3.

The law of treaties

International Law (4th edn)

Anders Henriksen

p. 40 3. The law of treaties

Anders Henriksen

https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780192870087.003.0003
Published in print: 18 May 2023
Published online: August 2023

Abstract
This chapter examines the principles and rules of the international law of treaties as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). It discusses the treaty as a legal concept and provides an overview of the regulation of who can
conclude treaties, how consent to be bound by a treaty is expressed, the rules on entry into force, treaty reservations, the
interpretation of treaties, amendments and modifications, the invalidity of treaties and the termination of and withdrawal
from treaties. The VCLT is meant to be applied to all types of written treaties and it therefore governs treaties as diverse as a
bilateral agreement to construct infrastructure as well as a multilateral document such as the UN Charter. In practice,
however, the concrete application of the Convention may differ depending on the type of treaties.

Keywords: 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, international law, treaty, bilateral agreements, multilateral
agreements, validity, interpretation, reservations, Covid-19

Central Issues

1. This chapter examines the international law of treaties as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.

2. It discusses the treaty as a legal concept and provides an overview of the rules on who can conclude
treaties, how consent to be bound by a treaty is expressed, the rules on entry into force, treaty
reservations, the interpretation of treaties, amendments and modifications, the invalidity of
treaties and the termination of and withdrawal from treaties.

3. For the most part, the international law of treaties resembles domestic rules for the creation and
operation of contracts.

4.
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 3. The law of treaties

The most contentious issues in the law of treaties relate to the subject of reservations and treaty
interpretation.

3.1 Introduction

Like other societies, the society of states needs rules that govern the agreements entered into by its legal
subjects. No society can function properly if its subjects are in constant disagreement on the application
and interpretation of their agreements. Not surprisingly, then, the law of treaties is one of the oldest areas
of public international law and it is part and parcel of the international law of coexistence, without which
stability and predictability would be difficult to maintain.

The primary rules in the law of treaties are found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) that was adopted by the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties in May 1969 and entered into force
in January 1980. The draft articles of the VCLT were prepared by successive Special Rapporteurs of the
International Law Commission (ILC). Since the VCLT seeks to codify customary practices, it generally
reflects customary international law. In fact, there has yet to be a case where the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has found that the content of a particular provision in the VCLT does not reflect customary
1
law.

p. 41 ↵ The VCLT applies to all types of written treaties between states. It therefore governs treaties as
diverse as a bilateral agreement to construct infrastructure and a multilateral document such as the UN
Charter. In practice, however, as this chapter will illustrate, the concrete application of the VCLT often
differs depending on the type of treaty. Like domestic contract law, the law of treaties is not concerned
with the material content of the instrument itself; that is a matter for the parties to the particular treaty.

The overview begins in Section 3.2 with the treaty as a legal concept. Section 3.3 examines who possesses
the authority to conclude treaties, Section 3.4 deals with treaties between states and international
organizations and Section 3.5 discusses the various forms of consenting to a treaty. Section 3.6 covers
entry into force and obligations in the so-called ‘interim period’. Section 3.7 discusses validity/invalidity.
The complicated issue of reservations is discussed in Section 3.8 and treaty interpretation in Section 3.9.
The chapter concludes in Sections 3.10 and 3.11 with, respectively, how treaty law may allow states to take
account of changes, and termination and withdrawal from treaties.

3.2 The treaty as a concept under international law

A treaty is an international agreement governed by international law concluded by two or more international
subjects with treaty-making capacity. The adoption of a treaty reflects a will among two or more
international subjects to apply international law as a means of regulating their interests. The vast majority
of treaties are concluded by two or more states and interstate treaties regulate an increasing array of
international relations. As we saw in Chapter 2, one can distinguish between bilateral treaties (concluded
by two states) and multilateral treaties (between larger groups of states). As noted, the VCLT only applies to
2
written treaties concluded between states. While international organizations can also be parties to a treaty
governed by international law, the treaty will not be governed by the VCLT but by the 1986 Vienna

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 3. The law of treaties

Convention on the Law of Treaties between International Organizations or between States and
International Organizations. It is important to note that a state may sometimes enter into an agreement
under national law in which case the agreement is governed by national law.

The legal basis of a treaty obligation is state consent. No one can force a sovereign state to enter into a
legally binding agreement and a treaty only creates legal obligations for the parties. This is reflected in
article 34 of the VCLT. So while state A and state B are free to conclude a treaty that governs their relations,
they cannot conclude a treaty that creates rights or obligations for state C unless the latter consents. When
a state has consented to be bound by a treaty and has become a party, it must comply with the terms. This
is reflected in the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Thus, article 26 states that a treaty in force is binding

p. 42 upon the parties to it and must be performed ↵ by them in good faith. As noted in Chapter 2, both the
pacta sunt servanda principle and the principle of good faith are general principles of international law.
Article 27 specifies that a state party may not invoke its national laws as justification for a failure to
3
perform a treaty-based obligation. Hence, a state is obliged to comply with a treaty even if doing so
requires breaching national laws.

Although the VCLT only applies to written treaties (between states), oral agreements are also ‘treaties’
under international law. Article 3 of the VCLT explicitly stipulates that the fact that the Convention only
applies to written treaties does not affect the legal force of other agreements. In Great Belt, a telephone
conversation between the prime ministers of Finland and Denmark concluded a dispute between the two
4
states concerning Denmark’s decision to construct a bridge across ‘Storebælt’ (Great Belt).

The title of the written instrument is immaterial and everything from ‘minutes’, ‘protocols’, ‘exchanges of
notes’, ‘memoranda of understanding’ to ‘covenants’, ‘charters’ and ‘conventions’ may qualify as a
5
treaty. As long as the instrument testifies to an intention to create rights and obligations under
international law it is a treaty. As we saw in Chapter 2, states often adopt instruments that do not intend to
be legally binding and it is only when a political pledge is accompanied by a desire to create rights and
obligations under international law that a treaty is created. In practice, of course, it may be difficult to
determine if an agreement is intended to be legally binding and states have an unfortunate tendency to be
6
reluctant to explicitly specify if that is the case. What is decisive is the intention of the parties. In some
cases, the instrument may help determine what the parties intend. In practice, both the terminology and
the form of the instrument may offer guidance. A lack of precision in the wording and the use of very
general and vague terms indicates a lack of intention to create a legally binding commitment. The same
goes for terms like ‘will’ and ‘ought’ whereas words like ‘shall’, ‘rights’, ‘oblige’ or ‘must’ indicate an
intention to create legal rights/obligations. Guidance may also be sought from the circumstances
surrounding the conclusion of the instrument as well as the manner in which it is dealt with subsequent to
its conclusion. If, for example, the instrument is submitted to a national parliament in accordance with
domestic procedures for the conclusion of treaties, it indicates an intention to create a legally binding
commitment. Just like a decision by the executive branch in such a situation, not to submit the instrument
for approval indicates a belief that the agreement is not legally binding. Article 102 of the UN Charter
specifies that treaties and international agreements entered into by a member of the UN shall be registered
with the UN Secretariat. Registration indicates a belief among the parties that they have entered into a
7
legally binding instrument.

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 3. The law of treaties

p. 43 ↵ Case law from the ICJ shows that it does not take much for an agreement to be considered legally
binding. In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, for example, the Court did not rule out that a press
8
communiqué without signatures or initials could be legally binding. In Case Concerning Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, the Court found that minutes from a
meeting reflected ‘commitments to which the Parties have consented’ and thus created rights and
9
obligations in international law. In Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean, the Court concluded that a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Kenya and Somalia was a treaty under international law.
The Court noted that the document recorded the two parties’ agreement on certain points governed by
international law; that it included a provision regarding entry into force of the MoU; that Kenya had
requested its registration under article 102 of the UN Charter; and that Somalia did not protest that
10
registration until almost five years thereafter.

3.3 The authority to conclude a treaty

Article 6 of the VCLT stipulates that all states possess the legal capacity to conclude treaties. However, not
all representatives of a state are competent to conclude a treaty on behalf of a state. The issue of
‘representation’ is dealt with in article 7 of the VCLT, which refers to the concept of ‘full powers’. In
practical terms, a ‘full power’ is a document that authorizes a state representative to negotiate and
conclude a treaty on behalf of the state. In Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean, the Prime Minister of
the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia had ‘authorized and empowered’ the Somali Minister for
National Planning and International Cooperation to sign an MoU with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
11
Kenya. But not all state representatives need to produce ‘full powers’. According to article 7(2)(a) of the
VCLT, by virtue of their functions heads of state, heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs
may perform all acts that relate to the conclusion of a treaty on behalf of a state without presenting full
powers. Their prominent positions mean that other states can rely on their ability to act on behalf of the
state. This is also of relevance to unilateral statements as reflected in Eastern Greenland, where the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) concluded that a statement by the Norwegian Minister of
Foreign Affairs was binding on Norway even though the minister was allegedly not competent under
12
Norwegian law to bind Norway in the matter in question. Under article 7(2)(b) and (c), a more limited

p. 44 authority to represent a home state rests on, respectively, heads ↵ of diplomatic missions and
representatives accredited by a state to an international conference or an international organization.
Depending on the circumstances, these individuals can participate in the adoption of a text of a treaty
without full powers.

According to article 46(1) of the VCLT, a state may not invoke the fact that its consent to a treaty has been
expressed in violation of its national laws as invalidating its consent unless the violation of national law
was manifest and concerned a national rule of fundamental importance. Under article 46(2), the violation
of internal law must be ‘manifest’ in the sense that it is objectively evident to any state conducting itself in
the matter in accordance with normal practice and good faith. The threshold is high, however, and in Land
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria the ICJ concluded that states are not obliged ‘to keep
themselves informed of legislative and constitutional developments in other States which are or may
13
become important for the international relations of these States’. In Maritime Delimitation in the Indian
Ocean, the Court concluded that there was no reason to suppose that Kenya could have been aware that a

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 3. The law of treaties

signature of a Somali minister on an MoU may not have been sufficient under Somali law to express
14
consent to a binding international agreement. If a person with no authority to conclude a treaty has
nevertheless done so, article 8 of the VCLT specifies that the state may decide to avail itself of the
opportunity to disavow the act of the person in question by subsequently endorsing the act and thereby
establishing its consent to be bound. The state will be held to have done so by implication if it invokes the
provisions of the treaty or otherwise acts in such a way as to appear to treat the act in question as
15
effective.

3.4 Treaties between states and international organizations

16
International organizations can also have treaty-making powers. For example, both the UN and the EU
have concluded a number of treaties covering a wide variety of issues. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties between International Organizations or between States and International Organizations was adopted in
1986 to regulate treaty relations of international organizations. However, it is not yet in force. When
drafting the articles, the ILC used the 1969 VCLT as the basis for the new convention on international
organizations and simply proceeded from article to article in order to determine when modifications were
called for. Thus, with a few exceptions, the 1986 Convention is identical to the 1969 Convention. The UN is
a party to the 1986 Convention.

p. 45 3.5 Consent to be bound

In order for a state to become legally bound by a treaty, it must consent to it. According to article 11 of the
VCLT, consent may be expressed by a signature, an exchange of the instruments, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession ‘or by any other means if so agreed’. Hence, the VCLT is fairly flexible and leaves it to
the parties to the treaty to determine the means by which the required consent may be expressed. In
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean, for example, Kenya and Somalia had signed an MoU that
17
contained a provision that expressly stated that it entered into force upon signature. Today, there is a
widespread practice of simply expressing consent by signature—also known as a definitive signature.
Under article 15, a state can give consent by accession, whereby it consents to be bound by a treaty already
negotiated and signed by other states, often after the treaty has entered into force, in the following
circumstances:

(a) if the treaty provides for it;

(b) if it is otherwise established that the negotiating parties were agreed that it should be possible; or

(c) if all the parties have subsequently agreed that a state may express its consent by such means.

Accession is primarily relevant in relation to multilateral treaties, such as human rights conventions, that
gradually seek to expand the number of participating states.

There is an important distinction between signature and ratification. Article 14 of the VCLT illustrates that,
in some circumstances, and very often with regard to multilateral treaties, consent to be bound by a treaty
requires not only a signature by the potential state party in question, but also a subsequent confirmation by

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 3. The law of treaties

the state that it intends to be bound by the treaty. The purpose of such ratification is to allow the signing
state a period of time before it gives its binding consent. Often the state may need the approval of its
national parliament (more rarely, it may seek approval of the general public through a referendum), or to
enact the necessary legislation to give domestic effect to the treaty. Well-known examples of treaties
subject to ratification were the 1992 Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) and the 2007 EU
Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, according to its article 82, the VCLT itself is subject to ratification. When
subsequent ratification is required, the (initial) signature is not (yet) confirmation that the state intends to
be bound by the treaty. For example, the United States has signed the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child but not yet ratified it. In the US, final approval of treaties requires the approval of two-thirds of
the members of the Senate. As we return to later, the mere signing of a treaty that is subject to ratification
triggers an obligation to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.

p. 46 ↵ According to article 14 of the VCLT, ratification is required if:

(a) it is specified in the treaty itself;

(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating parties agreed that it was needed;

(c) the representative who signed the treaty did so subject to ratification; or

(d) it appeared from the full powers of the representative or it was expressed during the negotiation
that that was the intention of the state.

If it is not specified or otherwise manifest that ratification is needed, there is a presumption that
ratification is not required.

3.6 Entry into force—obligations in the interim period

When a state consents to be bound by a treaty, it shows an intention to undertake the legal obligations it
contains. To some extent, the same can be said of a state that has signed a treaty that is subject to
subsequent ratification. In practice, however, the state is not legally bound until the treaty enters into
force. According to article 24 of the VCLT, a treaty enters into force ‘in such manner and upon such date as
it may provide or as the negotiating states may agree’. In the case of simple bilateral agreements, the treaty
may enter into force when both parties sign the agreement. But it is not unusual for a substantial amount
of time to pass before a multilateral treaty enters into force. The VCLT itself did not enter into force until
more than ten years after it was adopted. If the treaty does not specify when it enters into force, it will
generally enter into force as soon as consent has been established for all the negotiating states. A treaty
that has not yet entered into force cannot create any legal obligations for the contracting states. But good
faith requires that a state is not entirely free to act as it pleases when it has given its consent to be bound or
expressed an initial intention to be bound but needs to give subsequent confirmation in the form of
ratification—known as ‘the interim period’. Article 18 of the VCLT specifies that states must refrain from
acts which would ‘defeat the object and purpose’ of the treaty when (a) it has signed the treaty but not yet
ratified it, until it has made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its
consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty (and provided the entry into
force is not unduly delayed). Whether an act ‘defeats the object and purpose’ of a treaty must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. The provision is easier to apply to treaties of a contractual nature
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 3. The law of treaties

than to more general law-making treaties. As a point of departure, however, it will probably only be in
those cases where a state’s behaviour in relation to a treaty appears to be ‘unwarranted and condemnable’
18
and potentially motivated by bad intentions that it will be found to violate its interim obligations.

p. 47 3.7 Validity

All legal systems have rules concerning the validity—and invalidity—of their legal instruments, and
international law is no exception. Since the legal basis of a treaty obligation is the consent of the state
party, most of the grounds for invalidity relate to defects in the consent given by a state. Thus, with the
exception of treaties in violation of jus cogens, the underlying rationale of a claim of invalidity will be that
consent would not have been given had it not been for the circumstance in question. The rules on invalidity
are found in articles 46–53 and 64 of the VCLT, and they illustrate that it is very difficult to successfully
raise a claim of invalidity. In fact, predictability, stability and mutual trust dictate that once agreed and
entered into, even seemingly ‘unequal’ or ‘unreasonable’ treaties must be considered valid and legally
binding.

The first ground of invalidity has been noted previously in the chapter. Thus, according to article 46 of the
VCLT a state can invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty was expressed in violation of its
internal law. According to article 46(1), it requires, however, that the violation was ‘manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance’. Article 46(2) specifies that a violation is
‘manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with
normal practice and in good faith’. Article 46 must be distinguished from article 27 whereby a state may
not invoke its internal law as a justification for not fulfilling a treaty-based obligation.

Article 48 addresses error in the formation of treaties and stipulates that error can only be invoked if it
‘relates to a fact or situation which was assumed to … exist at the time when the treaty was concluded’ and
if it ‘formed an essential basis’ of the consent expressed. In addition, under article 48(2), error cannot be
invoked by a state if the latter contributed by its own conduct to the error or the circumstances were such
that the state should have noticed ‘a possible error’. Importantly, political miscalculations are different
from errors and international law assumes that state representatives can make reasonable judgements of
their own actions.

Article 49 specifies that a state can invoke fraud as invalidating consent if it has been misled or ‘induced to
conclude a treaty’. In a somewhat similar vein, article 50 specifies that corruption of a representative of a
state may be a ground for invoking invalidity. Article 51 concerns coercion and stipulates that an expression
of consent shall be without legal effect if it has been procured ‘through acts or threats’ directed against a
state representative. A more relevant provision is article 52, according to which a ‘treaty is void if its
conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of … the Charter of the United Nations’.
The rule raises a number of questions, including the validity of peace treaties concluded after a use of force
of doubtful legality under the UN Charter. Since some measure of coercion and pressure is endemic in
international relations and negotiations, it is of some importance that the article only concerns military
force.

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 3. The law of treaties

The most relevant of the provisions on potential invalidity is article 53 concerning peremptory norms/jus

p. 48 cogens. As we saw in Chapter 2, article 53 specifies that a ↵ treaty is void if it ‘conflicts with a
19
peremptory norm of general international law’. Such norms are those that have been ‘accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character’. Article 53 differs from the other articles on invalidity in that it is the only one that focuses
on the content of the treaty in question and thereby tries to limit the contractual freedom of the states.
While it is not clear which norms are of a jus cogens character (see the discussion in Chapter 2), the
category seems to include the prohibition against torture and genocide, the ban on slavery, the prohibition
of aggression, the ban on crimes against humanity, the prohibition of piracy, the right to self-
determination and the prohibition of apartheid and other forms of gross racial discrimination. Article 53
should be read in conjunction with article 64 according to which an existing treaty becomes void and
terminates if it conflicts with an emerging (new) peremptory norm. In contrast to article 53, the latter
article concerns cases where a treaty was valid when concluded but subsequently becomes void due to the
establishment of a new rule of jus cogens. An example would be a treaty previously intended to regulate the
slave trade.

3.8 Reservations

International law may allow a state to take account of national political, social or cultural attitudes by
becoming party to a multilateral treaty without accepting all of the obligations. Unilateral statements
whereby a state excludes or modifies the legal effect of one or more provisions of a treaty are termed
20
‘reservations’. The rules governing reservations are among the most detailed and complicated in the law
of treaties.

There is an important distinction between ‘reservations’ and ‘interpretative declarations’. Unlike a

reservation, an interpretative declaration (which is not mentioned in the VCLT) does not seek to modify a
treaty obligation but merely to specify or clarify the meaning or scope the declaring state attaches to the
obligation. Hence, the purpose of such a declaration is to communicate what the declaring state
understands the existing obligation to be. Often, the purpose of an interpretative declaration is to ensure
an interpretation of a provision consistent with the domestic law of the state. The declaration may
21
constitute a relevant element when interpreting the treaty (see Section 3.9). It is also important not to
confuse reservations with derogations. As we shall explore further in Chapter 9, some human rights
treaties contain provisions that authorize a state to ‘derogate’—and thus not to apply certain provisions in
the treaty—in times of emergency or a similar period of national crisis. A derogation is not the same as a
reservation.

p. 49 ↵ The concrete rules on treaty reservations owe much to the ICJ’s 1951 advisory opinion in Genocide
Reservations. Until then, reservations had to be accepted by all the contracting parties, but in the opinion
22
the ICJ adopted a new and more flexible approach that found its way into the VCLT. Thus, reservations
23
are now generally acceptable if they are compatible with ‘the object and purpose’ of the treaty. State
practice is rich with examples of state reservations, and reservations of relatively minor significance are
particularly prevalent in relation to human rights conventions such as the UN Covenant on Civil and

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 3. The law of treaties

Political Rights. Denmark, for example, has a reservation to the Covenant’s right for juvenile offenders to
be segregated from adults and accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status. Sweden and
24
Norway have a similar reservation. More well-known examples of treaty reservations are the Danish
‘opt-outs’ to the 1992 EU Maastricht Treaty. In a May 1992 referendum, a narrow majority of Danish
voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty and since the Treaty had to be ratified by all member states, the
solution to the ‘Danish problem’ was found at the Edinburgh Summit in December 1992, where the
25
member states agreed to allow Denmark to ‘opt out’ of certain aspects of the Treaty. In a subsequent
referendum in May 1993, a majority of Danes accepted Danish ratification of the Treaty with the four ‘opt-
outs’. In essence, the opt-outs were treaty reservations that meant that Denmark would not be bound by
26
certain provisions of the Treaty. On 1 June, 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a majority of
Danes in a referendum decided to abandon one of the opt-outs (common defence policy) and thus
strengthen its treaty-based relationship with the EU.

Reservations to treaties are not always permitted. Under article 19 of the VCLT, reservations are excluded
in three circumstances. First, reservations cannot be made to a treaty that expressly disallows it. Article
120 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, for example, specifies that no reservations
may be made to the Statute. Secondly, some treaties only allow certain reservations. Thirdly, a reservation
may not violate the object and purpose of a treaty. If it does so, it will be null and void and without legal
effect regardless of whether or not other states have objected to it. According to the ILC, the object and
purpose of a treaty is compromised if the reservation ‘affects an essential element of the treaty that is
27
necessary to its general tenour, in such a way that the reservation impairs the raison d’être of the treaty’.
It may be difficult to identify the object and purpose of a treaty, in particular as these have a tendency to

p. 50 become more elaborate and complex. However, both the title and a preamble of a treaty may ↵ offer
some guidance. It may, for example, be hard to draw the line between permissible and impermissible
reservations to human rights conventions. A concrete example is the reservation by the United States to
the obligation in the Covenant not to impose the death penalty for crimes committed by persons under 18
28
years of age. Some treaties contain a process for determining if a reservation is compatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty. An example is the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) adopted
29
pursuant to the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) Constitution.

Articles 20 and 21 of the VCLT deal with the important issues regarding acceptance/objection to
reservations and the legal effects of reservations. As a point of departure, due to the consensual nature of
the law of treaties, a reservation will not become effective in relation to another contracting state unless
that state has accepted it—either explicitly or implicitly. In short, if a state proposes a reservation the
other states may accept or object to the reservation. According to article 20(5), if a state has not objected
within 12 months, it is deemed to have accepted it. Article 20(1) initially stipulates that acceptance is not
required if the reservation is expressly authorized by the treaty. Under article 20(2), however, if it appears
from the limited number of participating states and the object and purpose of the treaty that it is meant to
apply in its entirety to all parties, reservation requires the consent of all those parties. Article 20(3)
specifies that, unless otherwise provided, a reservation to a treaty that is a constituent instrument of an
international organization requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.

Article 20(4) governs other cases than the above. Here, reservations are governed by the following
principles:

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 3. The law of treaties

(a) If a state accepts a reservation by another state they will be parties to the same treaty, see article
20(4)(a).

(b) If a state objects to another state’s reservation the treaty will not enter into force between the two
states if the objecting state expresses a definite intention for that to be the case, see article 20(4)(b).

(c) A state’s reservation is effective when at least one other contracting state has accepted it, see article
20(4)(c).

With regard to the legal effects of reservations and objections, article 21(1) stipulates that a reservation
modifies the provisions of the treaty for the reserving and the other state. According to article 21(2),
however, it does not modify the provisions for the other parties inter se. As a result of the Danish
reservations to the Maastricht Treaty, then, while Denmark is not bound by the ‘reserved’ parts of the
treaty, the other non-reserving states are bound vis-à-vis each other. Under article 21(3), if an objecting
state has not expressly opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving state, the
provisions with the reservation do not apply between the two states.

p. 51 ↵ In practical terms, then, a state can react to another state’s reservation in three ways: (1) it can accept
the reservation, in which event the treaty will enter into force between the two states with the reservation
in force; (2) it can object to the reservation and express an intention that the treaty as a whole should not
enter into force between the states—if that is the case, the treaty will not govern the two states’ relations;
or (3) it can object to the reservation but refrain from expressing an intention that the treaty as a whole
should not enter into force between the two states. Then the treaty will enter into force between the two
states with the reservation in force. In practice, therefore, the legal effect of options (1) and (3) is the same,
and the choices for an objecting state are not very favourable. Unless it wants the treaty as a whole not to
govern the relations between itself and the reserving state, it makes no material difference if it accepts or
objects to a reservation.

If a reservation violates a treaty’s object and purpose, the reserving state cannot rely on it in its treaty
relations with other parties. In practice, then, there would only appear to be two possible outcomes. The
first is that the invalidity of the reservation nullifies the instrument as a whole whereby the (reserving)
state is no longer considered a party to the agreement at all. While this approach preserves the integrity of
the treaty regime in question, it is a drastic step that the involved states themselves may not desire. The
second option is to essentially ignore the reservation and conclude that the (reserving) state remains
bound by the treaty, including the provision(s) to which the reservation related. However, this so-called
‘severance’ option goes against the principle that a state is only bound by the treaty obligations it consents
to. While ‘severance’ has been supported by, among others, the European Court of Human Rights
30 31 32
(ECtHR), the Human Rights Committee and the Nordic states, the ILC has suggested a more moderate
solution. It introduces a presumption of severability according to which the reserving state will be
considered a contracting state without ‘the benefit of the reservation’ unless it ‘has expressed a contrary
33
intention or such an intention is otherwise established’. Thus, unless the state makes it manifest that it
will only be a party to the treaty if it can benefit from the invalid reservation, it will be presumed to be a full
party without benefitting from the reservation.

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 3. The law of treaties

According to article 19 of the VCLT, a reservation must be made by a state ‘when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty’, and there is no mention of a right to make a reservation after
the treaty in question has been ratified. A reservation subsequent to ratification cannot therefore be
effective unless it is accepted by the other contracting parties.

p. 52 ↵ It has been debated whether a state that is not satisfied with an existing treaty obligation can
withdraw from the treaty in order to ‘re-accede’ with a reservation that excludes the unwanted obligation.
One solution would be for the other contracting parties to deal with the issue on a case-by-case basis. Re-
accession with a new reservation would, of course, not be possible if the reservation violates the treaty’s
object and purpose. In addition, a state that seeks to become ‘un-bound’ by a particular treaty obligation
will remain bound by the norm in question if it is (also) binding under customary international law.

3.9 Interpretation

Most disputes in international law concern interpretation of treaties, and treaty interpretation is therefore
one of the most important skills of any international lawyer. The relevant principles are found in articles 31
34
and 32 of the VCLT, which reflect customary international law. As always, the key is the intention of the
parties. Article 31(1) articulates the general rule that a ‘treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose’. Thus, the interpreter must consider three elements: the text, its context and the
object and purpose of the treaty as desired by the parties. All elements are relevant and in principle none is
more important than the others. While it is generally fair to assume that the ordinary meaning of a word or
term is what was intended by the parties to the treaty, the text is only the natural starting point, and if the
wording of a treaty is clear but its application would lead to an unreasonable result, the other elements
must be consulted. In practice, one can only grasp the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a text by considering its
context and the overall object and purpose of the treaty. In order to determine, for example, what is meant
by ‘force’ or ‘armed attack’ in articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, the interpreter must take account of
both the structure of the Charter as well as the Charter’s purposes. Under article 31(4) of the VCLT, a
‘special meaning’ must be given to a term in a treaty provision if ‘it is established that the parties so
intended’.

According to article 31(2) of the VCLT, the ‘context’ includes not only the treaty’s preamble but also
annexes as well as agreements and instruments made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. Article
31(3)(a) and (b) permits consideration of agreements and practice established subsequent to the adoption of
the treaty. This makes sense since the manner in which a treaty is actually applied by the parties is a good
indication of what they believe the treaty to mean. Indeed, if subsequent practice is sufficiently clear and
either expressly or tacitly accepted by all parties, it can take precedence over an otherwise fairly clear
wording of a text. In Namibia, the ICJ found that although article 27(3) of the UN Charter stipulates that

p. 53 decisions by the Security Council on ↵ non-procedural matters must be made by an ‘affirmative’ vote
of nine of its members including the ‘concurring votes’ of the five permanent members, subsequent
35
practice confirmed that the term ‘concurring’ should simply be interpreted as ‘not objecting’. The case
illustrates the difficulty of determining when subsequent practice should be considered an interpretation
36
or an outright amendment of a provision. In Hassan v UK, the ECtHR found that subsequent practice of

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 3. The law of treaties

the parties modified the content of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Although
detention on the basis of the Third and Fourth 1949 Geneva Conventions in the course of an international
armed conflict seemed to be inconsistent with the right to liberty under article 5 of the ECHR unless the
detaining state has made a valid derogation, subsequent state practice nevertheless showed that the lack of
a formal derogation should not prevent the Court from taking account of the Geneva Conventions when
37
interpreting and applying article 5.

Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT specifies that, together with the context, treaty interpretation shall take
account of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. Thus,
38
the treaty must be considered in the wider context of international law. In Hassan v UK, for example, the
ECtHR interpreted a human rights provision with due regard to international humanitarian law and found
that the grounds for permitting deprivation of liberty should be ‘accommodated … with the taking of
prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a risk to security under the Third and Fourth
39
Geneva Conventions’.

Article 32 of the VCLT concerns the status of the preparatory works to a treaty (travaux préparatoires), such
as preliminary drafts of the treaty, records from conferences and explanatory statements. Such material is
explicitly listed as a ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ and is only to be consulted ‘in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31’ either leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or will lead to a
‘result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. In practice, however, preparatory work is usually
consulted if it can add something meaningful to the identification of the intention of the parties.

According to article 33 of the VCLT, if a ‘treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages’ ‘the text
is equally authoritative in each language’ unless otherwise specified or agreed. The problem is sometimes
overcome by a stipulation in the treaty that one of the languages will prevail in the case of inconsistency.

Although articles 31–33 of the VCLT generally apply to all treaties, the amount of weight attributed to,

p. 54 respectively, the text, context and object and purpose of a treaty ↵ may depend on the type of treaty.
Thus, while treaties of a contractual/reciprocal character may dictate an interpretation that centres around
state consent and the intention of the parties involved, treaties of a more ‘law-making’ character may call
for a teleological approach that places more emphasis on the treaty’s stated object and purpose. A
constitutive treaty, that establishes an international institution and specifies the functions and
competences of that institution, is generally found to be of a ‘special nature’ that requires an
interpretation that focuses on what will make the institution ‘effective’. Thus, in Reparations, the ICJ found
40
that the UN has the competences required for it to effectively discharge its functions. In practice, it falls
41
to the international organization itself to interpret the extent of its own powers. In Legality of the Use of
Nuclear Weapons in Times of Armed Conflict, the Court did not find that the WHO could request an advisory
42
opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. When interpreting the constituent treaties of the
EU, the Court of Justice of the European Union generally relies on an interpretation that stresses the
‘effectiveness’ of the EU. In the seminal 1963 case of Van Gend en Loos, the (then) European Court of Justice
stated that the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community was ‘more than an agreement
which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states … [It] constitutes a new legal
43
order of international law’ and should be interpreted accordingly. Human rights conventions are also often

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 3. The law of treaties

interpreted less according to the original intention of the parties and more in order to ensure the effective,
real and concrete protection of the individuals who find themselves under the jurisdiction of the states. As
we shall return to in Chapter 9, the ECtHR has, for example, adopted what is referred to as ‘dynamic’
interpretation and it has repeatedly stressed that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’ that must be
interpreted in the ‘light of present-day conditions’ and not ‘solely in accordance with the intentions of
44
their authors at the adoption of the treaty’. A similar approach is visible in the practice of other human
45
rights bodies.

3.10 Taking account of changes

As just noted, subsequent practice in the application of a treaty can have the practical effect of modifying
the content of the treaty if it has been consented to by the parties. But as time passes and conditions and/or

p. 55 political sentiments change, the parties to a ↵ treaty may want to more formally or substantively alter
their rights/obligations on an issue covered by a treaty. Under article 39 of the VCLT, a treaty may be
amended by the specific agreement of the parties—often termed ‘protocols’. The ECHR has, for example,
been supplemented by a large number of protocols. In practice, many treaties, and most multilateral
treaties, will contain provisions on amendments. If there are no such provisions, the usual consent-
centred formalities on the conclusion and coming into effect of treaties apply. According to article 40(2),
proposed amendments should be notified to all contracting states. Regardless of any amendment, under
article 41 two or more parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement modifying the treaty
between them. It is, however, a requirement that it is provided for in the treaty or that the modification is
not prohibited by the treaty and does not affect the other parties’ rights or obligations. Also, the
modification cannot relate to a provision to which a derogation is incompatible with the effective
execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.

When it is particularly obvious to states that their treaty-based commitments must take account of
subsequent developments, they can adopt a framework convention that, unlike ‘regular’ treaties, does not
at the outset exhaustively regulate a given topic but instead establishes an organizational structure
competent to progressively develop the substantive regulation. As we shall return to in Chapter 11,
framework conventions are particularly prevalent within international environmental law where a well-
known example is the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the UNFCCC
itself only contains few substantive provisions, it establishes a Conference of the Parties (COP) that adopts
the measures required to reach the objectives of the Convention.

Sometimes, state parties find that a treaty is so outdated that they need to negotiate a whole new set of
treaty obligations that may either supplement or simply replace the existing treaty. One reason could be
that the state parties become increasingly more willing to assume greater international obligations to
more effectively cooperate on a given matter, as has occurred with the adoption of a succession of
increasingly expansive treaties binding on the EU member states. At other times, it may be technological,
societal or other developments that make states revisit their treaty-based obligations.

An example is found in international health law where the members of the WHO in 1995 decided to
fundamentally revise the 1951 International Sanitary Regulations (ISR). Not only were the ISR limited in
their application to a few specific diseases (most notably cholera, the plague and yellow fever) that had
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 3. The law of treaties

historically been associated with the trade concerns of the Great Powers, the ISR were also ill-suited to
accommodate a more modern and holistic approach to health concerns. In fact, international efforts to
make progress in international health law were increasingly driven not by the ISR but by international
human rights law, international trade law and international environmental law. Thus, in 2005, the ISR
were replaced with the current IHR that have a much wider scope and introduce an entirely new approach
to global health security. Among other things, the IHR bring together the often inter-related concerns of
public health, human rights, security and international trade. In addition, as illustrated by the Covid-19

p. 56 pandemic, the IHR grant the WHO the authority to declare the existence of ↵ public health emergencies
of global concern and issue temporary non-binding recommendations to states on how they should
46
respond to such emergencies. In July 2022, the WHO declared the outbreak of monkeypox to be such an
emergency. Interestingly, the IHR were adopted in a rare treaty-making procedure where states became
parties to the IHR automatically unless they notified the WHO’s Director-General that they did not want to
47
be a party.

3.11 Termination and withdrawal

According to article 54 of the VCLT, the termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party to a treaty
occurs either in accordance with a provision in the treaty or by the consent of all the parties thereto. Under
President Trump, the US withdrew (or signalled its intention to withdraw) from a number of international
treaties, at times, but not always, relying on specific provisions that allow for such withdrawals. In some
instances, the US merely stated that it would withdraw with 12 months’ notice. On 15 March 2022, Russia
announced that it would withdraw from the Council of Europe and by implication also the ECHR. In
practice, Russia’s decision pre-empted a decision by the Council of Europe to expel Russia. Since 25
February, Russia had been suspended from the Council. On 16 September 2022, in accordance with the
48
ECHR’s provision on withdrawal, Russia ceased to be a party to the ECHR. Russia’s departure from the
ECHR illustrates that multilateral treaties usually have more focus on the procedures for voluntary
withdrawal than on how other states can expel member states that repeatedly violate certain fundamental
principles of the Convention. For example, while the Treaty on European Union has a procedure for
suspending certain rights from a member state, it does not have a procedure for expelling a state from the
treaty and thus the Union. If termination or withdrawal is not provided for in a provision in a treaty, article
56 of the VCLT specifies that a state can only withdraw from a treaty where the parties intended to permit
such a possibility or where the right may be implied by the nature of the treaty. In such cases, a party must
give no less than 12 months’ notice of its intention to withdraw.

A state may also terminate a bilateral treaty if the other state materially breaches its obligations under the
treaty. Under article 60(3) of the VCLT, a ‘material breach’ consists of a repudiation of the treaty not
permitted by the VCLT or the violation of a provision that is essential to accomplishing the object and
purpose of the treaty. In cases of a material breach of a multilateral treaty, article 60(2) specifies that the
other parties may, inter alia, unanimously decide to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part
or to terminate it either in relations between themselves and the defaulting state or as between all the
parties.

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 3. The law of treaties

p. 57 ↵ In a few situations, international law permits a state to terminate or suspend its treaty-based
obligations for a number of exceptional circumstances. First of all, under article 61 of the VCLT, a state may
terminate or withdraw from a treaty if, due to the ‘permanent disappearance or destruction of an object
indispensable for the execution of the treaty’, it becomes impossible for a state to perform the treaty-
based obligation. Only a permanent impossibility will be relevant. Secondly, according to article 62, the
same may apply in cases of a fundamental change of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus). The exception is
narrow, however, and it may only be invoked if the change was unforeseen at the time the treaty was
concluded and the existence of the now changed circumstances ‘constituted an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty’ and the ‘effect of the change is radically to transform the
extent of the obligations still to be performed’. In addition, a state may not invoke its own conduct. In
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ did not find that changes in environmental knowledge and awareness
49
radically affected the obligations of the parties. According to the ICJ, the provisions for the termination
and suspension of the operation of treaties in articles 60–62 of the VCLT reflect customary international
50
law. The consequences of the termination or suspension of a treaty are listed in articles 70–72.

Summary

Like other societies, the society of states has rules and principles that govern the agreements entered into by its legal
subjects, and the law of treaties is one of the oldest and most important areas of public international law. The primary
rules in the area of the law of treaties are found in the 1969 VCLT, which, for the most part at least, reflects customary
international law. The 1969 Convention regulates the conclusion and entry into force of treaties, the application and
interpretation of treaties, the validity and termination of treaties and the withdrawal from treaties, and is intended to
be applied to all types of treaties whether bilateral or multilateral. For the most part, the rules resemble domestic
rules for the creation and operation of contracts and, as with national contract law, the law of treaties is not
concerned with the material content of the instrument itself. While the majority of the rules and principles are
uncontroversial, issues relating to treaty reservations and the interpretation of treaties remain contentious and
therefore fairly complex.

Recommended reading
For thorough contributions, see Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press,
2013); Duncan B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2020).

p. 58 ↵ A classic work on the law of treaties is Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford University Press, 1986). See also
Richard R. Baxter, ‘International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”’ (1980) 29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
549; Oscar Schachter, ‘The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements’ (1977) 71 American Journal of
International Law 296; Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (Kluwer, 1996).

For contributions on reservations, see William A. Schabas, ‘Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time of Innovation
and Reform’ (1994) 32 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 39; Ryan Goodman, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid
Reservations, and State Consent’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 531.

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3. The law of treaties

For a thorough work on treaty interpretation, see Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press,
2008) and Ulf Lindefalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties (Springer, 2010).

Questions for discussion

1. In what ways does the interpretation of constituent treaties and human rights treaties differ from a more
traditional approach to interpretation?

2. What is the meaning of pacta sunt servanda and how does the principle manifest itself in the law of treaties?

3. How should one determine if an agreement is a treaty governed by international law or is merely a political
pledge?

4. It is often the case that a treaty does not enter into force after a certain amount of time has passed. While a
consenting state cannot be bound by a treaty that has yet to enter into force, it is not entirely free to act as it
pleases. Why is that? From where is such an ‘obligation’ derived?

5. Can you provide some examples of when it is important to identify the object and purpose of a treaty?

Visit the online resources for outline answers <https://iws.oupsupport.com/ebook/access/content/henriksen4e-

student-resources/henriksen4e-chapter-3-guidance-on-answering-the-questions-in-the-book?options=showName> to
these questions. You can also listen to a podcast <https://iws.oupsupport.com/ebook/access/content/henriksen4e-
student-resources/henriksen4e-chapter-3-audio-podcast-the-law-of-treaties?options=showName> for further discussion
on this topic.

Notes
1
Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 11.
2
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), 1155 UNTS
331, art. 2(1)(a).
3
But see the exception in art. 46.
4
See Passage Through the Great Belt (Finland v Denmark), Application Instituting Proceedings, General List No. 86
[1991] ICJ Rep 1 and the subsequent Order [1992] ICJ Rep 348.
5
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey), Judgment [1978] ICJ Rep 3, para. 96; Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment [1994] ICJ
Rep 112, para. 23.
6
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (n 5) para. 96.
7
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (n 5) para. 29.
8
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (n 5) para. 96.
9
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (n 5) paras 25, 30.

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10
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v Kenya), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2 February 2017,
para. 42.
11
Ibid, para. 43.
12
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway), Judgment, 1933, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53. See also Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (n 5) paras 26–27.
13
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening),
Judgment [2002] ICJ Rep 303, para. 266.
14
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (n 10) para. 49.
15
ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966,
vol. II, pp. 187, 194.
16
See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion [1962] ICJ Rep
151, 168 and Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons in Times of Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 66,
para. 19.
17
Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (n 10) paras 37, 47.
18
Jan Klabbers, ‘How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Toward Manifest
Intent’ (2001) 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 283, 330.
19
The same applies to a unilateral statement.
20
For a definition, see VCLT art. 2(1)(d).
21
See also ILC, ‘Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties’ (2011), UN Doc. A/66/10, para. 4.7.1.
22
Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 21–22.
23
Ibid, 24.
24
For an overview of reservations to the Covenant, see https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en>.
25
European Council, ‘Denmark and the Treaty on European Union’, Edinburgh, 11 and 12 December 1992, 92/C
348/01.
26
The reservations related to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction of the common
currency (the euro), common defence policies, cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs and provisions
relating to EU citizenship.
27
ILC, ‘Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties’ (n 21) para. 3.1.5.
28
See reservations by the US in link in n 24.
29
See art. 62 of the IHR.
30
Belios v Switzerland, App. no. 10328/83, 29 April 1998, para. 60. See also Loizidou v Turkey, App. no. 15318/89,
Preliminary Objections, 23 March 1995.

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31
Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 24: General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made
Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under
Article 41 of the Covenant’ (4 November 1994), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para. 18.
32
See the overview in Jan Klabbers, ‘Accepting the Unacceptable? A Nordic Approach to Reservations to Multilateral
Treaties’ (2000) 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 179.
33
ILC, ‘Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties’ (n 21) para. 4.5.3.
34
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad), Judgment [1994] ICJ Rep 6, para. 41; Oil Platforms (Islamic
Republic of Iran v United States), Preliminary Objections [1996] ICJ Rep 803, para. 23; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana
v Namibia) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045, para. 18; LaGrand (Germany v United States) [2001] ICJ Rep 466, paras 99–101.
35
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para. 22.
36
See also ECtHR, Soering v UK, App. no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989, paras 103–104 and Öcalan v Turkey, App. no. 46221/99,
12 March 2003, paras 162–165.
37
Hassan v UK, App. no. 29750/09, 16 September 2014, paras 101–103.
38
On this, see ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (13 April 2006), UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.
682, 206–244.
39
Hassan v UK (n 37) paras 102–104.
40
Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179–180.
See also Certain Expenses (n 16) 157.
41
Certain Expenses (n 16) 168.
42
Nuclear Weapons (n 16) para. 19. See also LaGrand (n 34) para. 102.
43
Cases 26–62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, 12.
44
See, among others, Tyrer v UK, App. no. 5856/72, 25 April 1978, para. 31; Loizidou v Turkey, App. no. 15318/89, 23
March 1995, para. 71.
45
See Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 6: The Right to Life’ (30 April 1982), UN Doc. HRI/Gen/1/Rev.7,
paras 4–5; 19 Tradesmen v Colombia, 5 July 2004, Inter-AmCtHR, Series C, No. 109 (2004), para. 173.
46
IHR, arts 12 and 15.
47
See the procedure in arts 21 and 22 of the WHO Constitution.
48
See art. 58 of the ECHR.
49
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), Judgment [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para. 104.
50
Ibid, para. 46.

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