Just to show you the kind of differences I mean:

CONSTITUTION and RIGHTS:

Mattox v. U.S., 156 US 237,243. (1895) "We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the
law as it existed at the time it was adopted."

City of Dallas v Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944 “To take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to
take away the right itself. But that is not within the power of the State.”

Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1885). Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748, (1970) "Waivers
of Constitutional Rights, not only must they be voluntary, they must be knowingly intelligent acts done
with sufficient awareness."

Williamson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 815 F.2d. 369, ACLU Foundation v. Barr,
952 F.2d. 457, 293 U.S. App. DC 101, (CA DC 1991).
"It is the duty of all officials whether legislative, judicial, executive, administrative, or ministerial to so
perform every official act as not to violate constitutional provisions."

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OPERATING AN AUTOMOBILE IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT; DRIVING

(OPERATION FOR HIRE) IS NOT:
[See Annual Report of the Attorney General of the State of New York issued on 21, 1909, ALBANY
NEW YORK, pages 322-323] which reads: “There is NO requirement that the owner of a motor
vehicle shall procure a license to run the same, nor is there any requirement that any other person shall
do so, unless he proposes to become a chauffeur or a person conducting an automobile as an employee
for hire or wages. Yours very truly, EDWARD R. O’MALLEY Attorney General”

DRIVER. One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with
horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. A
person actually doing driving, whether employed by owner to drive or driving his own vehicle. Wallace
v. Woods, 340 Mo. 452, 102 S.W.2d 91, 97. [Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.]

"The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either
by a carriage or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a City may prohibit or permit at will, but a
common right which he has under the right to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." Thompson v.
Smith 154 SE 579.

"... It is now universally recognized that the state does possess such power with respect to common
carriers using the public highways for the transaction of their business in the transportation of persons
or property for hire. That rule is stated as follows by the supreme court of the United States: 'A citizen
may have, under the fourteenth amendment, the right to travel and transport his property upon them
(the public highways) by auto vehicle, but he has no right to make the highways his place of business
by using them as a common carrier for hire. Such use is a privilege which may be granted or withheld
by the state in its discretion, without violating either the due process clause or the equal protection
clause.' (Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 [38 A. L. R. 286, 69 L. Ed. 623, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324].)
“The use of the highway for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege but a
fundamental right of which the public and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived.” Chicago Motor
Coach v. Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 NE 22, 66 ALR 834. Ligare v. Chicago, 139 Ill. 46, 28 NE 934.
Boone v. Clark, 214 SW 607; 25 A JUR (1st) Highways, Sec. 163.

"First, it is well established law that the highways of the state are public property, and their primary and
preferred use is for private purposes, and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary
which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit." Stephenson vs.
Rinford, 287 US 251; Pachard vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited; Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs.
Railroad Commission, 271 US 592; Railroad commission vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co.,57 SW.2d 290;
Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313.

Public, adj. Pertaining to a state, nation, or whole community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting
the whole body of people or an entire community. Open to all; notorious. Common to all or many;
general; open to common use. Belonging to the people at large; relating to or affecting the whole
people of a state, nation, or community; not limited or restricted to any particular class of the
community. Peacock v. Retail Credit Co., D.C.Ga., 302 F.Supp. 418, 423. [Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th
Ed. pg. 1104, (1979)]

(A system of registration and licensing, as is commonly thought to be lawful, is actually violating the
law because "not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community" means the state is
without power to impose such a scheme where only those who are licensed and registered get to use the
public roadsways. That is "limited or restricted to" only the licensed, registered class, not all members
of the public.)

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CRIMINAL STOP and RIGHT TO USE AND FREE ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY:

"But even assuming that Purpose (prevention of crime) is served to some degree by stopping and
demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in
criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, (1979)

"The application of...(a code)...to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the
Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was
engaged, or had engaged, in criminal conduct. Accordingly, appellant may not be punished for refusing
to identify himself, and the conviction is reversed." (Probable cause) Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
(1979)

"Traffic infractions are not a crime." People v. Battle

Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 139 A2d 869, 872 "The RIGHT of the citizen to DRIVE on the public
street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in
some manner with criminality is a FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT which must be
protected by the courts."
'Whenever a law deprives the owner of the beneficial use and free enjoyment of his property, or
imposes restraints upon such use and enjoyment that materially affect its value, without legal process or
compensation, it deprives him of his property within the meaning of the constitution. ... It is not
necessary, in order to render the statute obnoxious to the restraints of the constitution, that it must in
terms or effect authorize the actual physical taking of the property or the thing itself, so long as it
affects its free use and enjoyment, or the power of disposition at the will of the owner.' [Forster v.
Scott,136 N. Y. 577, 18 L. R. A. 543, 32 N. E. 976; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,148 U. S.
312, 336, 37 L. Ed. 463, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622].

"Owner has constitutional right to use and enjoyment of his property."Simpson v. Los Angeles (1935),
4 C.2d 60, 47 P.2d 474.
"When rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation
which would abrogate them." Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 p. 491.
"A state MAY NOT impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted (sic) by the Federal
Constitution." MURDOCK v PENNSYLVANIA, 319 US 105.
"No state shall convert a liberty into a license, and charge a fee therefore." [Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105]

"If the State converts a right (liberty) into a privilege, the citizen can ignore the license and fee and
engage in the right (liberty) with impunity." Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Alabama, 373 U.S.
262

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TAXATION AND OATH OF OFFICE:

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958). "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer
can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it." The constitutional
theory is that we the people are the sovereigns, the state and federal officials only our agents." "The
individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is
an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state; but, the individual's rights
to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed."

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A U.S. CITIZEN IS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT "PROPERTY" AND CONTRADISTINCT FROM A

CITIZEN OF A STATE OF THE UNION?
Montgomery v state 55 Fla. 97-45S0.879
a. "Inasmuch as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the mind
only, a government can interface only with other artificial persons. The imaginary, having neither
actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible. The legal
manifestation of this is that no government, as well as any law, agency, aspect, court, etc. can concern
itself with anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the contracts between them."
S.C.R. 1795, Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators 3 U.S. 54; 1 L.Ed. 57; 3
Dall. 54; and,
b. "the contracts between them" involve U.S. citizens, which are deemed as Corporate Entities:
 c. "Therefore, the U.S. citizens residing in one of the states of the union, are classified as property and
franchises of the federal government as an "individual entity"", Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S.
193, 80 L.Ed. 1143, 56 S.Ct. 773

People v. Horton 14 Cal. App. 3rd 667 (1971) “A “US Citizen” upon leaving the District of Columbia
becomes involved in “interstate commerce”, as a “resident” does not have the common-law right to
travel, of a Citizen of one of the several states.”

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UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE BY GOVERNMENT; ONLY

INDIVIDUAL AGENTS:
Redfield v Fisher, 292 P 813, at 819 [1930] "...an officer may be held liable in damages to any person
injured in consequence of a breach of any of the duties connected with his office...The liability for
nonfeasance, misfeasance, and for malfeasance in office is in his 'individual' , not his official
capacity..."

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)

Note: By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in
his person). When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the
Judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges' orders are not voidable, but VOID, and of no
legal force or effect. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in
a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he comes into conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in
his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any
immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."

City of Dallas v Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944

“An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty has
the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault and battery.”
(State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260).

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FRAUD:
Donnelly v. Dechristoforo, 1974.SCT.41709 ¶ 56; 416 U.S. 637 (1974) McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350,
371-372, Quoting U.S. v Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307 Fraud in its elementary common law sense of
deceit... includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation.
A public official is a fiduciary toward the public,... and if he deliberately conceals material information
from them he is guilty of fraud.

70 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 50, VII Civil Liability

“Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters,”

Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S 426. “Fraud vitiates everything”

Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210 "Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents
and even judgments."

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NO SUCH THING AS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; NO CLAIM OF "GOOD-FAITH-ACTING" IN

WILLFUL DEPRIVATION OF LAW:
U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 US 61 WHEREAS, officials and even judges have no immunity (See, Owen
vs. City of Independence, 100 S Ct. 1398; Maine vs. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502; and Hafer vs. Melo,
502 U.S. 21; officials and judges are deemed to know the law and sworn to uphold the law; officials
and judges cannot claim to act in good faith in willful deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead
ignorance of the law, even the Citizen cannot plead ignorance of the law, the courts have ruled there is
no such thing as ignorance of the law, it is ludicrous for learned officials and judges to plead ignorance
of the law therefore there is no immunity, judicial or otherwise, in matters of rights secured by the
Constitution for the United States of America. See: Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. "When lawsuits are
brought against federal officials, they must be brought against them in their "individual" capacity not
their official capacity. When federal officials perpetrate constitutional torts, they do so ultra vires
(beyond the powers) and lose the shield of immunity."

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LIABLE FOR DAMAGES EVEN IF ACTING WITHIN THEIR DELEGATED AUTHORITY AND
NO CLAIM OF "ERROR" EXISTS:
"...where the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered
individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has
empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign has forbidden. His actions are ultra
vires his authority and therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is important to note (Page
690 ) that in such cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the
officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not
sufficient. (Page 692) The respondent's contention, which the Court of Appeals sustained, was that
there exists a third category of cases in which the action of a Government official may be restrained or
directed. If, says the respondent, an officer of the Government wrongly takes or holds specific property
to which the plaintiff has title then his taking or holding is a tort, and 'illegal' as a matter of general law,
whether or not it be within his delegated powers. He may therefore be sued individually to prevent the
'illegal' taking or to recover the property 'illegally' held." Larson v. Domestic Foreign Commerce
Corporation, 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949)

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WHAT A NATURAL PERSON OR HUMAN IS REALLY EXPOSED TO AND LIABLE FOR:

HALE v. HENKEL 201 U.S. 43 at 89 (1906) Hale v. Henkel was decided by the united States Supreme
Court in 1906. The opinion of the court states: "The "individual" may stand upon "his Constitutional
Rights" as a CITIZEN. He is entitled to carry on his "private" business in his own way. "His power to
contract is unlimited." He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to
open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no duty to the
State, since he receives nothing there from, beyond the protection of his life and property. "His rights"
are such as "existed" by the Law of the Land (Common Law) "long antecedent" to the organization of
the State", and can only be taken from him by "due process of law", and "in accordance with the
Constitution." "He owes nothing" to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights."

This common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to provide for his own
preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself; and, as soon as he reaches years of
discretion, he is the sole judge of the proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes
his own master. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT by Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1762

"As general rule men have natural right to do anything which their inclinations may suggest, if it be not
evil in itself, and in no way impairs the rights of others." In Re Newman(1858), 9 C. 502.

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UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE:
"The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in
reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from
the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. "No one is bound
to obey an unconstitutional law and NO courts are bound to enforce it." 16 Am Jur 2nd, Sec 177 late
2d, Sec 256.

"The word 'shall' in a statute may be construed to mean 'may', particularly in order to avoid a
constitutional doubt." Fort Howard Paper Co. v Fox River Heights Sanitary Dist., 26 NW 2d 661

"If necessary, to avoid unconstitutionality of a statute, 'shall' will be deemed equivalent to 'may.'" Gow
v Consolidated Copper Mines Corp., 165 Atl 136.

"'Shall' in a statute may be construed to mean 'may' in order to avoid constitutional doubt." Grover
Williams College v Village of Williams Bay, 7 NW 2d 891.

But whenever the operation and effect of any general regulation is to extinguish or destroy that which
by law of the land is the property of any person, so far as it has that effect, it is unconstitutional and
void. Thus, a law is considered as being a deprivation of property within the meaning of this
constitutional guaranty if it deprives an owner of one of its essential attributes, destroys its value,
restricts or interrupts its common, necessary, or profitable use, hampers the owner in the application of
it to the purposes of trade, or imposes conditions upon the right to hold or use it and thereby seriously
impairs its value. (Statute) 167 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Section 369.

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WHO ARE THE SOVEREIGNS IN AMERICA?

“The people of this State, as the successors of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights which
formerly belonged to the King by his prerogative. …" [Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wendell 9 (N.Y.) (1829), 21
American Decision 89; 10C Const. Law Sec. 298; 18 C Em.Dom. Sec. 3, 228; 37 C Nav.Wat. Sec. 219;
Nuls Sec. 1`67; 48 C Wharves Sec. 3, 7.]
"...at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the
country" CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA (US) 2 Dall 419, 454, 1 L Ed 440, 455 @DALL 1793 pp471-472.

The words "sovereign state" are cabalistic words, not understood by the disciple of liberty, who has
been instructed in our constitutional schools. It is our appropriate phrase when applied to an absolute
despotism. The idea of sovereign power in the government of a republic is incompatible with the
existence and foundation of civil liberty and the rights of property. [Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. (1 Dana)
481, 501].

“The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the different departments of its
government, but in the People, from whom the government emanated; and they may change it at their
discretion. Sovereignty, then in this country, abides with the constituency, and not with the agent; and
this remark is true, both in reference to the federal and state government.” [Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F
939 @ 943]

"Statutes employing the word 'person' are ordinarily construed to exclude the sovereign." 56 L.Ed. 2d.
895.

"The rights of the individual are not derived from governmental agencies, either municipal, state or
federal, or even from the Constitution. They exist inherently in every man, by endowment of the
Creator, and are merely reaffirmed in the Constitution, and restricted only to the extent that they have
been voluntarily surrendered by the citizenship to the agencies of government. The people's rights are
not derived from the government, but the government's authority comes from the people."City of
Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944 (Tex. App. - Dallas [5th Dist.], 1922)

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THE LIMITED RIGHT OF A PARENT AND THE AVOIDANCE OF AN ARBITRARY

GOVERNMENT:
If men, through fear, fraud or mistake, should in terms renounce or give up any natural right, the eternal
law of reason and the grand end of society would absolutely vacate such renunciation. The right to
freedom being the gift of Almighty God, it is not in the power of man to alienate this gift and
voluntarily become a slave. -Samuel Adams, our great president

Even if each man could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children: they are born men and free;
their liberty belongs to them, and no one but they has the right to dispose of it. Before they come to
years of discretion, the father can, in their name, lay down conditions for their preservation and well-
being, but he cannot give them irrevocably and without conditions: such a gift is contrary to the ends of
nature, and exceeds the rights of paternity. It would therefore be necessary, in order to legitimize an
arbitrary government, that in every generation the people should be in a position to accept or reject it.
[THE SOCIAL CONTRACT by Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1762]