MANU/SC/0008/1959

Equivalent Citation : AIR 1960 SC 51

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 342 of 1956

Decided On: 28.08.1959

Appellants:Babulal Parate
Vs.
Respondent:The State of Bombay and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sudhi Ranjan Das, C.J., A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and S.K. Das, JJ.

Subject: Constitution

Catch Words

Mentioned IN
Acts/Rules/Orders:
Constitution Of India - Article 1, Constitution Of India - Article 117, Constitution Of India -
Article 118, Constitution Of India - Article 122, Constitution Of India - Article 122(1),
Constitution Of India - Article 132(1), Constitution Of India - Article 226, Constitution Of India
- Article 3; States Reorganisation Act 1956 - Section 8, States Reorganisation Act 1956 - Section
8(1)

Relevant Section:
Constitution of India - Article 3; Constitution of India - Article 122(1); STATES
REORGANISATION ACT 1956 - Section 8(1)

Disposition:
Appeal Dismissed

Citing Reference:

Discussed
2

Mentioned
2

Case Note:
Constitution - reorganization of States - Article 3 of Constitution of India, Section 8(1) of States
Reorganisation Act, 1956 and Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955 - bill passed for
reorganization of some States including State of Bombay was later on amended - before
implementation writ petition against reorganization filed in High Court - appellant contended
that formation of composite State of Bombay contravened Article 3 - no opportunity of
expressing views on matter given to Legislature of Bombay after amendment - High Court
dismissed petition and held no provision of Article 3 violated - certificate under Article 132(1)
obtained and appeal filed - to validate such bills two conditions must be satisfied - firstly bill
must be recommended by President and secondly it has to be referred to State Legislature for
expressing views - failure of State Legislature to avail this opportunity does not invalidate bill -
if bill amended no fresh bill required to be send to State Legislature - bill send to Legislature of
Bombay and passed by majority - it was later on amended - as amendment was relevant to
subject matter bill not required to be send for reconsideration - petition dismissed - held, bill
valid.

JUDGMENT

S.K. Das, J.

1. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay under Art. 132(1) of
the Constitution, and the question involved in the appeal is the true scope and effect of Art. 3 of
the Constitution, particularly of the proviso thereto as it stands after the Constitution (Fifth
Amendment) Act, 1955.

2. On December 22, 1953, the Prime Minister of India made a statement in Parliament to the
effect that a Commission would be appointed to examine "objectively and dispassionately" the
question of the re-organisation of the States of the Indian Union "so that the welfare of the
people of each constituent units as well as the nation as a whole is promoted". This was followed
by the appointment of a Commission under a resolution of the Union Government in the
Ministry of Home Affairs, dated December 29, 1953. The Commission submitted its report in
due course and on April 18, 1956; a Bill was introduced in the House of the People (Lok Sabha)
entitled The States Reorganisation Bill (No. 30 of 1956). Clauses 8, 9 and 10 of the said Bill
contained a proposal for the formation of three separate units, namely, (1) Union territory
of Bombay; (2) State of Maharashtra including Marathawada and Vidharbha; and (3)
State of Gujarat including Saurashtra and Cutch. The Bill was introduced in the House of the
People on the recommendation of the President, as required by the proviso to art. 3 of the
Constitution. It was then referred to a Joint Select Committee of the House of the People (Lok
Sabha) and the Council of State (Rajya Sabha). The Joint Select Committee made its report
on July 16, 1956. Some of the clauses of the Bill were amended in Parliament and on being
passed by both Houses, it received the President's assent on August 31, 1956, and became
known as the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956) hereinafter called the Act.
3. It is necessary to read here s. 8(1) of the Act which instead of constituting three separate units
as originally proposed in the Bill constituted a composite State of Bombay as stated therein.

"S. 8(1) : As from the appointed day, there shall be formed a new Part A State to be known as the
State of Bombay comprising the following territories, namely :-

(a) the territories of the existing State of Bombay, excluding -

(i) Bijapur, Dharwar and Kanara districts and Belgaum district except Chandgad taluka; and

(ii) Abu Road taluka of Banaskantha district;

(b) Aurangabad, Parbhani, Bhir and Osmanabad districts, Ahmadpur, Nilanga and Udgir taluks
of Bidar district, Nanded district (except Bichkonda and Jukkal circles of Deglur taluk and
Modhol, Bhiansa and Kuber circles of Modhol taluk) and Islapur circle of Boath taluk, Kinwat
taluk and Rajura taluk of Adilabad district, in the existing State of Hyderabad;

(c) Buldana, Akola, Amaravati, Yeotmal, Wardha, Nagpur, Bhandara and Chanda districts in the
existing State of Madhya Pradesh;

(d) the territories of the existing State of Saurashtra; and

(e) the territories of the existing State of Kutch; and thereupon the said territories shall cease to
form part of the existing States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh, Saurashtra and Kutch,
respectively."

4. The appointed day from which the new State of Bombay came into existence was defined
in the Act as meaning November 1, 1956. But before that date, to wit, on September 12,
1956, the appellant herein filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in which he alleged, in substance, that the formation of the
composite State of Bombay as one unit instead of the three separate units as originally
proposed in the Bill contravened Art. 3 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the Legislature of
the State of Bombay had no opportunity of expressing its views on the formation of such a
composite State. The appellant asked for a declaration that s. 8 and other consequential
provisions of the Act were null and void and prayed for an appropriate writ directing the State
Government of Bombay and the Union Government not to enforce and implement the same. This
writ petition was heard by the Bombay High Court on September 14, 1956, and by its judgment
of even date, the High Court dismissed the petition, holding that there was no violation or
contravention of Art. 3 of the Constitution. The appellant then obtained the necessary certificate
under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution, and filed his appeal in this Court on October 18, 1956 on
the strength of that certificate.

5. Now, it is both convenient and advisable to read at this stage Art. 3 of the Constitution, as
amended by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955, the alleged violation of which is the
main ground of attack by learned counsel for the appellant.

"Art. 3 : Parliament may by law -

(a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or
parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State;

(b) increase the area of any State;

(c) diminish the area of any State;

(d) alter the boundaries of any State; and

(e) alter the name of any State;

Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on
the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects
the area, boundaries or name of any of the States the Bill has been referred by the President to
the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon within such period as may be
specified in the reference or within such further period as the President may allow and the period
so specified or allowed has expired."
6. It is clear that by its substantive part the Article gives a certain power to Parliament,
viz., the power to make a law in respect of any of the five matters mentioned in cls. (a) to (e)
thereof. This power includes the making of a law to increase the area of any State; diminish
the area of any State; and alter the name of any State. The substantive part is followed by a
proviso, which lays down certain conditions for the exercise of the power. It states that no
Bill for the purpose (the word "purpose" obviously has reference to the power of making
law in respect of the matters mentioned in the substantive part) shall be introduced in
either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless,
where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the
States, the Bill has been referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for
expressing its views thereon. Thus, the proviso lays down two conditions : one is that no
Bill shall be introduced except on the recommendation of the President, and the second
condition is that where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the areas, boundaries or
name of any of the States, the Bill has to be referred by the President to the Legislature of
the State for expressing its views thereon. The period within which the State Legislature
must express its views has to be specified by the President; but the President may extend
the period so specified. If however, the period specified or extended expires and no views of
the State Legislature are received, the second condition laid down in the proviso is fulfilled
in spite of the fact that the views of the State Legislature have not been expressed. The
intention seems to be to give an opportunity to the State Legislature to express its views
within the time allowed; if the State Legislature fails to avail itself of that opportunity, such
failure does not invalidate the introduction of the Bill. Nor is there anything in the proviso
to indicate that Parliament must accept or act upon the views of the State Legislature.
Indeed, two State Legislatures may express totally divergent views. All that is contemplated
is that Parliament should have before it the views of the State Legislatures as to the
proposals contained in the Bill and then be free to deal with the Bill in any manner it thinks
fit, following the usual practice and procedure prescribed by and under the rules of
business. Thus the essential concerns of the second condition is a reference by the President of
the proposal contained in the bill to the State Legislature to express its views thereon within the
time allowed. It is worthy of note, and this has been properly emphasised in the judgment of
the High Court, that what has to be referred to the State Legislature by the President is the
proposal contained in the Bill. The proviso does not say that if and when a proposal
contained in the Bill is modified subsequently by an amendment properly moved and
accepted in Parliament, there must be a fresh reference to the State Legislature and a fresh
bill must be introduced. It was pointed out in the course of arguments that if the second
condition required a fresh reference and a fresh bill for every amendment, it might result
in an interminable process; because any and every amendment of the original proposal
contained in the Bill would then necessitate a fresh Bill and a fresh reference to the State
Legislature. Other difficulties might also arise if such a construction were put on the
proviso; for example, in a case where two or three States were involved, different views
might be expressed by the Legislatures of different States. If Parliament were to accept the
views of one of the Legislatures and not of the other, a fresh reference would still be
necessary by reason of any amendment in the original proposal contained in the Bill.
7. We are referring to these difficulties not because we think that a forced meaning should
be given to the words of the proviso to avoid certain difficulties which may arise. We are of
the view that the words of the proviso are clear enough and bear their ordinary plain
meaning. According to the accepted connotation of the words used in the proviso, the
second condition means what it states and what has to be referred to the State Legislature
is the proposal contained in the Bill; it has no such drastic effect as to require a fresh
reference every time an amendment of the proposal contained in the Bill is moved and
accepted in accordance with the rules of procedure of Parliament.

8. That in the present case the States Reorganisation Bill was introduced on the recommendation
of the President has not been disputed; nor has it been disputed that the proposal contained in the
Bill was referred to the State Legislatures concerned and their views were received. According to
learned counsel for the appellant, however, this was not enough compliance with the second
condition of the proviso. He has put his argument in several ways. Firstly, he has contended
that the word "State" in Art. 3 should be given a larger connotation so as to mean and
include not merely the geographical entity called the State, but its people as well : this,
according to learned counsel for the appellant, is the "democratic process" incorporated in
Art. 3 and according to this democratic process, so learned counsel has argued, the
representatives of the people of the State of Bombay assembled in the State Legislature
should have been given an opportunity of expressing their views not merely on the proposal
originally contained in the Bill, but on any substantial modification thereof. Secondly and
following the same line of argument, he has contended that the word "Bill" should be given
an extended meaning so as to include any amendment, at least any substantial amendment,
of the proposal contained in the Bill; and thirdly, he has contended that in the present case
the formation of a new Bombay State as one unit was so different from the three units
originally proposed in the Bill that it was not really an amendment of the original proposal
but a new proposal altogether for which a fresh Bill and a fresh reference were necessary.

9. We proceed now to consider these contentions. It is necessary to state at the outset that our
task is to determine on a proper construction the true scope and effect of Art. 3 of the
Constitution, with particular reference to the second condition laid down by the proviso thereto.
We bring to our task such considerations as are germane to the interpretation of an
organic instrument like the Constitution; but it will be improper to import into the
question of construction doctrines of democratic theory and practice obtaining in other
countries, unrelated to the tenor, scheme and words of the provisions which we have to
construe. In plain and unambiguous language, the proviso to Art. 3 of the Constitution
states that where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of
any of the States, the Bill must be referred by the President to the Legislature of the State
for expressing its views. It does not appear to us that any special or recondite doctrine of
"democratic process" is involved therein. Learned counsel for the appellant has invited our
attention to Art. IV, s. 3, of the American Constitution which says inter alia that "no new
State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be
formed by the junction of two or more States without the consent of the Legislatures of the
State concerned as well as of the Congress." That provision is quite different from the
proviso we are considering : the former requires the consent of the State Legislature
whereas the essential requirement of our proviso is a reference by the President of the
proposal contained in the Bill for the expression of its views by the State Legislature. For
this reason we do not think that the decisions relied on by learned counsel for the appellant (State
of Louisiana v. State of Mississippi (1905) 202 U.S., and State of Washington v. State of Oregon
(1908) 211 U.S. 127, are in point. The expression 'State' occurs in Art. 3, and as has been
observed in the State of Texas v. George W. White (1869) 74 U.S. 700, that expression may have
different meanings : it may mean a territorial region, or people united in political relation living
in that region or it may refer to the government under which the people live or it may even
convey the combined idea of territory, people and government. Article 1 of our Constitution
says that India is a Union of States and the States and the territories thereof are specified in
a Schedule. There is, therefore, no difficulty in understanding what is meant by the
expression 'State' in Art. 3. It obviously refers to the States in the First Schedule and the
'Legislature of the State' refers to the Legislature which each State has under the
Constitution. That being the position we see no reasons for importing into the construction
of Art. 3 any doctrinaire consideration of the sanctity of the rights of States or even for
giving an extended meaning to the expression 'State' occurring therein. None of the
constituent units of the Indian Union was sovereign and independent in the sense the
American colonies or the Swiss Cantons were before they formed their federal unions. The
Constituent Assembly of India, deriving its power from the sovereign people, was
unfettered by any previous commitment in evolving a constitutional pattern suitable to the
genius and requirements of the Indian people as a whole. Unlike some other federal
legislatures, Parliament, representing the people of India as a whole, has been vested with
the exclusive power of admitting or establishing new States, increasing or diminishing the
area of an existing State or altering its boundaries, the Legislature or Legislatures of the
States concerned having only the right to an expression of views on the proposals. It is
significant that for making such territorial adjustments it is not necessary even to invoke
the provisions governing constitutional amendments.

10. The second line of argument presented on behalf of the appellant is that the word 'Bill'
in the proviso must be interpreted to include an amendment of any of the clauses of the
Bill, at least any substantial amendment thereof, and any proposal contained in such
amendment must be referred to the State Legislature for expression of its views. We do not
think that this interpretation is correct. Wherever the introduction of an amendment is
subject to a condition precedent, as in the case of financial bills, the Constitution has used
the expression 'A bill or amendments', e.g. in Art. 117. No such expression occurs in art 3.
Secondly, under Art. 118 Parliament has power to make rules of its own procedure and conduct
of business, including the moving of amendments etc. Rule 80 of the rules of procedure of the
House of the People (Lok Sabha) lays down the conditions which govern the admissibility of
amendments to clauses or schedules of a Bill, and one of the conditions is that an amendment
shall be within the scope of the Bill and relevant to the subject matter of the clause to which it
relates. Article 122(1) of the Constitution says that the validity of any proceedings in Parliament
shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. In view of
these provisions, we cannot accept an interpretation of Art. 3 which may nullify the effect of Art.
122, an interpretation moreover which is based not on the words used therein but on certain
abstract and somewhat illusory ideas of what learned counsel for the appellant has characterised
as the democratic process.

11. We recognise that the formation of a new composite State of Bombay as in s. 8 of the
Act was a substantial modification of the original proposal of three units contained in the
Bill. That, however, does not mean that it was not a proper amendment of the original proposal
or that the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views on all aspects of the
subject matter of the proposal. The High Court rightly pointed out that in the debates in the State
Legislature several members spoke in favour of a composite State of Bombay. The point to note
is that many different views were expressed in respect of the subject matter of the original
proposal of three units, and as a matter of fact it cannot be said that the State Legislature had no
opportunity of expressing its views in favour of one composite unit instead of three units if it so
desired. It cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was not relevant or
pertinent to the subject matter of the original proposal. In T. H. Vakil v. Bombay Presidency
Radio Club Ltd. (1944) 47 Bom. L.R. 428, a decision on which learned counsel for the appellant
has relied, the question arose of the power of the chairman of a club to rule an amendment out of
order. It was said therein that (1) an amendment must be germane to the subject-matter of the
original proposition and (2) it must not be a direct negative thereof. Judged by these two
conditions, it cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was not germane to the
subject-matter of the original proposal or was a direct negative thereof. We are unable,
therefore, to accept the third contention of learned counsel for the appellant to the effect
that the formation of a new Bombay State as envisaged in s. 8 of the Act was so completely
divorced from the proposal contained in the Bill that it was in reality a new bill and
therefore a fresh reference was necessary.

12. It is advisable, perhaps, to add a few more words about Art. 122(1) of the Constitution.
Learned counsel for the appellant has posed before us the question as to what would be the effect
of that Article if in any Bill completely unrelated to any of the matters referred to in Cls. (a) to
(e) of Art. 3 an amendment was to be proposed and accepted changing (for example) the name of
a State. We do not think that we need answer such a hypothetical question except merely to say
that if an amendment is of such a character that it is not really an amendment and is clearly
violative of Art. 3, the question then will be not the validity of proceedings in Parliament but the
violation of a constitutional provision. That, however, is not the position in the present case.

13. For these reasons, we hold that there was no violation of Art. 3 and the Act or any of its
provisions are not invalid on that ground.

14. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.

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Babulal Parate vs. The State of Bombay and Ors. (28.08.1959 - SC) : MANU/SC/0008/1959