G.R. No.

L-14639 March 25, 1919 apparently were under the impression that they were being
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no
vs. knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners. region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents. consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
MALCOLM, J.: received on board the steamers by a representative of the
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers.
remarkable as the one which this application for habeas The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for
corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to Davao during the night of October 25.
be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October
yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by
kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by
popular government, and if we give expression to the Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had
power of such a government, were constituted. The primary no previous notification that the women were prostitutes
question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further
men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the happenings to these women and the serious charges
Philippine Islands? growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest,
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it
proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for to say, generally, that some of the women married, others
other departments of the government, the facts are these: assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life
all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found
district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted means to return to Manila.
for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between To turn back in our narrative, just about the time
October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the
confined to their houses in the district by the police. attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable
Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly number of the deportees presented an application
perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the
some government office for the use of the coastguard parties, was made to include all of the women who were
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions
for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of concerned them all, the application will be considered as
October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the including them. The application set forth the salient facts,
chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women
Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban,
some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police
aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The
were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and writ was made returnable before the full court. The city
fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court
admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and because the women had never been under his control,
deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and
because the petitioners were not proper parties, because because they had married or signed contracts as laborers.
the action should have been begun in the Court of First Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have
Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, any of the women under his control and that therefore it was
because the respondents did not have any of the women impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after
under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a
did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. second order, which related that the respondents had not
According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the
the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore
salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought
open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales,
member of the court, that these women had been sent out and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in
of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some
of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was
province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of further stated that the question of whether the respondents
Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, were in contempt of court would later be decided and the
alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918. reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of
returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of a number of the women, of certain detectives and
counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was
clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as
day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of
persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the
in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of respondents technically presented before the Court the
those who had been able to come back to Manila through women who had returned to the city through their own
their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by
service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their
repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the returns, once again recounted the facts and further
stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in
copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the
the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, respondents, through their representatives and agents, had
and telegrams that had passed between the Director of succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight
Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who,
offered certain affidavits showing that the women were on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila,
contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn
return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by
other means, and that despite all efforts to find them of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No.
twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States,
and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the
The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, homeland. New York and other States have statutes
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of
of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a
members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination,
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or
the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or
requested that the replica al memorandum de los regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the
recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force
January 25, 1919, be struck from the record. citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons despite their being in a sense lepers of society are
for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected
We will now proceed to do so. by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another
hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
and then at night, without their consent and without any punishes any public officer who, not being expressly
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to
were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation change his residence.
to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of
that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of
not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional
the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not
cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the
respondents. President of the United States, who has often been said to
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no
question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much
Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts
persons from Manila to another distant locality within the within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the
Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find — chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the
in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police
can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have
from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves
and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of such power, then any other official can do the same. And if
Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court any official can exercise the power, then all persons would
have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any
sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality such situation as that now before us.
to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in
same club over the head of any citizen. force in these Islands provides:
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by
that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be who shall banish any person to a place more than two
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be
pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a
his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not
we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
(Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law
Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. or by regulation of a general character in force in the
The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard Philippines who shall compel any person to change his
individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro
law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
power in our system of government, and every man who by (Art. 211.)
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation,
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer
the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will
authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously
220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same as they have defended the same official in this action.
high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge
will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could
explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime,
makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty
primary question was whether the courts should permit a party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of
government of men or a government of laws to be criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15
established in the Philippine Islands. Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
respondents have raised three specific objections to its respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was
issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there shown that the case involved parties situated in different
is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still
should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was
question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must
was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider
city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women the application and then to grant the writ would have
from Davao. amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more
counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says
deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were
officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in
for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of
be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush,
Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance
law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first
the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court. manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint
asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action
have been made returnable before that court. It is a general is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila
rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as
But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code exercising the liberty of going when and where they
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila
526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to
Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the right.
particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a
that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or defense would mean. The chief executive of any
that the women had any means by which to advance their municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally
plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries
of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception
his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear,
the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the
had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice
the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within Cooley are quoted:
the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of
the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was
has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the laid before us. . . .
party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the
the custody of a person before the application for the writ is eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended
no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke
deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the could declare in his speech on the petition of right that
same officials must necessarily have the same means to "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no
return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and
the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that
domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is
while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is
effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined
easily evaded. without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper
It must be that some such question has heretofore been remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being
presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange brought to their notice. . . .
as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are
to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of confined to the case of imprisonment within the
respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature. state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in
Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction
of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes
person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the were not passed to give the right, but to compel the
State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has observance of rights which existed. . . .
been and continues to be detained in another State. The The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of
membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served
notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not
Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question reach the former except through the latter. The officer or
presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and
whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The
judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if
held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the
purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he
the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the
are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in
usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior
to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so period for the purpose of showing that what was done at
that by the power of the court he can be compelled to some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the
release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not question is not as to what was done before the issue of the
increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in
state, except as greater distance may affect it. The disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child
important question is, where the power of control exercised? in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo
And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the
Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.) Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.],
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q.
authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 B. D., 283.)
Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest.
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.) A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have
The English courts have given careful consideration to the before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three
subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in
respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased
Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he
and her husband directing the defendant to produce the believed, they were removed beyond the District of
child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus,
date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return and that they were then beyond his control and out of his
stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had
been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer removed the negroes because he suspected they would
in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return
to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to
appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said: produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to
issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant the custody of the marshall until he should produce the
to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law.
the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon
the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes
detained. That is a command to bring the child before the had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis
judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can produced the two negroes on the last day of the term.
be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed.
could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S.,
with the possession of the child before the issuing of the 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the
child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to
one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of
legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus. Davao, and that about this number either returned at their
There remains to be considered whether the respondent own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court respondents.
awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that The court, at the time the return to its first order was made,
they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or would have been warranted summarily in finding the
be taken as purged. respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for
Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient.
present the persons named in the writ before the court on The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar
December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas
The respondents were thus given ample time, practically corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's
one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision
discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about
21st of November before sending a telegram to the that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every
the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his effort to get the child back; that he must do much more
chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in
return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so America, and even if necessary himself go after the child,
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter;
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being and that the court would only accept clear proof of an
brought before the court on the day named. absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three return did not show that every possible effort to produce the
optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced women was made by the respondents. That the court
the bodies of the persons according to the command of the forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it
writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the
account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the
safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to
their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of mitigate their wrong.
Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the In response to the second order of the court, the
bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; respondents appear to have become more zealous and to
they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to
not present writings that waived the right to be present by Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
purporting to show that the women were contended with steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided.
their life in Davao, some of which have since been While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. contested case are to be expected, and while a critical
That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal
fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo
there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this appears to have been drawn into the case through a
effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications.
see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no
being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of
investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect
her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the
corpus proceedings. memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When
substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the
connection remains to be done. official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same,
contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, who made arrangements for the steamers and the
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the
Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for government, had it within his power to facilitate the return
the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the
Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila. Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the
The power to punish for contempt of court should be social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful.
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court
principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546
the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty
when one is commanded to produce a certain person and for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as
must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands
be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt.
or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It
in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban
to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. did comply substantially with the second order of the court,
(Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some
99 N. C., 407.) members of the court are inclined to this merciful view.
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding.
judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate
any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in administration of justice to such an extent that his later
opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct.
Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of A nominal fine will at once command such respect without
their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.
does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ
of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to
be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in
contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of
the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred
pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to RUBI ET AL. v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OP MINDORO, GR No.
strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los 14078, 1919-03-07
Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be Facts:
taxed against respondents. So ordered. This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged
not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their
serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and
of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal his companions are said to be held on... the reservation
encroachment. established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
away from the reservation.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and
the provincial board therepf directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the
shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor
and approved by the provincial board; The... action was
taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of
the Interior as required by said action Petitioners, however,
challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative
Code. This, therefore,... becomes the paramount question
which the court is called upon to decide.
Issues:
challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative
Code. This, therefore,... becomes the paramount question
which the court is called upon to decide.
Ruling:
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those
portions of the President's instructions to the Commission,
the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law
shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without... due process of
law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution Creator, subject only to such... restraints as are necessary
and these provisions, it has been said, "are universal in their for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of
application, to all... persons within the territorial jurisdiction, authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the
nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356.) citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to
The protection afforded the individual is then as much for live and work... where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
the nonrChristian as for the Christian. lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that purpose,
Liberty does not import 'an absolute right in each person to to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every successful conclusion. The chief dements of the guaranty...
person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any are the right to contract, the right to choose one's
other basis, organized society could not... exist with safety employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder "liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by
and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the law for the good of the individual and for the... greater good
operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each of the peace and order of society and the general well-
individual person to use... his own, whether in respect of his being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man
person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual
done to others. *" * * There is, of course, a sphere within is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law
which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own for the common good. Whenever and... wherever the natural
will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint,
government... especially of any free government existing deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally
under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of
that will. But it is equally true that in every well-ordered law. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the
society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its interest of the public... health, or of the public order and
members, the rights of the individual in respect... of his safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U. S., 539;
be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Ala.,
regulations, as the safety of the general public may 66.)
demand.'" (Harlan, J., in Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [190&] Due process of law" means simply * * * "first, that there
197 U. S., 11.) shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom powers of the legislative department of the Government;
which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently second, that this law... shall be reasonable in its operation;
with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular
right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
right to exist and the right to be free... from arbitrary applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a
personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,... affirmed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.1) "What is
the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with
the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer Government. In a late decision with which we are... in full
vs. Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.) accord, Gamble v&~ Vanderbilt University (200
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the
leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
prison at the mercy of unscrupulous officials. What, it is "We can see no objection to the application of public policy
asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes
The answer would naturally be that the... official into whose before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that
hands are given the enforcement, of the law would have theory, when not determined by differentiation of the
little or no motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, principle of a prior case or... line of cases, or by the aid of
the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing
carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales
patriotically. If, indeed, they... did ill-treat any person thus which the court believes will best promote the public welfare
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But
hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open , public... policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise
for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies.
of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of... Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound
oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
seem that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145
Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose. of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him
the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory, the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread reservations in accordance with said... section does not
belief in the amplest possible demonstration of constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further
governmental activity. The courts... unfortunately have of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code
sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat
the Government in this progressive march. analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is 2145 of the.
unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the. Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is
say that due process of law has not... been followed. To go the ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxed against
back to our definition of due process of law and equal petitioners. So ordered.
protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to
be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all
of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision
and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the determination
that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts
should assume towards the settled policy of the
 order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally,
it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System
(SSS) have the right to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging
that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA
staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the
SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered
the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a
result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that
the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages;
and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed
to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989 dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
(SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, employees with six (6) months or more of service into
JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to
ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other
VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner, regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
vs. allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
(SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices
QUEZON CITY, respondents. [Rollo, pp. 21-241].
Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners. The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary
restraining order pending resolution of the application for a
CORTES, J: writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime,
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's
the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.]
System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its
prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209- On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on
222]. On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo the ground that the employees of the SSS are covered by
denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor
order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since
that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83- 86]. As petitioners' neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees
also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners from striking.
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of
G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are
Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and
to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion for may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had
reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from
of Appeals on March 9,1988 promulgated its decision on the continuing with their strike.
referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court
recall the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the in deciding whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
Court on June 29,1988 denied the motion for reconsideration finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in
in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case
motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was and enjoined the strike are as follows:
also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for 1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141- 143]. Hence, the instant 2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from
pp. 12-37]. continuing with the strike and to order them to return to
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court work?
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim
petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the I
notice of strike they filed with the Department of Labor and The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and
Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152]. rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
reply and supplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
the issues joined and the case submitted for decision. law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of
Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the all workers and employees, including those in the public
SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly
preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil
Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of
Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions,
dispute. instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall controlled, are allowed to organize but they are prohibited
not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice- President is
2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve this
that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, different matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not being discussed in the Committee on Social Justice because
abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question we are trying to find a solution to this problem. We know
that the Constitution recognizes the right of government that this problem exist; that the moment we allow anybody
employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such in the government to strike, then what will happen if the
recognition also includes the right to strike. members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law happen to those people trying to protect us? So that is a
becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these matter of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But,
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the I repeat, the right to form an organization does not carry
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 with it the right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].
government employees to organize, the commissioners It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No.
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in
associations only, without including the right to strike. 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors Government, including instrumentalities exercising
of the provision that "[tlhe right to self-organization shall not governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted
be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], with proprietary functions:
in answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner .Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government.
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, — The terms and conditions of employment in the
explained: Government, including any political subdivision or
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is
long. When we proposed this amendment providing for self- declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein
organization of government employees, it does not mean shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or
that because they have the right to organize, they also have modification in their terms and conditions of employment.
the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only Such employees may belong to any labor organization which
talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in
the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the Bill of strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only
Rights, there is a provision that the right to form to employees employed in governmental functions and not
associations or societies whose purpose is not contrary to those employed in proprietary functions of the Government
law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the including but not limited to governmental corporations.
state is to prohibit the strikes coming from employees No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at
exercising government functions, that could be done one time it recognized the right of employees of
because the moment that is prohibited, then the union government corporations established under the Corporation
which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in the
provision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary
workers, including those from the government-owned and to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in
1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms and including government-owned or controlled corporations with
conditions of employment of all government employees, original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O.
including employees of government owned and controlled No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS
rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the is one such government-controlled corporation with an
Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161,
employees may strike, for such are excluded from its its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC,
coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are
807], is equally silent on the matter. covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by
of the right of government employees to organize, the the employees of the SSS was illegal.
President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government
the exercise of the right to organize of government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No.
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he 60403, August 3, 1:983, 124 SCRA 11 is relevant as it
Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in
and strikes in the government service shall be observed, the private sector and government employees with regard
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." to the right to strike:
The President was apparently referring to Memorandum The general rule in the past and up to the present is that
Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under 'the terms and conditions of employment in the
date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Government, including any political subdivision or
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11,
government employees ... enjoins under pain of the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and
administrative sanctions, all government officers and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass amended). Since the terms and conditions of government
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service." use the same weapons employed by workers in the private
The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the sector to secure concessions from their employers. The
absence of any legislation allowing government employees principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by
exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by law. Relations between private employers and their
express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to
implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor
that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
issue]. employment in the unionized private sector are settled
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition through the process of collective bargaining. In government
against strikes? employment, however, it is the legislature and, where
The Court is of the considered view that they are. properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil government which fix the terms and conditions of
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, employment. And this is effected through statutes or
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor- Management]
supplied]. Council for appropriate action.
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Government employees may, therefore, through their
Civil Service, in his position paper submitted to the 1971 unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the
Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment
Court in Alliance, to wit: which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason the appropriate government agencies for the improvement
of the nature of the public employer and the peculiar of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any
character of the public service, it must necessarily regard unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the
the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate
applying to public employees and civil service employees. It action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to
has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like
private employer, protects the interest of all people in the workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to
public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4,
interests as are present in private labor relations could not Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise
exist in the relations between government and those whom of the Right of Government- Employees to Self-
they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National Housing Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute
Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313, January 17,1985,134 arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the
SCRA 172,178-179]. government, including any political subdivision or
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of instrumentality thereof and government- owned and
the right to organize of government employees, while controlled corporations with original charters are governed
clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the by law and employees therein shall not strike for the
rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of purpose of securing changes thereof."
employment involved are not among those fixed by law. II
Thus: The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may
improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, be issued to restrain it.
may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor
employees' organizations and appropriate government dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC
authorities. and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to
The same executive order has also provided for the general issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the
mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the public strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and
sector to wit: conditions of employment of government employees shall
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations
procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public
resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over
government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved labor disputes involving government employees
unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the
existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not execution of the aforesaid order, if it has already become
precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under final.
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by
the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is
writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated
Labor - Management Council has not been granted by law March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED.
authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and
its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.
NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, SO ORDERED.
resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or
overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded with caution.
Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the
continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of
public service, the respondent judge, in the same order,
admonished the parties to refer the unresolved
controversies emanating from their employer- employee
relationship to the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory
Injunction," and reiterated in their reply and supplemental
reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld
bonuses and benefits due the individual petitioners and they
pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive
and mandatory injunction to restrain the SSS and its agents
from withholding payment thereof and to compel the SSS to
pay them. In their supplemental reply, petitioners annexed
an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated May 5,
1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not
preventively suspended and who are reporting for work
pending the resolution of the administrative cases against
them are entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and
other fringe benefits and affirmed the previous order of the
Merit Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this
Court, it is Our view that petitioners' remedy is not to
petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the