LW2204 Excerrpt From Required Text

1.
The Development of European Integration
EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (8th edn)

Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca
p. 1 1. The Development of European Integration

Paul Craig
https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198915522.003.0001
Published in print: 22 August 2024
Published online: August 2024
Abstract
All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic
debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter begins with analysis of the background to European
integration. The focus then shifts to analysis of the Treaties and the principal Treaty revisions from the inception of the
European Economic Community (EEC) to the present day. The EEC Treaty is examined, followed by the Single European Act,
and the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice Treaties. The discussion continues with examination of the failed Constitutional
Treaty and the successful ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The penultimate section deals with the impact of the financial crisis,
the refugee crisis, the rule of law crisis, the pandemic crisis, and the Brexit crisis. This is followed by an overview of theories
European integration offered to explain its evolution. The UK version contains a further section outlining the basic structure of
UK legal relations with EU law post-Brexit.
Keywords: European Economic Community, Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty, Nice Treaty,
Constitutional Treaty, Lisbon Treaty, financial crisis, refugee crisis, pandemic crisis, Brexit crisis
1 Central Issues
i. EU law is a complex and fascinating subject. This book considers the EU from a constitutional,
institutional, and substantive perspective, and reveals the dynamic relationship between the EU
and the Member States. It situates legal doctrine in its historical and political context, and
illustrates the dynamic nature of the EU polity, which has been in continuous development since its
inception.
ii.
established in the 1950s, even though until the amendments made by the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) in 1993, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, which expired in 2002), the
Page 1 of 39
Printed from Oxford Law Trove. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for
personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: University College Cork; date: 12 September 2024
1. The Development of European Integration
Economic Community (EEC), and the Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were, properly
Community, whereas the ECSC and the Euratom retained their original titles. The two constituent
parts of the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December 2009, are the Treaty on European
Union, TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU.
iii. This chapter locates the emergence of the EEC in the tensions produced by nationalism in the first
half of the 20th century. While nationalism could be a positive force for good, it also had negative
implications, more particularly when it led to force to subdue neighbouring states.
iv. The focus then shifts to analysis of the Treaties and the principal Treaty revisions. The ECSC Treaty
is examined, followed by the EEC Treaty and the amendments in the Single European Act (SEA), the
Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice Treaties. The chapter concludes with examination of the failed
Constitutional Treaty, the successful conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty, and Brexit. Three themes
should be borne in mind when surveying this development.
v. The first is the distinction between institutional and substantive Treaty amendments. Institutional
change connotes the relative power within the EU exercised by the principal players, the Council,
European Council, Commission, and European Parliament (EP). Institutional change can also
connotes the subject matter over which the EU has competence.
p. 2 vi. The second theme is the way in which successive Treaty amendments have made significant
changes to the inter-institutional disposition of power within the EU, and to the areas over which it
has competence. The factors that shaped these changes continue to be debated by commentators.
vii. The third theme is EU enlargement. The EEC began with six Member States, and there are now
twenty-seven. Enlargement has shaped institutional and substantive Treaty amendments. This is
equally true of Brexit, which involved contraction of the EU.
viii. The chapter ends with an overview of theories of integration to explain its evolution. This is
important to understand why states chose to create the EEC and the reasons for subsequent Treaty
changes.
2 Nationalism and the Origins of the EU
Viewed historically, ideas of European unity can be traced to the late 17th century, when a prominent
1
English Quaker, William Penn, called for a European Parliament. However, the more immediate push for
European integration can be dated to the 19th century. It is worth recalling that Germany and Italy only
2
became unified states in 1871. A powerful factor in the unification process was the surge in nationalist
sentiment, which resonated in politics, philosophy, and literature. It can be traced to the beginning of the
19th century, in reaction to French dominance of Europe.
Page 2 of 39
There was much that was positive about this nationalist sentiment, which was initially directed towards
attainment of unified states from disparate principalities, combined with the desire to be rid of foreign
control. There was a strong feeling that those who shared a common language and culture should naturally
coexist in a single political entity, the corollary being that pre-existing boundaries between principalities
The darker side of nationalism became apparent towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th
centuries. It was driven by economic imperatives, and by the desire to assert a particular national identity.
The battles were initially fought on borrowed terrain, with the main European nation states engaged in the
carving up of Africa. The First and Second World Wars brought the clash of nation states to the very
forefront of the European stage. While there is considerable debate about the causes of both conflicts, the
aggressive effect of nationalism was a significant factor in this regard.
The culmination of the Second World War generated a widespread feeling that international affairs should
be organized to reduce the possibility of such conflict recurring. This explains the founding of the United
Nations in 1945, where the guiding rationale was to provide a forum in which disputes could be resolved
through dialogue, rather than conflict, and to institutionalize a regime of international peacekeeping
where force was required.
The founding of the EEC was another response to the horrors of two World Wars, although it was to be over
a decade before it became a reality. During the war, the Resistance movement had strongly supported the
3
idea of a united Europe, to replace the destructive forces of nationalism. However, the integration
movement faltered after the war, especially after the electoral defeat in the UK of Churchill, who had been
a strong proponent of European unity.
There were, nonetheless, other moves towards European cooperation. The USA in 1947 introduced the
p. 3 Marshall Plan to provide financial aid for Europe, which was administered in 1948 by the
Organisation for European Economic Co operation (OEEC) and in 1960 the Organisation for Economic
Co operation and Development (OECD). Cooperation in defence was furthered by creation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1948, and the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954. The Statute
on the Council of Europe was signed in 1949, providing for a Committee of Ministers and a Parliamentary
Assembly. The international organization is best known for the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), which was signed in 1950 and came into force in 1953. We can now consider the more concrete
moves towards the founding of the EEC.
3 From the ECSC to the EEC
(A) ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community

The UK was unwilling to participate in potentially far-reaching plans for European integration in 1948,
and this led to more modest proposals advanced by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, that
France and Germany should administer their coal and steel resources pursuant to an international
agreement. Jean Monnet, a committed federalist, drafted the plan, which was framed so that other states
Page 3 of 39
could join. The focus on coal and steel was in part economic, but also in part political. Coal and steel were
the principal materials for waging war. Placing production under an international body was designed to
assuage fears that Germany might covertly rearm. It was hoped to bring Germany back into the
mainstream European fold, since the political architecture in Europe changed after 1945, with Russian
dominance of Eastern Europe and the emergence of the cold war.
The ECSC Treaty was signed in 1951 by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. It had a lifespan of fifty years to expire in 2002 and established a common market in coal and
steel. There were four principal institutions. The High Authority, composed of nine independent
appointees of the six Member State governments, was the main executive institution with decision making
There was a Council composed of a representative from each national government, which had limited
decision-making powers and a broader consultative role. There was also the Court of Justice composed of
nine judges. Its proponents saw the ECSC as a supranational authority, where the High Authority could
adopt decisions other than by unanimity, which could then serve as a step towards broader European
4
integration.
(B)
munity
The 1950s also witnessed setbacks in the moves towards European integration, which were nonetheless
and the European Political Community (EPC).
The proposal for the EDC had its origins in French opposition to German membership of NATO. The French
alternative outlined in the Pleven Plan in 1950 was for the EDC, which would have a European army, a
common budget, and joint institutions. The EDC Treaty was signed in 1952 by the six ECSC States, but
5
Britain refused to participate. It was felt that a European army required a European foreign policy, which
was the catalyst for plans to establish the EPC.
p. 4 The 1953 EPC draft statute was crafted by the ECSC Assembly, as reinforced by certain additional
members, with the principal work done by a Constitutional Committee. It produced far-reaching plans for
one chamber elected by direct universal suffrage, and the other senate-type body appointed by national
parliaments. The parliament would have real legislative power. There was also to be an Executive Council,
which would have been the government of the EPC, with responsibility to the Parliament. There was
provision for a Court of Justice and an Economic and Social Council. The draft received almost unanimous
support in the ECSC Assembly, but the reaction of the six foreign ministers of the ECSC was more
circumspect, and there was significant opposition to the parliamentary power under the draft EPC statute.
The fate of the EPC was, however, inextricably linked with that of the EDC. The latter failed when the
French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC in 1954, opposition coming from both the French right
6
and left wings. This resulted in a major setback for the integration process and the shelving of plans for
defence and political union.
Page 4 of 39
(C) EEC: European Economic Community

The demise of the EDC/EPC led proponents of European integration to focus more directly on the economic
rather than the political, while drawing on ideas discussed when the EPC was drafted, including the idea of
a common market. This was felt to be too risky for several countries in the early 1950s, since they had
protectionist traditions, but the idea resurfaced in discussions about the EEC.
A conference of foreign ministers of the six Member States of the ECSC was held in Messina in Italy in 1955.
A committee chaired by Paul Henri Spaak, Belgian Prime Minister and a strong advocate of integration,
published its report in 1956, which contained the basic plan for what became the Euratom and the EEC. The
underlying long-term objective may have been political, but the initial focus was economic. There was no
temporal limit to the EEC Treaty. The Treaty of Rome was signed in March 1957 and came into effect in
January 1958. There were six Member States: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and
Luxembourg. The same Member States were signatories of the Euratom Treaty, which came into effect at
the same time as the EEC Treaty.
In economic terms, the idea of a common market connotes the removal of barriers to trade, such as tariffs,
which increase the cost of imports, or quotas, which limit the number of imports of a certain type of
product. These barriers to trade were to be abolished and a common customs tariff was to be established.
The common market was to be created over a transitional period of several stages, but it connoted more
than the removal of tariffs and quotas. It also entailed the free movement of the economic factors of
production, to ensure that they were being used most efficiently throughout the Community. This explains
economic constitution: free movement of goods, workers, capital, and establishment and the provision of
services. The idea was that if, for example, a worker could not obtain a job in a particular country, because
unemployment levels were high, he or she should be able to move freely within the EEC to search for
employment. If there was an excess of demand over supply of labour in another Member State, the value of
the labour resource within the Community as a whole would be enhanced.
The Treaty also contained key provisions to ensure that the idea of a level playing field was not
undermined by the anti-competitive actions of private parties, or by national action that favoured
domestic industry. The Rome Treaty was in addition designed to approximate the economic policies
p. 5 of the Member States, to promote harmonious development of economic activities throughout the
Community, to increase stability and raise the standard of living, and to promote closer relations between
the Member States. There were common policies in agriculture and transport. A European Social Fund was
established to improve employment opportunities, and an Investment Bank to give loans and guarantees
and to help less developed regions or sectors. A European Development Fund for overseas countries and
territories of some of the Member States was also established.
In institutional terms, the Rome Treaty was a mixture of continuity with the past, combined with novel
arrangements devised for the EEC. The Parliamentary Assembly and the Court of Justice were shared with
the ECSC. There was, however, a separate Council of Ministers consisting of a national representative from
each Member State. There was also a separate executive authority, the Commission, composed of members
drawn from the Member States, who had an obligation of independence and represented the Community
Page 5 of 39
rather than the national interest. It was not until the Merger Treaty 1965 that these institutions were
merged and shared by the three Communities. An Economic and Social Committee with advisory status
was set up, to be shared with the Euratom Community.
The location of legislative and executive power was crucial to the Rome Treaty. The draft statute for the
EPC had been parliamentary in orientation, and aroused considerable opposition from the ECSC Member
States. The same unwillingness to accord power to parliamentary institutions was evident in the Rome
Treaty. The reality was that legislative power was divided between the Commission, which proposed
legislative initiatives, and the Council of Ministers, which voted on them. The Parliamentary Assembly,
which changed its name to the European Parliament in 1962, although it was not officially so named until
the SEA 1986, had a bare right to be consulted, and that was only where a particular Treaty Article
mandated such consultation. Voting procedure varied according to the issue: in some limited instances
was required. Where qualified-majority voting applied, voting in the Council gave greater weight to the
larger Member States than the smaller, although the weighting was not perfectly proportional.
Executive power was also divided in the original Rome Treaty. The Commission ensured that Member
States complied with the Treaty; it had responsibility to ensure that regulations, directives, and decisions
enacted pursuant to the Treaty were effectively implemented; and it was the principal negotiator of
Community international agreements. However, the Council exercised certain executive responsibilities in
relation to, for example, the conclusion of international agreements, the planning of the overall policy
agenda, and the Community budget. The Assembly was also given some power over the budget, and in
addition possessed a strong but never used power of censure, despite the tabling of many motions of
7
censure over the years, including one shortly before the dramatic resignation of the Commission in 1999.
4 From EEC to the Single European Act
(A) EEC: Tensions

The Rome Treaty provided the legal framework for the EEC for almost thirty years, subject to the Merger
Treaty 1965, which came into effect in 1967, and which merged the executive organs of the ECSC, Euratom,
p. 6 and the EEC. This is all the more remarkable given that the years after the SEA saw an almost
8
continuous process of Treaty reform. There were nonetheless important developments in the period
between the EEC Treaty and the SEA. The Community expanded through accession of new Member States.
The UK chose to remain outside the EEC when it was initially established. UK applications for membership
Denmark in 1973. Greece became a member of the EEC in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986.
The almost thirty-year period between the EEC and the SEA revealed tensions between two conceptions of
the Community. There was an intergovernmental view, championed initially by President de Gaulle of
France, in which state interests were regarded as paramount. There was also a more supranational
Page 6 of 39
perspective, espoused initially by Walter Hallstein, the Commission President, in which the overall
Community good was perceived as the primary objective, even if this required sacrifice by particular
Member States.
The tension surfaced in 1965, when the Treaty transitional provisions dictated a shift from unanimous to
qualified majority voting in the Council. De Gaulle objected to a Commission proposal that the Community
should be able to raise its own resources from agricultural levies and external tariffs, rather than national
9
contributions. When compromise in the Council proved impossible, France refused to attend further
until January 1966, after which a settlement was reached, which became known as the Luxembourg
Compromise or the Luxembourg Accords. It was essentially an agreement to disagree over voting methods
in the Council. The French asserted that even in cases where the Treaty provided for majority
decision making, discussion must continue until unanimity was reached whenever important national
interests were at stake. The other five Member States declared that in such circumstances the Council
10
It seems
were at stake, then this was akin to a veto, which the other Member States would respect.
The period between the EEC Treaty and the SEA also saw other developments that enhanced Member State
power over decision-making and intergovernmentalism. In 1970, the Davignon Report recommended the
holding of quarterly meetings of the foreign ministers of the Member States, which became an
intergovernmental forum for co operation in foreign policy. In 1973, this became known as European
Political Co operation, which enabled the EEC to be represented as one voice in other international
organizations in which all Member States participated, but also enhanced intergovernmentalism.
In 1974, the European Council was established to regularize the practice of holding summits. This body
consists of the heads of government of the Member States, with the President of the Commission
attending its bi
much needed direction, but represented to some a weakening in the supranational elements of the
Community. The European Council was not within the framework created by the Treaties, and it was not
until the SEA that it was recognized in a formal instrument.
The EPC and the European Council enabled Member State interests at the highest level to impact on
matters of political or economic concern, and their decisions, while not formally binding, would
p. 7 normally constitute the frame within which binding Community initiatives would be pursued. The
Member States also assumed greater control over the detail of Community secondary legislation, through
the creation of what became known as Comitology. This enabled Member States to influence secondary
Community legislation in a way not envisaged in the original EEC Treaty.
There were, however, also developments during the period between the EEC and the SEA that enhanced
supranationalism. Thus, 1976 saw agreement on direct elections to the Assembly, and the first such
elections took place in 1979. It provided the EEC with a direct electoral mandate that it had lacked hitherto,
but the downside was that voter turnout was low, and elections were often fought on national rather than
Community issues. The supranational dimension to the Community was more unequivocally enhanced by
Page 7 of 39
developments relating to resources and the budget. In 1969, agreement was reached on funding from the
maker. These developments were furthered in 1975 when a

second budgetary treaty was adopted. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) also made important
11
contributions to the supranational dynamic of the Community during this period. It used the doctrine of
direct effect in the 1960s and 1970s to make Community policies more effective. It interpreted Treaty
provisions broadly to foster the overall aims of the Community, such as the free movement of goods. It
created the supremacy of Community law over national law to reinforce these judicial strategies.
However, while there were positive developments relating to the Community from a supranational
perspective, the decade from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s was perceived as a period of relative political
12
through the Council, with the consequence that Community objectives were left unfulfilled. The malaise
13
both of which recommended strengthening the supranational
elements of the Community, but neither was acted on. This theme is evident in the following extract.
14
The dialectics of co operation or integration have also continued to dominate the process of
Community institutions. The Council of Ministers, which was originally intended to be a

Community body, has now become largely an intergovernmental institution thanks to the famous
Luxembourg Agreement, which, under French pressure, put an end to the majority decisions
which the Council was supposed to take according to the Treaty on proposals submitted by the
European Commission. This rule that decisions could only be taken unanimously had the effect of
gradually transforming the Commission into a kind of secretariat for the Council which carefully
checked its proposals with national officials before deciding whether or not to submit them. This
in turn has a negative effect on the European Parliament which can only reach for power, under
the Treaty, via the Commission. The move towards intergovernmental solutions for Community
p. 8
it too was largely ignored. The catalyst for change finally came from a meeting of the heads of state in the
Fontainebleau European Council in 1984. This led the 1985 European Council in Milan to establish an
intergovernmental conference (IGC) to discuss Treaty amendment, which led to the SEA. The impetus for
15
market before 1992.
Page 8 of 39
(B) SEA: Single European Act
(i) Institutional and Substantive Change

The SEA 1986 was a disappointment to those who advocated sweeping reform. It nonetheless had a far-
reaching significance.
The most important institutional change was that the SEA began the transformation of the European
Parliament. The Rome Treaty gave it scant powers, and its role in the legislative process was limited to a
procedure, which transformed the Community decision-making process. Prior to the SEA, the approach to
measures. The change in the SEA meant that the Commission had to take seriously the European
players, since the cooperation procedure meant that the European Parliament could block legislative
proposals if it had limited support in the Council.
There were also other institutional changes. The SEA gave a legal basis to EPC and formal recognition to
the European Council, although not within the Community Treaties. A Court of First Instance (CFI) was
created to assist the Court of Justice. The so
delegates powers to the Commission on certain conditions, was formally included within what was Article
16
202 EC.
The impact of the cooperation procedure was enhanced because of the substantive changes made by the
SEA, in particular the creation of what was initially Article 100a EEC, which confers broad power on the EU
to adopt legislation concerning the internal market. The completion of a common market requires not
merely that trade barriers are prohibited, what is termed negative integration, but also that there should
be European regulation of certain issues to replace national regulation, what is termed positive integration
or harmonization. The latter is required because each country will have rules on, for example, banking that
express important public interests, such as fraud prevention. These national rules cannot be eradicated,
but their very multiplicity can hamper the creation of a common market, because traders will have to
satisfy a different set of rules in each Member State, thereby adding significantly to the cost of business. A
way to meet this difficulty is to have Community rules on such issues. This was recognized in the original
Rome Treaty, but Article 100 EEC required unanimity in the Council, which was difficult to secure. This was
the rationale for Article 100a EEC, now Article 114 TFEU, which provided for the enactment of measures to
approximate the laws of the Member States for this purpose. The cooperation procedure was applicable to
rather than unanimity. The SEA amended the Rome Treaty to provide that the Community should adopt
p. 9
Page 9 of 39
17
What is now Article 114 TFEU became
the principal vehicle for the enactment of measures to complete the internal market through legislation
approximating Member State law.
The SEA also added new substantive areas of Community competence, some of which had already been
asserted by the institutions and supported by the Court, without any express Treaty basis. The additions
covered cooperation in economic and monetary union, social policy, economic and social cohesion,
research and technological development, and environmental policy.
(ii) Reaction and Assessment

The SEA represented the most important revision of the Treaties since they were first adopted, and
heralded a revival of the Community momentum towards integration. The initial response to the SEA was
nonetheless mixed. Some saw it as a positive step forward for the Community after a period of malaise.
Others, such as Pescatore, formerly a judge on the ECJ, regarded it as a setback for the integration
18
process.
19
White Paper.
20
J Weiler, The Transformation of Europe
Clearly, the new European Parliament and the Commission were far from thrilled with the new
act.
And yet, with the hindsight of just three years, it has become clear that 1992 and the SEA do
constitute an eruption of significant proportions. Some of the evidence is very transparent. First,
for the first time since the very early years of the Community, if ever, the Commission plays the
political role clearly intended for it by the Treaty of Rome. In stark contrast to its nature during
the foundational period in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Commission in large measure both sets
the Community agenda and acts as a power broker in the legislative process.
Second, the decisionmaking process takes much less time. Dossiers that would have languished
and in some cases did languish in impotence for years in the Brussels corridors now emerge as
legislation often in a matter of months.
For the first time, the interdependence of the policy areas at the new found focal point of power in
Brussels creates a dynamic resembling the almost forgotten predictions of neo functionalist
spillover. The ever widening scope of the legislative and policy agenda of the Community
manifests this dynamic.
policy, the environment, and research might be regarded as secondary, the changes created Community
competence in these fields. This reinforced the views of those who conceived of the single market project
Page 10 of 39
21
p. 10 The debate between those on different sides of the political
spectrum, between a neo
day.
5 From the SEA to the Nice Treaty
(A) The Treaty on European Union: Maastricht Treaty

The SEA reinvigorated the Community and many measures to complete the internal market were enacted
between 1986 and 1992. It would nonetheless be mistaken to think that the internal market could be
innovation, and changing patterns of consumer behaviour generate the need for new EU measures to
reduce obstacles to inter-state trade. The momentum generated by the SEA continued after its adoption. A
committee chaired by the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, on Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) reported in 1989 and set out a three stage plan for reaching EMU. The European Council held an IGC
on the subject, and a second IGC on political union. This led to a draft Treaty in 1991 and the Treaty on
22
European Union, TEU, was signed by the Member States in Maastricht in February 1992. It entered into
force in November 1993 having survived constitutional challenge before the German Federal Constitutional
23
Court.
(i) The Three-Pillar System

The TEU made important changes to the Rome Treaty, in institutional and substantive terms. It was also
the European Union. The Communities was the first of these pillars, and the EEC Treaty was officially
24
renamed the European Community (EC) Treaty. The Second Pillar dealt with Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) and built on earlier mechanisms for European Political Cooperation. The Third Pillar
dealt with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and built on earlier initiatives in this area. The pillar structure
was preserved in subsequent Treaty amendments, but was then removed by the Lisbon Treaty, although
distinct rules still apply to the CFSP. Title I of the TEU contained common provisions, which laid down
25
The principal rationale for creating separate Pillars for the CFSP and JHA was as follows. The Member
States wished for some mechanism through which they could cooperate in relation to CFSP and JHA, since
in its absence such meetings would have to be set up to discuss each new problem. This was time-
consuming and cumbersome. The Member States were not, however, willing to subject these areas to the
normal supranational methods of decision-making that characterized the Community Pillar. They did not
wish the Commission and the ECJ to have the powers they had under the Community Pillar, because the
Second and Third Pillars concerned sensitive areas of policy at the core of national sovereignty. Thus,
p. 11 decision-making under the Second and Third Pillars was more intergovernmental, with the Member
Page 11 of 39
States in the Council and European Council retaining the primary reins of power. The other Community
institutions, the Commission, European Parliament, and ECJ, either had no role or one that was much
reduced by way of comparison with the Community Pillar.
(ii) Institutional and Substantive Change: The Community Treaties

The Maastricht Treaty made a number of institutional changes to the Rome Treaty, the most significant
decision
procedure. It allowed the EP to block legislation, and was strengthened by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The
Parliament was also given the right to request the Commission to initiate legislation and the power to
block appointment of the new Commission. There were other significant institutional changes: provision
was made for a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and a European Central Bank (ECB) to oversee
The Maastricht Treaty also made significant substantive changes. It established the principle of subsidiarity.
26
action was best taken at Community level and national level. A new concept of European citizenship was
27
introduced, which was to become a fertile source for ECJ case law. There were new provisions on
28 29
economic and monetary union, which laid the foundations for the single currency. The Maastricht
Treaty also, like the SEA, added new areas of competence to the EC, with new titles on culture, public
health, consumer protection, trans-European networks, and development cooperation, and significant
modification to the title on, for example, the environment.
(iii) Common Foreign and Security Policy

The CFSP Pillar created by the Maastricht Treaty was distinct from the Community institutional and legal
structure, such that decision-making was more intergovernmental and less supranational than under the
Community Pillar. The CFSP Pillar established the objectives of EU action, which included preservation of
peace and international security, respect for human rights, and development of democracy. The Member
States had an obligation to inform and consult each other on any matter of common foreign and security
policy that was of general interest, to ensure that their influence could be exercised as effectively as
possible, through concerted action.
was, however, the European Council, consisting of the heads of state and government of the Member
States, which was to define the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP, with the Council having
responsibility for decisions to implement it. The CFSP included all questions related to the security of the
Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy. While decision-making was
concentrated in the hands of institutions in which Member State interests predominated, the Council and
the European Council, there was nonetheless provision for the European Parliament to be kept informed
about foreign and security policy, and the Commission was to be fully associated with work in this area.
Page 12 of 39
p. 12 (iv) Justice and Home Affairs
nationals, which were integrated into the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam. However, prior to the
Lisbon Treaty the Third Pillar also included cooperation on a range of international crime issues and
various forms of judicial, customs, and police cooperation, including the establishment of a European
Police Office (Europol) for exchanging information. National sensitivity about such issues meant that the
Member States were not willing for them to be included within the ordinary Community Pillar and be
subject to the supranational rules on decision-making. Decision-making was dominated by the Council,
30
Pillar into the general fabric of the Treaty.
(v) Reaction and Assessment

The TEU, like the SEA before it, was extensively analysed and criticized. The obscurity and secrecy of the
the borrowing of Community institutions for the intergovernmental pillar policy making, and the many
opt
unity and coherence of the Community legal order and the likely effect on the acquis communautaire, which
had bound all Member States to the same body of legal rules and principles, is addressed in the following
extract.
31
D Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces
The result of the Maastricht summit is an umbrella Union threatening to lead to constitutional
chaos; the potential victims are the cohesiveness and the unity and the concomitant power of a
does contain some elements of real progress (co decision and powers of control for the European
Parliament, increased Community competences, sanctions against recalcitrant Member States,
process of integration, if it has any meaning at all,
should only be one way.
It must be said, at the heart of all this chaos and fragmentation, the unique sui generis nature of
the European Community, its true world historical significance, is being destroyed. The whole
future and credibility of the Communities as a cohesive legal unit which confers rights on
individuals and which enters into their national legal systems as an integral part of those systems,
is at stake.
32
TEU, which was perceived as undermining the cohesiveness and unity of the Community order, was not a
temporary feature of European integration. The attraction of flexible or differentiated integration grew,
Page 13 of 39
p. 13 and both the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties consolidated this trend in provisions
33
The variety of labels describes a range of related ideas,
including the possibility that some states may participate in certain policies while other do not, or that
34
some will participate only partially, or possibly at a later date than others. There are disadvantages of
à la
carte
difference and reaching consensus in the face of strong divergence, and for permitting progress in crucial
35
areas such as EMU or foreign policy that might otherwise be deadlocked.
(B) The Treaty of Amsterdam

The process of Treaty amendment did not halt other important developments. Membership of the EU
expanded shortly after the Maastricht Treaty, with Austria, Sweden, and Finland joining in 1995. An
accession agreement was also negotiated with Norway, but a national referendum opposed membership of
the EU, as it had done in 1973. An Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) was also made between
the EC and the states that were party to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and came into force
36
in 1994.
The ink was scarcely dry on the Maastricht Treaty before plans were made for an IGC that would pave the
way for the next round of Treaty reform, which was the Treaty of Amsterdam. It was signed in 1997 and
came into effect on 1 May 1999. It was intended to prepare the Union for enlargement through accession of
East European countries, but this issue was postponed until the Nice Treaty. The result was that the Treaty
of Amsterdam was a modest exercise in Treaty reform, but it did delete obsolete provisions from the EC
Treaty, and renumber all the Articles, titles, and sections of the TEU and the EC Treaty.
The 1990s saw a surge of debate, political and academic, concerning the legitimacy of the EU. This is the
37
closely as possible to the citizen. Promotion of a high level of employment and the establishment of the
38
There were amendments the
effect of which was that the Union was said to be founded on respect for human rights, democracy, and the
39 40
p. 14 rule of law. Respect for these principles was a condition for EU membership. The Amsterdam
Treaty declared that the EU should respect the fundamental rights protected in the European Convention
41
on Human Rights (ECHR) and in national constitutions. There was provision that if the Council found a
42
The institutional changes made by the Amsterdam Treaty were largely an extension of the SEA reforms. The
Treaty Articles to which it was applicable was expanded. The cooperation procedure introduced by the SEA
Page 14 of 39
43
the amendment whereby its assent was required for appointment of the Commission President. There
The same continuity with the past was evident in the trajectory of substantive changes concerning the scope
of Community power. This was, as with the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, further enhanced through the
44
addition of new heads of competence, or the modification of existing heads. There was also a new
provision that conferred legislative competence on the Community to combat discrimination based on sex,
45
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.
The Treaty of Amsterdam also amended the Second and Third Pillars. The changes made to the Second Pillar
were modest, including the fact that the Secretary
46
whenever this was necessary in implementing the CFSP.
The changes made to the Third Pillar were more significant. The decision-making structure had been
criticized on the ground that many JHA policies were unsuited to the intergovernmental processes
established. The consequence was that those parts of JHA dealing with visas, asylum, immigration, and
other aspects of free movement of persons were incorporated into Title IV EC, although the relevant legal
provisions meant that decision-making was still more intergovernmental than in other areas for a certain
period of time. The remaining Third Pillar provisions were subjected to institutional controls closer to
criminal matters, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and the prevention and combating of racism
47 48
and xenophobia. These objectives were pursued through legal instruments specific to the Third Pillar:
common positions, framework decisions, decisions, and conventions. The ECJ had some jurisdiction over
49
certain measures adopted under this Pillar, although it was not equivalent to its jurisdiction under the
Community Pillar.
p. 15 (ii) Reaction and Assessment

Assessment requires a benchmark, some criterion against which to measure what was achieved against
prior aspirations. The two most salient benchmarks were institutional reform to cope with enlargement,
not fare well. Institutional reform to cope with enlargement was not addressed, and there was relatively
creation of the new Title IV EC, and provisions concerning access to documents, data protection, non-
discrimination, and the like were beneficial in this respect.
Page 15 of 39
The Treaty of Amsterdam nonetheless had a more general impact in two respects. It eroded the distinction
between the Pillars, especially in relation to the Third Pillar. It also legitimated mechanisms for different
degrees of integration and cooperation between groups of states. Article 40 EU, Article 11 EC, and Title VII
on closer cooperation demonstrated that differentiated integration should no longer be thought of as an
aberration within the legal order.
(C) Nice Treaty

The very fact that the Treaty of Amsterdam failed to address the institutional structure pending
enlargement meant that a further IGC was inevitable. It was convened in 1999 to consider composition of
the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, and the extension of qualified-majority voting. The
Nice Treaty was concluded in December 2000 after a notoriously fractious summit, and entered into force
50
on 1 February 2003.
The Nice Treaty made several institutional changes to the EC Treaty, in particular relating to the
had expanded to fifteen. There was consensus on the need for institutional reform pending enlargement.
This was achieved and the Treaty provisions concerning the weighting of votes in the Council, the
distribution of seats in the European Parliament, and the composition of the Commission were amended.
These topics might sound dry, but the debates concerning reform were often fierce, precisely because the
issues raised broader considerations concerning the relative power of large, medium, and small states in
the Community, and also raised contentious issues as to the balance of power between the EU institutions.
The detailed provisions have been superseded by those in the Lisbon Treaty, but the discourse concerning
these changes was similarly contentious as those in the Nice Treaty.
The principal substantive development concerned the EU Charter of Rights. The initial catalyst for this came
European parliamentarians, and national government representatives to draft a Charter of fundamental

51
rights for the EU.
a Charter by the end of 2000. The Charter received political approval at the Nice European Council in
52
December 2000.
largely welcomed as a step forward for the legitimacy and human rights commitment of the EU. The mode
by which it was drafted also attracted positive comment as an improvement on the method by which
treaties had traditionally been negotiated.
p. 16 (ii) Reaction and Assessment

The aspirations underlying the Nice IGC were limited, the primary aim being institutional reform in the
light of enlargement, a task left unresolved in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Viewed from this limited
perspective, the Treaty of Nice did the job. There was nonetheless dissatisfaction with the outcome.
Page 16 of 39
This was in part procedural. There was much adverse media reaction to the ill tempered exchanges and the
late night wrangling that accompanied the IGC and the European Council meeting in Nice. This formed
representative Convention to prepare for the next IGC.
The lingering dissatisfaction was also in part substantive. It was readily apparent that there were
important issues that were not touched. This was reflected in Declaration 23 on the Future of the Union
Rights, simplification of the Treaties, and the role of the national parliaments.
6 From Nice to the Lisbon Treaty
(A) The Laeken Declaration

The initial expectation following the Nice Treaty was that there would be another round of piecemeal
Treaty reform four years later in 2004. It would consider issues addressed, but not resolved in the Nice
Treaty, as set out in Declaration 23. These issues were to be considered further at the Laeken European
Council scheduled for December 2001. The reform process was, however, transformed during 2000, which
53
was reflected in the conclusions of the Laeken European Council.
It came to be accepted that the topics left over from the Nice Treaty were not discrete, but were connected
to broader issues concerning the EU institutional balance of power, and the distribution of authority
between the EU and the Member States. This led to a growing feeling that there should be a more profound
re-thinking about the EU. It was also accepted that if a broad range of issues was to be discussed, then the
54
consensus was reflected in the Laeken European Council, which gave formal approval, through the
within which a range of other questions were posed, concerning virtually every important EU topic. The
Laeken Declaration also formally embraced the Convention model used to draw up the Charter of Rights,
and established a Convention on the Future of Europe.
(B) Constitutional Treaty
(i) Proposed Institutional and Substantive Change

55
The Convention was composed of representatives from national governments, national parliaments, the
EP, and the Commission. The accession countries were also represented. The Convention was chaired by
p. 17 and Jean-Luc
56
Dehaene. The executive role in the Convention was undertaken by the Praesidium. It began work in 2002,
57
making extensive use of Working Groups for particular topics.
Page 17 of 39
The end result in 2003 was a proposal for a Constitutional Treaty, but this was not preordained. The
possibility of a constitutional text was mentioned only at the end of the Laeken Declaration, in the context
of Treaty simplification, and the language was cautious. Many Member States felt that the Convention
58
might just be a talking shop, which produced recommendations. It was, therefore, a surprise when
Constitutional Treaty for Europe. The Convention, once established, developed its own institutional vision.
59
The idea took hold that the Convention should produce a Constitutional Treaty. The Draft Treaty
60
Establishing a Constitution for Europe was agreed by the Convention in June 2003 and submitted to the
61
European Council in July.
However, the Member States in the European Council were divided on certain issues and agreement on the
62
Constitutional Treaty was only secured at the European Council meeting in June 2004. It was still
63
necessary for the Constitutional Treaty to be ratified in accord with the constitutional requirements of
each Member State. Fifteen Member States ratified the Treaty, but progress came to an abrupt halt when
64
France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty in their referenda. A number of Member
States therefore postponed the ratification process. The European Council in 2005 decided it was best for
France and the Netherlands, and did not become law. However, the Lisbon Treaty, which was ratified in
2009, drew heavily on the Constitutional Treaty.
(ii) Reaction and Assessment

There was considerable diversity of views on just about every facet of the Constitutional Treaty. The
65
principal areas of debate were as follows.
There was discourse as to whether it was wise for the EU ever to have embarked on this ambitious project. This
embodied in the Constitutional Treaty were unnecessary, because the EU could function on the basis of the
Nice Treaty, and dangerous, because the drafting of the constitutional document brought to the fore
p. 18 contentious issues, which were best resolved through less formal mechanisms. There is force in this
view. It should, nonetheless, be recognized that the four issues left over from the Nice Treaty were not
discrete. They raised broader issues concerning the nature of the EU, its powers, mode of decision-making,
and relationship with the Member States. The dissatisfaction with piecemeal IGC Treaty reform,
monopolized by the Member States, should not, moreover, be forgotten.
A related, but distinct, set of issues concerned the way in which the Convention operated. Thus, some cast
doubt on its participatory credentials, pointing to the increasing centralization of initiative in the
Constitution. The Convention did not, however, exist in an ideal-type world. It conducted its task against
the real-world conditions laid down by the European Council. When the European Council reaffirmed the
deadline, the Praesidium had little choice but to take a more proactive role, since otherwise the
Constitutional Treaty would not have been presented to the European Council in June 2003.
Page 18 of 39
66
A third area of debate concerned the content of the Constitutional Treaty. Some were critical about the
further federalization they believed to result from the Treaty, focusing on, for example, the shift from
unanimity to qualified-majority voting in the Council. Others were equally critical about what they saw as
the increased intergovernmentalism in the Treaty, through for example, enhanced Member State influence
in the inter-institutional distribution of power, the creation of the long-term Presidency of the European
Council, and the like. There were also significant differences of view concerning particular provisions of
the Constitutional Treaty. Thus, for example, some applauded the distribution of competences, while
others were critical, arguing that the provisions were unclear and uncertain.
(C) The Lisbon Treaty
(i) From the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty

The failure of the Constitutional Treaty meant that the EU continued to be based on the Rome Treaty as
amended by later treaties, including the Nice Treaty. This Treaty architecture had to regulate an EU of
twenty-five Member States, the result of the 2004 enlargement that brought ten further states into the EU:
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007, and Croatia acceded in 2013, making twenty-eight states. The policy
of conditionality meant that candidate states were required to adapt their laws and institutions before any
67
date for accession was set, at a time when they had little or no influence on European laws and policies.
referenda was sensible, given the justified concern that more states might vote against the Constitutional
institutions, which were at the time unsure whether any of the Constitutional Treaty could be salvaged.
The Member States were not, however, willing to allow the work put into the Constitutional Treaty to be
lost. To this end, the European Council in 2006 commissioned Germany, which held the Presidency of the
p. 19 European Council in the first half of 2007, to report on the prospects for Treaty reform. The European
68
Council meeting in 2007 then considered a detailed mandate of changes to the Constitutional Treaty, in
order that a revised Treaty could be successfully concluded.
69
This led to the birth of the Reform Treaty. It was agreed to convene an IGC, which was to finish its
70
deliberations by the end of 2007. The Reform Treaty was to contain two principal clauses, which
amended respectively the TEU and the EC Treaty, the latter of which would be renamed the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. The Union should have a single legal personality and the word
71
There was a conscious decision to
this Treaty reform, and given that the constitutional terminology of the Constitutional Treaty was
problematic for some Member States it was dropped. This was also the rationale for other terminological
72
changes where the wording in the Constitutional Treaty was felt, whether correctly or not, to connote the
Page 19 of 39
were abandoned; there was no flag, anthem, or motto; and the clause in the Constitutional Treaty
concerning the primacy of EU law was replaced by a declaration.
Portugal held the Presidency of the European Council in the second half of 2007 and was keen that Treaty
reform should be concluded during its Presidency so that the new Treaty could bear its name.
Developments in the second half of 2007 were rapid. There was scant time for detailed discussion of the
draft Treaty that emerged from the IGC. The Lisbon Treaty was forged hurriedly by the Member States and
EU institutions, since they were keen to conclude a process that had started shortly after the beginning of
the new millennium. The desire to conclude the Lisbon Treaty expeditiously was moreover explicable since
it was the same in most important respects as the Constitutional Treaty. The issues had been debated in
detail in the Convention on the Future of Europe after a relatively open discourse, and were considered
again in the IGC in 2004. There was, therefore, little appetite for those engaged in the 2007 IGC to re-open
73
This could not be admitted too explicitly, since it would invite criticism that they were
largely re-packaging provisions that had been rejected by voters in two prominent Member States,
although the negative votes in the French and Dutch referenda had relatively little to do with anything new
74
in the Constitutional Treaty.
75
The 2007 IGC produced a document that was signed by the Member States on 13 December 2007, and the
title was changed from the Reform Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty in recognition of the place of signature. The
finishing post was in sight, but the Treaty required ratification by each Member State, and Ireland rejected
it in a referendum. This obstacle was overcome by a second Irish referendum in October 2009, after
concessions were made to Ireland. The final hurdle was the unwillingness of the Czech President to ratify
the Lisbon Treaty. However, he did so reluctantly after a constitutional challenge to the Treaty had been
rejected by the Czech Constitutional Court, and after other Member States agreed to add at a later date a
Protocol to the Treaties relating to the Czech Republic and the Charter of Rights. The Lisbon Treaty entered
into force on 1 December 2009.
p. 20 (ii) Form
The Lisbon Treaty amended the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
76
Community. The Lisbon Treaty has seven Articles, of which Articles 1 and 2 are the most important, plus
numerous Protocols and Declarations. Article 1 amended the TEU and contained some principles that
govern the EU, as well as revised provisions concerning the CFSP and enhanced cooperation. Article 2
amended the EC Treaty, which was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The EU
77
is henceforth to be founded on the TEU and the TFEU, and the two Treaties have the same legal value. The
78
Union replaces and succeeds the EC. A consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty contains the new
79
numbering and references to the old provisions where appropriate.
Page 20 of 39
(iii) Substance
Part I of the Constitutional Treaty contained the principles of a constitutional nature that governed the EU.
The Lisbon Treaty is less clear in this respect, although the revised TEU has some constitutional principles
revised TEU, which had properly been in Part I of the Constitutional Treaty. Thus, for example, the main
80 81
rules concerning competence are in the TFEU, as are the provisions concerning the hierarchy of norms,
82
and those relating to budgetary planning.
The Lisbon Treaty did, however, improve the architecture of the TFEU. The latter Treaty is divided into
Seven Parts. Part One, entitled Principles, contains two Titles, the first of which deals with Categories of
Competence, the second of which covers Provisions having General Application. Part Two deals with
Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union. Part Three, which covers Policies and Internal Actions of the
83
Union, is the largest Part of the TFEU with twenty-four Titles. The provisions on Police and Judicial
84
Cooperation in Criminal Matters, the Third Pillar of the old TEU, have been moved into the new TFEU.
Part Four of the TFEU covers Association of Overseas Countries and Territories. Part Five deals with EU
External Action, bringing together subject matter with an external dimension. Part Six is concerned with
Institutional and Budgetary Provisions, while Part Seven covers General and Final Provisions.
The Lisbon Treaty is not built on the Pillar system, and in this sense the Treaty architecture that had
prevailed since the Maastricht Treaty has now gone. There are nonetheless distinct rules relating to the
approach to the CFSP in the Lisbon Treaty largely replicates that in the Constitutional Treaty, subject to the
p. 21 Representative of the
85 86
European Council and the Council. The CJEU continues to be largely excluded from the CFSP.
(iv) Reaction and Assessment
Treaty, since different considerations were relevant in the two instances.
been on the agenda for almost a decade, since the conclusion of the Nice Treaty, Declaration 23 of which
had been the catalyst for the next stage of Treaty revision, which led to Laeken, the Convention on the
Future of Europe, the Constitutional Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty. The failure of the Constitutional
Treaty, more especially its rejection by two founding states, had taken its toll on the EU, sapping energy
and morale. The prospect of failing twice was not, therefore, appealing. The prospect of re-opening the
debates on the key issues was equally unappealing, more especially because many official players believed
that the solutions in the Lisbon Treaty really were better than what had existed previously, and/or that
they were the best that could be attained in the real world of politics.
Page 21 of 39
expected. Indeed, the very diversity of opinion that marked reaction to the Constitutional Treaty continued
in relation to the Lisbon Treaty, primarily because the latter drew so heavily on the former. Thus, debates
Treaty. So too did discussion of the desirability and impact of major changes, such as the creation of the
long-term Presidency of the European Council. These issues will be assessed in later chapters of the book.
It is only then that informed conclusions can be reached about the impact of the new Treaty.
7 Post-Lisbon: I
The years since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty have not been easy for the EU. It has had to struggle
with several serious problems that are examined in more detail in later chapters.
(A) Financial Crisis

The Member States and EU institutional players that finally secured ratification of the Lisbon Treaty hoped
for a period of relative calm in which the new Treaty arrangements could bed down. This was not to be. The
successful conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty overlapped with the onset of the financial crisis that had a
87
profound impact on the EU.
p. 22 The reasons for the crisis are complex and cannot be examined in detail here, but some idea of the
88
causes is nonetheless important. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the legal framework for economic
and monetary union (EMU). The latter connotes the idea of a single currency overseen by a European
Central Bank. The former captures the idea of control over national fiscal and budgetary policy, with the
basic aim of ensuring that a Member State does not spend more than it earns. The rationale for these
controls was that the stability of the Euro could be undermined if the economies of the Member States that
subscribed to the currency were perceived as weak, and the financial markets might reach this conclusion
if some Member States persistently spent more than they earned. The problem was that the two parts of
89
the Maastricht settlement were not symmetrical. EU control over national budgetary policy was
relatively weak, and thus it was unable to exert the requisite control over national economic policy.
downgraded. This led to problems for the Euro, and to concerns about the budgetary health of some other
countries that used the currency. The impact of these developments was downward pressure on the Euro,
which was only alleviated when Euro countries provided a support package for Greece that satisfied the
financial markets. The sovereign debt crisis was overlaid by, and interacted with, the banking crisis that
affected some lending institutions that were heavily committed to economic sectors, such as housing,
90
which were hit badly by the downturn in the economic markets. The net effect was that a number of
countries, in particular Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, required large financial assistance from funds
Page 22 of 39
reaching economic and social reforms, thereby increasing unemployment at a time when the general
economic outlook was bleak.
The economic and financial crisis had significant effects on the EU, including its constitutional
91
architecture. It generated a complex array of political responses, some of which were to assist ailing
states, others of which increased oversight of national economic policy. The measures assumed varying
legal forms, ranging from enactment of EU legislation, to intergovernmental agreements made outside the
formal confines of the constituent Treaties. The constitutional implications of these developments had
important consequences for the legal, economic, and political dimensions of the EU, and indeed for the
from its very inception. The social dimension of EU policy was markedly affected by austerity policies at
both EU and national level.
(B) Rule of Law Crisis

The rule of law crisis will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. Suffice it to say for the present
that the problem is primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with challenge to the independence of
the judiciary in certain Member States, notably Poland and Hungary. This is but part of a broader problem
p. 23 concerning democratic backsliding in such countries. However, the 2023 change of government in
Poland alleviated the problems in that country. The rule of law is enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as one of the
values on which the EU is founded.
It is central to any conception of the rule of law that the government should act on a basis that is deemed
valid by that legal system. If the government or legislature exceeds the boundaries of its lawful authority,
then its action will be null or invalid. There must be independent courts to assess, in an objective manner,
whether the limits on lawful authority have been exceeded. If the courts lack such independence or are
subservient to the will of the political branch of government, then there is a real danger that fundamental
limits on the scope of political power will be ignored. Independent national courts are also central to the
regime of EU adjudication contained in Article 267 TFEU and Article 19 TEU.
(C) Refugee Crisis

The advent of serious conflict in other parts of the world generated a refugee crisis for the EU. Conflict in
the Middle East and North Africa led to very large numbers of refugees and migrants. The dividing line
between the two categories has become ever more difficult to maintain, more especially so given that
conflict can also have a devastating effect not just on economic well-being, but also on the viability of
economic survival in certain parts of the world. This led to an influx of refugees to the EU on a scale that
had not been known hitherto. The EU has a system for asylum seekers, but it has nonetheless been
overwhelmed by the numbers involved. The situation was exacerbated because of the inability of the
Member States to agree on a way to deal with the problem, with the consequence that the Member States
that are geographically in the front line have borne the brunt of the burden, since they are the most
proximate destinations sought by those fleeing conflict.
Page 23 of 39
(D) Brexit
The EU was just beginning to emerge from the financial crisis when it was faced with the hitherto
unprecedented scenario of a Member State seeking to leave the EU. The bare bones of this story will be
related here and considered in more detail in the following chapter. The UK held a referendum on 23 June
2016 on whether the UK should remain a member of the EU. Voter turnout was 72 per cent, with a majority
of 52 per cent voting to leave the EU.
Article 50 TEU requires a Member State to notify the European Council of its intention to withdraw. The
notification was duly given on 29 March 2017. There were two years of protracted negotiations between the
UK and EU to secure a Withdrawal Agreement. This was agreed by European leaders on 25 November 2018,
and then laid before the UK Parliament on 26 November 2018. The UK European Union (Withdrawal) Act
2018 required that the Withdrawal Agreement should be approved by Parliament. However, the
government failed to secure the requisite majority in votes on 15 January 2019, 12 March 2019, and 29
March 2019. The failure to secure parliamentary approval for the Withdrawal Agreement led to the UK
making two requests for extension of the two-year period in Article 50. These requests were granted, so
that the new deadline became 31 October 2019.
However, the Prime Minister, Theresa May, resigned on 23 May 2019, following pressure from her own
party. Boris Johnson succeeded her as Prime Minister and negotiated a revised Withdrawal Agreement.
European leaders agreed to this at the European Council on 17 October 2019. Boris Johnson initially failed
to secure parliamentary authorization for his revised Withdrawal Agreement. However, he achieved a
significant majority in the election held on 12 December 2019. This enabled him to complete the process
whereby the UK left the EU, which was completed on 31 January 2019. There was, however, a transitional
period, which lasted until 31 December 2020, during which the UK remained bound by EU law.
p. 24 Brexit entails multiple pieces of legislation. However, there are three principal statutes. The
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 became law on 26 June 2018 and was designed to ensure that the
UK had a functioning statute book when the UK left the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement)
Act 2020 gave effect in UK law to the revised Withdrawal Agreement. The UK is a dualist country, such that
treaties have no effect until they have statutory authorization. The EU and the UK then negotiated a Trade
92
and Cooperation Agreement to regulate trade in a post-Brexit world. This was given legal effect in the UK
by the EU (Future Relations) Act 2020.
The EU now has 27 Member States. There is no doubt that Brexit had profound implications for the EU. The
very idea that a state should seek to leave, when hitherto the momentum had been in the other direction,
with states seeking to join, was a significant jolt to the EU. However, Brexit also led the other Member
States to pull together during the negotiations, and revealed the difficulties that would be encountered by a
state that sought to leave the EU.
Page 24 of 39
(E) Pandemic Crisis

The coronavirus hit the EU in 2020. There were multiple dimensions to the crisis, as attested to by its
93
while its
94
competence in relation to EMU is bounded by the proscription of bail-outs. The CJEU interpreted the
95
salient provisions teleologically to help save the Euro during the financial crisis, but there were
nonetheless limits as what could be done by the ECB and other EU institutions. However, the EU did a
considerable amount within the legal limits of its competence, and within the political constraints of what
96
the Member States were willing to accept.
The initiatives were far-reaching and have constitutional implications. This is especially so in relation to
the Next Generation EU programme, NGEU 2020, which provides EU financial assistance to the Member
States. The European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) Regulation, based on Article 122 TFEU,
97
by the Covid-19 crisis. It allocated the resources among the various NGEU programmes, with the great
98
99
with the sums to be fully repaid by 31 December 2058 at the latest. These measures are important in
p. 25 themselves, and have implications for the fiscal capacity of the EU, connoting in this context its
100
ability to incur debt on the financial markets to be repaid in due course.
8 Post-Lisbon: II
The post-Lisbon world has also seen multiple legislative and non-legislative initiatives in all areas that fall
some broader themes that underpin more particular legislative developments.
(A) Conference on the Future of Europe

The advent of the 2019 European Parliament and Commission brought EU reform back on the table. The
101
catalyst for this was in part an earlier Commission White Paper on the future of Europe. The idea was
102 103
supported by the European Parliament, and the European Council. President Macron was particularly
supportive of such an initiative, and the new Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, committed in
104
The Commission conceived
105
of the Conference as a two-year process, which would begin on Europe Day, 9 May 2020. It was felt by
the Commission and the EP that it could be a way to revitalize the EU post-Brexit.
Page 25 of 39
106
The Conference on the Future of Europe (CFE) engaged in a broad array of consultations. Its final Report
107
will be considered in more detail in a later chapter. It contained 49 proposals and 326 more specific
108
measures structured around nine themes: climate change and the environment; health; a stronger
economy, social justice, and jobs; EU in the world; values and rights, rule of law, security; digital
transformation; European democracy; migration; education, culture, youth, and sport.
109
The Commission responded rapidly to the CFE Report. Its response was divided into four categories:
existing Commission initiatives that addressed the CFE proposals; Commission proposals currently under
consideration that did so; areas where the Commission intended to make proposals and would consider
suggestions made by the CFE; and areas where CFE proposals required new Commission initiatives. The
Commission responses included an admixture of legislative and non-legislative action, either because of
p. 26 limited legislative competence or because it was the best way to reach the desired outcome. The
Commission also noted that not all CFE proposals fell within its competence, and that some could be best
initiated by other EU institutions. It was, moreover, clear that while many proposals could be
accommodated within the Lisbon Treaty, there were some that would require Treaty change.
(B) Policy Challenges

The EU has also had to address difficult policy challenges, both external and internal, that have featured
prominently on the EU agenda in the last three to four years. In external terms, it has supported Ukraine
against Russian aggression, with significant financial assistance, coupled with the possibility of Ukraine
becoming a member of the EU. In internal terms, climate change has been an important feature in shaping
110
EU policy, as evidenced by the prominence accorded to the Green Deal. The benefits and dangers of
111 112
digitalization and AI have also occupied the EU, with significant legislation, and legislative proposals.
In more general terms, the increasing prominence of right-wing populist parties at national level poses
challenges for the EU, as reflected in voting in the 2024 elections for the European Parliament.
9 Theories of Integration
The preceding discussion has shown the way in which the EEC has changed since its inception. There is,
however, a related but distinct issue, which is the rationale for integration. There is a wealth of literature,
113
principally from political science, with debate as to the causes of integration.
(A) Neofunctionalism
114
Neofunctionalism was the early ideology of Community integration. It was to be the vehicle through
which Community integration, conceived of as technocratic, elite-led gradualism, was to be realized.
Legitimacy was conceived in terms of outcomes, increased prosperity, which was to be secured through
115
technocracy, even if this meant a marginal role for elected bodies. The central tenet of neofunctionalism
Page 26 of 39
Functional spillover was based on the interconnectedness of the economy. Integration in one sphere
created pressure for integration in other areas. Thus, for example, removal of formal tariff barriers
generated a need to deal with non-tariff barriers, which could equally inhibit realization of a single
market. The desire for a level playing field between the states led to other matters being decided at
Community level, to prevent states from giving advantages to their own industries.
p. 27 Political spillover was equally important and involved political pressure in favour of further
integration. In integrated areas, interest groups would become mindful of remaining barriers to inter-
state trade, which prevented them from reaping the rewards of existing integration, thereby adding to the
pressure for further integration. The Commission was to be a major player in this political spillover, since
it would encourage the beliefs of the state players.
Neofunctionalism was, however, challenged empirically and theoretically. The empirical challenge was
impact since Member State interests re-emerged with a vengeance. The resulting de facto unanimity
principle signalled that Member States were not willing to allow Community development inconsistent
with their vital interests. Decision-making for many years thereafter was conducted in the shadow of the
116 117
bureaucracy. Moreover, evidence of interest group pressure for greater integration was equivocal.
The theoretical challenge to neofunctionalism was based in part on the fact that its failure to accord with
118
political reality led to modification that rendered it increasingly indeterminate; and in part on
explain why states engaged in international cooperation.
It would, nonetheless, be wrong to conclude that neofunctionalism has no explanatory value for EU
119
integration, and it is arguable that functional spillover created impetus for further integration.
(B) Liberal Intergovernmentalism

120
An alternative theory is known as liberal intergovernmentalism, championed by Moravcsik. His thesis is
rooted in a branch of international relations theory. The central thesis is that states are the driving forces
behind integration, and that supranational actors have little independent impact on the pace of
integration.
The demand for integration is said to depend on national preferences, which are aggregated through their
121
political institutions.
incentives for policy coordination.
The supply of integration is said to be a function of inter-state bargaining and strategic interaction.
122
Governments choose one such agreement, normally
through negotiation. Integration is pursued through a supranational institution, because it is more
123
efficient. Constructing individual ad hoc bargains between states can be costly. This problem is obviated
Page 27 of 39
p. 28 by a supranational structure such as the EU. The same basic driving force of efficiency is said to
the decision to delegate or pool sovereignty signalling the willingness of national governments to accept
an increased risk of being outvoted on any individual issue in exchange for more efficient collective
124
decision-making.
(C) Multi-Level Governance

Liberal intergovernmentalism was predicated on the assumption that supranational institutions enabled
125
national governments to attain policy goals that could not be obtained by independent action. This
126
state-centric view was challenged by those who saw the EU in terms of multi-level governance.
Thus, Marks, Hooghe, and Blank argued that integration was a process in which authority and policy-
127
making were shared across multiple levels of government: subnational, national, and supranational.
National governments were major players, but did not have a monopoly of control. Supranational
institutions, including the Commission, the EP, and the ECJ, had influence in policy-making and were not
128
merely agents of national governments.
When competence has been transferred to the EU, proponents of multi-level governance contend that
129
there are real limits to individual and collective state control over EU decisions. Thus, while Member
States may play the decisive role in the treaty-making process, they do not exert a monopoly of influence.
principal action, informational asymmetries between principals and agents and by the unintended
130
(D) Rational Choice Institutionalism

Rational choice institutionalism is a derivative of rational choice theory. The latter is premised on
methodological individualism, whereby individuals have preferences, and choose the optimal method of
131
securing them. Rational choice institutionalists were critical of liberal intergovernmentalism, because of
132
the minimal role it accorded to EU institutions, although the gap between the two theories narrowed in
133
the late 1990s.
p. 29 Proponents of rational choice institutionalism acknowledged that institutions were important.

Institutions constituted the rules of the game thereby enhancing equilibrium, and they exemplified
credibility of their commitments, and to deal with incomplete contracting, since Treaty provisions are
often open to varying interpretations. Principal/agent literature focused on controls to ensure that the
134
agent did not deviate from the desired goals of the principal.
Page 28 of 39
(E) Constructivism
Constructivists agree with rational choice institutionalists that institutions matter. They nonetheless
dispute the foundations of much rational choice literature, more especially methodological individualism,
135
environment in which preferences are formed is inescapably social. This impacts on, and thus
Rational choice institutionalism regards institutions as rules of the game that provide incentives within
which players pursue their given preferences. Constructivists regard institutions more broadly to include
fundamental role for institutions, which constitute actors and shape not simply their incentives but their
136
There have been attempts to soften the divide between rational choice institutionalism and
137
constructivism. Thus, for example, many rational choice theorists accept that preferences may well be
altruistic as opposed to egoistic, and that preferences may be constrained by social structure. There have,
138
moreover, been moves to test the relative cogency of the two approaches through case studies.
10 Conclusions
i.
the founding of the EEC and the SEA was relatively stable in this respect. The period since the SEA
has been one of almost continuous Treaty revision, with the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice
Treaties coming in quick succession.
ii. Treaty reform is a continuation of politics by other means. The Lisbon Treaty represents the
culmination of a decade of attempts at Treaty reform.
iii. The period since the inception of the EEC has seen very significant institutional and substantive
changes to its powers.
p. 30 iv. In institutional terms, the European Parliament has moved from a player on the fringes of
decision-making to become an institutional force in its own right, with a major role in the
legislative process. The European Council has gone from strength to strength, beginning as an
institution that existed outside the strict letter of the Treaties, to become a major institutional
player, a position further reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty. Treaty amendments have also impacted
on the powers and institutional dynamics of the Commission and Council.
v. In substantive terms, the many complex Treaty changes should not mask the basic fact that each
successive Treaty amendment has seen an increase in the areas over which the EU has competence.
long gone. The rationale for this will be explored in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say the
following. There is debate as to the relative importance of Member States and other players, such as
Page 29 of 39
the Commission, during the process of Treaty amendment. There is, however, no doubt that the
Member States are central to the pace and direction of Treaty amendment, and that they have been
willing to accord the EU competence over an increased range of areas.
11 Further Reading
(a) Books
AMATO, G, MOAVERO-MILANESI, E, PASQUINO, G, and REICHLIN, L (eds), The History of the European Union: Constructing
Utopia (Hart, 2019)
CORBETT, R The Treaty of Maastricht (Longman, 1993)
CRAIG, P, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press, 2010)
DOUGAN, M, (ed), The UK after Brexit, Legal and Policy Challenges (Intersentia, 2017)
FABBRINI, F, (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit (Oxford University Press, 2017)
The Withdrawal Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2020)
FASONE, C, AND MARTINELLI, C (eds), A Multilevel Constitutional Perspective on Brexit: From Local to Global (Giappichelli,
2023)
MACCORMICK, N, (Imprint Academic, 2005)
MONAR, J, AND WESSELS, W, The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam (Continuum, 2001)
MORAVCSIK, A, The Choice for Europe (University College London Press, 1999)
Europe without Illusions (University Press of America, 2005)
NORMAN, P, (EuroComment, 2005)
, AND TWOMEY, P (eds), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Hart, 1999)
PIRIS, J-C, The Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2006)
The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2010)
WEATHERILL, S, Law and Values in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2016)
WIENER, A, BORZEL, T, and RISSE, T (eds), European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2019)
ZILLER, J, La nouvelle Constitution européenne (La découverte, 2005)
p. 31 (b) Articles
BELLAMY, R
Page 30 of 39
CRAIG, P
CURTIN, D
DE BÚRCA, G
DEHOUSSE, R
FABBRINI, F
MORAVCSIK, A
31 JCMS 473
PIRIS, J-C
2021/16
WALKER, N
ZILLER, J
Notes
1
D Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration (Longman, 2nd edn, 1995); J Pinder and S
Usherwood, The European Union: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2013).
2
In the case of Italy, 1871 is the date from which Rome became the capital.
3
W Lipgens (ed), Documents of the History of European Integration (European University Institute, 1985).
4
F Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (Norton, 1994) 239.
5
J Biziewski (eds), Security and Defence in Europe. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications
(Springer, 2020).
6
J Pinder, The Building of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 1998).
7
8
Permanent Treaty Revision
Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Hart, 2002)
ch 3.
9
which entered into force in 1971.

10
Bull EC 3-1966, 9.
11
Page 31 of 39
12
The EC: Past, Present and Future (Basil Blackwell,
1983) 7.
13
Bull EC 11-1979, 1.5.2.
14
L Tsoukalis (ed), The EC: Past, Present and Future (Basil Blackwell, 1983) 7.
15
COM(85) 310.
16
17
Art 8a EEC.
18
19
White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, COM(85) 310.
20
Weiler (n 11) 2454.
21
Ibid 2458.
22
R Corbett, The Treaty of Maastricht (Longman, 1993).
23
Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57.
24
25
objectives of the TEU. Titles II, III, and IV covered the First Pillar amendments to the EEC, ECSC, and Euratom Treaties
respectively. Title V created the Second Pillar of the CFSP, Title VI the Third Pillar of JHA, and Title VII contained the
final provisions.
26
Art 5 EC.
27
28
29
30
31
Curtin (n 24) 67.
32
out from what was then the Social Policy Chapter; the exemption from defence policy
provisions of Member States which are neutral or were not full WEU members; and the option for the UK and Denmark
to decide later whether to join the arrangements for EMU.
33
operation in the Treaty of Amsterdam: The Politics of
Page 32 of 39
34
Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity to

Flexibility (Hart, 2000); B de Witte, D Hanf, and E Vos (eds), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Intersentia,
2001).
35
WEP 125.
36
It provided for free movement provisions similar to those in the EC Treaty, analogous rules on competition policy,
Opinion
1/91 [1991] ECR 6079; Opinion 1/92
EU parties to the EEA have been Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein. One country (Switzerland) remains a member of
EFTA, but decided not to join the EEA; it has, however, entered into a number of separate bilateral treaties with the EU.
37
Art 1 EU.
38
Art 2 EU.
39
Art 6 EU.
40
Art 49 EU.
41
Art 6(2) EU. This was subject to judicial oversight through Art 46 EU.
42
Art 7 EU.
43
Art 214(2) EC.
44
There was a new title on employment, the provisions on social policy were modified, the title on public health was
replaced and enhanced, and that on consumer protection was amended.
45
Art 13 EC.
46
47
Art 29 EU.
48
Art 34 EU.
49
Art 35 EU.
50
51
52
[2000] OJ C364/1.
53
54
55
http://european-convention.europa.eu/ <http://european-convention.europa.eu/>.
Page 33 of 39
56
It was composed of the Convention Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, and nine other members.
57
Working groups were established on: subsidiarity, Charter of Rights, legal personality, national parliaments,
competence, economic governance, external action, defence, Treaty simplification, freedom, security, and justice,
and social Europe. The decision to create the first six groups was taken in May 2002; the remaining five groups were
created later in autumn 2002.
58
59
CONV 250/02, Simplification of the Treaties and Drawing up of a Constitutional Treaty, Brussels, 10 Sept 2002; CONV
60
The Constitutional Treaty was divided into four parts: Part I dealt with the basic objectives and values of the EU,
fundamental rights, competences, forms of lawmaking, institutional division of power, and the like; Part II contained
the Charter of Rights, which had been made binding by Part I; Part III concerned the policies and functions of the EU;
and Part IV contained the final provisions.
61
CONV 850/03, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Brussels, 18 July 2003.
62
63
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C316/1.
64
65
https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/
essays/56876/europe-without-illusions <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/essays/56876/europe-without-
illusions>
66
(eds), The Rise and Fall of the European Constitution (Hart, 2019) ch 5.
67
68
69
Ibid [10].
70
Ibid [11].
71
Ibid Annex I, [2].
72
The Lisbon Treaty: EU
Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty?
73
74
Page 34 of 39
75
Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty
on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, CIG 14/07, Brussels, 3 Dec 2007 [2007] OJ
C306/1.
76
J-C Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2010); P Craig, The Lisbon
Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press, 2010).
77
Art 1 para 3 TEU.
78
Art 1 para 3 TEU.
79
Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
[2008] OJ C115/1, [2010] OJ C83/1, [2012] OJ C326/1; [2016] OJ C202/1.
80
81
82
Art 312 TFEU.
83
Administrative Cooperation.
84
Part Three, Title V TFEU.
85
Arts 22, 24 TEU.
86
Art 24 TEU, Art 275 TFEU. It does, however, have jurisdiction in relation to Art 40 TEU, which is designed to ensure
that exercise of CFSP powers do not impinge on general EU competences, and vice versa; the ECJ also has jurisdiction
under Art 275 TFEU to review the legality of decisions imposing restrictive measures on natural or legal persons
87
M Adams, F Fabbrini, and P Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart, 2014).
88
20.
89
90
2012.
91
Adams, Fabbrini, and Larouche (n 87) ch 2.

92
[2021] OJ L149/10.
Page 35 of 39
93
Art 168 TFEU.
94
Art 123 TFEU, Art 125 TFEU.
95
Pringle Gauweiler Weiss EU:C:2018:1000.
96
97
Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094, of 14 December 2020, establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to
support the recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis [2020] OJ L433 I/23.
98
Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the
Recovery and Resilience Facility [2021] OJ L57/17.
99
Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053, of 14 December 2020, on the system of own resources of the European
Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom [2020] OJ L424/1.
100
EU Fiscal Federalism,
Past, Present and Future (Oxford University Press, 2023) ch 7.
101
The Future of Europe, 1 Mar 2017.
102
European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current
institutional set-up of the European Union, P8_TA(2017)0048.
103
Sibiu Declaration, 9 May 2019.
104
105
Shaping the Conference on the Future of Europe, COM(2020) 27 final.
106
https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20230417172132/https:/futureu.europa.eu/en <https://wayback.archive-
it.org/12090/20230417172132/https:/futureu.europa.eu/en>.
107
Ch 7.
108
Conference on the Future of Europe, Report on the Final Outcome, May 2022, https://commission.europa.eu/
strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-democracy/conference-future-europe_en <https://
commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-democracy/conference-future-
europe_en>.
Page 36 of 39
109
Conference on the Future of Europe, Putting Vision into Concrete Action, COM(2022) 404 final, https://
commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-democracy/conference-future-
europe_en <https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-democracy/
conference-future-europe_en>.
110
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en <https://
commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en>
111
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for
Digital Services [2022] OJ L277/1; Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector [2022] OJ L265/1; https://commission.europa.eu/
strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age_en <https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-
policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age_en>.
112
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial
intelligence (artificial intelligence act), COM (2021) 206 final; https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/proposal-
regulation-laying-down-harmonised-rules-artificial-intelligence <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/
proposal-regulation-laying-down-harmonised-rules-artificial-intelligence>.
113
A Wiener, T Borzel, and T Risse (eds), European Integration Theory (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2018).
114
E Haas, (Stanford University Press, 1958); L
Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford University Press, 1963); L Lindberg and S
Scheingold, (Prentice-Hall, 1970); L Lindberg
and S Scheingold, Regional Integration (Harvard University Press, 1970).
115
Lindberg and Scheingold (n 114
116
117
S George, Politics and Policy in the European Union
118
31 JCMS 473, 476.

119
George (n 117
120
31 JCMS 473; A Moravcsik,

86
121
120) 481.
122
Ibid 497.
123
J Buchanan and G Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (University of
Michigan Press, 1962).
124
120
Page 37 of 39
125
A Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (University of California Press, 1992); A Milward and V Sorensen,
The Frontier
126
the 1980s: State Centric Versus Multi
1998); K Armstrong and S Bulmer, The Governance of the Single European Market (Manchester University Press, 1998); S
Flinders (eds), Multi-Level Governance (Oxford University Press, 2004).

127
Marks, Hooghe, and Blank (n 126) 341, 342.
128
Ibid 346.
129
130
131
132
133
This was primarily because Moravcsik modified his theory to acknowledge that supranational institutions might
have greater powers over agenda setting and the making of EU law outside major Treaty negotiations than he had
posited in his earlier work, A Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht (Cornell University Press, 1998) 8.
134
M Pollack, The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU (Oxford University
Press, 2003); Pollack (n 132).
135
528.
136
Pollack (n 132
137
138
See, eg, the essays in (2003) 36 Comparative Political Studies.
© Text, Introductory Materials, Selection, and Notes Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, 2024
Page 38 of 39
Related Books
View the Essential Cases in EU law
Related Links
Test yourself: Multiple choice questions with instant feedback <https://learninglink.oup.com/access/content/smith-
concentrate8e-student-resources/smith-concentrate8e-diagnostic-test>
Find This Title

In the OUP print catalogue <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/9780198915522>
Page 39 of 39

LW2204 Excerrpt From Required Text

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

LW2204 Excerrpt From Required Text

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

LW2204 Excerrpt From Required Text

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1.

The Development of European Integration

EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (8th edn)

p. 1 1. The Development of European Integration

connotes the subject matter over which the EU has competence.

2 Nationalism and the Origins of the EU

3 From the ECSC to the EEC

(A) ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community

and the European Political Community (EPC).

(C) EEC: European Economic Community

4 From EEC to the Single European Act

(A) EEC: Tensions

maker. These developments were furthered in 1975 when a

Community institutions. The Council of Ministers, which was originally intended to be a

(B) SEA: Single European Act

(i) Institutional and Substantive Change

(ii) Reaction and Assessment

5 From the SEA to the Nice Treaty

(A) The Treaty on European Union: Maastricht Treaty

(i) The Three-Pillar System

(ii) Institutional and Substantive Change: The Community Treaties

(iii) Common Foreign and Security Policy

p. 12 (iv) Justice and Home Affairs

(v) Reaction and Assessment

should only be one way.

(B) The Treaty of Amsterdam

(i) Institutional and Substantive Change

p. 15 (ii) Reaction and Assessment

(C) Nice Treaty

(i) Institutional and Substantive Change

European parliamentarians, and national government representatives to draft a Charter of fundamental

p. 16 (ii) Reaction and Assessment

representative Convention to prepare for the next IGC.

6 From Nice to the Lisbon Treaty

(A) The Laeken Declaration

(B) Constitutional Treaty

(i) Proposed Institutional and Substantive Change

(ii) Reaction and Assessment

(C) The Lisbon Treaty

(i) From the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty

(iv) Reaction and Assessment

Treaty, since different considerations were relevant in the two instances.

(A) Financial Crisis

(B) Rule of Law Crisis

(C) Refugee Crisis

(E) Pandemic Crisis

some broader themes that underpin more particular legislative developments.

(A) Conference on the Future of Europe

(B) Policy Challenges

explain why states engaged in international cooperation.

(B) Liberal Intergovernmentalism

incentives for policy coordination.

(C) Multi-Level Governance

(D) Rational Choice Institutionalism

p. 29 Proponents of rational choice institutionalism acknowledged that institutions were important.

CORBETT, R The Treaty of Maastricht (Longman, 1993)

The Withdrawal Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2020)

MACCORMICK, N, (Imprint Academic, 2005)

Europe without Illusions (University Press of America, 2005)