human dignity and
decency as it is against the basic human rights.

3) CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXEPTION (ii) TO SECTION 375 OF IPC, 1860

As the exception (ii) to section 375 of Indian Penal Code is directly violate of article 14
and article 15 of the Indian Constitution. SC in many cases again and again stated that a
women is not a toy to be played with or treated inferior in any case. Exception (ii)
inherently gives a licence to the husband to misbehave with his wife and asks them to
treat women like a commodity for them.

4) THE SC JUDGEMENT OF RAJESH SHARMA VS STATE OF UP AMOUNTS

TO JUDICIAL OVERREACH:-

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED:-

1) Opportunity ensured under Article 25 does not enable people to infringe upon the

privileges of different people, however to engage religious conviction of his decision

and display his conviction and thoughts without encroaching the religious right and

individual flexibility of others.

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 2) Article 25 of the Constitution certifications to each individual and not only to the

subjects of India, the opportunity of soul and the privilege uninhibitedly to claim, hone

and spread religion. This is subject, for each situation, to open request, wellbeing and

ethical quality. Promote special cases are engrafted upon this privilege by proviso (2)

of the article. Sub-provision (an) of proviso (2) spares the energy of the State to make

laws controlling or limiting any monetary, money related, political or other common

action which might be related with religious practice; and sub-condition (b) saves the

State's influence to make laws accommodating social change and social welfare

despite the fact that they may meddle with religious practices. Along these lines,

subject to the limitations which this article forces, each individual has a key directly

under our Constitution not just to engage such religious conviction as might be

endorsed of by his judgment or inner voice yet to display his conviction and thoughts

in such obvious goes about as are ordered or authorized by his religion and further to

spread his religious perspectives for the enlightenment of others. It is irrelevant

additionally whether the spread is made by a man in his individual limit or for the

benefit of any congregation or foundation.

3) "As expressed above, religious resistance and equivalent treatment of every religious

gathering and insurance of their life and property and of the spots of their love are a

basic piece of secularism revered in our Constitution. We have acknowledged the said

objective not just on the grounds that it is our verifiable heritage and a need of our

national solidarity and honesty yet additionally as an ideology of general fraternity and

humanism. It is our cardinal confidence. Any calling and activity which go counter to

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 the previously mentioned statement of faith are an at first sight confirmation of the

direct in disobedience of the arrangements of our Constitution."

4) Article 25 is an article of confidence in the Constitution, fused in acknowledgment of

the rule that the genuine trial of a genuine majority rule government is the capacity of

even a unimportant minority to discover its character under the nation's Constitution.

This must be borne as a main priority in translating Article 25. The importance of the

articulation "religion" with regards to the Fundamental Right to opportunity of heart

and the privilege to pronounce, rehearse and engender religion, ensured by Article 25

of the Constitution, has been clarified in the notable instances of Commissioner, Hindu

Religious Endowment, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt

[Commr, HRE v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC

282 : 1954 SCR 1005] , Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. Province of Bombay [AIR 1954

SC 388, 392 : 1954 SCR 1055] and S.P. Mittal v. Union of India [(1983) 1 SCC 51] .

It isn't vital for our present reason to allude to the work contained in these judgments

but to state that in the first of these cases Mukherjea, J. made a reference to "Jehovah's

Witnesses" and seemed to cite with endorsement the perspectives of Latham, C.J. of

the Australian High Court in Adelaide Company v. The Commonwealth [67 CLR 116]

and those of the American Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Educationv.

Barnette [87 Law Ed 1628, 1633: 319 US 624, 629 (1943)] . For Rotilal's situation

[AIR 1954 SC 388, 392: 1954 SCR 1055] we additionally see that Mukherjea, J. cited

as fitting Davar, J's. following perceptions in Jamshed Ji v. Soonabai [(1909) 33 Bom

122: 10 Bom LR 417] :

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 5) We do support the view proposed by Davar, J's perception that the inquiry isn't

whether a specific religious conviction or practice requests to our reason or opinion yet

whether the conviction is truly and reliably held as a feature of the calling or routine

with regards to religion. Our own perspectives and responses are unessential. In the

event that the conviction is really and scrupulously held it draws in the security of

Article 25 yet subject, obviously, to the hindrances contained in that.

6) "The conflict planned in such wide terms can't, we believe, be upheld. In any case,

what constitutes the basic piece of religion is principally to be discovered with

reference to the tenets of that religion itself. On the off chance that the precepts of any

religious group of the Hindus recommend that offerings of sustenance ought to be

given to the symbol at specific hours of the day, that periodical functions ought to be

performed positively at specific times of the year or that there ought to be every day

presentation of consecrated writings or oblations to the hallowed terminate, all these

eventual viewed as parts of religion and the negligible reality that they include

consumption of cash or work of ministers and hirelings or the utilization of attractive

wares would not make them common exercises sharing of a business or monetary

character; every one of them are religious practices and ought to be viewed as issues of

religion inside the importance of Article 26(b)." We derive by this that the

arrangements in Article 25 are liable to Part III of the Constitution and can't disregard

them.

7) Basic piece of a religion implies the centre convictions whereupon a religion is

established. Basic practice implies those practices that are major to take after a

religious conviction. It is upon the foundation of fundamental parts or practices the

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 superstructure of religion is fabricated. Without which, a religion will be no religion.

Test to decide if a section or practice is fundamental to the religion is - to see if the

idea of religion will be changed without that part or practice. On the off chance that the

taking endlessly of that part or practice could bring about a key change in the character

of that religion or in its conviction, at that point such part could be dealt with as a basic

or basic part. There can't be increases or subtractions to such part. Since it is the very

embodiment of that religion and modifications will change its principal character. It is

such lasting basic parts is what is secured by the Constitution. No body can state that

fundamental part or routine with regards to one's religion has transformed from a

specific date or by an occasion. Such alterable parts or practices are certainly not the

'centre' of religion where the conviction is construct and religion is established upon. It

must be dealt with as minor embellishments to the unimportant part or practices.

8) In the present case, Justice Lakshmanan's contradicting judgment-" I am of the

assessment that there is legitimacy and substance in the dispute of scholarly senior

direction. In spite of the fact that the particular presentation of Tandava move openly

parade may have been late, this does not bring down the way that the Tandava move is

a piece of the religion of the Ananda Margis. In any religion, practices might be

acquainted concurring with the choices of the otherworldly Head. In the event that

these practices are acknowledged by the devotees of such otherworldly Head as a

technique for accomplishing their profound upliftment, the way that such practice was

as of late presented can't make it any the less a matter of religion." Article 21 has

gotten exceptionally liberal understanding by this Court. It was held: "The privilege to

live with human respect and same does not hint kept working. It takes inside its

overlap some procedure of human progress which makes life worth living and

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 extended idea of life would mean the convention, culture, and legacy of the individual

concerned." [P. Rathinam/Nagbhusan Patnaik v. Union of India and Anr.

MANU/SC/0433/1994 : (1994) 3 SCC 394.]

9) The judgment of Justice Gajendragadkar, J. in the Bombay HC case has been

confirmed in the Shayara Bano case otherwise called Triple Talaq case as takes after "

Although the point asked before us isn't by any methods free from trouble, overall after

a watchful thought of the different arrangements of the Constitution, we have arrived

at the conclusion that individual law is excluded in the articulation "laws in constrain"

utilized as a part of Article 13(1). The Constitution of India itself perceives the

presence of these individual laws in wording when it manages the points falling under

individual law in thing 5 in the Concurrent List- - List III. This thing manages the

points of marriage and separation; newborn children and minors; reception; wills,

intestacy and progression; joint family and parcel; all issues in regard of which parties

in legal procedures were promptly before the initiation of this Constitution subject to

their own law. Along these lines it is skilled either to the State or the Union Legislature

to enact on subjects falling inside the domain of the individual law but the articulation

"individual law" isn't utilized as a part of Article 13. since, as I would like to think, the

composers of the Constitution needed to leave the individual laws outside the ambit of

Part III of the Constitution. They more likely than not known that these individual laws

should have been transformed in numerous material particulars and in certainty they

needed to cancel these distinctive individual laws and to advance one basic code.

However they didn't wish that the arrangements of the individual laws ought to be

tested by reason of the central rights ensured in Part III of the Constitution thus they

didn't mean to incorporate these individual laws inside the meaning of the articulation

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 "laws in drive." Therefore, I concur with the scholarly Chief Justice in holding that the

individual laws don't fall inside Article 13(1) by any stretch of the imagination."

10) that Article 13(1) applies just to such pre-constitution laws including traditions which

are conflicting with the arrangements of Part III of the Constitution and not to such

religious traditions and individual laws which are ensured by the essential rights, for

example, Articles 25 and 26. It was additionally held that issues identifying with

religion are to be secured by 25 and 26 and can't be taken.

11) The first is that the security of these articles isn't constrained to issues of convention or

conviction they stretch out likewise to acts done in compatibility of religion and in this

manner contain an assurance for customs and observances, functions and methods of

love which are vital parts of religion. The second is that what constitutes a basic piece

of a religious or religious practice must be chosen by the courts with reference to the

precept of a specific religion and incorporate practices which are viewed by the group

as a piece of its religion. This suggests the noteworthiness joined to the training by the

training assumes a part in choosing its centrality.

12) Different justification for illegality :

1.Contravention of any central right, indicated in Part III of the Constitution.

2. Legislating regarding a matter which isn't relegated to the important assembly by the
dissemination of forces made by the seventh Sch., read with the associated Articles.

3. Contravention of any of the compulsory arrangements of the Constitution which force

impediments upon the forces of a Legislature, e.g., Article 301.

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

4. In the instance of a State law, it will be invalid in so far as it tries to work past the limits of
the State.

5. That the Legislature concerned has resigned its fundamental authoritative capacity as doled
out to it by the Constitution or has made an extreme appointment of that energy to some
other body.

13) The reality, that around 90% of the Sunnis in India, have a place with the Hanafi

school, and that, they have been embracing 'talaq-e-biddat' as a substantial type of

separation, is additionally not a matter of debate. The very reality, that the issue is as a

rule commandingly peddled, under the watchful eye of the most elevated Court of the

land, and at that-before a Constitution Bench, is confirmation enough. The way that

the judgment of the Privy Council in the Rashid Ahmad case MANU/PR/0074/1931 :

AIR 1932 PC 25 as far back as in 1932, maintained the severance of the wedding tie,

in view of the way that 'talaq' had been expressed thrice by the spouse, exhibits its

existence, as well as its implementation, for the assurance of the social liberties of the

gatherings. It is along these lines clear, that among Sunni Muslims having a place with

the Hanafi school, the act of 'talaq-e-biddat', has been especially predominant, since

time immemorial. It has been boundless among Muslims in nations with Muslim

ubiquity. Despite the fact that it is considered as skeptical inside the religious division

in which the training is pervasive, yet the category thinks of it as substantial in law.

Those following this training have concededly enabled their social liberties to be

settled subsequently. 'Talaq-e-biddat' is polished in India by 90% of the Muslims (who

have a place with the Hanafi school). The Muslim populace in India is more than 13%

(- around sixteen crores) out of which 4-5 crores are Shias, and the remaining are

Sunnis (furthermore, around 10 lakhs Ahmadias)- for the most part having a place with

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 the Hanafi school. What's more, subsequently, it would not be erroneous to finish up,

that a lion's share of Muslims in India, have had response to the severance of their

wedding ties, by method for 'talaq-e-biddat'- as an issue of their religious conviction as

an issue of their confidence.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED:2nd Issue

1) In the case venkata subbaiah V. Sareetha-: sareetha claimed and I quote section 9

of the Act, "is liable to be struck down as violative of the fundamental rights in

part III of the Constitution of India, more particularly articles 14, 19 and 21 in as

much as the statutory relief under the said provision, namely restitution of

conjugal rights offends the guarantee to life, personal liberty and human dignity

and decency'.

Relief of restitution of conjugal rights fraught with such serious consequences to the

concerned, individual were granted under section 9 of the Act enables the decreeholder

through application of financial sanctions provided by order 21 Rules 32 and 33 of C.P.C. to

have sexual cohabitation with an unwilling party even by imprisonment in a civil prison.

Now compliance of the unwilling party to such a decree is sought to be procured, by applying

financial sanctions by attachment and sale of the property of the recalcitrant party. But the

purpose of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in the past as it is in the present remains

the same coerce through judicial process the unwilling party to have sex against that person's

consent and freewill with the decree-holder. There can be no doubt that a decree of restitution

of conjugal rights thus enforced offends the inviolability of the body and the mind subjected

to the decree and offends the integrity of such a person and invades the marital privacy and

domestic intimacies of such a person

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 2) In Anna saheb v. Tara Bai, the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court

decreed the husband's suit for restitution of conjugal rights observing ":but if the

husband is not guilty of misconduct, a petition cannot be dismissed merely

because the wife does not like her husband or does not want to live with him..."

What could have happened to Tarabai thereafter may well be left to the eader's

imagination . According to law, anna saheb against her will.

3) power of the state for performing an unwilling Act of sexual cohabitation cannot

but be regarded as that of a human beast drained of all spirituality. In Russel v.

Russel (1897) AC 395 Lord herschell long-ago noted the barbarity of this judicial

remedy. He observed, I think the law of restitution of conjugal rights as

administered in the courts did sometimes lead

4) In the ancient Hindu system of Matrimonial law never recognised this institution

of conjugal rights all thought it fully upheld the duty of the wife to surrender to

her husband. In other words, the ancient Hindu law treated the duty of the Hindu

wife to abide by her husband only as an imperfect obligation incapable of being

enforced against her will . It left the choice entirely to the free will of the wife. In

Bai Jiva v. Narsingh Lalbhai (ILR 1927 Bom 264 at p. 268) a division Bench of

the Bombay High Court judicially noticed this fact in the following words: "Hindu

law itself even while it lays down the duty of the wife of implicit obedience and

return to her husband, has laid down no such sanction or procedure as compulsion

by the courts to force her to return against her will".

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 5) The Section 9 of the Act had merely aped the British and mechanically reenacted

that legal provision of the British Ecclesiastical origin. The plain question that

arises is whether our parliament now functioning under the constitutional

constraints of the fundamental rights conceived and enacted for the preservations

of human dignity and promotion of personal liberty, can legally impose sexual

cohabitation between unwilling opposite sexual partners even if it be during the

matrimony of the parties. It date backs to the feudal England , where the marriage

was primarily a property deal, and the wife and the children were part of man's

possessions as other chattels. Wife was treated like a cow who if run away from

master's shed could be brought back.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED: 3rd Issue

1) Violation of Article 14

It was held in Kumari Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, that: "Article 14 denies class
enactment; it doesn't restrict sensible grouping. So as to finish the trial of passable
arrangement two conditions must be satisfied—(I) that the order is established on
understandable differentia which recognizes people or things that are gathered together from
others let well enough alone for the gathering and (ii) that differentia must have a level-
headed connection to the protest looked to be accomplished."

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

Article 14 disallows class enactment however does not preclude sensible grouping which
implies:

(I) It must be founded on sensible and coherent differentia; and

(ii) Such differentia must be on a sane premise.

(iii) It must have nexus to the protest of the Act.

The certainties are with respect to the arrangement of legal and semi legal officers and the
vulnerability that encompasses the arrangement of the same. Moreover clarify for the current
circumstance. Separation between wedded lady and unmarried lady.

2) "It is currently settled that while article 14 disallows class enactment, it doesn't prohibit
sensible characterization for the reasons for enactment. Altogether, in any case, to finish the
trial of passable order two conditions must be satisfied, in particular, (I) that the
characterization must be established on a clear differentia which recognized people or things
that are assembled together from others let well enough alone for the gathering and (ii) that
that differentia must have a normal connection to the protest looked to be accomplished by
the statute being referred to. The grouping might be established on various bases; in
particular, land, or as indicated by articles or occupations or something like that. What is
essential is that there must be a nexus between the premise of arrangement and the protest of
the Act under thought. It is additionally settled by the choices of this Court article 14
censures separation by a substantive law as well as by a law of methodology".

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

The tests received to decide if an order is sensible or not are that the arrangement must be
established on understandable differentia which recognizes people or things assembled
together from others let alone for the gatherings and the differentia should a levelheaded
connection to the question of the enactment.

3) It must be recalled that those days are a distant memory when a wedded lady or a wedded
young lady youngster could be dealt with as subordinate to her better half or available to his
no matter what or as his property. Unavoidably a female has approach rights as a male and no
statute ought to be translated or comprehended to criticize from this position. In the event that
there is some hypothesis that propounds such an illegal myth, at that point that hypothesis
should be totally decimated. Associate this piece with the silly contention.

In considering the sensibility of grouping from the perspective of Article 14 of the

Constitution, the Court has likewise to think about the target for such order. In the event that
the goal be counter-intuitive, out of line and treacherous, essentially the grouping should be
held as nonsensical. This choice resulted with the trouble in understanding the question of the
arrangement.

4) Infringement of Article 19(1)(a)

"The privilege to discourse suggests, the privilege to hush. It infers flexibility, not to tune in,
and not to be compelled to tune in. The privilege appreciates opportunity to be free from what
one wants to be free from. Free discourse isn't to be dealt with as a guarantee to everybody
with suppositions and convictions, to accumulate at wherever and whenever and express their
perspectives in any way. The privilege is subordinate to peace and request. A man can
decrease to peruse a distribution, or turn off a radio or a TV. Be that as it may, he can't keep
the sound from an amplifier contacting him. He could be compelled to hear what, he wishes
not, to hear. That will be an intrusion of his entitlement to be let alone, to hear what he needs
to hear, or not to hear, what he doesn't wish to hear. One may put his brain or hearing to his
own particular uses, yet not that of another. Nobody has a privilege to trespass on the psyche
or ear of another and submit auricular or visual animosity."

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

5) Conjugal Rape and Right to Personal Liberty .

The importance of the words 'individual freedom' came up for thought of the Supreme Court
without precedent for A.K. Gopalan v. Union of India7 wherein it was held that the
'individual freedom' in article 21 amounts to just the freedom of the physical body i.e.
opportunity from capture and confinement without the specialist of law. In any case, this
prohibitive understanding of individual freedom has not been trailed by Supreme Court in
later choices and held that 'individual freedom' was not just constrained to real limitation or
repression to detainment facilities just, however was utilized as succinct term including itself
every one of the assortments of rights which go to constitute individual freedom of man other
than those managed in inside article 19 of the Constitution.

The legal elucidations have extended the extent of Article 21 significantly and held that
privilege to live isn't just kept to physical presence however incorporates inside its ambit the
'right to live with human poise

6) Eliza Duffey, a nineteenth Century demanded that 'upon the privilege to self' is based all
the satisfaction that can be found in marriage state. The spouse's body is unqualifiedly her
own and she will undoubtedly yield her body until the point when she feels that she can do as
such with the full tide of eagerness and love.

In a historic point judgment in Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Adminstration, the Supreme

Court held that There is almost certainly that a lady's entitlement to settle on conceptive
decisions is likewise a measurement of 'individual freedom' as comprehended under Article
21 of the Constitution of India. In perspective of this current lady's entitlement to security,
pride and real trustworthiness ought to be regarded. This implies there ought to be no
confinement at all on the activity of regenerative decisions, for example, a lady's entitlement
to deny investment in sexual movement or on the other hand the emphasis on utilization of
preventative strategies.

7) Test for article 21

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

Any law meddling with individual freedom of a man must fulfill a triple test: (I) it must
recommend a strategy; (ii) the methodology must withstand the trial of at least one of the
essential rights presented under Article 19 which might be relevant in a given circumstance;
and (iii) it should likewise be at risk to be tried with reference to Article 14. As the test
propounded by Article 14 plagues Article 21 too, the law and system approving impedance
with individual freedom and right of protection should likewise be correct and just and
reasonable and not discretionary, whimsical or onerous. On the off chance that the technique
recommended does not fulfill the prerequisite of Article 14 it would be no methodology at all
inside the significance of Article 21.

8) Judgments reprimanding assault

Regard for notoriety of ladies in the general public demonstrates the essential affability of an
edified society. No individual from society can bear to imagine he can make an empty in the
respect of a lady. Such reasoning isn't just grievous yet additionally regrettable. It would not
be an embellishment to state that the possibility of sullying the physical casing of a lady is the
obliteration of the acknowledged humanized standard, i.e., "physical ethical quality". In such
a circle, recklessness has no room. The energetic fervor has no place. It ought to be principal
in everybody's mind that, on one hand, the general public all in all can't lecture from the
podium about social, monetary and political uniformity of the genders and, on the other,
some sick person individuals from a similar society dehumanize the lady by assaulting her
body and demolishing her modesty. It is an ambush on the independence and natural poise of
a lady with the mentality that she ought to be exquisitely servile to men

9) Presently clearly, any type of torment or coldblooded, brutal or debasing treatment would
be hostile to human pride and constitute an advance into this privilege to live and it would, on
this view, be precluded by Article 21 unless it is as per strategy recommended by law, yet no
law which approves and no method which prompts such torment or unfeeling, barbaric or
corrupting treatment can ever stand the trial of sensibility and non-mediation: it would

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

evidently be illegal and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. It would in this manner
be seen that there is certain in Article 21 the privilege to security against torment or
barbarous, cruel or corrupting treatment which is articulated in Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and ensured by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.

"There is presumably that a lady's entitlement to settle on conceptive decisions is additionally

a measurement of "individual freedom" as comprehended under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. It is vital to perceive that regenerative decisions can be practiced to reproduce and in
addition to swear off multiplying. The critical thought is that a lady's entitlement to
protection, pride and substantial respectability ought to be regarded. This implies there ought
to be no confinement at all on the activity of regenerative decisions, for example, a lady's
entitlement to reject investment in sexual movement or on the other hand the emphasis on
utilization of preventative techniques.

10) This Court has over and over held that privilege to life implies a privilege to live with
human poise. Life ought to be important and worth living. Life has numerous shades. Great
wellbeing is the raison d'etre of a decent life. Without great wellbeing there can't be a decent
life.

Another contention against the teaching of conjugal exception to assault is that it abuses the
privilege to great strength of the casualty of such wrongdoing. The privilege to great
wellbeing has been perceived as a piece of the privilege of life under Article 21. Such a
privilege is fundamental for the persistent scholarly and otherworldly prosperity of a man.
The conjugal exclusion tenet abuses the privilege to great soundness of a casualty as it
definitely causes genuine mental and in addition physical damage all the while. It wrecks the
brain science of a lady and pushes her into a profound passionate emergency.

11) The conjugal status does not have level-headed nexus to the indistinct goal.

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 characterizes "human rights" in Section 2(d) as
significance the rights identifying with life, freedom, correspondence and respect of the
individual ensured by the Constitution or exemplified in worldwide agreements and
enforceable by courts in India.

The most punctual such choice is of the Calcutta High Court in Sri Mahadeb Jiew v. Dr. B.B.
Sen in which it was said that: "The unique arrangement for ladies in Article 15(3) can't be
understood as approving an oppression ladies, and "for" in the setting signifies "for"."

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED: 4th Issue

1) THE Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code, since its introduction has increasingly
vilified and associated with the perception that it is misused – that women
frequently use it as a weapon against their in-laws. This counter-narrative is
particularly ubiquitous on the internet, in the many online communities of
husbands who feel wronged by vengeful wives.

2) There is only ‘general complaint’ that Section 498-A of the IPC is subject to gross
misuse; but provides no data to indicate how frequently the section is being
misused. It is important therefore that such ‘arguments’ are responded to, so as to
put forth a clearer picture of the present factual status of the effect of several
criminal laws enacted to protect the women.

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

 3) Section 498-A was introduced in the Indian Penal Code in 1983 and the reforms
of the past 34 years have not been adequately evaluated at all by the governments
with respect to their deterrence goals, despite the institutionalization of law and
policy to criminalize domestic violence.

4) That Article 15 of the Constitution of India reinforces the fact that a woman is not
a toy to be played with, to be thrown away at one’s whims and fancies and treated
as inferior to any other. It inherently asks for husbands to their wives well and not
misbehave or demand unjustly which in a way sends forth a message that woman
is a commodity for sale.

5) It is a social institution where husband has the responsibility to take care and
maintain his wife. She wants to feel safeguarding in the house but situation was
against expectation when woman get cruelty and faces harassment behind the four
walls of their matrimonial home.

6) Because large victims are from poor and illiterate background, living in rural
areas, mostly benefited from section 498-A of Indian Penal Code.

7) Because the courts have in several instances made a very narrow interpretation of
this section considering it to be only cruelty in relation to unlawful demands or
dowry demands

8) It is also clearly noticed that woman today are still tortured and often the court
being the ultimate savior also does not come to the rescue to protect these woman.
Because as per allegations the abuse of this section is mostly used by well-
educated women who know that this section is both cognizable and non-bailable
and impromptu works on the complaint of the woman and placing the man behind
the bars. But who will take-care the poor and illiterate women in society from this
disease of cruelty?

PRAYER

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

Wherefore, in light of the questions presented, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, the
Petitioner requests the Honourable Supreme Court to find, adjudge and declare that:

1. The Respondent has no grounds to maintain the Special Leave granted and that the Petition
should be accepted.

2. The deprivation of property has been done with the authority of law and is considered
constitutional.

In respectful submission before the Honourable Supreme Court of Male-o-potamia,

Counsel on behalf of AVANCEE

Nyayadhar v. Union of India

Nyayadhar v. Union of India