2022 LiveLaw (SC) 3

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
M.R. SHAH; B.V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7403 OF 2021; January 03, 2022
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
Versus
Dilip Uttam Jayabhay
Disciplinary Proceedings - Effect of acquittal - An acquittal in a criminal
trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the
standard of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings
operate in different fields and with different objectives. (Para 10.4)
For Appellant(s) Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Nishanth Patil, AOR Ms. Malvika Kala, Adv. Ms. Kaveri
Rawal, Adv
JUDGMENT
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and
order dated 23.01.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay
in Writ Petition No.8401 of 2003, by which the High Court has dismissed
the said writ petition preferred by the appellant – Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “MSRTC”) in which it
challenged the order passed by the Industrial Court in Revision Application
(ULP) No.13 of 2002, directing reinstatement of respondent without back
wages but with the continuity of service, original writ petitioner – MSRTC
has preferred the present appeal.
2. The respondent herein was serving as a driver and plying passenger
buses. That on 23.10.1992 when he was driving the bus, it met with an
accident with a jeep coming from the opposite direction. It appears that
instead of taking the bus to the left side, he took the bus to the extreme
right which was the wrong side and as a result, the jeep and the bus
collided. The accident resulted in death of four passengers on the spot and
six passengers were seriously injured. The jeep was completely damaged

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with its radiator and engine board broken and damaged and the inside of
the jeep was completely crushed. The impact of the collision was so high
that the jeep was pushed back by about 25 feet. The bumper of the bus
was also crushed. The driver of the jeep also sustained injuries. The
respondent was subjected to disciplinary enquiry. On conclusion of enquiry
he was dismissed from service. He was also prosecuted for the offence
under Section 279 of IPC. However, he came to be acquitted. (his acquittal
shall be dealt with herein below). The respondent challenged the order of
dismissal before the Labour Court. The Labour Court upheld the order of
dismissal. In a revision application the Industrial Tribunal considering the
acquittal of the respondent in criminal proceedings and observing that the
drivers of both the vehicles were negligent (contributory negligence), the
Industrial Tribunal exercised powers under item No.1(g) of Schedule­IV of
the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971. (“MRTU” and “PULP Act, 1971” for short), and
held that the order of dismissal is disproportionate to the misconduct
proved. Before the Industrial Tribunal the respondent/workman did not
press for the back wages. The Industrial Tribunal directed his reinstatement
without back wages but with continuity of service.
3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 31.07.2003
passed by the Industrial Tribunal ordering reinstatement without back
wages but with continuity of service, the appellant preferred writ petition
before the High Court. By the impugned judgment and order the High Court
has not only dismissed the writ petition preferred by the appellant, but has
also directed appellant to pay to the respondent back wages with effect
from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018 i.e. which is the date of his superannuation.
The High Court has also directed that the respondent shall also be entitled
to retiral benefits on the basis of continuity of service with effect from date
of his dismissal and till his superannuation.
4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court, dismissing the writ petition and confirming
the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal setting aside the order of
dismissal and ordering reinstatement with continuity of service and back
wages, the MSRTC has preferred the present appeal.

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5. Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant – MSRTC has vehemently submitted that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court committed a grave error in
interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority
on the ground that the same is shockingly disproportionate to the
misconduct proved.
5.1 It is submitted that both, the High Court as well as the Industrial Court
have not at all considered and/or appreciated the difference between the
disciplinary enquiry and the criminal proceedings.
5.2 It is submitted that the High Court as well as the Industrial Court had
erred in relying upon the acquittal of respondent in criminal case. It is
submitted that the Industrial Court and the High Court have failed to
appreciate that the acquittal has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary
proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are different and
the proceedings operate in different fields and have different objectives.
Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court in cases of Samar Bahadur
Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 94 and Union of India & Ors. Vs.
Sitaram Mishra & Anr., (2019) 20 SCC 588.
5.3 It is further submitted that in fact the Labour Court rightly held that
acquittal in the criminal case would not come to the rescue of the
respondent as the acquittal in the criminal case is on the failure of the
prosecution to examine investigating officer, panch for spot panchnama,
etc., and to prove their case beyond doubt. It is submitted that on the other
hand in the departmental proceedings misconduct has been proved. It is
therefore submitted that the Industrial Court and the High Court ought not
to have given undue importance to the acquittal of the respondent in the
criminal case.
5.4 It is further submitted that even otherwise in the facts and
circumstances of the case when in the vehicle accident four persons died
due to the negligence on the part of the respondent in driving the vehicle
carelessly and negligently and during his three years’ tenure he was
punished four times earlier, it cannot be said that the punishment of
dismissal was shockingly disproportionate. It is submitted that in the facts

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and circumstances of the case, the case would not fall under item No.1(g)
of Schedule­IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.
5.5 It is further submitted that even the Industrial Court specifically
observed in the order that the misconduct is not of a minor or technical
character. It is further submitted that the Industrial Court also observed
that there is no victimization and the action of the MSRTC cannot be said to
be not in good faith. The Industrial Court also observed that the MSRTC has
neither falsely implicated the complainant – respondent nor has it
dismissed the respondent for patently false reasons and therefore
respondent failed to prove the alleged unfair labour practice as per the
MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. It is submitted that however the Industrial Court
has interfered with the order of punishment/dismissal imposed by the
disciplinary authority invoking clause 1(g) of Schedule­IV of MRTU and
PULP Act, 1971.
5.6 It is further submitted that even the respondent admitted that he was
gainfully employed after his dismissal. Therefore, the order of
reinstatement was not warranted at all.
5.7 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant that even otherwise the directions issued by the High Court in the
impugned judgment and order in para 8 directing the appellant – MSRTC to
pay to st the respondent back wages with effect from 1 November, st 2003
to 31 May, 2018, could not have been passed in a petition filed by the
appellant – MSRTC. It is submitted therefore that such an order is as such
beyond the scope of the writ petition before the High Court.
6. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.
7. Shri Nishanth Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent has supported the judgment and order passed by the Industrial
Court and confirmed by the High Court.
7.1 It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case when the
Industrial Court found the order of dismissal disproportionate to the
misconduct proved, the same can be said to be an unfair labour practice as
per item No. 1(g) of Schedule­IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. Thus the

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Industrial Court rightly interfered with the order of dismissal and the same
is rightly confirmed by the High Court.
7.2 It is contended that in the present case as such it was not the fault on
the part of the respondent – driver. That the jeep driver coming from the
opposite side was on the wrong side of the road and the respondent tried
to avoid the accident. It is submitted that the criminal court found that even
the jeep driver was also negligent and considering the fact the criminal
court acquitted the respondent – driver, the judgment and order passed by
the Industrial Court, ordering reinstatement without back wages but with
continuity of service does not warrant any interference. It is submitted
therefore that the High Court rightly did not interfere with the judgment and
order passed by the Industrial Court ordering reinstatement without back
wages.
8. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the present
appeal.
9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective
parties at length.
10. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the departmental
proceedings the misconduct alleged against the respondent – driver of
driving the vehicle rashly and negligently due to which the accident
occurred in which four persons died has been proved. Thereafter, the
disciplinary authority passed an order of dismissal, dismissing the
respondent – workman from service. The Labour Court did not interfere
with the order of dismissal by giving cogent reasons and after
re­appreciating the entire evidence on record including the order of acquittal
passed by the criminal court. However, the Industrial Court though did not
interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority on the
misconduct proved, interfered with the order of dismissal solely on the
ground that punishment of dismissal is disproportionate to the misconduct
proved and the same can be said to be to be unfair labour practice as per
item No.1(g) of Schedule­IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. The same is not
interfered with by the High Court.
10.1 Therefore, the short question which is posed for the consideration of
this Court is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the

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punishment of dismissal can be said to be an unfair labour practice on the
ground that the same was disproportionate to the misconduct proved and
therefore the Industrial Court was justified in interfering with the order of
dismissal and ordering reinstatement with continuity of service.
10.2 Having gone through the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in the
departmental enquiry and the judgment and order passed by the labour
court as well as the Industrial Court and even the judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the criminal court, it emerges that when the respondent
was driving the vehicle it met with an accident with the jeep coming from
the opposite side and in the said accident four persons died. From the
material on record it emerges that the impact of the accident with the jeep
coming from the opposite side was such that the jeep was pushed back 25
feet. From the aforesaid facts it can be said that the respondent –
workman was driving the vehicle in such a great speed and rashly due to
which the accident had occurred in which four persons died. Even while
acquitting the accused – respondent – driver who was facing the trial
under Sections 279 and 304(a) of IPC Criminal Court observed that the
prosecution failed to prove that the incident occurred due to rash and
negligent driving of the accused – respondent herein only and none else.
Therefore, at the best even if it is assumed that even driver of the jeep was
also negligent, it can be said to be a case of contributory negligence. That
does not mean that the respondent – workman was not at all negligent.
Hence, it does not absolve him of the misconduct.
10.3 Much stress has been given by the Industrial Court on the acquittal of
the respondent by the criminal court. However, as such the Labour Court
had in extenso considered the order of acquittal passed by the criminal
court and did not agree with the submissions made on behalf of the
respondent – workman that as he was acquitted by the criminal court he
cannot be held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings.
10.4 Even from the judgment and order passed by the criminal court it
appears that the criminal court acquitted the respondent based on the
hostility of the witnesses; the evidence led by the interested witnesses;
lacuna in examination of the investigating officer; panch for the spot
panchnama of the incident, etc. Therefore, criminal court held that the

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prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondent beyond
reasonable doubt. On the contrary in the departmental proceedings the
misconduct of driving the vehicle rashly and negligently which caused
accident and due to which four persons died has been established and
proved. As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial
has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard
of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in
different fields and with different objectives. Therefore, the Industrial Court
has erred in giving much stress on the acquittal of the respondent by the
criminal court. Even otherwise it is required to be noted that the Industrial
Court has not interfered with the findings recorded by the disciplinary
authority holding charge and misconduct proved in the departmental
enquiry, and has interfered with the punishment of dismissal solely on the
ground that same is shockingly disproportionate and therefore can be said
to be an unfair labour practice as per clause No.1(g) of Schedule­IV of the
MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.
10.5 Now so far as the order passed by the Industrial Court ordering
reinstatement with continuity of service by invoking clause No.1(g) of
Schedule­IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 is concerned, as per clause No.
1(g) only in a case where it is found that dismissal of an employee is for
misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to
the nature of the particular misconduct or the past record of service of the
employee, so as to amount to a shockingly disproportionate punishment.
Clause No.1 of Schedule­IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 reads as under:­
“Schedule IV
1. To discharge or dismiss employees­
(a) by way of victimisation;
(b) not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise of the employer’s rights;
(c) by falsely implicating an employee in a criminal case on false evidence or on
concocted evidence;
(d) for patently false reasons;
(e) on untrue or trumped up allegations of absence without leave;

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(f) in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of domestic
enquiry or with undue haste;
(g) for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to
the nature of the particular misconduct or the past record of service of the
employee, so as to amount to a shockingly disproportionate punishment.”
Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule­IV of the MRTU & PULP Act,
1971, to the present case it cannot be said that the dismissal of the
respondent was for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without
having any regard to the nature of the misconduct. The respondent –
workman has been held to be guilty for a particular charge and particular
misconduct. Even the past record of service of the respondent has not
been considered by the Industrial Court. As per case of the appellant –
MSRTC the respondent – workman was in service for three years and
during three years’ service tenure he was punished four times. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the order of dismissal was without having any regard to
the past record of the service of the respondent. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court wrongly invoked clause
No.1(g) of Schedule­IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.
11. Even otherwise in the facts of the case when in the departmental
enquiry, it has been specifically found that due to rash and negligent driving
on the part of the driver – respondent, the accident took place in which four
persons died, when the punishment of dismissal is imposed it cannot be
said to be shockingly disproportionate punishment. In the departmental
proceedings every aspect has been considered. At the cost of repetition, it
is observed that even the Industrial Court has not interfered with the
findings recorded by the enquiry officer in the departmental proceedings.
Therefore, in the facts and circumstance of the case, the Industrial Court
committed a grave error and has exceeded in its jurisdiction while
interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority,
which was not interfered by the Labour Court.
12. It is also required to be noted that before the Industrial Court the
respondent – workman – driver admitted that after the order of dismissal
he has been gainfully employed. Therefore also the reinstatement in service
with continuity of service was not warranted.

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13. Even the directions issued by the High Court in para 8 in the impugned
judgment and order directing the appellant to pay wages to the respondent
– workman for the period from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018 also could not
have been passed by the High Court in a writ petition filed by the appellant.
It was not the petition filed by the workman – respondent. Therefore, even
otherwise the directions issued in para 8 of the impugned judgment and
order cannot be sustained as the same is beyond the scope and ambit of
the controversy before the High Court.
14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present
Appeal Succeeds. The judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court in
Revision Application (ULP) No.13 of 2002 and the impugned judgment and
order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.8401 of 2003 are hereby
quashed and set aside and the judgment and Award passed by the Labour
Court in Complaint (ULP) No.96 of 1993 is hereby ordered to be restored.
Consequently, the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority
dismissing the respondent – workman from service is hereby upheld. The
present appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no order
as to costs.

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