The Two-Headed Grand Strategy:

Vietnamese Foreign Policy since Doi Moi

Alexander L Vuving
Cornell University

[email protected]

Paper to be presented at the conference

“Vietnam Update 2004: Strategic and Foreign Relations”
Singapore, 25-26 November 2004

- This is a draft document prepared for circulation to fellow conference participants. The
arguments are suitably provisional, and I look forward to discussion -

Submission date: 3 October 2004

Two-Headed Grand Strategy 2

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to offer a way to understand Vietnamese foreign policy during

the reform process known as doi moi, which began in late 1986 and still continues to the

present day. To this end, I will endeavor to answer two central questions: What has governed

the conduct of Vietnamese foreign policy in the period? How has it affected Vietnam’s

geopolitical orientation and foreign relations?

To analyze foreign affairs and think about foreign policy is also to draw upon a

certain image of foreign policy.1 In this study, foreign policy is imagined as a complex of

actions. These actions are interoriented and intermeshed through a number of spheres, of

which the most important are those of communications and power. The producer of foreign

policy can be seen as a collective actor with a social mind. The collective nature of this actor

implies that internal conflict is inherent in it, that its form and membership are subject to

change, while its actorness is permanently under negotiation through power processes. The

mind’s social character suggests that it operates through communications, which are shaped

primarily by ideologies, and is accessible through interpretation.2

This study is thus an investigation into two interrelated fields, the ideological and the

power settings, of Vietnamese foreign policymaking. I will examine the major discourses

and power games that have made Vietnamese foreign policy since doi moi. Crucial to the

making of foreign policy is grand strategy. Grand strategy is a process by which long-term,

overriding, and central objectives are defined and related to the major resources for and

1
For a classical discussion, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999). My image of foreign policy is different from but
cuts across Allison’s three conceptual lenses—the rational actor, the organizational behavior, and the
governmental politics models.
2
“Ideology” is here broadly understood as “a set of closely-related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes,
characteristic of a group or community.” See John Plamenatz, Ideology (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 15.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 3

principal methods of achieving those objectives.3 For a polity, this process involves the

answering of four basic questions. The first question addresses the nature of the world and

its answer refers to policymakers’ world outlook. The second question addresses the polity’s

identity while its answer refers to how policymakers perceive the threat to their polity’s

survival. The third question addresses the polity’s ambitions and its answer refers to the

standing in the world policymakers desire for their polity. Finally, the fourth question

addresses the ways and means of achieving the goals and objectives defined in the answers

to the second and third questions. Geopolitically, this specifies the roles other players in the

world should play in the overall plan thus completed and the strategies facing these players.

I will proceed in four steps. First, I will delineate the grand strategies that have

prevailed within the Vietnamese policymaking circles. Then I analyze the debates over

fundamental issues of Vietnamese foreign policy as well as the power struggles among

Vietnamese policymakers since the dawn of doi moi. In the next step, I show how a

distinctive blend of and division of labor among the prevailing grand strategies has framed

Vietnam’s geopolitical orientation and determined its policy toward major foreign co-players.

In the conclusion, I will assess the efficiency of Vietnamese foreign policy, the dilemma of

its making, and the prospects of its change.

Marxist-Leninist world outlook and the grand strategy of anti-imperialism

From its very inception the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) has based its theory of world

politics on two central theses. The first is Marx’s doctrine of “class struggle,” which asserts

3
This definition is adapted from John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of
Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. viii (Strategy is
“the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources”) and
Gregory G. Copley, “Re-visiting the Discipline of Grand Strategy,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy
28, no. 2 (May 2000), pp. 2-3 (Grand strategy refers to “the process of defining a nation’s goals, the structural
elements needed in the attainment of those goals, and the principal methods of achieving those goals”).
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 4

that class struggle is the driving force of history and mankind’s history therefore progresses

through five “socioeconomic formations,” each of which is characterized by a distinctive

form of class struggle—from primitive communism to slavery, feudalism, capitalism and

ultimately to socialism or communism, when class struggle ceases to exist.4 The second core

assumption of the VCP’s worldview is Lenin’s dictum of “imperialism as the highest stage

of capitalism.” This thesis on wars and revolutions in capitalism is considered by Leninists a

key supplement to Marx’s vision of history. According to Lenin capitalism in its highest

stage becomes “state monopoly capitalism” and takes the form of imperialism, which is the

main source of war in this historical era, and proletarian revolution is the only way to

preserve peace in the world.5 Marxist-Leninists then perceive the historical era as the world-

wide struggle between the “progressive” forces of socialism and the “reactionary” system of

capitalism/imperialism. This class struggle is constantly unfolding not only within each

country but also on the international plane.

These beliefs provided the logical grounds for the division of the world into “two

camps”—one is socialist and democratic, headed by the Soviet Union, the other capitalist

and imperialist, led by the United States—a Soviet doctrine which the VCP promptly

subscribed to in 1948, at the dawn of the Cold War, and embraced throughout the conflict.6

In line with Marxist-Leninist thinking, Vietnamese communist leaders see the key to

understand world politics in identifying its fundamental contradictions. A formula of four

fundamental contradictions in world politics remain essentially unchanged from the

inception of the VCP. First among them is the contradiction between the socialist countries

and the capitalist system. The other contradictions are between the bourgeoisie and the

4
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977
[1848]).
5
V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: a popular outline (New York: International
Publishers, 1977 [1916]).
6
Gareth Porter, “Transformation of Vietnam’s World-view: From Two Camps to Interdependence,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia 12, no. 1 (June 1990): 1-19, here pp. 2-3.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 5

proletariat, between imperialism and colonial and dependent states, and among imperialist

countries themselves.7

During the Cold War a third element, whose origins traced back to the Soviet Union,

was added to this worldview. It says that the contradiction between socialism and

imperialism must be solved by a “who will defeat whom” struggle that is carried on between

the revolutionary forces of the world and imperialism during the transitional period from

capitalism to socialism. The world revolutionary forces, which from 1970 was called

“currents,” were identified as including three components, namely the world socialist system,

the communist and working-class movement in the capitalist countries and the national

liberation movement.

The motive behind Vietnam’s subscription to the concepts of the world revolutionary

forces and the three revolutionary currents lay rather in the VCP’s long-term ambitions than

in some opportunist calculation. Thus Hanoi agreed with Moscow that the world socialist

system was the decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle, but at the same time it

emphasized the role of the national liberation movements in the Third World at the expense

of the workers’ and democratic movements in the capitalist countries. In this vision of the

world Vietnam would play a crucial role—it would be both the “advance post” (tien don) of

socialism in Southeast Asia and the “spearhead” (mui nhon) of the national liberation

movements in the world.8

Shaped by the VCP’s own struggle for power under the Cold War circumstances but

originated from earlier teachings of Marxism-Leninism, a system of thought has emerged to

guide Vietnamese foreign policy. In this system of thought, worldview, national self-image

and ambition reinforce each other, making the whole system a self-enforcing one. This

7
Ibid.
8
See Eero Palmujoki, Vietnam and the World: Marxist-Leninist Doctrine and the Changes in International
Relations, 1975-93 (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 45-50, where the author compares the Vietnamese, Soviet,
and Chinese worldviews and highlights the Vietnamese distinctions; and Porter, “Transformation of Vietnam’s
World-view,” pp. 2-3.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 6

ideology remained stable and coherent throughout four decades from the late 1940s to the

late 1980s despite dramatic changes in the international environment.9

Yet the loss of communist party power in a series of “brother countries” in 1989

proves to have been a defining date. Many Vietnamese communists saw in these events

schemes and acts of imperialist and capitalist forces to eliminate socialism. These events

thus did nothing but corroborate Marxist-Leninist worldview in the eyes of its adherents. At

the Seventh Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in August 1989, VCP Secretary-General

Nguyen Van Linh reaffirmed the “two camps, four contradictions” theory, and claimed that

the denial of these old teachings “has led certain persons to believe mistakenly that the

essence of imperialism has changed.” He stated: “In fact, as long as imperialism exists and

as long as the socialist revolution has not yet achieved victory on a world scale, the Leninist

theses mentioned above have still kept their original value.” 10 Echoing Linh, Defense

Minister Le Duc Anh expressed alarm at a “peaceful evolution strategy,” which were

carrying out by “imperialism and international reactionary forces” to eliminate socialism

from the world. 11 Following the plenum, the Party theoretical journal addressed U.S.

ambitions for East Asian hegemony for the first time since the Sixth Congress (1986), in a

concerted act with the military newspaper and the monthly military journal to blame U.S.

imperialism and capitalist forces.12

With the Party secretary-general and the defense minister as its main promoters, a

new-old grand strategy of anti-imperialism was formulated. This strategy is based on the
9
The idea of stability in Vietnamese foreign policy ideology despite changes in the international environment
stems from Palmujoki, Vietnam and the World, p. 40.
10
Nguyen Van Linh, “Phat bieu cua dong chi Tong Bi thu Nguyen Van Linh be mac Hoi nghi 7 cua
BCHTUD” [Speech by Comrade Secretary General Nguyen Van Linh at the Closure of the 7th Plenum of the
Party Central Committee] Tap chi Cong san, no. 9 (September 1989): 5-12, quotations p. 6.
11
Porter, “Transformation of Vietnam’s World-view,” p. 14, quotations from Le Duc Anh, “Excerpt from a
speech by Defense Minister Le Duc Anh,” September 6, 1989, on Radio Hanoi Domestic Service, September 7,
1989, in FBIS-EAS-89-173, September 8, 1989, p. 59.
12
Porter, “Transformation of Vietnam’s World-view,” p. 14. Interestingly, the party journal’s article argued not
from the points of view of “two camps, four contradictions” or class struggle but from a nationalist perspective
favoring a “multipolar world.” See Ho Bat Khuat, “Chau A-Thai Binh Duong trong ky vong cua chinh quyen
Bu-so” [Asia-Pacific in the Expectation of the Bush Administration], Tap chi Cong san, no. 9 (September
1989): 80-84.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 7

orthodox Marxist-Leninist teachings of class struggle as the motor of history and

imperialism as the essence of capitalism. It views the world through the lenses of the “who

will defeat whom” struggle between the forces of “national independence and socialism” and

“imperialism/capitalism.” Accordingly, the long-term and basic objective of the Vietnamese

communists in the era following the collapse of the world socialist system is to protect

socialism and oppose imperialism on a world scale. Because the true threat is perceived as

coming from imperialism’s attempts to eliminate socialism, the focus of national security is

put on the defense against “peaceful evolution.”13 As the identification of allies and enemies

(phan biet ban thu) is a basic principle of Vietnamese foreign policymaking,14 Vietnam must

now regard China, the sole remaining socialist great power, its strategic ally, and the United

States, the leading capitalist world power, its chief enemy.15

“New world outlook” and the grand strategy of modernization

In the 1980s a new worldview gradually emerged within the Vietnamese leadership. This

change was forced by the economic impasse Vietnam was facing then, inspired by the

economic success of the newly industrializing countries in the Asia-Pacific region,

influenced by the Gorbachevian “new thinking” in the Soviet Union, but probably also by

the reform line of Deng Xiaoping in China, and propelled by some leaders of the Vietnamese

13
The first formulations of this grand strategy can be found in Linh, “Speech at the 7th Plenum” and Anh,
“Excerpt from a Speech.” See former First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, Hoi uc va Suy nghi
[Memoirs and Reflections], privately circulated, 2003, passim for pointed formulations of Vietnam’s
worldview and objective by Linh and Anh. Note the crucial difference between Vietnam’s objective of
protecting socialism on a world scale and China’s purpose of safeguarding its own socialist regime in its own
country, which was also pointed out by Chinese ambassador to Vietnam vis-à-vis a Vietnamese Foreign
Ministry official in 1990, cited in ibid., p. 19. I am indebted to Vu Quang Viet for providing me with a copy of
Co’s memoirs.
14
Palmujoki, Vietnam and the World, pp. 22-28.
15
Notably, this identification of China as the ally and America as the enemy was clearly expressed by Nguyen
Van Linh and Le Duc Anh in various oral communications among Vietnamese policymakers. See Co, Memoirs,
pp. 33, 36, 49, 51, 53.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 8

foreign policy elite, notably Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach.16 Unlike the established

worldview, the new Vietnamese world outlook is not canonized and standardized by the state.

It is therefore far from a single set of ideas but remains a cluster of belief systems that bear

family resemblances.

A coherent view of the world can, however, be distilled from the intersections and

overlapping of these systems of belief. It is composed of two dimensions, one is economic,

the other geopolitical. In the economic dimension, it perceives the world as no longer

divided into two antagonistic zones but rather unified into a single world market, whose

central feature is the interdependence among its parts and whose epochal trends are

globalization and regional integration. Geopolitically, it refuses to focus on the world-wide

struggle between socialism and imperialism, which is primarily driven by class interests and

ideological confrontation, and considers instead national interests and the interrelationships

among the great powers as the decisive factors of world politics. In this view, the world is an

arena where the nations compete on the basis of their strength and prosperity. The long-term

and basic aspiration of the Vietnamese is therefore to become a prosperous and strong nation.

From the above-mentioned vantage point, a nation’s place in the world is defined

rather regionally than ideologically and seen in the contexts of the global economy as well as

great power relations. Consequently, Vietnam’s objective in the current period is to

modernize, industrialize, and to catch up with the more developed countries in its

neighboring region. In order to achieve this goal it must integrate in the region and the world

economy, take advantage of the financial-technological world centers (the United States,

16
Porter, “Transformation of Vietnam’s World-view”; Palmujoki, Vietnam and the World, pp. 173-215. Both
Porter and Palmujoki credit the Soviet Union with being the ideational source of the Vietnamese “new
outlook.” In fact, Thach’s program of “all for peace, national independence, and development” shows striking
similarities to Deng Xiaoping’s readjustment of Chinese foreign policy in the early 1980s. Compare, e.g., Deng
Xiaoping, “Safeguard World Peace and Ensure Domestic Development,” 29 May 1984; “Peace and
Development Are the Two Outstanding Issues in the World Today,” 4 March 1985, in Deng, Fundamental
Issues in Present-Day China (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987): 46-7; 97-9. Later on, the new Vietnamese world
outlook also has its Western sources of ideas.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 9

Japan, and Western Europe), and secure a balanced position between the great powers

(notably China and America) through both bilateral and multilateral regimes.

Another element of this grand strategy is its perception of threat. The danger of

“lagging behind” other countries is perceived to be the central threat to the nation’s survival.

National security must therefore be focused on the struggle against economic

underdevelopment.17

Elements of Vietnam’s “new world outlook” and its related grand strategy have been

scattered in numerous writings by policymakers and scholars since the late 1980s. The most

systematic and thorough formulation of the new worldview can be found in Nguyen Co

Thach’s book The World in the Past Fifty Years (1945-1995) and the World in the Coming

Twenty-five Years (1995-2020), which was published shortly prior to its author’s death in

1998.18 Thach was the architect of Vietnam’s new foreign policy orientation in the late

1980s. 19 In fact, he was a driving force behind the “renovation” (doi moi) of both

Vietnamese foreign and economic policies. As early as the mid-1980s he was concerned

with economic issues and commissioned by the Politburo to study price and monetary policy.

The key decision that marked a turning point in the late 1980s in Vietnam’s reform process,

namely the change from a bureaucratic-set price regime to a market-determined one, was

brought about in the first place by the efforts of Thach and Do Muoi, then prime minister,

against vehement opposition from the secretary-general, Nguyen Van Linh.20

17
This is pointedly expressed in Vo Van Kiet, “Yeu cau buc bach va kha nang buoc vao mot thoi ky moi cua su
phat trien kinh te-xa hoi” [The Pressing Requirement and the Possibility of Entering a New Era of the Socio-
economic Development], Tap chi Cong san, no. 1 (January 1994): 14-17, here pp. 16-17.
18
Nguyen Co Thach, The gioi trong 50 nam qua (1945-1995) va the gioi trong 25 nam toi (1995-2020) [The
World in the Past Fifty Years (1945-1995) and the World in the Coming Twenty-five Years (1995-2020)]
(Hanoi: Chinh tri Quoc gia, 1998). I thank Vu Quang Viet for giving me a copy of this closely distributed book.
19
See the memoirs in the collected volume Nha ngoai giao Nguyen Co Thach [The Diplomat Nguyen Co
Thach] (Hanoi: Chinh tri Quoc gia, 2003), of former First Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem, pp. 77-83;
former Assistant to the Foreign Minister Nguyen Tuan Lieu, pp. 112-118; former Ambassador Tran Tam Giap,
pp. 172-175; and Thach’s adviser Vu Quang Viet, pp. 262-273.
20
Vu Quang Viet, personal communication, 25 July 2004.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 10

In his book, Thach implicitly refuted Marxist-Leninist world vision in its entirety.

For him, it is not class struggles but technological revolutions in the economic life that are

the motors of history.21 Instead of approaching history in the standard Marxist way, thusly

positing Vietnam in the transition from capitalism to socialism, he described history of

mankind as undergone first the agricultural revolution, than two industrial revolutions, and

now reaching a new stage, the scientific-technological or the information revolution. In

Thach’s view, this last revolution has led to the formation of new relations of production

which are based on a very high level of productive forces. The result was a society that,

owing to its knowledge-based economy, qualitatively differed from the industrial society.

Thus, mankind was entering a new epoch, the “information age,” which had began in the

early 1980s and would cause profound changes in international relations.22 The end of the

Cold War was in Thach’s eyes a necessary consequence of the advent of the scientific-

technological revolution, because this revolution had led to an enormous growth of the

world’s productive forces, which, in turn, pushed forward the trends of internationalization

and globalization of world economy.23 Under these circumstances, the two superpowers—

the United States and the Soviet Union—realized that they would lose in economic

competition with West Europe and Japan. They therefore changed their grand strategies to

focus on an “economic race” rather than an arms race. For Thach, the economic challenge of

West Europe and Japan was the “top strategic challenge” for the United States.24 Thach

characterized the post-Cold War era with a détente in great power relations, a ”new

international division of labor” following from the interdependence of national economies,

and an increase of globalization and regional integration. While interdependence was gaining

21
Interestingly, here Thach appears more consistent in materialism than Marx himself. I thank Vu Quang Viet
and Brantly Womack for pointing me to a common ground of Marx’s and Thach’s thoughts.
22
Thach, World in the Past Fifty Years, pp. 7-8, 22, 86-88, 94-97, 99-100. This theoretical fundament of
Thach’s worldview was delivered by Alvin Toffler’s The Third Way.
23
Ibid., pp. 22-36, especially pp. 30-31.
24
Ibid., pp. 45-65, especially pp. 59-60. Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of Great Powers played a
significant role in impressing Thach, or rather reinforcing his realization, that military might is ultimately based
on economic strength.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 11

more and more momentum in this world, the biggest global contradiction remained the gap

between rich and poor.25 Thus, the grand strategic conflicts were no longer of military nature

but taking place in the economic field. As a result, “mankind will be emancipated from

world wars and enjoy a durable peace. The world is shifting step by step from the arms race

to the economic race.”26 In other words, the fate of the nations would be determined by the

economic race rather than militarily.27

Good communist as he was, Thach saw life in terms of struggle (dau tranh).28 Yet it

is not class struggle but human struggle in general and national struggle on the international

plane that make a permanent underlying theme throughout his book. For Thach, world

politics is an arena of struggles and cooperations among nations, not of class struggles. He

wrote:

The salient feature of international relations in the past fifty years is that national

interests increasingly became the decisive factors. The countries, particularly the big

powers (cac nuoc lon), all determined their foreign policy strategies on the basis of the

national interest.29

This also meant that Vietnam should define its national goals in terms of its own national, as

opposed to international or class, interest. Thach therefore believed that the primary

objective of the Vietnamese was to develop their country economically, to modernize it, not

to protect socialism or oppose imperialism and capitalism. He pointed out that in order to

achieve that goal Vietnam should capitalize its human resources and become an integral part

25
Ibid., pp. 30-31, 93-94.
26
Ibid., p. 96.
27
Ibid., p. 106.
28
Dau tranh is a favorable term in his vocabulary (Vu Quang Viet, personal communication, November 2001).
29
Thach, World in the Past Fifty Years, p. 65.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 12

of the regional and the world economy. In sum, it should occupy an “optimal position” in the

international division of labor, not a frontline in the crusade against imperialism.

Ideological wrestling, power struggle, and policy blend

The Sixth Party Congress, which announced the Vietnamese reform (doi moi) in December

1986, created an atmosphere of renovation in all fields of political life. Shortly after the

congress debates on fundamental issues of foreign policy were brought onto the pages of the

Party theoretical journal. In the May 1987 issue of this journal, an article by Phan Doan Nam,

an assistant to Thach in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made a plea for renovation of

foreign policy thinking. The article claimed that beginning in the early 1970s, both world

politics and economics had undergone profound changes. In world politics, it asserted, “the

time in which imperialism is relying on its military preponderance to threaten has gone

forever.” The class struggle on the international plane had changed its form from military

confrontation into peaceful emulation and competition in the economic field. Underlying the

dramatic changes in social life was the second scientific-technological revolution, which had

transformed relations between man and nature as well as international relations and the

world economy. The world economy was now marked by the processes of

internationalization, integration, and interdependence, which were of objective nature and

therefore law-like phenomena. These new characteristics of the world required, the article

argued, new thinking and new way of action in foreign policy. In this spirit, the article

outlined a new concept of national security, which no longer focused on the military aspect

alone but tried to be comprehensive while making the economic development its priority.

The article also revised the old concept of national independence, arguing that independence
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 13

must be brought in keeping with interdependence, because “it is this interdependence that

renders international relations equitable.”30

Nam’s bold article, which certainly reflected Thach’s thoughts as well, was, however,

preceded by a review of Lenin’s Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, which

reaffirmed the “unchanged essence of imperialism.”31 Nonetheless, all the other articles

relating to international relations that appeared in the Party theoretical journal in 1987

seemed to echo the new characterization of the world as depicted in Nam’s.

In May 1988, the Politburo secretly passed Resolution 13, which stressed a

“diversified and multilateral” foreign policy orientation. In Gareth Porter’s words, “it was a

bold, sweeping new analysis of the dynamics of global politics and economics that bore the

unmistakeable mark of Nguyen Co Thach’s influence.”32 The resolution was not made

public, but its ideological underpinnings were revealed three months in advance in an article

by the same Thach assistant. In this article, Nam repeated the characterization of the world

as described in his 1987 piece, highlighting the trend of interdependence and the need for

cooperation across ideological lines in international relations. What was new in the 1988

article was its overt disapproval of the “two camps, four contradictions” theory and its

criticism of the Party’s tendency to “force all international events into those boilerplate

models.” Moreover, it maintained that it would be a fatal error if the friend-foe distinction of

the class struggle within a country was applied to international relations.33 Promptly, this

new thinking, which emanated from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was attacked by

Defense Minister Le Duc Anh in an article, which emphasized two points. First,

“safeguarding the Fatherland is the strategic task of the entire Party and people, not

30
Doan Nam, “Ket hop suc manh dan toc voi suc manh thoi dai trong giai doan cach mang moi” [Combining
the Strengths of the Nation and the Epoch in the Revolution’s New Period], Tap chi Cong san, no. 5 (May
1987): 53-57, quotations p. 54 and p. 55.
31
Bui Ngoc Chuong, “Ban chat, dac diem va dia vi lich su cua chu nghia de quoc” [The Essence, Characteristic,
and Historical Status of Imperialism], Tap chi Cong san, no. 3 (March 1987): 99-106.
32
Porter, “Transformation of Vietnam’s World-view,” pp. 10-11.
33
Phan Doan Nam, “Mot vai suy nghi ve doi moi tu duy doi ngoai” [Some Reflections on the Renovation of
Thinking on Foreign Affairs], Tap chi Cong san, no. 2 (February 1988): 50-54, 79; quotations p. 51.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 14

something reserved for the armed forces alone.” Second, imperialism, headed by the United

States, has not given up its aim to eliminate socialism, thus, one cannot exclude the

possibility of full-scale wars of aggression caused by imperialist forces from one’s national

security calculations.34

Anh’s article, which appeared just before the adoption of Resolution 13, indicates

that there remained considerable disagreement on fundamental ideological issues within the

Vietnamese leadership despite the approval of readjustments in foreign policy orientation by

the resolution. Nonetheless, the “new world outlook” was able to maintain the upper hand

until the regime changes in Eastern Europe. In January 1988, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap wrote

an article in the Party theoretical journal, defining economic and technological backwardness

as a serious threat to the nation and set out the national goal of making the people rich and

the country strong.35 In August, an article by Nguyen Co Thach outlining the core ideas of

the grand strategy of modernization appeared in the same journal. Its title was All for Peace,

National Independence and Development.36

But the year of 1989 also marked the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe and

the Tiananmen massacre in China. Fierce debates flared up in the Vietnamese policymaking

circles over what was the real cause of the collapse of these socialist regimes and what was

to be done in order to prevent such development in Vietnam. One position saw in the East

European events clear evidences of imperialism’s attempts to erase socialism from the world

and concluded that ideological perseverance was the most urgent requirement of the

situation.37 Another position identified errors of “subjectivism and voluntarism” by Party

leaders as well as their failure in expanding cooperation with the capitalist countries as

34
Le Duc Anh, “Nang cao canh giac, cung co quoc phong va an ninh cua dat nuoc” [Enhancing Vigilance,
Reinforcing National Defense and Security], Tap chi Cong san, no. 4 (April 1988): 5-10.
35
Vo Nguyen Giap, “De cho khoa hoc ky thuat that su tro thanh dong luc phat trien kinh te-xa hoi” [For
Science and Technology to Really Become the Motive Force of Socio-economic Developments], Tap chi Cong
san, no. 1 (January 1989): 7-15.
36
Nguyen Co Thach, “Tat ca vi hoa binh, doc lap dan toc va phat trien” [All for Peace, National Independence
and Development], Tap chi Cong san, no. 8 (August 1989): 1-8.
37
E.g., Linh, “Speech at the 7th Plenum;” Anh, “Excerpt from a Speech.”
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 15

causes. The lessons this position drew from the collapse of socialism in Europe were that the

current model of socialism was irrational, reform was necessary, democracy was a pressing

requirement, and that opening up to the world outside conformed to the tide of the time.38 It

took the Party then seven months to restore order among its ranks. At the Eighth Plenum in

March 1990, the Central Committee reached an agreement on speeding up reforms while

determining “political stability” as the chief priority. Moreover, it expelled Politburo

member Tran Xuan Bach, the leading advocate of political pluralism, from the leadership.39

The plenum thus produced at once a consensus and a warning shot, which would set the

terms for public debates on ideological issues in many years thereafter.

The Seventh Party Congress in June 1991 did nothing but consolidate the tendency

set out in the Sixth (March 1989), Seventh (August 1989) and Eighth Plena. It was a triumph

of those who emphasized safeguarding socialism against imperialism over those who

considered modernization and opening up to the world a priority. Gen. Giap, a modernizer

who was receiving wide support across ideological lines, was outmaneuvered by Gen. Anh, a

leading anti-imperialist. The loudest opponents of Bach in the Eighth Plenum—Dao Duy

Tung, Nguyen Duc Binh, Nguyen Ha Phan, and Nong Duc Manh—were all appointed

members of the Politburo or the Secretariat.40 However, parallel to this tendency was also a

compromise, for demands for reform and opening up, especially from the populace, were

pressing. This is reflected in the ruling troika emerged from the congress. Gen. Anh received

the post of State President. Vo Van Kiet, a leading modernizer, became Prime Minister. And

38
E.g., Speech by Tran Xuan Bach (to Union of Vietnam Scientific and Technological Associations), 13
December 1989, in Hanoi Radio Domestic Service, 5 January 1990 , FBIS-EAS-90-005, 8 January 1990, p. 67-
68; Speech by Vo Chi Cong, 15 December 89, in Vietnam News Agency, 19 December 1989, FBIS-EAS-89-
243, 20 December 1989, pp. 67-68; Vu Hien, “Thu thach moi doi voi chu nghia xa hoi” [New Trial for
Socialism], Tap chi Cong san, no. 1 (January 1990): 81-84.
39
See “Hoi nghi lan thu tam Ban chap hanh Trung uong Dang Cong san Viet Nam (khoa VI)” [The Eighth
Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist Party], Tap chi Cong san, no. 4 (April
1990): 1-4.
40
Bui Tin, Hoa Xuyen Tuyet (Irvine, Cal.: Nhan Quyen, 1991), p, 150.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 16

Do Muoi, who was eclectic regarding both grand strategies, replaced Linh as the Party’s new

Secretary-General.

Also, the directives for Vietnamese foreign policy endorsed by this congress was a

blend of the two grand strategies. Thus, on the one hand, the VCP declared that “Vietnam

wishes to befriend all countries in the world community.” On the other, however, it

reaffirmed the four fundamental contradictions and stated that “the contradiction between

socialism and capitalism are unfolding fiercely.”41 This policy blend was a result of the

combination of “firmness on principles with tactical flexibility.”42 It thereby assigned each

of the two grand strategies a different status—anti-imperialism was to guard the principles

while modernization to supply the tactics. Some kind of division of labor was also arranged

among the ruling troika. Following the Seventh Congress, President Anh the anti-imperialist

oversaw defense, foreign, and interior affairs, while Premier Kiet the modernizer covered the

economic field, and Secretary-General Muoi the “ideologically fleet of foot”43 played the

moderator role between the two positions.

Because the Seventh Congress was held in a turbulent time, just a few months before

the disintegration of the USSR, a mid-term party conference was scheduled to serve as an

additional congress. During the time of preparation for this conference, in 1993, a series of

articles with the common theme of opposing “peaceful evolution” was launched in the Party

theoretical journal. 44 This indicates that opposing peaceful evolution would be the

41
Communist Party of Vietnam, 7th National Congress: Documents (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishers,
1991). First quotation in the Report on the Documents of the 7th Congress, p. 43; second quotation in the
Political Program for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism, p. 49.
42
Party Secretary in charge of foreign affairs Hong Ha, “Tinh hinh the gioi va chinh sach doi ngoai cua ta”
[World Situation and Our Foreign Policy], Tap chi Cong san, no. 12 (December 1992): 10-12.
43
Kent Bolton, “Domestic Sources of Vietnam’s Foreign Policy,” in Carlyle Thayer and Ramses Amer, eds.,
Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 170-201, here fn. 23, p. 197.
For a discussion of Muoi’s role and the troika’s dynamics, see ibid., pp. 176, 182.
44
See Tran Ba Khoa, “Canh giac voi am muu dien bien hoa binh cua cac the luc thu dich” [Vigilant over the
Hostile Forces’ Peaceful Evolution Scheme], Tap chi Cong san, no. 1 (January 1993): 18-20; Le Xuan Luu,
“Su pha hoai ve tu tuong cua cac the luc phan dong trong chien luoc ‘dien bien hoa binh’” [The Ideological
Sabotage of the Hostile Forces in the “Peaceful Evolution” Strategy], Tap chi Cong san, no. 4 (April 1993): 19-
22; Bui Phan Ky, “May suy nghi ve chien luoc quoc phong trong boi canh quoc te moi” [Some Reflections on
Defense Strategy in the New International Context], Tap chi Cong san, no. 5 (May 1993): 58-60, 62; Bui Phan
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 17

superweapon of the anti-imperialists at the mid-term conference. But the modernizers also

had their trump card. On the one hand, they argued that “lagging behind” other countries was

the largest threat to the nation and the only way to remove the menace was to industrialize

and modernize. On the other, they showed that there existed necessary conditions for

entering an era of industrialization and modernization.45 Vietnam’s situation at that time

seemed to support both camps. The economy was growing with high rates, hyperinflation

was substantially dampened, and foreign investment poured into the country. But at the same

time, a decades-long U.S. embargo was still in effect, and America was supporting regime

opposition with its pressure for the respect of human rights and religious freedom. Under

these circumstances, the party conference was concluded with an ironic compromise. It

announced that Vietnam was entering a new era and determined that industrialization and

modernization was the overall objective of the country in this new era. However, the anti-

imperialists were able to relativize the threat of “lagging-behind.” While the draft Political

Report presented at the Sixth Plenum in November 1993 still referred to lagging-behind as a

“big challenge” and failed to mention peaceful evolution, the final Political Report adopted

at the Mid-term Conference in January 1994 underlined that lagging-behind and deviation

from socialism, corruption, as well as peaceful evolution were equally dangerous. 46

Furthermore, on the eve of the conference, two archanti-imperialists—the Army’s political

chief Le Kha Phieu and head of the CC Economics Department Nguyen Ha Phan—were

Ky, “Ve nhiem vu quoc phong-an ninh hien nay” [On the Defense-Security Task at Present], Tap chi Cong san,
no. 9 (September 1993): 25-27; Doan Khue, “Quan triet quan diem quoc phong toan dan, tang cuong quan ly
nha nuoc ve quoc phong” [Fully Comprehending the All-People Defense Concept, Intensifying State Control of
Defense], Tap chi Cong san, no. 12 (December 1993): 8-10; Duong Thong, “Mot nhiem vu quan trong trong
cuoc dau tranh chong ‘dien bien hoa binh’” [An Important Task in the Struggle Against “Peaceful Evolution”],
Tap chi Cong san, no. 12 (December 1993): 23-25.
45
See Kiet, “Pressing Requirement.”
46
Do Muoi, “Phat huy thanh tuu to lon cua cong cuoc doi moi, tiep tuc dua su nghiep cach mang nuoc ta vung
buoc tien len” [Bringing into Full Play the Large Achievement of the Renovation, Further Advancing Our
Country’s Revolutionary Cause], Tap chi Cong san, no. 1 (January 1994): 4-13; “Bao cao chinh tri cua Ban
chap hanh Trung uong Dang tai Hoi nghi dai bieu toan quoc giua nhiem ky cua Dang” [Political Report of the
Party Central Committee at the Mid-term National Conference of the Party], Tap chi Cong san, no. 2 (February
1994): 7-26.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 18

elected to the all-powerful Politburo, while only one modernizer—Foreign Minister Nguyen

Manh Cam—was so.

The process of preparing for the Eighth Party Congress witnessed a new round of

dispute between anti-imperialists and modernizers. In August 1995, Premier Kiet prepared a

secret memorandum for consideration by the Politburo, in which he provided a new analysis

of the “complexion of the world today” and suggested fundamental changes in Vietnam’s

grand strategy. According to Kiet, the dynamics of the world was no longer governed by the

antagonistic contradiction between socialism and imperialism but by a diversity of national,

regional and global interests and by the multipolarity of interrelations between the great

powers. Like Thach, Kiet regarded development in terms of modernization the country’s

highest priority. He emphasized that the utmost aspiration of the Vietnamese was to become

“rich people, a strong country, and an equitable and civilized society,” and proposed to

interpret socialism in compliance with this objective. He went so far as to urge the Party to

abolish its organizational principle of “democratic centralism” and redefine its banner from

“national independence and socialism” into “nation and democracy.”47

Kiet’s letter triggered strong reactions from anti-imperialists. In a number of closed

meetings among party cadres, Nguyen Ha Phan, who, along with Permanent Secretary Dao

Duy Tung, was considered the anti-imperialist joint list to replace Kiet and Muoi as

government and party chiefs, branded Kiet’s views a ”deviation from socialism.” The anti-

imperialists also circulated among high-ranking officials a document entitled American

Strategy to Transform Vietnam after the Normalization of Vietnam-U.S. Relations to charge

Kiet, indirectly though, of playing into the hands of the hostile forces, or “peaceful self-

evolution.” The document argued that Vietnam’s opening up and integration into the

capitalist world was in full conformity with a clever U.S. strategy to transform Vietnam into

47
Vo Van Kiet, “Thu gui Bo Chinh tri” [Letter to the Politburo], August 9, 1995, reprinted in Dien dan, no. 48
(January 1996): 16-23.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 19

a noncommunist, U.S.-friendly and anti-Chinese state by encouraging intraparty opposition

and by means of foreign investment as well as “friendly diplomacy.”48

The modernizers’ counterattack was, then, focused on persons, not ideology. At one

of the last plena preparing for the Eighth Congress, both Phan and Tung were, by various

efforts of the modernizers, ousted from the name list for the next central committee. Yet the

modernizers’ candidates for the top job—Kiet and former Secretary-General Truong Chinh’s

son and Director of the Institute for Ho Chi Minh Thought Dang Xuan Ky—could not gain

the Politburo’s support. Of the anti-imperialists’ next candidates, Nong Duc Manh refused to

run for election while Le Kha Phieu, a protégé of Anh’s, was deemed too unexperienced for

the job. A stalemate was thereby installed. When the Eighth Congress was convened, it

reappointed the incumbent ruling troika.49 At the Fourth Plenum in December 1997, when

the leadership change was overdue, the anti-imperialists were able to put Phieu in the

secretary-general seat—for he had gained some experience as Permanent Politburo Member

in the previous eighteen months. The former troika of Muoi, Anh, and Kiet were appointed

Advisers to the Central Committee. In their new position, they continued to be invited to

attend every Politburo as well as CC meeting, where they could raise their voices. Because

the three possessed the largest power bases among all VCP leading persons, their respective

clout was cast over Vietnamese policymaking even after the leadership change.

The new ruling troika was composed of one modernizer (Premier Phan Van Khai),

one ideologically colorless (President Tran Duc Luong), and one anti-imperialist (Secretary-

General Phieu). The existence of two large camps within the Party and the principle of

collective leadership put Phieu in a delicate situation. Now the archanti-imperialist had to

48
Phong Quang, “Dang sau 2 tai lieu ‘mat’, mot cuoc dau tranh gay gat” [Behind Two “Secret” Documents: An
Intense Struggle], Dien dan, no. 48 (January 1996): 14-15; Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnamese Foreign Policy:
Multilateralism and the Threat of Peaceful Evolution,” in Thayer et al., Vietnamese Foreign Policy, pp. 1-24,
here pp. 11-12.
49
For a discussion of the Eighth Congress, see Brantly Womack, “Vietnam in 1996: Reform Immobilism,”
Asian Survey 37, no. 1 (January 1997): 79-87.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 20

play the moderator role between the two camps if he did not want to lose his seat. Although

his worldview remained basically unchanged, Phieu tried to build his own power base with

people, who were not necessarily adherents of anti-imperialism.50 Moreover, Phieu was bent

on curbing the power of the Advisers, thus getting in serious conflict with the latter. Finally,

the Advisers managed to unseat Phieu at the Ninth Party Congress in April 2001.51

The discharge of the archanti-imperialists Tung, Phan and Phieu did not mean that

the modernizers could gain the upper hand in the Party leadership, however. Beneath the

personnel changes on the surface, the balance of power between the anti-imperialists and the

modernizers remained intact. From the early 1990s this balance of power was consolidated

as a basic structure of power in the VCP leadership thanks to a universal commitment to

preserving VCP unity, but also to the VCP-style of decision making, which was based on

collective leadership and consensus, as well as the VCP-style of personnel selection, which

favored “continuity” over “renovation.”52 Formed during the late 1980s, it has guaranteed

some equilibrium yet no equality between the two camps. Like the policy blends it produced,

it assigned anti-imperialists and modernizers different statuses: the former to guard the

principles, while the latter to provide the tactics. It was this balance of power that prevented

all those who were deemed radical modernizers, such as Kiet in 1996 and Nguyen Van An in

1997 as well as in 2001, from assuming the top job in the Party. Once again, at the Ninth

Congress, the VCP chose in the person of Manh a temperate anti-imperialist or rather an

eclectic, who can moderates between the two camps, to be its next chief.

50
For Phieu’s worldview, see his speech at the 70th anniversary of the VCP, “Dang Cong san Viet Nam mai
mai vi dan, vi nuoc, thuy chung voi be ban” [The Vietnam Communist Party is Forever Devoted to the People
and the Country and Loyal to the Friends], Tap chi Cong san, no. 4 (February 2000): 3-10. One of Phieu’s
protégés was Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien, who was a very cautious modernizer.
51
Accounts of the Phieu affair include David Koh, “The Politics of a Divided Party and Parkinson’s State in
Vietnam,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 3 (December 2001): 533-51; and Zachary Abuza, “The
Lessons of Le Kha Phieu: Changing Rules in Vietnamese Politics,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 1
(April 2002): 121-145.
52
A “symbiotic relationship between nationalism and communism” (William J. Duiker, The Communist Road
to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1981), p. 7), or between “formalism” and “pragmatism”
(Palmujoki, Vietnam and the World) had been formed earlier, probably even from the inception of the VCP.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 21

As Brantly Womack pointed out, the resistance to moving beyond a consensual

middle ground resulted from the interplay of three factors. Reform, on the one hand, proved

to be the most successful economic policy in the history of the VCP, but on the other, had a

variety of undesirable consequences. In addition, the success of reform and a peaceful

international environment removed the mood of mortal crisis, which had prevailed in the late

1980s and the early 1990s. Thus, Vietnam has been stuck in a “reform immobilism,” whose

consequence is “leadership by default.” 53 No substantial innovation in foreign policy has

therefore been made since the late 1980s.

The appraisal of world situation as well as the foreign policy directives adopted at the

Ninth Congress rest on the same grounds as those approved at the Seventh and Eighth

Congresses. They all depict a world in which a scientific-technological revolution is

vigorously unfolding, involving all corners of the world, and triggers a process of

internationalization and globalization, which is a powerful world current. At the same time,

they also posit the world in the transition from capitalism to socialism. This means that the

“fundamental contradictions” that are caused by the activities of capitalism still exist and to

resolve them, “national and class struggles” are forcefully waged. International relations are

marked by both cooperation and combat in this picture. As to Vietnamese foreign policy, its

purpose is determined to combine the maintenance of a peaceful international environment

and the creation of constellations favorable for domestic socio-economic development and

national defense with active contributions to the “common struggle of the world’s people for

peace, national independence, democracy and social progress”—the old Vietnamese code

word for the combat against imperialist capitalism.54

53
Womack, “Vietnam in 1996.”
54
Compare CPV, 7th National Congress, pp. 41-43, 48-50; Communist Party of Vietnam, VIIIth National
Congress: Documents (Hanoi: The gioi Publishers, 1996), pp. 33-35, 77-79; Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Van
kien Dai hoi dai bieu toan quoc lan thu IX (Hanoi: Chinh tri Quoc gia, 2001), pp. 64-66, 119-123.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 22

Geopolitical orientations and major foreign relations

To implement the above-mentioned tasks, declared Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien in a

news conference that was part of the Ninth Congress, “Vietnam will continue to attach

importance to respecting and developing relations of friendship and cooperation with

socialist, neighbouring and powerful countries.” Then he added: “Vietnam will consolidate

and expand its relations with traditional friendly, national independent and developing

countries. At the same time it will diversify relations with developed countries and

international and regional institutions.”55 Nien’s list, in its order, reflects well a priority of

Vietnamese foreign relations. However, in the course of its evolution since the dawn of doi

moi, Vietnam’s geopolitical orientation has witnessed a number of shifts within this priority.

In 1987-88, Vietnam was still heavily oriented toward the USSR and other socialist

countries in Eastern Europe. But Resolution 13 soon initiated a “diversification” of

Vietnam’s international orientation. In 1989 the ratio of articles related to Asia-Pacific,

Southeast Asia, and capitalist countries in the region (excluding the United States) appeared

in the Party theoretical journal, compared with those concerning the USSR and socialist

countries in Eastern Europe was 4 to 5, while in 1988 this ratio had been 1 to 13. This

indicates a sharf turn of Hanoi’s attention, away from Eastern Europe to Asia-Pacific.

However, this trend was halted in early 1990, apparently in reaction to the collapse of

communist regimes in Eastern Europe. From then on till the end of 1991, the journal

published no articles on Asia-Pacific, but devoted space primarily to condemning

imperialism and America, as well as expressing solidarity with communists in Eastern

Europe.

55
“Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien says Vietnam to seek to ‘diversify’ international ties,” Voice of Vietnam,
20 April 2001, text web site, in Vietnamese.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 23

The period between 1989 and 1991 stands out as a time, when Vietnam was in search

for a new geopolitical orientation. Modernizers leaned toward regional integration into the

Asia-Pacific while seeking to normalize relations with the “big two”—China and America—

in a balanced way. Yet anti-imperialists favored instead a “red option”—an alliance with

China against the United States and the West. As Secretary-General Linh said in the April 10,

1990 meeting of the Politburo: “Vietnam and China are two socialist countries opposing

imperialist plots of wiping out socialism. [We] must oppose imperialism together.” 56

According to then Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co, this red option gained the upper

hand in the Hanoi Politburo from about March 1990.57 Vietnam’s endeavor to restore

relations with China during 1990-91 was seen by some modernizers as an effort to

“diversify” its international relations in the spirit of the “diversified and multilateral” foreign

policy. But the real motive that drove people like Secretary-General Linh, Defense Ministry

Anh, and a majority of the Politburo members to push for a rapprochement with China was,

as Anh explained in 1990, this:

The United States and the West want to exploit this opportunity [the end of the Cold

War] to eradicate communism. It [the U.S.] is eradicating [communism] in Eastern

Europe. It has declared the eradication of communism in the entire world. Obviously,

it is the direct and dangerous enemy. We must seek [an] ally. This ally is China.58

The Vietnamese request for an anti-imperialist alliance was, however, repeatedly rebuffed by

China. At the visit of Secretary-General Muoi and Premier Kiet in Beijing in November

1991, when relations between the two states and parties were formally normalized, the

56
Co, Memoirs, p. 33.
57
Ibid., pp. 30-33. Note that this time coincides with the Eighth Plenum, at which pluralism was officially
rejected and its advocate Bach expelled from the Central Committee.
58
Ibid., p. 51.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 24

Chinese responded to the Vietnamese that China and Vietnam could be “comrades but not

allies.”59

With the anti-imperialist proposal having been discredited, the agenda of the

modernizers regained momentum. In March 1992, the Party theoretical journal published an

article entitled Vietnam in the Common Trend of the Asia-Pacific by Deputy Foreign

Minister Dinh Nho Liem. Liem did not explicitly define the geographic scope of the region

but referred to “India, China, the United States, Japan, Indonesia, and other ASEAN

countries” as regional states. He argued that for the sake of its national security and socio-

economic development, Vietnam could not help but make its relations with the Asia-Pacific

a priority of its foreign policy. Admitting that this is quite novel to Vietnamese foreign

policy, he assured that “building and defending Vietnam along the socialist path does not

contradict the interests of the regional countries.” Liem also made a plea for “really new

thinking on domestic and foreign policy,” and defined socio-economic development as the

country’s highest objective. He concluded: “Following the path chosen by President Ho Chi

Minh, our people will build a rich and strong Vietnam, becoming a deserving member of the

peaceful, independent, and developed Asia-Pacific.”60 The next year, the journal published

an article by Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam, in which he pointed out that relations

with the great powers and the regional states were two “major directions” of Vietnamese

foreign policy. He also stressed that Southeast Asia would serve Vietnam as the “bridge” of

integration into the world.61 A few months later, Cam was echoed by Vu Khoan, one of his

deputies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with an article entitled Asia-Pacific: A Major

59
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest,” Asian
Survey 34, no. 6 (1994): 513-28; here p. 523.
60
Dinh Nho Liem, “Viet Nam trong xu the chung cua chau A-Thai Binh Duong” [Vietnam in the Common
Trend of the Asia-Pacific], Tap chi Cong san, no. 3 (March 1992): 60-61.
61
Nguyen Manh Cam, “Tren duong trien khai chinh sach doi ngoai theo dinh huong moi” [In Developing
Foreign Policy after the New Orientation], Tap chi Cong san, no. 4 (April 1993): 11-15.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 25

Direction in Our State’s Foreign Policy, in the party journal.62 After 1995, when Vietnam

acquired membership in ASEAN, a new, ASEAN identity was added to its Asia-Pacific

orientation.

Despite the ever firmer ASEAN identity, Vietnam has not regarded relations with

ASEAN its primary geopolitical orientation. In the Vietnamese blueprint of world anchorage,

which results from the superposition of the two grand strategies, ASEAN is rather a bridge

than a destination.63 Thus, after joining ASEAN, Vietnam has still been in search for a new

cornerstone of its foreign relations. After Le Kha Phieu became Secretary-General in late

1997, Vietnam embarked on a policy of closer ties with China. In 1999, the number of high-

level visits between the two countries jumped to 80, with Phieu himself visiting China. In

early 2000, he did so again for an unpublicized meeting with Chinese President Jiang

Zemin.64 Informal sources in Hanoi reported that Phieu went to Jiang with a proposal for

annual meetings of the Vietnamese and the Chinese regime chiefs.65 The attempt apparently

remained unsuccessful, but in mid-2000, a Vietnamese delegation led by Vietnam’s chief

ideologue Nguyen Duc Binh assembled in China for a “symposium on ideology,” the first

consultation of the two country’s chief ideologues since 1975.66

Whatever had been Phieu’s personal ambition, if his proposal was accepted, Vietnam

would be elevated into a “pole” in China’s multipolar world order. Meanwhile, President

Luong, who had inherited from his predecessor carriage of defense, interior, and foreign

affairs in the Politburo, was also pursuing his own option. Luong was namely reassured in

his 1998 visit to Moscow that “Russia still attaches importance to relations with Vietnam,

regarding Vietnam as a strategic partner in Southeast Asia and Russo-Vietnamese relations

62
Vu Khoan, “Chau A-Thai Binh Duong – mot huong lon trong chinh sach doi ngoai cua nha nuoc ta” [Asia-
Pacific: A Major Direction in Our State’s Foreign Policy], Tap chi Cong san, no. 6 (June 1993): 57-58.
63
For a discussion of Vietnam’s interests and role in ASEAN, see Jörn Dosch and Ta Minh Tuan, “Recent
Changes in Vietnam’s Foreign Policy: Implications for Vietnam-ASEAN Relations,” in Duncan McCargo, ed.,
Rethinking Vietnam (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 197-213, here pp. 204-211.
64
Nayan Chanda, “Friend or Foe?” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 22, 2000, p. 32.
65
N.S.P., “Thu Ha Noi” [Letter from Hanoi], Dien dan, no. 104 (February 2001).
66
Chanda, “Friend or Foe?”
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 26

as one pole in the multipolar world.”67 The Russo-Vietnamese rapprochement culminated in

the declaration of a “strategic partnership” between the two former allies, at the first ever

visit of a Russian supremo to Vietnam in 2001.

However, the world has changed forever after September 11, 2001. The

developments in great power relations afterward have made the Hanoi leadership clear that

the United States does not stand on an equal footing with the other big powers. Along with

the prospects of a multipolar world, Vietnam’s hope to be elevated by China or Russia into a

pole in some multipolar world order became more faraway. In July 2003 the Eighth Plenum

of the Ninth Central Committee passed a resolution on “Strategy of Homeland Defense in

the New Situation,” in which Vietnam relinquished the ideological clause in the

identification of “partners” (of cooperation) and “objects” (of combat) in its international

relations. This paved the way for intensifying contacts with the United States, notably

Defense Minister Pham Van Tra’s first ever visit to Washington and U.S. warship’s first ever

port call to communist Vietnam, both in November 2003. Whether new developments in

U.S.-Vietnamese relations in the post-9/11 era will amount to a new geopolitical orientation

of Vietnamese foreign policy remains to be seen, however.

Vietnam’s relations with foreign countries in the post-Cold War era seem to have

followed a number of geopolitical strategies to various extent. Contingent on momentary

circumstances, the geopolitical strategies were nevertheless shaped by the grand strategies,

which provided them with purposes and principles. The purpose of the grand strategy of

anti-imperialism was to oppose U.S. imperialism, and its principle “exploiting

contradictions.” There was a tactical change within this strategy during the “long 1990s.”68

In the earlier part of the period, the main contradiction was thought to be between socialism

67
Hong Viet, “Cong tac doi ngoai cua nuoc ta nam 1998” [Our Country’s Foreign Affairs in 1998], Tap chi
Cong san, no. 1 (January 1999): 11-16; here p. 13.
68
In our context, the “long 1990s” started with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and ended with
the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in September 2001.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 27

and imperialism, geopolitically represented by tensions in Sino-U.S. relations following the

Tiananmen incident. To put in conventional international relations vocabulary, Hanoi then

tried to balance Washington by bandwagoning Beijing. But circumstances changed

significantly in the latter part of the period. Sino-U.S. relations were restored. At the same

time, a new contradiction emerged between the U.S.-led “unipolarization” of world order

and the counter-movement of “multipolarization.” Recognizing that this was momentarily

the main contradiction of U.S. imperialism, Vietnam was ready to join China, Russia and

France, the major powers which advocated a “multipolar” world order, in various attempts to

counter “unipolarization.”

The purpose of the grand strategy of modernization was to turn Vietnam into an

industrial country and to catch up with the developed countries in its neighboring region.

The principle designed for achieving this was “taking advantage” of the external sources and

trends to create conditions favorable for domestic development. Following this principle,

modernizers tried to forge close ties with the financial-technological world centers, namely

the United States, Japan, and other advanced industrial countries in Europe and Asia which

are potential sources of both capital and technology. At the same time, they promoted

Vietnam’s participation in the regional cooperation and integration into the world economy,

in which ASEAN played a crucial role. In his 1995 memorandum to the Politburo, Kiet

emphasized Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN, a cooperation framework with the EU, and

the normalization of relations with the U.S. as Vietnam’s new “alignment of forces” (tap hop

luc luong). At the same time, he rejected the possibility of an assemblage of forces founded

on ideological grounds with China or North Korea. It is worth noticing that Kiet failed to

mention Sino-Vietnamese relations, which was restored at first, as a pillar of Vietnam’s

world anchorage.69

69
Kiet, “Letter,” p. 16-17.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 28

The superposition of the two grand strategies provides the framework for Vietnamese

foreign policy priority, and the mixture of them defines Vietnam’s policy toward foreign

powers. In this framework, the United States is both the allegedly central source of

subversion—the “basic enemy”—and the potentially most valuable source of capital and

technology—the “greatest partner.” The Vietnamese attitude toward the United States is

therefore ambivalent. It is marked by both admiration and hostility. The director of the Hanoi

Institute of World Economy, also an adviser to Do Muoi, distinguishes four possible

approaches to the superpower in what he calls a “multicentric world.” The first is alliance,

the second a strategic partnership, the third a combination of selective cooperation and

resistance, and the fourth confrontation. He assesses that right now very few countries still

follow the fourth option, and seems to hint at Japan for the first, China for the second, and

Vietnam for the third category.70

Vietnam’s perception of China also varies according to grand strategy. However,

both grand strategies have to deal with the same China problem. This problem includes

China’s rising power, which can entail assertiveness and pressures, and its territorial

conflicts with Vietnam, particularly in the South China Sea. Territorial dispute with Beijing

presents a big problem for Vietnamese anti-imperialists, because they consider China their

strategic ally. However, they solve this problem by pointing to the United States as the

“dangerous, direct, basic, and long-term enemy,” thus relegating the China problem to a

secondary threat. For Vietnamese modernizers, on the contrary, China is much more a

menace than a chance. Many Vietnamese modernizers are Sinophobic and pro-Western.

They see in Chinese assertiveness on territorial and border issues a greater threat than in

Western pressures for democracy and human rights.

70
Vo Dai Luoc, “Mot so van de ngoai giao cua nuoc ta trong nhung thap ky dau the ky XXI” [Some Issues of
Our Country’s Foreign Policy in the First Decades of the Twenty-first Century], in Bo Ngoai giao, Ngoai giao
Viet Nam trong thoi dai Ho Chi Minh [Vietnamese Foreign Policy in the Ho Chi Minh Era] (Hanoi: Chinh tri
Quoc gia, 2000), pp. 420-442, here p. 433.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 29

Grand strategy provides a framework for identity to affect foreign policy choice. To

contrast, anti-imperialists are ready make concessions to China, as they did in the Chengdu

summit (1990) and the border pacts of 1999 and 2000, but remain stubborn in dealing with

the United States, as manifested in their blockage of the U.S.-Vietnamese trade accord in

1999. The reverse is true for the modernizers. They were ready to make concessions in the

trade deal with Washington while delayed the ratification of the border agreement on the

Tonkin Gulf with Beijing. This is because the anti-imperialists identify themselves with the

regime rather than with the country defined as territory, while the modernizers identify

themselves with the nation in the conventional sense rather than with the regime in its

Stalinist fashion. Modernizers like Thach or Kiet were pushing to change the identity of the

regime while retaining its name. They are more concerned about their country’s territory

than communism’s principles.

Despite striking similarities in worldview between Vietnamese and Chinese

modernizers, leading Vietnamese modernizers like Thach and Kiet did not regard China as a

model of development. Their rationale is: If someone is better than China, why follow China?

If China is following someone, why not follow the latter? Thus their “natural” model was the

capitalist Asian “tigers.” In effect, Premier Kiet’s model were South Korea and Japan. His

reform of the state sector in 1990-1991 was aimed to establish big corporations mirrored

upon the chaebols and the zaibatsus. 71 This fit in his ideology. He wanted powerful

conglomerates to lead the Vietnamese economy in the world market. To him, the Korean and

Japanese models with big conglomerates were more attractive than the Singaporean or

Taiwanese models with small and medium enterprises. But all that got a hit with the

financial crisis of 1997. In the 2000s, with Sino-Vietnamese relations being in an era of

71
Nguyen Dinh Cung, “Cai cach doanh nghiep nha nuoc: Nhin lai va suy ngam” [State Enterprise Reform:
Retrospection and Reflection], Viet Nam Net, 10 September 2004.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 30

normalcy72 the modernizers have no fear of following the Chinese path and they are looking

at China for lessons.

Different ways of coping with China are built in the two grand strategies. The grand

strategy of anti-imperialism provides the possibility that a camaraderie with China may

undercut the latter’s pressures and reduce its assertiveness. The grand strategy of

modernization conveys two different approaches to the China problem. One is that China

will be balanced or deterred by Vietnam’s “assemblage of forces” from other powerful and

influential partners. The other avenue, which can be called “enmeshment,” is based on

economic interdependence and a dense web of regional cooperation.73 As a Vietnamese

foreign ministry official explained: “Sino-Vietnamese relations will be meshed within the

much larger regional network of interlocking economic and political interests. It is an

arrangement whereby anybody wanting to violate Vietnam’s sovereignty would be violating

the interest of other countries as well.”74 Each of these three strategies has, however, its own

handicap. To the first, China refuses to engage in any formal alliance with Vietnam and

remains tough when it comes to territorial disputes. To the second, it is not certain that the

other powers, among which the United States is the most competent, will throw their weight

to the Vietnamese side if the latter is seriously threatened by China. To the third, it depends

on China to let itself be “meshed” in the regional arrangements. Can some combination of

the three neutralize the handicap of each? The conditions in the 2000s seem positive for such

a prospect. In this decade, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship has entered an era of

normalcy. 75 The bestowal by President Jiang of the “sixteen characters” (friendly

neighborhood, comprehensive cooperation, long-term stability, and future orientation) in

Phieu’s visit to China in 1999 and the “four-good” motto (good neighbors, good friends,

72
Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (forthcoming), Ch. 5.
73
For a discussion of Vietnam’s approach to Chinese power, see David Wurfel, “Between China and ASEAN:
The Dialectics of Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy,” in Thayer et al., Vietnamese Foreign Policy, pp. 148-169.
74
Nguyen Hong Thach, quoted in Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” p. 528.
75
Womack, China and Vietnam.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 31

good comrades, good partners), by Jiang too in his visit to Vietnam in 2002, have provided a

framework for relations between the two countries. This framework signifies to the pro-

China faction within the Hanoi leadership that an alliance with Beijing on ideological

grounds is not welcome, while to Sinophobic people that they must avoid antagonizing the

“good neighbor” in the north. In the 2000s therefore, contending factions within the Hanoi

leadership can negotiate their different approaches to China on a solid platform of normalcy,

not, as during the 1990s, in a ravine between “red option” on one cliff and opposition on the

other, which rendered Vietnamese response to China subject to factional struggle, not to

skillful deliberation, and hence suboptimal.76

Vietnam’s policy toward the advanced industrial countries in the West outside the

United States as well as toward ASEAN is primarily shaped by the grand strategy of

modernization but significantly affected by anti-imperialism. Thus, Hanoi extends a hand of

cooperation while keeping an eye of suspicion toward these countries, which are either

capitalist states or former U.S. allies. The prioritization of countries within these groups is,

however, dictated by the grand strategy of modernization. An informal hierarchy is applied

to Vietnam’s relations with countries in these groups, which reflects their different sizes,

degrees of industrialization, and proximities to Vietnam. In effect, the most important

relations are with the “big powers” Japan and France and the “neighboring states” of

ASEAN and South Korea.77 There has been, however, a basic change in the relationship

between Vietnam and these groups. Following the normalcy with China, Vietnam’s

relationships with these countries reached the level of normalcy too in the early 2000s. A

joint statement on “comprehensive partnership in the 21st century” with South Korea was

inked in 2001. The next year, Vietnam and Japan reached a normative framework for

76
The normalcy of Sino-Vietnamese relations takes place in a wider context of normalcy in relations between
China and Southeast Asia at large. See Brantly Womack, “China’s Southeast Asia Policy: A Success Story for
the Third Generation,” Cross-Strait and International Affairs Quarterly 1, no. 1 (January 2004).
77
During Vietnam’s opening up to the world in the 1990s, it developed a new concept of state neighborhood, in
which virtually all Eastern Asian countries are counted as lying near to Vietnam.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 32

relations between the two countries in the 21st century.78 Subsequently, frameworks for

long-term cooperation with Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia were also signed.

The term ban or friend, which has exclusively been used to refer to the “traditional friendly”

countries, such as Algeria or India, begins to be applied to some Western and ASEAN states

as well. The informal hierarchy mentioned above remains intact. In fact, the framework

agreement with Japan was signed by Secretary-General Manh, those with South Korea and

Indonesia by President Luong, while the others by Premier Khai, who is ranked third in the

VCP nomenclature.

Conclusions

Vietnamese foreign policy since doi moi has not been guided by a single system of thoughts,

but resulted from the interplay of two different grand strategies, each of which is founded on

a distinct vision of the world. It is the conflict and compromise, and blend and division of

labor between the two grand strategies that has framed Vietnam’s relations to the outside

world as well as its prioritization of countries and issues. To elucidate the point of the story,

let us metaphorize foreign policy as a journey and the state as a ship. Thus, the Vietnamese

ship has two captains, with two different maps and two different ends. These ends are in

themselves not incompatible. But in a situation when the key external resources necessary to

domestic modernization are concentrated in the hands of the biggest capitalist powers, the

goals of anti-imperialism conflict with those of modernization. As a result, the captains have

to renegotiate their ends. In fact, neither of them has given up his own end, but they agree on

a compromised direction. The ship therefore approaches neither of the shores the captains

78
A little discrepancy exists as to Vietnam and Japan favor different maxims for the relationship. While
Vietnam wants a “reliable partnership with long-term stability,” Japan prefers “joint action and joint progress.”
Both maxims are, however, included in the framework. This difference also reflects Hanoi’s fear of deepening
cooperation with capitalist countries.
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 33

want it to land on. The captains’ dilemma is that if they want to reach their respective end,

they have to split their team (supposed that to split the ship is not an option), but if their team

is divided up, it may be a third party who takes over the lead.

Vietnamese policymaking is therefore characterized by formal consensus and

informal partisanship.79 Grand strategy is a template in which worldview, identity, and

interest are fused and reinforced. But since both anti-imperialism and international openness

are part of the public orthodoxy, they serve less as policy guides and more as “flags that can

stick out above the public waterline to rally partisans below.”80 The superposition of two

paradigms results in what modernizers perceive as a loss of paradigm. 81 This is

counterproductive to the purpose of modernization but actually serves the hidden agenda of

anti-imperialism. When the archenemy (America) is still very strong and the strongest

comrade (China) still refuses to cooperate in strategic matters, maintaining wide but shallow

relations with other players in the world is the best way to guard oneself and bide one’s time.

Policy, however, has to confront reality. The reality that Beijing repeatedly rebuffs

Hanoi’s proposal for an alliance founded on ideological grounds presents a strong pressure

for fundamental change in the anti-imperialist paradigm. At the same time, this pressure also

affects the balance of power between the two grand strategies of anti-imperialism and

modernization. The nutshell of their conflict concerns the question: Which one is primary to

the other—national or class interest? Between 1990 and 1997, the discourse was dominated

by proponents of class struggle. Anyone who was arguing for the primacy of national

interest had to do it subrosa. An example was Kiet’s letter to the Politburo. The “tide of

battle” began, however, to reverse in 1998. From late 1998 the thesis of the primacy or

79
I owe these words to Brantly Womack.
80
Womack, personal communication, 13 September 2004.
81
See Thayer, “Vietnamese Foreign Policy.”
Two-Headed Grand Strategy 34

salience of national interest became dominant in the discourse. 82 An interesting—and

indicative—case was Quang Can, who had been a militant anti-imperialist in the previous

period. In July 1999 and August 2000, apparently in anticipation of the Ninth Congress, he

launched two articles in the party theoretical journal, urging the Party to “raise the national

banner.” Furthermore, Can argued that the most fundamental contradiction was lying

between modernity and backwardness.83 Recall that these were two core ideas in Kiet’s letter

of 1995.

From the outside, the shifts in U.S. geostrategic priority following the “war on terror”

may facilitate or even enable some fundamental changes in Vietnamese foreign policy. The

Hanoi leadership may be convinced that having its chief concern with terrorism the United

States will “abandon its ambitions of eliminating socialism.” Furthermore, Washington may

offer Hanoi some heightened position in its global chessboard. Under these—still

hypothetical—circumstances, a new, robust Vietnamese grand strategy may emerge; robust,

because it has the capacity to provide elegant, interrelated, answers to all the four bottome-

line problems everyone who rules Vietnam has to deal with, namely regime maintenance,

economic development, the nation’s standing in the world, and China.

82
See Nguyen Viet Thao, “Ve dac diem cua van de giai cap va van de dan toc tren the gioi hien nay” [On the
Character of the Class Question and the National Question in the Present World], Tap chi Cong san, no. 20
(October 1998): 59-60, 64; Nguyen Chi My, “Net dac sac trong viec giai quyet moi quan he dan toc va giai cap
o Viet Nam” [A Distinction of the Dealing with the Relationship between Nation and Class in Vietnam], Tap
chi Cong san, no. 6 (March 1999): 19-22.
83
Quang Can, “Lai ban ve quan he dan toc va giai cap” [Rediscussing the Relations between Nation and Class],
Tap chi Cong san, no. 13 (July 1999): 20-21, 27; Quang Can, “Nhan thuc them ve su kien dinh muc tieu doc
lap dan toc va chu nghia xa hoi” [Knowing More about Persevering the Objective of National Independence
and Socialism], Tap chi Cong san, no. 16 (August 2000): 13-15, 23.