AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE

EYES OF THE WEST1

Edwin Etieyibo
Department of Philosophy, School of Social Sciences
University of the Witwatersrand
[email protected]

ABSTRACT
In this paper I unpack some nuanced aspects of cultural imperialism against
the backdrop of Du Bois’s analysis in The souls of black folk, dealing with the
confrontation of African Americans or blacks by the other (the West). My aim is to
gesture towards how certain ways of doing African philosophy can be considered
culturally imperialistic. I seek to illustrate one culturally imperialistic way of doing
African philosophy by discussing Thaddeus Metz’s brilliant presentation of Ubuntu
as an African moral theory. My motivation is to suggest along the way that his version
of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory seems to me a paradigmatic case of one such
way.

Keywords: Cultural imperialism; African philosophy; Africa; African; Ubuntu; West;

Western liberal paradigm; liberalism; communitarianism; Du Bois

INTRODUCTION
The literature is replete with debates and discourses on values and ethics in general
and human rights in Africa, in particular. In addition, and specifically in recent

1 The title “African philosophy in the eyes of the West” is a modification of the one that I presented
at the 20th Annual Conference of the ISAPS, Fort Hare, East London (30-31 May 2014), which
had the title “Cultural imperialism and African philosophy”. Although both papers deal with the
same central, namely, examining or viewing African philosophy from the standpoint of the West,
the former title better captures this confrontation in the way that is suggested by Du Bois’s The
souls of black folk, hence the title modification.

university
of south africa

Phronimon DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2413-3086/2016/117

Print ISSN 1561-4018 | Online ISSN 2413-3086
© Unisa Press

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

time, the issue of Ubuntu has caught the attention of scholars. On his part and as an
important contributor in the debate on African ethics, Thaddeus Metz has thrown
open a new horizon which has drawn different responses from scholars, most of
whom, contra Metz, have suggested alternative approaches to the issue.
This paper adds to the debate and complements existing literature, not by
suggesting any competing alternative to Metz’s version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral
theory, but by taking a therapeutic dimension to introduce a diagnostic initiative into
the debate through pointing out the weaknesses of Metz’s position and methodology.
In making inroads into Metz’s articulation of Ubuntu moral theory, I will begin with
Du Bois’s articulation of cultural imperialism. The importance of my engagement
with Du Bois is significant because his analysis of the confrontation of African
Americans by whites has connections to the way that Metz brings some Western
ideas into dialogue and confrontation with African philosophy, namely, he sets up
Africa against the West with the way he cashes out some facets of Ubuntu in terms
of certain aspects of Western thought.
When Du Bois wrote The souls of black folk, his analysis of life behind the
veil of race, the resulting “double-consciousness”, and “the sense of always looking
at one’s self through the eyes of others” referred primarily to the experiences and
condition of African Americans or blacks. Of course, his analysis can be extended
to others in similar conditions and with contiguous experiences, particularly to
Africans in the era of colonialism and post-colonialism insofar as a burden is placed
upon them to define themselves through the eyes of the West. The veil of race that
results in “double-consciousness” falls within the ambit of cultural imperialism,
where cultural imperialism concerns the practice of promoting a supposedly more
“powerful culture” over another that is considered “less powerful”. In this relationship
the former is considered “superior” and the latter “inferior”, where superiority and
inferiority may be taken to connote desirability and undesirability, respectively.
In Du Bois’s analysis the “other” that confronts the African American is the
West. In the spirit of his exploration I am extending my discussion in this paper
to some characterisation of the cultures, values and trends of thought that are
predominant in sub-Saharan Africa. Insofar as I am making this extension one can
appropriately talk of African philosophy in the eyes of the West, just in case the
characterisation constitutes some confrontation between the African condition and
experiences and the West. My aim in this paper is to unpack some nuanced aspects
of cultural imperialism and to gesture towards how certain ways of doing African
philosophy can be considered culturally imperialistic. I seek to illustrate one culturally
imperialistic way of doing African philosophy by discussing Thaddeus Metz’s
brilliant presentation of Ubuntu as an African moral theory. My overall interest is
to point our attention to subtle forms of culturally imperialistic tendencies that may
appear in our thinking and ways of doing and presenting African philosophy and to

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

suggest that Metz’s version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory is representative or

paradigmatic of one such approach.

SOME PRELIMINARIES
Before I proceed, some ground clearing will be important. I would like to clear up
a few things regarding my use of the terms “universalist”, “particularist” and the
“West”.
My use of “universalist” and “particularist” draws first and foremost on the
tradition in African philosophy within the context of the debate, some decades
ago, about the existence or otherwise of African philosophy. Universalist refers
to members of the universalist school who hold that in terms of methodology,
philosophy should be the same in Western and African discourses, namely, universal,
systematic, analytic, rational, scientific and rigorous. In contrast, particularist refers
to those that belong to the particularist school, who contend that when it comes to
reality, different cultures have different explanatory frameworks and that Africans
have a philosophy that is essentially different from other philosophies.2
As for the “West”, I will be using it in this paper to generally designate a
“geographical point” or a “psychological attitude”. In respect of geography one may
refer to someone as being “from the West” if such a person is geographically located
in the West, that is, he or she originates from any part of the Western world or society.
Therefore, a person that hails from say, Germany, Canada or Australia is, according
to this rendition, from the West. Such a person is a “geographical member” of the
West or Western world. The geographical usage of the West is different from that
which designates some psychological attitude. In the latter sense one may designate
someone as Western if such a person is sympathetic to Western culture or paradigms
in addition to counting the world and life-experiences of non-Western people as
inferior or less desirable on the basis of such culture or paradigms. For want of a
better word, let us call such a person a “psychological associate” of the Western
world or West.

2 It must be pointed out that just because one rejects universalism in favour of particularism does
not mean that the particularist is a cultural relativist. A particularist could in some way be a
pluralist. That is, particularism could be said to reflect the pluralism and heterogeneity of cultural
knowledge forms, ideas and traditions. It may be the case that the position of the particularist
school commits it to cultural relativism. Whether it does or does not is not germane to the direction
of this paper. For some discussions on the clash between the universalist and particularist schools
see Momoh, CS. 1985: 73-104; Van Hook, J.M. 1997: 385–396; Hesein, I. 2010: 15-21.

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

We might take the Western psychological associate as a “Western universalist”

(WU) insofar as she is committed to defending a one “superior” Western paradigm.3
My interest in the West in this paper is the WU. In general, the universalist lives by
a mindset that psychologically commits her to evaluating the merits of other cultures
and life-experiences by the paradigm of her own culture or a one “superior” paradigm.
As a particular instantiation of the universalist, a WU takes a one “superior” Western
paradigm to exist and commits herself to evaluating the merits of other cultures and
life-experiences in terms of this one “superior” Western paradigm.4
A geographical member of the West is not necessarily a WU. She is a WU insofar
as she is also a psychological associate. This means that one may for example, hail
from Germany, Canada or Australia and yet not be a WU if such a person neither
believes in a one “superior” Western paradigm, nor is committed to evaluating the
merits of other cultures and life-experiences in terms of this one “superior” Western
paradigm. Also, a psychological associate of a particular place is not necessarily
a WU even though she may be a universalist, namely, believes in a one superior
paradigm. A person that takes a one “superior” Asian or African, Arabian or
Caribbean paradigm to exist and commits herself to evaluating the merits of other
cultures and life-experiences in terms of this one “superior” paradigm, is although
a psychological associate, not a WU. Rather, she is an Asian or African, Arabian
or Caribbean universalist. Furthermore, one may be a psychological associate, and
consequently, a WU even though she is not a geographical member of the West.
So, a person from Nigeria, Jamaica or Philippines may be a WU if she takes a one
“superior” Western paradigm to exist and commits herself to evaluating the merits of
other cultures and life-experiences in terms of this one “superior” Western paradigm.
As I will be arguing in the paper, Metz’s version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral
theory suggests that he is a WU. What makes Metz’s presentation culturally
imperialistic is that it is hardly ever in question that it unpretentiously confronts
African philosophy with some of the ideals of the West or caches out some aspects of
Ubuntu in terms of certain aspects of Western thought. Particularly, he incorporates
some Western ideals, which he considers desirable, into his version of an Ubuntu-
inspired moral theory. The subtlety and mute suggestion in Metz’s articulation of
Ubuntu as an African moral theory is this: to be respectable and desirable a plausible
Ubuntu moral theory is to be aligned in such a way so as to fit with some “superior”

3 The term Western universalist seems to be in order, given that there can also exist a non-Western
universalist, such as an African universalist or Asian universalist, namely, those who are committed
to defending a one “superior” African or Asian paradigm.
4 On this presentation, even an African can be a WU. Indeed, during the early part of the clash
between the universalist and particularist schools the African logical neo-positivists qua
universalists were taken to be “biased towards the West”. It is important to note that many of the
African logical neo-positivists were black and Africans.

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

paradigm of the West, namely, the liberal paradigm. Significantly, he does this not
with the intention to denigrate.5 My use of the phrase “not with the intention” is
deliberate and very important. This is because I do not think that in presenting his
rendition of Ubuntu which incorporates some Western paradigm, Metz purposefully
sought to depreciate, as inferior, Ubuntu or African philosophy or African cultures
and life-experiences.

DU BOIS AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

Du Bois can be considered as one among the many of the early and foremost pan-
Africanist intellectuals. He had a long career as a teacher, sociologist, historian,
civil rights activist, pan-Africanist, author and editor. Du Bois was born in Great
Barrington, Massachusetts and he wrote extensively. Some of the most prominent
of his works include Black reconstruction in America (1935), and The souls of black
folk (1903). In Black reconstruction in America Du Bois was critical of the dominant
view that blacks were responsible for the failures of the Reconstruction era. In The
souls of black folk he discusses issues that revolve around the problems encountered
by the post-emancipated African Americans.
Du Bois’s incursion into the realm of cultural imperialism is captured in The
souls of black folk, where he presents some insightful summary, discussion and
analysis of the experiences and condition of post-emancipated African Americans.
The early chapters deal with a sketch and analysis of the spiritual world in which
many African Americans live in and strive. In subsequent chapters Du Bois shows
what emancipation meant to African Americans, and what its aftermath was. And
in later chapters he points out the slow rise of personal leadership in the African
American community, and criticises the leader (namely, Booker T. Washington)
whom he thinks bears the chief burden and responsibility of the problem of race of
the African American. In the final chapters Du Bois concludes the book by focusing
on how racial prejudice impacts individuals and provides an outline of the two
worlds within and without the veil (of race).
The souls of black folk is an important work in African-American literary history
in particular and on issues of cultural imperialism that confront black (or African)
people the world over in general. This is particularly so because Du Bois uses it to
demonstrate how racial prejudice impacts blacks and to decry the intellectual and
cultural imperialism which the post-emancipated black Americans suffer, particularly
in being viewed and judged through Western eyes and lenses. Du Bois’s position on
the impact of the intellectual and cultural imperialism on blacks can be summed up

5 I am prepared to assume that Metz has the best of intentions. But perhaps, some might think that
in his articulation he does so with the intention to denigrate. However, whether he does have the
intention to denigrate or not, is not relevant to my presentation and position.

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

in his claim that: “The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-
line, − the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in
America and the islands of the sea” (1903: 16).
In being viewed through the prism of the world, especially the world of the West
the African American is plunged into a sense of double-consciousness which denies
her the possession of any consciousness. That is simply put, the confrontation by the
West of the African American results in a double self that seeks to merge into a truer
self – a truer self that the individual cannot get a hold of. Du Bois puts it this way:
this lack or loss of consciousness for the “Negro” constitutes the history of the black
American, “which is the history of this strife − this longing to attain self-conscious
manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self” (1903: 9). More
worrying is that although the African American desires the merger of her double
self, she wishes to retain her past (which is not fully there), namely, not wanting “the
older selves to be lost” (Du Bois 1903: 9).6
Du Bois’s discussion of the problems encountered by the post-emancipated
African Americans in The souls of black folk and the relationship of this to cultural
imperialism, sets the tone for us in trying to conceptualise and explore the question
of the presentation of African philosophy, in particular the issue of how African
philosophy is viewed by the West. While on the one hand, one would say that Du
Bois’s idea of double-consciousness means that the African or black person in
general is experiencing what might be called a cultural lacuna, on the other hand,
she can be said to be intellectually subjected to the experience of the other, the West.
This subjection requires her to prove to the world, specifically the West, that she is
human. It requires also that she demonstrates that her culture, life-experiences and
paradigms are desirable and not inferior to those of the West.
In other words, the African is presented as an inferior subject and her humanity
or personhood is measured only through her relationship with the West. In terms of
the problem of double-consciousness the African has to be alienated, namely, reject
herself, her identity, and acquire the humanisation narratives of the West in order to be
accepted. This has implications both in terms of teleological aspirations and African
philosophy. Regarding the former, the ambitions of the African become, in the words
of Appiah (1992: 95-96), “entrapped within the Western cultural matrix we affect
to dispute”. As for the latter, given that African philosophy is measured in terms of
Western philosophy, the acceptance and legitimacy of its philosophical procedures
are determined by the Western interrogator. This is what Michael Onyebuchi Eze
(2010a; 2010b) calls the “colonization of subjectivity”, where African philosophy is
created to satisfy the intellectual curiosity of the Westerner who asked the question,
“is there an African philosophy?”; and where the African intellectual is still and
constantly being invented and conceived by the Western coloniser.

6 For a lengthier discussion of Du Bois’s presentation of cultural imperialism in the context of race,
see Etieyibo, E (2015: 147-170).

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

THE WU AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATE

Recall that the WU is one who takes a one “superior” Western paradigm to exist and
commits herself to evaluating the merits of other cultures and life-experiences in
terms of this one “superior” Western paradigm. The WU reminds us of members of
the universalist school in African philosophy during the debate about its existence
or non-existence.7
The WU accepts a superior Western cultural paradigm and judges other cultures
as inferior to it. Relatedly, those who belong to the universalist school in African
philosophy foist a one universal Western method of philosophy on African philosophy.
Insofar as both take a universalist view of cultural experiences (a view that is biased
towards the West) they are the same. Within the context of cultural imperialism one
might call them imperialist and non-WU or proponents of the particularist school
anti-imperialist, simply because at the heart of their positions is the view about how
to place a particular cultural paradigm, namely African philosophy relative to the
West or Western philosophy.8
There may be many motivations behind the position of the WU or those that
belong to the universalist school. Some may be motivated by their fascination with
the West, its history and development. Others may sincerely believe that in tracing
the history of ideas the West has got it right in many aspects, particularly in respect of
certain cultural paradigms. Yet others may be motivated by what Oguejiofor (2007:
31-36) calls the image of the philosopher. His point is that because the WU has an
image of the philosopher as a wise and perceptive thinker who has the ability to
exceed the reality that the ordinary person or majority of people can see and fathom,
it has generally adopted a stance that seems dismissive of a genuinely African thought
system.9 We shall call the cultural imperialists who are motivated in the first case
the “infrastructure admirer”, those in the second case the “intellectual admirer” and
those in the third case the “image admirer”. In arguing that Metz is a WU, namely
a psychological associate, I will be suggesting that he is an “intellectual admirer”

7 See the section on “Some preliminaries” for the motivation driving the universalist school.
8 The importance of the question of placement and the significance of the debate about African
philosophy can be seen from the fact that much of the early literature on African philosophy
was focused on the questions: “Is there an African philosophy?”, “What is the nature of African
philosophy?” and “How should African philosophy be defined?” See for example, Diop, C.A.
and Okpewho, O.O. 1981: 587-602; Momoh, C.S. 1985: 73-104; Onyewuenyi, I.C. 1991: 29-46;
Oruka, H.O. 1975: 44-55; Wiredu, K. 1972: 3-13.
9 And if one takes Bruce Janz’s (2007: 689) claim that “…questions about African philosophy’s
existence by non-Africans have often amounted to an implicit dismissal of Africa”, then on a
radical interpretation of WU’s cultural imperialism one might even worry whether WU’s attempt
to impose on African worldview a Western paradigm is not indirectly a denigration of Africa and
Africans. This radical interpretation takes the WU not as an “intellectual admirer” but a cultural
imperialistic colonialist.

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

insofar as he does not intentionally try to denigrate or depreciate African cultures and
life-experiences in his alignment of Ubuntu with some “superior” Western paradigm.

METZ’S UBUNTU AS AN AFRICAN MORAL THEORY

In the article “Toward an African moral theory” Metz engages in an analytic
normative ethical theorising whereby he presents a brilliant and forceful account of
Ubuntu as an African moral theory. Metz presents his motivations for this project in
these simple terms: to “construct an African theory of right action with the hope of
developing a principle that sub-Saharan Africans ought to believe, given adherence
to claims they typically deem to be less controversial than it” (2007a: 322). That is,
he will attempt to capture what counts as mere tendencies or recurrent themes that
are found in sub-Saharan Africa in establishing a theory of rightness (Metz 2007b:
375). These tendencies or themes will be rationally reconstructed as primarily those
“values associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’ and cognate terms that are prevalent among
sub-Saharan Africans” (Metz 2007a: 322).
In Metz’s view, this project is necessary because:
In the literature on African ethics, one finds relatively little that consists of normative
theorization with regard to right action, that is, the articulation and justification of a
comprehensive, basic norm that is intended to account for what all permissible acts have in
common as distinct from impermissible ones. (2007a: 321)

The project is laudable and one that I think is important, not the least because it
provides a moral theory that could be compared, in Metz’s words, “to dominant
Western theories such as Hobbesian egoism or Kantian respect for persons” (Metz
2007a: 321), but also that it opens up the space for a rigorous debate on African
ethics in general and Ubuntu in particular.
Since his first articulation of Ubuntu in “Toward an African moral theory” the
theory has been developed and modified to include an account of human dignity,
human rights, and so forth. Some of the developments come as a result of Metz’s
attempt to apply Ubuntu to a number of issues such as capital punishment, the
environment, bioethics, and human rights.10 It is from this original presentation
of Ubuntu and its modification and development that I shall seek to peel out the
thesis that Metz’s presentation of Ubuntu as an African moral theory is culturally
imperialistic and paradigmatic of ways in which African philosophy is made to
confront the West.
Metz begins his project on Ubuntu by critically surveying some of the available
literature on African philosophy. This is with the aim of articulating and justifying

10 For the development in Metz’s original expression of Ubuntu moral theory see Metz, T. 2007b:
369-387; Metz, T. 2010a: 81-99; Metz, T. 2010b: 49-58; Metz, T. 2011: 532-59; Metz, T. 2012a:
19-37; Metz, T. 2012b: 61-83; Metz, T. 2014: 131-51.

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

a single moral principle that is faithful to tendencies or recurrent themes and values
found in sub-Saharan Africa. Since he takes the tendencies or recurrent themes and
values to be associated with talk of Ubuntu and cognate terms that are prevalent
among sub-Saharan Africans, he explores the term Ubuntu and the associated
aphorism “a person is a person through other persons”. After reflecting on six
expressions of this maxim or competing theoretical interpretations of Ubuntu in the
literature as an ethical principle, Metz settles for one that, in his view, is the “most
promising theoretical formulation of an African ethic to be found in the literature”
(Metz 2007a: 334). The single principle is this: “an action is right just insofar as it
produces harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to
develop community” (Metz 2007a: 334).
Why is this the most promising principle or account of Ubuntu? It is because,
according to Metz, it has the “potential to account for all the intuitions or considered
moral judgments” − either those commonly accepted only by adherents of Ubuntu
or by “both adherents of ubuntu and Western people in modern, industrialized,
constitutional democracies” − that he discusses on pages 324-328 of the article
quoted above (Metz 2007a: 334).
Metz acknowledges that although this account of Ubuntu has the potential to
account for all the intuitions, it is not particularly well developed in its current form.
It is too vague in respect of the fundamental requirement to promote harmony and to
prevent discord. That is, it is too imprecise; metaphorical in the sense that it does not
properly allow us to contextualise actions that promote harmony or lead to discord. As
part of his way of rendering it less nebulous, he drapes it with some specification by
attempting some clarification. The clarification does two things. Firstly, it explicitly
teases out what Metz considers to be the aim of morality, which according to him is
not individual well-being or self-realisation. He notes: “As opposed to well-being
or self-realization, this account of ubuntu posits certain relationships as constitutive
of the good that a moral agent ought to promote. What is right is what connects
people together; what separates people is wrong” (Metz 2007a: 334). Secondly, it
unambiguously highlights the need to introduce some delimitation mechanism into
the Ubuntu project. The delimitation mechanism is a deontological constraint, which
will circumscribe both theoretically and practically the concept of harmony and the
fostering of relationships that are embedded in it.
With respect to the first clarification the individual qua a moral agent is
forbidden to promote any fundamental moral value that is self-regarding, i.e. value
that is internal to the individual. Rather, she ought to promote some value that is
“other regarding”, namely, the value that inheres in certain kinds of relationships.
It is this first clarification that explicitly brings out the communitarian element of
Metz’s Ubuntu, where the individual is morally commanded not to keep an eye on
herself or the autonomous self, but on relationships − the community. On the latter
clarification, we are presented with the deontological constraint of this obligation.

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

Why is the deontological constraint warranted? In Metz’s view it is necessary in

order to ensure that the moral agent in following through her obligation to “prize”
and “honour” harmonious relationships, does not sacrifice individual freedom and
other basic human rights. In “Ubuntu as a moral theory and human rights in South
Africa”, Metz cautions, “A moral theory that focuses exclusively on promoting good
outcomes however one can, has notorious difficulty in accounting for an individual
right to life, among other human rights” (2011: 540). It is this second clarification, the
introduction of the deontological constraint, that betrays Metz’s cultural imperialistic
tendencies.

METZ’S VERSION OF AN UBUNTU-INSPIRED MORAL

THEORY AS CULTURALLY IMPERIALISTIC
The charge that Metz’s presentation of Ubuntu is culturally imperialistic would be
unwarranted, were Metz to stop short of introducing the deontological constraint
in his theory of Ubuntu. Since I am teasing out this culturally imperialistic element
from the introduction of the deontological constraint, I would like to focus a bit on
it. We have already seen part of the reason why Metz thinks that the deontological
constraint is necessary. Given that the promotion of certain kinds of relationships
may sometimes justify sacrificing individual freedom and other basic human rights,
the delimitation, in Metz's view, of this obligation by the deontological constraint, is
warranted. Using a famous example that critics have often used to vilify utilitarianism,
Metz directs our attention as to why a moral theory that does not take human rights
seriously may not only be problematic, but also runs into serious difficulties.
[A]n instruction to promote as many communal relationships as one can in the long run,
would permit a doctor to kill an innocent, relatively healthy individual and distribute her
harvested organs to three others who would otherwise die without them, supposing there
would indeed be more of such relationships realised in the long term. A moral theory that
focuses exclusively on promoting good outcomes, however one can (which is teleological),
has notorious difficulty in accounting for an individual right to life, among other basic rights
(Metz 2011: 540).

From Metz’s vantage point, one of the serious difficulties that Ubuntu moral
theory will run into is the charge of collectivism, namely the criticism of being
uncompromising, majoritarian, or sacrificing the individual for society or the
community. In his view, his version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory is
impervious to this charge and criticism since the deontological constraint makes it to
be compatible with the value of individual freedom that is among the most promising
ideals in the liberal tradition (2011: 533). On this ground, Metz’s reasoning appears
then to be that the deontological constraint is necessary if Ubuntu as a moral theory

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is to be attractive and desirable. To be an authentic moral theory and be desirable,

it has to be compatible with a certain paradigm − the value and ideals of individual
freedom and rights (of the liberal tradition).11
Since liberalism or the liberal paradigm is generally taken to be opposed to
communitarianism or the communitarian paradigm, it is important to investigate
more deeply Metz’s version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory in the context of
its avowed communitarian commitment and supposed alignment with the liberal
paradigm. Crucially, we wish to ask, how can Metz’s Ubuntu account possibly be
communitarian and yet consistent with the value of individual freedom that is among
the most promising ideals in the liberal tradition?12 Happily, an incursion into this
sort of investigation and questioning has been done by Anthony Oyowe (2013).
Since I have no desire to “reinvent the wheel” I will appropriate some of Oyowe’s
exploration, as I seek to make the case that Metz’s version of Ubuntu is culturally
imperialistic.
In the article, “Strange bedfellows: Rethinking Ubuntu and human rights in
South Africa”, Oyowe (2013) argues, convincingly, in my view, that Metz’s Ubuntu
project fails in a number of areas: (a) “that individual freedom and rights can be
successfully grounded in a moral theory that already regards some extrinsic value
(that is, communal harmony) as the most fundamental moral value; (b) that “Metz’s
attempt to ground individual human rights in his Ubuntu moral theory raises the
problem of where the fundamental value lies in his theory”; (c) that “ in seeking to
integrate two potentially-conflicting and non-instrumental values in his theory, Metz

11 I get Metz’s motivation in desiring to present an account of Ubuntu that is compatible with
the value of individual freedom and rights. After all, we live in an age in which “individual
freedom”, “choice”, “human rights” constitute some of the buzzwords in and that revolve around
democracies, constitutionalism and laws of nations, and international relations between nation-
states. Because of this, an individual or a nation or a moral theory may seem to lack respect and
be denigrated if such an individual or nation or moral theory fails to seriously take into account
these buzzwords. This is similar to the way in which modern governments or regimes present
themselves as democratic, even if they are not. One motivation for doing this would be to avoid
a pariah-status or other isolationist consequences from the international community, just in case
such a government is construed as undemocratic.
12 It must be pointed out that it is irrelevant to my criticism of Metz concerning whether he
believes the good should be prioritised over the right or whether he thinks that Ubuntu deals
particularly with the right and not the good. Of course, in “Ethics in Africa and in Aristotle: some
points of contrast” (Metz 2012c) he argues that characteristic African values are “exclusively
‘communitarian’ and inconsistent with some core ‘individualist’ elements of Aristotle’s ethics”
(2012b: 99-117). However, irrespective of what he says here or does elsewhere, insofar as
he grounds his version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory on the deontological constraint, a
constraint that forbids the sacrificing of individual freedom and rights in the pursuit of some
communal values of harmony and relationships, he prizes the liberal paradigm (which values
individual rights) over the communitarian paradigm (that values communal rights).

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

substantially modifies his original Ubuntu ethical principle in such a way that the
communitarian/Ubuntu status of the theory is undermined”; (d) that “even if Metz’s
theory were sufficiently communitarian/Ubuntu-like, it could not possibly ground
individual freedom as a non-instrumental value” (2013: 103-124).
I will not examine all of these theses but I want to explore two related ideas that
arise from them. The first idea is that of the relationship between individual freedom
and community or communal harmony, and the second is the idea of double values
in Metz’s Ubuntu. The first idea emerges from thesis (a) − the claim that individual
freedom and rights can be successfully grounded in a moral theory that already
regards some extrinsic value (that is, communal harmony) as the most fundamental
moral value. The second idea emerges from thesis (c) − the claim that in seeking to
integrate two potentially-conflicting and non-instrumental values in his theory, Metz
substantially modifies his original Ubuntu ethical principle in such a way that the
communitarian/Ubuntu status of the theory is undermined. I begin with the first.
One big divide in moral and political philosophy is the divide between liberals
and communitarians. The divide is not brought about by practical or pragmatic
reasons. The divide is brought about by intellectual posturing. Simply put, by
liberals or liberalism and communitarians or communitarianism adhering to different
paradigms and conception of the self. Liberals or liberalism defend individual rights
and freedom, and they have a view of the self as constituted by nothing other than
itself. This is the view of the self that Charles Taylor (1985) calls an atomistic view
of the self. That is, the view that individuals are self-sufficient and may develop and
exercise their capacities qua human beings independently of (any) society,13 or what
Michael Sandel (1992) calls an unencumbered and unembedded self, namely, the
putting of a distance between the self and its experiences, aims and ends. Simply put,
it is a view that “rules out the possibility of…constitutive ends”, that takes selves
as “free to join in voluntary association with others and only capable of community
not in the constitutive sense but in the cooperative sense” (Sandel 1992: 18-19). This
is contrasted with the view of the self that communitarians or communitarianism
generally hold; a view of the self that is non-atomistic and that is encumbered and
embedded. An encumbered and embedded self is one that stands not at a distance
in terms of its relations to other things, but with them; it is a self with other selves.
This divide has led to charges being traded by liberals and communitarians. While
liberals criticise communitarians as being collectivist, majoritarian and totalitarian,
and of holding a view of the self and community that fails to take seriously individual
freedoms and human rights, communitarians criticise liberals of defending a view

13 Taylor not only criticises the atomistic view of the self, he defends as well the Aristotelian view
that “Man is a social animal, indeed a political animal, because he is not self-sufficient alone,
and in an important sense is not self-sufficient outside a polis.” He develops this view and his
objection to the atomistic view that “men are self-sufficient outside of society” in an influential
essay titled, “Atomism”. See Taylor 1985: 187-210.

12
Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

of the self that is deficient and being too thin to offer a robust moral ideal or sustain
a rich conception of a good life for human beings.14 Clearly then, on this divide
between liberals or liberalism and communitarians or communitarianism, Metz’s
presentation of his version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory as communitarian
and yet liberal seems problematic, and to say the least, intriguing and intellectually
unviable. On this distinction between the encumbered and unnumbered self in
relation to liberalism and communitarianism, the liberal paradigm takes the right to
be prior to or independent of any conception of the good while the communitarian
paradigm takes the good to be prior to the right.15
To take the right to be prior to the good is to give priority to individual freedom
and rights; and to take the good to be prior to the right is to give priority to the values
and interests of the community. Therefore, one would say that a moral theory that
is adequately communitarian or accepts the communitarian paradigm, is one that
captures the basic tenets of communitarianism − tenets such as taking the individual
or self to be necessarily embedded in a network of relationships (the community)
or the foundational claim about the causal dependence of the individual on the
community (Oyowe 2013: 105). Simply put, a communitarian moral theory will give
priority to the values and interests of the community over those of the individual,
and may allow (as posited above by Metz 2011: 540) “a doctor to kill an innocent,
relatively healthy individual and distribute her harvested organs to three others who
would otherwise die without them, supposing there would indeed be more of such
relationships realised in the long term”. But this is exactly what the deontological
constraint in Metz’s version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory forbids and seeks
to prevent. Therefore, it is difficult to see how Metz’s Ubuntu account can possibly
give rein to the value of individual freedom and human rights and yet be genuinely
communitarian.
I now come to the second idea − that of double values in Metz’s Ubuntu moral
theory. In exploring this idea I will begin with a long quote from Oyowe (2013),
which criticises Metz’s Ubuntu moral theory and takes it as problematic in virtue of
appealing to two moral values.
Second, and relatedly, it appears that there are now two, rather than one, non-instrumental
values in Metz’s Ubuntu theory. Alternatively, it is not entirely clear that we should still
regard friendly relationships as the sole fundamental moral value a moral agent ought to
promote. If the view that harmonious relationships are constitutive of the good and the claim
that basic individual rights ought to be respected are accurate, then it seems that there are

14 See Daniel Bell (1993) for a clear articulation of the core commitments of communitarianism,
according to which communitarianism can be taken to express certain claims: metaphysical,
normative and methodological claims. The metaphysical claim concerns the communal nature of
the self; the normative claim is about community as the fundamental value and the methodological
claim relates to the importance of communal context in moral and political reasoning.
15 Or, as Sandel puts it, the right as “unconditionally prior to the good” or “justice as having a moral
primacy” or “justice as justificatory prior” (1982: 18-19).

13
Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

two normative aims worth pursuing…it is worth pointing out that in the original statement
of the ethical principle it seems that the moral agent is obliged to do the good - that is,
promote harmonious relationships − everywhere. Now, it appears that sometimes the good
is not worth doing. More importantly, the moral agent within the Ubuntu moral system has
moral reasons to refrain from doing the good, and these reasons derive not necessarily from
her valuation of community, but from facts about some inherent value in the individual −
that is, specific entitlements the protection of which assures the individual’s well-being. So,
although the theory still retains its commitment to the view that morality is other-regarding,
it seems to imply that there is some non-instrumental value inherent in individuals rather
than relationships, and this value is worth pursuing for its own sake…and further, not only
does the theory in its more recent appearance equally prize two distinct moral values, but it
also prizes two competing − insofar as they are potentially conflicting − non-instrumental
values. (Oyowe 2013: 107)

The point here is that Metz’s Ubuntu moral theory appeals to two distinct values that
are difficult to reconcile; or even downright irreconcilable. Recall that part of the
reasons why Metz takes the incorporation of a deontological constraint in his Ubuntu
moral theory to be necessary, is his recognition that the goal of upholding individual
freedom and human rights may be undermined by the goal of achieving harmony;
or the goal of achieving harmony may sometimes clash with the aim of upholding
individual freedom and human rights. It may be the case that in order to achieve
harmony what needs to be done is for a doctor to kill an innocent, relatively healthy
individual and distribute her harvested organs to three others who would otherwise
die without them (Metz 2011: 540). But clearly in doing this one is sacrificing the
freedom and right of the relatively healthy individual for the interests of the others
and for harmony. Stated differently, in killing an innocent so as to achieve harmony,
one is satisfying one value (that of harmony) in favour of another (individual freedom
and human rights). The deontological constraint is meant to prevent this. But in
giving space to the deontological constraint to breathe, one may in this case refrain
from sacrificing the right of the relatively healthy individual for the interests of the
others and for harmony. But in doing this one has failed to give effect to the value of
harmony. That is, one is satisfying the value of individual freedom and human rights
in favour of the value of harmony. One should add that the problem is not just that
these values conflict, it is that a moral agent that finds herself in the situation of a
moral choice and has to decide which value to take up, may be frustrated since she
can’t possibly act on both simultaneously.
Clearly, Metz is caught here in a dilemma and one may ask how he got trapped
in it. Oyowe seems to suggest that Metz entangled himself in this web because of
his desire in trying to present an Ubuntu moral theory that avoids the charge of
majoritarianism or collectivism. He thinks that the attempt is unsuccessful because
it “is like attempting a trick the aim of which is to eat one’s cake and have it” (2013:
104). I agree with Oyowe but I want to suggest that Metz’s desire and attempt give
effect to some deeper motivation; the motivation that seeks to align some worldview

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

with some ideal − the ideal that constructing or interpreting a moral theory in ways
that make such a theory consistent with a particular paradigm, is desirable. Stated
differently, the ideal driving the motivation to avoid the charge of collectivism, which
will bedevil an Ubuntu moral theory if the deontological constraint is not introduced
in order for it to avoid the charge, is one that is biased towards the Western liberal
paradigm of prioritising the right over the good, namely, one that takes individual
freedom and human rights as espoused by the liberal tradition in the West as better
and desirable to the communitarian paradigm (that may be found in communities
across sub-Saharan Africa) and espoused by Ubuntu sensitive values. It is this ideal
that warrants my description of Metz as a psychological associate or WU insofar as
he believes that there is a one “superior” Western paradigm, and he is committed
to evaluating the merits of other cultures and life-experiences in terms of this one
“superior” Western paradigm.
I now want to consider some objections that can be raised for my project.
However, before I do that let me summarise briefly the main ideas presented thus
far. Along the way to arriving at his favoured principle of Ubuntu and in developing
his version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory, Metz thought it was necessary to
introduce some deontological constraint that will delimit and forbid the sacrificing
of individual freedom and rights in the pursuit of some communal values of harmony
and relationships. But by making this move, Metz implicitly commits himself to the
view that it is imperative to interpret and in fact circumscribe any moral theory or
practice by respect for individual freedom and rights.16 Given that the priority of the
value of individual freedom and human right over other interests, particularly those
that are communal, is largely Western, Metz’s introduction of the deontological
constraint to bind and shackle the “excesses” of communal-sensitive practices can
be interpreted as amounting to viewing African culture, values and philosophy
from the lenses or prism of the Western world, both generally and particularly −
generally, in suggesting that African cultures and life-experiences must conform
to some “superior” paradigm of the West, and particularly, in signifying that such
conformity is necessary if they are to be desirable or respectable. Because Metz’s
presentation of Ubuntu is culturally imperialistic in virtue of constructing Ubuntu to
be sensitive to ideals and paradigms that are predominantly of the West, he is a WU.
However, because his cultural imperialism does not purposefully seek to denigrate
or depreciate Ubuntu (or African philosophy or cultures and life-experiences) as
inferior, he is only but an “intellectual admirer”.

16 In pointing out that Metz’s Ubuntu-inspired moral theory is culturally imperialistic because he
interprets and circumscribes the theory by respect for individual freedom and rights, I am thereby
not suggesting that freedom and rights are not important or valuable. I am merely pointing out
what is going on in his analytic normative ethical theorisation, and the sorts of motivations that
may be attached to his construction of an Ubuntu moral theory.

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

SOME OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES

In this section I present two related objections to my project, which I then respond
to. The first objection is that my criticism of Metz falsely presents a choice between
extreme individualism and extreme collectivism. The second has to do with the
fact that my discussion of Western communitarianism and liberalism presents a
distinction that is overdrawn.17 I begin with the second objection.
The objection that I have offered an overdrawn distinction in my discussion
of Western communitarianism and liberalism points to something deeper about
the communitarian and liberal debate. Perhaps this distinction is not very sharp,
particularly in the context of two things: firstly, the difficulty of identifying “the
community” without invidious exclusion in multicultural societies; and secondly, the
various attempts to balance the rights of individuals and those of communities. I do
not think that the difficulty in demarcating community suggests that the distinction
between communitarianism and liberalism is misleading. To hold this view is to
suggest that those that have been involved in the communitarianism and liberalism
debate have been wasting their time in a vacuous debate, or that the debate never
happened. On a linguistic level, communitarianism is different from liberalism − they
both mean different things. This difference is independent of the fact as to whether
we can practically distinguish communitarianism from liberalism in a multicultural
society. In any case, the mere fact that they have been attempts to balance the rights
of individuals and those of communities suggest, to me, that there is recognition of
the difference between individual rights and rights of communities. This difference,
one could argue, suggests that communitarianism (which focuses on communal
rights) and liberalism (which focuses on individual rights) represent two different
paradigms.18
Now to the first criticism, which simply states that my position that Metz’s
presentation of Ubuntu is culturally imperialistic, is wrongheaded. It is wrongheaded
for two reasons: (a) it ignores the fact that certain sacrifices of individual dignity
the critic reminds us could be said to ultimately lead to disharmony or negative
harmony; (b) it discounts the fact that certain rights cannot always be maintained if
they disadvantage a whole community. I agree that in practice certain sacrifices of
individual dignity could lead to disharmony, such that we may need to circumscribe

17 I thank one of the two anonymous reviewers for raising these objections.
18 Elsewhere, I have discussed aspects of liberalism and communitarianism which, I think, allows
us to maintain a substantive distinction between both worldviews and paradigms (Etieyibo 2011:
1-26). The central theses I advanced in the paper is that (a) both an individualistic worldview (IW)
and a communitarian worldview (CW) embody the same goal — the flourishing or wellbeing
of citizens (i.e. the individuals that make up a body polity); (b) certain virtues are integral to
such flourishing; (c) some praiseworthy civic virtues are affirmed by both IW and CW; (d)
although both IW and CW affirm similar civic virtues, they have different foundations; and (e)
the foundation of CW seems to undermine the very same virtues it seeks to uphold and for this it
breaks down community.

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

these sacrifices if we are interested in maintaining harmony. I also agree that insofar
as we are keen on communal harmony, certain rights may have to be circumscribed
if they disadvantage the entire community. However, this criticism ignores an
important aspect of my project. I am not arguing in the abstract that sacrifices of
individual dignity that lead to disharmony cannot or ought not be circumscribed,
or that if certain rights disturb the harmony of the community, they should not be
curtailed. What I am arguing is that in the particular instance of Metz’s presentation
of Ubuntu, the introduction of the deontological constraint simply does not entertain
the possibility that some rights that disturb the harmony of the community may be
abridged. Without qualification, the deontological constraint in Metz’s version of
an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory simply prohibits in whatever circumstances the
sacrificing of individual freedom and rights in the pursuit of some communal values
of harmony and relationships.

CONCLUSION
This paper is generally about African philosophy in the eyes of the West. I have
pursued the thesis that some approaches to doing African philosophy can be
considered culturally imperialistic in general, and that Metz’s brilliant presentation
of Ubuntu as an African moral theory is paradigmatic of this way. By way of
concluding I would like to make two related remarks − the first, very briefly, and the
second, a bit more detailed.
My first remark is that in proposing that Metz is a psychological associate or
WU, I may be taken to suggest that the deontological constraint he introduces into
his version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory, is unnecessary. If the constraint pulls
his moral theory apart by presenting us with two moral values which are in conflict,
then perhaps a truly communitarian commitment will suggest that one should let go
of a reconciliation project that tries to fit in individual freedom and human rights
with harmony or communitarian values and interests. This consideration is further
advanced by my second remark.
It is important to emphasise that although Metz’s version of an Ubuntu-inspired
moral theory is exemplary of culturally imperialistic tendencies, his approach seems
consistent with the spirit of scholarship. Scholars, and in particular philosophers,
are brilliant at interpreting a theory, philosophical work or ideas that belong to a
different epoch in the context of modern ideas, experiences and values. Thus, one
may interpret some of Plato’s dialogues or Kant’s moral theory in the context of
our modern world and show that the ideas of these past philosophers are not only
relevant in today’s world but consistent with some new and important thinking. But
there would certainly be a limit to such interpretation. Thus one may be entitled to
be restless if confronted with an interpretation that is stretched to breaking point
and beyond reasonable imagination, no matter how brilliant such interpretation is.

17
Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

For example, one may legitimately worry if confronted with a secular interpretation
of St Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy, namely, an interpretation that makes God
disappear from his philosophy. My point here is that, notwithstanding the fact that
Metz’s project in getting to his Ubuntu moral theory is consistent with the spirit of
scholarship, one may worry whether it is not an interpretation that is stretched to
breaking point. For his intentions may seem genuine − he wants to defend a version
of Ubuntu that is impervious to the charge of collectivism. But perhaps Ubuntu does
not need to be rescued from such charge. Maybe Ubuntu as a communitarian theory
and as practised across sub-Saharan Africa prioritises harmony or the community
over individual freedom and rights − and therefore is collectivistic.
Often, one motivation for the interpretation of a philosopher’s ideas in the
context of modern values and experiences is to protect the philosopher and his ideas
against the worry of anachronism. But for me this may be doing too much. If the
philosopher’s ideas are anachronistic, they are anachronistic and perhaps should
be left so. After all, philosophers are not omniscient; they are fallible. To interpret
their ideas in ways which suggest that they are not anachronistic (if they are indeed
anachronistic), is to suggest that they are omniscient and infallible. Similarly, if
Ubuntu is collectivist and cannot respond appropriately to the enlightenment and
modern demand of individual freedom and human rights, then let it be collectivist.
After all, African people in the sub-Saharan belt who have circumscribed their
practices by various intuitions and values are not omniscient and infallible. Before
the enlightenment in the West people in the West did value less individual freedom
and rights. Perhaps African people in the sub-Saharan belt, or Africans in traditional
societies, as counterparts of those in the West before the enlightenment, also valued
less individual freedom and rights and this is reflected in tendencies or themes and
values that are associated with talk of Ubuntu and cognate terms that are prevalent
in their worldview.
Here is perhaps where one needs to pay particular attention to Kwasi Wiredu’s
admonition in respect of comparison between African thought and Western thought.
In the article, “How not to compare African thought with Western thought” Wiredu
cautions practitioners of African philosophy to guard against uneven and incongruent
comparison between African philosophy and Western philosophy, both in terms of
subject matter and history (1984: 157-58). Wiredu’s point is that if one thinks it is
legitimate to compare African philosophy and Western philosophy, one must compare
periods with periods and subject matter with subject matter. For example, it would
be an incongruous comparison if one were to compare ancient African philosophy
with modern Western philosophy. That seems to be part of what is going on with
Metz’s version of an Ubuntu-inspired moral theory.19 He seems to be looking at

19 For dissimilar motivations and in different degrees Magobe Ramose has criticised Metz for not
taking into account Wiredu’s admonition of how not to compare African thought with Western
thought (2007: 352).

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Etieyibo African Philosophy in the eyes of the West

Ubuntu within the more modern and “refined” Western ideas of individual freedom
and human rights, and trying so hard to fit the former into the latter at all cost.
Perhaps what he should be doing, if he is interested in some comparison or fitting
exercise and think this is legitimate, is to look at Ubuntu within the Western ideals
pre the enlightenment.20

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