Unit 3
Unit 3
Unit 3
Initially, the Indian Penal Code, of 1860 dealt with bribery and corruption in
situations involving public servants inside the Indian Justice System.
However, it was seen throughout the 1945s that the then-existing law was
insufficient to handle the exigencies, and an issue was felt to establish unique
laws with bribery and corruption, so the Prevention of Corruption Act, of
1947 was adopted impressively. The 1947 Act was later amended twice, first
by the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1952 and then by the Anti-Corruption
Laws (Amendment) Act of 1964, both of which were based on the
recommendations of the Santhanam Committee.
As a result, the 1947 Act served as a model for the 1988 Prevention of
Corruption Act, which went into effect on September 9, 1988. It was aimed at
making anti-corruption legislation more effective by broadening their
inclusion and strengthening the requirements to make the general resolution
more realistic and to eliminate corruption in government offices and public
sector organisations in India. The purpose of the Prevention of Corruption Act
aims to combat corruption in different government organisations and public
sector entities in India
Speedy Trial:
The Act stresses the need for a quick trial. Ideally, a corruption case should
be completed within two years. If it takes longer, the Special Judge must
provide reasons for the delay. Extensions, up to six months at a time, are
allowed, but the total trial duration should not typically exceed four years.
CO4 - Students shall also learn about the Prevention of Corruption
Act
When a public servant takes or gets illicit gratification for himself or another
person, the act is criminal. The term gratification has also been used
extensively, and it refers to a variety of things. Within itself, there are
instances and transactions. The term “gratification” is not just limited to
monetary or monetary-equivalent gratifications
The main distinction between Sections 8 and 9 is that Section 8 allows the
use of “personal influence” to secure favour or disfavour, whereas Section 9
contemplates the use of “corrupt or criminal methods.” Although Section 8
uses the term “corrupt,” it is not defined in the Prevention of Corruption Act.
According to Section 12, whoever aids any crime defined under Sections 7
to Section 11 regardless of whether the crime is committed as a result of the
aid shall be punished with imprisonment for a term that shall not be less than
three years but which may extend to seven years, as well as being subject to
a further five years in prison.
Section 13 of the Act enables the prosecution of a repeat offender and more
significantly, makes a public employee who:
Without evidence of demand, the mere possession and seizure of cash from a
subject of an inquiry do not constitute a violation of Section 7 or Section
13(1)(d) of this Act. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy vs The District Inspector of
Police (2015), the Supreme Court ruled that the use of corrupt or illegal
means or abusing one’s position as a public servant to obtain any valuable
item or financial advantage cannot be deemed to have been proven in the
absence of any proof of a demand for illegal gratification.
Is this Act applicable to private individuals as well
Thus, this Section 8 applies to anyone who has a connection to public workers
who are engaging in corrupt actions. Given our country’s V.I.P. mentality, this
is a critical provision. There are a lot of people who are relatives,
acquaintances, or friends of public workers who brag about their relationship
with such public servants and try to obtain illicit advantages in a variety of
areas. Furthermore, this regulation inhibits public officials from obtaining
illicit advantages by concealing their identities behind the identity of another
individual.
If a public employee who has been charged with an offence under Sections 8
or 9 aids and abets the actions of those other people, the act of aiding is
itself criminal under the Act, Whether the crime was done as a result of the
abetment, in this case, is irrelevant. The abettor will be subject to a fine in
addition to a sentence of imprisonment that must be at least six months long
but may not exceed five years.
As a result, the abettor will face the same form of penalty. It is a positive
feature when it comes to preventing people from assisting others to commit
crimes under the Act, as it provides the same level of penalty for the abettor
regardless of whether the offence aided is committed or not. Similarly,
Section 12 makes it a crime to aid and abet an offence described in Sections
7 and 11. Section 7 makes it a crime for a public officer to accept a reward
other than lawful pay in exchange for performing an official act.
Penalty: Imprisonment for a term not less than four years, which may extend
to ten years, and a fine.
Apart from this, Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, states
that “Whoever abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether or not
that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three
years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”
Also, in Section 14 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, habitual
offenders are punished with imprisonment for a term not less than 5 years,
which may extend to 10 years, and are liable to fine.
1. In the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment: An officer with the
rank of Inspector of Police or higher (CBI).
2. In metropolitan locations such as Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta: An
official with the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police or above.
3. Elsewhere: An officer with the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police
or higher is authorised.
2. The CBI and state ACBs investigate cases related to corruption under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The
CBI’s jurisdiction is the central government and Union Territories while the
state ACBs investigates cases within the states. States can refer cases to the
CBI.
5. All cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 are tried by
Special Judges who are appointed by the central or state government.
Section 24 of the POCA grants immunity to the bribe giver and states that the
bribe giver’s confession will not expose him to prosecution. The immunity
granted to bribe providers under this rule has been seen as a fundamental
weakness as well as contradictory with international norms.
1. The word “Prescribed” has been adopted to refer to rules that the
Central Government may create under the Act. As a result, we predict
the following rules: Rules requiring organisations and businesses to
develop internal policies and procedures to prevent their personnel
from giving undue benefit to public officials and rules governing the
prosecution of a public servant under the Act.
2. “Undue advantage” after this amendment is defined as any reward
other than legal payment. Similarly, the term “gratification” has been
defined to embrace all types of monetary gratification other than
economic gratification.
3. The phrase “Legal remuneration” under this amended Act has been
defined to cover all pay that a public worker is authorised by the
relevant body to receive.
4. Under Section 4(4), the courts no longer have to finish trials for Act-
related offences within two years, failing which the judges must record
the necessity for a time extension. A trial can now be prolonged for six
months at a time up to a maximum of four years.
5. The amended Section 8 lays out the consequences for anybody who
aids in the payment of a bribe or attempts to engage in corruption
alongside a public official. The Amendment Act exempts actions taken
under duress as long as the person who was forced to take them files a
complaint with the police or an investigative agency within seven days
after paying a bribe.
6. For business organisations, Section 9 now clearly addresses business
organisations and the people connected to them. The phrase “persons
affiliated with the commercial organisation” is broad enough to cover
workers and suppliers, while the word “commercial organisation” is
defined to include all types of corporate organisations.
7. For the penalty section under this Act, provides that where the
commercial organisation’s directors, officers in default, or a person with
power over the organisation has consented to the corrupt act breaking
the Act’s requirements, Section 10 now sets specific periods for
imprisonment and a fine.
8. When Sections 10 and 9 are amended together, it may be helpful to
keep in mind that the amended Act appears to punish both commercial
organisations for violating the Act by levying a fine and the officers in
charge of such commercial organisations under Section 10 by
subjecting them to criminal liability.
9. For provisions related to public servant corruption, it appears that the
Amendment Act has reduced the circumstances in which a public
employee may be charged with suspected criminal misbehaviour. Only
the misappropriation of property and unjust enrichment are included as
reasons for misconduct in the modified Section 13 of the Act, which is
assessed by disproportionate assets. In the past, Section 13 included
broad propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour or seek bribes as
grounds for criminal wrongdoing.
10. The Amendment Act seems to make it more challenging to bring
charges against government personnel. According to the change made
under Section 19, to prosecute a public employee under Sections 7, 11,
13, and 15 of the Act, a sanction must first be acquired from a body
that has the power to fire them. Second, an authorization request must
be made by the investigating authority such as a police officer or else
other complaints must be satisfied before the court may declare an
offence to have occurred.
11. Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2022)
12. Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict public
officials in bribery cases?
13. CASE DESCRIPTION
14.
15. On April 17th, 2000, Ms. Neeraj Dutta, a Lower Divisional Clerk at
the Delhi Vidyut Board demanded a bribe of ₹10,000 from Mr. Rajvit
Singh Sethi for the installation of an electricity metre at his shop. She
agreed to receive the amount the same day at Mr. Sethi’s shop
between 03.00 PM and 04.00 PM. Mr. Sethi registered an FIR against
Ms. Dutta that morning and got the police to undertake a sting
operation to catch Ms. Dutta in the act.
16. After successfully executing the sting operation and finding that
Ms. Dutta had in fact received the bribe, the police filed a charge
sheet. Ms. Dutta was charged under Sections 7 and 13 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA) which punishes public
officials for taking bribes or ‘illegal gratification’, and for misconduct.
Further, it prescribes a punishment of three to seven years
imprisonment and a fine.
17. Mr. Sethi, who made the complaint against Ms. Dutta, passed
away before the trial began. As a result, the case no longer had a
primary witness. Primary witnesses are crucial in proving the facts of a
case as they provide oral evidence of the events, which is considered
direct evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
18. In the past, the SC has held that in case the person to whom the
demand was made is either dead or unavailable for providing direct
evidence, the accused is acquitted. However, in this case, the Trial
Court relied on evidence based on other circumstances surrounding the
event such as the police statements to convict Ms. Dutta.
19. Ms. Dutta appealed the Trial Court’s decision at the Delhi High
Court. She stated that circumstantial evidence was not enough to
convict her under the PCA. The Delhi HC however, upheld the decision
of the Trial Court to convict her on April 2nd, 2009. A few days later, on
April 15th, 2009, Ms. Dutt, appealed this decision at the Supreme
Court.
20. At the SC, a 2-Judge Bench comprising Justices R.
Banumathi and Subhash Reddy heard her appeal. They examined
previous judgments relying on circumstantial evidence when the
primary evidence of the complainant is unavailable. In P.
Satyanarayana Murthy v District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra
Pradesh, (2015) the court held that relying on circumstantial evidence,
was not permissible under the law. The Bench viewed that this
conflicted with the SC’s previous judgements in B. Jayaraj v State of
Andhra Pradesh (2014) and M. Narsinga Rao v State of A.P. (2001).
21. The Bench concluded that there was a conflict in these decisions
on the nature and quality of proof necessary to convict a person under
the PCA when the primary evidence of the complainant is unavailable.
Seeing that a significant question of law was raised in the case, the
Bench referred it to a 5-Judge Constitution Bench.
22. The Constitution Bench comprising Justices Abdul Nazeer, B. R.
Gavai, A. S. Bopanna, V. Ramasubramanian and B. V.
Nagarathna heard the matter. The primary question before them was
whether a public official could be held guilty for the crime of
demanding a bribe or an illegal gratification under Sections 7 and 13 of
the PCA based on circumstantial evidence. The Bench also had to
decide whether the three decisions of the SC in P.Satyanarayana
Murthy (2015), B. Jayaraj (2014) and M. Narsinga Rao (2001) were in
conflict with each other.
23. The Bench unanimously held that a person could be convicted
based on circumstantial evidence for the crime of demanding a bribe or
illegal gratification under the PCA, 1988. In the Judgment delivered by
Justice Nagarathna, the Bench also clarified that the three judgments
were not in conflict with each other.
24. On the question of conflict in the judgments of P. Satyanarayana
Murthy, B. Jayaraj and M. Narsinga Rao, the Bench held that the facts
in each case were slightly different from each other which resulted in
differing decisions.
25. Justice Nagarathna wrote that Courts have the discretion to
make ‘presumptions’ of facts based on the evidence available when
considering a demand for a bribe, as long as this presumption is not
directly rebutted. Additionally, the Bench also stated that the death of
a complainant does not directly result in an acquittal of the accused.
26. This Judgment has significantly reduced the high degree of proof
that was previously required to convict an official for seeking illegal
gratification.