Case Laws Criminal Law
Case Laws Criminal Law
Case Laws Criminal Law
Evidence shows that the pair of son and stepfather had a good
relationship. They celebrated grandparents wedding anniversary, and they
consumed a quantity of alcohol. The resort of the family went to sleep,
son and stepfather stayed awake. The stepfather was upset of his son
because he told him he wants to leave the army. The stepfather dared his
son to load, draw and shoot faster than him. When the defendant loaded
first, the stepfather said: “I don’t think you have the guts but if you have
pull the trigger”. The defendant pulled the trigger in his drunken state,
not believing that the gun was aimed at the stepfather. The trial judge
directed on oblique intent and the jury convicted. The Court of Appeal
dismissed the appeal, and the defendant appealed to the house of Lords.
Held: convention for murder was substitute for manslaughter. it was not a
case of oblique intent, and the judge should not have issued a direction
related further expansion of intention.
LORD BRIDGE:
“ The golden rule should be that, when directing a jury on the mental
element necessary in a crime of specific intent, the judge should avoid
any elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent, and leave it to
the jury’s good sense to decide whether the accused acted with necessary
intent, unless the judge is convinced that, on the facts and having regard
to the way the case has been presented to the jury in evidence and
argument, some further explanation or elaboration is strictly necessary to
avoid misunderstanding.”
The jury should then be told that if they answer yes to both questions, it is
a proper inference for them to draw that he intended that consequence.
Decision/ Outcome: The House of Lords allowed Moloney’s appeal. He had
not intended to kill his stepfather. Knowledge of foresight of the
consequences of an action were to be considered at best material from
which a crime of intent may be inferred.
The defendants were striking miners who threw a concrete block from a
bridge onto the motorway below. It struck a taxi that was carrying a
working miner and killed the driver.
The defendants argued that they only intended to block the road but not
to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. The trial judge directed eh jury on
the basis of Lord Bridge’s statements in Moloney (was death or grievous
bodily harm a natural consequence of what was done, and did the
defendants foresee that consequence as a natural consequence?) and the
defendants were convicted of murder.
A child had burned to death in the house where the defendant had without
warning put the petrol bomb through the letterbox. He admitted to
starting the fire but stated that he only wanted to frighten the owner of
the house. The court of appeal overturned the murder conviction and
substituted a verdict of manslaughter as the judge had misdirected the
jury.
R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82
Woollin killed his 3-month-old son after throwing him onto a hard surface
in rage. The judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied that the
appellant had realised there was a substantial risk that the child would
suffer serious harm, they could convict him of murder.
Appeal allowed; the conviction for murder was quashed and replaced with
manslaughter
Lord Steyn: the judge blurred the line between intention and recklessness,
and hence between murder and manslaughter. The jury should be directed
to consider whether the defendant had foresight that death or serious
injury would be ‘virtual certain’ to result from his voluntary act.
Ds threw the victim into a river, who drowned and died. Ds argued
although they knew the victim could not swim, they did not intend for the
victim to die.
The judge gave the direction to the jury that it must find Ds guilty of
murder if they found that they had foresight that the victim was ‘virtually
certain’ to die or suffer serious harm.