TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………..i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………………ii

I. BACKGROUND……………………………………………………………………………….1

II. RECUSAL……………………………………………………………………………………..1

III. PROCESS OF RE-APPOINTMENT………………………………………………………2

IV. RULES FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT………………………………………………………4

V. EVIDENCE IN FRONT OF RE-APPOINTMENT PANEL…………………………….5

VI. RECUSAL REQUIRED BY STATUTE……………………………………………………5

A. Disqualification Based on § 144………………………………………………………5

B. Disqualification Based on Question of Partiality: Section 455(a)…………………..7

C. Disqualification: Based on Personal Bias or Knowledge: Section 455(b)………….8

VII. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES RECUSAL………………………………………………9

A. The Requirements of Due Process…………………………………………………..9

B. The Process That Is Due Process……………………………………………………12

IX. SUMMARY ARGUMENTS……….………………………………………………………..12

X. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………18

NOTICE OF MOTION…………………………………...……………………………………iii

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL………………………………………………………………..iv

i
 AUTHORITIES

U.S. SUPREME COURT

Accord, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884) 9

Berger v. United States , 255 U.S. 22, 24 (1921) 6
Bracy v. Gramley 520 U.S. 899 (1997). 10

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. , Inc. , 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op.
at 6, 11,12,18

Carey v. Piphus , 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). 10

Dennis v. United States 339 U.S. 162 (1950), 7

Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973 10

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 10,11,12,17

Greene v. McElroy , 360 U.S. 474, 496–97 (1959). 11

Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884). 9

ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R ., 227 U.S. 88, 93–94 (1913). 11

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 9,12,18

Liljeberg v. Health Svcs. Acq. Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), 7

Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). 7

Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894); 9

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); 10

Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976). 10,11

Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1982). 12

Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982). 10

Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); 16

Tumey v. Ohio , 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927), 11

ii
United States v. Morgan , 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941); 16

United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 133 (1936); 2, 7

Williams v. Pennsylvania , 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016). 9,12,18

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975 16,18

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 41-45, 339 U. S. (1950). 10

FIRST CIRCUIT

Blizard v. Frechette , 601 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir.1979). 8

Logue v. Dore , 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir. 1997)

16

United States v. Chantal , 902 F.2d 1018, 1023 (1st Cir.1990). 8

United States v. Kelley , 712 F.2d 884, 889 (1st Cir.1983). 6

FEDERAL COURTS

Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Franksu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550, 557 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); 7

Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 1995); 7

Christo v. Padgett , 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000), 5

Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996); 8

In re Hatcher , 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); 7

Kennedy v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 551 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir.
1977); 17

Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1979) 17

Ouachita Nat. Bank v. Tosco Corp ., 686 F.2d 1291, 1301 (8th Cir. 1982),
aff'd 716 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc). 17

ii
Phillips v. Join Legislative Committee on Performance & Expenditure Review ,
637 F.2d 1014, 1019 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982). 18

Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1980); 17

Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord , 529 F.2d 181, 186 (8th Cir. 1976); 17

U.S. v. Torres 128 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997).[ 2

United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1994). 8

United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.1985) 6

United States v. Chandler , 996 F.2d 1073, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993). 7

United States v. DeTemple , 162 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 1998); 7

United States v. Frankenthal , 582 F.2d 1102, 1107 (7th Cir. 1978); 17

United States v. Jeffers , 532 F.2d 1101, 1112 (7th Cir.1976). 6

United States v. Lovaglia , 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992); 7

United States v. Silba , 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980). 7

United States v. Sykes , 7 F.3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir.1993) 6

United States v. Thompson , 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973); 6

United States v. Tucker , 78 F.3d 1313, 1324 (8th Cir. 1996). 7

Whitaker v. McLean , 118 F.2d 596, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941)). 17

STATE AUTHORITIES

In re Disqualification of Murphy, 110 Ohio St. 3d 1206, 1207-8 (Ohio

2005), 2,8

State ex rel. Turner v. Marshall (1931), 123 Ohio St. 586, 587, 176 N.E.
454, 7

STATUTES

ii
28 U.S.C. § 144 Passim
28 U.S.C. § 455 Passim
28 U.S.C. § 631. 2
28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(5), 2
28 U.S.C. § 631(b). 14
28 U.S.C. § 631(i). 14
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3B(6) & cmt. 5
Canon 3,C, (1)(e). 8
Canon 3,C, (1)(b). 9
Canon 3(E)(1) 2

"RULES" FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-

DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, as Amended March 12, 2019,
Article I., 1(b) 4,13
Article I., 2(a) 4,13
Article II., 4(a)(1)(A) 4,13
Article II., 4(a)(1)(C) 4,13
Article II., 4(a)(6) 4,13
Article II., 4(a)(7). 4,13

OTHER AUTHORITIES
U.S. CONST. AMEND V 17

Cf. § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). 11

The Selection, Appointment, And Reappointment Of United States

Magistrate Judges March 2010 Judges Information Series No. 2, 4,5,6

Code of Conduct for United States Judges (Guide, Vol. 2A, Ch. 2).
(effective March 12, 2019) 14

The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 (Pub. L. No. 96-82; 93 Stat. 643) 2
Fed. R .Evid. 605 17

CASES EFFECTED
Case No. 1:21-cv-01047-LM 5
Case No. 1:19-cv-009 78-JL 5
Case No. 1:17-cv-00733-PB 5
Case No. 1:18-cv-00203-PB 5
Case No. 1:17-cv-00749-JD 5

ii
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Daniel E. Hall, Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:20-cv-536-SE
Twitter Inc., Defendant.

PLAINTIFF’S ATTACHED “MOL” IN SUPPORT

TO RECUSE HONORABLE JUDGE ELLIOT

I. BACKGROUND

1. Honorable "Judge Elliot" was sworn in as an Article I District Judge on December 22, 2021.

(Declaration, Attached Exhibit A).

2. Upon information and belief, on or around January 3, 2022, the Court posted public notice of the

re-appointment of Judge Johnstone.

3. On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff, aka Sensa Verogna, filed a comment to the Merit Selection Panel.

(Id. Attached Exhibit B). Within these comments, Plaintiff cites his [Rule 60 Motion, at 74].

4. On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff, aka Sensa Verogna, filed an amended comments to the Merit

Selection Panel, (Id. Attached Exhibit C), attaching his [Rule 59(e) Motion] objections filed in Case

No. 1:21-cv-01047-LM. (Id. Attached Exhibit D)

5. Judge Johnstone was reappointed to a second eight-year term effective June 16, 2022.

6. Upon information and belief, Judge Elliot, an Article III justice, participated in the re-appointment

process of voting, in chambers, among other Article III judges, which voted to re-appoint Judge

Johnstone, despite her bad behavior.

II. RECUSAL

Page 1 of 19
7. Federal Courts recognize three possible grounds for challenges for cause: those based on actual

bias, those based on implied bias, and those based on "inferable" bias. U.S. v. Torres 128 F.3d 38 (2d

Cir. 1997).[1]

8. A judge should step aside or be removed if a reasonable and objective observer would harbor serious

doubts about the judge's impartiality. Canon 3(E)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct ("A judge shall

disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be

questioned"); See In re Disqualification of Murphy, 110 Ohio St. 3d 1206, 1207-8 (Ohio 2005),

(Preservation of public confidence).

III. PROCESS OF RE-APPOINTMENT

9. A United States magistrate judge is a judicial officer of the district court, appointed by majority vote

of the district judges of the court, including Judge Elliot. [2] The Selection, Appointment, And

Reappointment Of United States Magistrate Judges March 2010 Judges Information Series No. 2, pge.

1. Hereafter as ("Magistrate Book").

10. The process for reappointment of a Magistrate Judge shares many of the same basic elements of

the process for initial consideration, selection, and appointment, with modification for the fact than a

pool of new applicants for a vacant position. If a district court desires to consider the first step is the

issuance of a public notice well before the expiration of the incumbent Magistrate Judge’s current

_______________________
[1] Pertinent here are “Actual bias is "bias in fact" — the existence of a state of mind that leads to an
inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 133 (1936);
U.S. v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997) “Implied or presumed bias is "bias conclusively presumed
as a matter of law." Wood, 299 U.S. at 133. ” Torres, 128, at 45. (implied bias disqualification is
mandatory.)
[2] The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 (Pub. L. No. 96-82; 93 Stat. 643) established certain minimum
standards and procedures for the selection and appointment of United States magistrate judges, which
are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 631. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(5), the Judicial Conference of
the United States has promulgated the Regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States
Establishing Standards and Procedures for the Appointment and Reappointment of United States
Magistrate Judges ( Id. Appendix J).

Page 2 of 19
term, noting the court’s consideration of reappointment of the incumbent Magistrate Judge and taking

comments from the bar and public to assist the members of a merit selection panel in its evaluation

on whether to recommend reappointment to the district court. A key difference in the notice of

reappointment consideration is that it does not take applications for the position, but rather comments

on the person under consideration for reappointment. The reappointment process also includes

appointment by the district court of a merit selection panel, the composition of which is the same as

that appointed to consider the selection of a new Magistrate Judge. The attributes considered by the

panel are much the same as those considered by panels evaluating candidates for initial appointment—

good (moral) character, judgment, legal ability, temperament, and a commitment to equal justice under

the law. Magistrate book Pge. 11.

11. The merit selection panel is appointed by majority vote of the district judges of the court.

Magistrate book, Pge. 21. The court must establish a merit selection panel to assist the district judges

in their determination to reappoint the incumbent. Magistrate book, Pge. 39. Normally, an incumbent

magistrate judge who has performed well in the position should be reappointed to another term of

office. Magistrate book, Pge. 37.

12. When the court has determined that it desires to consider the reappointment of the incumbent

and the public notice has been published, the panel does not take applications for the position. It

merely reviews the incumbent’s performance in office as a magistrate judge, and considers comments

received from members of the bar and the public, and any other pertinent evidence as to the

incumbent’s good character, judgment, legal ability, temperament, and commitment to equal justice

under the law. The panel and the court itself should determine how the panel should appraise the

incumbent’s performance. All written comments should be considered carefully. An interview with

the incumbent would generally be useful. Also the panel might want to interview selected individuals

Page 3 of 19
who have actual and reliable knowledge of the incumbent’s performance. To encourage candor, the

panel should assure individuals who comment on the incumbent’s performance that their names will

not be disclosed. As a matter of fairness, however, the magistrate judge should be given an opportunity

to appear personally before the panel to respond to any negative comments that have been received

and to answer any questions regarding his or her performance. Magistrate book, Pges. 39-40.

Reappointment Of An Incumbent Magistrate Judge To A New Term.

IV. RULES FOR JUDICIAL CONDUCT

13. A United States Magistrate Judge is a "covered" judge under the Rules for Judicial Conduct.

"RULES" FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, as

Amended March 12, 2019, Article I., 1(b).

14. These "Rules" govern proceedings under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act (Act), 28 U.S.C.

§§ 351–364, to determine whether a covered judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective

and expeditious administration of the business of the courts. Id. Article I., 1(a).

15. These "Rules" provide mandatory and nationally uniform provisions governing the substantive

and procedural aspects of misconduct. Id. Article I., 2(a).

16. Cognizable misconduct, within the Rules, includes, but is not limited to: using the judge’s office

to obtain special treatment for friends or relatives. Id. Article II., 4(a)(1)(A); engaging in improper ex

parte communications with parties or counsel for one side in a case. Id. Article II., 4(a)(1)(C); failing

to call to the attention of the relevant chief district judge or chief circuit judge any reliable information

reasonably likely to constitute judicial misconduct. Id. Article II., 4(a)(6); conduct occurring outside

the performance of official duties if the conduct is reasonably likely to have a prejudicial effect on the

administration of the business of the courts, including a substantial and widespread lowering of public

confidence in the courts among reasonable people. Id. Article II., 4(a)(7).

Page 4 of 19
17. The overarching goal of such action should be to prevent harm to those affected by the misconduct

and to prevent recurrence. Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3B(6) & cmt.

V. EVIDENCE IN FRONT OF RE-APPOINTMENT PANEL

18. The Court was noticed of Judge Johnstone's illegal policy on March 18, 2021, Plaintiff filed Doc.

74, Exhibits at 74.1 and on April 16, 2021, McAuliffe Recusal Motion, Doc. at 77, and with the

[COMPLAINT, at 1], filed in Case No. 1:21-cv-01047-LM on December 9, 2021, Plaintiff has made

well known to the Court Judge Johnstone's actions such as promulgating and utilizing illegal policies;

disregarding laws; using the judge’s office to obtain special treatment for the defendant Twitter; and

among other acts committed in; Case No. 1:19-cv-009 78-JL, involving Justice Joseph Normand

Laplante and Judge Johnstone, which was live from September 17, 2019, through January 28, 2021;

Case No. 1:17-cv-00733-PB, involving Justice Paul Barbadoro and Judge Johnstone, which was live

from December 21, 2017, through April 25, 2019; Case No. 1:18-cv-00203-PB, involving Justice Paul

Barbadoro and JOHNSTONE, which was live from March 5, 2018, through April 4, 2019; Case No.

1:17-cv-00749-JD, involving Justice Joseph A. DiClerico Jr. and Judge Johnstone, which was live from

December 21, 2017, through June 12, 2018.

19. Also, the Article III judges received notice of Judge Johnstone's illegal policy through comments

submitted on January 13, 2022, and as amended on February 28, 2022. above ¶ 3 and ¶ 4. also

Magistrate book, Pges. 39-40.

VI. RECUSAL REQUIRED BY STATUTE

A. Disqualification Based on § 144

20. 28 U.S.C. “Section 144” aims exclusively at actual bias, is triggered by a party’s timely and sufficient

affidavit, [and] applies only to district judges and “must convince a reasonable person that bias actually

exists.” Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000), or the judge has a personal bias or

Page 5 of 19
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. 144. The basis of the

disqualification is that personal bias or prejudice exists, by reason of which the judge is unable to

impartially exercise his functions in the particular case. The factual allegations must be established by

more than a prima facie case, but not beyond a reasonable doubt that the mind of the judge is closed

to justice.

21. An affidavit is only considered sufficient to support disqualification if the facts and reasons

provided “give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality

of judgment” Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 24 (1921), or when a “reasonable man would conclude

on the facts stated [in the affidavit] that the district judge had a special bias against the defendant.”

United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973); also 28 U.S.C. § 144.

22. Section 144 is unusual because it requires that the district judge accept the affidavit as true even

though it may contain averments that are false and may be known to be so to the judge. United States

v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884, 889 (1st Cir.1983).

23. When a judge receives a timely motion under Section 144, the judge must evaluate the sufficiency

of the motion and affidavit, but not their truth or falsity. The judge must disqualify himself or herself

if the motion alleges facts sufficient to show judicial bias, even if the judge knows the factual

allegations to be false. United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1112 (7th Cir.1976). At the same time,

however, the facts alleged must be sufficiently definite and particular to convince a reasonable person

that bias exists. Conclusions, opinions, or rumors are not sufficient. United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331,

1339 (7th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.1985)). In addition,

the Seventh Circuit has instructed, because Section 144 is weighted in favor of recusal, its requirements

must be construed strictly to prevent abuse. Sykes, 7 F.3d at 1339.

Page 6 of 19
24. “[I]t is apparent that the two sections (144 and 455) are not redundant but are complementary....”

United States v. Silba, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980).

B. Disqualification Based on Question of Partiality: Section 455(a)

25. In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding

in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”

26. “The test under Section 455(a) is whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed

of the facts on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s

impartiality.” United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993). Objective test, based on

all relevant circumstances. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994). “Recusal [is] required

whenever `impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'" Id.

27. The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a

reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the litigation

then an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists[.] Liljeberg v. Health

Svcs. Acq. Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), 2204-2205. “It is the appearance of bias or partiality that matters

here, not actual bias.” United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1324 (8th Cir. 1996). United States v.

DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 1998); “reasonable person” standard. [3]

28. In the present case, terms like “average person on the street,” or “reasonable man (or woman),”

See ("average man" test, United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123,(1936)), Dennis v. United States 339 U.S. 162

(1950), or “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” are all implicated in the present motion.

Judge Elliot's duties on the panel and her judicial duties on the bench might well cause a reasonable

and objective observer to question the judge's impartiality regarding Plaintiff's claims. State ex rel.

_______________________________
[3] , e.g., In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998); Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Franksu Enter. Corp.,
78 F.3d 550, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir.
1995); United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992);

Page 7 of 19
Turner v. Marshall (1931), 123 Ohio St. 586, 587, 176 N.E. 454, ("[i]t is of vital importance that the

litigant should believe that he will have a fair trial."). Because the plaintiff in this case has called into

question the fairness of the judge's dual roles, and because a reasonable and objective observer might

well share those concerns, the Court should conclude that the affidavit of disqualification should be

granted. In re Disqualification of Murphy, 110 Ohio St. 3d 1206, 1208 (Ohio 2005).

C. Disqualification: Based on Personal Bias or Knowledge: Section 455(b)

29. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) states that a judge shall disqualify herself… “where he has a personal bias or

prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the

proceeding." 455(b)(1)--does not require that bias or prejudice in fact be established. United States v.

Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1023 (1st Cir.1990). It does mean that where the appearance of partiality exists,

recusal is required regardless of the judge's own inner conviction that he or she can decide the case

fairly despite the circumstances. Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir.1979). Section 455 is

primarily concerned with knowledge gained “outside a courthouse”. in Judge Elliot's case, knowledge

acquired in an administrative capacity as an Article III judge, has not entered the record to which it

may be controverted or tested by the tools of the adversary process. . . . Off-the-record briefings in

chambers leave no trace in the record—and in this case Judge Elliot would be forbidding any attempt

at legitimate reconstruction. . . . This is ‘personal’ knowledge . . . .” Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256, 259

(7th Cir. 1996); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) states that a judge shall disqualify herself… Where he has served

in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness

concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in

controversy; Canon 3,C, (1)(e). also, The Ninth Circuit held that a judge, who was formerly a U.S.

attorney when the case at hand was under investigation, should have recused himself from ruling on

the appellant’s motion for a new trial. United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1994). The

Page 8 of 19
court noted that its analysis “imputes to the United States Attorney the knowledge and acts of his

assistants.” Id. The court held that both sections 455(a) and (b) required recusal in this case. 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(b)(5) (iv) states that a judge “shall disqualify himself… is to the judge's knowledge likely to be

a material witness in the proceeding. Canon 3,C, (1)(b).

VII. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES RECUSAL

A. The Requirements of Due Process.

30. Fundamentally, due process U.S. CONST. AMEND V guarantees “an absence of actual bias” on

the part of a judge. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The Supreme Court has imposed an

objective standard here, too, that asks whether “as an objective matter, the average judge in his

position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.” Williams v.

Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016).

31. Due process requires that the procedures by which laws are applied must be evenhanded, so that

individuals are not subjected to the arbitrary exercise of government power. Marchant v. Pennsylvania

R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894); (In a civil proceeding), Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708

(1884). “Due process of law is [process which], following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case

and just to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by law; it must be

adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever necessary to the protection of the parties, it must

give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought. Any legal

proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom or newly devised in

the discretion of the legislative power, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and

justice, must be held to be due process of law.” Id. at 708; Accord, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.

516, 537 (1884).

Page 9 of 19
32. First, “[p]rocedural due process rules under U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV are meant to protect

persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or

property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). “[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the

risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases.” Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976). At times, the Court has also stressed the dignitary importance of

procedural rights, the worth of being able to defend one’s interests even if one cannot change the

result. Carey v. Piphus, at 266–67; Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); The core of these

requirements is an impartial tribunal. Bracy v. Gramley 520 U.S. 899 (1997). Due process also requires

an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and for discovery; that a decision be made

based on the record.

33. An impartial decisionmaker is an essential right in civil proceedings. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,

271 (1970). “The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be

taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. . . . At the same

time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness . . . by ensuring that no person will be

deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance

that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.” Marshall, 238, 242; Schweiker v. McClure, 456

U.S. 188, 195 (1982). Thus, a showing of bias or of strong implications of bias was deemed made.

Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Or the conduct of deportation hearings by a person who, while

he had not investigated the case heard, was also an investigator who must judge the results of others’

investigations just as one of them would someday judge his, raised a substantial problem which was

resolved through statutory construction. One of the fundamental purposes of the Act was to

ameliorate the evils resulting from the practice of commingling in one person the duties of prosecutor

and judge. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 41-45, 339 U. S. (1950).

Page 10 of 19
34. Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he

has ‘a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in a case.” Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. , Inc.,

556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 6, quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927), there “are

circumstances ‘in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge

or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 6

(citations omitted). “a conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding.” 556 U.S. ___,

No. 08–22, slip op. at 7, 9. In such cases, “[t]he inquiry is an objective one. The Court asks not whether

the judge is actually subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be

neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’” 556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op.

at 11 (citations omitted). Relying on Caperton, which the Court viewed as having set forth an “objective

standard” that requires recusal when the likelihood of bias on the part of the judge is “too high to be

constitutionally tolerable,” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

35. “In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires

an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269

(1970). also ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93–94 (1913). Cf. § 7(c) of the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). “This Court has been zealous to protect these rights

from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, . . . but also in all types of cases where

administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny.” Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496–97 (1959).

36. Although this issue arises principally in the administrative law area, it applies generally to decisions

on the record. “[T]he decisionmaker’s conclusion . . . must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence

adduced at the hearing. Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), In Goldberg the Court held that the

pretermination hearing must include the following elements: (1) "timely and adequate notice detailing

the reasons for a proposed termination"; (2) "an effective opportunity [for the recipient] to defend by

Page 11 of 19
confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally"; (3)

retained counsel, if desired; (4) an "impartial" decisionmaker; (5) a decision resting "solely on the legal

rules and evidence adduced at the hearing"; (6) a statement of reasons for the decision and the evidence

relied on. Goldberg, 397 U.S., at 266 -271.

B. The Process That Is Due Process

37. Due process in this case would preserve the liberty and property interests stated in Plaintiff’s Doc.

1 COMPLAINT. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1982). “The requirements of procedural due

process apply to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV

protection of liberty and property.

38. The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an

objective matter, “the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an

unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’ ” Caperton, 556 U. S., at 881. Of particular relevance to the instant

case, the Court has determined that an unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the same person

serves as both accuser and adjudicator in a case. Murchison, 349 U. S., at 136–137. This objective risk

of bias is reflected in the due process maxim that “no man can be a judge in his own case and no man

is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.” Id., at 136. Williams v. Pennsylvania,

579 U.S. ___ (2016).

IX. SUMMARY ARGUMENTS

39. Accepting the declaration as true, Judge Elliot’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, given

her role as an Article III judge on the Court who just recently voted within a group of 5 other justices

[5] to re-appoint Judge Johnstone to another term as Magistrate Judge. A decision which provides the

highest evidence of actual bias or "bias in fact" and demonstrates the existence of a state of mind that

leads a reasonable person to an inference that Judge Elliot will not act with entire impartiality, and also

Page 12 of 19
demonstrates an implied or presumed bias which is conclusively presumed as a matter of

Constitutional law, for which disqualification is mandatory as this panel vote cannot be contradicted.

40. Judge Elliot’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, given her panel vote or the panel's vote,

which, despite the incontrovertible evidence presented by the Plaintiff, advocates in favor of Judge

Johnstone's duel role and her promulgation and utilization of her own unconstitutional court rules,

[6] which was conduct occurring outside the performance of official duties, [7] conduct prejudicial to

the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, [8] which demonstrates

special treatment for Twitter and its Attorneys, [9] which occurred over a period of over 2 years

indicating the engagement in improper ex parte communications, [10] and the failing to call to the

attention of the relevant chief district judge of this Illegal Policy, [11] which undoubtably had a

prejudicial effect on the administration of the business of the courts, [12], which certainly cannot be

actions construed to be within the mandatory and nationally uniform provisions contained within

Article I., 2(a), regarding judicial conduct.

41. With evidence of Judge Johnstone's Illegal Policies in hand, Judge Elliot just recently voted to re-

________________________
[5] Article III justices believed to be on the panel are; Honorable Chief District Justice Landya B.
“McCafferty”; Honorable Justice Joseph Normand Laplante; Honorable Justice Paul Barbadoro;
Honorable Justice Joseph A. DiClerico Jr.; Honorable Samantha D. Elliott; Honorable Steven J.
McAuliffe.
[6] A Magistrate judge such as Judge Johnstone does not possess the power to write her own rules or
policies, she doesn’t have the power to implement or utilize those policies. Any judge, including Judge
Johnstone, would therefore lack any power to adjudicate while knowing and utilizing or endorsing
those illegal policies.
[7] in violation Article II., 4(a)(7).
[8] in violation of Article I., 1(a).
[9] In violation of Article II., 4(a)(1)(A).
[10] In violation of Article II., 4(a)(1)(C
[11] In violation of Article II., 4(a)(6);
[12] In violation of Article II., 4(a)(7).

Page 13 of 19
appoint Judge Johnstone for good behavior to another term, partly based on her past performance

and merit. (Cannon 3(B)(3)). With this vote for re-appointment, Judge Elliot, has already decided

Plaintiffs claims such as his , which in turn makes her objectively bias, a material witness under her

Cannon 3(B) administrative responsibilities and would make any order from her unconstitutional.

42. Within that consideration, all six judges, including Judge Elliot, agreed and decided that Judge

Johnstone, despite her Illegal Policy; (1) would be their selection for Magistrate Judge in the next term;

(2) was selected pursuant to standards and procedures promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the

United States.[13]; (3) Was of good moral character and committed to equal justice under the law.

[14]; (4) should not be impeached or removed from her current appointment for incompetency,

misconduct, neglect of duty; (5) and exercised fairly re-appointment only on the basis of merit.

(Cannon 3(B)(3)); which is opposite of what Plaintiff alleges in his COMPLAINT. The Court cannot

make rules that favor one defendant or a group of lawyers because it creates favoritism and bias of

the Court.

43. Reasonable minds would believe that Judge Elliot has maintained and enforced high standards of

conduct and has personally observed those standards in compliance with Canon 1, has respect for the

laws at all times in compliance with Canon 2(A) and in a manner that promotes public confidence in

the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and has made a reasonable inquiry into Judge Johnstone's

illegal policy, and actual improprieties under this standard which included violations of law, court rules,

or other specific provisions of this Code.[15]

________________________________
[13] 28 U.S.C. § 631(b).
[14] 28 U.S.C. § 631(i).
[15] Code of Conduct for United States Judges (Guide, Vol. 2A, Ch. 2). (effective March 12, 2019)

Page 14 of 19
44. Judge Elliot’s vote was necessary to the re-appointment mandate. The fact that Judge Elliot’s vote

is not dispositive and may mean only that she was successful in persuading most members of the

Court to accept her position—an outcome that does not lessen the unfairness to Plaintiff. [16] A

multimember court must not have its guarantee of neutrality undermined, for the appearance of bias

demeans the reputation and integrity not just of one jurist, but of the larger institution of which he or

she is a part.

45. Presumably, all 6 judges, read and had previous knowledge of the actions stated in Plaintiff’s

Complaint(s) of judicial misconduct, including irrefutable proof of Johnstone's Illegal Policy, Judge

Elliot and the other 5 justices still voted and expressed an opinion including the merit of Judge

Johnstone's off-bench conduct such as criminal behavior, improper use of a judge’s authority, and

now have a predisposition to the Plaintiff’s claims alleging such behaviors.

46. Due process guarantees “an absence of actual bias” on the part of a judge. When Judge Elliot

performed due diligence under her duties prior to the vote on re-appointment, she had to have

investigated the allegations in Plaintiff's COMPLAINT to come to an informed decision regarding

Judge Johnstone's’ merits and behaviors.

47. Here, Judge Elliot was either compliant with her Article III administrative duties and has

investigated Plaintiff’s claims, and Judge Johnstone's illegal policy and thus has personal knowledge

or "extrajudicial information” and not what she has learned through the case. Regardless of whether

Judge Elliot voted for or against Johnstone's re-appointment, a reasonable person would surmise that

she along with the other Article III judges have already come to a conclusion on the matter of the

______________________
[16] Because an appellate panel’s deliberations are confidential, it is neither possible nor productive to
inquire whether the jurist in question might have influenced the views of his or her colleagues during
the decision-making process

Page 15 of 19
Plaintiff’s case, given her administrative duties to the Court or her personal knowledge of the case.

48. Because there is a “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators,” United

States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975), the man on the street under the reasonable person standard would

presume that Judge Elliot diligently discharged her Article III administrative duties and responsibilities

and therefore;

a. has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding and

stemming from an extrajudicial source other than what Judge Elliot has learned from her

participation in the case;

b. has personal knowledge of off-the-record briefings in chambers, administrative or

other meetings with other justices, clerks or personnel which leave no trace in the record;

c. remains a serious risk that Judge Elliot would be influenced by an improper, if

inadvertent, motive to validate and preserve the result obtained through any administrative

process of re-appointment.

49. Given Judge Elliott's position as an Article III judge, a conflict arising from her position or

participation as the re-appointment of Judge Johnstone in an earlier proceeding, presents a case of

actual bias or a high probability of actual bias too high to be constitutionally tolerable because the

average judge in Judge Elliott's position would be unlikely to be neutral. Furthermore, if not recused

from the case, Judge Elliot would be commingling her duties as administrator, advocate and Judge,

would not be an impartial decisionmaker, would be underhanded, and would violate Plaintiff’s Fifth

Amendment rights to an impartial tribunal. [17]

______________________
[17] Many cases have held that judges must not "become an advocate or otherwise use . . . judicial
powers to advantage or disadvantage a party unfairly," Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir.

Page 16 of 19
50. If Judge Elliot, being material fact witness to Judge Johnstone's previous actions were to continue

with this case, Plaintiff would lose constitutional due process rights regarding witnesses. She would

not be allowed to testify as a witness under Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 605, [18] or be excluded

so that other witnesses’ testimony could not be heard under , id. Rule 615. Plaintiff would also lose

his right to cross-examine to her personal knowledge of the matter under, id. Rule 602. “Case[s] must

be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.” Greene, at 474,

496, quoted with approval in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970). The right to confront,

interrogate or cross-examine and potentially impeach an adverse witness and that the decision be

based on the record are essential to a fair trial and due process under the U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV

regarding Plaintiff’s liberty and property.

51. Based upon the declarations attached hereto, a “reasonable person” would be convinced that bias

existed and, certainly, “would harbor doubts” about Judge Elliot’s impartiality. This recusal is

compelled since Ju’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. §

455. Likewise, the Due Process Clause of U.S. CONST. AMEND V, requires recusal under these

same circumstances, and in addition to Judge Elliot’s value as a fact witness.

_____________________________
Cont… 1997); that a judge must remain detached and impartial, Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d
181, 186 (8th Cir. 1976); and that "a right to be tried by a judge who is reasonably free from bias is a
part of the fundamental right to a fair trial." Nicodemus v. Chrysler Corp., 596 F.2d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir.
1979) (quoting Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941)). An advocate can present the
cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity
[18] Rule 605, entitled "Competency of judge as witness provides: "The judge presiding at trial may
not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made to preserve the point." Fed. R .Evid.
605. The prohibition of Rule 605 anticipates situations where the presiding judge is called to testify as
a witness in the trial — "where the judge abandons the bench for the witness stand." Fed. R .Evid.
605 advisory committee's note. Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir.
1980); United States v. Frankenthal, 582 F.2d 1102, 1107 (7th Cir. 1978); Kennedy v. Great Atlantic Pacific
Tea Co., Inc., 551 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1977); Ouachita Nat. Bank v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291, 1301
(8th Cir. 1982), aff'd 716 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc).

Page 17 of 19
X. CONCLUSION

52. All that must be demonstrated to compel recusal, then, is a showing of an appearance of bias ...

sufficient to permit the average citizen reasonably to question a judge’s impartiality. The appearance

of bias here is terrifying and mandates disqualification.

53. Plaintiff has shown that a reasonable person would harbor doubts about Judge Elliot's

impartiality.’" Phillips v. Join Legislative Committee on Performance & Expenditure Review, 637 F.2d 1014,

1019 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).

54. At the very least, there is an "intolerable risk of prejudgment", as Judge Elliot has had "prior

conduct, prior knowledge or an administrative connection with the case", and a failure to recuse Judge

Elliot from Plaintiff’s case presents an unconstitutional risk of bias. Williams, at 579 U.S. ___ (2016)

579 U.S. ___, No. 15–5040, slip op. at 1 (2016).

55. When a judge has served as an advocate for the State in the very case the court is now asked to

adjudicate, a serious question arises as to whether the judge, even with the most diligent effort, could

set aside any personal interest in the outcome. There is, furthermore, a risk that the judge "would be

so psychologically wedded" to her previous position as an administrator that the judge "would

consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed position." Withrow,

421 U.S., at 57, 95 S.Ct. 1456. In addition, the judge's "own personal knowledge and impression" of

the case, acquired through his or her role in the prosecution, may carry far more weight with the judge

than the parties' arguments to the court. Murchison, supra, at 138, 75 S.Ct. 623; also Caperton, supra,

at 881, 129 S.Ct. 2252.

56. The circumstances of this case lead any reasonable observer to believe that Judge Elliot has a

personal interest in the outcome, and that her continued presence in the case would undermine the

confidence in the impartiality of the federal judicial system and faith in the rule of law. U.S. CONST.

Page 18 of 19
AMEND V compels and the statutory bases of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) require that

Judge Elliot shall recuse herself from any further proceedings.

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that Honorable Samantha D. Elliot, hereinafter recuse

herself from this case by reason of 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 or due to the prejudice cast

upon the Plaintiff and in his Constitutional Due Process Rights.

Respectfully,

/s/ Daniel E. Hall

Aka, Sensa Verogna
[email protected]

Page 19 of 19
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Daniel E. Hall, Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:20-cv-536-SE
Twitter Inc., Defendant.

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO DEFENDANT AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on October 30, 2022, the Plaintiff,

proceeding pro se, will, and hereby do, move for the Disqualification of the
Honorable Samantha D. Elliot, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections § 144, on the
grounds that she is prejudice against his claims and in favor of Twitter the
Defendant. This motion will be based upon the attached points and
authorities, the Declaration of Daniel E. Hall, the Certificate of Good Faith by
Counsel of the Record, and all pleadings and records on file in this action.

The Plaintiff incorporates all arguments and exhibits presented in his October
30, 2022 Motion to Recuse, MOL and Declaration requesting recusal of
Honorable Judge Elliot, Docs. 104, 104.1 and 104.2

iii
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Daniel E. Hall, Plaintiff,

V. Case No. 1:20-cv-536-SE
'I\vitter Inc., Defendant.

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH BY COUNSEL OF THE RECORD

I declare, certify, verify and state that I am pro se counsel o f record for Plaintiff

in the above-entitled cause, that I am informed as to the proceedin g s, and that the

Declaration and application are made in good faith and not for the purpose o f

hindrance or delay.

Respectfully,

Is/ Daniel E. Hall

Aka, Scnsa V erogna
[email protected]

" I declare, certify, verify and state declare pursuant to U.S. 28 U.S Code 1746 and
under penalty o f perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Sig n ed this "3,")
../-1,.
day o f October 2022 in the State o f New Hampshire.

V=vt<ll g.;;J
Daniel E. Hall

Page 1 of2
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of October 2022, the foregoing document was
made upon the Defendant, through its attorneys of record to Jonathan M. Eck
[email protected] and Julie E. Schwartz, Esq., [email protected] and
Indraneel Sur, Lead Attorney. U.S. DOJ, [email protected]

Page 2 of 2
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Daniel E. Hall, Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:20-cv-536-SE
Twitter Inc., Defendant.

ATTACHED DECLARATION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECUSE

HONORABLE JUDGE ELLIOT

Plaintiff, Daniel E. Hall, ("Hall") in support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify

Honorable Samantha D. Elliot, hereinafter as, (“Judge Elliot”), hereby declare; 1. I

am a reasonable New Hampshire resident over eighteen and have personal knowledge

of facts below. If called upon to testify, I could and would testify competently as to the

matters contained herein.

2. I am the plaintiff in the above captioned case and declare, certify, that I am

informed as to the proceedings, and that this Declaration and Motion to Recuse are

made in good faith and not for the purpose of hindrance or delay.

3. Honorable "Judge Elliot" was sworn in as an Article I District Judge on

December 22, 2021. (Attached Exhibit A).

4. Upon information and belief, on or around January 3, 2022, the Court posted

public notice of the re-appointment of Judge Johnstone.

Page 1 of 4
 5. On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff, aka Sensa Verogna, filed a comment to the

Merit Selection Panel. (Attached Exhibit B). Within these comments, Plaintiff cites his

[Rule 60 Motion, at 74].

6. On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff, aka Sensa Verogna, filed an amended

comments to the Merit Selection Panel, (Attached Exhibit C), attaching his [Rule 59(e)

Motion] objections filed in Case No. 1:21-cv-01047-LM. (Attached Exhibit D).

7. Judge Johnstone was reappointed to a second eight-year term effective June

16, 2022.

8. Upon information and belief, Judge Elliot, an Article III justice, participated

in the re-appointment process of voting, in chambers, among other Article III judges,

which voted to re-appoint Judge Johnstone, despite her bad behavior.

9. I believe Judge Elliot has personal knowledge she gained through her

administrative position and duties within the Court as an Article III District Court

Judge, in which she advocated and voted to re-appoint Magistrate Judge Johnstone,

despite Judge Johnstone's past performance in promulging, implementing and

managing and adoption of an unofficial alternative admission procedures or the

COURT rule(s), which created a bias and unconstitutional tribunal in favor of Twitter.

10. I believe that Judge Elliot’s administrative position, makes her inherently

biased, personally attached to the case outcome, and also makes her a witness who

possesses personal knowledge surrounding JOHNSTONES ILLEGAL POLICY , and

as a result I fear that I will not receive a fair trial or a non-bias tribunal if she fails to
Page 2 of 4
recuse herself from this case, as she is unlikely to be a neutral or impartial

decisionmaker.

11. I believe that under Judge Elliot, in her previous participation in the panel

decision, disregarded Magistrate Judge Johnstone's previous performance of

disregarding New Hampshire law, disregarding US Supreme Court Rules, District Court

Rules in establishing her own pro hac vice COURT rules, by promulging, implementing

and managing and adoption of an unofficial alternative admission procedures or the

COURT rule(s) (“ILLEGAL POLICY”), that make current pro hac vice laws and rule

provisions unnecessary and for the specific reason of allowing TWITTER attorneys,

from the law firm of COIE and any associated local attorney, and specifically utilized

by MRAZIK and SCHWARTZ, the privilege of practicing before the COURT on 68

separate occasions, although both lacked the requirements of eligibility demanded

under Local Rules (“LR”) 83.1 and 83.2 to practice before the COURT and in violation

of New Hampshire RSA 311:7, and for the exclusive benefit of TWITTER 58 times.

12. I believe that if Judge Elliot's dule role and previous advocating of Johnstone

and Twitter when voting to re-appoint Johnstone to another term as Magistrate gives

the appearance of objective bias or partiality to be constitutionally intolerable and

therefore should recuse herself from this proceeding.

Respectfully,

/s/ Daniel E. Hall

Page 3 of 4
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

PRESS RELEASE

HONORABLE SAMANTHA D. ELLIOTT SWORN IN

AS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

For immediate release

CONCORD (December 22, 2021) The Honorable Samantha D. Elliott was sworn in
today as the 18th United States District Judge for the District of New Hampshire. Judge Elliott
will fill the seat vacated by Judge Paul Barbadoro, who took senior status on March 1, 2021.

Judge Elliott completed her undergraduate studies at Colgate University, cum laude, and
received her law degree from Columbia Law School. From 2006 until 2021, Judge Elliott was a
partner at Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell, P.C., where she served as the firm president from 2015
to 2020. Her areas of practice included business and commercial disputes, employment and
discrimination, product liability, property rights, and municipal defense in civil rights litigation.
Her professional accomplishments include being named to the 2021 Super Lawyer list for general
litigation and to The Best Lawyers in America for appellate practice and commercial litigation.
Judge Elliott served as a co-chair of the founding board of 603 Legal Aid, after serving in various
capacities as a member of the boards of New Hampshire Legal Assistance and the Legal Advice
and Referral Center. She also served as the lawyer representative on the New Hampshire Court
Accreditation Commission and as a member of the Federal Court Advisory Committee.

Chief Judge McCafferty commented on Judge Elliott’s appointment and confirmation: "The
court is grateful to the President and Senators Shaheen and Hassan for selecting someone with
the intellect, experience and character of Samantha Elliott to join our bench. We are confident
that she will have a long and distinguished career in service to the country and the State of New
Hampshire. And, on a personal level, we are thrilled that she is now our lifelong colleague."

Attached Exhibit A
MERIT PANEL SELECTION-CONFIDENTIAL.
Peter Callaghan, U.S. District Court, District of New Hampshire,
55 Pleasant Street, Room 110
Concord, NH 03301

January 13, 2022

COMMENTS FOR THE REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE JUDGE ANDREA K. JOHNSTONE

The current term of appointment for United States Magistrate Judge Andrea K.

Johnstone of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire is due to expire

on June 15, 2022. I bring to the attention of the panel my experience with Judge

Johnstone which may be pertinent when it considers the reappointment of the

magistrate judge to a new eight-year term.

1. I am a reasonable New Hampshire resident and US Citizen over

eighteen and have personal knowledge of facts below.

2. I am the party Plaintiff, proceeding anonymously in Case 1:20-cv-00536-

SM in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW

HAMPSHIRE. In a [Rule 60 Motion, at 74] I allege that;

“Magistrate Judge “Johnstone” was, on a continuous basis,

intentionally ignoring New Hampshire law and established official
court pro hac vice rules, and instead promulged, implemented,
managed and adopted her own non-public alternative admission
procedures, within her administrative case management duties,
Page 1 of 7

Attached Exhibit B
 that make pro hac vice laws and rule provisions unnecessary and
for the specific reason of, allowing partner attorneys from the law
firm of Perkins Coie, LLP. “COIE”, Ryan “Mrazik” and Julie
“Schwartz”, the privilege of practicing before the Court although
they lacked the requirements of eligibility set forth in Local Rule
83.2 and in violation of New Hampshire State RSA 31 1:7 and all to
the benefit of the defendant, Twitter.”

“Judge Johnstone’s unwritten, illegal pro hac vice unofficial

policies”, allowed COIE and partner attorneys of COIE, on 68
separate occasions, the privilege of practicing before the Court,
even though these attorneys lacked any of the requirements of
eligibility demanded under Local Rules 83.1 and 83.2 to practice
before the Court and in violation of New Hampshire Statute
311:7.”

3. I am the party Appellant, proceeding anonymously in Case No’s. 20-1933,

20-2005, 20-2091 and 21-1317, (consolidated) in the United states Court of Appeals for

the First Circuit, in which my true identity has been submitted under seal, and where I

allege, in part;

“If, as alleged, instead of utilizing the Rules of the Court, Judge

Johnstone promulgated and administered her own pro hac vice
rules specifically to benefit Twitter and allow Twitter Counsel to
appear before the Court although they lacked the requirements of
eligibility, and that these special benefits continued for a period of
over 2 years, and covering 68 incidents, ROA, 165-168, then it could
rightly be stated that self-promulgated rules administered by a
Court, for a period of over 2 years and covering 68 incidents would
be, albeit illegal, construed to be a policy of the Court. Gleaning
from these submissions to the Court is that these illegal policies
demonstrate a bias of the Court for a particular entity, over an
extended period of time and through several cases, is sufficient to
raise a reasonable inference of the appearance of actual or apparent
bias or prejudice. Tripp v. Borchard, 29 P.3d 345 (Colo. App. 2001).”

Page 2 of 7

Attached Exhibit B
 “If you start at point A of the “illegal policy”, ROA, 261-263, Br., at
60. then add up how many times it was utilized, and for who’s
benefit, the Court’s bias in favor of Twitter emerges. And although
Mrazik was not a part of Appellant’s case, his UPL in the Court
throughout 2018, ROA 164-238 (Dkt. 74.1), demonstrates continuous
use of the illegal policy and the Courts acceptance of that illegal
policy which establishes bias of the Court in favor of Twitter.”
See (Case: 20-1933 Document: 00117781153, Filed: 08/30/2021).

4. In Case 1:21-cv-01047-LM, in the United States District Court for the

District of New Hampshire, I alleged, in part;

“In all these above cases (1:17-cv-00749-JD, 1:18-cv-00203-PB, 1:17-

cv-00733-PB), (Collectively hereinafter as, “IP CASES”), and in
PLAINTIFF’S CASE, See [PE 001-068], which were submitted to
the COURT, both MRAZIK and SCHWARTZ invoked the
processes of the COURT in a matter pending before the COURT,
with both MRAZIK and SCHWARTZ exercising their legal training
and judgment concerning the impact of the respective plaintiff or
PLAINTIFF’S pleadings against TWITTER. These actions
constituted the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). When
MRAZIK and SCHWARTZ appeared before the COURT of record
for the purpose of transacting business with the COURT in
connection with TWITTER’S pending litigation or when MRAZIK
and SCHWARTZ sought to invoke the processes of the COURT in
a matter pending before it, both were engaging in the practice of
law. It is uniformly held that many of activities which MRAZIK and
SCHWARTZ participated in and advised TWITTER, such as
writing and interpreting contracts, drafting and writing pleadings,
and the giving of legal advice in general, constitute practicing law.
Additionally, JOHNSTONE, conceals from the respective
Plaintiffs, and PLAINTIFF, the material facts of; (1) the fraud upon
the COURT and that MRAZIK and SCHWARTZ are practicing
UPL as they are not members of the bar of the COURT, and
MRAZIK repeatedly states that [he plans] to “(motion for pro hac
vice admission to be filed)”, but facts of the record demonstrate he
never did so in any IP CASE; (2) her ILLEGAL POLICY; (3) the
bias of the COURT in favor of TWITTER, COIE, MRAZIK and
SCHWARTZ.” (Complaint, at 1, Para. 93)
Page 3 of 7

Attached Exhibit B
“By adopting JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY, the COURT
bypassed the COURT’S established rule promulgating procedures
that usually include either public comment or recommendations or
both from the Rules Advisory Committee. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b)
("Any rule prescribed by a court, other than the Supreme Court,
under subsection (a) shall be prescribed only after giving
appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment."); 28
U.S.C. § 2071(e) ("If the prescribing court determines that there is
an immediate need for a rule, such court may proceed under this
section without public notice and opportunity for comment, but
such court shall promptly thereafter afford such notice and
opportunity for comment."); U.S. VET. APP. R. 40(a) ("The Court
will have a Rules Advisory Committee . . . for the study of, and
advice to the Court on possible changes to, rules of the Court, either
sua sponte or at the request of the Court."). The COURT’S bar,
PLAINTIFF and the public were not given the opportunity to
provide input – indeed, the entire COURT should have the benefit
of such input – on such a far-reaching change in the COURT’S
practice and proceedings.” (Complaint, at 1, Para. 94)

“JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY: (1) was inconsistent with

and contrary to Acts of Congress; (2) was not prescribed by the
Enabling Act of 1934 and rules of practice and procedure prescribed
under 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) and (b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2072 and is
therefore unconstitutional; (3). violates 28 U.S.C. § 2071(f) as they
were not prescribed by the COURT, and are therefore
unconstitutional; (4) circumvented the COURTS’ prescribed LR’s
governing practice and procedure; (5) was not authorized by any
federal statute; (6) was not recommended by any rules advisory
committee; (7) was inapposite with N.H.R.S.A. 311:6 and 311:7; (8)
usurped and preempted the power of the governing State Authority;
(9) was not created as an immediate need under 2071(e); (10)
lowered attorney eligibility required under LR 83.2 only for
attorneys representing TWITTER or employed by COIE; (11)
operated with unlimited power; (12) operated with no restrictions;
(13) operated without any established standards and was secretive
to the public and PLAINTIFF; (14) was substantially biased in favor
of COIE attorneys and TWITTER and are therefore
unconstitutional; (15) was a moving force behind the
CONSPIRACY; (16) was the moving force behind all of the
Page 4 of 7

Attached Exhibit B
COURTS’ preconceived orders or pleadings, in PLAINTIFF’S
CASE.” (Complaint, at 1, Para. 96)

“On September 28, 2020, PEREZ and COIE, as counsel for

TWITTER, obedient to the illegal or legal advice given by
JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE, in an act directed by
JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE, and in acts to further the
CONSPIRACYS’ objectives, submitted a response [Case: 20-1933
Document: 00117648436] in the Appeals Court. In this response,
PEREZ states, in pertinent part;”

“Twitter was directed to file this Response by 12 p.m. on Monday,

September 28. Shortly before Twitter filed this Response, the
District Court issued an order stating “Plaintiff did not comply
with the court's extended disclosure order but instead filed
an ‘interlocutory’ appeal on the final day allowed. As an appeal has
been filed, and dismissal was inevitable for failure to comply - thus
essentially a final order - this court will stay further action pending
resolution of plaintiff's appeal.” This stay likely moots Appellant’s
Motion but, at the request of the Court, Twitter nonetheless
submits this Response on the merits of a stay.” (Complaint, at 1,
Para. 187)

“On September 28, 2020, JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE, in acts

to direct the PLAINTIFF’S CASE with an unseen hand, and to
further the CONSPIRACYS’ objectives, communicated ex-parte
and directed or “legally” advised TWITTER, through its counsel,
ECK, SCHWARTZ and PEREZ, using prior established conduits,
to submit an immediate response objection in the Appeals Court.”
(Complaint, at 1, Para. 188)

“JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE knew or should have known

that: (1) concealing material facts in a judicial branch of the United
States would violate 18 U.S.C § 1001; (2) conspiring and acts of
coercion against the PLAINTIFF would violate 18 U.S.C. § 371; (3)
giving legal advice to TWITTER would violate 28 U.S.C § 454; (4)
aiding and abetting MRAZIK and SCHWARTZ would violate 18
U.S.C. § 2(a); (5) acting as an accessory after the fact, would violate
18 U.S.C. § 3; (6) obstructing justice would violate 18 U.S.C § 1503;
(7) disclosing personal information in violation of the Privacy Act of
1974; (8) legislating your own rules would violate Article III of the
Page 5 of 7

Attached Exhibit B
 Constitution; (9) acting without jurisdiction would violate Appeal
Court Rules and case precedents, would create a bias tribunal and
would violate PLAINTIFF’S Constitutional Rights to; (1) due
process and adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the
Courts and justice guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) petition or right
to seek judicial redress for grievances including the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the First Amendment's
Petition Clause of the United States Constitution; (3) due process to
an impartial tribunal under the Fifth Amendment; (4) right to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment; (5) right to equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.” (Complaint, at 1, Para. 240)

“CONSPIRATORS, each of them, corruptly or by threats or force,

influenced, obstructed, deter and impeded, or endeavored to
influence, PLAINTIFFS’ pending judicial CASE by corruptly
obstructing and impeding, or endeavors to influence, intimidate,
officer in or of any court of the United States, the due
administration of justice within the meaning of 18 U.S.C § 1503
and Section 1985(2), which deprived PLAINTIFF of the due
orderly administration of law and justice.” (Complaint, at 1, Para.
241)

5. I believe Judge Johnstone set in motion an unconscionable scheme

calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability to impartially adjudicate a matter

by improperly influencing the trier of fact, or attempted to, utilizing ex-parte

communications and by unfairly hampering the presentation of Appellant’s claims

through a bias and unconstitutional tribunal, which amounts to judicial misconduct.

Page 6 of 7

Attached Exhibit B
 “I declare, certify, verify and state declare pursuant to U.S. 28 U.S Code 1746

and under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my

knowledge.

Dated: January 13, 2022 __________________________

Anonymously as Sensa Verogna
[email protected]

Page 7 of 7

Attached Exhibit B
MERIT PANEL SELECTION-CONFIDENTIAL.
Peter Callaghan, U.S. District Court, District of New Hampshire,
55 Pleasant Street, Room 110
Concord, NH 03301

February 28, 2022

“AMMENDED” COMMENTS FOR THE REAPPOINTMENT OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ANDREA K. JOHNSTONE

The current term of appointment for United States Magistrate Judge Andrea K.

Johnstone of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire is due to expire

on June 15, 2022. I am a reasonable New Hampshire resident and US Citizen over

eighteen and have personal knowledge of facts below.

1. On January 13, 2022, I sent you comments which may be pertinent when

the panel considers the reappointment of the magistrate judge to a new eight-year term.

2. On January 27, 2022, Chief Judge McCafferty outright dismissed my Case

#: 1:21-cv-01047-LM.

3. Because I feel that Judge McCafferty is attempting to sweep this issue

under the rug, and because I feel that anyone reviewing my comments and then her

outrageous Order, may get the wrong impression that there was nothing wrong with

Judge Johnstone’s actions, which couldn’t be further from the truth.

4. I have attached my [Rule 59(e) Motion] objections.

Page 1 of 2

ATTACHED EXHIBIT C
 5. I believe Judge Johnstone set in motion an unconscionable scheme

calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability to impartially adjudicate a matter

by improperly influencing the trier of fact, or attempted to, utilizing ex-parte

communications and by unfairly hampering the presentation of Appellant’s claims

through a bias and unconstitutional tribunal, which amounts to judicial misconduct.

“I declare, certify, verify and state declare pursuant to U.S. 28 U.S Code 1746

and under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my

knowledge.

Dated: February 28, 2022 __________________________

Anonymously as Sensa Verogna
[email protected]

Page 2 of 2

ATTACHED EXHIBIT C
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Verogna )
) Case #: 1:21-cv-01047-LM
v. )
) PLAINTIFF’S RULE
JOHNSTONE, et. al, ) 59(e) MOTION TO
) VACATE
____________________________________

PLAINITIFF’S RULE 59(e) MOTION TO VACATE

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

1. Pursuant to Local Rule LR 59(e), Sensa Verogna, the “Plaintiff” hereby

requests that the Court Vacate its January 27, 2022, Order of the Court and its Judgment

Order on January 28, 2022, because there is newly discovered or previously unavailable

information that was either unknown or understood and therefore not available when

the Recusal Motion was made and to prevent a manifest error of law and fact, on the

grounds the Order and Judgement (1) were based upon clear errors of law or fact; (2)

were determined by an objectively bias judge; (3) utilized an incorrect legal standard; (4)

misapplied the law to the relevant facts; (5) contain errors of judgment that are obvious

and indisputable; (6) completely disregarded the material facts of the case; (7) are against

the weight of credible evidence; and (8) genuine issues of material fact exist.

preponderance of evidence standard The Order also paints a picture of a Court that

had its mind made up before dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims for lack of jurisdiction for

judicial immunity and, alternatively, because it is frivolous, is based on an “indisputably

Page 1 of 51
meritless legal theory”, and that there is no arguable basis under the law stated in the

Complaint, at 1, (“COMPLAINT”). Within this Order and Judgment exist manifest

errors of judgment in law and fact that warrant reversal of the entire Order. This Court

has misinterpreted one or more of the Plaintiffs' allegations, and such errors have had

influence in the outcome and constitute a manifest error of law and fact. The

COMPLAINT does not seek changes to any order in Case No. 20-536.

3. The Courts Order which howls “frivolous” and “conclusionary” is simply

overblown rhetoric and hocus pocus which attempts to mask the reality that Plaintiff’s

arguments are based in undisputed facts and governing case law. Reminiscent of Orders

from Case No. 20-536, where the Judge does all the heavy lifting for the Defendant(s),

the Judge’s ruling here is in error as it completely lacks an arguable basis in law, is

without basis in the record, and should be voided for objective bias or reversed

completely. When compared, Plaintiff’s COMPLAINT” and the “RECUSE

MOTION” at 9, versus the January 27, 2022, Dismissal “Order”, what stands out other

than the mis-application of the law, is that the Order ignores the facts alleged, the direct

evidence presented of an ILLEGAL POLICY, and instead propagandizes by telling

stories, falsehoods and half-truths in the 1100 Club, (See Attached Declaration), while

avoiding the issues playing Word Trivia. (See Below). The Order uses approx. 1,100 of

its 4,214 words to spread falsehoods and half-truths in an attempt to label the Plaintiff

as a “disgruntled” litigant who alleges “frivolous”, fantastic or delusional scenarios

which fail to state any claims, while at the same time misapplying laws and basic
Page 2 of 51
doctrines, the issues, the direct evidence and the facts of the case.(see chart below).

Even as a carcass, the COMPLAINT alleges acts of retaliation by all conspirators, to

which each is liable for the acts of each other, and to which judicial immunity does not

attach.

Page 3 of 51
 4. The Order purposely recasts the COMPLAINT as a 1985(2) case, when

it is actually a 1985(2)(clause i) case, which allows [it] to incorrectly include a “class-

based, invidiously discriminatory animus,” which isn’t a requirement under (clause i).

The “Collateral Attack” position is void on its face because Case No. 20-536 is still

open and ongoing. Judge McCafferty totally disregards her Administrative Article III

position within the Court in not recusing herself, paints the case as frivolous and

dismisses it outright, when she knows that the Court, herself included, with evidence

of JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICIES in hand, just recently voted to re-appoint

JOHNSTONE for good behavior to another term, partly based on her past

performance and merit. (Cannon 3(B)(3)). With this vote for re-appointment, Judge

McCafferty, has already decided Plaintiffs case, which in turn makes her objectively bias,

a material witness under her Cannon 3(B) administrative responsibilities and makes her

order unconstitutional. The Court perpetuates the falsehood that the COMPLAINT

only alleges judicial acts when the Plaintiff has alleged many non-judicial, off-bench,

personal acts to which no immunity would not apply. Judges are also personally liable

for the acts of co-conspirators which cannot be considered judicial acts.

5. JOHNSTONE doesn’t have the power to write her own rules or policies,

she doesn’t have the power to implement or utilize those policies. Any judge, including

JOHNSTONE, would therefore lack any power to adjudicate while knowing and

utilizing or endorsing those illegal policies.

Page 4 of 51
I. JUDGE MCCAFFERTY ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT
THAT RECUSAL WAS UNWARRANTED AS THE ORDER IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATES PLAINTIFF’S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS

6. Plaintiff alleged, in part, in his Recuse Motion, at 9, that Judge

McCafferty’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” given (1) her role as chief

administrator of the District Court; (2) Due Process requires recusal as she is a fact

witness to JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY; and (3) that it would create actual

bias and an intolerable risk to Due Process of an unbiased tribunal. As this is the only

issue brought up prior to the Order, Plaintiff avers “new information”, or previously

unavailable information that was either unknown or understood and therefore not

available when the Recusal Motion submitted, (See Attached Declaration), which

provides proof that cannot reasonably be disputed, that because Judge McCafferty, as

an Article III judge on the Court who just recently voted within a group of 5 other

justices to re-appoint JOHNSTONE to another term as Magistrate Judge, and is

simultaneously the author of this Order, and the Plaintiff’s claims are opposite regarding

JOHNSTONES behavior surrounding her ILLEGAL POLICY, the Order creates an

actual bias and an unconstitutional tribunal, and violates Plaintiff’s due process

guarantees of “an absence of actual bias” on the part of a judge. [1] In other words, she

________________________
[1] The Order violates Plaintiff’s constitutional rights of the Due Process Clause of U.S.
CONST. AMEND XIV, which requires recusal as Judge McCafferty is a fact witness’s
to the ILLEGAL POLICY, and also violates Plaintiff’s rights Due Process under the
U.S. CONST. AMEND V as actual bias exists.

Page 5 of 51
had knowledge of JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY in hand when she voted to

re-appoint JOHNSTONE to another term. She had already made up her mind prior to

the Order, that JOHNSTONE’S off-bench acts of promulgating, utilizing, and applying

“illegal rules” to cases in the Court were of good character, merit and committed to

equal justice, which is opposite of what the Plaintiff alleges in his COMPLAINT. This

makes her a rotten jurist as she is objectively biased in favor of JOHNSTONE, and her

vote to re-appoint re-affirms that fact.

7. The process for reappointment of a Magistrate Judge shares many of the

same basic elements of the process for initial consideration, selection, and appointment,

with modification for the fact that the evaluation is of a known individual already

holding the position of Magistrate Judge rather than a pool of new applicants for a

vacant position. If a district court desires to consider reappointment of a Magistrate

Judge (it can choose not to, by a majority vote of the District Judges), the first step is

the issuance of a public notice well before the expiration of the incumbent Magistrate

Judge’s current term, noting the court’s consideration of reappointment of the

incumbent Magistrate Judge and seeking comments from the bar and public to assist

the members of a merit selection panel in its evaluation on whether to recommend

reappointment to the district court. A key difference in the notice of reappointment

consideration is that it does not seek applications for the position, but rather comments

on the person under consideration for reappointment. The reappointment process also

includes appointment by the district court of a merit selection panel, the composition
Page 6 of 51
of which is the same as that appointed to consider the selection of a new Magistrate

Judge. The attributes considered by the panel are much the same as those considered

by panels evaluating candidates for initial appointment—good character, judgment,

legal ability, temperament, and a commitment to equal justice under the law.

https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RMJ-feature4-mayjun14-

pdf-1.pdf

8. The Court was noticed of JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY since

Plaintiff’s [Rule 60 motion, at 74]*, on March 18, 2021, and his [McAuliffe Recusal

Motion, at 77], on April 16, 2021, in Case No. 20-536, and with the COMPLAINT filed

in this action on December 8, 2021, complaining, inter alia, that JOHNSTONE ran an

illegal policy through the Court 68 times, favoring one defendant and it’s counsel from

COIE. (* Case No. 20-536 is stated as [###], throughout).

9. Upon information and belief, on January 3, 2022, the Court posted notice

of the re-appointment of JOHNSTONE.

10. Any Article III Judge of the District Court, in their administrative duties,

bears responsibility for both legal and illegal policies or rules administered by the Court

and for any number of critical administrative decisions, including if any administrative

actions are to be taken, reprimands given, whether policies need to be adjusted or rules

changed, which witnesses to interview.

11. So shortly prior to January 3, 2022, Six (6) Article III judges of the District

Page 7 of 51
Court [2] were required within their duties to consider, give notice and instructions or

a (mandate) to the merit selection panel “that it does not seek applications for the

position” of the Magistrate Judge in the next term.

12. Within that consideration, all six judges, including Judge McCafferty,

agreed and decided that JOHNSTONE, despite her ILLEGAL POLICY; (1) would be

their selection for Magistrate Judge in the next term; (2) was selected pursuant to

standards and procedures promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United

States.[3]; (3) Was of good moral character and committed to equal justice under the

law. [4]; (4) should not be impeached or removed from her current appointment for

incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty; (5) and exercised fairly re-appointment

only on the basis of merit. See (Cannon 3(B)(3)); which is opposite of what Plaintiff

alleges in his COMPLAINT. The Court cannot make rules that favor one defendant or

a group of lawyers because it creates favoritism and bias of the Court.

13. Judge McCafferty’s vote was necessary to the re-appointment mandate.

The fact that Judge McCafferty’s vote is not dispositive and may mean only that she

was successful in persuading most members of the Court to accept her position—an

________________________
[2] Current Article III justices on the Court are; Honorable Chief District Justice
Landya B. “McCafferty”; Honorable Justice Joseph Normand “Laplante”; Honorable
Justice Paul “Barbadoro”; Honorable Justice Joseph A. “DiClerico Jr.”; Honorable
Samantha D. “Elliott”; Honorable Steven J. McAuliffe, “MCAULIFFE”;
[3] See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b).
[4] See 28 U.S.C. § 631(i).

Page 8 of 51
outcome that does not lessen the unfairness to the Plaintiff. [5] A multimember court

must not have its guarantee of neutrality undermined, for the appearance of bias

demeans the reputation and integrity not just of one jurist, but of the larger institution

of which he or she is a part.

14. Presumably, all 6 judges, and most certainly Judge McCafferty because she

is the judge here, read and had previous knowledge of the actions stated in Plaintiff’s

Complaint(s) of judicial misconduct, including irrefutable proof of JOHNSTONE’S

ILLEGAL POLICY, Judge McCafferty and the other 5 justices still voted and

expressed an opinion including the merit of JOHNSTONE’S off-bench conduct such

as criminal behavior, improper use of a judge’s authority, and now have a predisposition

to the Plaintiff’s claims.

15. Given the positions stated, issues avoided, falsehoods and half-truths

within the Order, Judge McCafferty displays a deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism

that would render fair judgment impossible, as she appears to be psychologically

wedded to her previous position to re-appoint JOHNSTONE, and that it is

permissible for JOHNSTONE to run an illegal policy through the Court 68

times, favoring one defendant and it’s counsel from COIE, creating a biased and

unconstitutional Court, which is contrary to the Plaintiff’s claims and incontrovertible

___________________
[5] Because an appellate panel’s deliberations are confidential, it is neither possible nor
productive to inquire whether the jurist in question might have influenced the views of
his or her colleagues during the decision-making process

Page 9 of 51
proof of an ILLEGAL POLICY. Judge McCafferty has consciously or unconsciously

avoided the appearance of having erred or changed her position, which obviously

carries far more weight with the judge than the Plaintiffs arguments. In addition, Judge

McCafferty’s “own personal knowledge and impression” of Case No. 20-536, acquired

through her role as the chief administrator, she has an interest in the outcome as

JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY was administered under her supervision.

16. Partiality in favor of the government may raise a defendant's due process

concerns. “Just as there is a prohibition against a judge adjudicating a case where he was

also an has an interest.

17. Due process guarantees “an absence of actual bias” on the part of a judge.

When Judge McCafferty performed due diligence under her duties prior to the vote on

re-appointment, she had to have investigated the allegations in the COMPLAINT to

come to an informed decision regarding JOHNSTONES’ merits and behaviors. DID

she interview other employees?, DID she interview the two judges? Or all judges? Did

she interview herself? Were damages to potential parties even discussed? When Judge

McCafferty voted with the other 5 Article III justices to re-appoint JOHNSTONE,

they did so regardless of her ILLEGAL POLICY, and in the process she/they created

actual bias towards Plaintiff’s case, therefore creating favoritism towards

JOHNSTONE, which created an unconstitutional tribunal which violates Plaintiffs

rights to Due Process as Judge McCafferty failed to recuse herself and produced the

Order dismissing the case. The Order is a clear error of judgment and Judge McCafferty
Page 10 of 51
has applied the wrong legal standards and neglected the facts in record. The Court

should void or reverse this Order.

II. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT THAT

PLAINTIFF’S SUIT IS AN IMPROPER COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
RULINGS OF ANOTHER COURT AND THEREFORE LACKS
JURISDICTION TO HEAR IT.

18. Plaintiff argues that none of the four elements required for a successful

application of collateral estoppel have been satisfied; "(1) the issue sought to be

precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue must have

been actually litigated; (3) the issue must have been determined by a valid and binding

final judgment; and (4) the determination of the issue must have been essential to the

judgment.

19. The issue(s) sought to be precluded through the Order, [6] are different

from those involved in the prior action, [7] the issues here have never explicitly been

litigated or decided, are not identical, an even if they were, they were non- fulfilling the

finality requirement, as the case is still open, [8] and not final.

_____________________________________
[6] The Order incorrectly states that the core factual premise of the suit is “that the
rulings made by Judges McAuliffe and Johnstone in Case No. 20-536 were incorrect.”.
See also, [Attached Declaration, The 1100 Club].
[7] Compare the issues here of violating Plaintiff’s statutory right to access to a federal
court Section 1985(2)(i), neglect to prevent a 1985(2)(i) violation, and violations under
the U.S. Constitution by federal officers versus his original claims in Case No. 20-536,
which are discrimination in contract, discrimination in public accommodation, and first
amendment rights to free speech and rights to assembly.
[8] Plaintiff’s original Case No. 20-536 is currently on Appeal in the United States Court
of Appeals for The First Circuit, Case Nos. 20-1933, 20-2005, 20-2091 and 21-
1317(consolidated). [Recusal Motion, at 9-1, ¶ 1].
Page 11 of 51
 20. Because none of the four elements required for a successful application

of collateral estoppel have been satisfied and it would be unfair to apply to the action

here, as Plaintiff’s COMPLAINT does not seek an appeal of the rulings due to

disagreements, and made by another federal judge, the Court erred in utilizing a false

core factual premise that Plaintiff brings this action because he disagrees with previous

orders in Case No. 20-536, and erred in law by mis-applying the facts on record to the

correct legal standard by applying collateral estoppel in a still open case and then

dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction on that basis.

21. Lastly, even if the Appeals Court concludes in Case No. 20-536 that there

was no fraud upon the Court as alleged in Plaintiff’s [Rule 60 Motion, at 74], the

standard of proof for fraud upon the court was “clear and convincing”, versus the lower

standard of proof required in this conspiracy case which carries a lower “preponderance

of evidence” standard, and therefore collateral estoppel would not apply in this case.

Even if the underlying factual questions were the same, which they are not, the earlier

case required clear and convincing, and this case only requires proof by a preponderance

of evidence.

Page 12 of 51
III. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT IN
HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
SECTION 1985(2)(Clause i) and 1985(3) (clause iii), BECAUSE HE DID
NOT ALLEGE ACTS WITH A CLASS-BASED, INVIDIOUSLY
DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUS.

22. COUNT I of the COMPLAINT clearly states that it is a statutory action

for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)(clause i), under the damage remedies provided in

42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (clause iii). COMPLAINT, ¶ ¶ ¶, 1, 218, 219].[9]

23. The first clause of Section 1985(2), provides in relevant part:

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to

deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in
any court of the United States from attending such court, or
from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully,
and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person
or property on account of his having so attended or testified.

24. That clause must be read in conjunction with the third and final clause of

Section 1985(3), which provides the remedy:

[I]n any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or

more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
____________________
[9] “Section 1985(2)” is mentioned in the body of Count I, but clearly states in the
header of claim I, and in four other areas of the COMPLAINT that the claims made
are for (Clause i) of , Section 1985(2)(Clause i) and not for Section 1985(2) as stated in
the order. See COMPLAINT at page 1 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)(clause i), (“Section
1985(2)”); id, page 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)(clause i); page 80 Header, COUNT I: 42
U.S.C. § 1985(2)(CLAUSE I) AND § 1985(3).

Page 13 of 51
 25. Section 1985(2) (clause i) protects the integrity of federal judicial

proceedings by proscribing conspiracies to deter a witness from attending or testifying

in federal court or to injure a witness in his person or property for having done so.

Section 1985(3) (clause iii) provides a remedy in damages to anyone “injured in his

person or property” or deprived of a federal right or privilege as the result of a

conspiracy proscribed by Section 1985(2) (clause i). Section 1985(3) (clause iii), specifies

the remedy for conspiracies proscribed by Section 1985(2) (clause i), and for

conspiracies proscribed by the other provisions of Section 1985. Plaintiff has alleged

sufficient acts and injury to sustain an action under both provisions. A prospective

plaintiff need not allege a class- or race-based discriminatory animus in order to

maintain a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)(clause i). Unlike Section

1985(2) clause 2, which contains equal protection language, Section 1985(2)(clause i)

does not contain such language and lacks similar equal protection language. Congress

intended the first clause to guard against conspiracies which directly affect the federal

judicial process. See Section 1985(2) Clause One Does Not Require Allegations of

Class- or Race-Based Discriminatory Animus.

26. Because Section 1985(2) (clause i) and Section 1985(3)(clause iii), have no

class-based, invidious discriminatory animus requirement, and because 1985(3) (clause

iii), simply provides a remedy for Section 1985 violations, the Court erred in law by

requiring the Plaintiff to allege class-based, invidious discriminatory animus in his

COMPLAINT, and to the correct legal standard of (clause i) and erred in utilizing a
Page 14 of 51
false core factual premise that all Section 1985 suits require a class-based, invidious

discriminatory animus, and then dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction on that

basis.

IV. PLAINTIFF HAS PROPERLY ALLEGED A CONSPIRACY UNDER

42 U.S. Code § 1985(2)(Clause i) AND A CAUSE FOR REMEDY UNDER
42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (clause iii)

27. In pertinent part; 42 U.S. Code § 1985(2)(Clause i) states; If two or more

persons…. conspire to deter……… by force, intimidation, or threat………..any party

or witness in any court of the United States………..from attending such court, or from

testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully…………. or to

injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so

attended or testified; ………….

28. Only “slight evidence” is needed to allow the jury to find that the

defendant was a member. Plaintiff need not present direct evidence to prove the

agreement, and can prove it with circumstantial evidence.

29. A single act by any member of the conspiracy is sufficient to satisfy this

element, as long as the act was committed to further the conspiracy and tended towards

that end. Acts as innocent as writing a letter or talking on the telephone may constitute

sufficient overt acts.

30. Conspiracies are typically proved by circumstantial evidence. ‘[S]ince such

participation, cooperation or unity of action is difficult to prove by direct evidence, it

can be inferred from the nature of the act done, the relation of the parties, the interests
Page 15 of 51
of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances such as “unity of purpose”, or alleged

intent to effectuate the object of the conspiracy.

31. JOHNSTONE, MCAULIFFE, ECK and SCWARTZ, conspired to

scheme and explicitly privately agreed, in part, to: (1) conceal from PLAINTIFF; (a) the

fraud upon the COURT; (b) JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY; (c) the bias of the

COURT in favor of TWITTER; (d) past, present and ongoing use of JOHNSTONE’S

ILLEGAL POLICY by COIE, MRAZIK, and SCHWARTZ; (e) JOHNSTONE’S and

MCAULIFFE’S ex-parte legal advice given to TWITTER’S counsel; (2) defeat

PLAINTIFF’S [Default Motion, at 7], and other motions, by using preconceived

motions, objections or orders; (3) to defeat the PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT prior to

addressing the merits of his claims by using preconceived motions, objections or orders;

(4) wrongly interfere with PLAINTIFF’S access to federal court to pursue his

discrimination and constitutional claims by: (a) judicially intimidating, coercing, forcing,

and deterring PLAINTIFF from attending and continuing his CASE in the COURT;

(b) retaliating against PLAINTIFF for bringing his CASE before the COURT; (c)

retaliating and punishing PLAINTIFF for discovering and bringing to light or public

scrutiny, the fraud that was being perpetrated against the COURT, JOHNSTONE’S

ILLEGAL POLICY, and the bias of the COURT in favor of TWITTER through his

various default claims in the COURT. (5) share the true identity of PLAINTIFF in an

effort to monitor PLAINTIFF’s actions or strategies. COMPLAINT, ¶ 15.

Page 16 of 51
 32. In a quick summary, the COMPLAINT lists at least seventy non-judicial

acts by all Defendants combined. [Attached Declaration, Overt Acts to Further the

Conspiracy, 1-52] Each person [is] responsible for a distinct act or of the acts of other

co-conspirators.

(1) JOHNSTONE committed at least twelve acts, and in part; promulgated,

implemented ILLEGAL POLICY [id, ¶ 1]; gave legal advice. [id, ¶ 2], [id, ¶ 36], privately

conspired [id, ¶ 3]; determined Order utilizing JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY

[id, ¶ 16]; disclosed personal CM/ECF information [id, ¶ 51]; communicated ex-parte

with defense counsel [id, ¶ 25], [id, ¶ 34], [id, ¶ 52]; concealed by scheme material facts

of JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY [id, ¶ 17]; judicially intimidated, coerced,

deterred Plaintiff [id, ¶ 18], [id, ¶24].

(2) MCAULIFFE committed at least thirty acts, and in part; gave legal advice.

[id, ¶ 2], [id, ¶ 36]; privately conspired [id, ¶ 3]; determined Order utilizing

JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY [id, 9], [id, ¶ 14]; disclosed personal CM/ECF

information [id, ¶ 51], communicated ex-parte with defense counsel [id, ¶ 34], [id, ¶ 52];

concealed by scheme material facts of JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY [id, ¶ 7],

[id, ¶ 12], [id, ¶ 19], [id, ¶ 27], [id, ¶ 29], [id, ¶ 32], [id, ¶ 38], [id, ¶ 48], [id, ¶ 49]; judicially

intimidated, coerced, deterred, Plaintiff [id, ¶ 8], [id, ¶ 13], [id, ¶ 23], [id, ¶ 28], [id, ¶ 30],

[id, ¶ 33], [id, ¶ 39], [id, ¶ 50]; acted to suppress the material facts [id, ¶ 20], [id, ¶ 21],

[id, ¶ 22], [id, ¶ 23]; ordered without jurisdiction [id, ¶ 37].

Page 17 of 51
 (3) ECK committed at least eighteen acts, and in part; privately conspired [id,

¶ 3] and, submitted material misrepresentations to the Court or the Appeals Court. [id,

4], [id, ¶ 5], [id, ¶ 6], [id, ¶ 10], [id, ¶ 11], [id, 15], [id, ¶ 26], [id, ¶ 31], [id, ¶ 40], [id, ¶ 41],

[id, ¶ 42], [id, ¶ 43], [id, ¶ 44], [id, ¶ 45], [id, ¶ 46], [id, ¶ 47], [id, ¶ 53].

(4) SCHWARTZ committed at least ten acts, and in part; privately conspired

[id, ¶ 3] and, submitted material misrepresentations to the Court or the Appeals Court.

[id, ¶ 4], [id, ¶ 5], [id, ¶ 6], [id, ¶ 10], [id, ¶ 11], [id, ¶ 15], [id, ¶ 40], [id, ¶ 42], [id, ¶ 53].

(5) Additionally, these acts by JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE are doubled

when you consider the retaliation factor, as each act was done in the furtherance of the

Conspiracy’s objective, which was to retaliate against the Plaintiff.

33. Plaintiff’s COMPLAINT also alleges that, JOHNSTONE, acting under

the pretense of her administrative capacity;

(1) promulged, implemented, managed and adopted unofficial alternative

admission procedures or an illegal POLICY [id. ¶ 94];

(2) utilized this POLICY for the benefit of the defendant Twitter and its

counsel in a Federal Court, allowing MRAZIK the privilege of

appearing before the Court 68 times and allowed SCHWARTZ to

appear and submit a [Dismiss Motion, at 3], although both lacked the

requirements of eligibility. COMPLAINT, ¶ ¶ 21 through 93.

(3) omitted from the Plaintiff, the material facts of the POLICY.

Page 18 of 51
 34. When Plaintiff unknowingly challenged the use of the ILLEGAL

POLICY with his [Default Motion, at 7], each of the four Defendants knowingly and

intentionally, privately conspired against him to deter his claims in Federal Court, in an

effort to conceal the material facts of the ILLEGAL POLICY from Plaintiff and the

Court. In the furtherance of this conspiracy, each defendant*;

(1) communicated through normal channels; COMPLAINT, ¶ 106

(2) with a motive and unity of purpose; [id, ¶ 107-114]

(3) with knowledge of the material facts; [id, ¶ 115]

(4) arrived at a mutual understanding or agreement, either spoken or

unspoken, through a unity of purpose to work together to achieve the

overall objective of the conspiracy, [id, ¶ 117]

(3) to deter by force, intimidation, threat or, retaliation …[the] party,

witness Plaintiff in the First District Court [id, ¶ ¶ 117, 161, 162, 166, 243.]

(4) from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending

therein, freely, fully, and truthfully [id, ¶ ¶ ¶ 117, 243, 256], and

(5) injured Plaintiff in his person or property on account of his having

commenced and continued his case. [id, ¶ 235].

* [All counts to include retaliation]

35. The COMPLAINT alleges many facts to plausibly state a conspiracy.

Direct evidence and factual enhancements include;

Page 19 of 51
 (1) MRAZIK’S 66 submittals to the Court, prior to Plaintiff’s case being
filed, which evidences;
a. JOHNSTONE created and administered an ILLEGAL POLICY;
b. an illegal policy that favors Twitter or COIE attorneys;
c. actual, continuous use and pattern of the ILLEGAL POLICY;
d. actual, continuous pattern of conspiracy between JOHNSTONE and
COIE attorney;
e. the ILLEGAL POLICY was used before/in front of many judges of
the district;
f. a bias of the Court that favors Twitter or COIE attorneys;
g. ex-parte communications between JOHNSTONE and COIE attorney
of a conspiratorial nature;
h. established channels of communications between Twitter, COIE
attorneys and the Court;
i. an off-bench relationship existed between JOHNSTONE and
MRAZIK;
j. JOHNSTONE omitted material facts of the bias of the Court and
her ILLEGAL POLICY to respective Plaintiffs;
k. a motive to deter or retaliate against, the Plaintiff;
(2) SCHWARTZ’S 2 submittals to the Court, in the Plaintiff’s case
evidences;
a. acknowledgement of an illegal policy to benefit Twitter attorneys;
b. JOHNSTONE created and administered an ILLEGAL POLICY;
c. an illegal policy that favors Twitter or COIE attorneys;
d. actual, continuous use and pattern of the ILLEGAL POLICY;
e. actual, continuous pattern of conspiracy between JOHNSTONE and
COIE attorney;
f. a bias of the Court that favors Twitter or COIE attorneys;

Page 20 of 51
 g. ex-parte communications between JOHNSTONE and a COIE
attorney of a conspiratorial nature.;
h. established channels of communications between COIE attorneys and
the Court;
i. an off-bench relationship existed between JOHNSTONE and
MRAZIK;
j. a motive to deter or retaliate against, the Plaintiff.
(3) ECK’S e-mail, which evidences;
a. ECK’S original frame of mind, that SCHWARTZ was not eligible for
bar when she submitted Twitter’s Dismiss Motion;
b. that ECK’S and SCHWARTZ’S submittals thereafter were all in
contradiction of ECK’S e-mail, and therefore a misrepresentation of
material fact;
c. that ECK switched position after agreeing to join the Conspiracy;
(4) Twitter’s reply brief to the Appeals Court, which evidences;
a. ex-parte communications between COIE attorney and the Court of a
conspiratorial nature.
b. channels of communication;
c. bias in favor of Twitter or its attorneys;
d. legal advice given by the Court to COIE attorney;
e. a continued conspiracy between the JOHNSTONE and COIE
attorneys;
(5) JOHNSTONE’S Court’s Orders, which evidences;
a. bias of the Court in favor of Twitter and COIE Attorneys;
b. channels of communication;
c. concealment or omitting of material facts of the ILLEGAL POLICY
from Plaintiff;
d. judicial intimidation in denying privileges to Plaintiff;
e. coercion to deter Plaintiff in his claims;

Page 21 of 51
 f. JOHNSTONE omitted material facts of the bias of the Court and
JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY to the Plaintiff;
(6) MCAULIFFE’S Court’s Orders, which evidences;
a. JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY was utilized in determining
Plaintiff’s default motion and reconsideration of the order denying
default.
b. an illegal policy that favors Twitter or COIE attorneys;
c. actual, continuous use and pattern of the ILLEGAL POLICY;
d. actual, continuous pattern of conspiracy;
e. a bias of the Court that favors Twitter or COIE attorneys;
f. MCAULIFFE omitted material facts of the bias of the Court and
JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY to the Plaintiff;
g. judicial intimidation, retaliation against the Plaintiff;
h. a pattern of Orders that lack any legal authority;
(7) ECK’S and SCHWARTZ’S motions to the Court evidences;
a. material misrepresentations to the Court or the Appeals Court;
b. a pattern of material misrepresentations;
c. ECK and SCHWARZ omitted material facts of the bias of the Court
and JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY to the Plaintiff.
V. PLAINTIFF HAS PROPERLY ALLEGED CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §
1986 AND THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT IN
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
SECTION 1986 BECAUSE CLAIM ONE FAILED TO ALLEGE ACTS
WITH A CLASS-BASED, INVIDIOUSLY DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUS
UNDER 1985.

36. The COMPLAINT states sufficient claims that “Persons”

JOHNSTONE, MCAULIFFE, SCHWARTZ and ECK all privately participated

actively in the CONSPIRACY, and therefore: (1) had actual knowledge of the Section

Page 22 of 51
1985 CONSPIRACY; (2) had the power as officers of the COURT to prevent or aid in

preventing the commission of the Section 1985 violation, and were in the optimal

position to prevent it; (3) but neglected or refused to prevent the Section 1985

CONSPIRACY; and (4) wrongful acts were committed against the PLAINTIFF in

furtherance of the CONSPIRACY; (5) which could have been prevented by reasonable

diligence. COMPLAINT, ¶ 262-266.

37. JOHNSTONE, in disregarding her obligation under departmental rules,

evidences her failure to exercise reasonable diligence in connection with her own

ILLEGAL POLICY. By neglecting to scrutinize and deter the efforts of MCAULIFFE,

SCHWARTZ and ECK to conceal the truth or existence of her POLICY, and the

CONSPIRACY and its objectives, from the PLAINTIFF, COMPLAINT, ¶ 264.

38. MCAULIFFE, in disregarding his obligation under departmental rules

evidences his failure to exercise reasonable diligence in connection with

JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY. By neglecting to scrutinize and deter the efforts

of JOHNSTONE, SCHWARTZ and ECK to conceal the truth or existence of

JOHNSTONE’S POLICY, and the CONSPIRACY and its objectives, from the

PLAINTIFF, MCAULIFFE is liable under Section 1986. COMPLAINT, ¶ 265.

39. Because the Court errored in requiring a class- or race-based

discriminatory animus, and because the COMPLAINT alleges plausible violations

under Section 1985(2) (clause i) and Section 1985(3) (clause iii), the Order should be

reversed and Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1986 should be re-instated.

Page 23 of 51
VI. PLAINTIFF HAS PROPERLY ALLEGED CLAIMS UNDER THE
BIVENS DOCTRINE AND THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND FACT IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER BIVENS.

A. BIVENS AND DUE PROCESS

40. Plaintiff alleges violation of his (1) due process and adequate, effective,

and meaningful access to the Courts and justice guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) petition or right to seek judicial

redress for grievances including the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and the First

Amendment's Petition Clause of the United States Constitution; (3) due process to an

impartial tribunal under the Fifth Amendment; (4) right to a jury trial under the Seventh

Amendment; (5) right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, (Compl., 250], and brought suit under

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

Bivens "allows constitutional claims against federal officials, in their individual

capacities, for actions taken under color of federal law."

41. The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that: "No person

shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S.

Const. amend. V. It applies to actions of the federal government, not those of private

individuals. The standards used for determining the existence of federal government

Page 24 of 51
action under the fifth amendment are identical to those used for finding state action

under the fourteenth amendment.

42. Since Plaintiff does have a constitutional right to petition the courts, he is

entitled a decision by an impartial tribunal for his discrimination claims, which carries

with it a right to jury trial. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1), and his right to equal protection

of governing laws.

43. Bivens establishes, as a general proposition, “that victims of a

constitutional violation perpetrated by a federal actor may sue the offender for damages

in federal court despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization for such suits.”

The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing

constitutional violations.

44. The Bivens doctrine allows constitutional claims against federal officials,

in their individual capacities, for actions taken under color of federal law. "In order to

establish liability under Bivens, a plaintiff must first show that the conduct complained

of was committed by a person acting under color of federal law in his individual

capacity. Secondly, a plaintiff must show the defendant's conduct deprived a "person

of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States." "There are two aspects to the second inquiry: 1) there must have been a

deprivation of federally protected rights, privileges or immunities, and 2) the conduct

complained of must have been causally connected to the deprivation. The Plaintiff,

having brought this Bivens action has plead that each Government-official defendant,
Page 25 of 51
JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE, through each of the official's own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.

45. A Bivens constitutional tort claim very similar to a 1983 lawsuit. However,

the defendants in Bivens claims are federal officials, not state or local officers. There

are several other subtle differences between the two types of claims, as well. Bivens

claims have to be made against individual officers. Bivens also only covers violations of

the U.S. Constitution, while 1983 claims also encompass violations of federal law.

46. To state a section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the

existence of a conspiracy involving state action; and (2) a depravation [sic] of civil rights

in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.”); (“In order to prevail on

a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color

of state law conspired to deprive him of a federally protected right.”).

B. JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE

47. The COMPLAINT pleads all the necessary elements to file a Bivens claim

against JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE. First, the individual defendant-judges, were

both federal officers ("defendants-officers"), who were allegedly acting under the

“pretense” of law by either participating in a federal civil action or presumably issuing

orders based upon the facts and applicable laws. COMPLAINT, ¶ 276. Moreover,

plaintiff alleges defendants-officers were acting in their individual, not official

capacities, in promulgating, administering or promoting the ILLEGAL POLICY, and

then purposely omitting those material facts to the Plaintiff and actively convincing the
Page 26 of 51
Plaintiff that legal policies were being used, and that the orders were based upon the

facts and applicable laws, when in fact they were not.

48. JOHNSTONE, under the color or pretense of law, intentionally,

maliciously and recklessly disregarded PLAINTIFF’S rights, mis-used the authority and

power that she possessed by virtue of being a Magistrate Judge, and with the intent to

injure PLAINTIFF, and with a substantial certainty that her actions would injure

PLAINFIFF, violated PLAINTIFF’S constitutional rights, intentionally and

deliberately caused a deprivation to PLAINTIFF and did so deprive PLAINTIFF of

his liberty and his property when she “promulged, implemented and managed illegal

pro hac vice and bar admission rules and unofficial court policies or an ILLEGAL

POLICY she promulgated herself, contrary to the established official rules of the

COURT and in violation of state law, to benefit TWITTER, COIE and partner

attorneys MRAZIK and SCHWARTZ of COIE, with the privilege of practicing before

the COURT, even though these attorneys lacked the requirements to practice before

the court, and then concealing and omitting these material facts to the PLAINTIFF

during his CASE. See also, (concealing or omitting material facts) COMPLAINT, ¶ 18.

49. MCAULIFFE, under the color of law, knowingly, intentionally,

maliciously and recklessly disregarded PLAINTIFF’S rights, mis-used the authority and

power that he possessed by virtue of being a District Judge, and with the intent to injure

PLAINTIFF, and with a substantial certainty that his actions would injure PLAINFIFF

and violate PLAINTIFF’S constitutional rights, intentionally and deliberately caused a

Page 27 of 51
deprivation to PLAINTIFF and did so deprive PLAINTIFF of his constitutional rights

of due process and a fair tribunal, his right to a jury trial, his liberty and his property

when he concealed material facts of JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY, the bias of

the COURT and the fraud upon the COURT, to the PLAINTIFF while presiding over

PLAINTIFF’S CASE. COMPLAINT, ¶ 286.

50. JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE also had constructive knowledge of

each other’s violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, yet made a conscious and

deliberate choice not to investigate or do anything about it. COMPLAINT, ¶ 285 and

¶ 289]. (willfully blind to alleged violations). COMPLAINT, ¶ 291; (failed in their

duties, [id, ¶ 292]. Neglected their duties [id, ¶ 264-266].

51. JOHNSTONE’S and MCAULIFFE’S acts of arbitrary interference

outside their judicial capacities or function, taken in absence of all jurisdiction to impede

or thwart PLAINTIFF’S claims, or to retaliate against him, were committed with an

impermissible purpose and motivation which cannot be described as legitimate acts

designed to improve any Government objectives. COMPLAINT, ¶ 295.

52. JOHNSTONE, in disregarding her obligation under departmental rules,

evidences her failure to exercise reasonable diligence in connection with her own

ILLEGAL POLICY. By neglecting to scrutinize and deter the efforts of MCAULIFFE,

SCHWARTZ and ECK to conceal the truth or existence of her POLICY, and the

CONSPIRACY and its objectives, from the PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT, ¶ 264.

Page 28 of 51
 53. MCAULIFFE, in disregarding his obligation under departmental rules

evidences his failure to exercise reasonable diligence in connection with

JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY. By neglecting to scrutinize and deter the efforts

of JOHNSTONE, SCHWARTZ and ECK to conceal the truth or existence of

JOHNSTONE’S POLICY, and the CONSPIRACY and its objectives, from the

PLAINTIFF, MCAULIFFE is liable under Section 1986. COMPLAINT, ¶ 265].

54. For Plaintiff's claim to be cognizable under Bivens he must establish that

JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE were acting under color of Federal law and in so

doing deprived him of some right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and beyond the

preponderance of evidence standard.

55. The COMPLAINT states sufficient claims that each defendant violated

Plaintiff’s (1) due process and adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the Courts

and justice guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution; (2) due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, which at minimum

requires an impartial tribunal; (3) right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment,

and; (4) his right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

COMPLAINT, ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ 1, 18, 125, 240, and 250.

56. The COMPLAINT sufficiently alleges civil rights violations, and the

alleged causes of such violations were the acts of the defendants-officers. Therefore,

Page 29 of 51
for pleading purposes, Plaintiff states a colorable Bivens claims against these two

Defendants-officers for non-judicial acts.

C. ECK AND SCHWARTZ

57. Public policy favors a duty, running from an attorney representing a party

to a commercial transaction, not to make fraudulent misrepresentations to an attorney

representing the adverse party in the transaction.” Neglecting to tell the whole story by

purposefully omitting important facts could serve to assist criminal activity. Even

though ECK and SCHWARTZ had a duty not to make fraudulent statements, ECK

and SCHWARTZ misrepresented the illegality of their Motion to Dismiss,

SCHWARTZS’ pro hac vice status, while omitting material facts of the ILLEGAL

POLICY, as an attorney can be liable to a nonclient, even an adversary in litigation, for

fraud or deceit.

58. ECK and SCHWARTZ’S as TWITTER’S counsel, failed to disclose

material fact of the ILLEGAL POLICY to a tribunal when disclosure was necessary to

avoid assisting criminal or fraudulent acts by TWITTER, and submitted material

misrepresentations which were acts of intentionally hiding the ILLEGAL POLICY and

then fabrication of a material facts, which, if known to the Plaintiff, could have

terminated, or significantly altered the basis of a contract, deal, transaction, or

settlement.

59. Because Twitter created the bias unconstitutional Court, its defense

counsel (ECK and SCHWARTZ) owed a duty to the Plaintiff to disclose the ILLEGAL
Page 30 of 51
POLICY, the Order incorrectly surmises that Bivens does not apply to ECK and

SCHWARTZ, while simultaneously stating that non-state or federal actors may in some

cases be liable for constitutional violations if they conspire with a state or federal actor,

and citing, which is alleged here.

60. Private individuals act under color of state law when they conspire with a

state official to violate a person's civil rights. The Supreme Court describes the proof

necessary to establish a conspiracy between public officials and private citizens. The

Court stated that the plaintiff had to demonstrate that the alleged conspirators "had a

'meeting of the minds' and thus reached an understanding" to take action that would

deprive the plaintiff of her civil rights, and that mere joint action will not suffice. The

requisite "understanding" may, however, be shown by circumstantial evidence"' and the

factfinder is usually allowed to determine whether the showing has been made.

61. The COMPLAINT alleges ECK and SCHWARTZ were knowing and

willing participants in joint action with the federal defendant-officers, and that ECK

and SCHWARTZ engaged in a conspiracy with JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE to

deprive Plaintiff of his federal rights.

D. CONCLUSION

62. Defendants, each of them, in the jurisdiction of the federal judicial branch,

knowingly and willfully privately conspired to commit and did commit affirmative acts

constituting a trick, scheme, or device within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 371, by which

CONSPIRATORS sought to conceal or omit material facts of: (1) JOHNSTONE’S

Page 31 of 51
ILLEGAL POLICY; (2) MRAZIK’S previous and continuing fraud upon the COURT;

(3) JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFF’ES bias in favor of TWITTER; (4) the COURTS’

bias in favor of TWITTER; (5) the private CONSPIRACY to retaliate against

PLAINTIFF; (6) JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFF’ES continuous legal advice given to

TWITTER, COIE, SCHWARTZ, O&R and ECK; from the PLAINTIFF and the

COURT, and within the meaning of 18 U.S.C § 1001. COMPLAINT at 235-237].

63. Each Defendant committed acts enumerated in paragraph 235 of the

Verified COMPLAINT are responsible for the acts of each other which damaged

PLAINTIFF in his person and property. COMPLAINT, ¶ 296, and each of them, knew

or should have known all that is enumerated in paragraph 240 of the COMPLAINT.

COMPLAINT, ¶ 296].

64. Each Defendant had a duty to disclose this to the Plaintiff in the case, but

omitted the facts surrounding the ILLEGAL POLICY, knowingly and purposely, with

hopes it would deter or stop Plaintiff from proceeding with his case, which, in this case,

did work. COMPLAINT, ¶ 296].

65. The COMPLAINT alleges the conduct, time, place, and persons

responsible for the responsible for the alleged civil rights violations, alleges a 'meeting

of the minds' and that an understanding was reached to take action that would deprive

Plaintiff of his civil rights, and that it was willful participation ... meaning voluntary,

uncoerced participation by each defendant.

Page 32 of 51
 66. The COMPLAINT states sufficient claims that Plaintiff was injured in his

person and property and deprived of a federal rights and privileges as a result of acts in

furtherance of the CONSPIRACY prohibited under Section 1985. 42 U.S.C. 1985(3)

(clause iii). Plaintiff is entitled to recover his damages occasioned by such injuries under

42 U.S.C. 1985(3), and against each DEFENDANT, jointly and severally. See

COMPLAINT, ¶ ¶ 125-128]. The Court has jurisdiction under both the claim and the

remedy.

67. Plaintiff petitioner has made out violations, in the least, of his Fifth

Amendment rights and will be entitled to relief under Bivens for all violations, if he can

prove that ECK and SCHWARTZ and JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE, in the

course of employment, reached an understanding to omit the material facts of

JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY, the bias of the Court, and deter or retaliate

against, Plaintiff from his case, in the First Federal District Court of New Hampshire.

68. Because the COMPLAINT alleges that the conduct complained was

committed by person(s) acting under the pretense of federal law in their individual

capacities, and has alleged and demonstrated that, each defendant's conduct deprived

Plaintiff of his "person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States.”, the Court errored and should reverse its decision.

VII. THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT THAT

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY PROVIDES COMPLETE IMMUNITY TO ALL
DEFENDANTS FROM THIS SUIT.

Page 33 of 51
 A. MCAULIFFE AND JOHNSTONE

1. OVERVIEW

69. The Order incorrectly states that all actions alleged in the COMPLAINT

are “indisputably judicial in nature”, then posits and concludes that single handedly

composing your own rules of the Court, giving legal advice to one party, joining a

conspiracy to deter the Plaintiff in his case, omitting material facts, communicating ex-

parted in an ongoing case with only one party, deciding motions with objective bias and

without jurisdiction, and the acts of other co-conspirators, are all judicial in nature. The

COMPLAINT posits that the acts alleged were not judicial in nature whatsoever, and

if they were they were without jurisdiction.

70. [G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are

shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” The analysis of qualified immunity involves two questions. One question is

whether “the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right.” Another question is

whether any such constitutional right was “clearly established,” and in particular,

“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.”

71. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the doctrine of immunity should

not be applied broadly and indiscriminately, but should be invoked only to the extent

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necessary to effect its purpose. We also must look beyond the status of the party seeking

immunity and consider the nature of the conduct for which immunity is sought.

72. When courts have spoken of immunity for acts within the jurisdiction of

a judge, they have declared that the doctrine insulates judges from civil liability "for acts

committed within their judicial jurisdiction," or "for acts within [their] judicial role," or

for "their judicial acts." Thus judicial immunity does not automatically attach to all

categories of conduct in which a judge may properly engage, but only to those acts that

are of a judicial nature. Judicial immunity does not include immunity from prospective

collateral relief.

73. Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, the lower courts “must engage

in a two-part inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable.” First, a

judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the

judge's judicial capacity.’” “‘Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial

in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.’” “With respect to the first

inquiry, ‘the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to

the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,

and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his

judicial capacity.’” The courts must “‘draw the line between truly judicial acts, for which

immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges,’

such as administrative acts.”

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 74. With respect to the second inquiry, [courts] must distinguish between acts

in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction,’ which do not enjoy the protection of absolute

immunity, and acts that are merely in ‘excess of jurisdiction,’ which do enjoy that

protection. A judge will be subject to liability when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of

all jurisdiction.

75. Absolute judicial immunity applies only to claims based on judicial acts.

(“[J]udges are entitled to absolute immunity from liability based on actions taken in their

official judicial capacity.”)

76. A government officer is entitled to qualified immunity from Bivens

liability on a Rule 12(c) motion unless (1) “the facts that a plaintiff has alleged ... make

out a violation of a constitutional right” and (2) “the right at issue was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of [the official's] alleged misconduct.” A right is clearly

established only if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

77. Based upon the allegations in the COMPLAINT JOHNSTONE and

MCAULIFFE, could not even carry their burden of proof for qualified immunity

because they would not be able to demonstrate that they were discharging the protected

function of the position when performing the acts of legislation, conspiracy, retaliation,

giving legal advice, ex-parte communications, deterring a party from federal court or

deciding case motions base upon made up rules or acts of self-legislation. Public policy

would not, could not, require an exemption for these type of acts.
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 78. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that disputed

questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided on motions for summary judgment.

And an official's subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of fact that

some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.

2. NON-JUDICIAL ACTS

79. The Supreme Court has posited that whether or not an act is judicial

depends on "the `nature' and `function' of the act, not the `act' itself." Typically, courts

look to two factors in making this determination. First, courts look to the nature of the

act, i.e. whether the act is a measure normally performed by a judge. Second, courts

evaluate the expectations of the parties, i.e. whether the parties dealt with the judge in

her judicial capacity.

80. The COMPLAINT does more than point an accusing finger, it plausibly

alleges an independent criminal venture. Many acts alleged are outside the scope of their

official duty” and not actions taken as part of their “their judicial functions” or related

to the individual judges’ actions in their roles as judges. The factors determining

whether an act by a judge is “judicial” relate to the nature of the act itself (whether it is

a function normally performed by a judge) and the expectation of the parties (whether

they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity).

81. In a quick summary, the COMPLAINT lists at least 70 non-judicial acts

by all Defendants combined. Each person [is] responsible for a distinct act.

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 (1) JOHNSTONE committed at least 12 acts, and in part; promulgated,

implemented ILLEGAL POLICY [id, ¶ 1]; gave legal advice. [id, ¶ 2], [id, ¶ 36], privately

conspired [id, ¶ 3]; determined Order utilizing JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY

[id, ¶ 16]; disclosed personal CM/ECF information [id, ¶ 51]; communicated ex-parte

with defense counsel [id, ¶ 25], [id, ¶ 34], [id, ¶ 52]; concealed by scheme material facts

of JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY [id, ¶ 17]; judicially intimidated, coerced,

deterred Plaintiff [id, ¶ 18], [id, ¶24].

(2) MCAULIFFE committed at least 30 acts, and in part; gave legal advice.

[id, ¶ 2], [id, ¶ 36]; privately conspired [id, ¶ 3]; determined Order utilizing

JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY [id, 9], [id, ¶ 14]; disclosed personal CM/ECF

information [id, ¶ 51], communicated ex-parte with defense counsel [id, ¶ 34], [id, ¶ 52];

concealed by scheme material facts of JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY [id, ¶ 7],

[id, ¶ 12], [id, ¶ 19], [id, ¶ 27], [id, ¶ 29], [id, ¶ 32], [id, ¶ 38], [id, ¶ 48], [id, ¶ 49]; judicially

intimidated, coerced, deterred, Plaintiff [id, ¶ 8], [id, ¶ 13], [id, ¶ 23], [id, ¶ 28], [id, ¶ 30],

[id, ¶ 33], [id, ¶ 39], [id, ¶ 50]; acted to suppress the material facts [id, ¶ 20], [id, ¶ 21],

[id, ¶ 22], [id, ¶ 23]; ordered without jurisdiction [id, ¶ 37].

82. Additionally, these acts by JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE are doubled

when you consider the retaliation factor, as each act was done in the furtherance of the

Conspiracy’s objective, which was to retaliate against the Plaintiff.

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 83. Plaintiff submitted with his COMPLAINT irrefutable court record

evidence, that JOHNSTONE, and other judges in the IP CASES, allowed Twitter and

its counsel to appear before the Court although they lacked the requirements of

eligibility, and that these special benefits continued for a period of over 2 years, and

covering 68 submissions. Plaintiff alleges in his COMPLAINT that these submissions

to the Court are direct evidence that this illegal policy existed over an extended period

of time and through several cases and, is sufficient to raise a reasonable inference of the

appearance of actual or apparent bias or prejudice, and demonstrates and establishes a

bias of the Court for a particular entity.

84. “As long as two or more persons agree to perform a wrongful act, the law

places civil liability for the resulting damage on all of them, regardless of whether they

actually commit the tort themselves. ‘The effect of charging . . . conspiratorial conduct

is to implicate all . . . who agree to the plan to commit the wrong as well as those who

actually carry it out.’ ”

85. Since conspiracy is a continuing offense, a defendant who has joined a

conspiracy continues to violate the law 'through every moment of [the conspiracy's]

existence. And, of course, the conspirator "becomes responsible for the acts of his co-

conspirators in pursuit of their common plot" id, under the rule established in Pinkerton

v. United States.

86. Negligence may result from omission in respect of duty. But act and

omission token different conceptions. Act denotes the affirmative. Omission denotes
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the negative. Act is the expression of will, purpose. Omission is inaction. Act carries

the idea of performance. Omission carries the idea of a refraining from action.

Webster's New International Dictionary defines act, primarily as 'that which is done or

doing; the exercise of power, or the effect of which power exerted is the cause; a

performance; a deed.' That work thus defines omission: 'Act of omitting; state of being

omitted; neglect or failure to do something; that which * * * is left undone.' "

87. A failure to act or an omission can be an overt act, where the co-

conspirator who failed to act had a legal duty to perform the act and he or she omitted

performance in order to further the achievement of the objectives of the conspiracy.

88. Because the COMPLAINT alleges non-judicial acts in the COMPLAINT,

the Court erred in utilizing a false core factual premise that Plaintiff has only stated

judicial acts and erred in law by mis-applying the facts on record to the correct legal

standard by applying blanket immunity to all Defendants for non-judicial acts contained

within the COMPLAINT and then dismissing the action against all Defendants for

want of jurisdiction on the basis of immunity.

3. ACTS WITHOUT JURISDICTION

89. Plaintiff fully believes that judges should be insulated “from vexatious

actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants”, but when the judiciary strips individuals’

constitutional rights of legal protection from its citizens, their acts must not be

condoned as our communities bear the consequences. Plaintiff did seek out the Court’s

jurisdiction by bringing Case No. 20-536 in this Court. Little did he know that Judges
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JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE would be performing acts not in the scope of their

employment and acting in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”, and outside the Court’s

jurisdiction when ruling on motions in that suit.

90. Because federal courts of the United States are courts of limited

jurisdiction, federal jurisdiction is never presumed. Our national government is one of

delegated powers alone and their proceedings are erroneous if the jurisdiction be not

shown upon them. In a limited government, a government limited by the constitution,

the violation of a citizens rights should never be justified due to the overriding

government goals or objectives, and that no branch of the government be allowed to

extend its power beyond it's legal limits.

91. The true scope of a government agent's authority is extremely important,

since the limits of that authority are a question that has the potential to arise in virtually

every interaction between a citizen and the Federal Government and the existence of

authority is a prerequisite to holding the Government responsible for its actions either

directly or through equitable estoppel. When a judicial officer acts entirely without

jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be held civilly

liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith,

that he had jurisdiction.

92. Here, the two judges were authorized to make orders utilizing official rules

and policies that streamed down through Article III, but acted without authority when

they decided motions utilizing an ILLEGAL POLICY not derived by Article III power.
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It is clear that under "color" of law means under "pretense" of law. Thus acts of

defendant-officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded.

93. The COMPLAINT alleges JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE knew or

had the means of knowing of the defect of jurisdiction. And that there is a material

distinction between a case where a party comes to an erroneous conclusion in a matter

over which he has jurisdiction and a case where he acts wholly without jurisdiction.

94. JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFEE lacked power and jurisdiction to act

and make judgments or orders based upon the ILLEGAL POLICY, because these

ILLEGAL POLICIES are not rooted in Article III power and are not judicial acts

within the contemplation of law, however much it may have involved the exercise of

judgment and discretion, but is merely the act of the individual, not the judge, assuming

an authority he does not possess. For their wrongful acts of this nature, JOHNSTONE

and MCAULIFFE are liable.

95. If jurisdiction is defined as the authority to act officially in the matter then

in hand, then how could it be contended that MCAULIFFE had a right to act utilizing

an ILLEGAL POLICY when those illegal rules contain no official authority or power?

No governmental action, such as MCAULIFFE’S, is proper unless a specific statute

states that it is.

96. "As to court of inferior and limited jurisdiction the general rule laid down

is that the judge is not liable when he acts within, but is liable when he acts without, his

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jurisdiction. This rule makes the liability depend upon the jurisdiction, using the latter

word not as applicable to a case of mistaken exercise of a doubtful jurisdiction, but

when under the pleadings and admitted or clearly proven facts there could be no

possible jurisdiction.". In stating the general rule that the liability of a judicial officer for

damages is dependent on the existence or non-existence of his jurisdiction, it is said in

97. An objectively reasonable judge would not rule upon a motion based on

an ILLEGAL POLICY. There is no way, given the record at hand, that MCAULIFFE

could have believed that his orders, [id, 9], [id, 14], which were dependent of the

ILLEGAL POLICY, complied with the law or complied with the due process of the

Fifth Amendment.

B. ECK AND SCHWARTZ

98. Immunity cannot lie for a judicial act of another co-conspirator, nor would

it lie if the acts performed by the co-conspirator(s) are non-judicial. Here, each

defendant or co-conspirator may be immune for committing the act themselves, but

would not be immune for acts of co-conspirators taken to further the private

conspiracy. Historically at common law, judicial immunity does not insulate from

damages liability those private persons who corruptly conspire with a judge. Immunity

for an act does not negate the act taken to further the Conspiracy. Immunity does not

extend to liability based on the acts of other private co-conspirators.

99. A private party involved in such a conspiracy, even though not an official

of the US Government, can be liable under Bivens. `Private persons, jointly engaged
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with federal officials in the prohibited action, are acting "under color" of law for

purposes of the statute. To act "under color" of law does not require that the accused

be an officer of the federal government. It is enough that he is a willful participant in

joint activity with the US. Government or its agents.

100. When private individuals act under color of law when they conspire with

a state official to violate a person's civil rights. Because the existence or nonexistence

of a conspiracy is a factual issue that the jury, not the trial judge, the Order which

dismisses the Bevins claims against ECK and SCHWARTZ should be reversed and the

COMPLAINT re-instated.

VIII.CONCLUSION

101. When Judge McCafferty voted with the other 5 Article III justices to re-

appoint JOHNSTONE, they did so regardless of her ILLEGAL POLICY, and in the

process she/they created actual bias towards Plaintiff’s case, therefore creating

favoritism towards JOHNSTONE, which created an unconstitutional tribunal which

violates Plaintiffs rights to Due Process as Judge McCafferty failed to recuse herself and

produced the Order dismissing the case. The Order is a clear error of judgment and

Judge McCafferty has applied the wrong legal standards of due process, is objectively

bias, and neglected the facts in record. The Court should void or reverse this Order and

Judgment as it is constitutionally intolerable.

102. Because none of the four elements required for a successful application

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of collateral estoppel have been satisfied and it would be unfair to apply to the action

here, as Plaintiff’s COMPLAINT does not seek an appeal of the rulings due to

disagreements, and made by another federal judge, the Court erred in utilizing a false

core factual premise that Plaintiff brings this action because he disagrees with previous

orders in Case No. 20-536, and erred in law by mis-applying the facts on record to the

correct legal standard by applying collateral estoppel in a still open case and then

dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction on that basis. Collateral estoppel would

not apply as the standards of proof in this case are lower than in Case No. 20-536.

103. Because Section 1985(2) (clause i) and Section 1985(3)(clause iii), have no

class-based, invidious discriminatory animus requirement, and because 1985(3) (clause

iii), simply provides a remedy for Section 1985 violations, the Court erred in law by

requiring the Plaintiff to allege class-based, invidious discriminatory animus in his

COMPLAINT, and to the correct legal standard of (clause i) and erred in utilizing a

false core factual premise that all Section 1985 suits require a class-based, invidious

discriminatory animus, and then dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction on that

basis.

104. Because the Court errored in requiring a class- or race-based

discriminatory animus, and because the COMPLAINT alleges plausible violations

under Section 1985(2) (clause i) and Section 1985(3) (clause iii), the Order should be

reversed and Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1986 should be re-instated.

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 105. Because the COMPLAINT alleges that the conduct complained was

committed by person(s) acting under the pretense of federal law in their individual

capacities, and has alleged and demonstrated that, each defendant's conduct deprived

Plaintiff of his "person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States. The Court errored and should reverse its decision.

106. A judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions

not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. A judge is not immune for actions, though

judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Judges are also

personally liable for the acts of co-conspirators which cannot be considered judicial

acts.

107. An objectively reasonable judge would not rule upon a motion based on

an ILLEGAL POLICY. There is no way, given the record at hand, that MCAULIFFE

could have believed that his orders, (Attached Overt Acts [id, 9], [id, 14], which were

dependent of the ILLEGAL POLICY, complied with the law or complied with the due

process of the Fifth Amendment.

108. When private individuals act under color of law when they conspire with

a state official to violate a person's civil rights. Because the existence or nonexistence

of a conspiracy is a factual issue that the jury, not the trial judge, the Order which

dismisses the Bevins claims against ECK and SCHWARTZ should be reversed and the

COMPLAINT re-instated.

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 109. Plaintiff loathes dropping the “k-bomb,” but the metaphor “Kangaroo

Court” can be intellectually justified and is illustrated throughout the Order. Plaintiff

finds that a Kangaroo Court and both of his cases have uncanny similarities.

110. Black’s Law Dictionary is most helpful. It describes the kangaroo court as

“1. A self-appointed tribunal or mock court in which the principles of law and justice

are disregarded, perverted, or parodied . . . . 2. A court or tribunal characterized by

unauthorized or irregular procedures, esp. so as to render a fair proceeding impossible.

3. A sham legal proceeding. 13. See Kangaroo Court, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(9th ed. 2009).

111. The definition found in West’s Encyclopedia of American Law. It defines

the term as meaning “a proceeding and its leaders who are considered sham, corrupt,

and without regard for the law.” 6 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN

LAW 103 (Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps eds., 2d ed.

112. Merriam-Webster defines kangaroo court as “a mock court in which the

principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted.” The defiance of legal

principles in this definition speaks to the inequitable and inferior nature of kangaroo

courts. Kangaroo Court, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, www.merriam-webster.com

113. Wikipedia defines a kangaroo court could also develop when the structure

and operation of the forum result in an inferior brand of adjudication.

www.Wikipedia.com.

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 114. “As a general rule,” it explains, a kangaroo court “is any proceeding that

attempts to imitate a fair trial or hearing without the usual due process safeguards” since

such “[c]onstitutional safeguards would stand in the way of a kangaroo court reaching

its predetermined result.”

115. The Constititon doesn’t mean whatever judges think it does. The

Founders put the Constitution in writing and designed the judiciary to interpret it the

same way. That way, judges can’t just make it up as they go along. Today, this approach

often is called “originalism” because the Constitution’s original meaning is the one that

counts, whether judges like it or not. The first three words of the Constitution are “we

the people.” We make the rules for government and government, including the

judiciary, is supposed to follow those rules. If the Constitution meant whatever judges

wanted it to mean, judges would be able to set their own rules. They would control the

Constitution, not vice versa. Thomas Jefferson, for example, warned that if the

Constitution means whatever judges want, it would be like “a mere thing of wax, that

they could twist and shape it into any form they please.” Supreme Court Justice Antonin

Scalia once called “power-judging.” The Founders designed the unelected judicial

branch to be the “weakest” and “least dangerous.”

116. A kangaroo court is a court that ignores recognized standards of law or

justice are inequitable, reduce procedural protections and generally degraded nature lead

to strong likelihoods that they produce unfair legal decisions. Ostensibly, the term

comes from the notion of justice proceeding "by leaps", like a kangaroo[8] – in other
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words, "jumping over" (intentionally ignoring) evidence that would be in favor of one

party. Another analogy is the reference to the pouch of a kangaroo, meaning the court

is in someone's pocket.

117. The Order obliterates any perception of the fair administration of justice.

Judge McCafferty must know that she just voted on JOHNSTONE’S past behaviors

of the Court and is blatant action of ignoring the rule of law, intentionally ignoring

evidence and Plaintiff's rights, and continues the Conspiracy to protect JOHNSTONE

and her prior actions.

118. The Complaint plausibly alleges violations of 42 U.S. Code §

1985(2)(Clause i) in that Plaintiff alleges that two judges and two lawyers, conspired to

deter the Plaintiff in his Court claims and jury trial and to retaliate against him for

initiating and continuing with his claims and therefore suffered injuries in his person

and property. ECK and SCHWARTZ would materially misrepresent the facts and omit

material facts, and then MCAULLIFE or JOHNSTONE would then intentionally

ignore evidence, ignore recognized standards of law, judicially intimidate the Plaintiff

and produce unfair and unconstitutionally bias legal decisions against the Plaintiff in an

effort to conceal or omit the material facts of JOHNSTONE’S ILLEGAL POLICY

under the “pretense” of law, to which they succeeded. Had JOHNSTONE and

MRAZIK not left a trail of fraud in the PUBLIC RECORD, Plaintiff would only be

left with suspicions and circumstantial evidence of a bias Court. This clear and

convincing direct evidence establishes direct links of; communications through normal
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channels, through several cases, private off-bench relationship, motive, a mutual

understanding, unity of purpose with knowledge of the material facts, between

JOHNSTONE, MRAZIK, COIE and Twitter, PRIOR to the Plaintiff even filing his

COMPLAINT. These same direct links naturally transfer to the Plaintiffs case as the

Court is already bias in favor of COIE and Twitter and SCHWARTZ attempts to use

the same POLICY in her initial defense of Twitter. More interestingly, because of the

established bias of the Court in favor of COIE and Twitter, the “to deter” factor is a

naturally built-in feature if the Court is in fact bias towards one party. Motive to retaliate

against the Plaintiff is when he submitted his [Default Motion, at 7] which challenged

the legality of SCHWARZ’S [Dismiss Motion, at 3] and indirectly and unknowingly

challenged the ILLEGAL POLICY. This created a motive for the conspirators to deter

and retaliate against him in an effort to shut him up, and keep him out of the Court.

119. Each Defendant’s conduct was intentional or showed an extreme

indifference to the rights of others.

120. Plaintiff attaches Memorandum of Law and Declaration in support

thereof.

121. Consent was sought, and denied by Defendants on record.

WHEREFORE, because the Order and Judgment (1) were based upon clear errors of

law or fact; (2) were determined by an objectively bias judge; (3) utilized an incorrect

legal standard; (4) misapplied the law to the relevant facts; (5) contain errors of
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judgment that are obvious and indisputable; (6) completely disregarded the material

facts of the case; (7) are against the weight of credible evidence; and (8) genuine issues

of material fact exist, Plaintiff, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court, in light

of these factors, Declare Void or Vacate, both the January 27, 2022, Order and January

28, 2022, Judgment.

Respectfully,

/s/_________________________

Plaintiff, Anonymously as Sensa Verogna

[email protected]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 24th day of February 2022, the foregoing document was
made upon the Defendants, through their attorneys of record to Dan L. Bagatell of
Perkins Coie LLP for Julie E. Schwartz, Esq., via e-mail to [email protected],
to Linda M. Smith of Morrison Mahoney LLP for Jonathan M. Eck, Esq., via e-mail to
[email protected].

By: /s/_________________________

Plaintiff, Anonymously as Sensa Verogna

[email protected]

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