Philosophica 82287 Christiaens

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 4

REVIEW 97

Thora Hin Bayer, Cassirer's Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms. A


Philosophical Commentary. New Haven & London: Yale University
Press, 2001, 210 pp.

In analytical philosophy the philosophical heritage from logical positivism


is sometimes called "the received view". It contains a Humean view on
the nature of causation and lawfulness, a strong distinction between the
context of discovery and the context of justification (together with the.
idea that only the context of justification is rational), a view on rationality
that is logically biased etc. It is difficult to find one logical positivist that
really believed all the ideas that belong to this received view. Never-
theless it is a real force in philosophical thinking. In other domains of
philosophy one could just as well talk about a received view with respect
to certain philosophical systems or individual philosophers. It was the
received view that Jean-Paul Sartre did not develop an ethics, that Leo
Apostel was a logical positivist, that (aesthetic, moral and epistemologi-
cal) realism was obsolete, etc. These beliefs have been proved wrong. It
is the received view about Ernst Cassirer that he was a neo-Kantian
philosopher. He did no develop a metaphysical system, it is said in the
philosophy of history handbook. Apparently this is not true. Several
manuscripts on metaphysics were found and a book was written giving
a general overview of Cassirer's metaphysics. I will look at the main
aspects of Cassirer's metaphysics as it is presented in this book and give
an appreciation.

lA. An important concept in Cassirer's philosophy is 'symbolic form'.


Under a 'symbolic form' should be understood "each energy of Spirit
[Geist] thorough which a Spiritual [geistig] content or meaning is con-
nected with a concrete, sensory sign and is internally adapted to this
sign." (p. 15, Introduction). It is something with a universal meaning
that inheres in a particular sensory sign. A system of symbolic forms
would grasp the world in its totality, and not from a certain perspective,
i.e. both theoretical, ethical, aesthetic and religious.
One of the first things that struck me was that, judging from this
book, Cassirer has no separate place for a category of matter in his
metaphysics. This is strange and unfamiliar. I have worked on the meta-
physics of Leo Apostel for more or less four years, and matter and the
theories of matter play a central role. The first thing that needs to be
98 REVIEW

integrated into a worldview is the science of physics (trying to understand


all the abstruse mathematics). The reason for this is the layered concep-
tion of the world: first there is the level of matter and energy, then there
is the chemical, then there is the biological level of reality and finally
there is the social-psychological level of reality. Another way of looking.
at reality is more holistic: realjty as a whole and every part of reality
cannot be situated in one of these levels, i.e. every real thing is an unana-
lyzable mix of physical, chemical, etc. characteristics. Cassirer is
.. definitely somebody that tends towards the holistic view.
I learned, studying Apostel' s manuscripts arid notes on metaphysics
and then studying philosophy of physics, that physics is riddled with
preconceptions and a priori's that are never questioned and that have
become almost unquestionable ways of thinking. Downplaying matter can
be a good thing: in philosophy of science there are philosophers that urge
the philosophical community to give more attention to chemistry, biology
and especially the social sciences. We have to big a fixation on physics
and the material world when it comes to developing metaphysical views.
Reality is a "Fluss des Werdens" for Cassirer. The same is true for
its concepts: they are like water. Fluidity is a root metaphor. Because
reality as a whole is a flood, the concepts must be fluid too (p. 76). Life
and Spirit are aspects of this becoming. Just as Life, Spirit and form, the
image of reality as fluidity is non-spatial. But in other places different
definitions of reality are given, for example: "The real is ultimately the
totality of symbolic forms as produced through the dialectic of Spirit and
Life". The first definition seems to indicate ontological (or metaphysical)
realism: reality is bigger than our experience and our experience (Life
and Spirit) is "contained" in an encompassing reality. In the second
definition of reality we have a certain degree of philosophical idealism.
The distinction between Spirit and Life is very important. Life is a
principle of unionbeyond which we cannot go. It is like a simple beam
of light that has not been refracted yet. Taken in itself it is whole and
closed. It is characterized by movement, change, immediacy, fate, pure
becoming. It is also subjectivity, but subjectivity without objects, without
self, without enduring characteristics (p. 43). Spirit is the transpersonal
sphere of meaning. In it plurality and difference are preserved as a plura-
lity of symbolic forms. Its primary activity is to fix sensation within the
flux of Life; from this a world of-objects js generated, through symbolic
formation. The world of Spirit is both immanent and transcendent. Sym-
REVIEW 99

bolic forms play a key role is the distinction and connection of Life and
Spirit: "The actualisation of symbolic forms is a development from Life
into Spirit" (p. 64). Caught up 'in' and raising itself 'above', both
'inside' and 'above' it. Objectivity occurs through the ability to achieve
meaning inexperience, to elicit non-temporal, enduring features in ex-
perience. One should be careful not to identify objectivity with scientific
theories. It is achieved in myth, where also several perspectives on things
are combined (p. 72-73). In contradistinction to Nietzsche he does not
think that Life uses Spirit for the "Will to Power". It is more like "Will
to Formation". Spiritual forms do not die like organisms do. They are
perpetuated, they continue to exist in the cultural realm. They are a form
of freedom from organic necessity ..

lB. Basis phenomena (Basisphiinomene). The idea of basis phenomena


comes from the poet Goethe. The first basis phenomenon is the'!, or the
'Self'. It is not the experjence of an unchanging substance but the ex-
perience of the I as moving, temporal, as something that points to the
future and comes from the past, a Heraclitean flux. The second basis .
phenomenon is the 'act'. It is the active interv~ntion in the environment.
You could also describe it as 'you' or 'the other', because it is charac-
terized by resistance, a stubbornness of its own, something that limits our
own action. 'The work' is the third basis phenomenon. Examples of a
work are a work of art, science, 'politics, etc. They form systems of
work. Works have an inherent meaning, which. distinguishes them from
actions: actions are done solely for their effect. The work is identified
with the world of Spirit.
I briefly look at some other aspects, Cassirer seems to have more or
less a coherence theory of truth: "The whole of experience is the measure
of truth. Particular experiences or perceptions are measured against this
whoie"(p. 156). Bayer quotes Cassirer: "Every individual perception
must be measured within this whole and tested if it is 'true' or 'false'."
Cassirer is anti-Kantian in his view· of metaphysics: metaphysics is not the
enterprise that goes beyond experience. None of the great metaphysicians
wanted to do that and neither did they do that. Truth can be found in
human experience. They just overemphasized one aspect of experience.
Cassirer thinks of Heraclitus, Leibniz, Spinoza or Hegel. The trick is not
to overemphasize one aspect of experience. Cassirer has a lot of sym-
pathy for the romantic and poetic notion of the mysterious that cannot be
100 REVIEW

dissected with rational-analytical thought to be found in Goethe's


writings. Here he differs from the traditional metaphysical philosophers
like Spinoza or Leibniz, and he also differs from the rational-analytical
views of Descartes and Kant. What cannot be unravelled must be ac-
cepted as such.

2. My appreciation of the book. I think everything has a vagueness to it


that is typical of Continental philosophy. But even looked at from that
point of view, it seems different than what one would expect from Cas-
sirer. Of course, Cassirer did not write this book, so maybe this can be
attributed to the writer of the present book. But this feeling of vagueness
stays when I look at the content of the metaphysics. It is minimally
systematic, very associative and intuitive. I am not saying that is it a bad
metaphysics or anything like that, I'm saying it is a poet's metaphysics.
It reminds me also of the pre-Socratics and certain "Romantic" notions
like elan vital, Wille zur Macht and the like. Metaphysical systems can
be generated on the' basis of scientific theories (or scientific practices),
artistic practices, political views, etc. Metaphysics is always generated
from a certain background. A "poetic" metaphysics is justified, but it
would be given more justice if it were expressed in poetry. It does not
work as good for me if you make it part of a normal academic discursive
text, because the format of academic discour~e mutilates the content and
even hinders the expression of .certain contents. It becomes derivative.
Nevertheless I think the whole project is highly interesting and I feel very
close to the ideas expounded, especially the combination of a coherence
theory of truth, relative truth and the experience view of metaphysics.
But I should postpone my judgement until reading the manuscripts on
metaphysics by Cassirer themselves.

Wim Christiaens
Universiteit Gent

You might also like