Marko Nikezić: A Struggle for Anti-Nationalism

in Socialist Yugoslavia
Cemre Aydoğan

Introduction

The dissolution wars of socialist Yugoslavia caused mass atrocities

due to the nationalist polarizations among distinct ethnic groups. The
war years (1991-1995) are generally known for several disasters. The
wars “generated massacres and ethnic cleansing, culminating in Sre-
brenica in 1995, the mass destruction of cities such as Vukovar (a Cro-
atian city), Mostar, and Sarajevo, the latter of which was under siege
for almost four years” (Boskovic 2013: 54). The rise of Serbian natio-
nalism in the 1990s mobilized nationalist groups1 especially in Bo-
snia-Herzegovina where multi-ethnic demographic structure was cle-
arly and historically traceable. Serbian nationalism and its influence
brought about the end of socialist Yugoslavia.
During the collapse of the Iron Curtain, many states also ow-
ned their independence in Eastern Europe through internalization
of liberal market economy and a rupture from the Soviet Union.
Their re-turn to Europe (Neumann 1993) process did not cause
violent conflicts although they face economic problems that conti-
nue even today due to the extension of capitalism in those states.
On the other hand, socialist Yugoslavia and its folks faced econo-
mic disasters in the 1990s, however the political actors focused the
issue of artificial nationalism to maximize their interests by skip-
ping the issue of economic deprivations (Ramet 2006). Hence, tho-
se actors used the card of “nationalism” to gain the self-esteem

1
Serbs started to stockpile arms across the regions where Serbs populated, but
especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this was a material part of the planned Bos-
niak genocide (Ramet 2006: 9).
256 Anno XXXIII – apr/sett 2021

they lost during the periods of economic “recess” (Ozkirimli 2017:

51-54).
Although many studies centralize nationalism to understand and
to discuss the dissolution of former Yugoslavia (Denitch 1996; Sells
1996; Bieber 2002), the distinctions among communists are generally
less focused aspect of the dissolution process (Jović 2009). The distin-
ction process started in 1960s, especially in Serbia and among Serbian
politicians and thinkers. Despite the fact that Tito and other foun-
ding elites certainly aimed to decentralize the state as their primary
goal, the “liberal” communists also insisted on discussing the econo-
mic depression of Yugoslavia and local solutions on that through re-
forms (Guzina 2003).
Serbian nationalism was seen harmful even in Serbia in the 1960s,
but it found a grassroot movement due to the polarization between
the arguments of the “liberal” communists and the conservatives2
who supported pro-statist policies. The conservative wing consisted
of both nationalists and anti-nationalists, however the reformists
are generally categorized as anti-nationalist voices of Serbia. Hen-
ce, suppression of the reformists (the “liberal” communists), such
as Koća Popović, Mijalko Todorović, Latinka Perović, Marko Nike-
zić, and Petar Stambolić, and their dismissal from their office paved
the way for the consolidation of nationalist conservatives in the next
decades. In this article, I will analyse the role of Marko Nikezić, a
former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia and the 6th Chair-
man of the League of Communists of Serbia between 1968-1972, to
discuss how anti-nationalist maneuvers were visible in the Serbian
politics of the 1970s, and also how they were ignored. I will analyze
Marko Nikezić’s speeches, policies, and targets for the sake of an-
ti-nationalist future of Yugoslavia through primary and secondary
sources, then I will display the impossibility of anti-nationalist poli-
tics in the context of the rise of Serbian nationalism and the Yugo-
slav politics.

2
They were either nationalist or anti-nationalist.
Rivista di Studi Politici – “S. Pio V” FOCUS – 257

Brief history of Serbian nationalism

Scholars who specialize on Serbian nationalism in the Balkans mainly

refer to the Battle of Kosovo of 13893 as the first important incident
while they try to trace the roots of nationalistic sentiments among Ser-
bs (Sells 1996; Bieber 2002; Subotić 2016). On the other hand, many
studies that underline the modern and constructed essence of natio-
nalism open a window of opportunity to understand how nations (re)
narrate their history through retrospective interpretations (Anderson
1983; Hobsbawm 1983; Üngör 2014). In other words, national hi-
stories and quest for national independence were tried to be justi-
fied through historical, generally ancient, cases in the 19th, especially
among distinct nations of imperial states and by their nationally he-
roic figures or state elites (Brass 1979; Greenawalt 2001: 57-59). The-
refore, construction of national incidents and myths might be general-
ly classified as artificial efforts in the modern era. Although this claim
is contractionary with Orientalist school since the members of this
school centralize the ancient and embedded hate of the folks through
their explanations of the wars when they focus on nationalism, espe-
cially in the Balkans (Kaplan 1991/1992).
The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and Serbian Chetniks’ role4 (Todoro-
va 1994) in the World War II influenced the mindset and manuscrip-
ts of the scholars who analysed the Serbs (or the Balkans in a broa-
der perspective), and their claims centralised Orientalist arguments:
barbarous East, violent Slavs, and their constantly conflictual beha-
viours (Kaplan 1991/1992: 65). On the other hand, after the WWII,
the establishment of socialist Yugoslavia with its six republics and two

3
The war was between the Ottoman State and the forces of the Serbian prince
Lazar in 1389. The Battle of Kosovo ended with Turkish victory and the collapse of
medieval Serbia. Although Serbs were defeated, the war is still important for them
because it is believed that the war initiated a new era in their history. Therefore, ro-
mantic and retrospective remembrance of the war constitute one of the important
milestones of Serbian national history.
4
It was a Serbian guerrilla force in the occupied Yugoslav regions (by Germans
and Italians) during the WWII. Chetniks collaborated with fascist units, even with
Croatian Ustashe who systematically killed Serbs in the WWII.
258 Anno XXXIII – apr/sett 2021

autonomous regions5 started a new epoch because of the formulation

of supra-national identity and its internalization among the folks of
Yugoslavia. Its establishment highlighted that the violent conflict or
centrifugal politics is not inevitable in the region6.
Although national questions were also visible within the borders of
multi-ethnic socialist Yugoslavia, especially because of the introduction
of the market socialism7 (Ramet 2016), Yugoslavia might be generally
remembered with its anti-nationalist, Marxist utopian, and decentrali-
zed structure (Budding 1997; Lindstrom 2005; Maksimović 2017). The
rise of nationalism, or at least nationalist ideas, found room in the 1960s
and 1970s in Yugoslavia, especially in its Serbian republic among se-
veral thinkers and politicians8, however this does not demonstrate that
there were no communist and anti-nationalist bloc in Serbia.

The 1960s-1970s: Can we detect Serbian nationalism?

Budding’s article on Serbian national identity crisis in the late 1960s

and 1970s starts with an intriguing example from today’s perspective9:

Republics: Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, and

5

Macedonia; autonomous regions: Kosovo and Vojvodina.

6
National liberation front in the WWII had a diversified social and political
structure with members from several political and religious backgrounds and with
the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. Then, the state was founded by the Anti-Fascist
Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in 1943 with the name of
Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (named as “socialist” Yugoslavia/SFRY in 1963).
7
National questions were also traceable in Yugoslavia since national conflicts
emerged among political leaders of federal republics even in the 1960s due to the
introduction market socialism that bifurcated the Yugoslav society: reformists vs.
conservatives. Under the general umbrella of the conservatism, there were not just
anti-nationalist communists. National front also found a room under etatist-conser-
vatism to criticize the reformists’ policies by referring to unequal nature of the re-
forms and their unequal effects among republics.
8
Serbia was economically one of the less developed parts of Yugoslavia, therefo-
re suspicion on reforms and ideological distinctions were much more visible in com-
parison with other republics of socialist Yugoslavia.
9
The dissolution wars of Yugoslavia flamed nationalism within the region, and
today there are still nationalist polarizations in the lands of former Yugoslavia where
multi-ethnic structure exists.
Rivista di Studi Politici – “S. Pio V” FOCUS – 259

how Serbian poet Pavle Stefanović’s ranked his identities, first a Yugo-
slav, then a Serb (1997: 407). Guzina discussed the 1960s’ Serbia from
the point of nationalism, and he claims that “civic nationalism” and
“Yugoslavism”10 were the most concrete ideologies that aimed to in-
clude all “communist” citizens without an exclusionary policy (2003:
92). Another example that displays the legal hegemony of the Yugoslav
identity over Serbness in 1960s is the case of the Brioni Plenum of 1966.
Vice-President of Yugoslavia and the highest-ranking Serbian commu-
nist, Aleksandar Ranković was accused in this plenum due to his secret
efforts to create “a-state-within-the-state” (Budding 1997: 410) and his
smuggling activities in Kosovo and Metohija where Ranković consciou-
sly supported Serbian migration waves (Cvetković 2017: 130). Prpic un-
derlines that Ranković’s “closer ties with Moscow” even after Tito-Sta-
lin split in 1948 and his “Serbian chauvinist” acts caused the end of his
political career (1969: 41). Furthermore, he was stamped as “nationa-
list” or “chauvinist” which carries negative connotations in the 1960s’
Serbia and of course in Yugoslavia (Budding 1997: 410).
On the other hand, Ranković was not alone in his illegal and chau-
vinist acts, and his supporters were also accused in the Plenum (Prpic
1969: 41). Although Ranković “was openly against the notion of Mu-
slim particularly and denied the existence of, or the possibility of, a
Muslim nation” (Ramet 2006: 286) which was clearly against socialist
and de-centralized spirit of Yugoslavia, his coterie was also against the
idea of “ethnic particularities” (Ibid.). Therefore, a Serbian grassroot
for nationalist ideas started to be mobilized silently around Ranković’s
mindset. After the reign of Ranković, “mainly Serbs and Montene-
grins moved to other parts of Yugoslavia” because of “the discrimina-
tory policies of Kosovo Albanians” (Mertus 1999: 27). Hence, Serbian
state elites who applied to the tool of nationalism in 1990s would start
to refer to those incidents too in their polarizing narratives.
On the other hand, “Serbian opposition to Yugoslav decentraliza-
tion” organized a public discussion in March 197111 that also centra-

10
Yugoslavism is generally argued as a civic religion in the socialist regime, and
it aims to glorify communism in a Marxist utopian way.
11
“Serbian opposition to Yugoslav decentralisation gained its fullest explicit-
ly political expression during the period of officially-mandated “public discussion”
260 Anno XXXIII – apr/sett 2021

lized the issue of national benefit maximization of Serbs which was

contrasting with the essence of socialist utopian Yugoslavia12 (Bud-
ding 1997: 416). Cyrillic colour of nationalism started to be spoken
loudly although one of the most important scholars who also joined
this public discussion, Mihailo Đurić was sentenced to nine months
prison due to his critique of Yugoslav decentralization and his posi-
tive attitudes towards the rise of Serbian nationalism (Ibid.). Howe-
ver, there were also “other communists” who supported anti-nationa-
lism in Serbia.

The 1960s-1970s: Marko Nikezić

Even though Serbian nationalism was started to be spoken loudly in

Serbia, there were also some “liberal”13 communists who believed and
supported “internationalism” across Yugoslavia through the maximi-
zation of the citizens’ economic interests without any nationalist argu-
ment (Budding 1997: 409). “The Serbian ‘liberal’ communists were
party reformists (headed by Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović14)
who gained prominence in Serbia after the fall of Ranković and were
in control of the Serbian Communist Party from 1968 until 1972”

that preceded the passage of the constitutional amendments of 1971. In March

1971, the Law Faculty of the University of Belgrade hosted a particularly dramat-
ic session. It was fraught with claims that Yugoslavia was “at its final cross-roads”
and that “after the adoption of these amendments Yugoslavia will no longer exist
as a state”. In this charged atmosphere, a few speakers put forward a political ana-
logue to the Proposal for Consideration’s linguistic platform. That is, they insisted
that if others could do without Yugoslavia so could the Serbs on certain terms. Phi-
losopher Mihailo Đurić, asserting that Serbs had “magnanimously” chosen to cre-
ate Yugoslavia instead of Greater Serbia in 1918, called on the Serbian people to re-
nounce ‘the mistakes of the past’” (Budding 1997: 416).
12
The essence of socialist utopian Yugoslavia was anti-nationalism and pro-de-
centralization-oriented policies across its borders.
13
Liberal communist of Serbia refer to a bunch of state elites and their suppor-
ters who aimed to eradicate economic inequalities through reforms and through
adaptation of social democratic principles.
14
Koća Popović, Mijalko Todorović, Latinka Perović, Marko Nikezić, and Pe-
tar Stambolić were the leading names of the liberal communists of Serbia in the
1960s-70s.
Rivista di Studi Politici – “S. Pio V” FOCUS – 261

(Guzina 2003: 94). In this article, I specifically discuss the role and im-
portance of Marko Nikezić to understand anti-nationalist maneuvers
in 1960s-70s’ Serbia. Nikezić was a former Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Yugoslavia and the 6th Chairman of the League of Communists of
Serbia between 1968-1972. Before that he was one of the partisans,
and he was also a member of founding bureaucratic class of Yugosla-
via with Josip Broz Tito and Edvard Kardelj.
Flere and Klanjšek state that “Nikezić explicitly considered that
republics, not nationhoods, were constituents of Yugoslavia” (2019:
136). This is important to understand the general mindset of the “li-
beral” communists on nations and nationalism in Serbia: it was never
one of the central ideologies of the state. Nikezić’s ideas for the futu-
re of Kosovo signified its homeland situation for both Albanians and
Serbs (Ibid. 143), hence Serbian nationalists were uncomfortable with
Nikezić’s discourse. Végel underlines that “Nikezić incessantly em-
phasized that the primary goal of Serbian communists must be reso-
lutely fight the resurgent Serb nationalism” (2005: 172). This quote
also displays how he was against hegemonic and historical narratives
of Serbian nationalism.
Furthermore, he was a pro-European figure because of his belief in
inclusive overarching identities. In 1966 Nikezić argued that “the se-
ries of initiatives by the socialist East European countries and by West
Europe to actively change the state of affairs and to remove the ob-
stacles accumulated through the Cold War” (1966: NN2). Therefore,
the idea of pan-Europeanness was also important for him like the idea
of South Slavness. According to Nikezić, Europeanization was also a
vital goal for each citizen of socialist Yugoslavia, and Europeanization
equated with more reform to improve economy within all republics
and regions. Nikezić aimed to eradicate extreme underdevelopment
and backwardness in former Yugoslavia, and he thought that state
intervention should have been stopped in certain reforms (Đorgov-
ić 2014). Nikezić also argued that more qualified working class would
have ended the economic problems, and new decisions should be for-
mulated independently, independent from the state (Ibid.).
While Nikezić insisted on reformist policies for the sake of citizens
of socialist Yugoslavia, he also believe that problems of ethnic mino-
rities, such as the problems of Croatian Serbs, should have been sol-
262 Anno XXXIII – apr/sett 2021

ved in their regions, in Zagreb not in Belgrade (Jović 2009: 133). This
is also significant to trace his position vis-à-vis Serbian nationalism to
prevent any pan-Serbian movement across Yugoslavia. Moreover, he
was also skeptical of decentralization policy of socialist Yugoslavia
since it might have found a room for the goals of nationalists actors
(Ibid. 124). His ideas against the rise of Serbian nationalism and for
economic prosperity of citizens of socialist Yugoslavia went hand-in-
hand, and he started to be more critical for the regime’s agenda.
Although the “liberal” communists of Serbia aimed to save the state,
their ideas were seen unacceptable for Tito and the ruling class (Ibid.).
Therefore, anti-nationalist bloc of Serbia was dismissed from the offi-
ce. Nationalist wing of Serbian politics also agreed Tito’s exclusionary
attitudes towards the “liberal” communists. Hence, reformist ideas of
Nikezić and others, were cleaned from the state’s agenda, especially
through their dismissal from their offices in 1972. This maneuver of
Tito would cause the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia through natio-
nalist conflicts especially in the regions where Serbs populated. The-
refore, ideological warfare of the late 1960s-70s led to the emergence
of artificial reasons for the war, nationalism, and the lack of the “libe-
ral” communists’ bloc would bring about the rise of violent politics.

Conclusion

Scholars on the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia and the rise of Ser-

bian nationalism mainly focus on centrifugal politics in the 1990s
among distinct ethnic groups to understand polarizations and their
reasons. On the other hand, the ideological differentiations in Yu-
goslavia on certain issues were less discussed since those distinctions
were the stories of the 1960s-70s. In this article, I aimed to demon-
strate why we need to know different voices in the Yugoslav politics,
especially in Serbia, in order to understand the roots of the dissolu-
tions. I specifically focused on Marko Nikezić, a former Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia and the 6th Chairman of the League of
Communists of Serbia between 1968-1972. As a “liberal” communist,
Nikezić and his fellows supported the idea of anti-nationalism in their
policies. They were dismissed from their offices in 1972 due to their
Rivista di Studi Politici – “S. Pio V” FOCUS – 263

reformist policies that were contrasting with Titoist state-centered po-

litics. From the point of fictional history, the existence of the “liberal”
communist bloc would have mattered, and might have prevented vio-
lent conflicts in the dissolution process.

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