1

THE HISTORY OF THE IRAQ LEVIES 1915-1932

Robert Vernon Joseph Young

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of

Philosophy, University of London,
School of Oriental and African Studies
Department of History
September 1997
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the origins and developments of a

British-initiated force, known as “The Iraq Levies”, which was raised during
the Mesopotamian campaign of the First World War. This is a subject which
had previously received very little rigorous historical study.
The Force began with some forty mounted Arab scouts, recruited from
Zubair in southern Mesopotamia by the Field Intelligence unit of the Imperial
Expeditionary Force (I.E.F. ‘D ’) in July 1915. By May 1922, the Force had
expanded to approximately 6,000 officers and men, as against a planned 7,500
at the Cairo Conference.
A survey of the performance and military background of several
British officers who served with the Levies, was considered worthy of study.
Mostly they came from the Indian Army, and thus were experienced in what
may be described as “political soldiering” - an invaluable qualification for
their service in Iraq.
It was felt important that the different ethnic backgrounds and political
aspirations, as well as religious loyalties represented in the ranks o f the Levies
required investigation to assist in an understanding of their motivation and
service.
Without a detailed review of these factors, it would be difficult to
comprehend how a force which could be considered to owe its allegiance to
its pay-masters, could undertake the task of internal security in so volatile a
region as that of Iraq, especially during and after the First World War. When
its political problems, both internal and external, had to be resolved by the
British government which became the mandatory power.
This thesis ends with the achievement of Iraq’s independence in 1932.
The Levies, however, were not finally disbanded until May 1955. That final
section of their history was not to be without drama and incident; but it awaits
the attention of another student who is interested in the nature and evolution
of British Imperial Forces in the Middle East. Their day has now ended, but
this thesis hopes to illuminate a little of their history and significance.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

ABSTRACT 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3
PREFACE 4

CHAPTER I 5
Introduction and Discussion of Sources

CHAPTER II 16
The Mesopotamian Campaign and the Genesis o f the Levies,

CHAPTER III 56
The First Kurdish Rising and the Consolidation of the Levies.

CHAPTER IV 103
The Arab Insurrection and the Consequences of the Cairo
Conference of 1921.

CHAPTER V 159
Assyrian Enlistment. The Establishment of the Iraq Army,
and the R.A.F.’s Assumption of Control over Iraq.

CHAPTER VI 227
Attempts to Integrate the Levies into the Iraq Army,
the “Strike” of 1932 and the Conversion of the Levies
to become the Air Defence Force.

CHAPTER VII 251

Conclusion

APPENDIX 259
Note on Cavalry versus Mounted Infantry Controversy

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 260

ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY USED IN THE 262

DOCUMENTS

BIBLIOGRAPHY 266

MAPS
Map 1: Areas of Employment of Levies from 1915-1921 271
Map 2: Civil Administrative Divisions in the Occupied
Territories of Iraq 29 June 1918 272

ILLUSTRATIONS 273
Iraq Levy Uniforms
 4

PREFACE

The thesis would not have been possible in the first instance, I being a
very mature student, without the support of my family, and especially my wife
Ruth, as the work entailed my being absent from Suffolk over long periods of
research. I am also most grateful to Major Bryan Keatley for reading the draft
and providing valuable observations. During the last ten years, I have
received every encouragement from family and friends alike.
During my first four years as an undergraduate student at SOAS, I
owed much to several members o f the teaching staff in the History
Department for their patient guidance in the disciplines required in the pursuit
of higher education. In this period, in particular, my thanks are due to my
tutor Dr. D.O. Morgan and to Professor M.E. Yapp (now retired), Dr. G.R.
Hawting, and Dr. C.J. Heywood and also Miss M. Hillman, then the
department’s invaluable secretary.
I am indebted to several members of the staff of the SOAS Library for
their co-operation: to Mr. A. Farrington and his staff at the India Office, also
to the staff of the Public Record Office for providing me with every assistance
in my researches. I am likewise indebted to the curators at the Library of St.
Antony’s College, Oxford, for allowing me access to some o f St. J. Philby’s
manuscripts. My thanks are also due to Miss J. Marks for typing the thesis,
and to Mrs. C. Lawrence for the preparation of the maps.
Transliteration has proved a considerable problem, arising from the
range of documents used, and from the many small variations o f place names
to be found there. My aim has been to achieve a measure o f consistency and
also to make it possible for the reader to recognise the location of the major
events.
But I owe most to my supervisor, Dr. R.M. Burrell, for his
encouragement in my undertaking this work in the first place, for sustaining
my determination to complete it and for his unflagging patience in correcting
my method of presentation. Should any faults remain, they are mine.

RALLY.
September, 1997.
 5

CHAPTER I
“It would be strange indeed if in a life struggle between the
greatest oriental and the greatest continental power
Mesopotamia had played no part in the contest.” A Sketch o f
the Political History o f Persia, Iraq and Arabia: with
special reference to the present campaign (Calcutta, 1917),
p.2. (Probably written by A.T. Wilson.)

This PhD thesis studies the history of a small, but by no means

insignificant, military force in the Middle East, the “Iraq Levies”. The origins
of that body are obscure and complex, as Chapter 2 will show. It was born in
the confusion of the British campaign in Mesopotamia, which began very
soon after the Ottoman Empire joined in the First World War. That
Mesopotamian campaign has been the subject of much later research, and no
little controversy but, as will be seen, very few of the books written on it pay
much attention to the origins and role of the Levies. By the end of the First
World War they were, however, performing a wide range of valuable duties,
and their ad hoc origins in no way diminished their future role and
importance.
The work attempts to offer an interpretation of events; it is not a
traditional regimental history, which endeavours to record all the events with
relatively little attention given to analysis and interpretation. Therefore, not
all the known military operations performed by the Levies are included here,
but only certain representative ones, to demonstrate the wide range of tasks
they had to perform - often, as will be seen, without training and adequate
equipment. After the end of the First World War, the Levies were to be the
subject of numerous reforms and reorganisations, not all o f which were
carefully planned or well co-ordinated. Despite this, they were an extremely
usefiil force during the period of the British Mandate.
My wish to conduct research into the historical origins o f the Iraq
Levies was in large part personal, and due to the fact that I had both the
honour and pleasure to serve with that Force over a period of two years —from
1941 to the middle of 1943. During this time I spent four months in
Habbaniyah; one year on the northern frontier with an Assyrian company
based on Ain Zala; then six months in Sharjah and Dubai, commanding an
Arab company. There were also two other interludes with Assyrian
 6

companies in Iran and in Palestine, but my period of service is outside the

scope of the thesis. In all, my Middle East military service covered a period
of 16 years in eight countries, and this strengthened my wish to see how the
Iraq Levies formed part of the wider pattern of the modern military history of
the Middle East.
Prior to joining them, the Iraq Levies had existed for 26 years. I only
managed to glean a little knowledge of the origins of the force through
conversation with local men whose service in the Force was often
intermittent. But their experiences were sufficient to encourage further study,
should the opportunity arise.
As so little seemed to be known about the origins and development of
the Iraq Levies, this thesis has been structured around some simple and direct
questions - but finding satisfactory answers to them was by no means always
a straightforward process.
The basic questions were: What were the origins of the Levy Force?
What were the causes created by the Mesopotamian campaign which initiated
the early recruitment of local Arab irregulars, and what were the roles
designated to them, and by whom? What were these early tasks and how and
when did they change as the campaign progressed? How was this achieved as
the roles of the Levy Force developed and became more regularised in
character? What were the methods of recruitment, and what arms, uniforms
and training were found necessary to enable these irregulars to meet the
demands placed upon them by the Civil Administration and the imperial
Mesopotamian forces? How and why did it become necessary to recruit men
from other local ethnic groups as the campaign progressed and the area of
enemy-occupied territory increased until the armistice? In what manner did
the Levy Force work in conjunction with the imperial occupying forces at the
end of the Mesopotamian campaign, and eventually most closely with the
RAF?
An initial problem in answering some of the questions posed
concerned the location of the relevant archives - there were no consecutive
sets of files labelled “The Iraq Levies” at the India Office Library, or at the
Public Record Office. At the India Office Library and the PRO, the staff
appeared to have little, if any, knowledge of the Iraq Levies. Thus it was
 7

necessary to trawl very widely for information. The first task was to locate
relevant documents, and it soon became clear that I was venturing into
uncharted waters. According to my supervisor, that would be part of the
“enjoyable challenge” of my research, and so it has proved to be.
The layout of the thesis is based on a traditional chronological
approach, in which the pattern of events unfold as they occur. Sometimes the
chronology has been interrupted to carry forward the story o f a particular
series of events. The chapters vary in length and in the period of time
covered, because of the changing nature and intensity of events. Some themes
occur in almost all chapters - such as the importance and personality of the
man on the ground and the lack of co-ordination between London and
Baghdad which created the demand for innovation and improvisation by local
British Levy officers.
Only one file entitled “Iraq Levies” was discovered in the India Office
Library, covering the period from September 1919 to December 1920. Some
of the documents in the files were to be found as copies in other files - these
were of identical content, being copies sent to or from other departments. In
particular, these were often Political Officers’ reports, which had, for
example, been passed to London under a covering letter. This duplication
presented much extra time-consuming work.
Another problem sometimes encountered concerned the fact that
although the Indian government was responsible for the prosecution of the
“First Phase” of the Mesopotamian campaign, the conduct o f the “Second
Phase” was later assumed by the War Office. During the period of this
changeover of responsibility some items of correspondence were still being
passed to India while others were for the War Office and London only.
It was clear that the importance of an irregular body of Arab “guards”,
responsible to their local Political Officers, failed to draw much attention in
high places when Britain was still heavily engaged with the European
campaign. It was not until the first Kurdish revolt of 1919, followed by the
Arab revolt of 1920, that the Levies started to attract serious attention in
London. The PRO files pertaining to the Levies then became more
voluminous and coherent. From October 1922, when the RAF was given the
responsibility for the control of Iraq, the Air Ministry files on the Levies
became more orderly and easier to follow.
During research, some documents made plain the apparent muddled
thinking behind which many of the decisions were made. However, various
questions remained unanswered. In an attempt to let the facts speak for
themselves, it was sometimes necessary to relay the words o f the men who
dealt the cards, and those who had to play the hands assigned to them. In this
context, a letter acquired by the author, and written 011 25 June 1922, by a
serving British Levy officer, Captain P. S. Horny old, and cited in Chapter V,
p. 164, casts an important light 011 prevailing conditions in the Levies during
June 1922.
The first task was to discover and present the narrative of relevant
events as accurately as possible. Some of the information was based upon
technical military detail; for example, the exact composition and armament of
the Levy units. It has been possible to intersperse some o f this technical
information with descriptions of the performance of the Levies in their various
operations. This thesis is designed to describe how the Levies developed from
a somewhat disorganised force of sundry units into a balanced fighting force,
organised on recognisable military lines. It will be shown that this was
achieved in the face of considerable and varied frustrations.
In the context of primary source material, the following is a general
guide and evaluation of the documentary content of the files by chapters.
Chapter II covers 1914-1918: The War Diary of Lt.-Col. Beach, and his
Intelligence Summary on War Office Files 157/777 and 158/708 (World War
1. H.Q. Papers); also India Office File L/MIL/17/5/327, provided the
information on the recruitment of Arab irregulars, for assisting British Field
Intelligence officers in their work, and the first “Shabanah” and River Guards
on India Office Files L/P&S/10/617 to 732. The latter files contained a very
broad range of material, but there was, alas, no index.
In Chapter III covering 1919, the increasing number of Political
Officers5 Reports on their districts, as more enemy territory came under
British Civil Administration, provided an excellent source of information on
the early “Shabanah55, “Militia55 and “Levies55, as the designations for the
irregulars changed during the first four years of their existence. These reports
 9

were mostly available on the India Office Files L/P&S/10/617 to 732. There
were, of course, other files which contained some telegraphed correspondence
between the Civil Administration and London, and these are referred to in the
relevant footnotes and listed in the bibliography. This chapter also contained
the evidence concerning the first “Kurdish Rising”, derived from the
following India Office Files, L/P&S/10/162, 658, 732, 781, 889, and
L/P&S/5/798. Some of these documents are copies of Mesopotamian
Expeditionary Force telegrams.
Chapter IV covers the “Arab Insurrection” of 1920, followed by the
“Cairo Conference” of March 1921 and its immediate aftermath. For this, the
main documents are to be found in India Office Files L/P&S/10/175 to 874.
These contained the Civil Administration (Iraq) Foreign Office Files
371/5073, 5227-9, 6351, 8998 (Political and General Correspondence), and
Levy matters. Colonial Office 696/3 (Iraq - Correspondence and Reports)
covered Levy operations. AIR 5/1253 (Historical Branch Records Series II)
dealt with the Arab Insurrection operations, some of which were copies of
War Office reports, published in the London Gazette. Air Ministry Files AIR
5/555 referred to the Cairo Conference, as did Cabinet papers 24/123. Also,
Cabinet papers 24/126 contained some general memoranda on Iraq.
Chapter V, from 1922 to 1926, deals with the period when the RAF
took over “Control” of Iraq from the War Office in October 1922. The
preponderance of documents from then on were to be found in the Air
Ministry series AIR 2/1450, and comprise mostly Air Ministry policy for Iraq.
AIR 2/1451 deals with the policy on control of punitive bombing in Iraq. AIR
5/295 deals with the possibility of Levy units being transferred to the Iraq
army. Foreign Office film 371/9004 refers to the RAF defence problems for
Iraq’s northern frontier. These AIR files were well arranged by subject
content.
Chapter VI discussed events from 1927 to 1932, most of the
information for which is contained in the “Iraq Command Report October
1930 to September 1932”, files AIR 2/1452 and 5/1255; also Foreign Office
371/16922, and Colonial Office 730/118/5, which provided some items of
interest.
 10

It may be appreciated from this brief survey of assorted files, that the
research of the primary sources has represented a large jigsaw puzzle; a series
of miscellaneous pieces of information from which a picture has been
constructed on the growth of the Iraq Levies. There were very few instances
when one file could provide a sequence of any length on an issue. The reason
for this was that throughout the 18-year period covered by this thesis, the
structure of the Force rarely represented one coherent policy - it was for ever
changing, according to the needs of its prevailing masters. In other words, it
evolved by meeting requirements as they occurred. Therefore, no one
governmental department, or service command sired it; it was as orphan with
many foster parents, who cared for it only to serve their immediate needs.
It is also unfortunate that imperial units serving alongside Levy units
during, for example, the Arab Insurrection of 1920, failed in general to record
the conduct of the Iraq Levies. Levy records of these operations by the Force
should have been retained - but none were discovered by the author.
Regarding the secondary sources, only one was directly relevant to the
Iraq Levies - J.G. Browne’s The Iraq Levies 1915-1932. This, alas, gave no
indication of either the nature or location of the primary documentation
available to him as Levy Commandant between 1925 and 1932. The Iraq
Levies provides a typical condensed Force history, and has proved a helpful
signpost to chronology. Browne states that much of his information was
founded upon conversations with a number of British ex-Levy officers and
senior NCOs. In his conclusion, Browne assumes that the change of
designation to Air Defence Force heralded the demise of the Levies, whereas
in reality, it was but one more change of nomenclature to be added to their
list.
Inaccuracy was another problem to be confronted. In lhs work,
Browne states that Major J.I. Eadie was the first British officer to raise 40
Arab irregulars for the Field Intelligence of I.E.F. “D”. This assertion was
confounded by entries discovered in the “Intelligence Summary” of Lt.-Col.
W.H. Beach (Head of Field Intelligence for Force “D”) on W.O. file 157/777-
8. An entry dated 20 July 1915 indicated chronologically that Captain J.I.
Eadie was not the first - it was, in fact a Lt.-Col. Leaclnnan. This “find”
opened a faint trail to the genesis of the Levies.
 11

The secondary material on Iraq is quite considerable, but is lean on

coverage of the Iraq Levies. It is to be regretted that so few ex-serving Levy
officers recorded their experiences, particularly regarding the political and
administrative problems they encountered dining their service with the Force
between 1915 and 1922. The few articles found in regimental journals mostly
read like a recruiting campaign, stressing the recreational opportunities and
improved pay, perhaps to encourage their regimental colleagues to join the
Levies, in the years between the wars.
The most important secondary work, after that by Browne (mentioned
above) is Sir Arnold T. Wilson’s Loyalties Mesopotamia 1914-1920. This
work offers considerable information on the political background to Anglo-
Iraqi relations during the immediate post-war years, together with an
important insight regarding the British government’s inter-departmental
turmoil in coping with the restless development of the Middle East. However,
the Levies were but one facet of his remarkable list of responsibilities during
his tenure as Deputy High Commissioner in Iraq.
Other works give only incidental information on the development of
the Levies. These include C.J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs. It was his
service in Kurdistan during 1919 that was particularly enlightening. General
Sir Aylmer L. Haldane’s The Arab Insurrection o f 1920, showed how the
performance of the Levies in the field changed his mind on the military value
of the Force. The Assyrians and Their Neighbours by the Rev. W. A. Wigram,
is an interesting book, and provides an insight on the Assyrian people who
were to play an important role in providing manpower for the Iraq Levies.
A book which appeared by its title to be relevant, was The Role o f the
Military in Politics by M.A. Tarbush. It provides an example o f the existing
jealousies over the Assyrian Levies, expressed by the misguided Iraqi public,
which prevailed in the period discussed by the author. In fact, the work is a
disappointing one. It says very little about the Levies, and its view of them is
clearly influenced by Arab nationalist political views - as can be seen from
the following quotation:
The swaggering Assyrian levies with their slouch hats and red or
white hackles, who stood guard at the homes of the High
Comissioner, and Hinaidi, the British Air Force Fleadquarters,
 12

situated in a suburb of Baghdad, became the symbol of British

domination (p.97).

The Marquess of Anglesey’s History o f the British Cavalry 1816 to

1919, vol.VI, provided information on the “Cavalry versus Mounted Infantry”
controversy; and Brigadier-General F.J. Moberly’s official history of The
Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918, was most useful, not only for the
campaign, but also for a brief description of the Assyrian and Armenian
exodus from Urmia to Hamadan, and the formation of the “Urmia Brigade”.
There are a number of other works, listed in the bibliography, which provide
much general information on the historical background and many social and
other aspects of the ethnic groups serving in the Iraq Levies. These, with the
former works, helped to provide a picture of history of Iraq before and during
the years covered by this thesis.
The books listed in the bibliography provide reading on Iraq in relation
to Britain and her policies in the region, both prior to World War One and
during the Mesopotamian campaign and its aftermath. However, little can be
gleaned from this selection on the history of the Iraq Levies to the year 1932.
As will be seen in the bibliography, the range o f secondary literature is
wide. It includes official and unofficial histories of the Mesopotamian
campaign, regimental histories of those involved, and memoirs by serving
soldiers - one of the most interesting being On the Road to Kut, written under
the pseudonym “Black Tab” (referring to the collar tabs worn by the Indian
army’s equivalent of the Royal Army Service Corps). The author provides a
vivid account o f the floods and mud the imperial forces faced in lower Iraq,
which so impaired the progress of man and beast; all of which compounded
the difficulties in trying to maintain vital supplies to the fighting troops and
the evacuation of the wounded. Braddon’s Siege o f Kut may, with advantage,
be read in conjunction with the former, because the latter’s material was
obtained from officers and other ranks who were listed as being in Kut at the
time of the siege. In the same context, Millar’s Death o f an Army joins with
some others in the condemnation of General Townshend’s failure to press the
Turks to alleviate the suffering of his men in Turkish captivity. Davis’s Ends
and Means explores the problems and military misdemeanours to be found in
the prosecution of the campaign.
 13

Few publications, other than A.T. Wilson’s Loyalties Mesopotamia

1914-1920, have dealt in depth with the numerous difficulties experienced
both in creating and maintaining the British Civil Administration, already
mentioned above. However, Lyell, who served under Wilson as a Political
Officer from 1917 to 1920, leaving the service in 1923, appears to have
admired his chief for his iron determination, coupled with an inexhaustible
capacity for hard work. Lyell felt that the seeds of Bolshevism were
spreading in Islam. His work in the Land Registration Department (“Tapu”)
brought him into contact with many walks of Iraqi life. Main’s Iraq from
Mandate to Independence, may be read to advantage with Lyell’s work. Main
provides a lively view of Iraq through the eyes of an academic, and as a local
newspaper editor, between 1920 and 1930.
The two main ethnic groups, other than the Arabs, discussed in this
thesis, are the Kurds and the Assyrians. McDowall’s A Modern History o f the
Kurds, is a study in depth on Kurdish problems, and explains the causes for
their reputation for “political dissidence”. The Assyrians play an important
part in this work, as they became an essential source of Levy manpower.
Their history is well covered by Wigram, already mentioned above.
Westrate’s The Arab Bureau; British Policy in the Middle East, 1916
to 1920, is most revealing. It appears that the agency acquired an almost free
hand in foisting its ideas on London; it alone had the time to assess and
interpret the information acquired from its intelligence network; its reports to
London must have been like water in the desert to those seeking to acquire
knowledge on the world beyond Europe. Although Winstone’s The Diaries o f
Parker Pasha does not include Iraq, it does, however, provide evidence on
important personalities, both Arab and British, involved with Iraq, as being
members of one of the two Arab secret societies - namely Al-Ahad (Military),
and Al-Fatat (Civil).
There are several books which cover Mesopotamian history, while
others discuss British Middle East policy. Ireland’s Iraq: a Study in Political
Development, commences in the seventeenth century, when Britain
considered Turkish Arabia as an extension of the Persian Gulf, right through
until 1936, when the Society of National Reform began a vigorous
programme for infrastructure, to include road, railway and irrigation schemes.
 14

Jackson’s The Pomp o f Yesterday: the Defence o f India and the Suez Canal,
provides interesting references to Germany’s preparation of the Turkish army
for war against Britain and her Empire as far back as 1883, with the ultimate
objective of invading India. Yet, by the end of World War One, the British
army was administering almost the whole of the former Ottoman Empire
south of the Taurus mountains. In a similar context, Darwin’s Britain, Egypt
and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath o f War 1918-1922,
contains informative comments on British post-1918 imperial policy, stating
that her security lay ultimately not in her capacity to crush nationalists, but in
an ability to divide or defeat those powers whose military and economic
strength matched her own. In his work The British Army and the Crisis o f
Empire, K. Jeffery appears to have used some primary source material similar
to that used in this thesis, but has made no reference to the Iraq Levies. Also,
P. Marr’s The Modern History o f Iraq seems, in some instances, to lack
adequate research in the primary sources. The author claims: “The occupation
that was to change the future of Mesopotamia came about less by design than
by accident”. The Levies in c.1920 are described as “a special army
contingent recruited entirely from among the Assyrians”. It would appear
from these assertions, that too much attention was paid to local hearsay.
Nevertheless, the secondary literature had little to contribute directly
to the research, and this may perhaps be seen as further indirect evidence of
the obscure nature of the origins and early history of the Levies. After perusal
of this selection from the bibliography, the poverty of secondary material with
regard to their early history is made conspicuous by its absence when
compared with the copious imperial regimental and services histories of those
formations which took part in the Mesopotamian campaign. Also
unfortunately, there is little reference to the Levies in academic monographs
such as P. Slugglett’s Britain in Iraq 1914 to 1932, or in general histories,
such as E. Monroe’s Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914 to 1956.
Any inference on the immediately available sources must, however, be
tempered with the possibility of what the future may yet reveal; as must the
fact that the RAF Regiment is now so well established, and that the Levy
force had by 1932 become “The RAF Levies Iraq”. RAF historians may yet
discover valuable primary material and new knowledge based on the papers
 15

and memoirs of retired air force officers. Not to attempt to undertake such
research on the history of a Force, which literally “came under their wing”,
could prove a disconcerting omission, because the service of the Levy Force
extended into World War Two. Disbandment of the Force did not take place
until 1955.
 16

CHAPTER II

This chapter proved to be the most difficult of the entire thesis to

write, especially during the archival research 011 the origins of the Levies and
their growth. Many individuals had a role to play in the development o f the
Iraq Levies, some of whom left most useful documentary records, enabling
one to trace in detail the Levy evolution; others, because o f exigencies of the
wartime milieu, left little or nothing for use by later historians. What can be
claimed for this chapter is that it provides a far more detailed and in other
ways a substantially different picture from the more “standard” Force Record
by J.G. Browne.
It was the British invasion of Mesopotamia in November 1914, which
ultimately brought the Iraq Levies into being. It will be shown that in
December 1914, the urgent need for information by the Indian Expeditionary
Force “D”, about their enemy, the Turkish army, its intentions and strength,
this requirement became the essential catalyst for recruiting irregular Arabs
for service under British officers, for field intelligence-gathering work. There
also developed a need for using local irregulars in guarding the developing
Lines of Communication (L of C). By the use of more Arab irregulars, they
released a considerable number of regular British troops for front-line service.
Later, as the Mesopotamian campaign developed, the newly-established
British-organised and officered Civil Administration had essential tasks which
were also to be met by the use of “friendly” Arab irregulars.1
It will also be shown how official personalities played a considerable
part in determining almost every issue during the evolution and
transformation of the Levies; from a handful of Arab Scouts finding their own
arms, clothing and mounts, to a force that years later had a strength equal to
that of a weak Division, armed with light and medium machine-guns and
artillery.
Without World War One encompassing Mesopotamia, the Iraq Levies
would never have existed, therefore a brief introduction to that campaign is
felt necessary.

1 See M ap 1, p.271.
 17

On 5 November 1914, Britain and France declared war on Turkey, On

the same day, the Indian Expeditionary Force “D”, (I.E.F. “D”), approximate
strength one Brigade, sailed from Bahrein to Basra, seen as the “key to
Mesopotamia”, under the command of Brigadier-General W.S. Delmain. His
task was to secure the co-operation of the Shaikhs of Mohammerah and
Kuwait; to capture Fao, and to move up the Shatt-al-Arab to support the
Shaikh of Mohammerah and secure the Abadan oil refinery and pipeline. He
was also to reconnoitre routes towards Basra for the advance of the remainder
of the force which was by then being mobilised in India under the command
of Lieutenant-General A. A. Barrett.
Barrett’s charge was to take Basra, provided he considered his total
force was of adequate strength for the task. The Political Adviser to the
expedition was Lieutenant-Colonel P.Z. Cox. This officer is important, both
for his report on the initial stages of the campaign, and in the following years
as head of the Civil Administration in Mesopotamia. He already had wide
experience in the Persian Gulf region, and so carried considerable weight in
Indian political circles.
Fao fell on 6 November 1914. On 15 November, General Barrett
commenced his advance on Basra with the majority of his 6lh Indian Division.
Operations began with two successful minor actions, Saihan and Saliil, on 15
and 17 November respectively. By 22 November, I.E.F. “D” had occupied
Basra. The speed and success o f this operation raised British prestige in the
region.
At this point, troops had been deployed to protect the oil installations,
Basra was in British hands, and the short campaign had achieved its original
political and strategic objectives. The Turks had fled, and the local Arabs
received British and Indian troops with enthusiasm.
Plowever, events followed which would end in committing Britain and
India to a perilous extension of the campaign in Iraq; and this, in turn, created
the circumstances which led to the creation of various irregular groups which,
as will be seen, were the precursors of the Iraq Levies.
Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, the Political Adviser of I.E.F. “D”, sent a
private telegram to the Viceroy on 22 November 1914, stating: “ ...after
earnest considerations of the arguments for and against I find it difficult to see
 18

how we can avoid taking over Baghdad...” This telegram perhaps

represented the beginning of a dichotomy of political policy and military
strategy, where, for success, they should have remained interdependent. The
original limited political and military objective Basra, was within the capacity
o f India’s military experience and available forces - but the initial aim
expanded into an undertaking out of all proportion to its original concept. The
result of Cox’s expressed exuberance was that General Barrett was allowed to
expand his bridgehead. Barrett had approved that fateful missive.
The events which produced the initial recruits of the Iraq Levies after
the fall of Basra were complex, and it would be best to take them in
chronological order. During the Turkish evacuation of Basra, they destroyed
their administrative structure. This contingency was anticipated, and a senior
British Indian police officer arrived with a handful o f Indian police, within
two weeks of Basra’s occupation, to assume the policing of the township.
This police force was to expand slowly, and the training required was time-
consuming. This police force must not be confused with “Shabanah”,
“Gendarmerie”, or any other nomenclature adopted by the forerunners of the
Levies. But the latter did perform police duties in the basic sense until the
regular police could train men to take over - but only in the nature of “watch
and ward”. The police maintained a separate entity throughout the period of
this work.
The army’s expansion of operations increased the Lines of
Communication with dumps of stores and the use o f river craft to augment
their transport facilities, which were eventually followed by a railway system.
This military infrastructure with telegraph lines required troops to guard them.
To free the regulars for the front, the army employed a few local armed Arabs
but not before Cox, on 6 March 1915,2 cabled to India for “ 100 Punjabis to
protect against lawless gangs of Arabs”. His request was not met.
As military objectives were achieved, so the “occupied enemy
territory” increased, requiring pacification and administration. The officers
who would take charge would require an executive force with which to
impose their authority on the population in this acquired territory. For this

2 L /P & S /10/513, F.107

 19

work the Civil Administration would have to employ local Arabs. However,
in July 1915, the army’s field intelligence was to lead the way in employing
Arab irregulars to work with British officers. It was these particular Arab
irregulars who became the precursors of the “Iraq Levies”.
It will be shown that from 1915 to the beginning o f 1917, the initial
trend of the development of this irregular force mostly mirrored the somewhat
haphazard and disastrous escalation of the Mesopotamian campaign. As the
narrative unfolds, it will be noted that there are many confusing changes in
nomenclature in the early years; for example, the ubiquitous term “Shabanah”
(a Persian word meaning night-watchman), could indicate mounted or
dismounted men, and gave no indication of the exact employment or terms of
service, which will be seen to vary considerably. Their resources were few,
because the prosecution of the main campaign was all-consuming. Thus the
force was the “sworn brother to grim necessity” from its inception.
As stated, it was the Military Field Intelligence o f I.E.F, “D” which
was first to make use of local Arab irregulars. The senior Intelligence Officer
was Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Beach, R.E., and his assistant was Major H.
Smyth. A series of telegrams emanating from the Chief o f General Staff
(C.G.S.) India to General Barrett (the G.O.C., I.E.F. “D”), appears to have
been the catalyst causing the initial use of Arab irregulars in the field.
The I.E.F. “D” Field Intelligence “War Diary”3 quoted a telegram
from the C.G.S. India to General Barrett, dated 19 December 1914, which
began: “The organisation of an efficient intelligence service should be your
first consideration, and you should have agencies at least as far north as
Baghdad and as far west as H a’il. Can your present staff do this to your
satisfaction?"” Barrett responded to the effect that he felt his staff was
adequate, but stated: “ ...I will try to establish agencies at H a’il and Baghdad;
but at present the distance of the former makes it impracticable”. Indeed, one
can but wonder at the geographical appreciation of the C.G.S. India in making
the request in the first place.
The C.G.S. India continued to be less than impressed with the I.E.F.’s
intelligence activity and reportage during the first few weeks of the campaign.

3 L /M IL /17/5/3227, A ppx.94.
 20

He again telegraphed on 24 Decemberl914 to General Barrett: “Regarding

information of important Arab Chiefs and of the enemy, you are doubtless
keeping in close touch with your Chief Political Officer, nevertheless this fact
should not preclude your telegraphing all this kind of information in full to
me”. These two telegrams could have prompted the intelligence staff of I.E.F.
“D” into initiating Arab irregulars for use by their Field Intelligence Officers
- based 011 Indian Army experience on the North-West Frontier - urged on by
their Force Commander. These two communications were followed by a very
disgruntled third 011 the 26th:
.. .your intelligence service. So far it has rather lacked initiative, and
the outlook has been too local. Please impress 011 your General Staff
that the operations you are now conducting are regarded in Egypt,
India and London as a portion only of the principal campaign against
Turkish troops, officered and assisted by Germans.4

This last telegram arrived soon after the occupation of Qurnah (9

December 1914), after which the I.E.F. was involved in some stiff fighting
around Ahwaz, during which period its General Staff would have been fully
employed. Also in the same period, the strength of the I.E.F. was increased to
that of an army corps, which required that a senior general should take
command. The replacement chosen was General John E. Nixon, who
assumed command on 9 April 1916. It appears that it was not until after the
change in command that the intelligence staff had the necessary opportunity to
produce a scheme for improving their field intelligence gathering, the author
of which was Major Smyth.
Beach’s Intelligence Summary entry on 5 July 1915 stated: “Handed
Smyth’s scouts scheme over to eD(b)’ to carry on with”.5 Beach then stated
he had talked with Captain Eadie about working up local connections. Eadie
was one of the intelligence staff and an excellent linguist, and 110 doubt was
detailed to look into the possibility of obtaining reliable local Arabs for
Smyth’s scheme.
In the same Summary, on the 17th, Beach states: “To C.P.O. [Cox] and
told him Army Commander wished raising of Arab ‘Guides’ got on with at

4 L /M 1L/17/5/3227, A p p x.146
5 W .O . 157/777 and 778
 21

once. C.P.O. sent for Zubair (local Arab Shaikh) to be here tomorrow to talk
it over and get Scouts out now to watch for reported Kurdish Cavalry”.
It is worth noting that the nomenclature for the scheme already
vacillates between Scouts and Guides. This practice becomes the norm in
future Levy designations.
Before these early issues are set aside, another issue needs to be raised
—how Captain J.I. Eadie and Major R.E. Hamilton came to be thought the
first officers to raise irregular Levies for the military. It is in the work of J.G.
Browne (a senior officer in the Force from 1925 to 1932), The Iraqi Levies
(1915-32).6 His book states: “In 1915, Major J.I. Eadie of the Indian Army,
who was then a Special Service Officer in the Muntafiq Division in
Mesopotamia, recruited forty Mounted Arabs from tribes round Nasiriyah, on
the Euphrates, for duty under the Intelligence Department”. It appears they
became known as the “Muntafiq Horse”, were soon increased to sixty, and
were called “Arab Scouts”. This increment tallies with the Intelligence
Summary extracts being discussed.
Browne continues: “In March 1916, another small mounted force, also
sixty strong, was raised by Major Hamilton, the Political Officer at
Nasiriyah”. These were called the “Political Guard”. It will be noted, as
discussed above, that the nomenclature varies considerably, and will continue
to do so throughout this work. Unfortunately, the book, a most valuable guide
to the development of the Force, gives no sources for the content, other than
consultation with some fifteen ex-officers and N.C.Os.
It is desirable to establish chronologically who was the first officer to
command these “Arab Guides/Scouts” (Arab irregulars) for military field
intelligence. O f the Intelligence Officers on Beach’s staff, any one could have
filled the role; although they were sometimes attached to formations, they
were still directly under Beach and/or Cox. Leach man, an officer of
subsequent publicised fame, arrived at Basra on 11 March 1915. He was
interviewed by the C.P.O. (Cox), and posted as an Assistant Political Officer
(A.P.O.) to the 6th Infantry Division. There he held a dual role, both with the
military as a Field Intelligence Officer, and as an A.P.O. under Cox. In both

6 J.G. B row ne, The Ira q i L evies (London, 1932), pp. 1-2.
 22

these roles he was on the staff of the Commander I.E.F. “D”. Leachman was
no stranger to the country. He had travelled in Iraq in 1910, and in so doing
made useful Arab contacts.
For the purpose of establishing the first officer to command the Arab
irregulars raised by the Field Intelligence of I.E.F. “D”, it is necessary to
return to Beach’s Intelligence Summary and, in particular, the entry dated 20
July 1915. As discussed, Beach had visited Cox, and told him: “ ...the Army
Commander wished raising of Arab Guides got on with at once”. The next
n
entries are as follows:
17 July 1915. Interviewed Shaikh of Zubair with C.P.O. Got A.C. to
consent to Harvey for Guides at Zubair.
20 July 1915. Arranged that Harvey goes to Zubair to raise Guides
on 22nd. Gave him all his instructions.
20 July 1915. Leachman reports Arab Guides as a success.
21 July 1915. Gave Harvey final instructions before he leaves for
Zubair on 22nd to commence raising Guides.

These entries appear to provide reliable proof that Leachman was the
first with his “Arab Guides”. He seems to have obtained a head start in the
scheme, perhaps because of the previous Arab contacts made on his previous
trip to Iraq in 1910, as discussed above. Also, he may well have been in at the
inception of the plan because of his dual role as Intelligence Officer and
Political Adviser to the 6th Division (Major-General C.V.F. Townshend).
Neither Eadie nor Hamilton is mentioned at this stage in raising
Guides/Scouts.
Beach noted in his Summary on the 23rd: “A corps of Arab Guides is
being formed with sections at Khamisiyah, Nasiriyah, and Amara”. (Part of
this plan was put on “hold” by General Gorringe, Commander 12th Division,
on 6 August 1915).
However, on 24 July 1915, Beach wired Smyth that the Army
Commander had approved his numbers, “30 Khamsieh and 30 Nasiriyah of
Guides/Scouts for the townships of Khamsieh and Nasiriyah” respectively;
and that he was sending him Eadie to help interrogate some Turkish prisoners.
This entry in Beach’s Intelligence Summary dated 13 August 1915,
confirms the date when Eadie is first consulted about raising Scouts/Guides:

7 W .O. 157/777 and 778.

 23

“Consulted Eadie regarding Guide scheme at Nasiriyah”.8 Again, on 18

August: “Spoke Eadie regarding his possible move to Nasiriyah”.9 On 24
August 1915: “Told off Eadie for Nasiriyah”.10 By then it is clear that the
Guides/Scouts scheme had been launched; but it is possible to detect some
uncertainty, perhaps about their exact role. There was also the matter of
General Gorringe wanting the scheme to be put on hold in his area. So Beach
then refers both matters to the Army Commander (A.C.) on 24 July 1915:
“Spoke A.C. regarding definition o f I.Os’ [Intelligence Officers] duties at
Nasiriyah, and he wrote a d/o [demi-official] to G.O.C. 12th Division” 11
(General Gorringe).
Beach’s meeting with the A.C., and the latter’s letter to Gorringe,
seemed to have an almost immediate effect - because Beach’s next entry o f
the 27th stated: “ 12th Division report Arab Guides started”.12 Nixon was not
dubbed the “ginger general” for nothing. It would certainly appear from these
varied entries that the best of plans were still subject to the “fog-of-war”
meaning; the change of situations on the battlefield could alter plans and
priorities.
The next item of interest in these summaries is the method of payment
for the Guides/Scouts scheme. In the relevant entry o f 27 July 1915, Beach
notes: “Shaikh of Zubair in office. ...Paid him 1st month’s pay of Arab
Guides”.13 It appears that it was the practice to pay the Shaikh for the “hire”
of the men; and, as it subsequently transpired, this could include the Shaikh or
his son if they and their men were employed as a “unit”. This was certainly
the case for some remuneration for the “civil” irregulars. In these
circumstances, and for “military” employment, the men found their own arms,
clothing and mounts, fodder and food. •
The Summary has two more entries of interest. On 3 September,
Beach noted: “Major Smyth arrived. Lots of good news regarding Nasiriyah
arrangements. Guides scheme booming”. This indicated that Eadie’s unit
was in the field (some forty days after Leachman’s). From them on, Beach

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
 24

starts to receive Eadie’s intelligence reports, but these have not been traced.
The second point of note is an entry by Beach on 8 November 1915: “Eadie
wires asking to enlist more Scouts as new tribes come in. Wired sanction”.
This unspecified increment of men could tally with Browne’s assertion that
the Scouts/Guides were increased around this time.
Beach’s Intelligence Summaries point conclusively to the military
being the first in the field with Arab irregulars; that Leachman was first, with
his “Arab Guides” on 20 July 1915, and that Eadie followed with his men “on
the ground” by 3 September 1915. The fact that there is no further mention of
Leachman after the brief statement above, may be said to be typical of his
reputation - he avoided putting pen to paper, much to the chagrin of his
commanders and biographers. It is reasonable to assume that Leachman paid
his men direct from his official imprest account, as Beach does not comment
on paying for men on the “Tigris Line”. Leachman’s biographers relied
heavily on his letters home for information on his activities and campaign
locations. One of the three was Philby. In his unpublished “The Legend of
Lijman” (sic) he states: “And among them came Leachman’s future
biographer to whom, in due course, fell the task of dealing with his accounts,
and often large financial operations hastily scribbled on scraps o f paper and
not too easy either to decipher or to understand”.14 At the time Philby was the
Civil Revenue Commissioner in Mesopotamia.
It will be noted that throughout the campaign the Civil Administration,
under Cox, lacked a firm policy from London, especially as regards Britain’s
intentions after a conclusive defeat of the Turks —would Turkish rule ever
again return? Full co-operation could not be given by the indigenous
population without a firm undertaking on this point. As long as that
possibility remained open in the minds of the people, the uncertainty created
fear, in which mutual confidence was difficult to establish. Even the military
commanders lacked firm political objectives; the campaign proceeded on an
“opportunity basis”. In this way, the alternating fortunes in battle of the two
armies was reflected in the relations of the populace with the agents of the
British military government.

13 Ibid.
14 Philby, “T he L egend o f Lijman” (unpublished), p.8.
 25

As previously discussed, as well as the Arab irregulars serving in the

I.E.F’s field intelligence, there were irregulars employed by the newly-created
Civil Administration for the Enemy-occupied Territories. As soon as
townships were occupied, such as Basra, Ahwaz, Qurnah, Nasiriyah and
Amarah, a British Political Officer (P.O.) was installed. His first task was to
ensure local security. To this end the P.Os recruited Arab irregulars for the
task of watch-and-ward, usually via the shaikhs or headmen. They also
provided escorts for the P.Os. As the Civil Administration developed, the
military passed on to it the control of the river and store-dump guards
employed along the lines of communication. However, the strength of the
latter was dictated by the military, who also financed their pay.
It was the Arab irregulars, employed by the Civil Administration, who
acquired the old Turkish name of “Shabanah”. Although it is to be found in
various Military and Civil Administration documents, the name was
considered somewhat derogatory, because it was the ubiquitous name for the
unpopular Turkish gendarmerie. It was a name which took years to discard,
and, in spite of subsequent numerous official attempts to replace the term, it
endured. But it was never applied to the Irregular Field Intelligence Units of
the army.
But it is necessary here to establish the prevailing situation in the
campaign by the late summer of 1915, in relation to the activities o f the Civil
Administration. Broadly, the success tally of the Anglo-Indian forces was that
they had destroyed the enemy’s counter-offensives; and Nixon had established
a line on Nasiriyah-Amrali-Ahwaz to consolidate the Basra wilayet; the
oilfields and their installations were made secure, together with the Gulf
shaikhdoms of Mohammerah and Kuwait. Nixon had only to consider his
future plans. Already ICut beckoned, and Baghdad lay 103 miles beyond —the
latter a coveted prize of British generals and senior politicians alike.
By September 1915, the Civil Administration had six Special Duty
Officers (S.Ds) in the field, plus Leachman. An A.P.O. (Assistant Political
Officer), Captain C.T.W. Fowle, was sent to Ahwaz on 6 November 1915. It
may be assumed these S.D. Officers, working directly under Cox, were given
the task of making contact with the Arab shaikhs to prepare the way for the
new Civil Administration, and also to try to bring in the “waverers” on to the
 26

British side away from the staunch supporters of the Turks, A great deal of
extra enemy territory had been gained since the commencement o f Nixon’s
advance on Amarah and Nasiriyah in May 1915.
In his Summaries, Beach mentions on 19 October 1915, that Major
R.E.A. Hamilton was A.P.O. Nasiriyah. A further entry mentioned:
“Intelligence Officer states that in place of the 31 Arab Guides now enlisted in
Nasiriyah (all sons of Sheikhs), 300 could if necessary, be obtained of
excellent class without any difficulty”. The report was dated 8 October 1915,
so could have been sent by Hamilton. There is another connection with this
entry. Two of Leachman’s biographers mention the content of one of his
letters home, written some time in October 1915; it stated: “ ...They have just
told me to enlist a large number o f Arab horsemen - I lightly suggested that I
should command them m yself’. These entries confirm that these units were
popular with certain local Arabs, and were successful in the eyes of the
military.
Between mid 1915 and 1916, the Civil Administration acquired a
considerable area of enemy territory, which was divided into Political
Divisions and Subdivisions. The pacification of these “Enemy-occupied
Territories” began with the occupation of Suq-ash-Shuyukh and Nasiriyah (8-
25 July 1915). It was then that the Special Duty officers began to get the
shaikhs and headmen of townships and large villages to raise their own
“Shabanah”, on repayment, for duties of “watch and ward”. They were only
responsible for their own environs.
It is proposed to bring selected examples of the P.Os’ work in the field
into the discussion. The following reports by officers o f the Civil
Administration are the first discovered covering this early period in
correspondence15 concerning the “Political Control of Hammar Lake”, an area
occupied by the 12th Infantry Brigade. Three officers o f the Civil
Administration were requested to submit reports on control of the lake area;
they were Major Hamilton A.P.O. Nasiriyah, and Captains H.R.P. Dickson,
A.P.O. Suq-ash-Shuyukh, and A. Grey, A.P.O. Kurna. The reports were dated
3 January 1916. They are particularly interesting for their detailed comments

15 W .O. 158/708, January 1916.

 27

on some of the Arab tribal problems with which they had to deal, together
with recommendations for necessary action to be taken. Captain Dickson’s
has been chosen as the best example, as follows:
In accordance with G.O.C. 12th Division’s orders, that I should
submit my ideas in writing as to the best way o f redistributing,
administering, and policing the tribes of Hannnar Lake...assuming
Hanunar Lake will be put under Suq.

REDISTRIBUTION
(1) The Hammar Lake, including Chabaish and Beni Raad tribes to
be brought under A.P.O. Suq’s jurisdiction.
(2) All Lake tribes of Beni Khaigan stock to be placed under a
selected Beni Khaigan Shaikh.
(3) These Lake tribes of Bani Esad stock to be left under Shaikh
Majia of Chabaish.
This would do away with the perpetual source of trouble arising from
the fact that a number of Bani Khaigan tribes are now under the heel
of the Bani Esad tribe, with whom the Beni Khaigan have always
considered themselves at w ar...

His appreciation of the situation continues with his suggested plan for
administration of the Lake area. It was Dickson who offered the most detailed
suggestions, and from these it is possible to anticipate the shape o f the
irregular levied force, which was being created by pressure o f local situations.
The report continues:
ADMINISTRATION
(1) A junior officer who must speak Arabic, to be attached to
A.P.O. Suq, to help him run Suq municipality affairs and local
Police...
(2) A M udir... to have in his charge the policing o f the Hammar
Lake. ...He would have 30 policemen and one chaoush under
him ...
(3) A second Mudir to be appointed at Khamisieh. .. .20 mounted
police to be in his charge.
(4) A third Mudir of Beni Said. .. .Here a small post would be built
on spot where Turks had one. Under him would be 1 chaoush
and 10 men to be stationed at Beni Said. 1 Ombashi and 10
men at Hezlik village.

Under this heading there are typical “Shabanah” sub-units being

projected; some are to be equipped with “mashoof ’ (a clinker-built canoe-like
boat of the Marsh Arab, with high curved prow and stern), with which to
traverse the lake. The police are under a separate heading, which follows.
 28

POLICE
Head Quarters of whole Police Force in Suq area to be at Suq. The
police to be under the A.P.O. The Deputy Commissioner of Police
who it is understood will shortly take up his duties at Nasiriyah could
periodically visit and inspect them. The latter would also arrange for
pay and clothing etc. from Suq Head Quarters for all police in the
Suq area (i.e. Town Police, river police, horsemen and lake police).
The point being that though A.P.O. would control the Police
movements, and issue orders to them, they, the police would actually
form part of the Iraq Police Force, and would be paid and clothed
from Basra Vilayet funds.

There are a few interesting issues in this suggestion. It appears that

“regular police” are here under discussion, indicating that within a year the
Basra police had sufficient trained men for duty beyond that township.
Nasiriyah was the old headquarters of the Turkish District Administration. It
was of considerable political importance, being a centre from which the tribes
o f the Lower Euphrates could be controlled. There was also a strategic
consideration: situated at the junction of the Euphrates and the Hal., it had
represented a potential advanced base for any possible Turkish counter-attack
011 Basra.
So these considerations could explain the priority the area was being
given early in the campaign. The political divisions had to create their own
budgets, based on anticipated divisional revenue; that is why, in his
appreciation, Dickson is anxious to hive off the cost of police to Basra. His
projected revenue dictated the strength of his Shabanah force.
It should be noted that the small “regular police” element mentioned,
soon proved unsatisfactory, and was returned to Basra - it appears to have
been a linguistic problem, the police being Indian.
The next piece in the “Arab Irregulars/Shabanah” jigsaw is a document
to “The Director, Arab Bureau, c/o Director Military Intelligence, Cairo.
Memorandum. Tribal Guards under control of Political Officers”, signed by
A.T. Wilson, for the C.P.O., Iraq Section Arab Bureau.16 Although the
covering note is dated 26 January 1917, it obviously covers late 1916, as the
opening paragraph states: “ ...the light railway, Qurna to Amara was

1(5 L /P & S /10/617, Fs. 25 2 -2 5 9 .

 29

completed” (the date of completion being 28 November 1916). Extracts are

as follows.
It will be remembered that the Civil Administration raised a force of
local Arab irregulars to provide the Political Officers with the necessary
power to enforce their authority in their areas. The memo, begins:
The tribal guards (Shabanah) who are enrolled and paid by the local
political officers play an important part in the protection of the rivers
in the Occupied Territories and of the railway along the Tigris, of
which the section from Qurna to Amara is now completed, from
tribal raids, such as were common in the time of the Turk. No such
guards have as yet been enrolled for the protection o f the Basrah
Nasiriyah railway.

This confirms that by then the military lines of communication were

under the Civil Administration, and that the military advised the P.Os and
A.P.Os on the necessary strength and dispositions of these guards. Also, that
not only Shabanah were used for security of the lines of communication, there
was another method: “Tribal responsibility is not however absent even on this
route, the friendly tribes.. .being charged with the maintenance o f peace on the
desert frontier, in return for the subsidy accorded them”.
The text returns to Shabanah matters:
The Shabanah are enrolled by the A.P.O. o f the district through the
Shaikhs. Owing to the difference in local conditions and available
material it has not been found possible to maintain universal rates of
pay applicable to all districts, and at present they vary between 20 to
25 for Shabanah, 25 to 30 for Onbashis, 30 to 35 for Chaushes. The
men are supplied with arms and uniform by government. [The
figures refer to rupees.]

There are a few points needing clarification. Concerning pay, the

sums mentioned were paid monthly. Because the military was a big employer
of local labour, over-generous pay for the force could cause employment
problems. In the early days Shabanah were mostly armed with captured
Turkish rifles. On the question of uniforms (as stated) those who were
employed on a contractual (unspecified) basis, via a shaikh or headman, to
patrol their townships, villages and the environs of same, usually equipped
themselves to include mounts. But those men who were individually enlisted
by the P.Os, normally via the shaikhs, during late 1915 and early 1916, were,
where possible, issued with a headdress comprising argal and chafiyah, also a
 30

cavalry-style IC,D. jacket, sirwal (baggy cotton trousers), belt and ammunition
pouches, boots, or sandals. But uniform, such as it was, appears not to have
been regularised, and was usually in very short supply until 1918. However,
it is most doubtful if any attempt was made to provide the military field
intelligence Scouts/Guides with uniforms, as it would inhibit their activities as
intelligence gatherers, sometimes behind enemy lines.
The memo, confirms that: “The organisation of the force is in the
hands of the Assistant Political officer, and varies according to the
requirements of the district”. It further states that where the force was
composed of separate tribal elements, no single local leader could be put in
charge. Also, it was found inadvisable to post Shabanah in their own tribal
district, as they were tempted to take part in local feuds. As the service was
considered “honourable employment”, dismissal from government
employment was generally regarded as heavy punishment. The strength of
the force on the date of the memorandum of 26 January 1916, was 500, and
there were no manpower problems then. The designation “Sowar” (trooper)
implied mounted, and that of “Shabanah” dismounted; but even these basic
designations were seldom maintained. Shabanah was frequently used in the
context of both mounted and dismounted men, or in any other connotation.
The memorandum also confirmed that Shabanah irregulars were being
used as “district police”, as noted in this extract:
The Shabanah, or river guard, existed under the Turkish regime, and
a semi-military tribal guard, such as the Sowars o f Suq and
Nasiriyah, performing the duties of a civil police under civil
authority, corresponds very closely with the Turkish Gendarmerie
and is readily accepted as a continuation of the former administrative
system. Under existing social conditions the patrolling of traffic
routes by semi-military tribal levies is found to be the most effective
guarantee of security. Moreover Sowars and Shabanah will provide
an outlet for restless spirits and give an opportunity of honourable
service to petty chiefs and impoverished members of ruling families,
such as the Sa’adun, whose loyalty to the British administration will
be proportionately larger according to the measure of their personal
participation in local authority.

This last extract ends the memo, which is unsigned. However, there
can be little doubt that the author was Captain Dickson, A.P.O., Suq (Suq-ash-
Shuyukh abbreviated). The pointers are the citing of Suq and Nasiriyah as
 31

examples of policing by Sowars (troopers); he was ex-Indian Army cavalry;

spoke Arabic, and appears “at ease” in his appointment. Captain Dickson’s
reports will be used later for discussion in this work.
It will be remembered that early reference was made to raids by armed
Arab gangs in the environs of Basra, and Cox’s request to India for men of
fighting capacity from the Punjab. In this context, the reference to the river
guards perhaps requires a descriptive background to the then prevailing
situation, especially over the period November 1914 to the occupation of
Baghdad on 30 April 1917. I.E.F. “D” had a very considerable problem in
dealing with the audacious raids of tenacious gangs o f armed Arabs, who
targeted river craft employed in transporting military stores along the
waterways of the lengthening lines of communication. Nor were the attacks
of these gangs confined to the rivers; they were even brazen or courageous
enough to raid army store dumps, and had been known to crawl into military
camps under the barbed-wire fence to tie the muzzle and legs o f a tethered
cavalry horse, and drag it out under the wire. These conditions were partly
conducive to the early expansion of the civil irregulars.
A good example of the co-operation between the P.Os and the military,
is illustrated in an Annual Report for the Qal’at Salih District for the year
1916-17, by Lieutenant H. Hiles, A.P.O., dated March 1917.17 Under
“Shabanah”, he pointed out that: “ ...if the Shabanah are to remain a
permanent force in this area, the question will have to be taken in hand from
the revenue point of view ...” It appears that the number of Shabanah on
which he had estimated his annual budget, was not, in the opinion of the
G.O.C. Defences, sufficient to safeguard the railway, and extra men had to be
enrolled. Hiles’s annual cost for the river and railway Shabanah was about
£T2,000, which was more than the total land revenue received from the
Shaikh. “But on the brighter side, whereas the district had been in a very
unsettled state, caused by outlaw Shaikhs in the m arshes...it would not have
been safe or responsible, to have relied solely on the Shaikhs for the
protection of the Lines of Communication.”

17 L/P&S/10/617, Fs. 111-113.

 32

It may be appreciated from these brief sketches how and why the
irregular force of Shabanah evolved, and was by necessity tied to the
prevailing conditions in the campaign. The Civil Administration was trying to
establish in the minds of the populace that they (the British) were better
administrators than the Turks. In Wilson’s words, the task of the Civil
Administration was “to renew the weft and warp of the life of the civil
population”. Their duty was also to the British exchequer, by way of
recovering revenue from the people whose land was under their stewardship.
This was no easy task where almost every man was armed. It was soon after
the capitulation of Kut, for example, that attempts at voluntary enlistment
failed and the old fears that the Turk might return again took hold.
Almost every P.Os report from 1916 to 1919 throws more light on the
development of the irregular Shabanah in one way or another, because these
reports covered various periods and locations. Most of the reports are divided
into sub-headings, and cover all aspects of the P.Os division, for example;
revenue, crime, irrigation, railways, rivers, etc., and Shabanah. Where space
allows, their own words convey the flavour of their trials and tribulations so
much better than any paraphrase.
The next selected for its content on Shabanah, is from the A.P.O.
Qurnah District, Captain J.B. Mackie, dated 28 May 1917, for the year 1916-
17.18 Extracts on Shabanah state:
The Shabanah force in this district now total 246, while a further
force has been sanctioned but not yet recruited. Their business is the
guarding of the river telegraphs and railway lines in this
district...they have carried out their work in a thoroughly efficient
m anner...a lot of thieving...by the marsh tribes on the Tigris Line
but the Shabanah were too watchful and the thieves soon found that it
paid better to remain content with what they already possessed than
to run the risk of losing that for the uncertain hope of getting more.

Also his men provided protection for the “balam” convoys (local river
craft larger than “mahailas”, for conveying military stores). Like Lieutenant
Hiles, he stated that the tribes that had caused trouble had now “come in”, and
were living peacefully.

18 L/P& S/10/617, F.97.

 33

On Shabanah armament, Mackie noted that those on the Shatt-al-Arab

and Euphrates were aimed with Turkish rifles, and that those on the Tigris
Line had British long rifles. Lastly, it appears that no drill had been possible
because of security commitments; but there was a waiting list of recruits.
“Because of duties, little or no training could be undertaken...But almost
every many knew how to use a rifle, even if he was not schooled in the finer
points of musketry and ceremonial drill.”
To recapitulate briefly: in this somewhat confused beginning, the
irregulars served the requirements of the Military and Civil Administrations
alike. In the former role, as already discussed, they were employed by Field
Intelligence, found guards for supply dumps, telegraph lines and river “bunds”
along the lines of communication. Later, they undertook guard duties for the
railways and for whatever purpose regular troops could not be spared, the
irregulars filled the gap. Their duties in the Civil Administration have been
touched on, but in point of fact they were “jacks of all trades”, and were
without any organisation in the accepted military sense. There were no
establishments as such, numbers varied from district to district according to
requirements and the responsibilities of each P.O.
During 1916-17 attempts were made to provide a basic uniform and
this, like the strength and organisation of the force, evolved gradually and
according only to availability. Until then they used their local dress, found
their own arms and ammunition, and fed themselves and their mounts. As
mentioned in the intelligence summaries, they were sometimes “contracted”
(undefined) via their shaikhs or village headmen. As this discussion develops,
it will be seen that official terms for service finally developed.
The following Annual Report by Captain H.R.P. Dickson, A.P.O. Suq-
ash-Shuyukh, for 1916-17, provides a lively and revealing picture of his
method in organising his units.19 He appears to have been a keen and
progressive officer, as follows:-
The sub-heading conveys an important message, because of the
designation “Mounted Scouts” and also because the report covered the year*
1916-17, the year in which General Maude had taken command of the I.E.F.

19 L/P& S/10/617, Fs. 164-167.

 34

Maude was strongly against the use of Arabs in the “field”, and maintained
his stance in spite of being urged by London to utilise the local population
where possible. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that he had objected to
the use of Arabs by field intelligence, and so the “Muntifiq Horse/Scouts” of
Captain Eadie (the area of the Mimtafiq encompassed Suq-ash-Shuyukh) were
handed over to Dickson, an officer in the Civil Administration and P.O. at
Suq. It has not proved possible to support this contention by documentary
evidence, but, towards the end of this work, the supposition will appear more
feasible.
Shabanah Force and Mounted Scouts
He found the Suq police force, as discussed, “totally unsuitable”.
Their duties had been taken over by the “Suq Shabanah Force”. This unit had
been increased from 100 to 120 to meet the extra duties.
At that time the Civil Forces at his disposal were:
“A” Mounted Men “B” Dismounted Riflemen
1 Yuzbashi 1 Yuzbashi
30 Scouts 1 Bashchaush
1 Writer
12 Chaushes
120 Shabanahs

Total: 31 Mounted Total: 135 Dismounted

The “Scouts” were under a contractual arrangement, with Thamir Beg,

a Sa’adouni and an elder brother to ‘Ajaimi (who remained a thorn in the side
of the British, being strongly pro-Turk). Thamir, a prominent man of his
tribe, remained staunch to the British. At the end of 1916, he was without rent
for his lands, so, as an alternative, he petitioned to raise thirty mounted
Shabanah on a monthly subsidy of Rs. 1,500, plus a personal salary of Rs.500
per month. According to Dickson, the arrangement was most successful. As
mounted police, their duties were varied: they patrolled the local environs,
keeping law and order among the wandering tribes within the borders of Suq,
and were armed with good Martini carbines together with 100 rounds of
ammunition. It appears their work changed the whole temper of the area,
making it safe for the P.Os to ride at will, unescorted. The commander of this
“little patrol” was a fighter of local repute; disfigured by the loss of his left
 35

eye, but “ ...a quiet pleasing man to meet and the last man in the world to be
suspected of being a renowned desert raider”.
The “B” force of dismounted men was commanded by another
Sa’adouni, who also “knew his job”. They were organised into twelve
sections of ten men each. These were armed with the Turkish .304 rifle and
100 rounds per man. Their duties were primarily to keep the river
communications open; and secondly, to police the township and its environs.
Dickson claimed they were all good shots, and, as marsh men, could be taught
nothing about the management of a “m ashhuf’.
This officers’ force was organised to obtain objectives, namely
maintenance of law and order, provision of a small “Striking Force”, and a
training period for all of them. To achieve his three targets, he divided his
120 dismounted men into two parts. For fifteen days, sixty men (half the
dismounted force) were sent out to man nine district posts. The remaining
sixty manned five town and two river posts. These last sixty men were given
rudimentary training, and they also provided a force, which was directly under
his hand at headquarters, to deal with any major civil trouble. After the
fifteen days were completed, there was a “turnabout”; the sixty men on duty
outside the township exchanged duties with those inside.
Their training was, militarily, fairly rudimentary; it included a certain
amount of drill and musketry, with “great attention paid to cleanliness,
smartness and care of arms”.
It is fortunate that his reference to the Shabanah terminates with some
information on uniform and clothing. It is the first detailed description of its
development. He states: “The uniform found most suitable is a long khaki
‘Dugla’ or kind of Cossack coat reaching to the ankles. It is both pleasing to
the eye and liked by the Arab”. This description largely corresponds to a
caption “The Levy Uniform for 1916-1917” and illustration in Browne’s
Book. In the photograph two men are shown wearing agal and kaffiyah, the
‘dugla’, under which is a local white shirt and full cotton drawers tapering to
the ankles (the latter known as “thaub shillaht” and “sirwal”), and boots. They
also wore a local-type cartridge belt. In both pictures, covering 1916 and
1916-17, the men are shown wearing “abbalis” (the Arab cloak, of seasonal
 36

weight) over the whole habiliment. The latter, 110 doubt, because there were
no anny “greatcoats” to spare.
However, in his next paragraph he states: “A uniform scale of clothing
has recently been sanctioned for use of Nasiriyah, Suq and Hammar
Shabanahs and horsemen—a distinct advance in the right direction”. The
administration-specified uniform was only available for Shabanah in the
Nasiriyah area, perhaps indicating shortages, and that it was necessary in
Nasiriyah where, because of its Turkish municipality background, Britain
required to maintain a good image.
In the same report, Dickson made a brief comment 011 courts and local
crime. He claimed that Suq town and its environs were:
...curiously situated in this matter (crime). Whereas the town may be
looked upon as a civilized community to which ordinary laws of the
land can be applied, the surrounding tribes have been treated quite
differently. The Indian penal code cannot be bettered for purposes of
dealing with cases in the town, but Tribal Laws and Customs must be
employed in dealing with tribal cases.

It appears there was little crime in the township, other than petty
robberies from houses by tribesmen, in league with a townsman. But among
the tribes, matters were reversed, a man carried his life in his hands and
killing and being killed were a part o f daily life; but there was almost 110

premeditated murder. There were small tribal battles which, in almost every
case, could be traced to land-grabbing, or rivalry over women.
With the application of law and order, the need arose for the
apprehension of criminals, and sometimes the collective punishment of
villages or nomadic tribes, by punitive action. In all these matters the local
Arab irregulars, 01 *“Shabanah”, were the only civil law-enforcement agents of
the District Political Officers. Few, if any, regular police served outside Basra
township, being neither mobile nor suitable for such operations from 1915 to
1918.
Dickson understood tribesmen hated discipline, but four days leave
each in their homes, and Dickson’s own leadership and knowledge of Arabic
ensured their loyalty. The administration must have thought well of him, as a
number of his reports were selected to go to London via Cairo.
 37

So it was that the Shabanah, in their varied roles, undertook their

duties with little or 110 training 01* experience. Also, there was an important
anomaly—that of Christian invaders imposing their ideas o f justice upon
Muslims, who for many centuries had known none other than Qur’anic law.
This must raise the question of morale for these men in quasi-military
employment. Those employed by Military Field Intelligence were small
bodies of hand-picked men, led by experienced officers who spoke their
language and had been successful in winning the confidence of Asians in the
Indian Army, and perhaps, like Eadie and Leachman, had led them in battle.
Their dangerous work, often seeking information behind enemy lines, led to
mutual trust and confidence— a brotherhood developed in battle situations.
It is important to appreciate the divisions which existed in the Arab
irregulars and their duties, for a clearer understanding o f the growing pains
experienced— their duties were seldom clear-cut. There was a considerable
difference between the Scouts/Guides of Field Intelligence and the civil
Shabanah; the latter’s duties entailed guard duty along the lines of
communication, the rivers, and telegraph lines; or, in the situation o f Arab
policing Arab, in and around their townships; imposing restrictions on tribes
with whom they were familiar, and often being called upon to carry out
punitive action against them. The Shabanah, unlike the Scouts/Guides, mostly
lacked the occasion to experience comradeship with their P.Os in their more
mundane tasks. It required time and opportunity for their British officers to
acquire a similar understanding and mutual confidence with their motley, and
sometimes reluctant, men. It is remarkable how quickly their numbers
increased in view of the fact that there was 110 real organisation with which
the men could identify.
It should be noted that Lieutenant-Colonel A.T. Wilson, who had been
assistant to Cox, was appointed Acting Civil Commissioner in his place on 23
October 1917, when Cox was transferred to Persia. Wilson, like Cox, had
served in Iraq from the inception of the Mesopotamian campaign. He had also
been Cox’s assistant in the Persian Gulf prior to 1914; so he was no stranger
to the responsibilities of political stewardship. His new appointment was
merely an extension of his existing mandate.
 38

As discussed, the Shabanah strength was something in excess o f five

hundred 0 1 1 26 January 1917, at a time when General Maude had reopened the
campaign after a period of reorganisation and retraining of the M.E.F.
Baghdad was occupied on 11 March 1917, and the Turkish retreat north
began. The Civil Administration, by then under Wilson, continued to spread
its mantle of law and order over the newly-occupied territory.
It is perhaps helpful to give the reaction of an official war journalist
who visited the area of the Muntafiq in mid 1916. Because it is considered of
historical value to have the comments of a reliable witness on the complicated
conditions which characterised the work o f Political Officers, Candler’s
description of his experiences in the Muntafiq area are given below: “Anarchy
is normal. There is no village that is not a battlefield. Every Sheikh is against
his neighbour, brother against brother; and there is no loyalty within the
90
community”. O f Nasiriyah he stated:
A student of British methods could not do better than pass a day in a
town like Nasiriyeh, a year after occupation. Spend a morning in the
court of the Military Governor. In the seat of authority you will
probably find a very young officer, one of the type who has been in
the habit of spending his leave before the war in Persia, Arabia, or
the Himalayas, shooting strange beasts, picking up strange dialects
and studying the ways of stranger people.

Most importantly, he noted:

An interesting feature of our occupation was the enrolment of the
Nasiriyeh Arab Scouts. All the local tribes are represented in the
N.A.S., and a score of the Sa’doun, the ruling family of the Muntafiq.
The scouts have proved very useful in patrol work and military
intelligence.

This is an interesting piece of information in that it is recorded almost

exactly a year after the formation o f these irregulars by the military. By then
the name had changed from “Guides” to the “Nasiriyeh Arab Scouts”; and
already they had acquired a military abbreviation, the “N.A.S.”. Further, it is
reasonable evidence that they had indeed been Captain Eadie’s men.

20 Edmund Chandler, The L o n g R o a d to B aghdad, vol. I, pp.271-7.

 39

In contrast are the impressions of an American woman journalist, on a visit to

the war zone round about September 1917. 2!,1 She described the “Politicals”
briefly as:
These men in Mesopotamia should be called Civil Commissioners,
perhaps. They constitute a kind of balancing-bar between normality
o f government and actual military rule, and their duties are to see that
the life of the people goes on in the usual way, to introduce necessary
measures of reform in matters directly affecting the civil populations,
to keep open a friendly communication between the Arab head-men
and the British military authorities, to collect taxes and to maintain,
in so far as it is possible, the ordinary routine o f governmental
procedure.

This was a fair description, seen through the eyes of a journalist in the
centre of the theatre of war.
International law demanded an adequate administrative structure in the
occupied territories. However, aroused by Turkish incitement, some of the
Arab population, the tribes of the Shammar and Muntafiquin particular the
former under the influence of Ibn Rashid, and the latter Ajaimi were a serious
source for concern. In the districts, where the greatest burden lay, the essential
task was to obtain and maintain the co-operation of the tribal leaders. Indeed,
the P.O ’s Report for the “Muntafiq Division” (Major Dickson), for the period
ending 30 November 1918,22 observed:
It is hoped that Local Shabanah will be able to enforce all our orders,
the B. Sa’id alone can muster six times as many rifles as the whole of
the Shabanah force. Should one fine day the tribe take it into their
heads to decide to refuse to pay Revenue (a quite likely contingency,
because they had never yet seen any of our troops either on Tigris or
Euphrates), what then?

The exact date to which this extract from an Annual Report refers is
not known. As usual in a P.O’s report of this nature, it was a broad resume of
all matters concerning his district. The document was signed by Major
Dickson, P.O. Muntafiq Division, and dated 9 January 1919, for the year 1918
(it seems he had been promoted). It represents an important milestone in the

21 E.F. Egan, W ar in the C ra d le o f the W orld, p. 109.

22 L /P & S /10/619, F.291
23 L /P & S /10/619, Fs. 110-105
 40

development of the Levies. Dickson's Annual Report, pp. 16-21, begins as

follows:
SHABANA
The Shabana Force of the Muntafiq Division may be divided into 3
heads:
“A” The Muntafiq Horse (Mounted Gendarmerie) [Assume
ex-N.A.S.]
“B” Suq Scouts (Shabana dismounted).
“C” Town Police Shabana (for town duty only; dismounted).

The above are all under command of Lieut. F.W. Hall, Shabana
Officer for the Division, and were entirely reorganised, rearmed, and
issued out with one standard form of clothing during 1918. The
armament of the Shabana consists of .303 1914 short rifle and their
uniform is somewhat similar to that worn by Indian Silladar Cavalry,
except for the head-dress which remains the Kaffiyah & Agal. [The
kaffiyah was red and blue.]

From the breakdown of the above force, the ubiquitous use of the term
“Shabana” is, as usual, rather confusing. Here it denotes both mounted and
dismounted, if, in the latter context, the name “Scouts” is added. The
“Muntafiq Horse” described as “Mounted Gendarmerie” take on a quasi­
military character. This partly confirmed by the corps’ history, which is
related in the following extract:
THE MUNTAFIQ HORSE (strength 400)
This corps first came into being early 1916, and its original strength
was 30. In 1917 it was amalgamated with the then existing Muntafiq
Scouts (a military body), and the strength rose to 75 men. In the latter
part of 1917 it became necessary to raise the corps to 200 men, and
finally with our penetration of the Gharraf region it was decided to
raise the number producing a corps of 400 men. This corps is now
entirely responsible for the maintenance of Law & Order in the
Nasiriyah Dist. and throughout the Gharraf (Muntafiq Area). Every
effort is made to run the coips as a regiment, and the name “Muntafiq
Horse” was introduced to encourage the spirit of “Esprit de Corps”
among the men, who one and all are members of the Sa’adoun and
Muntafiq Tribes.

This brief history is so important to the main theme of this study that it
is deemed necessary to quote it almost in full. It tallies in general with
Browne’s contention of amalgamation. There is one point in nomenclature:
Candler wrote of the “Nasiriyah Arab Scouts”, dubbed by the military the
N.A.S. Dickson was P.O. Nasiriyah when Candler was there. Also, Nasiriyah
 41

was the main township of the “Muntafiq” and so under Dickson’s

stewardship. Thus it would appear that Dickson had amalgamated the
“Muntafiq Scouts” and the “Nasiriyah Arab Scouts” (N.A.S.) to form his
“Muntafiq Horse”.
At present the Corps being in its infancy —not a very high standard of
efficiency, is insisted upon. One’s idea is to popularize service in it.
Too much discipline does not suit the Arab, and at the
commencement of things it would be a pity to frighten the tribesmen
off. As time progresses, discipline will be tightened up and I have
every hope of the Muntafiq Horse eventually becoming the first
recognised Arab Irregular Cavalry in Mesopotamia.

It is also interesting to note that Dickson appears to feel that the

tribesmen were potentially better fighting material than the townsmen. The
duties of the corps were as follows:
a. Guarding the main lines of communication, by river and land,
in the districts of Nasiriyah, Shatra, and Qalatsikar districts. To
facilitate this, a chain of fortified posts were maintained along
the Euphrates and the Gharraf rivers, between Shattra and
Nasiriyah. This fortified chain, joined up with a similar chain
in Suq district and Samawa.
b. Replacing need for military garrisons at Shattra and Qalatsikar.
c. Finding escorts for Survey Teams; Revenue, Telegraphs,
Railway, Irrigation, and Agricultural advisers.
d. District Policing and general maintenance o f Law and Order.
e. Collection of Revenue, destruction of towers etc of recalcitrant
Sheikhs, when necessary.

The organisation of the “Corps” was broadly as follows:

Headquarters: Commanding Officer and staff of four
The Muntafiq Horse: comprised four squadrons, each o f 100 all ranks.
Each squadron (bulq) was made up of ten sections (mankar) of ten troopers
(sowars). Squadrons had two Arab officers and a sergeant and each section,
one unpaid corporal.
Pay: for officers and men as follows (per month):
Squadron leader Rs.250 Choush Rs.80
Squadron officer Rs. 15 0 Sowar proficient Rs.70
Bash Choush Regtl. Rs.100 Sowar recruit Rs.60

Supplied by Government: uniform, equipment, rifle and ammunition.

 42

N .B . Each man provided his own horse, saddlery and horse ration. The
C.O. passed the horse, which could not be changed without sanction.
Terms of Service; six months, with the option to re-engage if desired.
The recruits were entirely tribal, selected from the leading families in
the district. A “demand” for a specified number of men was sent among the
shaikhs, who supplied them. At the time of the report, it was ten per shaikh.
These were indeed, “levied” troops. Their training included dismounted drill,
rudimentary equitation, squadron drill, and musketry. The corps was also
served by regimental institutes, comprising veterinary lines, carpenter’s,
armourer’s and tailor’s shops.
It may be seen that this corps was being developed and organised on
established military lines; but this was not the situation throughout the country
under the Civil Adminstration in 1918. Most district irregulars were still run
on less structured lines and much smaller strengths. It was, perhaps, a matter
of maintaining the image of the Civil Administration in local eyes in that
important and potentially restive area, the Muntafiq.
It is reasonable to assume that the initial irregular units raised at
Nasiriyah caught the eye of the local senior army executive, perhaps because
of the energy and enthusiasm expended on them by officers like Dickson in
the Civil Administration, and Eadie in the Military. Once the potential o f the
irregulars as replacements in many post-war spheres to relieve regular troops
had been recognised by the executive, help, by way of army instructors, was
then made available.
As already mentioned, not all the districts were equally developed by
the end of 1918. The following quotes are offered in contrast to Dickson’s
report above, in an attempt to assist the understanding of the broader situation.
For example, the “Political Diary” of Captain L.M. Yetts, Dulaim Division,
for December 1918.24 He stated that the Shabanah were “ ...a good stamp of
self-reliant desert Arab, strong, healthy, and excellent physique* They were
engaged under the original method: an arrangement had been made with
neighbouring shaikhs to supply the necessary men; they were to be changed
“ ...periodically according to the Shaikhs’ fancy...” This meant that the

24 L /P & S /l0/620, F.344.

 43

greater majority of the men had to re-enlist every two months. On being
questioned, these Shabanah had stated that drill was a “nuisance”, and that
discipline was “abhorrent”. However, Yetts felt that if they were given
uniforms and ordered to concentrate at Ruhaimah, they would respond almost
to a man.
Lieutenant G.R. Pedder, A.P.O. in the Ba’qubah Division, had
completed a Shabanah Progress Report for December 1918.23 In it he stated
that: “If the Shabanahs are given a good place to live in, they take much more
pride in themselves and the discipline is far better”. It appears that in his
Division administration was ad hoc in almost every sphere. At Dalli ‘Abbas,
because of “ ...the scarcity of grain and famine prices, the horses are in poor
condition, but this should improve with the present grain issue”. When the
cost of grain rose above the norm, the troops could not afford to feed
themselves and their horses properly, and so “Revenue Barley” (grain taken in
lieu of money, in settlement of tax dues) was resold at a controlled
government price, and issued to the Shabanah on repayment. It appears that he
was authorised to finance the purchase of horses: “I have been compelled to
get rid of a number of horses quite unfit for work. If their owners have been
otherwise satisfactory, I have advanced them money to buy fresh horses, or
turned them into Piyadahs” (Persian term for foot soldiers).
One final interesting feature of this Division concerns the Shabanah
sharing guard duties with a neighbouring British unit (the 13th Hussars) by
way of training.
The Shabanahs liked working with British troops and at the same
time learning the duties of a guard...both parties appreciate it - the
Pte. Soldier because he gets fewer guards and the Shabanah, because
he is working with Britishers.

For the Shabanah, it was perhaps the first opportunity to feel that they
were at last recognised as soldiers, and their morale boosted accordingly.
Before leaving the issue of privately-owned horses of the Shabanah,
there was an interesting factor at work in those early days prior to the
reorganisation in 1919. Few Shabanah sowars owned their horse in its
entirety; they owned only a part of it—a leg, or perhaps two—the rest was

25 L /P & S /l0/620, F.365.

 44

shared with others, a sort of mini-consortium of village neighbours. Thus

during his service, the sowar endeavoured to buy the other partners out, to
secure full ownership. This arrangement could have led to horses being
underfed; the money saved on fodder being used to pay off the others of the
syndicate.
There are few mentions of camels being used by the Shabanah. During
the early planning stage by the Army Field Intelligence, there is mention of
getting some camels for the Guides/Scouts, but they appear not to have
materialised. However, they are mentioned by the A.P.O. of Zubair, Captain
A.H. Roberts, in his Administration Report for December 1918, under
“BLOCKADE”:26 “Khamisiyah was blockaded on the 19th and I went there
on the 22nd to explain the system to Shaikh Hamid, The whole of that area is
now being watched by camel patrols”. His force for blockade duty was fifty
camel sowars, and twenty-three piadas. The sowars provided their own
camels. The “blockade” was to prevent vital stores reaching the Turks.
Captain H.R.P. Dickson’s “Muntifiq Horse” was not the only
Shabanah unit which was under development as a military unit; there was
another, the “Hillah Shabahah”. As already demonstrated, the importance of
unique personalities in the Mesopotamian situation is exemplified by the work
of Leachman and Eadie in successfully enlisting Arab irregulars into the
army’s field intelligence. Also, there is a strong and able personality to be
found in Captain C.A. Boyle, who had joined the administration on 30
December 1917 to initiate and command the Hillah Shabanah. This is shown
in his long and detailed report for his P.O. Hillah and the Civil Commissioner,
Baghdad, dated November 1918.27 In due course (14 January 1919), it was
forwarded to the Under-Secretary of State, India Office, London. The Minute
Sheet had two interesting comments, as follows: “The Secretary, Military
Dept....this report...seems to indicate that there is good material for a future
‘Mesopotamian Army’. Sgd. Shuckburgh, 10 March 1919.”
This was followed by a second entry: “A very interesting report— & as
you say the material promises w e ll-m u c h better than I expected. Sgd. H.Y.
Cox, 11 March 1919”.

26 L/P& S/10/620, F.344

 45

Indeed, it was a well-constructed report, and covered the period from

January to November 1918. It is proposed to convey the gist o f the fourteen
typed pages as it represents the essential culmination of the ideas and needs of
the Civil Administration for a reliable force, organised 011 sound military
principles.
Boyle had spent the first three months “ ...endeavouring to induce the
Shabanah placed by the Shaikhs in the various road and district posts to come
into Hillah for training”. It may appear odd that they could not be “ordered” to
report—but, as discussed, the men were needed, and at that time they were
almost free agents. He eventually succeeded; and by the end o f March 1918
training commenced in earnest, in which the men showed great keenness. This
enabled him to weed out the old and unfit “(the latter mostly suffering from
venereal diseases).” He filled the vacancies created with recruits, and
appreciated the help given in the recurrent six-weeks training programme by
B.Os and B.N.C.Os attached to him as instructors.
The training was successful. “The men have shewn great zeal and have
adapted themselves to military discipline.” Recruiting had not been easy.
“Enlistment is the gauge by which one can measure the popularity or
unpopularity of the Shabanah amongst the Arabs and is therefore to a great
extent a measure of success.” He had at first found men from the tribes
difficult to recruit, but finally they responded; “but townsmen, none”.
The reason given is worthy of note.
In January and February, when training was started in Hillah, the
rumour went round that the British were short of men in the field and
that the Government wanted to form an Arab army either to fight the
Turk or to send to Bombay or London.

It appears that the issue of uniforms had given substance to the

rumour. Nevertheless, Boyle achieved his required strength o f 647 enlisted
Shabanah, after the discharge of 382 unsuitable men.
There were two other recruiting impediments. One was the “reported”
severity of the training; but this had been annulled when the men returned to
their homes, fitter and stronger than when they left. The other was the lack of
accommodation. There had also been the problem of suitable men being

27 L/P& S/10/619, F.609 to 623.

 46

“pressed” into the M.E.F’s Military Arab Labour Corps (who lived at home,
but were on less pay than the Shabanah footmen). They were used for
unloading ships, and in store depots.
The Shabanah terms of enlistment included the following: that the man
brought a certificate of good character from his shaikh/mukhtar, who
promised to produce him, if he deserted, during the first three months, which
was the length of service initially binding on each man; that his guarantor was
responsible for any item stolen by him; that tribesmen brought their own
rifles, and sowars their own horses (ownership of which has already been
discussed in detail). Saddlery, owned by the men, was of local design, and so
unsuitable for military service, in that it was not designed to carry equipment.
Boyle hoped this would be replaced by a “General Service” pattern in due
course. It will be remembered that similar conditions prevailed in the units of
Scouts/Guides in the Field Intelligence, in so far as arms, horses and saddlery
were concerned.
The chief recruiting agents were still the shaikhs, who were urged by
the P.Os to send men in. Townsmen were a very acceptable class of recruit.
Boyle felt they were strong and used to riding since childhood— “the ideal
cavalry recruit”. He wrote: “The Shabanah is now in its experimental stages,
and its status eventually will probably depend to a great extent on the
experience gained now”. The men enjoyed parades and field days, but he
wanted to get them into barracks to improve discipline, and to enable him to
get half his force in at a time for a month’s training, while the other half were
out at posts. He was sure that the training periods helped to break down tribal
barriers. It appears that recruits from shaikhly backgrounds had become
scarce; this was because of the policy of appointing “paramount” shaikhs in
districts, answerable to Political Officers. In this way minor shaikhs had lost
their previous influence, and the new senior patriarchs retained their sons to
help them with their increased duties.
After training, Hillah townsmen had produced some good drill
instructors, and were possessed of a basic education (usually from a Qur’an
school). They also proved to be good shots, and in addition were physically
strong and had good nerves. Boyle was satisfied that: “The Shabanah are now
 47

well competent to cope with practically any situation they might meet with, in
tribal fighting with the local tribes”. Boyle gives a shrewd insight on his
men’s mentality: “For example a man who would not think of missing a
parade or not turning up for guard, will, under cover of his uniform insult
passers-by or take bribes when on blockade duty”. He felt that “eradication”
of the aberrations would be “.. .gradual, but is certain”.
It is odd to note that the Hillah Shabanah had been issued with the .301
Peabody rifle. A serviceable weapon with a fixed battle-sight to 400 metres,
this rifle was an advantage in the hands of irregulars, and was superior to the
average weapon of the tribesmen. However, the ammunition supplied was
next to useless. Boyle hoped the issue of these ex-Turkish rifles was only a
temporary measure. The bayonets were o f a good pattern, but too heavy for
easy handling and smart drill movements. The mounted men were being
trained along “Mounted Infantry” lines; the horses only for mobility, not a
“shock” element, as in the cavalry.
It seems that Boyle was ordered to experiment in order to discover the
suitability of “Mounted Infantry” as a tactical arm for the irregulars, as
opposed to that of the “Cavalry”, adopted by Dickson for his “Muntafiq
Horse”. The force now had two units which were, perhaps, under close
scrutiny for decision-making on future policy. (A note on the issues of cavalry
versus mounted infantry will be found in Appendix A, p.259.)
In his report Boyle discussed horses. The majority of the issues have
been mentioned in this work; however, Boyle does make some points on local
Arab ponies:
A more ungainly and ill-shaped animal than the average type of
Shabanah pony would be hard to find - on the other hand, for hard
work, long-distance rides and cross-country riding over the type of
obstacles to be met with in this country, they are hard to beat.

He also mentioned the local “plate shoe” which, although in no way

conforming to the British model, “ ...appears very efficient and causes of
lameness from injured hoofs or bad shoeing, are practically non-existent”.
It is pertinent to mention here some of the minor operations in which
the “irregulars” are known to have been involved, other than as guards,
patrols, blockade duty, and general gendarmerie-type policing. Boyle’s Hillah
 48

Shabanah were sent to Madhatiyali on 12 April 1918, on a punitive operation,

involving the destruction of some villages and shaikhly defence towers, and
the apprehension of certain malefactors. The main reason seems to have been
the recovery of overdue revenue. This small exercise proved successful in that
Boyle’s Arab troops were prepared to punish other Arabs on the issue of
revenue collection, an affair in which they may well have held common cause
with the dissidents. They were next called out in the same month, on the 21st,
this time to destroy some twenty-seven towers and burn two villages. The
latter affair lasted three days and, most importantly, it entailed a mounted
march of thirty-three hours in the saddle, during which not a man or his mount
were found wanting. They had vindicated Boyle’s training regime.
Lastly, there was the problem of selecting suitable local officers and
senior N.C.Os. Boyle considered that there were three available sources. First,
the ex-Turldsh officer or ex-civil official. Secondly, relations o f a shaikh.
Thirdly, selection from the ranks. The first two offered the attribute of
education, but were found to have little influence with the men. The second
category was restricted, because they were needed for their influence in
administering the tribes. The third category was found to be the most useful
source, as discipline increased and tribal influence became less. The latter also
usually possessed a certain amount of education. In the long term, Boyle felt
there was no one suitable class from which to choose the ideal Arab officer,
that a class would have to be created, and that “more education would, in
time, improve morals and manners”.
It would be wrong to set aside this report before quoting his comments
on the right type of British officer for the force:
An officer with sufficient strength of character to assert his influence
on the men must first get their confidence and the high road to get
their confidence is to know their language so that they realise that
any complaint or petition that they make will be understood, and
fairly dealt with.

He added that physical fitness was an essential factor.

Generals Marshall and Costello had inspected his Shabanah28
alternately, and expressed their approval on the method of training, smartness

28 L /P & S /l0/619, F.608.

 49

in turnout, good physique and bearing; and finally, that they would turn into a
good corps.
By the end of 1918, the two Shabanah formations had partly taken on
the semblance of regular units, namely, the “Muntafiq Horse” and the “Hillah
Shabanah”, the latter more so as Hillah seemed to be earmarked as a training
depot, but without written evidence. However, they did represent opposing
lines of military thought; they epitomised the controversy o f “cavalry” versus
“mounted infantry”.
To re-quote both officers on this issue:
Dickson:
I have every hope of the Muntafiq Horse eventually becoming the first
recognised Arab Irregular Cavalry in Mesopotamia”.

Boyle:
The Sowars are trained and armed purely as Mounted Infantry, their
horses being used for mobility...any form of arrne blanche, except a
bayonet would be a hindrance to training...the effect o f controlled fire in
action by irregular mounted troops is much more than that o f uncontrolled
or semi-controlled shock-action.

These statements speak for themselves. They prove that Boyle was
aware of the controversy which surrounded the two tactical principles, the
basis of this important military argument; and therefore relevant in the history
of the “Iraq Levies”. It will be seen that, ultimately, the cavalry prevailed.
In so far as training was concerned in the Political Divisions, they
found it difficult to sustain an adequate programme because o f their other
commitments; but it was a situation that was being slowly overcome during
1918, as operations moved further north, and the outcome of the campaign
against the Ottoman forces was no longer in doubt. The military command,
also realising that hostilities would come to a successful conclusion, had
already designated the “irregulars” to replace regular troops wherever possible
in preparation for the inevitable run-down of the M.E.F. To ensure these
“replacements” were adequately trained, British regular N.C.Os were posted
to the Shabanah in some of the Political Divisions to undertake training in
drill, musketry and horsemastership. No doubt, because o f the then recent

/mirs
(lonoim.
\u m v y
 50

recruitment problems, there were insufficient recruits to warrant establishing a

training depot; also no future policy had yet been made known.
There were a number of problems concerning recruitment during 1918,
not all of which have yet been mentioned. To acquire much needed men,
coercion through their shaikhs had been used. This, in turn, created more
problems: “Owing to the difficulty of finding recruits, local Sheikhs have had
to give monthly subsidies to men in order to induce them to join...this has
raised their pay to Rs.70/- p.m.”29 The A.P.O. Aziziyah was forced to stop the
practice as it caused local labour rates to become”abnormal” (January 1919).30
The A.P.O. Diwaniyah, on the other hand, made a local notable, Kliadim Lulu
(with previous experience in the Turkish gendarmerie), a “Wakil Thabit”, “on
the understanding that he brings the Shabanah up to establishment”, 30
December 1918.31 “Establishment” in this context only meant the number of
men required for a particular Political Division.
There were other problems encountered in the recruitment o f both
tribesmen and townsmen in any number during early 1918-19. The former
were jealous of their freedom, and the latter found it difficult to leave rural
commitments. Most of the irregulars, at this juncture, were becoming
disenchanted with the niggardly pay and allowances on offer. There were
financial “rewards” to be obtained by the Shabanah for the capture, or
information leading to same, of wanted men. For example, the reward offered
for the capture of Alnned ibn Nahar was Rs. 1,000. “O f this, the lion’s share
will go to Chaush Sayid Muhammad, whose information led directly to
Ahmed’s capture” (August 1919). Indeed, a princely sum when considered
with his approximate pay and allowances of Rs.80 per month. But the chances
for such a reward were few.
By the time Ramadi was occupied on 29 September 1918, the
recruitment problem had worsened. The P.O. of the Mimtafiq Division
reported that since news of the Armistice had reached Mesopotamia there was
a general fear that the Turks would return to take vengeance on all
collaboators if Iraq were given back to them. However, Wilson, when visiting

29 L /P & S /10/620, F .497.

30Ibid.
31 L /P & S/10 /6 2 0 , F.284.
 51

the district in November of that year’, tried to dispel this fear by telling the
local leaders that “Iraq was the new ‘Arus’ (bride) of Great Britain, and would
never be returned”.33
Nevertheless, inducements were urgently needed to raise sufficient
Shabanah with whom to police the newly-acquired enemy territories. Back in
June 1918,34 Wilson had stated, in a report to London, that the conditions of
the Shabanah were changing, and that as so much more was now expected of
the men, the then current rates of pay were insufficient to attract men for
service. However, he felt that any increase would entail considerable
expenditure, and therefore “careful consideration” was needed before a
decision was taken. But almost every Shabanah unit was below its required
strength, and there was little choice but to act because desertions had already
started. Wilson ended with: “The labourer is worthy of his hire, however, and
prima facie there would seem to be no reason why the Shabana should not be
as well paid as the men in the regular police”.
By 15 September 1918, the increases had been approved and the
A.C.C. was able to report:
It has been found necessary to sanction a general increase in pay.
This has taken the form of a proficiency allowance at the rate of
Rs.10/- a month for horsemen and Rs.5/- for foot. It is granted only to
those who can pass certain tests [unspecified] and its introduction is
having a rapid effect in the improvement of quality.35

Pay for Sowars and Piada in “Civil Departmental Orders,

M.E.S.Ex.Force H.Q. Baghdad, 1st October 1918, Part 2 Establishments, p.
87, Political”,36 shows Shabanah pay for mounted and foot as follows:
Designation Rate per month w.e.f.
Chaush Rs.85 17.7.18
Sowars Rs.70 24.7.18
Piada Rs.35 24.7.18
(The 100 per cent increase of the Sowar over that of the Piada, was
caused by the feed allowance for the Sowar’s mount.)

32 L /P & S /10/617, F.448.

33 L /P & S /10/732, F.92.
34 L /P & S /l0 /7 3 2 , F.89.
35 L /P & S /l0 /7 3 2 , F.92.
36 L /P & S /l0 /6 1 9 , F.64.
 52

Taking the Muntaflq Division as an example, the rates o f pay as at 9

T7
January 1919 in the Muntafiq Division were as follows:
Squadron Leader Rs.250 per month
Squadron Officers Rs.150 per month
Bash Choush Rgtl. Rs.100 per month
Chaush Rs. 80 per month
Sowar “proficient” Rs. 70 per month
Sowar recruit Rs. 60 per month

The “proficient” Sowar included the new increase o f Rs.10 over the
sowar “recruit”, or a partly-trained man. The Sowar, it should be remembered,
was still responsible for feeding his mount.
The terms of service for Shabanah appear not to have been specifically
laid down in 1918. In the P.O’s reports, it seems to have been a matter o f a
man’s ability whether he was kept or discharged. In the Muntafiq Division,
the terms of service in mid 1918 were “six months”, with the option to re­
engage “as often as desired”. No doubt dependent on performance. Leave was
at the rate of four days per month. Perhaps these terms of service were in use
generally, although their promulgation has not been discovered in the files.
But it was noted that efforts to get the men to sign on for longer periods had
failed, with the result that the force was constantly full of newly-recruited
men. This was adequate proof that a fixed term of service did not then exist in
1918.38 This quick turnover of men could not have been conducive to
satisfactory training programmes.
Accommodation for the men had been almost non-existent. Usually
they appear to have been billeted about the towns and villages in which their
duty caused them to be stationed. There was no training depot or central
organisation—they were random units raised in the Political Divisions where
there was need of their services. However, the army executive became more
demanding, expecting a disciplined body, especially where they were taking
over more patrols and guard duties from the military. No doubt senior
officers, on tours of inspection, demanded a disciplined performance to
inspire them with confidence in respect of the force providing the

37 L /P & S /l0 /6 1 9 , F . l l l .
38 L /P & S /l0 /6 1 9 , F.150.
 53

replacements for regular troops. For example, in anticipation of

demobilisation.
However, men not living in a unit and with little training, would be
lacking in all-important morale. It was also difficult to impose discipline on a
scattered unit. In 1918, there were more efforts being made to find fixed
accommodation for the Shabanah. Captain Nelson Suter, P.O. Samawah,
stated:39
Sanction has been asked for the construction o f a Shabanah
headquarters building at Rumaitha. I sincerely hope sanction will be
given as at present the Shabanahs are scattered all over the town and
unless they are always together I fear they will never materialize into
a good corps.

And again in the Baghdad Wilayat Fortnightly Report No.20, dated 1

October 1918:
A Turkish fort, at the heart of the Jarbu’iyah district, known as
Manzil-al-Shu’bah, has been taken over and will be used as a
Shabanah Barracks. Lodging the men in barracks with necessarily
curtailed liberties, will prove a further test of the future possibilities
of the Shabanah as a disciplined force.

This was an undoubted attempt to bring a true semblance of military

discipline to the irregulars.
To complete the summary of this fragmentary development over the
war years by the precursors of the Iraq Levies in 1918, it is necessary to
discuss the imposition of military discipline. The practice of corporal
punishment was by then no longer used in the British Army. A Memorandum
explaining “The Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulations”, was in force in
Mesopotamia dining the war. They were based on “The Sudan Criminal
Procedure Code” (approved by Lord Kitchener after the reoccupation of
Sudan in 1898, and based mainly on the Indian Penal Code). It seems to have
applied to civilians and Shabanah alike. Whipping and flogging was the rule
in 1918, and no doubt earlier, under this authority. It is understood it was still
practised in the Indian Army at this time.
An extract from the P.O’s report for December 1918 is quoted as an
example: “Punishments: far fewer this month due perhaps to two severe

39 L/P& S/l 0/732,Fs.99 and 169.

 54

thrashings given last month to two sentries, found asleep 011 their posts, and
who had their rifles taken from them by military police” (an old method used
to provide proof of sleeping 011 guard duty—obviously a most serious
offence). It continued: “A year’s imprisonment to a very smart chaush, who
enabled another chaush whom he was to arrest to escape, has also had its
effect. The men dislike beating and I am avoiding fining” (ex. Ba’qubah
Division).40 Avoiding “fining” was correct, as the men received pay in lieu of
rations.
In conclusion, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, the progenitors
of the Iraq Levies did not have a straightforward planned inception— like
Topsy, they “grow’d”. Although for many years their major form of
employment was similar to that of gendarmerie, their conception and birth
was the result of a military liaison. It will be shown that, ultimately, they
returned to their original family as a levied military force, commanded by the
senior British officer responsible for security in Iraq, under whom they served,
in conjunction with imperial troops and units of the RAF.
No considered policy brought about their existence; only expediency
for intelligence gathering, to expand quickly into other spheres of need
engendered by the campaign. In this way expediency was the sole guiding
force, in the form of an ad hoc development, to include recruiting, strength,
arms, mounts and equipment, pay, clothing, and, finally, terms of service.
Each service increased in numbers until 1917, when it appears the
Field Intelligence units were handed over to be absorbed by the Civil
Administration; for example, when the “Nasiriyah Arab Scouts” (N.A.S.)
became the “Muntafiq Horse” under Major Dickson. It will be seen how this
particular unit maintained its entity, though not its designation, over the next
seventeen years. Following Dickson’s work in the area of the Muntafiq, a new
Shabanah unit was formed at Hillah, under the command o f Major Boyle,
whose purpose, it will be remembered, was to establish Mounted Infantry
training in particular. But for the time being, the Muntafiq Horse continued as
cavalry.

40 L /P & S /l0/620, F.365.

 55

Boyle’s Hillah Shabanah however were destined to become the first

training depot for the Force. The arms, especially the rifles, remained varied
in type, and there was no regulation saddlery. An attempt to get the men into a
standard uniform had been made, but even boots were in short supply.
Rates of pay had been established with a service agreement of sorts,
but expediency remained the theme for some time to come. There were only
two units, the Muntafiq Horse and the Hillah Mounted Infantry, which
appeared to possess a rudimentary military unit structure. The remainder of
the force was employed as “jacks of all trades”. The force strength remained
dictated by requirement.
The need for accommodation was, at last, recognised, but its provision
would take a great deal of time. Rationing had not yet begun, and there was no
firm policy for the future of the Force. However, it will be shown that this
irregular corps would be under pressure for organisation and expansion,
together with a training programme, in order to be able to take over as many
duties as possible from the regular army and to enable demobilisation to
begin.
 56

CHAPTER III

The previous chapter covered the British invasion o f Mesopotamia in

1914, the successful achievement o f the initial objectives in the Basrah
wilayet, the somewhat haphazard development of the campaign into a drive to
capture Baghdad - only occupied after the ignominious surrender of Kut -
and finally with the occupation of Mosul in late 1918.
It also showed how, during the first few months o f the campaign,
pressure from the C.G.S. India on the Field Intelligence staff o f I.E.F. ‘D ’ for
improved Intelligence Reports on the enemy, caused the raising of troops of
Arab Irregulars to assist the British Field Intelligence Officers in their work.
These Scouts/Guides were soon followed by other Arab Irregulars and River
and Army Depot Guards, along the Lines of Communication. The latter
irregulars were organised by the Civil Administration, and quickly expanded
into a corps representing the executive power of the Civil Administration
during the period of British control of the Enemy Occupied Territories.
Political officers used them as personal guards and District Police in the
capacity of “Watch and Ward” in the villages and townships.
The reader will see that this chapter, unlike all the others in the thesis,
covers in essence a single year—that o f 1919. This is because that year was a
crucial one for the future development of the levies. It was seen in the last
chapter that the historical origins of the Force were both complex and obscure.
Its development until 1919 owed a great deal more to personal initiative by
individual British officers, and to often uncoordinated ad hoc arrangements,
than it did to any coherent planning and the subsequent implementation of
such plans.
In 1919, however, that situation began to change. The war with the
Ottoman Empire was now over, and the British government had to consider
the long-term future of Iraq, which inevitably involved the future nature and
role of the Levies. It soon became clear that the planning for the future of Iraq
often looked much more urgent in Baghdad than it did in London, where the
British government had a post war list of other issues and problems to be
addressed, which was truly daunting both in length and complexity. As
always, the British government made European issues take precedence over
 57

those in the Middle East and elsewhere. What appeared very urgent in
Baghdad— or in Cairo— did not attract as much attention in London, until,
that is, violent subversion occurred, as it was to do in both these countries.
Then London had to take more notice—as will be seen in the following
chapter covering events in 1920.
Those in charge of planning the future of Iraq were faced with the
British National plan for demobilisation, then in full operation. It had been
implemented in answer to the popular political and governmental demands for
financial stringency. This, in turn, demanded the withdrawal o f large numbers
of imperial troops from Iraq and so produced the need for an “alternative”
military force to be established to fill the gap created by the departing troops.
This would have two major assignments. The first to perform the tasks
of the troops scheduled to leave for demobilisation in the United Kingdom;
the second, and partly-related task, to maintain law and order throughout the
country - a far from easy undertaking in the aftermath o f war and military
occupation. In some remote areas prolonged periods of lawlessness resulted
from lack of control by central government.
The accomplishment of those twin tasks of taking over British troops
and establishing law and order was a heavy undertaking, given both the
fragmented nature of Iraqi society and the often rugged terrain in the north.
The situation for the British officials in Baghdad and in other towns and cities,
was made all the more difficult by the lack of agreement in London on plans
for the future of Iraq.
It was in this context, for example, that in the mountains o f Kurdistan,
the Assyrian refugees from Ba’qubah camp were to be utilised for use with
imperial troops under General MacMumi to help quell a violent Kurdish
uprising. Owing to demobilisation there was a shortage o f men trained in
mountain warfare, which skill was second nature to the Assyrian
mountaineers from their Hakkiari enclave, where they lived as a Christian
“millet” in that region of Turkey, and had fought successfully with the
Russians against the Turks until the Russian revolution left the Assyrians
isolated. Thus, short of ammunition and Russian support, they fled south to
Ramadan in August 1918.
 58

As has been noted, the British government had other more urgent
issues and problems to confront at the end of the First World War; the lack of
guidance from London further exacerbated the many difficulties facing the
British authorities, both civil and military, in Iraq. It will be seen also in this
chapter (and in the following one), that even when the British government did
devote time and attention to consideration of the future o f Iraq, different
departments of state held very contrasting and sometimes confusing views on
what should be done, and how.
This chapter therefore covers a difficult and complex period. The
urgencies and confusions of the war period may have ended, but the transition
to a new and generally expected peace-time role for the levies, was to be a
difficult one to visualise and to achieve. Progress was neither smooth nor
uneventful.
The main issues for discussion include the organisation o f the Levies
at the beginning of 1919, the dispositions of the Political Divisions, the Civil
Administration’s stewardship in Kurdistan, the first Kurdish uprising, changes
in Levy designations. Above all we see the commencement of the
reconstruction of the Levies, entailing the decision to divide the Force into
two parts - a “Striking Force” comprised of both Mounted Infantry and
Infantry and “District Police”, both mounted and foot. Also, where
appropriate, it is proposed to discuss the general situation existing in the
Force, as seen through the eyes of the P.Os and A.P.Os.
As a prelude to an investigation of the role of the Levies, it may be
helpful to recall some of the causes which formed the basis of the unrest in
Iraq. Among these was the publication of President Wilson’s fourteen points
of 8 January 1918, in which the twelfth point stated: “the nationalities now
under Turkish rule should be assured o f undoubted security of life and an
absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development” . This was
followed by the Anglo-French Declaration on 8 November 1919. This stated
that the object of the British and French in the East was the establishment of
national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the
initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations. These statements
were a source of motivation for independence by many of the ethnic and
religious groups which had constituted the Ottoman Empire. Among those
 59

peoples with whom this work is directly concerned were the Arabs, the Kurds
and latterly, the Assyrians.
Without attempting a detailed and extensive discussion 011 these and
other political pronouncements, suffice to say that the ambiguity they created
did not ameliorate the already difficult task of the Civil Administration. The
frontiers created by the war had not yet been agreed; for example, the Iraq-
Persian frontier from Fao to Ararat, as laid down by the Frontier Commission
of 1914, had not been ratified. More importantly, the northern frontier with
Turkey had yet to be resolved. In 1919, the British proposals for delineation
were meeting strong Turkish resistance, and the issue was o f considerable
concern to the Kurds as its projected path, in their eyes, would separate what
they regarded as their true homeland. The latter issue was to form one o f the
reasons for outbreaks of contentious and dangerous unrest in Iraqi Kurdistan
in which Turkish infiltrators were to become a part. Even the Syria-Iraq
frontier was politically undefined, with what could be described as a “no­
man’s land” in the Ottoman Mutasarrifiik of Deir-ez-Zor, an area which was
to cause problems, and will form the first section of the next chapter.
In the context of these complex problems, the men to whom fell the
task of dealing with the aspirations and disputes arising from them in the
postwar period, were Cox and Wilson. Cox, it will be remembered, was the
“Political Adviser” to I.E.F. “D” in 1914. Then, when the designation changed
in July 1916 to “Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force” (M.E.F.), he continued in
that capacity until April 1917, when he became “Civil Commissioner” for
Iraq, with Wilson continuing as his Assistant from February 1915. However,
Cox was put 011 “Special Duty” as H.M’s Acting Minister in Tehran from 1
March 1918. Thus Wilson replaced Cox to become Deputy Civil
Commissioner in Iraq and left Iraq when Cox returned on 16 September 1920.
Although Cox and Wilson provided continuity in the political field
from the commencement of the campaign until after the Armistice, the sole
responsibility for the administration of Iraq lay with the Commander-in-Chief
(G.O.C.-in-C) Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force, until Cox’s reappointment
as High Commissioner for Iraq. However, because the situation in Iraq
remained volatile, political and military affairs continued to be
interdependent.
 60

In preparation for discussion o f the events affecting the Levies in

1919, it is first necessary to recall the Force’s position at the start of that year.
That will be followed by an investigation of various plans for improving their
rudimentary structure and organisation. As previously indicated, it appears
there was still some confusion in the Civil Administration as how best to meet
the pressing demands on the Force. This was made apparent by the series of
changes which followed one another, indicating uncertainty and lack of
direction by the executive.
By the beginning of 1919, the Civil Administration had two partially
organised units, namely the “Muntafiq Horse” at Suq under Dickson, and the
“Hillah Shabanah” of Boyle; the former were being trained on the lines of the
Indian Irregular Horse (Cavalry), and the latter were on trial as “Mounted
Infantry” (M.I.). The remainder of the Force continued as before to be an ad
hoc Force, dispersed throughout the Political Divisions. Divisional strengths
varied greatly according to local requirements. The Force remained the
executive power of the Civil Administration. The “Shabanah” o f the P.Os
performed the tasks of District Police, or gendarmerie; the latter designation
was used intermittently. Already, in early 1919, the Force was either
performing or gradually taking over various military commitments from the
M.E.F.
A “Memorandum on Shabanah in Mesopotamia” was issued on 8
November 19181 by the Civil Administration. It appears to have been the first
of its kind and is mentioned by Browne. However, as it failed to establish a
real military organisation, it is felt it would have been less confusing to delay
discussion on it until the beginning of 1919, because alterations to it followed
quickly in that year.
The contents of the memo, explained the chain of command and gave
instructions for future co-operation with the military. It also stated that P.Os
were responsible to the Civil Commissioner for the maintenance of order and
collection of revenue. Also, there was at the P.O’s disposal the means to
enforce order, which were:

1 L /P & S /l0/618, Fs.52-6.

 61

1. Armed Arab district levies known as Shabanah.

2. Town police—police. (Meaning dismounted Shabanah.)
Further, the P.Os had certain responsibilities to the local military
authorities for the protection of railways, stores, posts, etc. There was to be
close liaison between “Administrative Commandants” (in reality military
liaison officers) and the P.Os. The latter were responsible for the safety of
their Sections, commanded usually by the A.P.Os; but the “Administrative
Commandants” of the military were responsible for their locations, to assist
the P.Os to obtain aims and equipment and generally help in making the
Shabanah Force efficient. It may be assumed that the arms and equipment
were to be supplied from the M.E.F’s Ordinance and Equipment Depots.
The allocation of Military “Administrative Commandants” to P.Os
was listed as follows:
Base Section to deal with the P.O. Basrah
Kurnah to deal with the P.O. Kurnah
Amarah to deal with the P.O. Amarah
Kut to deal with the P.O. Kut
Advance Section to deal with the P.O. Baghdad
Euphrates to deal with the P.O. Nasiriyah and Samawah Euphrates

A.P.Os were being appointed to command Shabanah in each Political

Division; they were directly responsible for matters o f routine, clothing,
equipment, pay, accounts, and for keeping their P.Os informed as necessary.
A.P.Os could use Shabanah in their districts, subject to the general approval
of their P.Os, Another condition stated: “ .. .that no action should be taken with
the aid of Shabanah which may involve bloodshed, without reference to the
local military authority”.
Under “Defences of Localities and Small Posts” it was stated: “The
men should be trained in this, but its importance is secondary, as a British
Officer would always be at an important point, and it is not desired to train the
Shabanah to act as a military force”. This instruction now reads somewhat
ambiguously; there was only one British officer per Shabanah unit, and that
was the A.P.O. Therefore, he could only supervise one post personally, and
Shabanah strengths mostly allowed for more; also, as they were taking over
military posts, it could only mean that they were taking on military
responsibilities.
 62

The uniform of the Force remained similar to that already mentioned

in Dickson’s Report for 1918-19 in the previous chapter: agal, chafiyah,
blouses kurta K.D., pantaloons, putties, boots, shirts, belts leather, brass
shoulder badges. However, three types of rifle were on issue, which was
strange, especially at a time when efforts were being made to achieve
standardisation; also bayonet, bandolier and water bottle. Haversacks were
“issued on demand only”. This latter proviso is difficult to understand,
especially where men were to be on detachment, perhaps manning isolated
posts, and needing to carry rations and items of clothing. A brass badge was
mentioned, but not described. It may be assumed to have been the crossed
“Kunjars” which remained the insignia of the Iraq Levies.
The Memorandum also laid down a scale of pay for Shabanah. Yet
again, there appeared an unexplained lack of uniformity. The scales varied by
Political Divisions; four of them did not get the “Proficiency Pay o f Rs.5/- per
month”, but the Muntafiq Horse received Rs.10/- for this allowance. Because
no such distinction was accorded to Boyle’s Hillah Shabanah, it may have
been a “sweetener” for the Sa’aduni and other Muntafiq tribesmen. The
Muntafiq had proved to be a difficult people to control.
The following table shows the extent of the variations in pay:
Mounted Troops Foot Troops
Chaush Rs.55 to Rs.90 Chaush Rs.30 to Rs.55
Sowar Rs.45 to Rs.70 Sowar Rs.20 to Rs.40.

No explanation is given in the Memorandum for variations in the pay

scales. The lowest paid mounted men were in Kut and, for the foot, in Qurnah
and Amarah. These pay inequalities could have perhaps stored up trouble for
the future. It will be shown in due course that the Civil Administration was
not averse to breaking monetary promises given during recruiting.
Using the Memorandum it is possible to calculate the total number of
men in the District Shabanah at that time. There were 1,882 Mounted Troops,
and 2,781 Foot. In addition, there were 442 Municipal Watchmen and 362
men referred to as Revenue Colchis and Blockade Police. The overall strength
was therefore 5,467. This figure is also shown by Browne.
The two important units previously mentioned were included in the
above totals. Their individual strengths were as follows:
 63

Nasiriyah (Major Dickson) Mounted: 430; Foot: 367 Total: 797

Hillah (Major Boyle) Mounted: 480; Foot: 429 Total: 909
Grand Total: 1.706

Thus, of the total 4,633 District Shabanah, the Muntafiq and Hillah
Divisions together equalled more than a third of the Force’s total strength and
represented the only potential fighting force in a real military sense.
It is felt helpful to give the dispositions of the Political Divisions at the
« ■ 9 * * * ■
beginning of 1919. The fourteen Divisions shown rose to sixteen when it was
felt expedient to expand the stewardship of the Civil Administration further
north. It will be seen that the Political Divisions quoted below are not always
named after the geographical location of the P.O’s headquarters/office.
Kirkuk was in the Mosul wilayat, and had been occupied by the British
on 25 October 1918.3
Division P.O’s H.O. Division P.O’s H.O.
Dulaim Ramadi Khanikin Khanikin
Samarrah Samarrah Kut-al-Amarah Kut-al-Amarah
Hillah Hillah Amarah Amarah
Shamiyah Najafi Muntafiq Nasiriyah
Samawah Rumaitha Qurnah Qurnah
Baghdad Baghdad Basrah Basrah
B a’qubah Ba’qubah Kirkuk Kifri

In order to understand the difficulties faced by the levies in the north it

is necessary to appreciate the ethnic complexity of that region. After the
occupation of Mosul on 6 November 1918 the indigenous manpower situation
in the Levies began slowly to change. Hitherto, the men serving in the Force
had been Arab, with a few Turkoman and Persians. The new British territorial
commitment of Kurdistan entailed the employment of Kurds, as well as other
minor northern ethnic groups, with which to police the region.
There is confirmation of the employment of “Kurd levies” by the
M.E.F., probably in a “Mobile Column” of 6th Division, commanded by
General Cayley during an advance on Kirkuk in May 1918. This fact perhaps
indicated to many that the Kurds were not necessarily anti-British. Their use
by the M.E.F. in the spring of 1918 is mentioned by the Marquess of

2 L /P & S /l 0 /6 1 9 , F .107.
3 M ap 2, p .2 7 2 , sh ow s Political Districts.
 64

Anglesey in his History o f the British Cavalry 1816-1919.4, stating that in the
spring of 1918, when Kirkuk was occupied and the road to Persia closed to
the Turks and German agents, Irregular Kurdish Horse were raised under
British cavalry officers and N.C.Os. This group of irregular horse changed -
“from dashing cavaliers became frontier foot police”.
Wilson also mentions the use of irregular Kurds in his Report to the
Secretary of State, India, for the months of October/November 1918,5 in
which he stated that,
...no organized Shabanah force in the Khaniqin District, and the
duties of Shabanah have been carried out partly by Kurd levies and
irregular horse provided by Muhammad Beg Dilo. The [Kurd] levies
are not under political control and the need of their combined
existence has disappeared.

By this it may be assumed that Wilson meant that these irregulars were
not under his control, nor on the official pay roll of the Civil Administration.
There had been conditions of famine throughout certain of the areas adjoining
the Persian frontier, making the maintenance of public order difficult. Major
E.B. Soane was then P.O. in Khanaqin Rom 5 December 1917, and raised a
force of 200 Kurds under their own chiefs— among whom was Muhammad
Beg Dilo. Soane may have taken on some of these men after their use by the
M.E.F ended.
Amidst the religious minorities of this region was a significant
Christian element, the Chaldeans (Assyrians, who formed a schism from the
Nestorian Church, and given “Uniate” status); not to be confused with the
Turkish Assyrians. In this important context, an administrative report from the
Basra wilayat in the autumn of 1918 casts an interesting light on the arrival of
Assyrians (Nestorians) in Iraq from the Hakkiari and Urmia via Hamadan,
many of whom were destined to serve first with the M.E.F., and later in the
Iraq Levies.6 Item “C” of the report was headed “Migration of the Jelous”
(“Jelous” being a “generic term” applied to the various Christian tribes
operating in Trans-Caucasia, especially Urmia). It stated: “The Assyrian
(Nestorians) engaged in the defence o f Urmia against the Turks, evacuated

4 M arquess o f A n g lesey , H isto ry o f the B ritish C a va lry 1 8 1 6 -1919, vol. 6, p. 135 (London,
1995).
5 L /P & S /l0 /7 3 2 , F .119.
 65

that district early in August (1918) with their wives and families and large
quantities of horses and cattle and sought protection with us”.
The “families”, mostly comprising women, children and old and
infirm men, were drafted into a large reception camp at B a’qubah on the right
bank of the Diyalah river. Those of the men who were willing and fit to bear
arms, were enrolled by the British army at Hamadan into mixed battalions (to
include men of the Armenian refugees) organised by General Marshall, and
officered by those who had served in the then defunct mission o f General
Dunsterville. This corps was officially designated the “Urmia Brigade”.
However, the Armistice precluded this Corps from taking the field, and it was
disbanded, the men being sent on to Iraq to join their families at Ba’qubah
camp.
Later it will be seen how the Assyrians were called upon to assist the
M.E.F. in fighting the Assyrians’ traditional enemies, the Kurds. It is in the
context of Kurdistan that the Civil Administration’s governorship of Mosul is
now discussed.
The Civil Administration’s stewardship in Northern Iraq began in
Mosul, and Leachman, whose work has been mentioned in the previous
chapter, was posted there as P.O. 011 11 October 1918. During November of
that year, he reported on the state of his new Division.7 He found the ex-
Turkish Mosul Gendarmerie, on paper, comprised about 1,000 men many of
whom “were old and useless”. He returned to Turkey all serving men of
Turkish nationality. Those from Baghdad and Lower Mesopotamia were
returned to their homes in Iraq.
By the end of November, this Gendarmerie battalion consisted of
twelve local officers and 362 other ranks. It may be noted that the term
“battalion” is used for the first time in the context of the Shabanah/Levies
(Leachman was an Infantry officer). Enlistment of recruits commenced and
drill instructors obtained (borrowed, no doubt from local M.E.F. units). Five
companies were formed according to districts. Leachman felt it necessary to
“pay the men at a high rate, and Rs.50 was fixed for unmounted men”. His
“high rate” of pay was perhaps to discourage his men from resorting to the

6 L /P & S /l0 /7 3 2 , F.94.

7 L /P & S /l 0 /19, F.287.
 66

Turkish method of augmenting poor pay with bribery. There was a serious
shortage of winter uniforms; “khaki drill is unsuitable to the cold winter in
these parts”. However, equipment was plentiful. (The latter, perhaps, because
the M.E.F. depot was in the township.)
At about the same time as Leachman’s appointment to Mosul, Major
E.W.C. Noel was appointed as P.O. to the Kirkuk Division, which did not
then include Sulaymaniyah. His role was to maintain contact with political
and military developments in Kurdistan as they occurred. The region, with its
mountainous topography created serious tactical and supply problems for the
Army of Occupation. For the P.Os it presented a confused and dangerous
political situation.
Generally, the Kurdish and Armenian questions were seen as
interrelated, both in London and Baghdad. Wilson had tended to confirm this
view in a telegram to the India Office in October 1918.8 He urged the
necessity for creating “a Kurdish confederation, free from Turkish influence”
if an independent Armenia state, “which he understood to be contemplated by
His Majesty’s Government and the Allies, was to have a fair chance”. It will
be shown that the Allies’ concern for the Armenian situation caused the Kurds
to fear the possibility of Armenian domination in the region, backed by a
sympathetic European support.
Wilson received a letter from Shaikh Mahmud of the Barzinjar after
the occupation of Kirkuk by British troops in April 1918. In the letter,
Mahmud offered his loyal services to Britain as representative in
Sulaimaniyah. However, the Turks reoccupied Kirkuk for a short period and
the place was re-entered by the British in June 1918. Nevertheless, Wilson
had replied that he would accept the Shaikh’s offer when the British returned
to the region after the hot weather.
It is now necessary to discuss events on the appointment of Major
Noel as P.O. Kirkuk Division. It may be remembered that on 1 November
1918, Wilson, in his brief, had instructed Noel to appoint Shaikh Mahmud as
Governor of Sulaimani, should he consider it expedient, and to make other
appointments of this nature “at your discretion”.9 Noel was also to help the

8 L /P & S /l0 /78 L F .5 0 3 -4 .

9 A .T. W ilson, M eso p o ta m ia 1917-1920. A clash o f loya lties (London, 1931), p .128.
 67

local chiefs, and to try to maintain law and order in areas beyond those under
military occupation, which included Sulaimani. This was because the M.E.F.
was reluctant to have isolated detachments too far north in view of
provisioning problems (bad terrain with no roads) and lack of adequate
communications.
Noel organised his Political Division in November 1918 according to
his brief, appointing Shaikh Mahmud as Governor of Sulaymani, and other
Kurdish officials to minor subdivisions to work under the guidance of British
P.Os. This was in the hope of meeting some of the Kurdish aspirations for
their own administration and autonomy, rather than the imposition of Arabs.
But the tribes and townsfolk of Kifri rejected Shaikh Mahmud.
Wilson then visited Sulaimani by air 011 1 December 1918 for a
meeting with Shaikh Mahmud and other local notables. I11 their discussions it
was pointed out to the Shaikh that the tribesmen and townsfolk o f the Kifri
and Kirkuk Divisions did not accept his leadership. In response, Mahmud
agreed not to press for their inclusion within his proposed jurisdiction, and
accepted the situation.
But, in fact, this was by way of a subterfuge to gain time for his future
undeclared plans. It was in the latter context that Mahmud was to let it be
known locally that he had a mandate from all the Kurds of the Mosul wilayat,
and many in Persia. In short, in his mind, he desired to form a Unitary
Autonomous Kurdish State. Also, during Mahmud’s discussion with Wilson
he had “ ...asked for British Officers for all Government Departments,
including officers for Kurdish levies, stipulating only that the subordinate
staff should, wherever possible, be Kurdish and not Arab”.10 This was the
general agreement between Mahmud and Wilson.
The importance of the region to the British and future Iraqi
governments at this time is encapsulated in a memorandum by the Political
Department, India Office, initialled by Shuckburgh, dated 14 December 1918
to W ilson.11 It highlighted the reasons for the region’s importance for the
viability of Iraq, which were: “ ...the power paramount in this country will
command the strategic approaches to Mesopotamia and control the water

10 L /P & S /l0 /7 8 1 , F s.503-4.

1] Ibid.
 68

supply of the eastern affluents of the Tigris, 011 which the irrigation of
Mesopotamia largely depends”. It was felt in London that Baghdad needed
both Basra and Mosul for Iraq’s existence.
Before returning to the events in Kurdistan, which entailed the
appointment of Shaikh Mahmud as Governor of Sulaymaniyah, and the
disruptive outcome of that decision some months hence, it is first necessary to
discuss the varied condition of the levies in some of the Political Divisions, as
seen through the eyes of the P.Os and A.P.Os, and to include those in the
more remote areas.
Major Dickson, P.O. of the Muntafiq Division, whose reports on Levy
local organisation and detail proved to be enlightening, was also informative
011 local conditions under his responsibility. His report covering the winter of
1918-19 is chosen because of his insight into tribal ethos.12 The Shabanah
force of his Division was then so organised as to enable musketry training to
be started in Nasiriyah, resulting in daily improvement in marksmanship.
Dickson intended to include Suq in this training programme; this had been
made possible by the arrival of three British O.R. instructors, sufficient for
one instructor to each Squadron of the “Muntafiq Horse”. There was 110

mention of Mounted Infantry Training; perhaps it was not then mandatory.

On the Muntafiq tribes, Dickson found them all to be well-armed with
good rifles and plenty of ammunition. In this context he stated:
I think that if the Arab is left alone and given a fair amount of law,
order and justice and if, especially, roads and railway follow quickly,
he will soon find a rifle a useless thing, and existing arms will
gradually find their way into the Arabian desert, where they will
always fetch good prices.

Nevertheless, at the moment he felt that a “stronger British Garrison

was required at Nasiriyah— able to move out quickly, and to strike hard at the
first signs of trouble, within a 50 mile radius”. In this his judgement and
foresight proved prophetic.
Dickson’s views on the immediate improvement of his Levies was
confirmed in Wilson’s comments in a memorandum to G.H.Q.M.E.F. on 23
December 1918.13 They were important in proving the progress the

12 L /P & S /l0 /6 1 9 , F .291.

13 L /P & S /l 0 /6 1 9 , F .447.
 69

“Shabanah” were making during the last few months by talcing on the duties
o f imperial troops to release them for repatriation and demobilisation. Their
increased efficiency “has made possible a reduction in the number o f troops
on various lines of communication without anarchy resulting”. Wilson’s final
words also echo those of Dickson in respect of the need for mobile troops able
to strike hard and quickly in the event of trouble, in view o f the weakening of
the imperial garrison then in progress. There were still elements in the country
who resented the British occupation.
Wilson’s memorandum included praise for the work being done by
Boyle at Hillah: “The greatest credit is due to Captain C.A. Boyle to whose
energy and initiative much of this improvement is due and to Lieut. A.R.
MacWhinne at N ajaf \ He made no reference to Major Dickson, and his work
with the “Muntafiq Horse”. This may have been, perhaps, the first noted clash
o f personalities in the creation of the Iraq Levies. According to Philby,14
Wilson wanted Dickson out of Suq some time in mid April 1917, and had
tried to get him sent as Deputy Director of the Department of Local Supplies,
while Cox was C.P.O. However, Dickson declined.
The following various reports show the variation of conditions in some
of the Shabanah in the Political Divisions at the end of 1918. The problems
varied by type. There was no “pattern”; one would be in need of uniforms,
while another would find recruiting difficult. Captain Carver, A.P.O. Anna,
expressed grave concern for the condition of Shabanah horses under his
command in December 1918.15 They were then still the property of their
riders; the main problem being that those horses of reasonable quality were
underfed. In view of the official move towards training as Mounted Infantry
then being undertaken by Boyle, the problem of poor mounts could only be
overcome by the issue of Government animals and rationing them, if
reliability and uniformity were to be achieved. It is clear that the poor
condition of levy mounts continued for some time.
With regard to the men, there was the common lack of uniform,
without which they could not look smart, and in consequence would lack
morale. But he too had received help, by way of British O.R. instructors, and

14 W. St. John Philby, "M esopotage” (unpublished), p. 168.

15 L /P & S/10/628, F .561.
 70

those Shabanah free of other duties were made available for drill every
afternoon, . .and this was stiffening them up a bit”.
The Kifri Division’s P.O., Major W.C.F. Wilson, had recently received
an A.P.O, Captain Machan, to take charge of the Kut Shabanah. This enabled
all the Divisional outstations to be visited more frequently, and in
consequence their performance was to improve.
By January 1919, the Shabanah of this Division16 had received the
1914 Pattern Rifle. Also, the issue of clothing and equipment was improving.
However, there was a problem experienced in obtaining good recruits. But as
Major Wilson commented: “ .. .as the price of foodstuffs have dropped and are
still dropping rapidly, it should not be long before the present rate of pay is
sufficient to attract the right class of men”.
These Divisional reports indicated that the Force was slowly
progressing on the right lines. The availability of British officers to serve as
A.P.Os and British O.Rs as instructors, inevitably improved the general
standard and performance of the men. Inadequate supervision and lack of
regular training quickly caused troops to lose heart. Lack of uniforms
remained an essential factor, which required urgent attention. Also, a resume
of pay and allowances was required in view of the high cost of living, to
ensure they were comparable to other forms of local employment; and, for
mounted men, sufficient to feed their horses as well as themselves.
In the meantime, it soon became apparent that all was not well in
Sulaimani and Kirkuk. Because they feared Mahmud, many of the tribes had
agreed to his governorship but later they broke away because British
protection was offered to them. The Jaf insisted on direct dealing with the
British Civil Administration, and others followed suit. By April 1919, many
tribes had deserted Shaikh Mahmud. His supporters were considerable, and
included the Hamawand and the Mikhaili section of the Jaf. These constituted
a substantial following.
In view of these disruptions, Wilson thought that perhaps there was a
personality problem between Noel and Mahmud,17 and agreed with Colonel
Leachman, then Military Governor of Mosul, to replace Noel with a Kurdish-

16 L /P & S /l0 /6 2 8, F .494.

17 A .T. W ilson, M eso p o ta m ia 1 9 1 7 -1 9 2 0 , p. 134, para.3.
 71

and Persian-speaking officer. The officer chosen was Major E.B. Soane, who
had had extensive pre-war experience of Kurdistan and its people round about
1908, and was fluent in Kurdish, both spoken and written. He replac^Noel as
P.O. Sulaymaniyah on 24 April 1919. Noel was then sent on tour in Iraqi
Kurdistan to evaluate Kurdish opinion on self-determination.
Soane gradually regained control of Mahmud’s Kurdish irregulars,
which comprised two half companies of infantry and fifty sowars. There were
no details given for the levies allowed to Mahmud, but they may have been
approximately 150 in all. In the original agreement arranged by Noel they had
been under the control of Shaikh Mahmud, which differed from the Shaikh’s
request to have British officers for his levies, made during his discussions
with Wilson in December. It appears that during Noel’s tenure as P.O. he had
allowed Mahmud to place the sons of his local Aghawat (minor leaders and
their sons) in command of these levies. This proved to be a grave error of
judgment because, by this action, the sons gained complete control of this
small force, and so it became the personal bodyguard o f their respective
fathers, the local Aghas. Hence government-paid and armed groups were
controlled by self-interested Aghawat until Soane’s intervention.
It may be appreciated from these events that the general situation in
Kurdistan at this time was far from satisfactory, and was somewhat delicate
politically. This was at a time when G.H.Q.M.E.F. remained preoccupied with
demobilisation, and disinclined to garrison too far north, for reasons already
discussed. This situation was to prevail for the next four months, thus leaving
many newly-appointed P.Os in some areas of Kurdistan very vulnerable.
Perhaps because of the new responsibilities of the Mosul wilayat, the
need for more P.Os and A.P.Os became urgent. In response to this shortage,
the Civil Administration published a General Circular in January 1919,18
requesting that regular officers of the Indian Army, reserve or temporary, who
desired to remain in the Civil Administration and to take their discharge in
Iraq, were to submit their particulars to the Civil Commissioner as soon as
possible.

18 L/P& S/l 0/619, F.246.

 72

Not only was there need to clarify the British Officers’ employment
situation, but there was also the Irregular Force to be improved by all means
possible. To this end, it appears that Wilson and his advisers felt the Shabanah
were in need of a new designation, and a Circular was issued, dated 12 March
1919,19 raising the issue:
SHABANAH DESIGNATION
The Shabanah Forces of the Tigris and Euphrates will be known in future by
the following designations; there will be no change in their functions as
already laid down:

Dul aim Division Shabanah 1st Euphrates Militia

Hillah 2nd Euphrates Militia
Shamiyah 3rd Euphrates Militia
Diwaniyah 4th Euphrates Militia
Nasiriyah 5th (Muntafiq Militia)
Samarra 1st Tigris Militia
Kut al Amarah 2nd Tigris Militia
Amarah 3rd Tigris Militia
Qurnah 4th Tigris Militia
Basrah Basrah Shabanah
B a’qubah Ba’qubah Militia

This document also stated that the whole Force, apart from those
stationed in the “Basrah Shabanah”, will be known as the “Arab Militias”.
Also, that “Capt. C.A. Boyle, I.A. A.P.O.i/c Shabanah, is appointed
Inspecting Officer of Arab Militias, his office and headquarters will be in
Baghdad in the office of the Civil Commissioner”. The designation for A.P.Os
i/c Militia was “A.P.O. Commandant Militia”.
Although this helps to better understand the developments which were
taking place, there was still no indication of any establishments for units.
Captain Boyle’s training ability had been recognised, enabling him to
continue on the successful lines he had adopted at Hillah. However,
“Contracted” Irregulars were still to be found in service, as may be noted
below.
An annual report for the “Muntafiq” by Dickson, dated 12 February
1919,20 was passed to the India Office by Wilson, with the following
comment: “It is of exceptional interest”. The report was headed “Nasiriyah

19 L /P & S /l0 /6 1 9, F.39.

20 L /P & S /l0 /6 1 9 , F.92.
 73

Division”, but in Wilson’s covering letter it was designated the “Muntafiq

Division”. Such minor anomalies were common in the documents, and could
be confusing. However, the first point of interest was that at least one unit of
“Arab Irregulars” was still extant on “contract”. Dickson mentioned that
Thamir Beg Sa’dun continued to maintain thirty horsemen on a monthly
subsidy of Rs. 1,500/-, and that the “Muntafiq Horse”, with its strength o f 400,
was continuing training with British O.R. instructors. There was no mention
of this Cavalry unit being trained as Mounted Infantry at this time
(J anuary/F ebruary 1919).
There was much more Divisional administrative detail of interest
which did not concern the Levies, with the exception of the following which
demonstrates the character and the ideas of what was, and what was not,
honourable in the eyes of Dickson’s men of the “Muntafiq”, as recounted by
Dickson and included in his Report. It had proved almost impossible to get the
men of the Muntafiq to agree to be hired for any menial task; they considered
such labour beneath their dignity, and the Shaikhs would refuse “point blank”;
“were they, the men of the Muntafiq, considered as common coolies for hire?”
However, the P.O. of Nasiriyah was in urgent need of help to complete work
on the Sayih Channel, and the Suq tribesmen were asked to provide 4,000
men. On the request being put to them, a unanimous decision to “Faz’ah” (call
to arms) was decided upon.
The result was most successful. On the appointed day, all tribal
banners were unfurled and each tribe in the district provided its quota of men,
led by their Shaikhs to Sayih (about 1.5 miles above Nasiriyah). The tribes
took with them all their coffee pots and household stores, and camped near the
work site. Unfortunately influenza broke out, taking many lives, and
hampering the work considerably so that it had to be temporarily abandoned.
Nevertheless, the “experiment” was successful. The psychological
approach had proved its worth when dealing with men who fiercely guarded
their independence. Dickson was a good Arabist; he gained his knowledge
while living among Arabs as a child, but he was no academic. His “street
Arabic” caused some of the elders to exchange glances when in “mejlis” with
him.
 74

In the context of Kurdistan, and its proneness to unrest, it may be

recalled that the northern frontier with Turkey remained unresolved, and there
was a real threat that the Turks might attempt to retake Mosul by force of
arms, although every effort was being made by the British government to find
a solution during discussions in both London and Paris. The future of Iraq, as
discussed, was unavoidably affected by the outcome with regard to the
alignment of the northern frontier. Perhaps in this context, Wilson was called
to Paris and London for consultations during the period March to May 1919,
in his capacity as Officiating Civil Commissioner.
While Wilson was away, he received some disturbing news from
Baghdad 011 7 April 1919.21 The telegram stated that over the past three
weeks, reports had been received regarding both anti-British and Christian
intrigues in Kurdish tribal areas to the north of the Mosul wilayat. This
information had been passed to the High Commissioner in Constantinople,
where it was believed some of these disruptive movements had their
headquarters. Also, that on 4 April, Captain Pearson, A.P.O. Zakho, was
proceeding from Bilu, where he had established a gendarmerie post for
maintaining local order, when he was ambushed and killed at a Goyan village
called Karear.
The Governor of Mosul, Leachman, considered that aeroplanes should
bomb the Goyan strongholds. He urged this action regardless o f the cost of
infringing the frontier (the Armistice Line). His view was shared by Wilson’s
deputy in Baghdad (the originator of the telegram) if the trouble was to be
contained. However, the bombing was disallowed, it is assumed by
G.H.Q.M.E.F., possibly because of the discussions then being held in Paris
and London on the Turkish treaty. (The source of this veto and its origin was
not discovered in the records.)
The lack of a firm policy for the northern region of Iraq was perhaps
giving Kurdish leaders an opportunity to misinterpret British intention in their
mutual struggles for local power. Whatever the cause of Captain Pearson’s
murder, it created great concern in Baghdad. This is indicated by the

21 L/MIL/5/798, F.98.
 75

following urgent and secret signal sent by the G.O.C-in-C.M.E.F., then Sir
George MacMunn, to the War Office on 5 May 1919,22 stating:
...Finding myself fully in accord with General Cobbe’s views as to
volcanic possibilities of situation here and divergent location of
possible storm-centres, I trust these measures will be approved and
full consideration be given to various requests re assistance in drafts
of officers and men. I am impressed with the following points:-

1. Increasing unrest of Kurdish border.

2. Possibilities also on Lower Euphrates as shown by recent unrest there.
3. Well-armed state of tribes in Lower Mesopotamia.
4. Increase of Wahabism amongst the Ibn Saoud’s tribes.
5. Increasing intrigue by agents of Sheriff and C.U.P. (Committee of
Union and Progress).
6. Unsettling effect of events in Egypt and in India.
7. Inefficient state of several units in this force while under transition.

Without any suggestion that there is cause for alarm, the possibilities o f the
situation must not be disregarded.

This document shows that British Army Intelligence had given the
authorities in London a very fair forecast of the pending regional troubles
which were to beset the Mesopotamian Command.
Wilson returned to Baghdad on 9 May 1919, to find the Kurdish
situation still simmering. Shaikh Mahmud was indulging in bellicose activity
in an attempt to recover his local prestige. He was taking advantage of the
absence of Soane, who was on leave (Captain Greenhouse temporarily
replaced Soane at Sulaymaniyah). Mahmud had gathered a Kurdish force of
some 1,500 men on the Persian side of the frontier.23 On 22 May 1919, he
crossed back into Iraq and attacked the township of Sulaymaniyah. The local
levies resisted, but were routed, leaving Mahmud victorious. He at once
imprisoned Greenhouse and other British area officers, looted the treasury,
and declared himself ruler of Kurdistan. His flag (a red crescent on a green
ground) was raised on the government office in Sulaimani, and his retainers
appointed to control districts. He even began to issue postage stamps for his
acclaimed region.24

22 L /M IL /5/798, ¥ .1 2 .
23 L /P & S /l0 /6 5 8 , pt.2, F .346.
24 A .T. W ilson, M eso p o ta m ia 1917-1920, p. 136.
 76

On 25 May it was reported from Baghdad that air reconnaissance confirmed

that Sulaimaniyah was in the hands of hostile Kurds, but that Halabja, Koi and
Rania had been quiet on the 24th.25
The G.O.C-in-C. M.E.F. had responded to the situation by despatching
a mixed column to Chamchemal to hold the main pass. At the same time “a
strong force had left the Tigris for Kirkuk”(sic).
The P.O. at Halabja had been seized and imprisoned by the Shaikh’s
followers, but he had escaped, assisted by Adel Klianum, the Agha’s widow
of that township (better known by the British as the “Lady o f Halabja”).
The nearest British troops were at Kirkuk (35 miles Rom Sulaimani).
They consisted of a battalion of infantry, a few light armoured cars and some
cavalry. Further away at Bai’aiji (about 80 miles) was a brigade and some
Divisional troops. As a reconnaissance measure, the commander at Kirkuk
was ordered to advance a detachment as far as the Chamchemal plain, while
the Bai’aiji brigade was ordered to Kirkuk.
The Kirkuk detachment commander disregarded orders, and, perhaps
underestimating the opposition, attempted to penetrate the mountains with his
Levy cavalry (the latter perhaps a misnomer, they may have been local
Gendarmerie - there was at that time no “Levy Cavalry” so far north),
armoured cars and Ford trucks fitted with Lewis guns. A small force perhaps,
but with considerable fire power. On reaching Tasluja Pass, some twelve
miles from Sulaymaniyah, his force was surrounded by Kurds and compelled
to retire, followed closely by the enemy for some 25 miles. During his retreat,
he lost four armoured cars and nineteen Ford vans, and suffered severe
casualties. The Kurds had proved resolute fighters, and this part of the affair
served mainly to give the Kurds a false impression of British military
weakness.
But the main local British force was soon in the field—the 18th
Division from Mosul, commanded by General Fraser. He assembled the
“South Kurdistan Force” at Kirkuk on 17 June 1919. The force then began its
advance against Mahmud’s men, who were holding the Darband-i-Baziyan
Pass, in the Qara Dagh range, twelve miles east of Chamchemal. The Kurds

25 L/MIL/5/798, F.68.
 77

expected a frontal attack, but the surrounding heights were seized, and the
Kurds encircled 011 the 18th. During the operations, Shaikh Mahmud was
wounded, taken prisoner, and removed to Baghdad, where he recovered. He
was tried with his associate, Shaikh Gharib, and sentenced to death by a
military court martial for rebellion, but this was commuted to long-term
imprisonment. (This, in turn, was commuted in 1921 to banishment to India.)
This affair has been discussed in considerable detail because it is
necessary to demonstrate that although the “enemy” was represented by a
band of Kurdish brigands, they possessed considerable fighting ability,
especially in their own territory. Indeed, they proved, as did the Arabs in their
later “insurrection” of 1920, to be a match for regular troops— no commander
confronting them could afford to make mistakes.
Meanwhile, the Political and Intelligence Officers remained concerned
with the murder of Captain A.C. Pearson, the A.P.O. Zakho on 14 April 1919.
According to Wilson, he was an experienced “Political”, an excellent linguist
who had shown great skill in previous negotiations with Kurdish and other
tribes. The Goyan had invited him to meet them for the purpose of their
enrolment in the list of tribes within the sphere of British military occupation.
Pearson accepted the invitation and started off to meet the chiefs on their own
ground, accompanied by a Kurdish orderly and a few local men of the Goyan.
Before reaching the agreed meeting place, he was ambushed and killed. In
Wilson’s opinion,26 The Goyan were “perhaps the wildest of the tribes with
whom we had to deal...”. They dwelt in an inaccessible valley, both from the
south and from the Turkish side of the disputed frontier. The crime remained
unpunished.
There is one important contention in the following document, which
has been discussed previously in this chapter. It would seem to confirm the
previous Kurdish fear of European-backed Armenian rule in their region.
In August, the Army Council made known to the India Office the
considered opinion of their Department (M.I.2) on this affair (Pearson’s
murder) by telegram.27 It was pointed out that the Goyan were the original

26 A .T. W ilson, M eso p o ta m ia 1 9 1 4 -1 9 1 7 (London, 1931), p .147, para.2.

27 L /P & S /10/658, pt.2, F .346.
 78

perpetrators and murderers of Pearson, and that it had not been possible to
punish them.
Further, it was felt that Shernakhi and Jazirah Ibn Umar were the
trouble centres, but controlled from Constantinople. Also, that Major Noel, in
about the middle of April, reported that “the anti-British movement in the
Nisibin-Mardin area, had little foundation except fear of Armenian rule, and
pointed out that “a definite British policy was required”.
N oel’s assessment was concurred by Admiral Calthorpe in
Constantinople on 12 May, by telegram. It appeared that reports were being
received regarding the millet, and that these reiterated Noel’s opinion that the
main cause of Kurdish agitation was the fear of falling under Armenian rule.
The Kurdish fear of Armenian rule was based on Armenian pressure
for self-determination. They were Christians 011 whom the Kurds had inflicted
repeated atrocities and so the Kurds anticipated a situation in which European-
backed Armenian retribution might be exacted. As these contemporary
documents show, the situation was one of great complexity, and public order
remained very fragile.
The Kurdish situation remained a threat for further unrest. Mahmud
was not the only leader who was prepared to seek unrivalled dominance, if
only within his own tribal region. The British military were hard pressed to
meet the demands for demobilisation, while still being essentially responsible
for maintaining internal security. It seems the Civil Administration remained
unnecessarily preoccupied with changing, yet again, the designation o f its
Civil Corps of Irregulars, while its functions remained for the most part
unchanged.
Later, the Levies were once again involved in a change of designation.
I 11 July 1919, the officials in Baghdad rescinded the designation of “Militia”
* * 28
111 a General Circular

28 L /P & S /10/619, F.29. Arab L evies. C .D.O . 51 o f 12 March 1919 is cancelled and the
follow in g substituted: the Shabanah Forces on the Tigris and Euphrates w ill be know n in
future by the fo llo w in g designation: there w ill be no change in the functions as already laid
down.
Dair-ez-Zor D ivisional Shabanah D air-ez-Zor L evy
D ulaim “ “ 1st Euphrates L evy
Hillah “ “ 2 nd Euphrates L evy
Sham iyah “ “ 3rd Euphrates L evy
D iw aniyah “ “ 4 th Euphrates L evy
 79

The whole force was to be known as the Arab (or Kurdish) Levies.
Major C.A. Boyle was appointed Inspecting Officer o f the Arab Levies,
including the Mosul Gendarmerie and Sulaimaniyah Levies. His office and
headquarters were to be situated in Baghdad, with the office of the Civil
Commissioner. Commandants Militia would be known as Commandants
Levies, and Assistant Militia Officers would be known as Assistant Levy
Officers.
The obsession with designations for the irregulars is difficult to
understand, and no explanation has come to light. The earlier “Guides and
Scouts” of the Field Intelligence were understandable. Levies” is descriptive
for the conditions of service and source of personnel for the majority of the
force (some, it may be remembered, were still “contractual”).
It may be noted that there were also a few changes in the Political
Divisions since the previous relevant document “Shabanah Designation” (see
p.72). Nasiriyah had become Muntafiq and Basra omitted—perhaps a clerical
error.Those added were Dair-ez-Zor. Khaniqin, Kirkuk, Sulaimani (Kurdish
for Sulaymaniyah), and the Mosul Gendarmerie. The term “Gendarmerie”
would appear to indicate District Police, or the old Shabanah.
Although the dispositions in the Corps are clear, as yet there was still
no reference to unit organisation, nor any Political divisional strengths.
Regular army organisation of parent units were usually by regiments or
battalions. These were composed of sub-units of squadrons or companies,
troops or platoons, and then sections. This grouping of troops under a parent
unit, of, say, a battalion, facilitated their tactical use in the field. Also, in the
event of a serious breakdown in internal security, it would have enabled the
Levies to be more easily assimilated by a commander of British troops with
his forces. The prevailing situation represented various groups of men, known

M untafiq 5th Euphrates Levy

Samarrah 1st Tigris L evy
ICut al Amarah 2 nd Tigris L evy
Amarah 3ld Tigris L evy
Qurnah 4 th Tigris L evy
B a ’qubah B a ’qubah L evy
Khaniqin Khaniqin L evy
ICirkuk Kirkuk L evy
Sulaim aniyah Sulaim aniyah L evy
M osul Gendarmerie M osul Gendarm erie
 80

mostly by their geographical locations, of varied strengths - with the

exception of Leachman’s “battalion” of Gendarmerie at Mosul.
In the context of internal activity, although Shaikh Mahmud had been
dealt with effectively, he alone did not constitute the “Kurdish problem”.
There were many other potential and rival leaders ready to ferment unrest.
The opportunity for another insurrection by the Kurds was unwittingly
afforded by Leachman, Military Governor of Mosul.
With the general aim of extending Baghdad’s control over the Kurdish
area, Leachman decided to send a small group o f officers and men to
Amadiyah to raise, equip and train recruits to join the gendarmerie. Those
selected were Captains R.H.D. Willey and H. Macdonald (the former as the
P.O. Amadiyah) together with Sapper Troup and two Indian telegraphists. The
party left Mosul 28 June but it was to provide the Kurds with yet another
opportunity for armed protest and violence.
The Gendarmes were duly recruited from both Muslims and Christians
to try to generate local confidence in the force. However, the G.O.C. had
withdrawn the military detachment from Amadiyah in June, in line with
M.E.F. policy already discussed.
Neither Leachman nor Willey appear to have been concerned about the
prevailing Kurdish situation. Perhaps long service in the country had
contributed to their over-confidence. But the Kurdish political climate
remained unsafe, and Leachman must have been aware of this. It was
reflected in a telegram from the G.O.C.M.E.F. to the High Commissioner
• 29 * *
Constantinople, dated 9 April, which pointed out that the leaders of the
“Kurdish National Committee” at Constantinople, Sheikh Abdul Qadir and
Dr. Abdullah Jojat, had passed through Mosul on about 25 March for
Sulaymaniya with letters for the tribes calling on them to cast off the British
yoke and declare their independence under Turkish suzerainty.
However, as will be recalled, Captains Willey and Macdonald, with
Sapper Troup, were then in Amadiyah. The three had returned from a week’s
tour in the Raikan district east of Amadiyah, and had telegraphed to Mosul
that all was quiet.

29 MIL/5/798, F.37.
 81

This situation was soon to change, and a telegram from Baghdad to

on
Simla dated 21 July 1919, announced that all five men had been killed on
the evening of 14 July. It was officially considered that the two officers and
their party were killed by local Gendarmes at the instigation of the local
people, and that nearly all the leading Muslim notables were more or less
involved. It further states: “It is yet to estimate probable effect o f the event on
Kurdish communities in other portions of Mosul Vilayat, but there is every
probability, unless drastic punitive measures are undertaken, similar outbreaks
will occur elsewhere”.
Willey had been a “Political” since 1915, and was experienced. Wilson
stated the posting was without reference to him,31 but, “Once done, however,
nothing but harm could have come from a withdrawal..
The incident prompted a quick retaliatory response by the British
Army. H.Q.M.E.F. decided with Wilson that the Barwari and Guli were the
tribes most implicated in this affair. British Generals Nightingale, Wooldridge
and Cassels with their brigades from 18th Division, were ordered by General
MacMunn to assemble two columns at Suwair and Zalcho, and a third to
traverse the whole northern area respectively. The purpose was to take
punitive action against the rebellious tribes and to punish the murderers.
However, it took time to organise this operation because the force, in part, had
to be drawn from Baghdad—but all was ready by the end o f July. It was
intended to reassert British authority and prestige throughout the region.
Because of rapid repatriation, the M.E.F. then lacked troops experienced in
mountain warfare (in which the Kurds excelled), and were for the same reason
below strength. Faced with mountainous terrain, especially around Ser
Amadiyah, someone in G.H.Q. remembered the fine performance the
Assyrians had put up against the Turks for some two years in Urmia.
Consequently, the G.O.C. ordered that two Assyrian battalions be
immediately reformed in B a’qubah and, together with their former British and
Assyrian officers, sent to join and so augment the 18th Indian Division on 30

30 M IL /5/798, F.37.
31 A .T. W ilson, M eso p o ta m ia 1914-1917, p. 147, para.6.
32 L /P & S/l 0 /8 8 9 , F.24.
 82

July 1919. This is confirmed in a despatch from G.H.Q.M.E.F. to the War

office on 7 October 1919:33
...after several days difficult mountain fighting in which the enemy
lost considerably, our troops assisted by Assyrians occupied Keroar
exacting punishment and destroying defences.... They proved a most
valuable addition to our force quite equal to the Kurds in their own
tactics.

The Assyrians had performed exceedingly well and with valour in

these operations. This was another example of an “ad hoc” decision which
was to have considerable repercussions in the history of the Levies.
It was a hard lesson learnt, and it was to be some time before it was
considered safe for British P.Os to be placed in isolated posts so far north,
without adequate protection.
By 15 September 1919, the majority of the hostile tribes in the
Amadiyah region had made their submission. The Assyrians had received
their first “blooding” under the command of British officers, and alongside
imperial troops during the operations, and had proved their mettle. It was the
first of many subsequent occasions when the Assyrians were to be used to
impose British authority on their traditional enemy, the Kurds,
After the recent operations, General MacMumi on 4th December34
expanded on his previous communication to the War Office, stating that the
firm response to the revolt, which included operations against the Zibari
Kurds, were then completed, and, “as far as possible, punishment for murders
exacted”. The authority of the Civil Administration was restored, and British
prestige in the region re-established. Casualties had been trivial, and
MacMunn was withdrawing troops to Mosul, but leaving a post at Aqra,
consisting of four Indian battalions, a Mountain battery and three companies
of Assyrians. These were to support Political and other Civil Officers in the
area.
This brief interlude was a very important and significant event in the
background of the commencement of the “Iraq Levies”, because the Assyrians
were destined to play a lasting and important role in that force. It was also a
lesson for all concerned in planning the future of Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan was

33 M IL /5/798, F.20.
34 M IL /5/798, F.4.
 83

going to prove a problem to control. A firm policy for the region was now
overdue.
It was after these operations that the Civil Administration in Baghdad
took a more purposeful step towards regularising their Force, but it was still
not organised on a recognisable military structure although previously it was
not desired to train the Shabanah to act as a military force. This policy was
contradictory, because the levies were, in fact, very clearly being used in those
military roles—taking over many duties from the imperial garrison, regardless
o f the fact that they were really insufficiently trained to undertake the duties
urgently imposed on them.
Nevertheless, there is evidence pointing to the Force being slowly
brought into line with British army procedures by means of a series of Orders.
A study of these now follows:
A Memorandum on the “Arab and Kurd Levies in Mesopotamia”,
o c § #
dated 12 August 1919, is also interesting because of the statement that it was
“approved” by G.H.Q.M.E.F. on 26 July 1919. This appears as the first time
G.H.Q.M.E.F’s approval had been sought prior to promulgation of a Levy
Order/Memorandum. Also, there is at last mention of squadrons and
companies and the strengths of which these units were composed, together
with the number of troops/platoons in each squadron or company and their
strengths, and sections.
Forces at the disposal of the P.Os remained in two parts:
i) Levies, and
ii) The Town Police (meaning Shabanah or Gendarmerie).
“Each Levy is organised in Companies or Squadrons (of 100 men
each) and Platoons or Troops (of 25 men each).”
The Levies were not to be involved in “definite hostilities” without
reference to the British military authorities. Levies were to be used, wherever
possible, to relieve the military of patrols, guards and escort duties.
Organisation: The Levy Force is to be organised into corps, each with a
British Officer in command as follows:-
Political Division Levy
Dulaim 1st Euphrates
Hillah 2nd Euphrates

35 L/P& S/10/874, F.170.

 84

Shamiyah 3rd Euphrates

Diwaniyah 4th Euphrates
Nasiriyah 5th Euphrates
Samarra 1st Tigris
Kut 2nd Tigris
Amarah 3rd Tigris
Ba’qubah Ba’qubah) Amalgamation under
Khanikin Khanikin) consideration
Basrah Zobeir
Dair-az-Zor Dair-az-Zor
Kirkuk Kirkuk
Sulaimaniyah Sulaimaniyah
Mosul Mosul Gendarmerie.

This list indicates that there had been some small changes and
exclusions. Muntafiq changed to Nasiriyah; it is assumed that Basrah had
absorbed Qurnah and Samawah; there were four extra Divisions, namely,
Diwaniyah, Dair-az-Zor, Sulaimaniyah and Mosul: Baghdad was previously
included, but no longer listed as a Political Division.
The use of the term “corps” in this document could be misleading. A
corps is a military formation that usually applies to two or more divisions, or a
military body with a specific function, such as the “Medical Corps”. More
importantly, there was as yet no indication of “parent units” such as battalions
of infantry, or regiments of mounted infantry or cavalry. The strengths of
squadrons/comp allies and those of their troops/platoons indicate that there
were four troops/platoons per squadron/company, and therefore it may be
assumed that there were three sections to each troop/platoon of eight men
each, plus a section leader.
There is no detail on how the “1st Euphrates Levy” or the “2nd Tigris
Levy” were organised. The designation “corps” gave no indication of this. It
appears that they were named after their geographical locations, but no
strengths or structure were given for any of these units.
The duties listed were similar to those previously published. Levy
Commandants were responsible to the P.Os for discipline, training, and
interior economy and promotion in accordance with orders contained in
General Circulars. They were to deal direct with Boyle, Inspecting Officer
Levies, keeping the P.Os informed as necessary.
 85

There was an interesting section on “Compensation”. A Commandant

could award Rs.100/- to a Sowar if his horse died “actually 011 duty”— it was a
fifth of the amount a Sowar’s family would receive if he were “killed in the
execution of his duty”. The awards went up in approximate increments of
Rs.100/- from Rs.500/- forNafars, Sowars and Ombashis, to Rs.1000/- for an
Assistant Native Levy Officer. These sums were payable to a man against
total disablement, 01 *half if only partial.
The document also covered clothing and equipment scales, and rates
of pay. From pay scales it has proved possible to establish some projected
strengths. The total Force was 5,965 all ranks, excluding British officers and
N.C.Os. There was 110 strength given for the Mosul Gendarmerie, but 1,500
was “under consideration”. There was 110 figure for “Railway Levies”, but
they also were “under consideration”.
It may therefore be estimated that in August 1919, the projected
strength of the Levies (including the Mosul Gendarmerie) was approximately
6,000; and if the Railway Levies were implemented, then 7,500. The Force
was intended to achieve quick growth over a twelve-month period if it
continued taking on duties from the imperial garrison.
As discussed above, there were still many omissions in the conception
of the Force in view of its obvious future role, which was to support the
depleted imperial garrison.
Another relevant document36 was the “Notes 011 Training of the Arab
and Kurdish Levies and Gendarmerie”, of 26 September 1919. It appears that
this was published locally. It was obviously only a stop-gap, pending the
arrival of the current British Army Training Pamphlets, which were soon to be
available and put into use. However, it was gleaned from the local pamphlet
that a Recruits’ Course would be for three months at Hillah, under the
supervision of Boyle.
Whereas by 1919, the Civil Administration had, for some four years,
experience with their Arab irregulars, the addition of Kurds to the corps was,
as yet, a relatively untried experience. The performance of those under the
command of Soane in his “Kurdish Horse”, it could be said, was influenced

3G L/P& S/10/874, F.154.

 86

by his exceptional personality and knowledge of them and their homeland.

Soane, however would need more British officers as his force continued to
expand. It would require those officers to have a knowledge o f Kurdish - no
doubt difficult to find; and they would lack Soane’s exceptional knowledge of
Kurds and their particular psychology.
Fortunately for the Civil Administration another British officer,
Captain C.E. Littledale, showed great aptitude with these difficult, fierce and
independent people. He was possessed of a “wall eye”, which it was said was
held somewhat in awe by those fearing the “evil eye”— this may have
impressed the less sophisticated, but he was also a courageous and determined
officer, as shown by his commitment in the following action, involving the
newly-raised Kurdish Gendarmerie, which were to be in many minor
operations from 1919.
As a further introduction to the Gendarmerie element o f the forces,
employed by the Civil Administration in maintaining law and order, the
following examples are worthy of mention.
Captain C.E. Littledale, attached to the Mosul Gendarmerie, was
awarded the Military Cross for “A splendid example to his men”37 in early
August 1919. The unrest in the north had involved Rowanduz, where a small
party of officials and police were surrounded. Littledale, with 15 mounted and
32 dismounted Gendarmes and 30 dismounted Levies, marched from Arbil to
Batas via Shaklawa (some 30 miles), during which he was ambushed near the
village of Batas. The whole country being hostile, he was forced to fight a
withdrawal on Arbil, during which action the column was fired on by the
surrounding villages throughout the line of his withdrawal. Nevertheless, he
managed to bring 31 of his original strength of 77 back to Arbil.
The next episode is discussed in support of the above action. On 1
November of the same year, the acting P.O. Mosul, Mr. J.H.H. Bill, and the
A.P.O. of Aqra, Captain K.R. Scott, were attacked and killed by Zibari Kurds
at Barzan, near Bira Kapra. These Kurds then attacked Aqra, which was
defended by Lt. Barlow and some Gendarmerie. After a fight, the small
garrison was forced to retire from the township, The Yuzbashi Hasoon Ibn

37 L/P&S/l 0/889, General Circular No. 43.

 87

Falayfil, who later received a reward for gallantry, rallied a small party of
Levies at Jujar, and so managed to deny the Mosul road to the insurgents. In
so doing, he also gave support to local loyal Kurdish chiefs. This action
enabled Aqra Dagh to be reoccupied without opposition from the Kurds.
It has been recorded that the performance o f the Levies owed much to
the ability and tenacity of its British officers, under the most trying conditions.
Without doubt, the men under their command were inspired by them, as
indicated in the above affair. The best of the troops would also have tried to
emulate these acts of courage.
These troops were most likely to be Kurds. Not every Kurd felt that
self-determination for the Kurdish people was possible; some, perhaps the
more realistic ones, miderstood that tribal factions would be difficult to unite.
Also, and importantly, the Levies were slowly developing a strong “Force
identity” which, in turn, promoted morale.
While all these military activities were taking place in northern Iraq,
Levy operations had given rise to some interest in the House of Commons. On
15 July 1919, Lieut-Comdr., Kenworthy put the following question in
parliament to the Secretary of State for War, Mr. W.S. Churchill:
.. .whether native levies are being raised and trained in Mesopotamia;
and when it is expected that native levies will be able to relieve the
greater part of our troops in Mesopotamia and what is the future
policy as regards the Army of Occupation in Mesopotamia?

Mr. Churchill replied:

The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative. Future
policy with regard to the policing of Mesopotamia cannot be
definitely laid down until we receive a mandate to administer the
country. The possibility of using native levies to some extent is,
however, under consideration.38

Churchill had, perhaps, in this case, to be economical with the truth,

because the mandate was not granted until May 1920. In those circumstances
it was perhaps a matter of protocol— Churchill’s reply indicated that the
League of Nations had not yet been informed o f the existence of the Levies.
Nevertheless, the Levies continued to make headway in their search
for improvements in the structure of the Levy Force. A new Memorandum

38 118 H.C. D eb.55 (1919); A .T. W ilson, M eso p o ta m ia 1 9 1 7 -1 9 2 0 , p.163.

was issued by the Civil Administration in Baghdad dated 31 December
1919, as an Annexure to the previous Circular of 31 July 1919 on the change
of the Levy designation from “Militia” to “Arab or Kurdish Levies”.
This document is important because it marked the creation o f a Levy
“Striking Force”. It was an unambiguous move towards a military force, but
without parent units based on a recognisable military structure. Nevertheless,
because so many more changes were due to take place by the following April,
when a more comprehensive reorganisation would be implemented, only the
main points of this document have been selected for discussion.
MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE RECONSTITUTION OF
ARAB LEVIES IN THE HILLAH DIWANIYAH AND NAJAF
DIVISIONS

1. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Euphrates Levies will be divided into:
(a) A Striking Force to be known as the 2nd
Euphrates Levy;
(b) District Police Forces in the Hillali, Diwaniyah,
and Najaf Divisions.

The total authorised strength was to be 5,965, plus 1,500 for the Mosul
Gendarmerie, which remained under “consideration”, together with the
Railway Guards. Thus the proposed strength had not changed since the
previous instruction of 31 July 1919. None of these figures included British
personnel.
The main instruction stated that the headquarters of the 2nd Euphrates
Levy would be at Hillah, and that the previous duties of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
Euphrates Levies would be undertaken by the District Police. This was to
enable the newly-formed “Striking Force” (designated the “2nd Euphrates
Levy”) to maintain uninterrupted training for a period of six months, with
effect from the date the scheme came into force.
After the specified training period, the 2nd Euphrates Levy would
undertake the usual duties of “Treasure Escorts”, and “Guards for P.Os”, but
their special task was to ....
...be at the disposal of Political Officers for minor military
operations and punitive expeditions considered by him to be beyond
the scope of the District Police, and not sufficiently serious to
warrant the employment of the imperial troops; and as a first line for

39 L /P & S/l0/621, F.372.

 89

reconnaissance and an auxiliary arm to the Imperial forces in major

operations.

Without doubt, the latter required military training for a military role.
The Striking Force was to consist of mounted infantry, trained for
mobility and rapid action, mounted on govermnent horses and aimed with
British rifles, as proposed by Boyle, rather than the cavalry concept adopted
by Dickson.40 In this context, the decision taken to issue the mounted infantry
with government horses was most necessary for consistent reliability in type,
and availability of replacement. It is assumed that “issued animal rations”
would, where possible, take the place of Horse Maintenance allowance— a
necessary innovation.
Other issues covered were: that tribesmen could be enlisted, but men
of Turkish nationality could not. The initial period of enlistment was two
years— a bonus of two months pay being given on re-engagement for a further
three years. Leave would be 31 days per year, plus casual, at the discretion of
Commandants and, eventually, that quarters in cantonments outside towns
would be provided.
The total strength of the 2nd Euphrates Levy (the new Striking Force)
for that period is shown below. The fact that this Levy was divided into three
geographical areas, namely, Hillah, Diwaniyah and Sukhair, was perhaps a
necessary expedient, but not a tactical dispersion, because o f insufficient
accommodation to billet the whole Striking Force at any one of these
locations. Hillah was being developed as a training depot.
It may be remembered that in the previous Memorandum o f 12
August, the total Levy strength was given as 5,965. This figure included the
Striking Force, which was divided into mounted infantry and infantry, based
on 100 men per squadron or company.
Mounted Dismounted
Hillah: Sowars352. Total Arab ranks 458
Diwaniyah: Sowars 176 Total Arab ranks 230
Abu Suqhair: Sowars 176 Total Arab ranks 230
Totals: 704 918

40 S ee A ppendix p.259, for N ote: “Cavalry versus M ounted Infantry”.

 90

The H.Q. was at Hillah, and so that establishment would have been
larger than the other two.
In addition, there were to be added the B.Os and B.N.C.Os, also the
clerks, medical personnel, drivers and sweepers, making a total of 22, and
therefore a grand total of 1,644. There were also twelve horses and 704 ponies
(a military pony is a horse not usually exceeding 14 hands), and eight mules
with carts.
The fact that Wilson sent copies of this document to the India Office
on 29 December 191941 is interesting, because during its circulation it
acquired some informed “minutes”. The first of which read:
This is a commencement of a practical attempt to form local forces to
maintain internal order. The purely police work, necessarily entailed
separation from headquarters and isolation in small parties and is
therefore incompatible with any attempt to get a disciplined and
trained force to suppress disorder.

Another comment stated:

The Concentration of the proposed levy force, its six months initial
training, living in barracks and issue of rations are the only way to
get discipline which will make the force a useful one and will save
the calling out of the military on every small disturbance. We may
hope it will in time, develop into the Arab Force to support the Arab
power which we are pledged to work up to, and to dispense with a
large portion (and presumably eventually all) of the foreign mil
garrison.
Signed A.S. [Shuckburgh?] and Cobbe, 13.11.20.

The second comment implied that the Levies might in future form a
nucleus of trained manpower for the establishment of an Iraq National Army,
perhaps indicating the understanding of the implications of the coming
Mandate, and the tasks which lay ahead. But the remarks which implied that
the “Striking Force” could be housed in a barracks was lacking in detailed
knowledge of conditions in Iraq. The problem was that the whole Striking
Force lacked adequate permanent accommodation. This, as has been
suggested previously, was the reason for the “Striking Force” being split
between three locations. Permanent barracks/camps with necessary amenities
were a serious deficiency in the Force as a whole.

41 L/P& S/10/874, F.134.

 91

The next few Minutes covered a visit by Major Boyle to the India
Office while on leave, and the bureaucratic comments on discussions held
with him in relation to the Levies:
I have recently had a long conversation with Major Boyle, who is in
Command of the Mesopotamian Levies.
(This was never an official designation.)

He takes a sanguine view o f the future utility o f the Levies for

garrison and other purposes, but anticipates the development will be
rather slow, and that a garrison of regular troops will be required for
some time to come, initialled E.G.D.[?] 19/2.

Gathered from Major Boyle that one of the main difficulties at

present is to get the right type of British officer, thinks they are all
too...[young?], initials indecipherable, 16/2.

Although London appeared to be satisfied with the progress being

made with regard to the development of the Levies; on the ground, the
Kurdish problem continued to give concern. Security of the P.Os was and
continued to be a worrying issue.
In view of the recent troubles, which included the murders by Kurds of
British P.Os and A.P.Os, one a temporary civilian acting as P.O. (Mr. Bill), it
seems to have been rather a rash policy to have an irregular party of Kurds as
escort for a British officer. Nevertheless, Captain P.J.R. Wigley’s Monthly
Report as A.P.O. Zakho for December 1919,42 mentions the existence o f a
troop of 15 local Kurdish Levies, raised some months previously by Captain
Walker in Zakho. They were led by Rashid Agha, a brother of Mohd. Agha,
the Rais Baladiyah, and assisted by his son Abdul Kerim. Their duties were to
provide an escort for the A.P.O. when on tour. Also, they were to undertake
“special missions, such as recovery of stolen property etc.”. Thus it seems that
expediency still remained the rule in the Civil Administration— Kurds still
being employed as guards for P.Os.
A serious incident took place on 11 December 1919, and could be
considered the first of many in 1920, the year of the “Arab Insurrection”.
During the latter part of November 1919, in response to a request by the
inhabitants of the township of Dair-ez-Zor, which had been an old Ottoman
Mutasarriflik, a P.O., Captain A. Chamier, was posted there, together with
 92

some 60 Levies, to maintain law and order.43 Neither the G.O.C.M.E.F. nor
Wilson wanted that township to be included in the eventual limit of
Mesopotamia because the frontier between Syria and Iraq had not yet been
defined. Dair was situated on a trade route, some 400 miles northwest of
Baghdad, connecting that city with Aleppo. In the interim period, pending a
political decision, the P.O. and his men remained there and managed the
Customs post.
Although the Dair-ez-Zor affair was not considered by the British as
the beginning of the “Arab Insurrection”, the research for this thesis,
regardless of this official opinion, would seem to indicate that the incident
could be seen as an event extending into the Arab Insurrection o f 1920.
Because these two disruptive events continued through 1920, it is proposed to
discuss them together in the next chapter.
At the end of Shaikh Mahmud’s insurrection, General Fraser spent six
weeks exacting punishment from the rebellious chiefs who had supported
Mahmud. The imperial column was dubbed “Fraser’s Force”, and Soane was
posted to it on 1 June 1919. This ended Soane’s service with the Civil
Administration. Thus other British P.Os had to be allocated to Kurdistan in
the wake of Soane’s period of pacification.
Captain G.H. Salmon replaced Soane in Kirkuk as P.O. on 13 June
1919. His reports provide evidence of continued variation in the condition of
Levy units in the districts, regardless of the published establishments for men,
uniforms and equipment which were approved for these troops in the
Memoranda published during 1919. Some of the reports from the Political
Districts continued to indicate serious shortages of many items. Delays in
delivering the necessary stores to troops in the outlying areas could have been
caused by lack of transport and long distances over difficult terrain.
The P.Os’ reports continue to provide the best information of the
overall progress being, or not being, made. They indicate how unprepared the
Political Divisions were for the coming Arab onslaught of 1920. Shortages of
clothing and mules without pack-saddles were typical example o f the
deficiencies. Many problems remained in the districts, of both a political and

42 L /P & S /10/162, F.140.

43 M IL /5/799, F .330.
 93

administrative nature, especially in Kurdistan, where units of Kurdish levies

and Gendarmerie had not long been established.
The A.P.O. at Kirkuk, Salmon, casts an interesting light on the
troubled situation in his area of responsibility in his half-yearly report for June
1919-January 1920.44 It stated that discipline had been maintained throughout
the troubled times of summer, but,’’Three men had been killed on duty and
eight wounded”. These casualties in mid-summer could have occurred during
the insurrection of Shaikh Mahmud.
The report showed that many earlier problems persisted, including the
usual list of short supplies, which impeded progress. Examples include rifles,
which finally arrived in October, and government horses, of which 40 came
up in September without saddlery. Salmon was still awaiting supplies of
winter clothing. More serious were the conditions he considered beyond the
control of any organisation—the alarming cost of living throughout the
Division, and of fodder in particular, rendered the men’s pay almost below the
living minimum. This meant that horse rations were not yet being issued to
Salmon’s area, although government horses/ponies were reaching his district.
Referring to the potential of his recruits, Salmon noted that recruiting
had been good and the Turkoman among them, he considered, were “better
material by far than the Arab, and readier to be trained than the Kurd”. This,
perhaps, because many of the Turkoman had previous military or gendarmerie
training (no doubt under the Turks).
Finally, and importantly, Salmon found the year’s work had made
clear the impossibility of expecting a single body o f men, with a
simple training-programme which they are bound to observe, to
perform incompatible duties. The Kirkuk levy of April to December
(1919) were Police, messengers, escorts, bailiffs and soldiers. These
manifold duties, of which Police in particular is a specialist’s work,
interfered with the levies’ training as a military Striking-Force, at
times almost to vanishing point.

It was for these reasons that the D.FI.C. (Wilson) consented in

December 1919 to the conversion of this levy into a “Divisional Police Force”
in early 1920.

44 L/P& S/l 0/621, F.92.

 94

Before leaving Kurdistan, there is another document worthy of

attention, because it was, perhaps, his last. It is Soane’s Annual Report for
1919.45 It included references to other issues not relevant to this work. But in
regard to his Kurdish Levies, he described the steps he was taking in
connection with the training of his “Cavalry” (not mounted infantry). They
were receiving troop, followed by squadron drill, and he had hoped to
introduce a competitive spirit by mounting the infantry and cavalry guards
together in the Square. “But in the present threadbare state o f their clothing,
this is impossible.” His “Cavalry” disregarded official Levy training policy in
mounted infantry. It will be remembered that Soane, like Leachman, enjoyed
a free hand in his Division, and not even the Levy Inspecting Officer, Boyle
could interfere he could only advise - as Wilson had ordered.
The third and last of these Annual Reports for 1919 has been selected
because it was by an experienced senior officer, Major C.K. Daly, P.O.
Diwaniyah, dated January 1920.46 He provides an insight into his Division,
which was longer established than the two previously mentioned Divisions,
and closer to Wilson's office and Levy headquarters. He described an
unfortunate occurrence during the disarmament of one of the tribes, the result
of which involved London.
He began, somewhat sarcastically, with a brief introduction on the
irregular police— Shabanah— describing their duties, which were those of
mounted messengers, escorts to touring officers, and as guards, “of whom too
exact services were neither expected nor obtained”. Also, they were called
upon to make occasional arrests of offenders. But, in his opinion, they were a
mixed blessing and occasioned much annoyance to inhabitants by petty
oppression of the ignorant, “resulting from the majesty with which they were
invested by reason of their khaki uniform and rifle”. It will be remembered
that other British officers had mentioned this tendency.
Early in 1919, when the Force was remodelled, armed with British
rifles and placed under the command of a British A.P.O with British N.C.O
Instructors, the situation improved. Notably, their drill as embryo soldiers
improved and esprit de corps began to manifest itself. However, he felt that

45 L /P & S /l 0 /6 2 1 ,F . 147.
46 L /P & S/l 0 /6 2 2 , F .454.
 95

oppression increased correspondingly, “they were bad soldiers and worse

policemen”. It appeared that recruits of the “right stamp” would not enlist.
This was because the terms of engagement were not sufficiently attractive;
Levy pay, did not compare with the wages obtainable in other walks of life.
The most important description in this report was the incident which
happened in December 1919, when a fracas occurred between the Levies of
Samawah and the A1 Sufffan tribes during an official attempt to disarm that
tribe. This action resulted in the death of three levy men—by the rifle fire of
two of their comrades.
The official report stated that:
The two accused were members of a party under an Arab Officer,
sent to collect rifles from the tribe. The tribe offered aimed
resistance, shots were fired and the two accused deserted to the
enemy and actively engaged against the Levies. The Levies sustained
the following casualties; 3 killed and 1 wounded. Thaqil ibn Daqash
was seen to fire on the Levies. The Court sentenced Thaqil ibn
Daqash to death; and Dakhil ibn Selman to penal servitude for 15
years. The Death Sentence was carried out on 10 March 1920.

As the author of the final investigation stated: “The Arab who sells his
rifle, according to tribal etiquette, loses caste”. No matter how the owner lost
his personal amis, his “loss of face” was the same. Hence the reluctance of
Arabs to give up their weapons. This tribal code perhaps motivated the three
men to side with the tribe being disarmed.
Daly’s final comment was that:
On the whole, whether under the designation of Shabanah, Militia,
Levy or Police, all of which have been applied during 1919; the
irregulars have filled a gap which could not otherwise have been
filled and have been useful, although expensive.

However, the “incident” caused the India Office to issue an instruction

dated 10 June 1920 to Baghdad. The draft signed by J.E. Shuckburgh (Under
Secretary Political Dept.),47 stated that in future any incident of a similar
nature involving armed force in matters connected with the internal
administration of Mesopotamia would be made the subject of a special report.
This instruction appears to be devoid of substance. The India Office must
have known about the incident, or they would not have commented. If

47 L /P & S /l0/889. N o folio

 96

anything was to be said on the matter, it should have stated that no similar
confiscation should be carried out except under the supervision of a British
officer. Also, if the general situation allowed, the local regular Army
Commander should have been requested to make a “show of force”, and so
discourage any resistance. But it seems that London was not really “en
rapport” with Mesopotamia.
These reports convey the feeling of the men on whom the entire
success of the Force depended. They were mostly “out on a limb”, and the
P.Os had more than enough to do administering their Division, which entailed
almost every aspect of rural life, from valuation of crops for revenue, to local
courts, and even health and education. Before help was received, by way of
A.P.Os and British N.C.O Instructors, it is a wonder that the Force performed
so well as it did. Before passing judgment on the progress of the Levies
during the early years, it is necessary to remember the conditions prevailing in
the country, and the myriad tasks performed by the Civil Administration.
In a similar context, it is necessary to return to the continued attempt to
reorganise the “Striking Force” of the Civil Administration over the previous
six months. A number of documented imiovations 011 the subject had
gradually improved in detail. Browne mentions that the Hillah headquarters
had “A” and “Q” branches by September 1919; meaning that there was an
Adjutant's branch for personnel records, discipline and general orders,
together with a Quartermaster controlling the majority of supplies. However,
they lacked a “G” branch for operations, planning, organisation and
establishments. These were all long overdue and perhaps contributed to the
continued rash of inadequate orders on the Levy reorganisation. The policies
seldom appear to have been thought through prior to publication. Hence the
series of subsequent changes which retarded the original intent.
Further evidence regarding the often confused attempt to reorganise
the Levies is to be found in another Memorandum on the subject, although it
is dated 24 March 1920. The reason for this is that the intention for further
adjustment to the previous instructions 011 the Levy reorganisation were not to
be implemented until 1 April 1920, when the Arab Insurrection was just
beginning. It was too late; the Levies were, by then, fully committed to the
prevailing operations, in one way or another. It was not until the autumn of
 97

1920 that the Levies acquired their first Senior Commander, and their
situation changed for the better.
The Memorandum in question was headed “Reconstitution of Arab
and Kurdish Levies in Mesopotamia”.48 The next statement is only important
because it confirms the reasons for discussing this Memorandum in this
chapter. It stated that with the exception of the Levy and Gendarmerie forces,
“Arab and Kurdish Levies in Mesopotamia are to be Reconstituted from 1st
April 1920, as follows:...”.
The existing Levies were divided into (a) Striking Forces, and (b)
District Police”. This new division of the Force was an improvement on the
previous memorandum of 31 December 1919 (p.88) on this layout, in that the
“military” portion was now separate from the District Police, each with
distinct functions. “The “Striking Force” was now the military arm o f the
Civil Administration. It appears that attempts were being made to centralise
the Striking Force, although there was an acute shortage o f accommodation.
Previously the units had been more widely dispersed.
It is assumed that it was intended to bring these changes about
gradually before the chosen date of 1 April 1920, when Reconstitution was
due to be implemented. But it is more probable that these were the
approximate dispositions of the Striking Force at the commencement o f the
coming Arab Insurrection.
Levy Headquarters Sanctioned Strength

1) 1st Euphrates Levy Ramadi 2 squadrons

(a)
2) 2nd Euphrates Levy Hillah 8 squadrons
(b)
3) 3rd Euphrates Levy Nasiriyah 4 squadrons
4) 1st Tigris Levy Mosul 3 companies
5) 2nd Tigris Levy Kut 2 squadrons
6) 3rd Tigris Levy Amarah 1 company
(c)
7)Diala Levy Ba’qubah 2 squadrons
8) Arbil Levy Arbil (1 squadron
(2 companies

48 L/P&S/10/889, F.Nil.
 98

O f the remaining details, there are only a few worthy o f note. The
training as “Mounted Infantry” not Cavalry, remained unchanged.
However, at least the structure of squadrons and companies were
indicated. These are worthy of note, regardless of the fact that later the
strengths of the squadrons and companies were to change, perhaps because of
budget restrictions:
Mounted Infantry (M.I.):
M.I. Squadron is composed of 4 Troops; a Troop is composed o f 6
sections of 4 men each. Total all ranks including H.Q.: 108. Riding
Horse 1. Ponies 107.

(This organisation of sections is odd in the extreme. When the

mounted infantry went into action, their horses would be taken to cover in the
rear'. Thus they had to be led away by one man. In this case, it would have left
a maximum of three men to form a rifle section—quite inadequate. Had they
had three sections of eight men, two would have taken the eight horses to
cover, leaving a section of six men—more realistic.)
Infantry Company:
Company is composed of 4 Platoons; a Platoon is composed o f 4
sections of 8 men each. Total all ranks including H.Q. .:- 140.

The details of sub-unit strengths shows an improvement, in that it

provides a more comprehensive picture of the proposed Levy Force. But it
still required parent units such as regiments or battalions.
The Levy Force was to form an armed reserve at the disposal of
Political Officers for minor military operations and punitive expeditions
considered to be beyond the scope of the police, and not sufficiently serious
for the employment of regular troops. It was to provide a first-line
reconnaissance and an auxiliary arm for the regular forces in major
operations. District Police were not to be used for quasi-military duties.
Levies/Gendannerie in the Mosul, Sulaimaniyah and Dulaim Divisions
were not due for revision. It appeal’s that they retained the special
arrangements granted to Soane and Leachman.
There was provision for farriers, armourers, tailors, saddlers, drivers
and medical personnel. They were allocated according to requirements, so no
firm establishment for units. They were allocated on the basis of one artisan
between two appropriate units (saddlers and farriers for mounted units only).
 99

In addition, four pack-mules and two A.T. (animal transport) carts for the
Levy headquarters.
According to the “Sanctioned Strengths”, as detailed above, totals
were as follows:
Striking Forces
One Levy H.Q. of 21
Eight H.Qs of nine 72
Twenty-two squadrons of 108 all ranks 2,268
Seven-and-a-half companies o f 140 all ranks 1.050
Total Striking Force 3,411

Gendarmerie /Police
Three detachment H.Qs of nine 27
Five squadrons of 108 540
Ten companies of 140 1.960
Total Gendarmerie/Police 2,527

Total Forces of the Civil Administration: 5,938

This total is little changed from the previous one under reference
above, of 5,965.
Proficiency pay for the trained men in the Levy Force o f Rs.5/-, was
approved. Regarding rations,
Where it is not possible to provision in kind; following allowances
are to be given in lieu:

Ration allowance (man) Rs. 151-

Ration allowance (horse) Rs.25/-

Authorised Scale of Pay for Arab and Kurdish Levies—

Arab Officers Rs.p.m.

Bhnbashi 250/-
Yuzbashi 200 / -
Zabit 150/-
Arab Adjutant (Zabit) 200 / -

Mounted
Bash Chaoush 90/-, 80/-) If in possession
Chaoush 85/-, 75/-) of government
Sowar 70/-, 60/-) remounts

49 L /P& S /l0/621, F.184.

 100

Dismounted
Bash Maullumchi 65/-
Bash Chaoush 60/-
Chaoush 50/-
Armourer 70/-
Nafar 40/-
Clerk 120/-
Sweeper 25/-
Bhistie 30/-
Bootmaker 40/-
Tailor 40/-

British N.C.Os (rs.)

Sergeant-maj or 250/-
Quartermaster-sergeant 200/-
Assistant Instructor 175/-

The pay structure remained the same, except for two or three rupees
less for a couple of tradesmen.
It will be noted that the main difference between this Memorandum
and the previous one, was that the division of the role o f the Striking Force
from that of the District Police was more defined. The new overall approved
strength was only 27 less than that previously published. However, the
strengths often varied as the Civil Administration struggled to meet each
budget.
The Levy Force was improving slowly, and it will be shown that more
minor changes were to be published in the ensuing years; some even before
those enumerated were implemented.
In reality, the Iraq Levies were now represented by the “Striking
Forces”. The Shabanah/District Police and Gendarmerie were a force apart.
However, for budget purposes they were all “Levies”. This became more
apparent in the following year when the designation “Levies” encompassed
the entire Force of the Civil Administration.
In conclusion, 1919 had certainly been a year of change for the Levies.
The year could be divided into two major periods which were interrelated and
produced a cause and effect.
Firstly, the commencement of serious Kurdish unrest, which began
with the murders of Political officers and their associates in April and ended
with the abortive insurrection of Shaikh Mahmud, and with more murders of
 101

P.Os and their staffs during November. All these serious incidents entailed
long and costly punitive operations by imperial garrison troops o f the M.E.F,
assisted by Levies. However, these operations did afford the opportunity for
the British to learn of the fighting capacity of the Assyrians, and so introduced
the authorities in London and Baghdad to a new source of very desirable
military manpower for the Iraq Levies in the years to come.
Second, the Kurdish troubles demonstrated the urgent need for the
Levies to expand and, if time allowed, for training to enable the Striking
Force to cope better in its new military role. But it was to prove that all had
been left too late; the speed of future events left no time for training. With the
continuance of demobilisation in the face of anticipated unrest, of which
Wilson had given repeated warnings to the G.H.Q.M.E.F., the country was, in
some regions, restive and threatening, and the imperial forces were inadequate
to deal with any serious unrest.
Matters were not helped by the political events in Syria. These became
manifest on the withdrawal of the British troops from there in September
1919, when Britain handed over control to the French. This was followed by
hostilities between the French and the Syrians. In the neighbouring disturbed
situation, repatriation of British and Indian troops continued in Iraq,
dangerously weakening the imperial garrison, and regardless of the vacuum
thus created, for which the Levies were neither sufficiently trained nor
numerically able to fill. The situation in Iraq had gradually changed from that
envisaged by the British government when the plans for demobilisation had
been drawn up.
Many troubles were, perhaps, created by slow communications
between Baghdad and London; even urgent military problems had to be
discussed by telegraph, and as some o f the documents show, often with
transmission faults which required correction, causing more delays by
increasing signal traffic.
Unrest in Kurdistan has been given considerable coverage in this
chapter, because the Kurds continued to play an appreciable part in the history
of the Iraq Levies for some years to come. Also, Shaikh Mahmud, in
particular, became, as so aptly described by Browne, the “electric hare” of the
Levies, for he was never caught again.
 102

Perhaps the simple answer to most of the Mesopotamian problems

was, in part, created by the British Treasury— financial stringency was
politically and economically imperative in the British postwar situation.
Further, as has been discussed at the beginning of this chapter, and echoed by
Wilson in his book Loyalties Mesopotamia 1917-20, p.217: “The problem of
Iraq was at the time many-sided, and several Departments o f State were
simultaneously dealing with various aspects, often without consultation with
each other”. The research carried out for this thesis would more than justify
Wilson’s view.
 103

CHAPTER IV

Chapter III dealt with the first Kurdish insurrection, which was
followed by the reorganisation of the Levies into two groups: the Striking
Forces and the District Police, By the end of 1919, they were still not
organised into parent units of regiments or battalions, and therefore had no
command structure. Also, the imperial garrison, of necessity, had discovered
the excellent fighting qualities of the Assyrians when dealing with the
Kurdish insurrection.
This chapter covers the period from the end of 1919, beginning with
the Deir-es-Zor incident. It continues with the spread o f disturbances until the
Arab Insurrection, officially commencing June 1920. This, in turn, led to the
Cairo Conference in March 1921; the recommendations o f which were
implemented in the autumn of that year.
Two political landmarks affecting Iraq were: (i) Britain was assigned
the Mandate for Iraq by the League’s Supreme Council on 25 April 1920; and
(ii) the Amir Faisal was proclaimed King of Iraq on 23 August 1921.
As a background to the events in Mesopotamia during 1920, it is
proposed to discuss an important document in the context of Britain’s
continuing involvement in Iraq, in spite of nationally imposed economic
stringency. It was a Memorandum circulated to the Cabinet on 1 May 1920,1
from the Secretary of State for War (Churchill), who was soon to become
Minister for Colonial Affairs. He was deeply concerned with the cost of
postwar Middle East commitments, especially Iraq. In essence, it advanced
the immediate steps he proposed to take in Mesopotamia to effect a reduction
in the escalating expenditure.
In the document, Churchill pointed out that the War* Office was not
responsible for troop distribution: “ ...the policy of the Cabinet for
Mesopotamia was animated by the Eastern Committee”. The Foreign Office,
not the India Office, gave the “ ...directing impulse”. On departmental
responsibility for the heavy expenditure, he further asks: “How long is this
state of affairs to continue? It will continue as long as the department calling

1 Cab.24/106, F.67.
 104

the tune has no responsibility for paying the piper”. He was derogatory of
Mesopotamia, calling it “ ...a score of mud villages, sandwiched in between a
swampy river and a blistering desert, inhabited by a few hundred half naked
families usually starving...
After comparison with the costs of garrisoning India, he arrived at his
raison d ’etre, which reflected the anticipated Ministerial responsibility for
Colonial Affairs. “I hope, therefore, that Mesopotamia may be handed over
immediately to the Colonial Office.”
In a similar context, the Chief of Air Staff (Trenchard) was writing a
paper in March 1920 on the air force taking over control o f Mesopotamia
from the War Office. In part, it was a matter of inter-service rivalry because
previously the navy and the army had a Royal Naval Air Service and a Royal
Flying Corps respectively; this status quo they wished to retain. The air force
wanted to obtain recognition as a third independent service, and acquiring
control of Iraq, from the army was a means to that end.
It will be shown that 1920-21 was a critical period in the history of the
Iraq Levies, affecting, as it did, their manpower composition, recruitment,
armament and equipment; it also marked the arrival of the Levy’s first “Field
Commander”. Since the end of the war, the Levies had been in the
administrative charge of a succession of British officers, and in 1920
■ • #
comprised “a somewhat disorganised force of odd units”, which meant being
without an organisation based on parent units of regiments or battalions to
enable the creation of a command structure—necessary for functioning as a
military force, which role they had recently assumed.
It is now proposed to discuss the Deir-es-Zor affair, which had been a
“running sore” moving to a crisis. The problem of Deir-es-Zor was that it lay
on an undefined frontier between Iraq and Syria. The township and environs
were described by Wilson as a “no man’s land”. Members of Faisal's
Damascus interim government had tried to impose their authority in the
township. This caused the townsfolk to request the appointment of a British
officer to maintain law and order there. Wilson3 had referred the matter to
London as far back as 13 December 1918 but the issue remained, pending the

2 J.G. B rowne, The Ira q i L evies 191 5 -3 2 (London, 1932), p. 17.

3 A .T. W ilson, M eso p o ta m ia 1917-1930, A clash o f loya lties (London, 1931), V o l.2, p.229.
 105

decision of the Conference to give a ruling “ 011 the same basis as our
occupation of the Mosul wilayat”.
The Deir-es-Zor affair was an external challenge to British postwar
authority in Iraq, and continued to spread through northern Iraq during 1920,
the year referred to by the Arabs as, “Am al-Nakba” (the Year of
Catastrophe).
A telegram from the G.O.C. Mesopotamia to the War Office 011 11
December 19194 reporting an attack on Deir-es-Zor was short in detail. It
appears that on 10 December a Sharifian Arab officer named Ramadhan al-
Shalash made a surprise attack 011 the town at dawn, with an unspecified
number of Sharifian Arab troops, supported by local Arabs from the town and
its environs. According to the report, Captain A. Chamier was A.P.O. in the
town, with sixty Levies and two British armoured cars.
According to Wilson,5 on 11 December Deir-es-Zor was entered by
tribesmen from the south who together with the townsmen, raided the civil
buildings, including the P.O’s office, where they broke open the safe, stealing
its contents. A British armoured car, sent to reconnoitre the situation, was
fired on and badly damaged. Later, fire was opened 011 the Levy barracks; two
machine-guns on its roof returned fire, but were put out of action by the
enemy. Soon after, Captain Chamier was invited to “parley” with the Mayor
and leading citizens who were anxious for a truce because the tribesmen they
had incited were by then well out of hand.
The tribal shaikhs were of an opinion that, having gone so far, they
might as well kill the British officer and his staff. But the fortuitous arrival of
two aircraft, sent by G.H.Q. Mosul, proceeded to strafe the town with
machine-guns, causing the shaikhs to beg Chamier to stop the attack. This
accomplished, a twenty-four-hour truce was agreed.
It appears that Ramadhan-al-Shalash was a Mesopotamian from
Mosul, an ex-Turkish army Arab officer, and prominent member of the ‘Ahd-
al-Iraqi secret society. He commenced negotiations with Chamier, which
eventually involved the Amir Faisal in Damascus (who, by 11 March was
proclaimed King of Syria). He attempted to calm the situation. However, the

4 L /M IL/5, F.331.
5 W ilson, op.cit., p.231.
 106

political intrigues continued, incited by other ex-Turkish army Arab officers,

and members of the ‘Ahd-al-Iraqi. They encouraged the frontier tribes to raid
and rob caravans and villages within the Iraq border, and sent threatening
messages to the British P.Os in the region.
On 11 January 1920, Ramadhan-al-Shalash attacked Albu Karnal with
his tribesmen “who entered the suburbs, looted the houses o f Arabs who were
in British service, and violated their women”.6
Ramadhan was succeeded by Maulud Pasha al-Khalaf, another ex
Turkish army officer, who, like Ramadhan, was a “Mosulawi”, and a member
of the ‘Ahd-al-Iraqi society. On assuming command of Ramadhan’s
marauders, he proceeded to spread more hostile propaganda among the
shaikhs in the south as far as Amara; even attempting to incite jih a d along the
Euphrates.
At the end of January, the G.O.C-in-C., Lt.-General G.F.MacMunn,
decided to deal summarily with Maulud and his raiders by sending a
detachment of imperial troops to Salahiya, half-way between Albu Kamal and
the Khabur river. Maulud used this as an excuse to indulge in fresh hostilities,
claiming he was unable to restrain the fury of the tribes. These, led by ex-
Turkish Arab officers, attacked Albu Kamal in mid-February; at the same
time raiding the line of communication of the imperial garrison as far down as
Qaim.
Wilson,7 claimed that much of the cause of these troubles could be
attributed to the failure of the British government to clarify publicly the
intention of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, leaving
ambiguity in the method by which it was proposed to administer Iraq under a
Mandate. He further pointed out:
We continued to assume that the Arab Government [at Damascus]
was not responsible for what was done by its officers and that a state
of war did not exist but that it was an assumption increasingly
difficult to maintain.

These events may not appear to be directly in the context o f the history
of the Iraq Levies, but they are, in the opinion of the writer, of considerable
importance as a background to the commencement of the violent disturbances

6 Ibid, p.235.
 107

which were to beset the whole of Iraq, involving the British imperial garrison
and the Civil Administration, both of whom were much dependent on the
Levies. The roles and tasks to be faced by the Levies dictated their strength
and armament— but usually they obtained this recognition too late to be of use
when most needed. Nevertheless, their loyalty to the British Crown was, time
and again, proved beyond doubt.
As postulated in this work, the troubles of 1920 had begun and
continued in the north, until the Tel Afar incident of June 1920. Therefore the
Levies had little or no opportunity to prepare for the forthcoming greater civil
onslaught of the “Arab insurrection”, which the British imperial garrison
found so hard to put down.
The Deir-es-Zor8 confrontation could have, in part, arisen from lack of
early negotiations for the alignment of that sensitive frontier. The matter was
raised at an “Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs” on 16
June 1920, chaired by Earl Curzon.9 The Conference was invited to approve a
telegram to the G.O.C. Mesopotamia, directing him not to bomb Jeziret Ibn
Omar as it was in the French sphere, or the actual town o f Deir-es-Zor. Mr.
Montagu (Secretary of State for India), pointed out that “Dair-es-Zor being in
the Arab sphere, the bombing of that town would be tantamount to a
declaration of war on Faisal”. Curzon stated that, “ ...W ilson’s reported
assurances that the raiding parties...were led by Sharifian officers, but that he
[Curzon]...did not know exactly what this expression [Sharifian] meant”.
Curzon did not appear to approve of Wilson’s administration. The content of
the discussion also demonstrated the inherent political sensitivity o f the area.
There was no adverse comment on the inability of the Levies to defend
Deir-es-Zor, nor any mention of desertions. The A.P.O. had only been
resident in the township since November 1919, and from the following
comment, the Levies he commanded were not from those who had been under
Major Boyle’s training scheme—they were perhaps locally recruited

7 Ibid.
8 Mutasarriflik o f Zor (D eir-es-Zor). Zor w as not divided into Sanjaqs, but w as administered
by a Mutasarrif, hence its appellation; he took his orders direct from C onstantinople. The
creation o f this appointment appears to date from 1874, when the Turks extended their
influence over the desert tribes o f the area. Admiralty, “Handbook o f M esopotam ia”, vol.I
(A dm iralty War Staff, A ugust 1916), p. 100.
9 FO .3 7 1 /5 2 2 7 , F.52.
 108

Gendarmerie, and fit only for that duty. This is clear from an entry in the
Diary for August 1919 of their P.O., Major F.E. Carver:10
At last our Shabanah clothing has come. This should make a great
difference in the morale of the Shabanah force. No man can be really
smart when wearing an old Turkish tunic out at the elbows and
trousers of rainbow hue.

It would seem that much was expected and demanded o f these men in
return for poor and very few basic military necessities and amenities, and even
adequate training, to fit them for the situation which had so quickly
developed.
The incident was considered o f sufficient concern by General
MacMunn to increase the force at Fallujah and Ramadi by six squadrons of
cavalry, ten light armoured cars, and a battalion of infantry. The cavalry began
to advance up the river 011 12 December 1919. By the 13th, civil officials and
Levies evacuated Albu Kamal in the face of the advance o f hostile tribes upon
the town. By the 14th, all M.E.F. demobilisation and leave was suspended.
From then on this new affair escalated, in spite of the intervention understood
to have been made by the Amir Faisal, ordering his subordinates to
withdraw—with no effect—for which no date has been found.
There can be little doubt that both the Military and the Civil
Administrations were deeply concerned, especially the former, with so many
untrained troop replacements coming in to fill the gaps created by those
returning for demobilisation. The G.O.C.-in-C’s telegram to the War Office
on 14 December 1919 confirms this problem:11
As newly arrived artillery [men] have no training I am retraining able
men, both artillery and other services, till situation clears. Arab
advance on Ramadi and Mosul may take place and preparations to
meet this are in progress.

This proved that the Deir-es-Zor affair was serious, and could spread
without sufficient force to stop it.
These extracts may also help the reader to appreciate the political
environment which formed a background for the impending insurrection, and
the immediate inadequacies of the British military resources to deal

10 L /P & S /l0 /6 2 1 , F .464.

11 L /M IL /5/799, F.330.
 109

definitively with it. The situation in 1920 required an efficient mobile force
with which to maintain internal security. The reorganised Levy Coips of
3,195 partly-trained Striking Force, coupled with some 2,000 District Police,
were mostly to be used by the military as guides (a reminder of their
beginnings in 1915), reconnaissance patrols, guards on the lines of
communication or as garrisons for the protection of Political Officers at
Divisional Centres, where they were sometimes besieged. It will be shown
how, in the early days of the insurrection, Levies were undervalued by the
military; but by the end of 1920, they had engendered respect as both a
necessary and promising force. Perhaps it was because the Levies were, at
first, undervalued, that their participation in actions with units of the M.E.F.
caused their performance seldom to be acknowledged in the War Diaries of
the units with which they served.
There appears to have been little operational activity by the Levies or
District Police immediately after the Deir-es-Zor incident; but that event
seems to have encouraged the opportunism of the Syrians and Mesopotamians
to continue their harassment of the long and vulnerable British lines of
communication from the Fallujah railhead, through Ramadi, Hit and Anah.12
Frequent attacks on this line continued from 14 February 1920 in an
attempt to make the British occupation of Albu Kamal untenable. These
attacks were serious, often comprising raiding bands of Arabs 300-600 strong,
and ending in considerable losses on both sides. For example: on 1 March
1920, 400 Arabs attacked a detachment of the 126th Baluchistan Infantry. The
enemy were eventually driven off. Imperial casualties included one British
and one Indian officer killed, while Arab losses were 34 killed and many
wounded.
Regardless of the continued unrest after Deir-es-Zor, the official report
by the War Office dated 26 October 192013 maintained that the “Arab
Insurrection was timed for the hot weather”, and “the initial explosion at Tel
Afar” on 3 June 1920 signalled a general anti-British rising in Mesopotamia.
It is a long document covering many aspects and raises the question, “ ...on
how far the Arab movement is spontaneous, or how far it forms merely a

12 A IR /5/125 3 , p .5324.
13 W O /33/969, no folio.
 110

section of attack in a general conspiracy against the British Empire”.

Fortunately the Kurdish situation, in so far as the possibility of further
turbulence might have been expected, remained relatively quiet. This can,
perhaps, be attributed to the qualities of Major Soane during his period of duty
as P.O. Sulamani.
While these disturbances were taking place in the north, the time for
the “Reconstitution of the Arab and Kurdish Levies” on 1 April 1920 had
arrived. In this connection it may be recalled, that at Hillah, under the
“Reconstitution” of the Corps, the Levy Striking Force was to be excused its
previous duties to enable it to carry out a period of six months uninterrupted
training. In theory, the training programme should have started, and this is
indicated in a report by Brigadier-General A.G. Wauchope (Commander, 34th
Infantry Brigade),14 sent to Sir Arthur Hirtzel, India Office, on 4 April 1920.
Wauchope had been detailed to inspect the Levies, no doubt by the new
G.O.C.-in-C., General Haldane.
His tour of inspection of the Levies started at Hillah, accompanied by
Boyle. It covered the “Striking Force”, and was to continue with the District
Police at Hillah, Diwaniyah, and Shamiyah Divisions. The report is long and
very detailed, but its essence is contained in a D.O. letter from Wauchope to
Wilson, dated 22 April, giving his impressions gained during his inspection.
The D.O. covered a copy of his official report, which was not correct
procedure, but a friendly gesture in confidence; usually it would have gone
direct to G.H.Q.
The D.O. stated: “The inspection has been a very great pleasure to
m e .. .the evidence of so much energy and good spirit and desire to do well by
the Levy”. He had found that the A.P.Os felt they might expect more support
than they got from Political Officers. They certainly received none from the
army officers. He thought that a “suggestion” in both cases was all that was
required. He was not satisfied with the horses, especially at Sukhair, and took
the local P.O. (who endorsed his opinion) with him to see for himself.
He noted that the squadrons at Hillah had not yet received their horses.
(They were destined to be trained as Mounted Infantry.)

14 L/P&S/10/874, F.94.
 I ll

O f the 150 horses at Abu Sukhair, about 50 are India Country bred
ponies...with few exceptions...ready for hard work. The remainder
are mainly Arab ponies.. .many are of poor quality. Of this 100, 10 or
50 are suffering from debility and should be exchanged. About
another 30 are well under three years old and will not be fit for
service conditions for about another year.

Ultimate responsibility for the state of affairs as described would

appear to have lain at the doors of British or Indian governmental
departments. If approval was given for 2,052 Mounted Infantry to be raised
and trained, why were less than half the necessary ponies fit for service?
There was a recurring failure to meet official decisions with the necessary
supplies— animals, all forms of equipment, clothing and even a standardised
rifle. Almost every report by P.Os or Levy officers contained the same
complaint— shortage of most supplies. The deficiencies were serious in every
respect. As will be seen, these supply problems continued for some time.
Wilson, in the covering letter for the report above,15 to Hirtzel, India
Office, stated in his final paragraph:
His point about Levy Officers expecting more support than they get
from Political Officers is receiving attention. It is probably inevitable
that as a result of the division of levies into two forces:

(1) District Police pure and simple at the disposal of the

Political Officer, and
(2) Striking force which is not directly under his orders.

The Political Officers should tend to interest themselves in the Police

Force, for which they are personally responsible, rather than on the
Levies which are administered direct from Baghdad. However, this
will doubtless come right in time.

The Territorial system that we are adopting is, I feel sure, sound and
the Levies, whatever their ultimate name may be, will afford a career
for some of the younger Arabs.

Boyle disagreed with Wilson’s territorial organisation, as will be noted

in his memorandum below.
In a similar context, Boyle wrote a memorandum, Mo.INS/G/1 dated 3
May 1920, to Wilson,16 giving his comments on Wauchope5s report,
especially the remarks on the 2nd Euphrates Levy at Hillah. and Abu Sukhair.

15 L /P & S /l 0 /8 7 4 , F.91.
16 I.O. L /P & S /l0 /874, F s.88-9,
 112

Incidentally, this designation did not describe a regiment or battalion in the

British army sense, because there was no comparable establishment. Their
strengths varied. However, Boyle made the following points: he saw no need
for more British officers provided the present establishment was maintained,
but there was a shortage of staff. He recommended an H.Q. Training Centre
be created to remove the “in-unit” training responsibility from the Levy Unit
Commanders.
His feelings regarding British N.C.Os was the same as for officers; he
saw no need for an increase. He also wanted a well-staffed Central School for
Arab officers, to enable them to be given more responsibility at Hillah. Boyle
required a “better stamp of recruit”; the latter could be obtained by British
officers touring the districts. He especially favoured good tribal men, feeling
they would increase esprit de corps; but he accepted it might incur tribal
spirit— a disadvantage to be overcome. “The men must be made to realise that
they are all members of one corps rather than individual tribes.” His ideas
were to enlist men with “antecedents” who would improve “a heterogeneous
corps wholly loyal against local tribes, so they may be counted on”. If not,
they may well turn into “a corps of scallywags, ex-Turkish Gendarmerie
system”.
He was most keen that every advantage be taken for the Force to train
with local British military units at every opportunity. His reasons were: to
increase esprit de corps and to afford the opportunity for Levy British officers
to train in the field with the men under their command.
It was felt necessary to discuss Boyle’s comments as fully as possible,
because he was the one officer at this stage of Levy development who had
their moulding in his hands. He also had Wilson’s ear.
Wauchope continued with his inspections of the corps, with further
long and detailed reports, which mostly cover the Hillah District Police and
the Diwaniyah and Shamiyah districts; plus a supplementary report on Arab
and Kurdish Levies, dated 5 May 1920.17 This was as long and detailed as the
former, for he was an astute and meticulous officer. He seemed pleased with a
few Arab officers and senior N.C.Os. The married families had built a small

17 L /P & S /l0/874, F.72.

 113

village near one camp of which he approved, but felt it would have been better
further from the lines. He also felt that whenever possible, issued rations
would be better than the practice of a monetary allowance, but that the camp
coffee shops helped keep the men from the Bazaar.
When discussing personnel, he noted:
In the Squadrons at Hillah and Abu Sukhair Tribesmen are mixed,
but the Kurds are organised in separate troops. At Diwaniyah the 30
Kinds are mixed among the Arab troops. They seem to be on
thoroughly friendly relations, but I think the advantage of having
several units of Sunnis, men free from all influence, religious or
tribal, is a standing advantage to the Levy, and is easily gained by
having Kurds in separate troops.

In this he was to be proved correct.

It appears that uniforms were made up locally from imported cloth,
issued from Force headquarters. Nevertheless, in general, severe shortages
remained the rule, the Mounted Infantry were deficient in adequate sound
mounts and sufficient saddlery or rifle buckets, without which it was
impossible to train, let alone undertake operations as planned.
Wilson, it would seem, lacked a competent centralised military staff
with which to maintain co-ordination throughout the Levy Force; Boyle was
overloaded. Then, perhaps, matters could have been far better planned. But as
the G.O.C. was ultimately responsible, Wilson may have felt he could lose
control of his “private army”. The fact that he got Wauchope to give him an
early copy of his report, perhaps indicates some unease on Wilson’s part;
indeed, friction between him and Haldane was to follow.
The strength of the Levy Corps was something in excess of 5,000 men,
including both the “Striking Force” and the “District Police”, and was still
rising slowly by mid-1920; and in accordance with military practice, a senior
officer was required to command a force of this size. This appointment was
long overdue.
Therefore, the following telegram was sent by Haldane to the War
Office on 10 May 1920:18
The locally recruited Levies under the Civil Administration have now
reached a stage of development at which it is advisable that their
organisation and training should be co-ordinated under an inspector

18F.O. 371/5073, F.326.

 114

of standing and experience. STOP. The Civil ask that if you consider
him suitable the services of Brig-Gen,.C.,L. Smith V.C., M.C.,
commanding 9th Indian Brigade of Infantry Palestine should be made
available for this purpose. STOP. I consider this would be to the
benefit of this country and would be a step in the direction of making
more use in future of Arab Levies. STOP. I therefore recommend for
favourable consideration, (sic.)

On the 11th, Wilson backed the same request with a telegram to

Hirtzel,19 stating he had ascertained that Smith was willing to come on the
terms provisionally offered, namely Rs. 1,800 with the “usual concessions and
12 months’ contract in the first instance”. He continued:
Improvement in training and status of levies is necessary if reduction
of garrison is not to be accompanied by grave disorder and I hope
you will see your way to move Treasury and War Office accordingly.

The War Office responded to the above: “No objection if Smith

Willing”. It therefore remains unclear why this posting never took place; it
was urged by Shuckburgh in a telegram to the Secretary of the Treasury,
London, on the 21st,20 stating: “Mr. Montagu is satisfied that the appointment
cannot with advantage be held by an officer of lower rank than that of
Brigadier-General”.
However, it was not until 1 February 1921, that Colonel-Commandant
J. Sanders took charge of the “Levy Administration”. He worked, it would
seem, from G.H.Q.M.E.F. It has not been possible to discover what happened
about Smith.
Wauchope’s reports clearly indicate that regardless o f the order for the
“Reconstitution” of the Arab and Kurdish Levies, the Levy Striking Forces
were still not ready to take the field. Shortage of horses and equipment would
have retarded their progress in the six months’ training period allocated. For
example, the Striking Forces of the 2nd Euphrates Levy with Boyle’s H.Q. at
Hillah, produced only 554 Mounted Infantry against an approved
establishment of 800. (It is doubtful whether all of the Striking Forces of
Mounted Infantry were adequately mounted at this time.)
There was also another important factor, which not only affected the
Levies, but more importantly M.E.F. itself, and perhaps the conduct o f some

19F.O. 3 7 1 /5 0 7 3 , F .337.
20 F.O. 3 7 1 /5 0 7 3 , F .336.
 115

of the operations in which all the imperial forces in Mesopotamia were soon
to be involved. This was the apparent clash of personalities between General
Haldane (G.O.C.-in-C,m M.E.F.) and Lt.-Colonel Sir A.T. Wilson (D.C.C.,
Mesopotamia). During his visit to Paris and England, Wilson had an audience
with the King on 14 April 1919, when it may be assumed he received his
knighthood.
After Deir-es-Zor of December 1919, the operations had continued in
and around the Mosul wilayat21 with some serious fighting, which was not
part of this work as the Levies were not involved. Suffice to say sporadic
attacks by tribesmen, encouraged by ex-Sharifian officers (as claimed by
G.H.Q.) during April and May, kept the M.E.F. troops busy in the Mosul area,
between the Euphrates, Tigris and Khabur. Raids were also made on the
Baghdad to Mosul lines of communication, including the railway. The Kurds,
as previously mentioned, remained relatively quiet.
While these operations continued, the new G.O.C., General Haldane,
who, it may be recalled, had arrived at Basrah on 20 March 1920, began a tour
of his Command. He had been warned by Wilson that trouble was brewing.
Nevertheless, Haldane, with some of his staff, left for Persia, which was a part
of the M.E.F. Command, on 5 June 1920. This, it will be noted, was one day
after the attack on, and murders at, Tel Afar, soon to be discussed.
That Haldane and some of his staff were in Persia in the early days of
the “Arab Insurrection” gave cause for some adverse comment in
Mesopotamia, London and Simla. Quotes from the following relevant
documents seem to point to an early mutual dislike between Haldane and
Wilson, which perhaps boded ill for the Levies at this difficult stage, both for
their development and the increasing threat of major civil disorder.
The A.C.C. (Wilson) had acquired considerable spheres o f regional
responsibility, appointments hitherto held by Cox, whom Wilson had
temporarily replaced. In an Annex to the General Circular No.492 of 20 April
1920,22 under “Central Administration”, he suddenly took a somewhat
unusual step by officially publishing the responsibilities o f his appointment:
they were considerable.

21 A IR /5/125 3 , F.73, pp .5326-7, respectively.

22 L /P & S /l0 /7 5 1 , F.N il.
 116

Over and above the administration of the Mesopotamian Occupied

Territories, Wilson’s responsibilities included: Political Resident, Persian
Gulf; Consul-General, Fars, Kuzistan, Bushire and general supervision over
affairs in the Persian Gulf, to include Muscat, Bahrein, the Mekran Coast,
Bandar Abbas, Kerman, Persian Baluchistan, Fars, Arabistan and Luristan.
He was also Chief Political Officer for G.H.Q. M.E.F., and supervised
Political Officers with troops in north-west Persia, acting in such matters as
Representative of His Majesty’s Government at Tehran with the G.O.C.-in-C.
in Mesopotamia, and as a mouthpiece of the latter’s views.
He was also responsible to His Majesty’s Government for negotiating
with Ruling Chiefs in Central Arabia, taking his orders from the India Office.
He co-ordinated information on Kurdistan, for advising the British
government 011 the region. With regard to questions arising in Arabistan,
Bakhtiari Country and Luristan, the Civil Commissioner exercised general
supervision over the Consular* and Political Officers concerned under orders
of and in communication with:
1. G.O.C.-in-C.
2. His Maj esty ’s Minister, Tehran (Cox)
3. Government of India, Foreign Department
4. Secretary of State for India.

Under existing arrangements Kuwait was supervised by him in his

capacity as Civil Commissioner, rather than a Political Resident in the Persian
Gulf.
To speculate 011 the reasons for publication of this apparently self­
aggrandisement is tempting. Wilson, as a much younger man than Haldane,
was also “outranked” by him and could well have found it difficult to impress
the general with the seriousness of the volatile political situation. In such
circumstances, if things went wrong, as they did, Wilson could have been
accused of failing to impress on Haldane the problems he faced. Thus, by
“trailing his cloak”, Wilson perhaps hoped to impress Haldane by the many
responsibilities with which he was entrusted by both London and Simla— a
man of consequence.
I11 his book, The Insurrection o f Mesopotamia, 1920, p.2, Haldane
wrote:
 117

Besides congratulations on my new appointment, I was the recipient

of more than an equal number of condolences; and although no
official hint was breathed that Mesopotamia might prove to be
something other than the proverbial bed of roses, I had many private
warnings which induced me to believe that those flowers would not
be unaccompanied by their usual crop of thorns.

In Wilson’s book, Mesopotamia, 1917-1920, p.273, he wrote of

Haldane:
By this time the political situation both in Baghdad and elsewhere
had become alarming, and I pressed him urgently yet again to defer
his departure. He felt, however, that his long-delayed tour of
inspection to Persia should have precedence, and took a more
optimistic view of the position in Iraq than I was able to do. On
grounds of health too, he needed the change of climate and scene that
the Persian plateau could afford. It is clear from his book that his
hopes and desires warped his judgement. His optimism was not
shared by the General Staff in the “Operations” and “Intelligence”
branches, nor by his Divisional Commander, but their representations
were not heeded.

From these recollections, it is not difficult to discern there was, or had

been, considerable friction between these two important and central
personalities.
The Tel Afar affair, as mentioned, was officially considered the signal
for the start of the “Arab Insurrection” and had begun the day before Haldane,
with some of his staff, left for Persia on 4 June 1920.
The most concise report on the incident, although not definitive, is
contained in a document circulated by the Secretary o f State for India. It was
based on the report of the P.O. Mosul (Lt.-Colonel L.F. Nalder) to Wilson,
dated 25 June 1920, in which he described the affair from the beginning.23 It
was the “official” spark which ignited the whole conflagration, and is
considered worthy of adequate coverage because a unit of the Levies was
involved. Colonel Nalder stated that ever since the occupation o f Deir-es-Zor
by the Sharifians in December 1919, there had been a good deal of
restlessness in the desert, with raids on British lines of communication. This
culminated in the killing of Major MacDonald (ex-Mosul Gendarmerie) by a
party of the Albu Algali.

23 L/MIL/5/799, F.55.
 118

On 21 April, the first caravan for some months arrived at Mosul from
Deir-es-Zor. This appeared to inflame a fresh period of sedition in Mosul,
with raids increasing, leading to a train being destroyed near Ain Dibbs on 24
May. The P.O. (Nalder) had toured Tel Afar in early May, and the district
Shaikhs had come to meet him expressing loyalty in the tents he visited—they
had even attended a race meeting in Mosul prior to Ramathan.
On 26 May, reconnaissance by the Levy A.P.O. Tel Afar, made it clear
that attempts were being made to raise the tribes in the name of the Amir
Abdullah ibn al Hussein. Reconnaissance by armoured cars and aircraft
reported nothing suspicious— however, the British army posted a Vickers gun
with gunner at Tel Afar. The P.O. considered evacuating Tel Afar, but, first,
he had no grounds for doing so, and secondly, the Tel Afar Gendarmerie
detachment was one of the best he had. Furthermore, the Tel Afar mound
afforded excellent opportunities for defence. The P.O. felt that to abandon the
district would create a bad image among the tribes, and cause an adverse
impression in Mosul.
On 3 June, Major Barlow (Mosul Gendarmerie) reported by telephone
from Tel Afar that the Sharifian Agents were holding a meeting in the town to
herald the arrival of the Sharif with a force. Barlow also reported that his
Gendarmerie Yuzbashi (captain) had left the town, and that the telegraph line
was cut. Eighteenth Division sent aircraft and armoured cars to Tel Afar every
day; and on the following day, pigeons were to be sent there in case o f a
breakdown in communications.
The attack on the town commenced early next morning (4 June).
Tribesmen rode into the town, which rose in response. Lt. Stuart was shot
deliberately by one of his own native officers, and no resistance was offered
to the attack by the Gendarmerie. Sergeant Walker, the Indian clerk, and the
machine-gunner, held the roof of the barracks until the Sharifian troops
arrived, when the three defenders were killed by a grenade.
The A.P.O., Major Barlow, had left the town the previous day for
Bogha, as arranged, and found Sulaiman Agha, who endeavoured to capture
him; but Barlow got away on foot only to be recaptured next morning near Tel
Afar. As he was being taken into the town, he saw some British armoured cars
and, as he broke away dashing to them, he was shot. The cars were ambushed
 119

ill the township, none of the crews escaping. This Arab success was a signal
for all the tribes in the district to rise.
The P.O’s conclusion, in brief, was that the affair had shown the fatal
results of P.Os in frontier districts without close military support. Also:
These functions would normally be performed by levies, but until
public opinion in this division is convinced that to serve the
Government is to join the winning side, and this opinion is by no
means generally held at present, levies will be most difficult to
recruit and unreliable when recruited.

This was a shocking affair, in so far as the Levy Gendarmerie was

concerned. But they were employed for work which resembled that of District
Police. Their ethnic composition was not indicated. It is possible that the
Yuzbashi had served in the Turkish army. Whatever the reasons for this
debacle, it understandably undermined the confidence o f the new G.O.C.-in-
C. in the Levies in general, by raising the spectre of the battle o f Shaibah
(April 1915), which had damned the Arabs in the eyes of many British senior
officers.
Llowever, Wilson appeal's to have seized the opportunity to publicise
his lack of confidence in Haldane by somewhat usurping the G.O.C’s position
as Army Commander during his absence in Persia. It is thus felt important to
continue with a little more of the correspondence involved because the
apparent friction must have had a negative effect, both in the quelling o f the
insurrection, and in retarding the growth of the Levy Force.
Wilson informed the India Office of the worsening internal situation
by telegram on 9 June 1920, supporting the contention that all was not well
between these two key men. In it he stated that:
1. Recent developments have caused review of whole situation of
Mesopotamia, arising out of the announcement of grant of
mandate and its reception by public in this country. 2. During the
last 18 months progress of demobilisation, withdrawal of
experienced civil officers and their departure on leave have given
men of all classes in this country reason to doubt whether we are
prepared or are in the position to give effect to our obligations
under mandate. 3. Our Army is now .. .incapable of
defending...frontier divisions of Mosul and Dulaim against
aggression...or restoring internal order. 4. Both above divisions
were protected from Sharifian aggression up till October last by

24 L/P& S/l 1/175, F.12.

 120

the Dair-ez-Zor division; its separation from Mesopotamia by the

Peace Conference...its seizure by Arabs, led to a succession of
incidents.. .latest.. .being the outrage at Tel Afar. 5. Last February
I warned Government that we must hold what we then had with
the troops then in the country, or clear out, and that there was no
middle course. Events have shown that this was not an over­
statement.

The text continued with political discussion, and ended with:

The above telegram has not been shown to or discussed with General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, firstly because he is in Persia and,
secondly, issues are of such vast importance that I consider it best to
place my views before you on my own responsibility.

This despatch caused the War Office to send a rather punctilious letter
to the Under-Secretary of State for India, dated 3 July 1920,25 stating:
I am to say that the Army Council are of the opinion that the time has
now come when the Secretary of State for India will appreciate an
expression of desire on the part of the Council that Mr. Montagu may
see his way to indicate to Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, K.C.I.E.,
the advisability of leaving expressions of opinion on military matters
to the responsible authority viz., the General Officer Commanding-
in-Chief, Army of Occupation.

The affair caused quite a flurry in the government departments in

London. A minute stated: “I suspect they were put up to it by the F.O., whose
consistent policy it is to ‘go and see what Wilson is doing, and tell him not
to’”. (Initialled J.E.S. [S^ickburgh].)
Wilson’s telegram, dated 9 June above, had pre-empted Haldane’s of
the 12th to the War Office,26 in which the latter stated:
Reference Civil Commissioner’s telegram 6948 o f June 9th to India
Office and telegram of 11th from Baghdad to you. Portions of these
as worded may cause undue concern. My full views will be wired
after I arrive Baghdad on 18th. Request however sanction for
bombing Dairezzor. [This request was refused, as it was in the
French sphere.] Sent from Kasvin. (sic.)

From this it may be surmised that in spite of the incidents of Deir-es-

Zor and Tel Afar, coupled with the incursions by the Sharifians and tribes
down the Euphrates, the G.O.C.-IN-C. M.E.F. seems to have remained
relatively unconcerned. But he showed his frustration with the “Civil” in the

25 L /P & S /l 1/175, F . l l .
26 L /P & S /l 1/175, F.Nil.
 121

following telegram to the War Office, dated 23 June 1920.27 After reference to
Persia, he stated:
Regarding the Levies and their progress please ask India Office for
their latest report on their state. The levies are of no military value
and for 2 years their value is likely to be of doubtful quality. They
cannot be counted on in questions of reduction as a factor. In the Tel
Afar incident as in some others previously the levies have either led
the way or joined in withdrawal from enemies. I do not consider they
are likely ever to be reliable in cases where religious fanaticism is the
cause of disturbances.

(Haldane appeared to disapprove of Wilson’s “private army”. By the

year’s end, he had to concede its worth.)
Wilson’s final statement on the matter is in the first and last
paragraphs of his telegram Mo.8422, to the India Office, dated 14 July 1920:28
I am sorry War Office take exception my action, but I beg to point
out that as I explained at the time, General Officer Commanding in
Chief was absent in Northern Persia, and in any case had changed his
Headquarters for the Summer to Persia(n) [sic] hills and did not
contemplate returning to Baghdad till Autumn unless in special
emergency.

Last paragraph:
I confirm my telegram of July 10th No. 8312 which crossed your
telegram under reply, and assuming you give me discretion requested
above, I am content to abide by the consequences.

The Secretary of State for India noted, “I think Wilson is right”.

Throughout this period of contentious exchanges between the
personalities and government departments concerned with Iraq, the Arab
insurrection continued to gain pace. The Army of Occupation was to be
involved in almost continuous fighting over an ever-increasing area; but the
Levies were not really involved in these initial operations until July 1920.
However, many small district detachments were besieged with their
P.Os and A.P.Os. in Rawandiz, Diwaniyah, Abu Sukhair, Kufah, Hillah,
Kliidr and Nasiriyeh. Perhaps the Force was not considered ready or reliable
by Haldane, other than initially as guides or for reconnaissance, until the
worsening situation made all troops valuable. It was a bad time for the Levies
who, in the vast majority it will be shown, remained faithful to the

27 L /P & S /l0/874, F.68.

 122

government throughout the rebellion in spite of constant attempts by the

rebels to subvert their loyalty by appealing to their tribal and family
affiliations. In this latter context, according to Browne and Wilson, rumours
were circulated that their women were being assaulted, carried off, or even
killed. In coffee shops, cups used by Levy personnel were broken by other
local customers.
By July, the Insurrection had become a real trial o f strength between
the insurgents and the British and Indian troops of the M.E.F.; the imperial
troops were hard pressed in trying to contain the situation. The long lines of
communication were vulnerable, railways tracks were torn up and trains
derailed. A further example of the increasing confidence o f the insurgents is
evident in their successful attack on part o f a column of the 2nd Battalion of
the Manchester Regiment, sent to relieve Kifri, during the night of 25 July
1920. The debacle occurred during an ill-timed withdrawal, during which the
Manchesters’ casualties were 20 killed, 60 wounded, and 318 missing. Those
of the insurgents are not known.
It is considered of value to discuss the views of Major Boyle on “his”
Levies at this time, with regard to their possible performance in the

operations. Boyle wrote a D.O.to Wilson on 17 June 1920.29 Although Boyle

was a Levy enthusiast, as a soldier he was a realist; this will be discerned in
his following remarks.
Memorandum Reference our conversation last night regarding my
opinion as to reliability of Levies with reference to the present
political situation.

(1) It must be borne in mind that the Levies are very young troops
and that their discipline is as yet but skin deep.

(2) “Loyalty” to the British Government is non-existent—their

Loyalty is to their B.Os so in this respect their reliability varies with
the efficiency of their B.Os.

(3) Generally speaking religion means nothing to them, and is only

used as a means to a political end.

(4) The men are essentially orientals and therefore want to be on the
winning side— The sight of a few aeroplanes or Lambs supporting

28 L /P & S /11/175, F.4.

29 L/P&S/l 0/874, Fs.47-9.
 123

them will have more influence on them than promises o f God’s

pleasure and Heaven. [“Lambs” were light armoured motor
batteries—in today’s parlance, armoured cars, A/Cs.]

(5) I do not think that Sherifian propaganda, unless backed by hard

cash, will have much effect on the Rank and File— We have most to
fear from the effendi type of officer to whom the dreams of National
Independence and greater personal power will appeal very much vide
Sulaimaniyah Levy—Mosul Gendarmerie, where only 11 effendi
officers remain out of the original 30 odd.

It must be borne in mine that each Arab Officer who becomes

disloyal will be followed by such of the men as were in his “clique”.

I append details of the Levies.*

Sgd. Captain H. Buck for Major, Inspecting Officer Arab and

Kurdish Levies.

*Only extracts concerning composition and strengths o f units, together

with pertinent comments by Boyle are included.
2nd Euphrates Levy Hillah
with—Detachments at Diwaniyah and Abu-Sulchair

Composition:Arabs: tribes 250, Towns 170 = 420) Proportion

Kinds 100)Shia-Sunni
Persians 20)roughly 3:1

Possible sources of trouble

(a) Sherifian propaganda

(b) Religious propaganda emanating from Najaf, Karbala
and Baghdad
(c) A mixture of (a) and (b)
(d) Tribal troubles in Diwaniyah Division.

In this, Boyle pointed out that the Levy was composed of widely
differing elements of varied political ideals where, if any, existed. He
reiterated his previous remarks on religious ideals:“except for political ends is
conspicuous by itsabsence”. He was concerned for the detachments: they
were being isolated from the main body, and were susceptible to local
intrigue. He proposed changing them every two months dependent upon
barrack construction, “a lengthy business”, and feeding arrangements. (Troops
were used to build their own barrack accommodation— a false economy. Their
time would have been better spent in training.)
 124

His next concern was for the 3rd Euphrates Levy at Nasiriyeh. They
were composed of 200 Muntafiq, a few Marsh Arabs and Nasiriyeh
townsmen. Anticipated sources of trouble were similar to the above.
However, he made a most interesting comment on another danger he foresaw
in its composition: “ ...this Levy is in danger of becoming too definitely the
‘Muntafiq Horse’, and not in line with the other Levies....” It was a perfect
example of an “established unit”, acquiring its own identity (it will be
remembered it had developed roots in 1915, as the “Nasiriyeh Arab Scouts”,
the N.A.S. under Major Eadie). They were later trained as cavalry under
Major Dickson, and not as mounted infantry, the officially approved arm. It
seems they acquired the esprit de corps of the “arm blanche” and, in so doing,
had maintained their identity during the “Reconstitution”. Boyle’s response to
this problem was to suggest that a squadron of Kurds be enlisted into that
Levy, resorting to a bi-ethnic composition to break the tribal unity of the Arab
element.
The Diyalah and Baqubah Levies were composed o f 40 Arabs, 50
Kurds and 10 Kirkuklis. The anticipated main source of trouble was on the
Kurdish border. Boyle added: “This force is very young and I think that the
Commandant is doing everything he can to ensure the loyalty of his men”. But
to this end, the Maijana camp needed to be made more comfortable, with
improved feeding arrangements.
The 2nd Tigris Levies, Rut, comprised 30 Arabs, 120 Kurds and 10
Kirkuklis. This unit, together with the Arbil Levy, composed o f 200 Kurds
and a few Christians. The latter force was considered too young to be relied
on. Their Commandant, who was developing the unit on sound lines, was very
popular with his men. Trouble could be expected from two sources: Kurdish
nationalist propaganda and local trouble in Rowanduz.
The Gendarmeries were described as primarily District Police, “which
they do well. It would be unreasonable to expect reliability of them in the
event of serious operations”. (The “Tel Afar” affair was an example.)
It would appear from this memorandum that the available fighting
force of the Levies at the commencement of the Insurrection was
approximately 1,200 men, excluding Gendarmerie, of which perhaps one-third
were suspect with regard to loyalty and reliability.
 125

It should be noted, especially with regard to the overall Levy strength,

that Haldane in his book claimed that there were no “Railway Police”.30
(Perhaps for Police read Guards.)
At almost the same time that Boyle was briefing Wilson on the Levies,
Haldane was briefing the War Office on them in a telegram dated 21 June
1920.31 He stated that the disturbances in Mesopotamia were purely sporadic,
but there were definite intrigues on the Upper Euphrates and in the Mosul
Wilayat. Those responsible were members of the Young Arab Party,
encouraged by Sharifian officers, subsidised possibly from Syria and in the
Middle Euphrates, from Baghdad. He claimed the intrigues effectively worked
on religious fanaticism, the seed of which had been sown to foster anti-British
sentiments. He also felt that there was an understanding between young Arab
Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviks.
Haldane claimed that he based his intelligence regarding the internal
situation chiefly on Political Officers’ opinions and, in areas where the threat
of unrest was strong, on those of the Civil Commissioner. The latter had
stated that “he was unable to place any limit upon the possible development of
the present unrest”. It was considered that it might become necessary to
withdraw Political Officers from areas where the threat o f disturbance was
strong. The communication ended with a warning that the railway from Mosul
to Baghdad could be cut at any time, and so reduce military efficiency.
The next affair to be discussed as relevant to the development o f the
Levies is the relief of the siege at Rumaythah, some 200 miles south of Plillah,
and the same distance north-east of Basrah. It is important because it shows
the strength and tenacity of the Arab insurgents, who opposed powerful
relieving imperial columns three times, inflicting heavy casualties before the
imperial troops broke through to the township. Levies were attached to these
T9
columns.
The incident began with the arrest of a Shaikh of the Bani Huchaim by
the Political Officer of Rumaythah, on 30 June 1920, for failing to repay an
agricultural loan. The Shaikh was forcibly released by his tribesmen on the

30 Sir A ylm er L. Haldane, The Insurrection in M esopotam ia, 1920 (London, 1922), p. 13.
31 L /P & S /l0 /8 7 4 , F.65.
32 A IR /5/1253, pp.5 331-3.
 126

same day. The success of the latter action kindled the flame o f insurrection in
the area of the Middle Euphrates, and duly spread to other parts of
Mesopotamia. Haldane despatched 308 Indian troops with four British
officers the same day, to restore order; but these troops were also invested in
the township by 4 July, together with 153 railway staff, and 60 Indians. A
final total of 527 (including the Political Officer) remained besieged, and had
to be supplied by airdrops. Although the insurgents were bombed and strafed
repeatedly by air, their determination remained firm.
The 1st Relief Force consisted of a mixed column of a cavalry
squadron, a battalion of infantry, 30 Kurdish Levies, and a mountain battery
section, under Lt.-Colonel McVean. On 7 July, from 3 to 5,000 Arab
insurgents surrounded the column six miles from Rumaythah. McVean
attempted to break through to relieve the township, but was forced to retire
under cover of a dust storm. The insurgents harassed the column for 20 miles,
until it reached the shelter of Imam Hamza on 8 July. Casualties were: killed,
1 British officer and 47 I.O.Rs; wounded, 1 British officer and 166 I.O.Rs. No
mention is made of the Kurdish Levies.
Worthy of note is that the insurgents resisted these M.E.F. columns,
although they were supported by artillery and air cover.
A second relief column was ready by 18 July, and concentrated at a
point close to the railway, some 16 miles north-west of Ramaythah. This
column comprised one cavalry squadron, one British and five Indian infantry
battalions, one sapper and miner company, two machine-gun sections, one
mountain battery, 1 howitzer battery and one R.F.A. battery. The column was
commanded by Brigadier-General Coningham.
Because of having to repair an insurgent-damaged railway line, the
column’s advance was delayed until 19 July. At 1310 hours, the column
attacked an estimated 5,000 insurgents, deployed in groups along a canal
embankment, and another second line; both positions were directly across the
relief column’s intended line of advance. The insurgents repulsed the first
attacked headed by the Sikhs and Mahrattas. At 1750 hours, the Gurkhas,
supported by two guns of the R.F.A., plus a section o f the machine-gun
company, pressed another attack in an attempt to gain access to the river
 127

before dark. It seems this also failed. British/Indian casualties were: killed, 2
B.Os, 32 I.O.Rs; wounded 2 B.Os, 150 I.O.Rs. Insurgents killed, 150.
Suffice to say the column had achieved little by nightfall; gun
ammunition was by then low; the infantry, having fought after a 12~mile
desert march, were short of water. However, on the following day (the 20th),
the insurgent resistance was much less, and the Gurkhas were able to turn the
insurgents’ flank. This, coupled with further air attacks, caused the enemy to
fall back. On the same day the cavalry entered Rumaythah. Although the
besieged garrison had been relieved and evacuated, as the column withdrew
towards Diwaniyah on 22 July, its rearguard was repeatedly attacked under
cover of a dust storm. It reached Diwaniyah on the 25th.
The details of this operation show the ferocity and determination o f the
insurgents. Also, that the performance o f the Levies originally besieged, and
those in the relief columns, was not mentioned in this report. This practice, as
previously discussed, may perhaps reflect Haldane and other regular offers’
prejudice against irregulars in those early days of the Insurrection.
However, Boyle mentions this operation in an Administrative Report
on the Arab and Kurdish Levies for the year 1920-21, dated 1 April 1921.33
The report stated: “The Gallant Defence of the Levy Barracks at Abu-Sukhair
and the story of the Levy operations with the columns detailed to relieve
Rumaithah”, This was fourth among five operations mentioned. Others were
in greater detail. The total Levy casualties for the five affairs mentioned were:
“ 107 killed and wounded, 5 officers and 10 other ranks were awarded the
Medal of the British Empire, for gallantry and devotion to duty in the field”.
The Levies could not “shine” without a real opportunity. But the chance was
soon to come, as will be seen shortly.
Briefly, by July, Haldane claimed he had committed the majority of
his mobile reserve to the last operation. Four trains had been destroyed near
Rumaythah. The railway was an essential element for operational supplies and
its vulnerability was not lost on the insurgents. Dirt tracks were the only
alternative. The situation was now getting out of hand.

33 CO 696/3, F.41.
 128

Hillah, the training centre o f the Levies, the township with its
Jarbuiyah Bridge over the Hillah part of the Euphrates, was part o f Haldane’s
defence scheme for Baghdad. A post had been constructed to protect the
bridge and the railway line. The line from Hillah to Baghdad was unprotected
through lack of troops, but the line from Diwaniyah to Hillah was partly
guarded.
On the evening of 1 July 1920, the last ammunition train reached
Hillah from Baghdad, but the enemy cut the line behind it the same night. On
the 30th, a column of troops was ordered to evacuate Diwaniyah by rail for
Hillah, and escort 1,120 railway staff, together with a large quantity of
ammunition, and taking six days’ rations. The insurgents harassed the column
all the way, tearing up the track behind and in front o f it, a mile or more at a
time— slowing its progress to 5l/2 miles a day. The train consisted o f 200
trucks and five engines. By the time it neared Hillah on 8 August, troops from
the township went out to meet the column with a construction train to help
repair the disrupted line, enabling the column to reach Hillah the next day.
The success of the delaying tactics of their brother insurgents on the
column, encouraged the Albu Sultan tribe to rise, and they destroyed the line
south of Hillah. On the night of 27/28 July, Hillah was attacked. Again on the
night of 31 July/1 August, tribesmen broke into the town, but were driven out
by the Rajputs. A second attack was made in considerable force by the enemy,
who lost 149 men.
The aforementioned details are an extract from a long report by
Haldane,34 who does not mention that the Levies played any part in the
defence of Hillah on the night of 31 July/1 August. There is also little mention
in the War Diary of the 8th Rajputs,35 with whom the Levies fought in
defence o f the town.
Major Boyle took part in the action, and by good fortune we have his
report in the form of a D.O. to Wilson, from Hillah, dated 24 August 1920,36
in which he stated:

34 A IR /5/1253, pp .5336-7.
35 WO 9 5 /5 2 2 9 , 1 A ugust 1920.
36 L /P & S /l 0 /8 7 4 , F .41-2.
 129

Dear Colonel,

Thank you very much for your wire re the discharged levies
from Diwaniyah—it has had the desired effect. The levies here have
justified all our aspirations of them. Their patrol work is most gallant.
Since I have been here to date the total casualties are 11 killed and 22
wounded though many of the latter were mere scratches. I was with
the levy picquet on the night 31 July/1st August during the attack on
Hillah and we had to defend about 100 yards, from the river bank
through the palm gardens to an Indian picquet on our right. The
attack lasted three hours and the Levies fought very well indeed. At
about 4 a.m. the enemy rushed the point at X and thus enfiladed both
picquets. I saw the left of the Indian picquet beginning to go and we
had two men on the right of our line hit. I got a bullet through the
shorts which helped me to make up my mind so I gave the order to
retire. The men retired in good order and there was no doubling. A
counter attack by the 8th Rajputs at 5 a.m. regained the position.
There were a good many enemy dead in front of our position.
The chief point of interest was the fact that the enemy were
chiefly Khafaja-Kiflawis and from Shamiyeh and some o f the Levies
were also from those tribes and towns. The enemy raised a shout
“We are your relations (akliwal) why have you gone over to the
infidels?” One of the Levies answers, “Ehua awlad ul levy wa
talaqua kum” (We are the sons of the levy and have divorced you).
This cry was taken up and turned into a “hausa” by the whole
lot!.. .the Levies appear to have put up a good fight.
Yours sincerely, C. Boyle.

This is the only first-hand report from a British officer who was
fighting side-by-side with his Levy troops— and Boyle had been directly
responsible for their training. It has therefore been quoted almost in full, as an
important document on Levy field performance.
The Levies, from then on, earned considerable praise because of their
well-demonstrated loyalty, especially from the senior officers commanding
columns and Divisional Commanders.
While the pacification of Iraq continued, the India Office was
compiling a memorandum on the latest information they had on the Levies; no
doubt because Haldane’s complaints of having insufficient troops, and the
Inspection Reports of General Wauchope would by then (July 1920) have
filtered through to them,. In the same month, the Levy Adjutant, Major
 130

Channing Pearce, on leave in London, received a memorandum from the India

Office 0 1 1 23 July 1920,37 to be returned with his comments.
Only a few points on the then current strength of the Levies are worthy
of note, because most of their memoranda comprised the “Reconstitution of
the Levies”, which has already been discussed. There were a number of
mathematical errors in the strengths of individual units, and attention is drawn
to these here. The procedures for the use of the Levies by P.Os had not
perceptibly changed.
At the time of General Wauchope’s inspection in April, already
discussed, he recorded the total Levy force as follows. It is included for
comparison with the “proposed” strengths for the force.

General Wauchope’s Figures

Nomenclature: Mounted Foot Combined

Levies, Mounted &Infantry 1,900 750 2,650
Gendarmerie 500 900 L400
Totals: Mounted and Foot 2*400 1.650 4.050
( (£) This figure may have excluded the “District Police”.)

There were three points of interest in the memorandum. The first, the
proposed strength for the Force, is as follows:
The “corrected” Grand Total was: 6,520.
In Addition: 1,500 Railway Levies - Under Consideration
The Approximate “possible”: Total Strength of all Ranks: 8,000.

Secondly, Channing Pearce acknowledged, it had proved impossible

for the Striking Forces to carry out the projected training period”
Actually, owing to the political situation, little opportunity has
occurred to give practical effect to this scheme: e.g. the 1st Euphrates
Levy has been actively engaged to have time for intensive training or
opportunity to pass on its police duties, which it will (like the 2nd
Euphrates Levy) eventually shed, to the Dulaim Gendarmerie.

and,
Similarly in the Mosul and Sulaimaniyah Divisions it has been
decided to leave things as they are till April 1921 at any rate.

Thirdly, there was a proposal regarding the Levy Striking Forces,

37 L /P & S /l0/874, Fs.52-7.

 131

(to which should be added, as part of the Arab forces o f the country,
the district police which will continue to perform many o f the duties
hitherto executed by the original levies).

This bracketed statement indicated the possibility o f using the Arab

Levies as a nucleus for a future Iraqi National Army.
Both the India Office and the deliberations of the War Office were
appraising the Mesopotamian situation. This was made apparent in their letter
to the Under-Secretary of State for India, dated 22 July 1920,38 which stated:
“They must ask Mr. Montagu whether he is confident that the local policy
pursued by the Political Staff in Mesopotamia, is such as to minimise the
chance of the repetition of such practical demonstrations o f Arab discontent”.
This was also, perhaps, an indication that the War Office had not forgotten nor
forgiven Wilson for his intervention in Haldane’s absence in Persia, after the
Tel Afar affair. There was also further anti-Wilson innuendo in the letter:
...they would ask Mr. Montagu whether he is satisfied with the
system adopted by the Political Staff in Mesopotamia is sufficiently
elastic to enable local political officers to give timely information
and assistance to the nearest military commander.

In the context of the Levy situation being reviewed in London, Wilson

telegraphed the Secretary of State for India on 30 July 1920. Firstly, he
pointed out that recruiting was difficult because of other attractive forms of
employment, and the Arab dislike for discipline. There was also the fear of
associating with a government whose tenure might be short-lived. “The
difficulties in obtaining equipment.... In these matters we have received little
assistance from the military authorities who, until Armistice, viewed growth
of Levies with disapproval for obvious reasons.” This last remark may have
referred to the battle of Shaiba, 12-14 Aril 1915, which showed the Arabs in a
bad light as allies, as previously discussed.
Wilson accepted that the Levies lacked tradition and experience on
which to build. There was a reluctance of locally-enlisted men to leave their
homes. Finally, Arab officers of good family status were almost uniformly
unsatisfactory. Those promoted from the ranks did well—but they took time
to train and gain experience in leadership.

38 C ab.24/109, F .478.
39 L /P & S /l0 /8 7 4 , F.50.
 132

Wilson felt most of the factors listed would continue to operate for
some time. He also feared that an Arab force could be used politically. In
support of which contention, he cited the arrest of Yaisin Pasha in Syria, prior
to his attempt at a "coup d ’etat”. His final comments were: “I find it almost
impossible to imagine local Arab army in Mesopotamia would be of value for
purposes of offensive against Turks or Kurds who have infinitely better
material to draw on” (sic). In this observation, Wilson perhaps realised that if
a National Iraqi Army was created, then local politics would not allow British
officers executive commands, and this was the inherent strength o f the Levies.
While the future of the Levies was pondered in London, the Force
continued to give valuable assistance to the M.E.F. in quelling the remaining
unrest. A final example of the operations in which the Levies were engaged
was connected with the siege of Kufah.
A column of troops from Diwaniyah, on reaching Hillah, were then
despatched to relieve a siege at Kufah, in which a squadron o f the 2nd
Euphrates Levy, under the command of Lieut. F.J. McWhinnie and Lieut.
Matthews, had been joined by another Levy detachment, which had escaped
from Abu Sukhair. Together, these Levies then formed part of the besieged
garrison at Kufah. This siege lasted 90 days before relief on 17 October 1920,
during which time the Levies were forced to eat their mules. A difficult
decision for the senior officer, because without animal transport, had the
chance occurred for the Levies to break out, they would not have been able to
carry sufficient ammunition with which to fight if attacked again. Their
casualties were five killed and fifteen wounded in the siege.
There are several other recorded operations, some of which were quite
serious, but those discussed should suffice to explain Haldane’s reluctant, but
favourable change of heart on the value of the Levies. In his letter to the War
Office dated 25 September 1920,40 his last paragraph stated: “Mr. Levy has
done well in several instances, and if Arab-speaking British officers can be
procured, good progress could quickly be made in augmenting the force”.
Also in his book,41 he stated,

40 Cab 2 4 /1 1 6 , F.59.
41 Haldane, The Insurrection in M esopotam ia, 1 9 2 0 , op.cit., p.302.
 133

I think in all fairness it may be said that in the annals of the British
Empire 110 young force, a force in this case of only a few months’
standing, has ever passed through so high a trial. Deserters there were
a few, for everywhere men of mean spirit will be found; but when the
temptations to which the Levies were daily subjected, and which
almost passed endurance, are weighted against those o f them who
proved faithless, the number is insignificant.

It would appear from all the available independent records, that the
Levies had given an excellent account of themselves, with inadequate
training, arms and equipment. Their casualties during the revolt were 107, of
which 73 were killed. Awards of British Empire Medals for gallantry were 15.
Wilson also joined Haldane in high praise for his force, and gave
generous and well-earned praise to Major Boyle and his qualities of
leadership, in a telegram to the Secretary of State for India 011 5 September
1920,42 when the Insurrection was all but over, and stated:
I continue to receive most satisfactory reports from Hillah Nasiriyeh
and elsewhere as to behaviour of Arab Levies and Police wherever
they are employed with and under their own British officers whom
they know. In Hillah in particular they have done most enterprising
and gallant work at heavy cost in killed and wounded against their
own people, in spite of every temptation and appeal to their tribal,
family and religious feelings, thanks largely to the personality of
Major Boyle, Inspecting Officer of Levies who has a remarkable hold
011 them.

Indeed, Boyle had done more than well to get so much out of the new
Levy Striking Force. Their only arms were a rifle and bayonet and, as has
been discussed the promised six months training— free of other duties— never
materialised; they were thrown into battle wherever the need arose.
Shahraban, was a fine example, where a British officer and sergeant-major
fought side by side with their Levies, and died together with 35 of them. A
story as good as many told of gallant stands made by detachments in the
British army.
A suitable extract on which to end the considerable praise the Levies
had earned among the senior British officers during the hostilities, was sent by
Major-General Saunders, Commander 17th Division, to the 2nd Euphrates
Levy 011 9 February 1921, stating:43 “The highest praise I can give is that

42 L /P & S /l0 /8 7 4 , F.44.

43 CO 6 96 /3 , F .N il, p. 18.
 134

whenever a Column Commander has been considering the force to take out he
has always said, ‘Let me have some Levies with m e’”.
By October, hostilities were at an end in Iraq, and on 4 October 1920
Sir Arnold Wilson restored the office of Civil Commissioner to Sir Percy
Cox, the permanent incumbent, for whom he had acted over the past two-and -
a-half years, and went on leave. Cox would have needed some time to
reacquaint himself with the detail of the much larger Administration than the
one he had left. The tasks before him were forming a Council of local
Ministers, with British advisers, and the creation of an Iraq civil service for
the future.
As far back as 16 June 1920, at a departmental conference on Middle
East affairs,44 chaired by Curzon, the tide had begun to turn against Wilson.
Curzon referred to:
...an unpleasant impression of Colonel Wilson’s incapacity to deal
with the situation. He must ask the Secretary of State for India to say
whether he considered that the policy on which they were in perfect
agreement, and which they would have to defend against a powerful
attack in the Cabinet on the following day, as likely to be carried into
effect so long as Sir Arnold Wilson remained control in
Mesopotamia.

An extract from Montagu’s reply stated:

...he had never held the view that Colonel Wilson, with his marked
inclination to concentrate power in his own hands, could fairly be
asked to carry out the policy of His Majesty’s Government in
Mesopotamia.

The latter statement supports the writer’s contention that some of the
administrative problems in the Levies could have been caused by Wilson’s
failure to delegate, or to ask for G.H.Q’s help, for fear o f losing his direct
control.
In late November Montagu sent a paper relating to War Gratuities to
Earl Winterton,45 a matter the earl had previously raised with the Secretary of
State for India. The document concerned the rules regarding “Grant of
Gratuities” to the inhabitants of Iraq killed or injured while in government
employment. In brief, Political Officers and Heads o f Departments were

44 F 0 .3 7 1/5227, F.52.
45 L /P & S /l0 /8 7 4 , F.25.
 135

authorised to pay gratuities admissible under this regulation on the certificate

of a medical officer, duly appointed, up to a limit o f Rs. 1,000. Claims for
gratuities amounting to over Rs. 1,000 required the sanction o f government
prior to payment.
An example of this order in practice is found in an Administrative
Circular dated 11 November 1920,46 detailing the compensation for death
awarded to the dependants of some of the Levies killed in action.
2nd Euphrates L ew , Hillah

One Zabit Rs. 1,000

One Ombashi Rs. 1,000
Four Ombashies Rs.500 each
One Nafar Rs.700
Eight Nafars Rs.500 each
One Sowar Rs.500

Another example of the British government’s wish to administer Iraq

“on the cheap” is plainly manifest; “death” being considered equal to one
year’s service, and recompense based on the rank to which it applied.
Another issue of interest concerning the Levies was raised by Colonel
Yate (retd.), MP, in a letter in parliament dated 20 November 1920,47 to the
Secretary of State for India concerning the Assyrians (then not yet serving in
the Levies).
Yate wanted to know if levy recruits were being taken from the
“Chaldeans or Ba’quba Refugees”, because he understood they had furnished
two battalions which did excellent service in Kurdistan (two “Urmia
Battalions” resuscitated by the British, as discussed). Yate had mixed up the
refugee Assyrian Nestorians from Urmia with the Mosul Chaldeans.
Montagu’s secretary explained, “There are certain Assyrian Nestorians who
were refugees at Baqubah and are being repatriated to their homes in the
Urmia District”. Also, that none of these had been enlisted as permanent
levies. (Meaning that those who fought in Kurdistan were employed directly
by the M.E.F., as previously explained.)
The letter ended:

46I.O. L /P & S /l0/874, F.25.

47 L /P & S/l0/874, F.18.
 136

As far as the Assyrian refugees are concerned, these are all being
repatriated to their country at their own wish, and the fighting
members of the race are required to act as protectors to the others on
the journey and on arrival.

The content of the last paragraph was in part true; but the attempt by
the Assyrians to return had failed, owing to the winter conditions and
disagreements between the tribes. Nevertheless, Yate’s query excited the
imagination of Montagu (Secretary of State for India) when his approval was
sought for answering Yate’s queries. His reply was: “I agree. But the Mosul
Chaldeans are not going away and never were. Ought we not to suggest their
further recruitment? Would it not be worthwhile to make sure?”48
Yate’s question had provoked a minute49 to Shuckburgh from a
member of staff (signature illegible), extract as follows:
Prima facie, Col. Yate’s suggestion is a good one, now that the
Assyrians have failed to repatriate themselves. Both hillmen and
plainsmen have given a good account o f themselves in recent
fighting against Kurds and Arabs. In fact for the purpose o f fighting
Kurds, they are an adequately bloodthirsty body of Christians. They
are however Christians. How far then would it suit the National Arab
Government to enlist “Kurdish” (as opposed to “Arab”) Christians?

There is not much justification for conscripting them. And if

conscription is to be adopted, it does not seem probable that the
National Government will be prepared to pay considerable sums of
money in wages to alien Christian mercenaries. If H.M.G. were
seriously running the country, it would be a different matter.

The minute continued:

With regard to S. of S. (for India) minute. Mosul Chaldiens are
employed in levies where they wish to be. But very few recruits have
come from them, and are distinctly bad. If however the Government
orders conscription, no doubt a percentage of men will be conscripted
from the Mosul Chaldiens.

It is suggested that the official letter submitted should issue it seems,

the purpose of an enquiry: (a) whether the Assyrians can be used in
any way for Levies, and (b) how the matter of levies in general is
proceeding.

Initials not legible. Dated 30 November 1920.

48 L /P & S /l0 /8 7 4 , F.12.

49 L /P & S /l0 /8 7 4 , F.10.
 137

These queries concerning the Assyrians as prospective Levy

manpower almost coincided with events in Iraq, for on 20 November Cox
telegraphed Montagu,50 to state:
I have reason to (suspect that?) French Government is about to ask
that Assyrians be invited to settle between Marden and Jazirah and it
is rumoured that certain Assyrian leaders have been heavily bribed to
secure their consent. [Sic.]

Cox also understood that the French would bear all the costs o f the
scheme and guaranteed to arrange matters to the satisfaction o f both Kurds
and Assyrians. Finally, Cox required to know urgently what were the wishes
of the British government concerning this move, should it develop further.
From this it would appear that the French were thinking of inserting a
Christian minority of proven fighting ability into their newly-mandated
territory of Syria, perhaps to try to increase the Christian minority element;
which, in turn, might be relied upon to support their mandatory power.
It will be seen that the need to recruit Assyrians for the Levies would
be confirmed in April next year, at the Cairo Conference. In the meantime,
serious Levy deficiencies in strength were being experienced. This was
highlighted in a telegram from Cox to the Secretary of State for India, dated 1
February 1921,51 in which he pointed out a shortage of Levies created by their
taking over garrisoning the Euphrates Railway from the M.E.F.; and that
therefore the need to recruit up to “sanctioned strength of 5,000”. This appears
a low figure when compared with previous prognostications. Also, the
immediate strength of British officers was inadequate.
« ^9
However Cox mentioned in a second telegram that there was a
“scheme” for the progressive reduction of British officers “from the end of the
first year”. This he felt could be met by short-term contracts o f one or two
years. For the future, it would be necessary to retain fourteen o f these officers
on three-year contracts, perhaps longer, or the “right type” would be difficult
to secure.

50 L /P & S /l0 /8 7 4 , F.9.

51 L /P & S /l0 /8 7 4 , F.5.
52 Ibid.
 138

Sir Arthur Hertzel backed this request to the War Officer by a letter on
53
14 February 1921 in which he pointed out that unless the requirement was
quickly met the development of the Levy Force would be retarded. This, in
turn, would mean that the withdrawal of British regular troops would be
correspondingly delayed.
In the middle of February 1921, a minute indicated that a telegram was
sent to Cox by Montagu54 stating:
Possibility of recruiting levies from Assyrian refugees. Should be
glad of your comments early. You will of course take into account
urgent necessity of disposing of these refugees and of extreme
reluctance of H.M.G. to incur unproductive expenditure on them any
longer. (Sic.)

The position with regard to the future of the Levies was daily
becoming more important, but, as may be deduced from these telegrams and
various minutes, it remained an unplanned evolvement. A government was to
be established in Iraq, and it would require a nucleus of trained men from the
Levies with which to establish a National Army. It was evident from the
recent insurrection that the mandatory power would have to ensure internal
security until the National Army could assume the role. If the Levy strength
was depleted by providing men for the proposed National Army, from where
could good manpower material be found with which to rebuild the Levy’s
depleted strength? By good fortune, the attempt by a large number of the
Assyrians to repatriate themselves to their homelands in the Hakkiari, was
frustrated by bad weather and inter-tribal disagreements.
The Levies had done well in fighting the Kurds with the imperial
troops of the M.E.F. in 1919. Now, in 1921, they represented the best possible
manpower pool, if H.M.G. could entice them to enlist. It was also an
opportunity for the British Treasury to see a return on the money expended in
“maintaining unproductive refugees”. If the opportunity was not taken,
together with the urgent recruitment of British Arabic-speaking officers to
serve with the Levies, then delay in British demobilisation was inevitable.
The tumultuous year of 1920 had come to an end; the “Insurrection”
had been a serious setback for the British government’s thinking on

53 L /P & S /l0 /8 7 4 , F.3.

54 L /P & S/l 0 /8 7 4 , F.6.
 139

maintaining security and influence throughout the region at the least possible
cost to the Treasury. Although the insurgents5 fighting was mainly conducted
by the tribes, their scattered forces had contained an organised army infinitely
its superior in equipment.
The Arab irregulars had directed their main effort against highly
vulnerable British lines of communication. Their adopted tactic was a
succession of violent local actions. As soon as the first failed, it was
immediately followed by another, rather than a concerted attack by one
striking force. Thus they were able to compel the M.E.F. to be extensively
reinforced from India, thus taxing that country's military resources to the
utmost. British air support had been considerable, and at one point doubled.
Haldane had telegraphed for permission to use gas on 18 August 1920,55 this
was refused.
The main military characteristics of the irregular Arab insurgents had
been:
a) The employment of loose, irregular' formations, with great
mobility.
b) Independence of an organised supply system, and freedom in
maintaining one.
c) Inability to concentrate an army in the field, but able to
maintain a local force engaged for an adequate period, and to
move it quickly out of its local zone of operations.

The heads of the services had to seek an answer to these problems,

with the least possible cost to the British exchequer.
The Arab and Kurdish insurrections had provided the War Office with
perturbing experiences, but they also created an excellent opening for the air
force, in proving the latter5s cheaper and far superior mobility. This situation
had been pre-empted by Trenchard in a paper mentioned in the first page of
this chapter. His counter-proposals showed that the air force was desperately
fighting to maintain its independence as a third service under an air ministry.
This was receiving opposition from the navy and army, who wished to return
to the pre-war status quo when British military aviation was divided between
two separate services, the Royal Navy and the Army—the “Royal Naval Air
Service55 (R.N.A.S.) and the “Royal Flying Corps55 (R.F.C.). Trenchard’s plan

55 FO 371/5229, F.20.
 140

prevailed, not only for Iraq, but for Britain’s colonial security commitments in
general. During the Arab insurrection air power had pointed the way by
maintaining communications, carrying out punitive operations and by
breaking up the grouping of irregular fighters and raiding by tribesmen.
Perhaps the most important recommendations in the debate 011 the
future control and defence policy for Mesopotamia, by the man who would
implement it, was contained in a Memorandum of 1 May 1920 by Churchill,56
previously touched on in the first page of this chapter. He stated:
I 11 my opinion, we should start on the control and development of
Mesopotamia from an entirely different point of view. We should
hand the country over immediately to a Department of State which
has real knowledge and experience of the administration and
development of these wild countries, which is accustomed to
improvisations and makeshifts, which is accustomed to measure the
territory it occupies by the amount of force at its disposal, and to
measure the amount of force at its disposal by the exiguous funds
entrusted to it.

Churchill continued:
In the second place, I recommend...as soon as the administration of
Mesopotamia is transferred to the Colonial Office I shall be given
full authority to arrange with them (War Office and Air Ministry) the
scale of the garrison in accordance with the policy decided on, and
the grant-in-aid, and subject to Cabinet approval o f a detailed scheme
I shall be entitled to transfer the military responsibility for sustaining
the policy of Colonial Office from the War Office to the Air
Ministry, and to take the necessary steps to form the additional air
forces required and generally give directions which will result in the
effective diminution even during the current financial year of the
enormous forces and charges now involved.

However, all these political and economic strategies were still in the
planning stage. In reality, during December 1920, the imperial forces in
Mesopotamia and Persia amounted to 17,000 British and 85,000 Indian
troops, the annual cost of which to the British taxpayer was well over
£30million, A Memorandum prepared by the Director of Military Operations
(D.M.O.) and concurred by the C.I.G.S., had been circulated to the Cabinet by
the Secretary of State for War 011 10 December 1920.57 The document
concerned problems encountered by the imperial command in Iraq during the

56 Cab 2 4 /2 0 6 , F.67, pp. 1-3.

57 Cab 2 4 /1 1 6 , F .272, pp.1-2.
 141

Arab Insurrection, and the reasons for the length of time it took the G.O.C.-in-
C. to put it down. Extracts from this document stated:
.. .it is clear that we ran things too fine and that a great disaster was
only narrowly avoided...and General Haldane is at present under
orders to reduce his force by 1st April 1921, to the same dimensions
as it was before the reinforcements arrived from India.

and,
Under the most favourable circumstances, the minimum garrison
required for Mesopotamia, during 1921-22, will be the equivalent of
three divisions and 6 cavalry regiments, or approximately 15,000
British and 65,000 Indian troops.

This was on the basis of withdrawing British forces from Persia.

Throughout the early part of 1921, there was a series of government
departmental meetings concerning Mesopotamia and its security. These
discussions covered many issues, but only those directly relating to the Levies
will be considered here. The appointment of Churchill to the Colonial Office
was confirmed early in 1921, and the setting up of a new “Middle East
Department” within the Colonial Office, to concentrate the existing
responsibilities of the War Office, Foreign Office, India Office and Colonial
Office in a single department for the region, took effect from 1 March 1921.
The essential part of Churchill’s brief was to co-ordinate government policy
in Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia, and to effect substantial cuts in
military expenditure throughout the Middle East.
The Cabinet decided to hold a Middle East conference in Cairo
between 12 and 30 March 1921. The discussions on Mesopotamia were
recorded under Section 2 of a document printed in April 1921,58 which
presented the main Mesopotamian agenda due for discussion by two
committees: a Political Committee, presided over by the Secretary o f State,
and a Military and Financial Committee, presided over by Sir Walter
Congreave. Those matters concerning the Levies will be discussed in general
terms only because so many of the deliberations of the subcommittees failed
to come to fruition in the way they prescribed.

58 FO 371/6350, F.167, no.2.

 142

The estimated saving (including Palestine) was £5million for 1921-22.

This was considered by the Secretary of State to be insufficient on 15
March.59 The document stated:
The savings resulting from the immediate reductions now arranged
are only estimated by Mr. Crossland to amount to five millions. This
is quite insufficient. It is therefore, indispensable to consider now the
second stage of reduction this year. This stage will begin on the 1st
October, assuming that a further review of the situation in September
renders it possible.

The Cairo Conference indulged in much prognostication, and this is

but one example in support of the statement that many failed to come to
fruition.
The Conference decided that political conditions in Iraq were best
served by the selection of a Sharifian ruler; and that the most suitable
candidate was the Amir Feisal— on the assumption that the Amir would be
successfully elected by the people of Iraq.
A scheme for the “control of Mesopotamia” by the RAF was
submitted by the Chief of Air Staff,60 and approved in principle by the
Conference. When brought into operation, the imperial garrison would
eventually be reduced to “ 1 Brigade and 1 Pack Battery”. The alternative was
“ 12 Infantry Battalions, 1 Cavalry regiment, 1 Field Battery, 1 Pack Battery, 1
Sapper and Miner company and five Squadrons of the R.A.F.” (increased to
six squadrons under the RAF scheme). The G.O.C.-in-C. would remain in
command until the air force was in a position to take over.
Concerning policy in Kurdistan, and having regard for Article 62 of
the Treaty of Sevres, southern Kurdistan had hitherto not been brought under
the Provisional Government of Mesopotamia. It was further considered that
any attempt to force Kurdish districts under Arab rule would meet with their
resistance. Therefore Kurdistan would be directly under the High
Commissioner, separate from Iraq, He would be empowered to recruit
Kurdish units, under British officers, as an “improvised force” (later referred
to as a “Kurdish Frontier Force” in their discussions). This force was

59 A IR /5/555, F.8A.
60 Cab 2 4 /1 2 6 , F.120.
 143

considered more suitable to take over from the British than an Arab army,
officered by Arabs, in that region.
It was recognised that the existing force of Arab Levies under British
officers, must, for the present, remain in existence, though political
considerations demanded that measures should at the same time be adopted
for the raising of a purely Arab army. It was accordingly decided that the
existing Arab Levies should be expanded by the addition of Kurdish and
Assyrian units. By this means it was intended to effect the early withdrawal of
the imperial garrisons in Kirkuk and other frontier districts. Speed and
efficiency were the object of the arrangement and it was anticipated that as the
contemplated Arab army grew and became capable of taking over the whole
country the Levy organisation, except in Kurdistan, would gradually
disappear. The cost of Levy organisation would be borne by the Colonial
Office, subject to a possible contribution by the Mesopotamian government.
When Cox was chairing a subcommittee meeting concerning a
National Army in Iraq, he received a telegram (no date) from the P.O. Mosul,
stating,61 “the menace from Turkey has by no means ceased to exist”. The
P.O. contemplated with grave concern the withdrawal o f the Mosul-British
outposts in two months time. The committee considered that a senior officer
should be sent to report on the situation. This troubled frontier was but one of
the subsequent problems which had considerable adverse effects on the
decisions taken. It has therefore been considered best only to discuss decisions
affecting the Levies, as they occurred after the conference in order to avoid
confusion.
On the question of an Arab army, a scheme was formulated “ ...for
raising a nucleus army of 5,000 men, officered entirely by Arab officers with
British inspectors, to be recruited within a year from date of permission being
given, to start recruiting”. Also it was hoped that if recruiting started by 1
April 1921, it might be possible to have 4,000 troops ready to take over the
Kirkuk area on 1 October the same year. However, it was not mentioned that
by this decision, the Levies would lose almost all their trained Arab troops to
the army.

61 Cab 24/126, F.149.

 144

The cost of the Arab army would be borne entirely by Mesopotamian

revenues, and would constitute for 1921-22 the contribution of that
government towards the cost of Mesopotamian defence. It was pointed out
that as the proposed National Arab Army would be raised by voluntary
enlistment, the pay of both the army and Levies should therefore be similar.
In connection with the RAF scheme for the control o f Iraq, the
Conference also considered the opportunities it would provide. These were;
the vital necessity of training the RAF for possible war requirements; the
importance of testing the potentialities of the air force; and the need to provide
superior officers and staffs with the experience of independent command and
responsibility. It would also afford the opportunity for an all-British military
and commercial air route to India.
Finally, in the context of possible Levy manpower resources, the
Conference discussed the Assyrian refugees, who had been warned by Cox
that no funds were available for their maintenance during the financial year
1921-22, and that their refugee camps would be closed down on 1 April 1921.
The Assyrians fell into two main categories: plainsmen (Unnians), and
mountaineers (mostly ex-Hakldari). Some Unmans had attempted self­
repatriation, approved by the British, and had failed (discussed on p. 137). It
was considered there was no prospect of them being received by the USA, or
by the French in Syria (ignoring the warning by Cox of French overtures to
the Assyrians on p. 137 of this chapter); nor could they be absorbed into the
local Mesopotamian population. The Conference decided
...there was no alternative but to give the Assyrians some arms for
personal protection, and turn them out to make their way back to
their own country. A small number might possibly be assisted by
American charity, and some might enlist in the “new levies”.

On the other hand, the “mountaineers”, it was recommended, should

be
...settled locally in conjunction with the new levy scheme. It was
proposed that a few Assyrian companies should be raised under
British officers and distributed along the frontier, in localities where
there appeared to be reasonable prospects of small Assyrian
communities being settled down.
 145

It was anticipated that this involved a “maximum expenditure of

£200,000”. The sum was to provide them with agricultural implements, and
items such as seed. The Conference recommended that this should be done,
and the cost included in the grant-in-aid to Mesopotamia.
Other, more important issues relating to the future of the Levies, were
discussed at another subcommittee 011 19 March.62 Cox was again chairman.
Members were: Major-Generals Ironside and la ’afar Pasha, Lt.-Colonel Slater
and Major Eadie.
The Committee considered the accommodation required for the new
Levy Force; they anticipated little expenditure, provided that any Turkish
military buildings in Levy areas were handed over to them as soon as
possible.
The new Levy establishment would amount to 5,000, plus 30 British
officers and 15 British N.C.Os (considerably less than the previous estimate
of 8,000. The question, with or without the District Police?).

DISTRIBUTION OF NEW LEVY FORCE

Rowanduz 3 companies
Erbil 1 squadron *
Kirkuk 2 battalions )Doubled unless
1 regiment cavalry )reinforced within
1 battery )7 days
* * 1 section of lambs
Mosul 2 companies Akra
2 companies Dohuk
2 companies Zaklio
Reserve 2 companies
Tel Afar 2 squadrons cavalry
2 guns, pack battery
Totals 19 companies infantry
6 squadrons

Companies at 200 Two officers per battery

* It remains unclear from where these troops were to come; perhaps

from the imperial garrison.
** “Lambs” are armoured cars, but there is 110 evidence that the
Levies ever received armoured cars.

62 Cab 24/126, p.64.

 146

The cost of the Force was estimated annually at “about 70 lakhs”. The
existing force of 2,500 (it is assumed meaning the “Striking Forces) would be
amalgamated with the new Force above, at an estimated cost o f 40 lakhs. This
indicated that the District Police and Gendarmerie would no longer form part
of the Levies, the total cost for the new Levy Force would be 110 lakhs,
“approximately £750,000, replacing a British force costing far more”. It will
be noted that the “New Levy Force” had two important changes: the mounted
infantry had been replaced by cavalry, and armoured cars were under
consideration. (Subject to correct nomenclature.)
At another meeting immediately following the one above, Cox
undertook to accept “ ...the withdrawal of the existing British detachments
from four Mosul outposts, and replace them by levies”, dependent on the
“removal of Turkish hostility and menace”, which had been the subject of a
series of discussions in London.
It should be noted that the Cairo Conference had consisted o f between
40 and 50 committee meetings, held between 12 and 24 March 1924. Much of
the detail then contemplated was later changed due to unforeseen political and
economic factors — not uncommon to the Middle East. Planning was one
thing, implementation quite another.
Reappraisals and clarifications continued by telegraph. In one such
document from Cox to Churchill on 20 May63 (in this context it will be
recalled that Col.-Commandant Sanders, on the staff o f Haldane,
“administered” the Levies until July 1921), Cox stated that he had been on a
local tour, and after consultation with the G.O.C.-in-C. (Haldane) and the
local P.Os, Sanders had submitted a detailed scheme for the organisation and
distribution of the New Levy Force, claiming that it was in accord with
decisions taken at the Cairo Conference. It entailed raising the Levy
establishment to 60 officers (assume British and local), and 7,500 men at an
estimated cost of £1 million per annum.
The suggested distribution of these troops was: “(a) Euphrates
(Nasiriyeh to Hit) 3,150. (b) Mosul out-posts 2,400. (c) Kirkuk area 950. (d)

63 FO 371/6351, F.24.
 147

Sulaimani area 1,000. Total 7,500” (plus 60 officers). This presupposed

Mosul and Kirkuk were garrisoned by British troops.
As to (d) Cox commented that the substitution of levies for British
garrisons at Kirkuk and Mosul would be the next phase. Therefore, either 900
additional temporary levies must be raised to relieve Kirkuk, or it was
necessary to wait until that number was made available by the relief of the
Levy garrison on the Euphrates by the “Arab army”. When the time came for
relief, the same alternative would arise. Numbers required for the Mosul
garrison would be 1,600.
Wrhen the Levy garrison on the Euphrates had been relieved by the
Arab army, 2,400 to Mosul outposts, 1,600 to the Mosul garrison, 950 to the
Kirkuk garrison, and also over 1,000 to Sulaimani omitted, a total of 6,850
would be required until the Arab army became sufficiently effective to take
over the Mosul garrison and outposts. This would continue to be the accepted
strength. Cox continued:
I think you will recognise that from a military point o f view, it would
be a totally unsound arrangement for Levy detachments, manning
difficult Mosul outposts, to be based upon an Arab army garrison at
Mosul, or vice versa,

Cox further stated that his proposals would fall within the estimated
expenditure of £1 million, and added:
I am of the opinion time has been lost owing chiefly to the fact that
refugee policy remains undefined, the closure o f the Minden camp
has not been affected, and Assyrians will not come while they are fed
by Government and can dream of repatriation. Unless immediate
action is taken, I am convinced that already the most difficult task of
carrying into effect the Cairo recommendations, will become
impossible.

and:
I have therefore in anticipation, approved detailed schem e.. .and have
sent sanction and instructed Colonel-Commandant Sanders to
proceed therewith. As regards details and recruitment o f officers, I
will address you separately.

Subsequently, it should be realised that there were to be many

misunderstandings between London and Baghdad. These emerged as early as
 148

May, and can be seen in a telegram from Churchill to Cox o f 25 May 1921,64
covering a number of issues. It appears that Cox had thought that the Levies
would substitute the imperial garrisons at Mosul and Kirkuk. Churchill stated
that this was not contemplated at Cairo, but that, “ ...areas falling within the
Arab State of Iraq, should never be garrisoned by Kurdish or Assyrian units’\
Churchill had assumed that “ ...all posts that will be eventually taken over by
the Arab Army, will be garrisoned either by British troops or by Arab levies
until they can be handed over.
Further, Churchill understood that Tel Afar and Mosul, and possibly
Kirkuk, “should remain within the Arab sphere, while Suleimaneiyah, the
Kirkuk area, and the Kurdish outposts of Mosul, should be permanently
garrisoned by Assyrian and Kurdish levies”, and pointed out that if this had
been the intention, then the levies at Acra, Zakho and Dohuk should be
supported by the Arab army at Mosul. The question of Kirkuk had not been
finally decided, and Churchill wanted to know if Cox felt that “ ...Kirkuk
should be treated as part of Mesopotamia, or as pail of Kurdistan?”.
In this last context, Churchill clarified the principle that:
(a) In a post which is eventually to be garrisoned by Arabs, no
Kurdish force should relieve British troops, (b) In a post which is
eventually to be garrisoned by Kurds or Assyrians no Arab force
should relieve British troops, (c) Unless it is quite certain that
their formation will entail a net reduction in the military
expenditure during this financial year no additional Arab or
Kurdish levies beyond those contemplated at Cairo should be
raised.

After the proposals made in Cairo, recruiting of Assyrians from among

the refugees had commenced in August 1921 at Minden refugee camp. At
first, the endeavours of recruiting officers met reluctance by the Assyrians to
come forward. To a certain extent this was overcome by the intervention and
eloquence of the missionary, Dr. Wigram.65
The Cairo Conference decisions were not quite so easy to implement
as they perhaps had seemed while sitting round tables in Cairo. It appeared
that the time required to recruit men (assuming they were prepared to enlist),
kit them out, and give them basic training, had not been taken into account,

64 FO 3 7 1 /6 3 5 1 , F.26.
65 See B iographical Sketches.
 149

nor had the fact that British Officers and N.C.O.s and the necessary stores
would be needed. The urgent need to cut expenditure is understood, but, not
for the first time, matters had not been thought through in detail.
The situation in Iraq in 1921 remained unstable, and the punishment of
rebellious tribes had continued by way of punitive operations, which involved
the existing Levies. Also, another Kurdish rising in July to some extent incited
by the Turks, involved the Levies in conjunction with the RAF in putting
down what could have been a most serious conflagration. This is made clear
in the following reports.66
One such action is described in detail in a long report from Major
Goldsmith, P.O. Kirkuk, dated 20 August 1921. It informed Cox that the
object of the expedition was to destroy the villages of Batas, Harir, Karwaian
and Bawiyan; the villages of Golan and Burgunga had been burnt. The
Lashkar had been fed from village grain (in emergencies it was official
practice to call upon friendly tribal chiefs to raise a “lashkar” or “contingent”).
The villages were empty, the inhabitants being afraid o f the bombing, even
though they had not taken part in the Insurrection. They were told to return to
their homes. The Lashkar and Levies returned to Bania; the former dispersed.
Batwata had been bombed for five days and reported empty. It was
assumed that the villagers had fled to the local mountains. Goldsmith was
reluctant to let the Levies return to sack the village in case they were fired
upon; and in the event of their retiring, it might be twisted by rumour, or
interpreted as a defeat of government troops. On the 17th, when Derbend and
Rania were practically empty of fighting men, the Levy force, having marched
up the Shawr valley, had caused the local Pishdur under Saleh Hamid Agha
and Baiz Agha to form a Lashkar to march on Rania to sack the place. But the
timely arrival of planes demonstrating over them, made them alter their minds
and they dispersed at once in all directions. Some of them even went so far as
to come in to offer themselves to fight for the government.
Babekr Agha received news yesterday, that the Mangur over the
Persian Border were forming a Lashkar which could only be for two
reasons: (a) To attack Babekr’s Summer quarters at Kailin or (b) To
come over the border and attack Kaler Diza. Throughout the

66 T hese reports are on file in A IR 5 /1253, no folio numbers.

 150

disturbances here the aeroplanes have been most successful, it is

astonishing how frightened the tribesmen are of them.

Goldsmith reiterated the value of aircraft in another memorandum to

Cox in September, in which he commented on the successful use of aircraft in
punitive operations and dealing with raiding tribesmen (later to be the
continuing role of the RAF in Iraq). Goldsmith found the use and effect of
aircraft during the Rania disturbances between 14 to 22 August 1921 of great
value because the regular troops were rapidly being withdrawn from that area
and he was committed to the risk of maintaining law and order among people
who understood no other policy than that o f the whip. With aircraft supported
by a handful of untrained and untried levies this was a difficult operation,
and it is obviously impossible for the Royal Air Force to profit by
experience and thus reduce the risks to a minimum, miless they
receive full reports from the Political authorities after each action. I
have commented and made suggestions very freely in the hope that
they will be found of use. (Copy sent to Group Captain,
Commanding Royal Air Force, Baghdad.)

The India Office series L/P&S and AIR/5 contain many similar
reports, one of which is of particular relevance, because it concerns a punitive
expedition against the Surchi Kurds by a combined force o f the Levies and
Police, backed by aircraft (one of which became a casualty) on 12 September
1921.
Major Goldsmith commanded the column, assisted by Captain
Littledale and Commandant Arbil Police (Kurds) with his 72 mounted rifles
and a Lewis gun. Also in the column was “C” squadron of the 4th Regiment
Levies. The operation entailed considerable action with casualties. One
aircraft force-landed. The pilot was trying to destroy his machine with a tracer
bullet in the petrol tank, when the machine exploded. He was severely burnt.
The resulting fire caused the bomb load to explode, and the aircraft was blown
to pieces. Levy casualties in the operation were three Levies and four horses
killed, plus one horse wounded and three others missing. Levy Mulazim-
Thani (2nd Lt.) Hider ibn Kerim was recommended for a military decoration.
“Comment: Both men and Officers showed great keenness in fulfilling
their duties and the Levies were particularly deserving of praise.” Enemy
casualties were given as: Batas, destroyed by fire with all personal property,
 151

one insurgent killed, and 70 cattle; Harir destroyed by fire with all personal
property. Local casualties: 18 insurgents killed, together with 15 women and
children, by aircraft bombing.
Qalaia Sur: mill and machinery destroyed by dynamite and house
burnt; one insurgent killed and 15 women captured but released on retirement
of force. Karwatan, destroyed by fire with all personal property; killed: 20
cows, 10 goats, 4 donkeys and 1 colt.
Later in this work it will be shown that the authorities in Baghdad
became concerned over these somewhat indiscriminate and ruthless punitive
air attacks on civilians, and imposed various controls.
As already mentioned, the Sulaimani Division had remained relatively
passive throughout the Arab Insurrection, perhaps because of Soane’s legacy
o f firm rule. This is reflected in the content of a long report which Cox sent to
Churchill in October 1921.67 The document revealed that armed Turkish
incursions into Iraq had begun, and that the Turkish government was believed
to be inciting the Kurds in northern Iraq to revolt.
The report stated that the origins of the recent disturbances at
Rowanduz and Batas which, in turn, extended to include the Rania Qadha,
could be traced back to a petition sent by disruptive elements o f Rowanduz, in
June 1921, through Muhi-al-Din Effendi, ex-Yuzbashi o f Gendarmeries, to
the Kamalist administration, asking for their help to gain freedom from the
British yoke. As a result, a force o f Turkish irregular soldiers, under the
command of an officer named Mahmud Fadhil, was raised by Muhi-al-Din.
Orders for this had been given by Nihad Pasha, but it was considered
that the authorities of Van were much involved. It appears that the first
Turkish troops arrived at Rowanduz on 29 July 1921, to be joined by some
ex-officers from Sulaimani. They comprised a Turkish lieutenant, some 60
men, 2 machine-guns, 1 gun (Arty.), and 20 ammunition mules. Reliable
locals stated that the men were old Turkish soldiers, under military discipline;
the remainder were tribesmen.
On the night of 30 July, there was a small disturbance between the
police of Iraq and some hostile Kharwatan villagers near Batas. On the arrival

67 This report on A IR /1253, no folio numbers.

 152

of the Turkish infiltrators, their Girdi tribesmen attacked Batas. Some of the
police deserted to the Turks, the rest surrendered, except for the Post
Commandant, who was murdered. The police were stripped of their arms and
set loose. The Turks then proceeded to Rowanduz, where they established
contact with tribal chiefs of the Arbil district and many o f its notables—the
majority of whom rose in rebellion.
The ringleaders established a local government in Rowanduz, and
collected revenue, with which they paid a retainer to the Turks. A military
column was sent to Arbil, where it arrived on 12 August 1921, to impress the
tribes by a demonstration of force. There followed operations, which ended in
the punitive actions described on the previous pages.
Cox pointed out that had Rania fallen, then insurrection could have
spread in uncontrollable proportions. The main military column at Arbil was
too far off to be in time to attack the insurgents; and rather than lose the
chance of teaching them a lesson, Captain Littledale, with his Kurdish Police
and the Levy contingent with other officers and supported by aircraft, decided
to take the risk of a reverse— which decision proved highly successful. Cox
praised the gallant initiative and the performance of the Levies: “ ...the
gallantry and endurance of the Levies in particular, in view of their
comparative lack of training, more than justified the expectations of their
commander”.
It appears from this report that as a direct result of these operations, the
Surchi chief, “who had been in rebellion since March 1919”, made his
submission to the government. But reports from Rowanduz remained
conflicting. Anticipated Turkish reinforcements failed to materialise, which
disgusted Rowanduzis for the Turkish lack of support. They were also
, .worn out by the continual bombing”.
Nevertheless, the penultimate paragraph of the report states: “On the
other hand rumours continue to circulate that the Rowanduzis do not intend to
surrender, but are making preparations for a new attack in the Arbil
direction”. This rumour proved to be correct.
 153

It was at this time that the levy’s first senior Field Commander arrived
in Iraq. According to Brown,68 this was in September 1921. He was Brigadier
L.W. de V. Sadleir-Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., who took command of the
Force, as Inspector-General, relieving Col.-Commandant Frith. Sadleir-
Jackson at once commenced the complete reorganisation of the Force from
Levy headquarters, Baghdad, “which had already been partly put in train on
paper”.
Sadleir-Jackson took the necessary steps to equip the Force with light
automatic weapons. Lewis and Hotchkiss guns were ordered; the former for
the infantry, the latter for the cavalry.
Also, according to Browne, the Levies had undertaken few operations
since the early part of the year (1921), except for a minor skirmish at Dohuk
on 4 October. However, on 14 December the same year, an Arab Levy cavalry
escort to the A.P.O. was attacked by Kurds near Babachikchek. The attack
resulted in Lt. Bois being wounded, and nine men and their horses killed—
forcing the escort to retreat.
Sadleir-Jackson issued orders for operations against these Kurds on 16
December. A cavalry column some 700-800 strong was ordered to assemble
at Arbil under his command, to march via Shaklawa on Batas, while an
infantry column under Lt.-Colonel Barke marched on Batas via Kandil, to co­
operate with the cavalry. After some 110 miles of hard marching, collecting
other Levy units on the way; the whole force arrived at Arbil on 22 December
1921.
Suffice it to say, Kurds were found in occupation of Harir and Batas
on 26 December. An advance party had already arrived at Isteria village on
the 24th, where, while making rafts to cross the Greater Zab, they came under
Kurdish fire, wounding an Assyrian officer.
During the night the rafts were completed, and on the 26th the first raft
with 50 men crossed the river under cover of rifle and machine-gun fire.
Although enemy fire was heavy, they successfully crossed to find the
opposing force, a mixture of Turkish soldiers and local Kurds from
Ruwanduz, who soon retired. The crossing was by then completed. Two

68 B row ne, The Ira q i L evies 1915-32, o p .c it, pp.17-20.

 154

aircraft from 55 Squadron RAF arrived, of which one landed; but on trying to
take off again, it crash-landed. The pilot was taken off by the other machine,
while his mechanic with the plane’s Lewis gun, joined the columns.
One column burnt the village of Kliorra 011 the 27th, and advanced
close to Batas. The cavalry attacked Harir, where they met stiff resistance and
were held up. The fight continued through the day, during which Captain
Carvosso was killed with five of his men. Lieutenant Burridge was killed next
morning.
On the same day, Batas was attacked with air support, and by midday
the town was occupied, with only two Levies wounded. Very heavy rain then
commenced. At 1730 hours, a party was ordered to attack Harir Dagh, under
cover of darkness, but the ground conditions caused by the rain proved too
much for progress. Next morning, the party reached the top, capturing a Kurd
on the way. They pushed along the top to a point overlooking Batas, where
they built sangars. Small parties of enemy were seen, but did not offer fight.
By the afternoon, Sadleir-Jackson, unable to obtain air support, owing to the
bad weather, ordei^an attack on Batas. Two men killed and two wounded, one
of whom later died. The town was burnt, ending the operations. The Force
was back in Arbil by 31 December.
It may be appreciated that by the reorganisation of the Levy Force, and
the creation of a command structure by giving the odd squadrons and
companies parent units of regiments and battalions, their new commander had
made considerable improvements in a very short time. Also, he had arranged
to improve the armament of the Force, by ordering light automatics, and
conducted difficult but successful operations in Kurdistan— all in the space of
some fourteen weeks from his arrival. He was not a man to let “grass grow
under his feet”. His actions invite speculation on what effect his continued
command might have had on the force, given more time.
The Levies, throughout the Arab Insurrection of 1920, had proved
their worth. They had attained a semblance of military structure, but were
afforded 110 time in which to carry out the promised six-month training period.
The Striking Forces, which then represented the Levies, were permanently
divorced from the District Police and Gendarmerie, together with any railway
guards who may have been enlisted. It was the old Striking Force which
 155

would form the nucleus of the “new Levies” planned at Cairo, and it was
contemplated they would undertake the security of the northern frontier.
A later document by Cox—the Iraq Administration Report69 for the
period 1920-22— gives a valuable overall view of the extent to which the
Cairo proposals were, or were not, being put into effect. This document stated
that after the Cairo Conference in March 1921, the Levies consisted for the
greater part of men of Arab nationality. The decision was to raise the strength
to an estimated 7,500 (well above the estimate for the “New Levies” shown
on p. 156 of this chapter).
Their responsibilities had extended to Kurdistan, in addition to Iraq.
The strength of the force at that period numbered 4,000 rank and file.
Although a small proportion of Kurds had been introduced into the force, and
the Kurdish Levy in Sulaimani had been incorporated (assume the latter were
remnants of Soane’s Levies), it was not until the end of August (1921) that the
raising of Assyrian units was begun, and a Christian element introduced.
With the flow of imperial troops out of the country, Levies were called
upon to shoulder still heavier responsibilities for finding reliefs on the
Kurdish frontiers, and replacing imperial troops. In the above report Cox
further stated that the Levy strength was approximately that of a weak
brigade, without artillery or light machine-guns (as will be recalled, the new
commander had put these on order); but they were called upon to relieve the
equivalent of two weak imperial divisions. The manner in which they filled
their obligations was shown by the fact that the frontier remained intact. “The
casualty roll was eloquent of the readiness with which they responded when
called upon to assert Government authority by force of arms.”
Before beginning the next chapter, it is considered important to present
the following extract from the report of the Levy Inspector-General, Sadleir-
Jackson, in the above Administration Report (Appendix II) for the period
September 1921 to March 1922, in order to keep the reader informed of the
Levy strength, organisation and dispositions.
The report stated:

69 FO 371/8998, F.208.
 156

On September 1921, Levies were disposed as follows:

Euphrates Area 12 Squadrons Kurdish Area 9 Squadrons
Euphrates Area 3 Companies Kurdish Area 2 Companies
Strength 4,000. (Four Companies of Assyrians raised.)

By March 1922, the amalgamation of the various Levies had just been
completed.
The Force comprised four mounted Regiments each o f 4 Squadrons,
4 Assyrian Companies. Two Companies Sulaimani Kurds, 3
Companies of Marsh Arabs. Companies and Squadrons were below
establishment. Troop, Platoon, and Section organisations were not in
force; no Headquarters existed in units.

(This would have been how the majority of the Force was comprised
in 1920 during the Arab Insurrection, and at the time Sadleir-Jackson assumed
command—“a somewhat disorganised force of odd units”.)
On 28 February 1922, the Force was reorganised and consisted of:
4 Mounted Regiments 4 Battalions
1 Pack Battery (Assyrian) 1 Vickers Gun Company
1 Wireless Section

(It may be assumed that as the Force had four “Battalions” o f infantry,
the “Regiments” would by then be cavalry, and not mounted infantry.)
Regimental, battalion and battery organisation, on the lines similar to
those at present in force in the British army, was introduced. A Record
Section and Horse Register were maintained. Acquittance role system was
superseded by a Pay and Mess Book System.
The role changed from police force to that of a military force, and
additional responsibilities for safeguarding the frontier from Faishkhabur on
the Tigris to Halabja were added to the duties for maintaining internal order.
Terms for enlistment: a period of one year, extendable.
Courses were being held continually at Levy headquarters for officers
in the mounted units, infantry and trade services. Training instructions were
translated into Arabic. Depots were formed at Baghdad for recruit training. A
remount system was organised; but accommodation was, in the main, still
tented. Hospitals and veterinary centres were established.
Armament had improved with the S.M.L.E. rifle, and approval given
for Vickers machine-gun and Lewis gun instruction.
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The strength of the force on 1 March 1922, was 5,000, and Assyrian
recruits were coining in freely. Indeed, this total was exceeded by 400. This
excess was disposed of by weeding out non-efficients.
The two years covered by this chapter (1920-21), had presented a
considerable trial for the British government, the imperial garrison and the
Levies. Indeed, the troubles of 1920 had even raised the question as to
whether British interests in Mesopotamia lay only in the Basra wilayat, to
which they should retire, and leave Baghdad and Mosul. Clashes of
personality between key men in 1920 had also played a debilitating role, at a
time when the optimum co-operation was essential.
At the Cairo Conference of March 1921, an attempt had been made to
resolve far too many issues, the error of which became clearer as time
progressed. The most important achievements of the Conference were the
decision to hand the future control of Iraq to the air force, and the creation of a
National Iraq Army. The latter may have appeared simple during discussion,
but proved to be far more complicated than envisaged in the planned four-year
period.
Other salient matters discussed included the production of a timed
programme for the reduction of the imperial garrison, but it was ultimately
delayed by more considerations than had been visualised. It could be said
there had been a substantial Levy revival but, as was their usual fate, it will be
shown that considerable problems lay ahead for this important, proven and
willing Force. The Assyrians, on whom, in reality, the future o f the Levies
depended, were being taken for granted by the British because of their
apparent dependency on Britain’s goodwill for their future. Their national
pride and fierce independence had failed to be recognised, which boded ill for
their future co-operation.
The Turko-Iraqi frontier problems began to take a more serious turn
with the intervention of well-armed Turkish quasi-regular troops, whose
object was to encourage and support Kurdish insurrection against the British
administration—with the unresolved question of Mosul as the raison d ’etre.
In the next chapter, more examples of Levy military operations will be
discussed. There is no doubt that the acquisition of senior commanders for the
Force was responsible for the Levies finally achieving a regular military
 158

organisation, with better central control providing improved tactical

application and supporting aims, as detailed above. But artillery and the
Vickers machine-gun were technical weapons, requiring a reasonable
understanding of mathematics—how these problems were overcome has not
come to light. Nevertheless, efficiency in all these weapons was obtained—
especially on the Vickers gun. Supporting weaponry was manned by
Assyrians, under the command of British officers and N.C.Os.
It will also be shown in the following chapter that personality
problems quickly robbed the Levies of their first senior field commander. A
further setback was the loss of so many of their trained and experienced men
to the Iraq army. The Assyrian recruits, although good material, provided an
initial language problem. Also, shortage of funds was to cause recruiting and
enlistment problems, which not only slowed progress, but fostered resentment
among the Assyrians.
Regardless of the Arab ex-Levy troops, to be supplied as a nucleus
with which to form the Iraq army, the army was to fail to meet the target of
four years, set by the Military protocol in the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, which laid
down that Iraq should be responsible for its own internal security on
completion of that period. It is proposed to discuss this and the Air Ministry’s
replacement of the War Office for the interim control of Iraq, in the following
chapter.
 159

CHAPTER V

In the previous chapter, the first year— 1920— was taken up almost
entirely with the Arab Insurrection and the considerable issues attending it,
which had included the acceptance of the Mandate for Iraq by Britain in May
of that year. It also covered the Cairo conference of March 1921, and the main
decisions taken there concerning the urgent need for an Iraq army, the
implementation of which entailed the loss to the Levies o f almost all their
Arab personnel. In turn, the first attempted enlistment of Assyrians to replace
the Arab element, commenced in August 1921. In September o f the same
year, the first Senior Field Commander, Brigadier-General L. de V. Sadleir-
Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., was appointed to the Levies.
This chapter, the longest in the thesis, covers the four years from 1922
to the end of 1925. Among the new issues to be considered will be: the
dismissal of Sadleir-Jackson; matters on Levy administration; H.M.G’s
Kurdish policy; the arrival of the A.O.C. to implement the Air Ministry’s
assumption of responsibility for the control of Iraq from the War Office and
further Kurdish troubles backed by the Turks. These complex and sometimes
interrelated events were all to affect the evolution of the Levies in this period.
Several changes in historical perspective will be encountered by the
reader in this chapter. The history of the Levies is, to a considerable extent,
connected with the development of the new state of Iraq, and also the original
concept of British imperial air power. The Levies remain the main theme of
the thesis, and issues affecting the Force will be discussed, and chronology
maintained where possible. The Levy history covering these four years cannot
be considered neat and tidy, any more than the political environment in which
the Levies operated; they served in a region in which the surrounding
countries, as well as Iraq, were mostly in a state of unstable transition.
The chapter opens with the aftermath of the Cairo Conference, which
was fully discussed in the previous chapter when, it may be recalled, the
continued existence of the Levies was confirmed with a strength o f 7,500. But
they were to lose their trained Arab personnel to the newly-developing Iraq
army. This, in turn, caused a decision to be taken to replace the Arab element
with Assyrians (then refugees). It will be shown in the following discussions
 160

that there were many interrelated fundamental issues which shaped the
continued evolution of the Levy Force, some of which were broad in
conception, while others were localised, and sometimes created by unexpected
events.
In this early period, Levy history was heavily influenced by conflicting
demands being made by the authorities in London and Baghdad. Hitherto, the
various government departments in London had found it difficult to agree on
any clear and consistent policy with respect to the Levies. Once again, the
progress and performance of the Levies depended heavily 011 the discipline,
courage, ability and often the ingenuity, of the British officers seconded to
them.
At the Cairo Conference, a period of four years had been agreed in
which the Iraq army was expected to become efficient enough to undertake
the country’s internal security. This period was inserted, in the form of a
Military Protocol, within the Military Agreement o f 25 March 1922.
However, it will also be shown that it was later realised by the Air Ministry
that this target would not be achieved.
In this context, the British Treasury was trying, by every possible
means, to reduce expenditure 011 Iraq. Thus almost any method by which the
Iraq government could be cajoled and persuaded into assuming greater
financial responsibility for internal security, was seen as a potential financial
saving for Britain; but with the proviso that any increase in expenditure by
that government on their national defence was not to reduce Iraq’s share of
repayment of the “Ottoman Debt”.
The manpower of the Levy Force in 1922 was increasingly represented
by Assyrians, to replace the Arab personnel lost to the Iraq army. The role of
the Levies was to continue to fill the vacuum created by the diminishing
British imperial garrison, wherever possible. This was to continue until the
Iraq army was large enough and adequately trained to replace them. The area
which had been proposed for the “new Levies” was in the north of Iraq, while
the imperial garrison progressively withdrew south. Ultimately, the plan was
for the Levies, coupled with the Iraq army, and backed by the air power o f the
RAF, to maintain internal security without the imperial garrison.
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A British Military Mission was sent in early 1922, to help train the
Iraq army, in an advisory capacity. However, the Iraq government had
rejected British officers in a command role, because the army could be seen as
a British and not a national force, and might be used in other than Iraq’s
interest.
Recruiting of Assyrians had tentatively commenced on 17 April 1921.
A recruiting party of Levy officers, together with the missionary Dr. Wigram,
had commenced attempting to recruit Assyrians from refugee camps around
the Mosul area in April 1921. However, the men showed great reluctance in
coming forward, and they persisted in requesting repatriation under British
protection. This was deemed to be impossible by the relevant government
departments in London.
With much eloquent persuasion by Dr. Wigram, and the promise of
pay at Rs.50 per month, some 50 men enlisted and a start was made. Some of
the men had second thoughts and tried to break away, but were prevented by
the British Levy officers, helped by some local British troops. The parties
were then marched off to their respective holding camps. By June 250 were
enrolled, with considerable reluctance on the part of the Assyrians.
Nevertheless, progress was made in this important new British undertaking. If
this scheme had failed, there was no ready alternative source of manpower
under British control.
The proposed strength for the Levies, projected at the Cairo
Conference, was approximately 7,500. This was soon to be watered down to
5,000, based perhaps on a budget reappraisal which, in turn, may have caused
the first breach of faith by the British with their new Assyrian recruits. This
had resulted from them being informed that their monthly pay of Rs.50 was
arbitrarily reduced to Rs.45, mentioned above. The reason for this is not clear,
but it may be assumed that hasty budgeting at Cairo had proved over-
generous, and an adjustment was therefore needed if the number of men
required were to come within the permitted financial ceiling.
However, after this unwelcome information had been given to the
Assyrian officers and men, it did not lead to trouble at that time; but from then
on, men refused to re-engage after their one-year service contract during 1922,
which promised to denude the Force of the majority of its new manpower, as
 162

will be discussed in due course. Also, the new Levy Commandant, Sadleir-
Jackson, had called for a further 1,500 Assyrians to be recruited from 7
January 1922.
It is necessary to recall the tensions which existed between the
Christian Nestorian Assyrians and the Islamic peoples o f the region. The
Hakkiarians had formed a “millet” within the Ottoman empire, living under
Islamic sufferance, but never treated as “equals”. Much o f the area was
inhabited by Kurds, with whom confrontations of a violent nature sometimes
took place—resulting in later reprisals. These Christians, now the mercenaries
of another alien Christian nation, the British, were to be used to impose the
rule of law upon Islamic peoples, sometimes with force. It is little wonder that
high tensions were to prevail in the future.
It will be confirmed later, in a personal letter by a British Levy officer,
that “mixed” sub-units had been tried for a few months, but the Assyrians,
unlike the Kurds and Arabs, had proved to be poor horsemen. However, the
Assyrians were to make excellent machine-gunners and artillery men. There
was also the matter of religion, and perhaps old feuds, which could in some
cases cause friction between these men within the same unit. Therefore, the
practice of mixed units was dropped as soon as the rearrangement of
personnel could be organised.
The unfortunate dismissal of General Sadleir-Jackson on 14 March
1922, resulted from another clash of personalities, which the Force could ill
afford; especially because during his brief sojourn in the Force, he had
achieved a very great deal. It will be seen that he appeared popular among
many of the British Levy officers.
Sadleir-Jack son’s parent regiment was the 9th Lancers. He had just
completed commanding successful operations with a British brigade on the
Divina in north Russia—under the overall command of General Ironside at
Archangel. The object of this “Russian Relief Force” was to assist “White
Russian” (Barishnyas) forces in preventing the Bolsheviks (Bolos) from
capturing north Russian territory. The operation lasted until 27 September
1919—therefore Sadleir-Jackson must have been posted to the Levies after
these operations almost immediately. These facts reinforce this officer’s
suitability to command the Levies.
 163

However, it will be shown how this “battle-tried” officer, apparently

popular with many British Levy officers, had his reputation undermined by
one of ChurchilFs aides who was perhaps possessed of a far less distinguished
“operational” career—Lt.-Colonel R. Meinertzhagen.
The latter in his Middle East Diary 1917-56,1 mentioned Sadleir-
Jaclcson in derogatory terms: “London 7/12/21:...Freddie Guest came over to
see W inston...to read...to him a private letter from Sadleir-Jackson...the
letter comprised violent abuse of the whole Administration in Mesopotamia,
from Sir Percy Cox downwards”.
No doubt “the letter” also contained many home truths about the
deficiencies in the Levies at the time Sadleir-Jackson assumed command. It
may be recalled from the last chapter, that after he had taken his Force out on
operations against the Kurds on 16 December 1921, he had ordered light
machine-guns and artillery for the Levies. They had indeed been short of
adequate weaponry.
The diarist further stated that Churchill had called Meinertzhagen to
hear the contents of the letter, stating, “he did not mind how he got his
information so long as he got it”. Churchill listened to the letter, and directed
Meinertzhagen to write to Cox, with all the points raised in the letter.
Meinertzhagen said that no notice should be taken of a private letter, and “that
its tone was most insubordinate”. Churchill answered that “such scruples did
not worry him”.
In final confirmation of the proven value of Sadleir-Jaclcson, his letter
to Guest appears to have contained more “home truths” on the signs of
administrative neglect he had found in the Force he had accepted to command.
This reflected badly on Cox and members of ChurchilFs staff, about which
Meinertzhagen was particularly concerned.
As a result of the umbrage created by this letter, but not taken by
Churchill, Sadleir-Jackson was to be lost to the Levies, and in the writer’s
opinion, for no adequate reason. This contention is supported by the following
private letter.

1 R. M einertzhagen, M id d le E a st D ia ry 1 9 1 7 -1 9 5 6 (London, 1959).

 164

The letter, of 25 June 1922, written by a British cavalry officer,

Captain P. S. Horny old, serving in a Levy cavalry regiment stationed in Dulip
Camp, a few miles from Mosul, to Lt.-Colonel J. Parker, O.C., 1st Regiment
Levies, Kirkuk, stated:
On Tuesday 125 new remounts arrive & in consequence o f our
protests they have ordered the 3rd Assyrian Btn. to transfer 111 men
over to us at once. It has of course yet to be seen whether said
Assyrians are prepared to be transferred, for they enlisted as
Infantrymen in an Assyrian Force & not in a mixed one containing
two third strength of their hereditary enemies, the Kurds. [The
problem was created by the loss of the Levy Arab element to the Iraq
Army, as seen in the previous chapter.] We failed, like you, to find
any time in which to train the m en.. .1 have never imagined that such
a show as Levies could exist—the whole business amazes me more
& more as I learn more about it & am made perforce to realize that
nothing matters at H.Q. as long as the I-G (Inspector-General
Sadleir-Jackson) gets cleared out by hook or by crook. Whether in
the process the Levies are reduced to such a pass that the only thing
left is to disband them—worries no man. That every contract to the
men &to the white officers who have come out to give of their best—
is broken, is of no importance whatever, Even if I had never met the
I-G before landing at Baghdad, I should still be a partisan & a very
warm one. For his one crime appeal's to be that he had fought, despite
every adverse circumstance, to obtain that which we needed &to
help.

What a farce the whole show is— I never imagined that anything
could be quite so hopeless under British rule. I wonder what—
knowing the real situations; Lloyds would insure the life of a British
officer for three months hence—or the prestige of the British for that
matter either. (Sic.)

Meinertzhagen was successful in removing Sadleir-Jackson, as may be

seen from the above letter, for no better reason than that Sadleir-Jackson had
bypassed the usual chain of his immediate superiors, who were, again
according to the content of the above letter, failing the Force by neglect. The
Levies, in view of their increasing responsibilities, were important in the
scheme for maintaining internal security in Iraq, especially during the steady
departure of the British imperial garrison. Also the lack o f adequate progress
being made by the new Iraq army was slowly being recognised by the
executive of the Air Ministry, who was now the responsible body for Iraq’s
security.
 165

The question remains, why were the Levies allowed to remain in such
a poor state during 1921-22, when those responsible were acknowledging
their importance and performance? The Levies, regardless of their lack of
material support from the executive, continued to perform their duties. Cox
had made this abundantly clear' in his Administration Report for 1920-22
(mentioned in the last pages of the previous chapter).
The writer has concluded that the most important faults lay with
London. Many documents clearly indicate that the problem lay in lack of
funding. Although the Exchequer was under pressure to reduce expenditure by
the reduction of the British imperial garrison, the vacuum thus created had to
be filled. The RAF could not undertake their new responsibilities for the
control of Iraq without some supporting ground troops. This task the new Iraq
army was unable to assume at this juncture, regardless of the hopes expressed
at the Cairo Conference. Therefore the Levies were the only alternative force
available to fill this gap. They were also cheaper than the departing British
imperial garrison. But the Levies lacked the necessary arms and equipment
with which to undertake the role of their predecessors. This important fact was
not being recognised, and thus the whole plan was being put at unnecessary
risk. The question, why the Levies could not have loaned the required arms
from the departing imperial troops, is not understood—it would have entailed
no extra costs to the Treasury.
On the departure of Sadleir-Jackson, Cox requested G.H.Q. M.E.F. to
take over the temporary administrative control of the Levies. This was done
by G.H.Q., who then tried to install a member of their staff (Colonel Vincent)
as Col.-Commandant. This officer was rejected by the Air Ministry for
reasons not revealed; but was perhaps due to inter-service rivalry.
On 2 September 1922, the Air Ministry cabled Air H.Q. Baghdad,2
stating that, “Colonel Sadleir-Jackson, should...have left Iraq before Sir J.
Salmond arrives”. It was further suggested that the Levies should be placed
under the temporary command of an officer with rank of colonel. It was
considered this arrangement was conducive for Levy training, discipline and
administration, but did not sever G.H.Q’s operational control, and was

2 A ll on AIR 5/295, no folios.

 166

preferable to either ail Inspector-General independent of G.H.Q., or reverting

to control by the High Commissioner. The arrangement would continue until
1 October 1922, when the A.O.C. and staff would replace G.H.Q. Iraq.
(Meinertzhagen’s meddling had created havoc. Had he not undermined
Sadleir-Jackson, the A.O.C. on his arrival could have come to his own
conclusions regarding the value of that officer.)
The responsibility for the Levies had been a problem since 1920, and
perhaps explains why there are so many gaps in Levy records. The following
changes are a summary of a complex and sometimes confusing situation:
CHANGES IN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LEVIES

October 1920 The Civil Commissioner.

December 1920 Ministry of Defence
7 January 1921 Minister of Interior
10 January 1921 The High Commissioner
8 February 1921 Minister of Interior
June 1921 The High Commissioner

Six different administrative government departments in eight months

was not conducive to the maintenance of good records, or o f consistent
growth.
Nevertheless, the departed Levy Commandant had left an inheritance
by way of M.M.Gs (Vickers guns) and a pack battery (2.75 inch howitzers);
also light automatic weapons, such as Hotchkiss for the cavalry, and Lewis
guns for the infantry.
The advent of so large a body of Assyrian recruits, coming in over a
period of about six months, brought its own serious problem—that of
language for communication in training. Newly-appointed Assyrian officers
and N.C.Os had no knowledge of English, and the British officers and British
N.C.O. instructors had no knowledge of Syriac. That they managed to train so
many men, regardless of this serious impediment, in so little time, reflects
great credit on those men of the British army then serving with the Force. It is
doubtful whether this problem had been voiced at the Cairo Conference, when
the decision was taken to discharge the vast majority of the trained Levy Arab
officers and men, and to replace them with Assyrians, with all the problems
that would follow.
 167

As usual, it was not officialdom, but the initiative of a British officer,

Lt. R.H. Hart, who wrote a useful handbook on Colloquial Syriac, finally
printed in Mosul in 1926, which filled the gap.
During the training periods for Assyrians, British officers selected and
appointed native officers and N.C.Os, usually men with tribal status (maliks
and the sons of leaders), who were given a trial period in their proposed ranks;
any found unsuitable were “broken” at once (reduced to the ranks).
Sadleir-Jackson, during his short tenure, had organised the force which
had comprised a number of disorganised individual “sub-units” (for example,
squadrons and companies without “parent units”), by brigading them under
“parent units” (for example, regiments and battalions). The Inspector-General
had created a command structure. This allowed for squadrons and companies
to be dispersed on detachment when necessary, and facilitated their use when
united under their parent units, or in co-operative operations with the imperial
garrison.
By 29 February 1922, according to the “Iraq Administration Report
for 1920-22”, the Levy Force had comprised:
4 mounted regiments (perhaps mixed cavalry and M.I.)
4 battalions of infantry
1 machine-gun company (also with pack transport)
1 pack battery
1 wireless section.

As usual this organisation does not quite tally with that given by
Browne, and for that matter, in the early history of the Levies, many official
reports fail to tally in detail. Nevertheless, they all provide a reasonable guide
to what had taken, or was taking place.
This document also mentioned the levy “Strength on 1/3/22 was 5,000,
with Assyrian recruits coming in freely”. It may be recalled that the suggested
strength mentioned at the Cairo Conference was 7,500. But once again, when
the costs had been reappraised, reductions followed. No Force headquarters
establishment was mentioned in the above document, but its location was
Baghdad.

3 FO 371/8998 Appendix II.

 168

This document by Cox shows the division of command, up to the first

part of 1923
(a) From 1st April 1921 to 1st October 1922, the Levies were under
G.H.Q. M.E.F. for administration.
(b) From 1st October 1922 to 31st March 1923, under the A.O.C.

Cox also stated, “The first period was, to a certain extent from the
point of view of the Levies, an unsatisfactory one”. Amongst other issues
mentioned were:
that the complete elimination of the Arab element by compulsory
discharge— although essential [politically]— somewhat dislocated
unit organisation; and many regrets at the departure— against their
will— of valuable Arab officers and N.C.Os were felt and expressed.

No date is given for this discharge, as mentioned previously. The

retention of the Levy 1st Marsh Arab Battalion contrary to declared policy,
will be discussed later in this work.
In the second period (1 October 1922-31 March 1923), the Report
stated that during the winter (1921-22), mud and plaster huts had
been provided for the British personnel. Also, that there was
“considerable anxiety” for the future of the Assyrian Levies. The
reduction in pay from Rs.50 to Rs.45 per month, was seen as a
breach of faith, together with the disbandment o f 400 men in the
weeding-out process mentioned earlier.

These had been factors in contributing to their almost unanimous

refusal to re-engage on the completion of their one-year service
contracts. This would have meant that by the spring of 1923, the
Assyrian units would have ceased to exist.

(This is but one more example of maladministration o f the Force.)

In the context of the “on-going” Kurdish trouble in the approaching
period of the change-over of the Iraq command from the War Office to the Air
Ministry in October 1922, trouble had continued from June in Kurdistan. The
anti-British feeling, successfully promoted by the Turks, had resulted in
sporadic unrest among many of the Kurdish tribes in northern Iraq. One of the
Kurdish chiefs, Karim Fattah Beg, regarded as a notorious trouble-maker by
the British authorities, and who was in collusion with the Turks, murdered
two British officer P.Os, Captains Bond and Makant, on 18 June 1920. Karim
Beg was pursued from late June by a mixed column of imperial forces and
Levies, until, finding no respite, he fled his area and escaped to Ruwanduz.
 169

In view of the gravity of the situation in the area of Sulaimaniah, Cox

decided to reinstall Shaikh Mahmud as governor of the township, and then to
evacuate all British, Indian and pro-British officials by air to Kirkuk. This was
after Cox had obtained from Mahmud his solemn oath not to attempt to usurp
official authority again. Many of the local population had called for
Mahmud’s reinstatement, in spite of his previous record.
Nevertheless, regardless of the solemn promises previously given by
Mahmud to Cox in August 1922, Mahmud, on his return to Sulaimaniah, at
once renewed contact with the Turks. Until such time as a political settlement
could be reached between the Turks and the British, the threat of Turkish
infiltration remained. Officially-encouraged Turkish agents, aided by
ambitious Kurdish leaders, were making incursions into Kurdistan to spread
anti-British propaganda in the name of Kurdish independence. These Turkish
emissaries offered vague promises of military support for the Kurds in
fighting the “oppressive infidel”. Singly, or together, the Turks with many
Kurdish leaders promised trouble. Cox had made an error o f judgment in
reinstalling Mahmud in Sulaimaniah.
The next most important event in the newly-agreed control of Iraq by
the Air Ministry in place of War Office, was the arrival of the A.O.C. Sir John
Salmond in Iraq, to assume his duties of command by 1 October 1922.
Incidentally, a new Levy Col.-Commandant H.T. Dobbin, arrived in Iraq
about the same time.
On learning of the problem concerning the refusal of the Assyrians to
re-engage, Commandant Dobbin called an urgent conference at Dohuk, with
the Assyrian maliks and religious leaders, in the autumn of 1922. The
discussions covered the offer of better terms of engagement, and extending
service contracts from one to two years. Also, the terms offered included “the
gift of a rifle and 200 rounds of ammunition, to each man on the termination
of his period of engagement”. The maliks were invited to co-operate not only
in ensuring the re-engagements, but in raising another Assyrian battalion to
replace the 4th Kurdish, which was handed over to Shaikh Mahmud on his
reinstatement by Cox in August 1922. It was felt that “ ...a distinctly
favourable impression had been created...” at this conference.
 170

The Turkish-backed troubles with the Kurds were still smouldering,

and because of the vulnerability of the British garrison in Sulaimaniah,
G.H.Q. M.E.F., with the agreement of Cox, decided to evacuate the area in
September 1922. The H.C. wrote to the A.O.C. on 14 November, stating,4
...reference to the 4th Levy Battalion...Kurdish officers and
m en...were definitely to be handed over to the Sulaimani
government with their arms and equipment on the date of the
evacuation. It was arranged that they would be paid...from the Levy
budget.

Some men were on leave at the time, and if they chose not to return,
they were to be struck off the Levy payroll.
The evacuation by air on 5 September 1922, of 101 personnel,5 was
probably the first operation of its kind, and used approximately 20 aircraft.
The latter comprised De Havilland 9As and Vernons. Two of the aircraft were
badly damaged in accidents during the operation, and had to be burnt because
recovery was impractical under the prevailing conditions. During the
evacuation, the Sulaimaniah landing-ground was guarded by 19 Assyrian
Levies with two Vickers machine-guns, together with three Bristol fighters.
The latter were parked “in a position from which their Lewis guns could
command the town”. The operation began on 4 September, ending on the 5th.
Approximately 26 aircraft had been involved.
It appears that in the context of the continued trouble on the Turkish-
Iraq border, the A.O.C. had done his “homework” by wilting an
“Appreciation on the Military Situation”, with special reference to the
possible attempt of a “Turkish Invasion of Iraq”, dated 1 October 1922, and
addressed to the Secretary of State for Air.6 This document is important
because it marks the R.A.F’s first operational plan for the defence o f Iraq
against external aggression. The Appreciation contained considerable detail,
which it is felt unnecessary to discuss in full. However, his main
considerations were a possible attempt by the Turks to retake Mosul, and are
covered in the following extracts.

4 A IR 2 3 /5 7 2 , Pt.I, F.79.
5 A IR 5 /1253 , no folio.
6 Cab 2 4 /1 4 0 , F s.244-5.
 171

Although the defence of Mosul, with its long lines of communication

to Baghdad and Basrah, was not considered “sound militarily”, the A.O.C. felt
it was justified because of:
a) Prestige, and obligation to the Iraq Government.
b) Possibility of defeating the Turks, if they invaded, with only a
small force of 5 Battalions and 2 Batteries, combined with the
R.A.F., our prestige would be vastly increased and Iraq secured.
c) Ground to the north of Mosul, on the Tigris left bank, lends itself
in skilful manoeuvre to our ground forces, any force advancing
from Jezire-ibn Omar or Nisibin, would be most vulnerable to air
attack.
d) Any danger of Turkish forces backed by Turks advancing west of
the Aqra-Erbil-Kurkuk-Kifri line, against our L. of C. on the
Tigris right bank, is a danger the Levies with the R.A.F., could
counter.

The only “friends” to be counted on were the Assyrians north of

Mosul— especially those “settled near Dohuk (about 2,000 men partly armed)
could assist us”. He had even considered an attack by the Turks from the
direction of the Dardanelles. (Perhaps he had “Chanak” in mind.) He also felt
that the Kurds would support the Turks if it were seen that they might
succeed.
The forces the A.O.C. considered to be at his disposal were:
(a) What was left of the British imperial garrison, drawn from Mosul
and Baghdad:

Brigade Headquarters 1 company sappers and miners

5 battalions 1 signal section
1 pack howitzer battery 1 field ambulance section
1 field howitzer battery 1 veterinary section
3 armoured car companies

(b) Assyrian Levies in their outpost dispositions:

2 battalions )
1 pack battery ) Zakho and Aqra
2 squadrons )

Supports located near Dohuk and Minden—unspecified.

The Levy Forces consisted of:

1 cavalry regiment (less 1 squadron) Arbil

1 cavalry regiment Kirkuk Alton Keupri
1 cavalry squadron Khanikin
1 battalion (less British officers) Sulaimaniah
1 battalion Nasiriyah
 172

There was also the 1st Levy Marsh Arab Battalion, which the A.O.C.
stated, “if politically necessary, could garrison Kut and Amarah”. In his
opinion, this was not necessary, because the Tigris lines o f communication
were defended by four defence vessels and armoured barges.
The RAF comprised:

3 squadrons De Havilland 9A Mosul

1 Snipe squadron )
1 Bristol squadron) Kirkuk
2 squadrons Vickers Vernon Baghdad
1 squadron De Havilland 9A Shaibah

The Iraq army, although included by the A.O.C. has been excluded
because they were thought to be hardly “battle-worthy” at this time. Indeed,
not capable of maintaining internal security.
It may be seen that the strength of the British imperial garrison was
about on a par with the Levy Force, except for artillery. The main power for
defence lay with the RAF, with which the A.O.C. intended to attack the
enemy before their forces reached the temporary frontier, then still in dispute.
The A.O.C. would have been well briefed in the United Kingdom
before leaving for his command. Therefore, there is every indication that the
British government felt that the threat of a Turkish attempt to retake Mosul
was being treated seriously, and this is reflected in his Appreciation.
To confirm this opinion, a comment by the Air Council on the A.O.C’s
Appreciation was sent to him on 1 November 19227 in which it was stated
that, “ ...the determined attitude” the A.O.C. was proposed to adopt, and “the
offensive role assigned to the Air Units”, was in full accord with the Air Staff
in London. However, the Air Council considered that, in certain
circumstances, as for example, in case of an attack by still larger forces than
those envisaged by the A.O.C.; H.M.G. viewed with apprehension his plan
which placed the bulk of the garrison in an advanced position. They felt his
operations should be limited to a closer radius of strongly defended points.
This document has been presented because it provides the reader with
a clear idea of what was involved in the face of continued Turkish aggression,

7 Ibid.
 173

mostly by irregulars, to disrupt the northern frontier, the exact delineation of

which was still under discussion between Britain and Turkey.
This period of Levy history should be seen in the broader context of
British government policy in respect of the Kurds, and the aggressive
posturing of the Turks. This is borne out by a document raised by Churchill to
Cox, on 27 July 1922,8 in which he stated:
The policy of His Majesty’s Government in southern Kurdistan was
defined by myself in the House of Commons on 11th July in the
following terms. As far as Kurdistan is concerned, we have not the
slightest intention of getting ourselves involved or entangled there.
We are doing the best we can for southern Kurdistan, but we are not
committing ourselves in any serious way. I have given explicit
directions which will prevent anything of that kind arising. We do
not wish to force the people of southern Kurdistan under the
government of King Feisal. They are free to take part, or not, in the
elections which are about to take place, as they choose. We are most
anxious to study their wishes and to develop any local bearing o f the
self-government which has been given to Iraq, that may commend
itself to them.

We firmly believe that the interests of southern Kurdistan are so

closely involved in Iraq that, without any compulsion from us, these
two territories will ultimately come into harmonious accord.

It may be seen that H.M.G’s declared policy in no way met the

aspirations of a large proportion of the Iraqi Kurdish population for self-
determination offered by the League of Nations.
The situation faced by the A.O.C. would have been daunting to a
lesser man. He had immediate control over the air force, the Iraq Levies and
what was left of the British imperial garrison; but the Iraq army was another
matter. The British government, it seems, was prepared to include it in the
forces at the disposal of the A.O.C. in the event of an external attack on the
sovereignty of Iraq—if for no other than financial reasons (it was funded by
the Government of Iraq). However, as mentioned previously, it was far from
being a national army other than in name in 1922-23. Thus the A.O.C. had to
count on the efficiency of the Levies and the fast receding strength o f the
British imperial garrison— backed by his airpower.

8 CO 730/22, F.594.
 174

In the context of the A.O.C’s Appreciation, which included his

proposed use of the Levy Force, a letter from the Levy Commandant on 31
December 1922,9 to the A.O.C., based on Iraq Report on Iraq Army and
Levies, gave the current composition and ethnic structure of the Levy Force,
as:
Units Personnel Animals
H.Q. staff
1st regiment Kurds/Turkomen Horses
(Arabs/W ailers)
2nd regiment 2:1 Kurds/Assyrians “ “
3rd regiment Arabs/Kurds/Turkomen/Persians “ “
1st battalion Marsh Arabs
2nd battalion Assyrians
3rd battalion Assyrians
4th battalion Assyrians being reformed
Pack battery Assyrians Mules

Also: depot, remounts, and medical team.

It may be noted in the previous report, that no Machine-gun Company

is mentioned. This is perhaps because the guns were dispersed among the
regiments and battalions where, as previously, they were “brigaded” within
the Machine-gun Company. This new arrangement perhaps simplified getting
the guns to units on detachment. The Force was, it may be recalled, often
distributed over large areas.
The ethnic distribution of personnel noted in this report, shows the
Assyrians being weeded out from the cavalry, and there were a few Arabs in
the 3rd Regiment (Cavalry). These Arabs were not mentioned as an anomaly,
because like the 1st Battalion of Marsh Arabs, they were perhaps only a
handful of “tribal men”, whom the Iraq army did not enlist. The reforming of
the old Kurdish 4th Battalion with Assyrians, as may be recalled earlier in this
chapter, was promised to the maliks at the Dohuk autumn conference.
There was one considerable improvement noted in the document. Levy
Headquarters staff would consist of: Commanding Officer (ITT. Dobbin), an
orderly officer, G.S.0.2 (Ops.), D.A.Q.M.G., D.A.A.G, and staff captain— six
officers, two of whom were to be “p.s.c.” (passed staff college). Also, because
the operational area allocated to the Levies was north of Mosul, it was

9 AIR 23/572, F.274.

 175

suggested that their headquarters be moved from Baghdad to Mosul, where

the depot was established. With regard to recruiting and training, the G.O.C.
had proposed to abolish the depot, and to decentralise by “inter-unit” training.
After careful consideration, he decided not to burden unit commanders with
recruit training, they having sufficient work with their commands. A depot
was thus to be established in Mosul to handle both recruiting and initial
training. The objective for the Levies was “to rank as first class irregular
troops”. But no attempt was to be made to turn them into a “Brigade of
Guards”. The new policy for the Levies was slowly beginning to take effect,
but continuing inadequate financial support remained a serious problem.
Other noteworthy points in the document stated that each battalion had
eight Lewis guns and four Vickers guns to each of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions
only; and four Vickers guns to each cavalry regiment. The 1st and 2nd
Cavalry Regiments were armed with rifle and bayonet, and trained as
mounted infantry, but the 3rd Regiment was trained for “mounted shock
tactics” (traditional cavalry) for which “swords” were on order to replace the
bayonets. The Pack Battery was armed with four by 2.75 inch mountain guns,
with a total reserve of 20,000 rounds. However, the men’s clothing was
patched, and most of the tentage remained in a “shocking state”.
In the same context, Commandant Dobbin again wrote to the A.O.C.,
on 31 December 1922,10 stating the “proposed” Levy strength was 5,463.
However, his present native strength was 4,531 - 137 over the “old” G.H.Q.
establishment, and 932 below the newly-proposed one. He suggested,
therefore, that in view of the fact that the 4th Battalion (with the exception of
70 men) drew no pay for three months, and that the establishment for British
other ranlcs was 91, whereas only 35 were on strength. Thus the money saved
by these deficiencies in personnel provided sufficient funds to prevent an
excess expenditure in 1922/23.
Therefore he proposed to recruit up to his new establishment because
“it would be...disastrous to stop recruiting at the present time”, and
“especially as the G.H.Q. establishments had never been sanctioned by the
Colonial Office”. There was also the need to re-establish the 4th Battalion in

i0 AIR 23/572, F.250 and F.76.

 176

accordance with the wishes of the A.O.C’s letter of 9 November 192211 to the
High Commissioner, in which it was stated: “ ...the Air Officer Commanding
is anxious to enrol another battalion in its place” (as promised at the Dohuk
Conference, held between the Levy Commandant and Assyrian leaders).
Yet again, the documents show that the decisions made at the Cairo
Conference were failing to be implemented, and it is remarkable to note that a
senior officer, who had far more important tasks to undertake, was having to
indulge in a “penny-pinching” exercise, while more valuable issues, such as
training, required his attention.
The new “chain of command” for the Iraq Levies after the RAF took
over control from G.H.Q. M.E.F., was: Colonel-Commandant to the A.O.C.,
Iraq; A.O.C. to the Air Ministry; and the Air Ministry to the Colonial Office.
The new Levy Commandant (Dobbin) also attempted to change the
designation of the Force (a lasting preoccupation it seems) from “Iraq Levies”
12
to “The Iraq Frontier Force”, on 15 January 1923. His reasons given were
“ ...that the name ‘Levy’ is misleading, in as much as it implies a
disorganised, unequipped and undisciplined force raised hurriedly for the
defence of its own homes”. The request was passed to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies on 22 February 1923, 13 who refused the request, stating,
“After careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the present
moment is inopportune for making any change in the title of the force”.
While discussing Levy problems created by the reorganisation, it
should be mentioned that a proposal for the repeal of the Arab and Kurdish
Levy and Gendarmerie Proclamation of 1920 had been sent by the Air
Ministry to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 2 November 1922,14 in
which it was desired that the Levies be placed under the Army Act, Section
175, Sub-section 4 and Section 176, Sub-section 3, Article 2 o f the Mandate.
This was to bring the Force into line with prevailing Service regulations.
(Under this Act, it might be noted, the punishment by flogging was not
permitted.)

" A IR 2 3 /5 7 2 , F .250 and F.76.

12 A IR 5 /295 , no folio.
13 A IR 5 /295 , F.49B.
14 A IR 5 /295 , F.45A .
 177

Devonshire replied on 11 January 1923,15 to the effect that,

...provided that you are satisfied that the code o f law embodied in
the Army Act is sufficiently stringent to secure that the discipline of
the Levy Force is not impaired, and that this important change in the
conditions of service...can be brought about without causing any
dissatisfaction as to impair their efficiency, I approve your
proposal....

By the end of 1922 relations between Great Britain and Turkey

remained so tense it was feared that the situation might escalate. The Turkish
menace on the northern frontier had forced the A.O.C. to meet the threat by
concentrating some forces in the Mosul area. By the end of January 1923, the
A.O.C. considered that his preparations for defence were adequate to meet
any immediate Turkish threat.
The Acting High Commissioner (H. Dobbs) wrote to the Secretary of
State for the Colonies on 14 March 1923,16 regarding the revised
establishment proposed for the Levy Force for the coming financial year, in
which he discussed some aspects of the Levy reorganisation. He also stated
that improvements to accommodation was an urgent necessity. A table
showing where savings had been made was also attached. It appears the
A.O.C. Iraq was pushing to get the necessary financial approval for the
current year—after all, the operational responsibility for the defence and
security of Iraq was his. He appeal's not to have been prepared to try to “make
bricks without straw”.
Not until 24 April 1923,17 was conditional approval given, and this had
the usual sting in its tail. The establishment for the Levies, as submitted to the
High Commissioner, was agreed subject to the following reduction: “ ...in the
strength of Native Officers and Native Other Ranks of 390”. This represented
a typical “approval”, with a rider which almost nullified the purpose o f the
whole argument for which approval had been sought. Whereas Dobbin had
found a financial saving by way of the 4th Kurdish Battalion, which had been
given by Cox to Mahmud, causing the official disbandment o f that Levy 4th
Battalion. Therefore not to be resuscitated with Assyrians. This represented a
period of non-payment; also, the salaries saved by 55 British other ranks not

15 Ibid.
16 A IR 5/295, F .6115.
 178

to be replaced. These combined savings, Dobbin felt, would cover any excess
expenditure in his next budget. In reality, the sums involved were so small in
comparison to the entire budget, that the time spent by senior staff in the
argument was more valuable than the amount presumed to be overspent.
On 20 March 1923, the A.O.C. wrote to the Air Ministry18 in the face
of the approach of spring, and therefore the reopening o f the northern frontier
with Turkey. His concern was for the many problems which might have to be
faced, especially those on the north-western frontier where the Turks were
known19 to have some 8,000 troops in the Jeziret Ibn Omar-Nisibin-Sairt area.
This he considered an entirely different problem from that of Turkish
aggressive infiltration in the north and north-east experienced in the previous
winter.
The A.O.C. emphasised that the situation was constantly changing
because of the uncertainty connected with the political negotiations (British-
Turkish). He stated that the position in Kurdistan had deteriorated
considerably, and Shaikh Mahmud’s administration had produced chaos,
“ ...w ith consequent acute unrest among the tribes [Kurdish], and their
discontent combined them against us”. He further stated that, “Captured
documents showed definite proof that he (Mahmud) intended to join the Turks
in attacking us at the first opportunity”. Mahmud had refused to come in to
explain his conduct; it was therefore necessary to evict him from Sulaimaniah,
and to take precautions against any serious Kurdish tribal menace. A suitable
replacement to head the administration had to be found to take Mahmud's
place.
The A.O.C. further stated “ ...that the captured documents confirmed
that the Turks intended to instigate an early attack on Erbil, Kosianjack, and
Kirkuk; and that they intended to remain in support and were rapidly making
their preparations to this end”. He stated that late spring onwards was the
period for Kurdish unrest and Turkish incursions. The latter, he felt, “ ...might
be beyond the power of our forces to cope with, [and] would almost inevitably
result, unless Turkish action, anticipated above, is forestalled”. He therefore

17 A IR 5 /295 , F.61A .
18 A IR 5 /295 , F.45A .
19 FO 3 7 1 /9 0 0 4 , F.12.
 179

intended to commence operations forthwith to forestall the Turks’ intentions

by denying them the Ruwanduz avenue o f approach.
The impression given by this correspondence with London, is that the
A.O.C. anticipates trouble, rather than waiting for it to happen—also, his
intelligence is very active.
The Acting High Commissioner telegraphed the Secretary o f State 011

20 March 1923,20 to reinforce his concurrence with the above plan of the
A.O.C. and stated the need to maintain tranquillity, “ .. .during the forthcoming
negotiations” with the Turks. “Mere rumour of our intentions has produced
disintegrating effect on the Kinds and at Kirkuk and Kifri and Arbil where
pro-Turkish propaganda had made great progress confidence has already been
restored” (sic).
Jafs of Halabja are believed to be ready to submit to Iraq
Government and are separating from Suleimanieh and tribes east of
Koi are reported on the turn. I feel confident that we shall be able to
get through the summer without serious disturbance and that no
dangerous embarrassments will result from prolongation of
negotiations with the Turks provided that we persist in our plans.

In the same context, the police had managed to seize a Turkish postbag
at Amadiyah, the contents of which confirmed the fears o f both the A.O.C.
and the A.H.C. This incident was relayed to the Foreign Office by the
Colonial Office 011 9 April 1923.21 A Minute stated:
The main impression conveyed by a perusal of these very interesting
documents is the utter lack of any real solidarity between the various
leading personalities on either side. The result is a series of shifting
combinations, which continually give way to new ones.

One of the letters seized stated that Euz Demir (Iron Shoulder)
stigmatised Simlco as “the scoundrel”, whereas a few months later he is
described as “controlling all Kurdistan...an expert and well fitted to be
Governor”. Also, Shaikh Mahmud was suspected of being a tool of the
British. After perusal of all the documents, British intelligence felt that the
letters indicated the intense duplicity in these tribal affairs. However, these
letters were considered evidence of the success of the British efforts in
Kurdistan to prevent the formation of a pro-Turkish bloc, and that although

20 FO 3 7 1 / .9 0 0 4 , F .228.
21 FO 371/9 0 0 4 , F.254.
 180

Shaikh Mahmud had let the British down badly, Euz Demir’s intrigues had
been neutralised.
The operations for north-east Kurdistan, as planned by the A.O.C.,
failed to materialise quite as planned because of heavy rains, which must also
have interfered with any Turkish infiltrators’ intentions. Nevertheless, two
columns of troops were dispatched, and engaged in minor actions in
eradicating snipers before Euz Demir left Ruwanduz with his men on the
night of 20 April. Finally, Ruwanduz township was attacked by the columns,
supported by air action, and occupied by the A.O.C’s troops on 24 April 1923.
It should be noted that Shaikh Mahmud, who had been ousted from
Sulaimaniah, escaped to Persia, where he usually wintered. But on this
occasion, he returned to Iraq in July 1923.
On 20 March 1923,22 the A.O.C. decided to expel a Turkish
detachment, still situated at Ruwanduz, “ ...before the North-Eastern frontier
is opened in the Spring...”, by using imperial and local forces. A column of
Iraq Levies in co-operation with a column of imperial troops occupied
Ruwanduz, after driving all Turkish troops across the border into Persia. The
Iraq army contributed to the success of the operations by sending two cavalry
regiments and a pack battery. When the operations were completed, the Iraq
government installed a Qaimmaqam in the Ruwanduz area. The Iraq army
also stationed an infantry battalion at Mosul to augment the imperial garrison
there (which had not been affected by the British withdrawal from
Sulaimaniah) by one squadron, and an infantry battalion to the northern
frontier area.
As may be recalled, the Mesopotamian garrison was only designed for
internal security, and maintained on the assumption that there would be no
external aggression. Also, Sir Percy Cox had recently been warned by the War
office that no reinforcements would be available for Iraq. Thus, any further
forced withdrawal would constitute a serious blow to British prestige, and
might encourage further Turkish infiltration, followed by another Kurdish
rising.

22 FO 371/9004, F.231.
 181

The whole concept and scale of the Levy Force was now to provide
ground troops in support of the RAF. The greater the threat to security, and
the less able the Iraq army proved adequate to shoulder their share in
maintaining internal security, the more important the Levies became,
especially with the weakening of the imperial garrison. The more trouble the
A.O.C. anticipated, the stronger the case for strengthening the Levies,
especially in the early years of the R.A.F’s new role in Iraq.
On 17 August 1923, there was yet another communication on the
subject of the Levy establishment.23 It appears that the Colonial Office
insisted on discounting the 1st Levy Arab Battalion (Marsh Arabs), which
they had excluded from the total of 5,463, leaving a total of 5,073. This
battalion was seen as a political problem by the author, who stated,
...I still feel it should be disbanded, but in view, firstly of the
undertaking that we would not enlist further Arabs in the Levies,
which we gave to King Feisal; and secondly of the paramount
importance of showing to Iraq Government that, in practice, local
forces under imperial control, will be reduced pari passu with
progressive withdrawal of Imperial Force, and of securing some
relief to the British Exchequer. I cannot, in any case, sanction
increase in strength. On distinct understanding that no excess over
proportionate figure based on estimates of £500,000...these
establishments are sanctioned from today.

The reader might note that this in no way ended the controversy of the
1st Marsh Arab Battalion.
The following document confirms the continued excessive financial
stringencies which often led to the loss of efficacy in the control of Iraq,
responsibility for which, Britain was by Treaty bound. In this context, it is
proposed to set out an extract from this document, dated 20 June 1923,24 from
the High Commissioner to the Colonial Office, in which he discussed in detail
some of the aforementioned problems, and commenced,
My conclusions are, then, as follows:
(a) the Iraq Government should be permitted to spend more that
twenty-five per cent of its revenue on its defence forces, if this can be
managed by it within the period of the Treaty, consistently with its
financial obligations to His Majesty’s Government and in the matter
of the Ottoman debt. [The “Ottoman Debt” was Iraq’s share of the

23 A IR 5 /295 , F.68.
24 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F .200.
 182

War Debt, incurred by the Ottoman empire, of which Iraq formed

part.]
(b) for the purpose of internal defence alone, a considerably greater
expansion of the forces is necessary than would be required to bring
them up to the present numbers of the Iraq Army, Iraq Police and
Levies, owing to the disappearance of the Royal Air Force as far as
internal defence is concerned;
(c) such an expansion cannot for political reasons be in the direction
of an expansion of the Police nor for tribal reasons in the direction of
a local tribal Militia system;
(d) there will be difficulty in securing the absorption of the Levies
into the Iraq Army owing to:
1. prejudice against a British-officered force
2. greater expense of the force
3. prejudice against Christians as far as the Assyrians are concerned,
and
4. the desire for conscription o f the townspeople. If, however, it were
found possible to continue to form the Iraq Army on a voluntary
basis, this prejudice might to some extent be overcome and the
absorption be secured by some rearrangement of emoluments and
terms of service and by large diminution of British Officers;
(e) the plan which commends itself to the Iraq Government is the
conscription of the town populations and the inhabitants of settled
villages and although this would be a confession o f weakness so far
as the tribesmen are concerned, it would be better than nothing. It
would provide for rapid expansion within the present revenues of the
Iraq Government, whereas an expansion on the present voluntary
basis would have to wait for a problematic expansion of revenues.

There were comments on this document by the Deputy Director of

Operations Iraq (D.D.O.I.) to the Deputy Chief of Air Staff (D.D.A.S.) in an
Air Ministry file Minute sheet, dated 17 October 1923.25 These stated that the
Colonial office was pressing for the opinions of the Air Staff on the High
Commissioner’s despatch above.
The D.D.O.I. felt it was
... quite obvious that no local forces can be raised in Iraq without an
increase of revenue expenditure, and I suggest that the local forces in
Iraq should be tried out on the volunteer basis, and, if necessary, an
expenditure up to 40% of the revenue might be applied for the first
few years.

(Meaning that the men recruited on a “voluntary basis” were usually

more expensive than those enlisted under “conscription”.)

25 Ibid.
 183

In order to get the army started at all it will be necessary to start

reducing the Levies. I think the time has now come when it should be
made quite plain to the Iraq Government that for the first few years it
is essential for efficiency that a proportion of British officers must be
attached to the Iraq Army. This should be made clear, even although
it may hurt the feelings of the many late Turkish army officers at
present in Iraq.

(Presumably the intention was to take away the Levy element of

support, and so make Iraq shoulder the defence deficiency thus created.)
If a voluntary force was too expensive the only alternative method
would appear to be conscription for the towns, and subsidies paid to
the tribes provided they keep a certain number of armed tribesmen
available for the Central Government when required.

(These Minutes are 011 the same file above.)

The Next Minute was from D.C.A.S. to C.A.S. (Chief o f Air Staff),
dated the same day, in which he felt the previous Minute did not carry the Air
Staff much further, as they were unlikely to influence the Iraq government on
the choice of a voluntary or conscripted army (cost and politics being the main
factors). Also, it was seen from the Iraq press that it would raise considerable
opposition to continuing the Levies, or to the inclusion o f British officers in
the Iraq army,
C.A.S. considered that if the policy of reduction continued, then it was
necessary to consider if it was safe to leave the RAF in the country without
protection of at least four battalions; “and whether we are prepared to accept
local forces with or without British Officers, in substitution of any of these
four battalions”. (This would appear to be a somewhat ambiguous statement,
in view of the fact that their intention was to have four Levy battalions
officered by British, or that four Iraq army battalions officered by British
would be acceptable as a substitute.)
The D.C.A.S. stated that the Colonial Office should “emphasise as
strongly as possible the necessity for a proportion of British Officers with the
local forces” . Also, “subject to the above remarks, we can agree with the
conclusions of the High Commissioner’s report”.
The issue of the future role of the RAF and the proposed Iraq air force,
as well as the newly-created Iraq army, continued to form the essential
background to the evolution of the Levies during 1923. The general situation
 184

of Iraq’s defence progress affected the planning for the future o f the Levies.
The whole controversy continued unabated throughout the next few years.
The Levies were a pawn in this departmental wrangle.
At the time of these particular discussions, it should be noted that
Trenchard (C.A.S.) stated in a letter to the Secretary o f State, dated 2
November 1923:26
Finally, I must make clear to you my own view, that when the date
for final evacuation comes in four years time (1927-28), there is great
likelihood of the country lapsing into disorder; for the reason that the
native forces under a native administration would prove too
incompetent to keep the peace between the different sections.

According to the decisions taken at the Cairo Conference for the

combined estimated strength of the “local Iraq forces” (Levies and Iraq army)
to be 15,000, this figure had never been achieved.
A draft letter by Trenchard to the Colonial Office of 2nd November
1923,27 indicated the current trend in Air Ministry thinking on the matters
under consideration. It pointed out that important questions were being raised
on the way the defence forces in Iraq should develop; and whether those
forces were to replace those then controlled by Britain, namely the Levies and
remnants of the imperial garrison, when the latter were withdrawn. There
were two main points:
(a) the development of the land forces of the Iraq Government;
(b) the possibility of air units being maintained in Iraq in some form
or other after the Treaty period has elapsed.

Trenchard anticipated,
...racial, financial, and political difficulties in the absorption of the
Levies...on any large scale in the Iraq forces. Equally, the
employment of British officers in the Iraq army is unpopular with the
Iraq government.

But the A.O.C. was,

... strongly of the opinion that the Iraq Government should be pressed
to recognise the necessity for having a proportion of British officers
in their forces...,

if Iraq were to be able to protect itself after the British departure.

26 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F.5.
27 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , M inute sheet 5.
 185

With regard to the RAF after the end of the four-year Treaty period,
the question of any squadrons remaining without a new agreement to ensure
British control of their use, required urgent consideration by both Sir Henry
Dobbs and Sir John Salmond. They felt that in those circumstances, it would
be difficult to maintain a British-controlled and financed air force. However,
these problems should not apply to the maintenance of a civil aerodrome as
part of an air route.
At the end of 1923, the question of the fate of the Levies was clearly
the subject of much disagreement between various government departments.
The dialogue differed considerably, but it is felt necessary to explore the
arguments as they developed, although they remained unsolved.
A telegram from the High Commissioner to the Colonial Office of 7
December 1923,28 stated that the A.O.C. agreed that British officers would
secure maximum efficiency in the Iraq army, if in executive positions. But the
request for this should be spontaneous by the Iraq government, or the
Constituent Assembly would not agree. He proposed that Feisal might be
manoeuvred into making the desired suggestion, and added, “Iraq would
certainly seek help from other powers if we refuse”.
Cox also stated that he disagreed with Trenchard on the matter of the
inclusion of British officers in executive positions in the Iraq army by
pressure on Feisal:
I do not believe that the sincere concurrence o f King Feisal or his
Ministers in wording desired by Air Ministry can be secured (in the
Military Protocol) and if their nominal assent is secured by pressure
they will certainly arrange opposition in constituent assembly by
subterranean means. By attempting to secure the form we shall then
lose the substance.

On 18 December, Trenchard wrote to Churchill29 in a most resolute

tone concerning the requirements of the Air Ministry and its future intentions,
in which he stated that,
As long as the local forces are below 14,000, air action must continue
[meaning punitive bombing would have to continue]. The Air Staff
wish to reduce air action gradually, so eventually its cessation will
pass unnoticed. At this stage, the Imperial Garrison can withdraw
without undue reaction. Gradual reduction (of Imperial Forces), can

28 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F .148.
29 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F.163.
 186

only be achieved, when local forces are strong and efficient enough
to control the country.

Trenchard contended that it was the wrong principle to keep the

strength of local forces low because of the presence of an imperial garrison:
it could only lead to a stalemate as follows:

(1) Imperial Ground Forces will be maintained to guard air bases,

because Local Forces are too weak to control the country.
(2) Local Forces will be kept weak, because of the presence of the
Imperial Garrison.

He declared:
The above is futile, therefore action must be taken without delay to
increase efficiency and strength of local forces. It should be
remembered, that local forces will protect the air bases, not by direct
guards, like the Imperial troops, but by the fact that they are
controlling the country. The more they control the country therefore,
the more the Imperial ground forces...and air forces, be spared. The
policy to be followed, therefore, is to increase the local forces as
quickly as possible.

The Air Ministry regard 9,000 local forces, o f which 4,000 are
officered by British Officers (the Levies), as sufficient, with the
Imperial Garrison.

The Air Ministry,

...emphasise that future reductions in the Imperial Garrison will
depend more and more on the size and efficiency of the Local Forces.

The Air Staff would make a tentative proposal on the reduction of the
imperial garrison for 1925/26, but the proposal must be submitted to the High
Commissioner and the A.O.C. before it can be finalised, and it depends on the
following points:-

(i) The settlement of the Frontier with Turkey.

(ii) The Military Agreement. (Meaning Military Protocol.)
(iii) Progressive increase of local forces, in efficiency and numbers.
(iv) State of the country. [Iraq.]

With regard to (iii) above, it is hoped that, not only will the Iraq
Government Local Forces be increased, by recruiting from outside
sources (assume this referred to tribesmen, as opposed to townsmen),
but that they will also absorb the British Officered Levies, either into
the Army or as a Gendarmerie force. It must be clearly understood,
 187

that a transfer of Levies to the Iraq Government, does not constitute

an increase in the local forces. It simply means less expenditure for
the Imperial Government.

Trenchard’s exposition was realistic, but the British Exchequer and

local politics were the stumbling block to rational answers in the existing
situation. The Cairo Conference of 1921 had decided 011 two local forces,
which were: (a) the Iraq army: officered by Arabs, but with a small number of
British military advisers; and (b) the Levy Force: officered by British officers.
The Iraq army was organised to enable the Iraq government to
maintain internal security 011 the withdrawal of the imperial garrison. But it
would not achieve military efficiency within the four-year period without
British executive control. This had not been anticipated in Cairo. The Iraq
government strongly resisted British executive control of the army, mostly on
political grounds. This also applied to their absorbing the Levies. The Air
Ministry and the Colonial Office still hoped to find a way of overcoming Iraqi
objections.
Further light is cast on these issues by notes in a document by the Air
Staff 011 policy, covering the years 1921-23.30 They are in the context o f the
issues now being discussed, and help to explain much of the background for
Trenchard’s expressed concern.
The original Treaty period was for twenty years, which should have
been enough time for the Iraq army to become efficient, especially if the
Levies were absorbed into the Iraq army with their British officers.
However, the reduction of a twenty-year to a four-year period by a
Military Protocol in the Treaty, was signed 011 30 April 1923. This caused the
Air Staff to urge that British officers with executive powers be accepted into
the Iraq army, as quickly as possible, to improve that army’s efficiency. The
Air Staff also felt that Iraq’s expenditure 011 defence should exceed 25 per
cent of revenue. This was also agreed by the High Commissioner, Iraq, and by
London, with the proviso that it did not prejudice Iraq’s financial obligations
to Britain.
The Air Staff could not accept a further reduction o f the imperial
garrison, unless the British officers were quickly accepted for the Iraq army in
 188

an executive capacity. If this proved impossible, then they required to be

informed immediately.
In the context of Trenchard’s letter of 18 December 1923, on the
matter of reducing punitive air action in Iraq, an Air Staff Memorandum of
December 192331 to Air H.Q. Iraq on the same subject, said:
The stated object was: in order to carry out the policy of the
Government, for the evacuation of the Imperial Garrison, in four
years time, the question of the efficiency of Local Forces is all
important. Certain principles, although already understood bear
repetition— and must be vigorously applied.

The message was that bombing as a means of punishment should be

treated as a last resort and that therefore “all punishment of recalcitrant tribes
should be carefully scrutinised”. Where possible, every effort was to be made
to mete out punishment by other methods without resorting to air action.
Because British officials are greatly reduced in outlying districts,
reliability of information on the tribes, is questionable. The degree of
punishment is based on this information, and most careful scrutiny of
all applications is therefore necessary.

There can be little doubt that bombing, as a form of reprisal or

punishment, could be highly controversial, especially with regard to Britain’s
position vis-a-vis the League of Nations. However, the burning o f villages and
destruction of crops, together with the seizure of livestock by ground troops
was effective, but slow, and therefore costly. Also, in the matter of frontier
incursions, or inter-tribal fracas, it was too slow to prevent a possibly very
serious incident, which might spread. Internal security methods o f the period
had to take all these matters into careful consideration before authority was
given for such action by aircraft.
In the context of the ground troops most likely to be called for punitive
action among other internal security work, were the Levies. The composition
of the Levies by the end of 1923, is given in a report by the Levy
Commandant to the A.O.C. on 15 December of that year.32 Then the Levy
Forces at his disposal were:

30 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F. 125.
31 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F .166.
32 A IR 2 3 /5 7 4 , F .274.
 189

* 1st Levy Pack Battery * 1st Battalion

* lst Cavalry Regiment *2nd Battalion
*2nd Cavalry Regiment 3rd Battalion
3rd Cavalry Regiment Iraq Levy Depot.

Dobbin stated he was unable to submit a report on the 4th Battalion

until after three months, because the personnel (then Assyrians) had been
employed “solely on building” over the last three months. It will be
remembered that this was the old Sulaimaniah Kurdish battalion, which had
disintegrated after Shaikh Mahmud was re-established in the district; and it
was being re-formed with new Assyrian recruits. Some money had been
allocated with which to try and improve some of the appalling Levy
accommodation.
In another point perhaps worthy of note, it appeared an air staff officer
had ticked (shown thus*) a number of units listed above, leaving others
unmarked. The latter may have been subjects for amalgamation or future
disbandment because of lack of money.
The year 1924 began with a conference, held at the Colonial Office on
3 January,33 where agreement was reached on a number of issues regarding
military policy in Iraq. (Those in attendance were not listed, except for the
Chairman, the Duke of Devonshire.) Decisions were taken as follows:
a. The Colonial Office agreed that it was essential to have British
executive officers in the Arab Army. But this provision could not
be inserted in the military agreement. The reasons being, lack of
time and political undesirability. However, every effort would be
made to achieve it, as it was essential to improve the efficiency of
the army, before expiry of the four-year Treaty. The High
Commissioner, together with the A.O.C. of Iraq, would be
telegraphed to this effect, and urged to make strong
representations.

b. Colonial Office agreed that every effort should be made to increase

the strength of the local forces up to 14,000 or 15,000 as early as
possible. The A.O.C. to be informed of this decision.

c. The vexed question of the wording of Article 8 (of the Treaty) was
considered, and a compromise of the wording, as follows, was
agreed: “That neither Government shall undertake any military
operations without previous consultation and agreement with the

33 A IR 2/1450, F .l l.
 190

other Government”. The A.O.C. Iraq should also be urged to

accept it.

d. Agreement was also reached on some other points (not

mentioned), but included the disbandment of the Arab Levy
Battalion (the 1st Marsh Arab Battalion) should be postponed.

(This was taken from the Minute Sheet which, according to the initials,
was signed by Shuckburgh, and addressed to C.A.S.)
In an attempt to clarify the continued discussions on the fate of the 1st
Levy Marsh Arab Battalion, the following points may be recalled. Firstly, it
was agreed Arabs would not be enlisted for service in the Levies in order not
to deprive the Iraq army of recruits. However, the army did not enlist
tribesmen, and the Marsh Arabs were of this group. Therefore, the army was
not being deprived of men. Secondly, the 1st Battalion had developed a
history of service while in Nasiriyah. From the remnants of Major Eadie’s
“Muntafiq Horse” they became Captain Dickson’s “Nasiriyah Arab Scouts”
(the N.A.S.). Thirdly, they were considered one of the finest of the Levy
battalions and finally, the area of the “Muntafiq” was restless and rather
volatile; therefore, in the interest of internal security, it was desirable that the
resident force comprised men of that area. These were more than sufficient
reasons for the A.O.C. to wish to maintain the unit.
Having attempted to clarify the position of the last Arabs in the Levies,
it is now proposed to discuss the immediate Assyrian situation because they
now formed the bulk of the Levy Force.
An interesting Confidential Report, passed by the High Commissioner
Iraq to the Colonial Office, and then passed on to the Foreign Office on 5
January 1924, was headed “Note on Assyrian Refugees”.34 (The author was
Air Staff intelligence.) It is important because it indicates the British policy of
connecting the settlement of the Assyrians with the attempt to acquire an
adequate Turkish-Iraq frontier settlement. The report stated: “Recent enquiries
go to show that influences are at work trying to exploit the somewhat natural
discontent among the Assyrians”. This
.. .anxiety is reflected in high Assyrian quarters, where there is now a
distinct feeling that they can no longer trust the British, and that the

34 FO 371/10088, F .l l.
 191

latter are quite capable of being willing to hand back the Assyrian
country, if not the whole Mosul Vilayet, to the Turks, while
continuing to deny any such intention.

This,
.. .is, of course, aggravated by the Arab Assyrian feeling, which goes
so far as to say that the Assyrians, assisted by the levies, are planning
to seize the Mosul Vilayet for themselves.

Further, it had been openly stated by responsible Assyrians that:

“ ...the French have strongly invited the nation [Assyrian], including the
levies, to immigrate bag and baggage to their mandatory area”. The arrival in
Beirut of Captain Ducrocq, who was interested in the project, and Agha Petros
in Paris (the latter no doubt presenting the Assyrian case to the French),
showed that at least the rumours had some foundation. These reported
Assyrian assertions, it will be seen, expressed a desire for an Assyrian-
Chaldean state, which strongly appealed to the French. Furthermore, reports
from Mosul stated it was known that the Persian Consul in Mosul, who had
held appointments in Bolshevik Russia and had a Russian wife, was in
correspondence with the Bolshevik Minister in Tehran. The latter had been
active in trying to induce the Assyrians in Mosul to return to Urmia or Russia,
promising them assistance from the Bolshevik Consulate in Kermanshah. If
all was to be believed, subversive intrigue was rife. It will be shown, in due
course, that at least some of these seeds o f Levy subversion came to fruition.
Next, the Secretary of State for the Colonies wrote to the High
or

Commissioner Iraq on 19 January 1924 on “ 1. The Question o f Assyrians”.

He concurred with the suggestion that Assyrians of Persian origin should be
returned to Persia. Also, the Foreign Office was being consulted on the
appointment of a British vice-consul to Urmia; and “2. His Majesty’s
Government propose at forthcoming frontier negotiations to press in any case,
as regards the Assyrian area.. .for the ‘extreme limit’ frontier proposed in your
secret despatch of the 18th October”. This was for “making provision for all
Assyrian communities” in northern Iraq.
It appears that the real intention was to use the settlement of the
Assyrian refugees (especially the mountaineers of the Hakkiari, then mostly
 192

serving in the Levies), who could not return to their homelands in Turkey, as a
political lever to achieve the best possible settlement with Turkey on the
question o f Iraq’s northern frontier. The pertinent extract reads:
Our case before the League o f Nations would be greatly strengthened
if it could be shown that sufficient territory would be available within
proposed frontier for ultimate settlement of all Assyrians; including
those communities scattered outside Iraq at present.

Under paragraph 3 it was stated, “It would not be possible for any
section of Assyrian community to be supplied with arms by His Majesty’s
Government”. Also, that if Assyrian settlements in Iraq were to be armed, this
could only be done as part of an organised defence scheme by the Iraq
government. However, Assyrians intending to settle outside the frontier of
Iraq could not be armed by either government (namely, Britain or Iraq). This
would apply to those being returned to Persia, for example. Nevertheless,
Assyrians, on completion of two years service with the Levies, were being
armed, as may be recalled at the Dohulc meeting.
The High Commissioner was requested to press the Iraq government to
settle Assyrians on the lines proposed above:
under loose Iraq control and to provision o f enough land for
accommodation, if and when they come, for further returning
Assyrians.... The Iraq Government should be told:

a. That from a diplomatic standpoint best and perhaps only prospect

of securing strategically defensible and really satisfactory frontier
for Iraq is afforded by this.

b. That Iraq would secure excellent military material for defence of

northern frontier by settlement of Assyrians.

c. That there is risk, if the Assyrians are not satisfied with their
treatment by Iraq, of their being tempted to throw in their lot with
the French or the Turks.

d. That we expect Iraq Government 011 general grounds to give us

assistance in doing what we can for a people to whom we are
under obligation for services rendered during the war.

During research in the primary sources it is rare to find the British

government expressing such a truth as at (d) above, in writing. Many senior

35 FO 371/10088, F.37.
 193

officers had expressed their thanks and admiration for the efforts of those
known as “the brave little people”. Nevertheless, in this case the stakes were
quite high in the British interest. Because if the Assyrians left Iraq, then
Britain would have lost the manpower source for the Levies, which was vital
for the British plan for the immediate control of Iraq. The settlement of the
Assyrians was a lever to be used in negotiations concerning the Turkish-Iraq
frontier.
In the same context, the Secretary of State for the Colonies telegraphed
the High Commissioner Iraq on 19 January,36 stating:
Would it not be possible to mitigate present unhealthiness of Dohulc
area in which it is proposed that Assyrians should be settled by
relatively inexpensive measures against malaria. Please ascertain to
what extent Iraq Government would be prepared to assist in such
measures.

Further, he (Devonshire) thought that a representative from the School

of Tropical Medicine in England could examine the problem, and that such a
mission should not cost more than £1,000, “ ...which might be regarded as
money well invested by Iraq Government”. There was no explanation why the
Iraq government should offer to finance the resettlement of Britain’s former
allies— although it was being pointed out to the Iraq government that they
should not miss the opportunity of having such excellent military material,
situated between themselves and the Turks, on their northern frontier.
This example, together with the following, shows the British
government’s parsimony being carried too far. It demonstrates how the Levies
(a) had their tactical and operational ability severely reduced; and (b) a
considerable portion of Iraq’s civilian livestock was at risk.
The latter refers to a :”Veterinary Memorandum” of 5 March 1924,37
issued by the Director of Civil Veterinary Services Baghdad. It stated:
I wish to call your attention to the fact that practically every
Squadron of the Levy Force has for more than a year, until recently
been kept in working isolation, on account o f their animals being
infected with “Epizootic Lymphangitis” [glanders].

36 FO 3 7 1 /1 0 0 8 8 , F.164.
37 AIR 23/574, F.181,
 194

At present, the Levies have no British Veterinary Officer. Only one

Indian Veterinary Assistant remains to do the work of the whole
Force— an impossible task.

(Indeed it was, spread as they were over northern Iraq.)

I shall be enforced to prohibit the movement of any Levy horse or
mule within the boundaries of Iraq...their being a source of serious
danger to the health of the animals of the Civil Community, to the
Police force, and to the Iraq Army.

Locally, this must have been devastating to British prestige.

Having dealt with the immediate Assyrian situation, with all its
implications for the morale and, in turn, the reliability of the Levies, it is now
intended to discuss the same issues in relation to Levy Persian and Kurdish
personnel.
These matters are embodied in a letter from the Levy Commandant to
the A.O.C., British Forces Iraq, dated 31 March 1924.38 He claimed he
possessed no definite information as to disloyalty among Persian Kurds; but
he was of the opinion “ ...that their position (meaning an Iraq minority) and
racial tendencies, made them peculiarly liable to be influenced by hostile
propaganda”.
It was not easy to determine their exact international status, and their
enlistment was consequently liable to objection under Article 2 of the
Mandate. This point had been raised by the High Commissioner with the
former Inspector-General (Sadleir-Jackson) when the question of recruiting
Persian Kurds was vetoed by the High Commissioner. This decision had also
been concurred with by the A.O.C. The commandant was, therefore, issuing
instructions to that effect. Nevertheless, he considered the immediate
discharge of all Persian Kurds would be detrimental to morale, let alone
dislocation, in the units. Thus he would gradually eliminate them.
The letter concluded with the usual reference to funding. Because of
the financial cuts, he was unable to maintain the Force at its present strength
during 1924-25. In order to rationalise the enforced cuts in personnel (it may
be recalled that a reduction of 390 had been demanded, p. 177), he suggested
the following course of action: (a) The amalgamation of the 2nd and 3rd

38 Ibid.
 195

Cavalry Regiments. The newly-amalgamated Regiment H.Q. and one

squadron at Mosul, and the remaining two squadrons to be stationed at Arbil;
(b) the reduction of the cavalry to a two-regiment establishment, by the
gradual elimination of the Kurdish element, as suggested; (c) cavalry
personnel to be confined to Chaldeans for the present. (The three squadron
regiments replacing the more usual four.)
In the context of ethnic problems, the Levy Commandant had another
case to resolve. On 9 April 1924, he wrote to Air H.Q. on an unusual matter39
(this is the only case discovered). It concerned a letter in the Baghdad Times,
perhaps derogatory, about the Levies; or concerned the existing predicament
o f the stateless Assyrians. Its content was not mentioned in the
communication. The cutting had been sent on to the Commandant by Rab
Khaila David d’Mar Shimun, but is not on file.
The letter in question had been signed by “Mr. Nibbad”. In point of
fact, the letter was written by Mr. E. St. J. Hebbard, at that time employed by
Messrs. Orasdi Back, who was an ex-Levy British officer— a Company
Commander stationed at Aqra, and lately in the I.A.R.O. (Indian Army
Reserve of Officers). His services had been “terminated” in the summer of
1922 by the G.O.C.-in-C. because he had married an Assyrian woman, a
dependant of one of the men in his company. In those days this breach of
conduct could not be tolerated.
The Assyrian question arose again in an important letter from the
Acting High Commissioner Baghdad, to Prime Minister Jafar Pasha El
Aslcari, dated 2 April 1924.40 The letter reveals how the British government
proposed to use the “Assyrian Question” in their interests, by trying to ensure
the Assyrians remained in Iraq— available for enlistment in the Levies.
Further, the security of the northern frontier involved topographical
considerations to provide a suitable line for the defence of Mosul— the latter
issue was perhaps in the interests of both Iraq and Britain.
The letter had stated that the British government had the Assyrian
question under review for some time; not only because o f their services

39 AIR 23/574, F.162.

40 FO 371/jjo89t F.18.
 196

rendered and sacrifices made during the war, but also because of the
importance to Iraq of
...having on the Iraq side of the frontier and attached by gratitude
and loyalty to the Iraq State this small but warlike people and the
districts which they occupy. In negotiating the Mosul frontier, the
British Government is therefore disposed to press for the frontier to
be fixed as far north as possible so as to include the greater part of
the Assyrian people other than those that belong to Persian districts,
that is to say, so as to include the mountains occupied by the Taiyari,
Tkhuma and the Jelu and Baz tribes.

The advantage of this to the Iraq State need not be enlarged upon, but
His Majesty’s Government has also to consider the interests of the
Assyrians themselves, and it cannot support Iraq’s claim to the
extreme northern frontier unless it is assured, and can satisfy the
world, that the Iraq Government will do its part in assuring a
prosperous future to those Assyrians who will be settled within its
borders.

The letter referred to the Assyrian diaspora as follows;

From Persian territory 5,000 persons
From territory which was formerly Turkish and
which the British government proposed to claim
for Iraq 14,000 persons
From Turkish territory not to be claimed for Iraq 6.000 persons
Total, men, women and children 25.000

It was claimed that some 7,500 Assyrians had found their own way
back to the Taiyari and Tkhuma country, most of whom would return if the
border region was assigned to Iraq. Those Assyrians in Persia would also be
pressed to return to northern Iraq.
Another incentive was offered to encourage the Prime Minister of Iraq
to accept the plan:
Lastly, looking still farther ahead to the time for the admission of
Iraq to the League of Nations, what better proof could she offer of
her ability and desire to deal justly and wisely with persons of
different race and faith than to point to a friendly and satisfied body
o f Assyrians settled within her borders?

Regardless of these subtle political machinations, it would have been

better had the British kept in closer touch with the patriarchal family while
planning what might, or might not, be done for the resettlement of the tribes.
At this juncture, it will be shown that the Assyrians contrived to upset the
situation.
 197

In the meantime, on 7 May 1924, the Secretariat of the High

Commissioner passed to the A.O.C.41 the approved Budget for the Iraq Levies
for the financial year 1924-25; this was £580,000. The Treasury stated that
expenditure was for 87 lakhs, and subject to “such modifications” as were
required to meet the following charges, “while keeping the expenditure within
the sterling figure of £580,000”, detailed below:
a. Revised medical organisation
b. Disbandment of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment
c. Possible appreciation of the rupee
d. Movement of units
e. Non-effective charges
f. Extraordinary expenditure, resulting from the Ruwanduz operation,
as will not be covered by the amount provided to meet that
expenditure during the current financial year.
g. Any expenditure incurred in 1923-24, which has not been accepted
during that year, pending receipt of further explanations.

It also had to cover a temporary house allowance for British other

ranles of Rs.45 per month. (Their tentage had been reported by Meinertzhagen
as “rotting”.)
However, if the content of these financial restrictions can be
understood, it appeal's to imply from item (f) above “Extraordinary
Expenditure”, that if, for example, the Commandant had to put down trouble
in Iraqi Kurdistan, the cost of those operations would be set as a charge
against his budget. The order that the limit of £580,000 could not be exceeded
would seem to imply this. If so, then the financial imposition was hardly
rational in view of the whole purpose of the Force, which was to maintain
internal security in a turbulent emerging country.
Although there had been much correspondence on the burgeoning of
Assyrian fears for their future, which could cause serious unrest, it would
appeal' that little had been done to allay the fears o f the local populations in
the Mosul Vilayet, or in Kurdistan, on the anticipated influx of Assyrians into
the region, and rumours were rife.
The following disturbance concerns the local population of Kirkuk. In
May 1924, the 2nd Battalion of the Levies was stationed, with their families,
in Kirkuk, during the operations in Sulaimaniah. By 4 May, only two

41 AIR 23/574, F.91.

 198

companies remained. There had been enmity between the townsfolk and the
Levies (Kurds with the Assyrians), and on seeing the bulk o f the battalion
reduced, the locals stalled to intimate how they would deal with the Assyrian
women when all Levies had departed.
A fracas was reported in the bazaar at 9.30 a.m., and a native officer
with the Regimental Police went to clear any Assyrians from the area. They
brought back two wounded Levies, and reported the bazaar clear o f troops. By
then, the remainder of the depleted battalion were on parade under their
company officers. The men were told that shopkeepers who had caused the
trouble, would be arrested and tried. The men were instructed not to cause
further trouble, and the town was placed “out of bounds”. A Regimental
Police piquet was posted on the bridge leading to the town.
Nevertheless, on leaving the parade the men had to pass a tea-booth
(chai-khana) from where the occupants shouted some offensive remarks. The
men rushed the place, breaking it up, together with the contents. They then ran
to cross the bridge, overcoming the resistance of the police piquet. They
pressed on, only to be fired on from the town and suffered casualties. Some
Levies then stormed back to the camp, returning to the town with rifles and
ammunition. They captured a large house on the edge o f town and started
firing in all directions from the roof.
British and native officers caught as many men as they could,
disarmed them and put them under guard in camp. By then, four Levies and
one Arab employee had been killed, and seven Levies wounded. The
townsfolk of Kirkuk suffered some fifty killed. The Levy Commandant, who
was in Baghdad at the time, was telegraphed about the events, and arranged
for British armoured cars from Mosul to move to Kirkuk. In the meantime, a
British officer went into the township, and by moving from house to house
under fire, managed to collect small parties of the men as he went. Eventually,
he recovered some eighty men and three native officers, whom he returned to
the fort, together with around a hundred Christian civilians. By 5.00 p.m. all
was quiet, and a platoon of the Royal Innisldlling Fusiliers arrived, and took
over the fort.
The situation remained critical, with feelings bitter and running high.
On the 6th, the remnants of the battalion, together with their families, were
 199

marched away towards Chemchemal. The column consisted o f 23 old men,

404 women and 172 children, escorted by two Levy companies, using any
transport, including that acquired on the march. On the evening of the 7th,
they were at Qara Anjir, when Kurds attacked one of the piquets— but were
driven off.
The march resumed next morning, and the Kinds attacked the Levy
column from all sides, and continued firing on them until it was three miles
from Chemchemal. The column had lost one man killed and one missing. The
attacking Kurds were fired on by aircraft, and at one point, the Levies
managed to get to close quarters with their attackers, killing fifteen of them—
their bodies were later taken to Kirkuk. A court of enquiry was held, and those
Levies found guilty of the violent fracas were punished. No details of a court
martial are available. In mitigation, it was agreed they had been under great
pressure.
The consequences of the affair are important. A Foreign Office
Minute, dated 8 May 1924,42 stated:
Transmits copy of telegram of May 6th from Baghdad informing that
Council of Ministers have accepted proposals for settlement of
Assyrians north of Mosul, but massacre perpetrated by Assyrian
Levies at Kirkuk has changed situation.

This was followed by the following comment in manuscript:

The Assyrians will only have themselves to thank if the ultimate
solution of the problem is not to their liking. The massacre will
doubtless make the Iraq Govt, loath to commit itself in favour of the
formation of a quasi autonomous Assyrian unit, and the effect of this
will be to weaken Sir P. Cox’s hand at Constantinople....

The general tenor of Assyrian concern for their future is, to a certain
extent embodied in the following extract of a letter from the Levy
Commandant to Air H.Q, of 25 June 1924,43 regarding a petition from
Assyrian officers of the 4th Levy Battalion. The extract reads:
The opinions expressed therein, are general throughout the Assyrian
Levies. They are due not only to distrust of the Iraq Government, but
also fear of a combined Turkish-Persian and Kurdish attack against
them, which they expect will occur on the British departure, and

42 FO 3 7 1 /1 0 0 8 9 , F .l.
43 A IR 2 3 /5 7 4 , F.43.
 200

against which they could not hope to compete without British

assistance.

It is perhaps useful to enlarge on the situation resulting from the

“Kirkuk Massacre”, because further trouble of this nature in 1924 had yet to
occur. The discussion now considers Foreign Office extracts from a letter
received from the Rev. E.W. McDowell and Mr. R.E. Speer, of 3 July 1924.44
The following extract read;
Word has just come from Tiary to the effect that a Turkish army has
appeared in the neighbourhood of Julamerk.... Certain Kurdish
chiefs are in conference with the Turks in Julamerk. The Turks refuse
to grant any of the Mosul territory to Sir Percy. The arm y...is in
sufficient strength to warn the English to keep hands off. We may
expect them, therefore, to push as far south as the English will allow
them at this time. This will probably mean the whole o f Tiary and
Tkhmna [territory?].... It is probably one of the chief purposes of
that Turkish army to sweep all the Tiarians and Tkhomians out of the
mountains.

You will have noted that the treaty between Iraq and England was
signed in Baghdad recently, but only after prolonged opposition on
the part of the Iraq Mejlis Assembly. Two clippings from the
Baghdad Times will indicate something of the temper o f both sides.

Reference is then made to the “Kirkuk Massacre”.

The Iraq Assembly demanded the removal of all the Assyrians from
their territory, and especially the Assyrian army [the Levies]. The
Government had to confess that they could not dispense with the
services of the Christian army in defending Iraq from the Turks.

But the incident [“Kirkulc Massacre”] proves conclusively the utter

impossibility of the Assyrians dwelling anywhere in this land without
the presence of the English.... The Arab is as bitter an enemy of the
Assyrians as the Turk and just as dangerous, but he is depending
upon these Assyrians to save him from the Turk. That once done, the
Arab will turn on the Assyrian and rend him.

(A prophecy which materialised in August 1933.)

This letter raised the question of whether the British government ever
sought the opinions of the “men on the ground”. Had they done so, and
perhaps listened to their advice, many such political cul-de-sacs might have
been avoided.

44 FO 371/10089, F.100.
 201

The real fear of the Assyrians for their future is aired in a letter from
Air Staff Intelligence to the C.S.O., dated 4 July 1924,45 stating:
The Assyrians have realised for some time past, that owing to the
hostile attitude to Muslims generally, which they adopted during the
wax-; it would be practically impossible for them [the Assyrians] to
occupy their former homes without strong British backing.... The
policy recently announced to them by the High Commissioner has
been received with the greatest dismay.... They fear that in many
ways they will have fewer privileges than they enjoyed under the
Turks who at least allowed them a certain amount of semi­
independence.

Some of the main points also commented on were:

1. No guarantee that the mountain districts of Tiari-Tkhuma-Jilu and
Baz will not be ceded by Turkey,.
2. The deserted lands, the property of the Iraq Government North of
Dohuk are rumoured to be waterless and unhealthy.
3. The payment of regular taxes to the Iraq Government, as opposed
to the old system of a yearly tribute free from Turkish supervision.
4. No official recognition of the Patriarch and Maliks.
5. Non-exemption from service in the Iraq Army.

Emigration is now regarded as the only solution to an impossible

situation.

There followed some hoped for destinations, for example, Canada and
Cyprus (the Greek Orthodox Church being sympathetic to them).
The Assyrian situation in early 1924 was highly problematic, and in
turn, their problems were, in reality, those of the High Commissioner and
A.O.C. Together with the imperial garrison, the Assyrian Levies formed the
only ground troops under the direct command of the A.O.C. There was also
the anomaly of the 1st Levy Battalion Marsh Arabs during this difficult
political period in Iraq.
The Assyrians were becoming increasingly restive and fractious. From
all the documents reviewed, it is clear' their lot was not an easy one. Few
months went by without them being involved in operations in which they
suffered casualties, fighting people (Kurds in particular) with whom it was
suggested they were to live cheek by jowl in the near future when the fighting
was over.

45 AIR 2/1450, F.34.

 202

Also as discussed, the future of the Assyrians, as a people, had become

increasingly uncertain. British hopes on the subject were unrealistic for the
long term. Their pay as mercenaries was poor, with bad accommodation for
themselves and their families— the latter living four families to a tent. They
were well-officered, but there was little the British officers could do for the
comfort and welfare of them men and dependants—the British Treasury cared
little for what it could not see nor understand. But their excessive meanness
usually led to more expense than it ever saved, as has yet to be shown.
On 6 July 1924, there was another “near call”,46 this time in Mosul. At
about 10.15 a.m., a row took place in the meat bazaar between two Muslim
shopkeepers. As it was getting serious, the Assyrian Levies in the bazaar
started to return to their camp in accordance with Standing Orders.
As they returned to camp, a mob of townspeople, ignorant of the
source of the trouble, pursued the Levies, assaulting them with sticks and
stones. “However, all returned to camp in an orderly manner.” Levy casualties
in this incident were two seriously injured, and eight Levies and one Assyrian
civilian slightly injured. This was a good example of the discipline which
could be achieved with these “hot-headed” troops.
While the Assyrians feared for their future, and their presence was
causing local resentment in the Mosul wilayat—the concerns o f both parties—
being born of ignorance, the progress of the Iraq army was under review.
On 26 June 1924, a conference was held at the Colonial office on “The
Proposed Increase of 2,000 men for the Iraq Army 47 (It may be recalled that
the Iraq government had to obtain British Treasury permission for
expenditure, because of the Ottoman Debt.) Representatives were;
Shuckburgh and Meinertzhagen, Air Commodore Steel, Colonel Joyce (Iraq
army), Squadron-Leader Graham, Mr. Vernon and Mr. Headlam. Joyce
proposed that the sooner new units were formed, the sooner greater efficiency
would be obtained by the end of the Treaty period. Further,
...The Iraq Army will be sufficiently efficient to maintain internal
security against Arab tribes. They would be a doubtful quantity
against the Turk but in 10 to 20 years they should be all right for

46 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F.27.
47 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F .236.
 203

defence against external aggression as by that time the Army will

have a reserve built up.

D.C.A.S. stated, “ ...if Iraq Army is increased there will be no money

left for Iraq Government to take over Levies”. Meinertzhagen said, “...Iraq
Government would not take over the Levies, officered by British”.
Shuckburgh said that the need for a 2,000 increase in the Iraq army
was agreed, but with some reduction in the Levies, as the new Iraq Army units
were efficient. He also urged the disbandment of the 1st Levy Arab Battalion,
as their work could be done by the Iraq Army. (This only proved he did not
understand the need for tribesmen in the area of Nasiriyah— desirability for
like policing like.)
The D.C.A.S. countered, saying, “It must not be thought that levies
should be disbanded, simply because the Arab Army was being increased”.
In the writer’s opinion, the meeting was little more than a farce, as
problems clearly expounded in Trenchard’s letter to the Secretary of State for
the Colonies of December 1923 (p. 185) had not been addressed. However, it
has been included as a means of emphasising the apparently casual and ill-
informed way important issues of Iraq were being dealt with in London.
Nothing had been achieved.
This is an example of the lack of co-ordination between London and
the British executive in Iraq, at a time of considerable British perplexity in the
country— the following provides ample proof of “the left hand not knowing
what the right was doing”.
Concern was created by a telegram to the High Commissioner Iraq
from the Colonial Office, dated 8 August 1924, calling for the cessation of
the issue of a rifle and ammunition to Levies on their discharge after two
years service. The High Commissioner responded, explaining that the order
would “ ...upset the whole morale of the levies at this critical juncture, and
involves breach of expressed terms of enlistment”. Also, that in November
1922 at Dohuk, the new defence scheme was communicated to the Assyrian
chiefs, and the privilege was categorically promised them. Therefore, urgent
reconsideration was requested.

48 AIR 2/1450, Fs.81, 80 and 63.

 204

The Levy Commandant then telegraphed the Colonial Office the next
day, pointing out that on taking command, he had renewed the promise in a
final effort to dissuade the Levies from taking their discharge; to this Cox and
Salmond agreed. The Assyrians were serving on the formal understanding,
that “If the pledge is repudiated enlistment of all Assyrian personnel, who
must presumably be offered their discharge with the option of re-enlistment
on new terms, will automatically terminate”.
Dobbs, the High Commissioner, was 011 leave when this commotion
began. He wrote a D.O. to Young at the Colonial Office, pointing out the
following: Assyrians could purchase rifles from savings on discharge; Iraq
was full of rifles of all kinds, but with little uniformity of type. With regard to
ammunition for British rifles, this was less easy to come by in Iraq, unlike
ammunition for other types of rifle. Discharged Levies would be no less a
menace to the Turks, but there would be no British responsibility for their
armament.
Further, he deprecated the prohibition 011 the engagement of new
recruits at the present moment while the result of the frontier question with
the League of Nations was yet unknown. The proposed edict would certainly
be interpreted by Mosul Christians and population as a sign that we were
expecting to have to abandon the Mosul province and the Assyrian mountains
to the Turks, and a very unsettling effect produced. He felt that the League
might insist on a plebiscite, and anything throwing doubt on our desire to
retain the whole area for Iraq should be avoided.
He continued by saying that if the result of the League’s decision gave
the Assyrian mountains to Turkey, then the whole Assyrian question would
change, and so would the question of their armament. O 11 the other hand, if we
gained the frontier we desired for Iraq, and the Iraq government carried out
the generous policy towards the Assyrians which it had officially accepted to
do, and took over the Assyrian Levies as a frontier force, as it was then
inclined to do, then their armament question would have to be reconsidered.
Finally, he felt that after the frontier question had been settled, the
cessation of the practice would not affect recruiting. However, before the
frontier settlement it would imply that we intended to abandon the Assyrians.
 205

Regardless of this correspondence, Ramsay MacDonald decided to

enter the fray, with a letter 011 8 September 1924, addressed to the Colonial
Office.49 He appreciated the force o f Dobbs’ contentions (these were
enumerated), nevertheless, the Treaty obligations with the Turks required, as
far as possible, that “ ...no direct British responsibility for the discharged
Levies being in possession of arms”.
MacDonald continued with his view that “unfortunate consequences”
might occur if the practice ceased immediately— this was noted, and it would
therefore be preferable to take no action until the League’s decision was
known. However, if the League decided to make enquiries on the spot or hold
a plebiscite, all of which might cause considerably delay, then
During this period His Majesty’s Government are bound by the
Treaty of Lausanne to do nothing to disturb the status quo and the
danger of such disturbance will inevitably increase...proportionately
as the number of armed ex-levies increases.

But because of the grave consequences anticipated by Dobbs, Ramsay

MacDonald had “reluctantly agreed not to press for the immediate and total
cessation of the existing practice”.
But this aspect of the matter could not be held to relieve H.M.G. o f the
duty to take some immediate measures, as the Turks had officially
complained, regarding the “provision of arms to Christian natives”. The
matter was to be farther discussed with Dobbs, prior to his return to Iraq.
The Air Council then took up this subject, writing to the Colonial
Office on 23 September 1924.50 They had not yet been informed o f the period
of grace allowed above. They stated:
In view of the serious situation which may develop if the incursion of
the Turks is not completely stopped at once; the Air Council view
with some alarm the withholding of this permission (gift of rifle and
ammunition) without prior consultation with themselves, and desire
to bring the following considerations before the Secretary of State for
the Colonies.

Their concerns were, first, that the garrison in Iraq was insufficient,
and was never intended to secure Iraq from an invasion; this had been
emphasised repeatedly. On the occasion of the last threat, permission was

49 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F.39.
50 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F.44.
 206

given to raise a corps of local camelry to assist in dealing with any Turkish
invasion (this was not implemented).
Secondly, in view of the changed theatre of immediate operations, the
Council considered local inhabitants should be armed and organised to resist
an invasion. This did not suggest the force should invade Turkish territory, the
intention being that most vigorous action should be taken against any Turkish
incursions over the boundary.
Thirdly, in view of the unsettled state of the country, Mosul could at
any time be fraught with grave danger to the garrison, followed by similar
eruptions in others places, such as Sulaimaniah district. It could add very
seriously to the problem of extricating such forces.
Fourthly, the Air Council desired to make it clear they did not view the
situation with undue anxiety if absolute freedom was given to the A.O.C. to
take vigorous action by all means in his power. But they were convinced this
permission must be given before the situation developed, and it would then be
too late.
In the light of the continued Turkish threat of aimed incursion, and
even of invasion, and the then current attempts to counter such actions, it is
necessary to assess the strength of the ground forces in Iraq in August 1924,
which was:
Iraq army 6,300
Iraq Levies 4,700
Imperial troops 3.400
Total 14.400

From these figures it may be seen that the Cairo Conference estimate
for the combined strengths of the Levies and the Iraq army o f 15,000 during
the last four years of withdrawal of the imperial garrison, had not been met.
Also, in the four-year period, the Iraq army was supposed to gain in efficiency
so as to allow the programmed reduction of the imperial garrison. Trenchard
and the A.O.C. considered that this necessary military excellence would not
be achieved in the period allowed. Therefore, the Levy’s strength should have
been at 7,500 and that of the Iraq army the same—regardless of who paid. The
RAF would also have to continue to support these ground troops until such
time as an Iraq air force could be established to take over.
 207

Issues connected with Iraq were becoming increasingly complex. The

Kamalists in the postwar period were prepared to resort to any means to
maintain national prestige in the face of those perceived as their former
enemies. The Iraqi nationalists felt their government was in the British pocket.
The country was also divided between townsmen, villagers and tribesmen.
The Kurds wanted independence in some form, but failed to speak with one
voice. The Assyrians were divided into mountaineers/herdsmen and
plainsmen/cultivators; the former provided the best material for the Levies,
but both had lost their homelands and were expressing a “refugee complex”.
All parties held suspicions regarding British intentions concerning them.
In the same context, it is proposed to enlarge 011 the subject o f frontier
incursions, as viewed by the Air Council above.
Because Shaikh Mahmud refused to leave Sulaimaniah the township
was bombed in July, and occupied by units of the Iraq army, together with
some British armoured cars. Mahmud retired to Barzinjar. From the time of
the occupation of Sulaimaniah, operations against Mahmud began, and were
to last for the next three years.
It may be recalled that some Assyrians of the Upper Tiari and Tkhuma
people had managed to infiltrate back into their old homes inside Turkish
territory. Some time in August 1924, the Turkish Wali of Julamerk, while
touring his district with his escort, accidentally came into contact with some
of these Assyrians. Some firing took place, and the w aifs baggage was seized
by the Assyrians. On being informed of the affair, the Turkish government
decided to take action.
On 13 September 1924, a Turkish force crossed the Hazil river and
appeared to threaten Zakho. The following day, they were attacked by British
aircraft. On the 18th, the Turks attacked Bersivi, some nine miles north-east
o f Zakho. At this juncture, the A.O.C. placed the Levy Commandant in
command of Mosul, Zakho and Amadiya.
There were also ready Levy detachments in Amadiya, which were:
One company, 3rd Levy Battalion
One company, 4th Levy Battalion
One section of machine-guns (two guns).
 208

By chance, Levy Colonel Barke was on inspection at Amadiya and

took command of the township. It was rumoured that the Turks had advanced,
and because small arms and artillery fire was heard near Ashita, Barke sent
two platoons under a British office to Ain D ’Nuni.
On the 17th, Barke moved to Ain D ’Nuni with the remainder of his
scratch force, but leaving two platoons at Amadiya. The same day, the Turks
crossed the Khabur river near Merga, and fired on a British air reconnaissance
patrol east of Chellek.
Some Irregular Assyrians51 were at Ain D ’Nuni, and were able to help
hold up the Turks; but being concerned for their families, they returned to
Bebadi. The colonel’s small force was now isolated, with Turks in front and
011 his left flank. On the 18th, Barke moved his scratch force to Benawi,
where he was joined by 70 Irregular Assyrians under a native officer.
It is assumed that these “Irregular Assyrians” were perhaps receiving
some financial support from a fund which had been granted to the A.O.C.
some time in September, for raising a “Frontier Camel Corps”. They were
therefore armed settlers with their families. The safety of the latter would have
been their first concern. Perhaps some o f them were ex-Levies.
As well as the problem of the Turks, there was concern for what action
the Berwari Bala Kurds might take in supporting the Turkish attack. They had
caused much trouble during the insurrection in 1919. On the 19th, news was
received in Constantinople that Turkish police were in action against brigands
who had attacked the Wali of Julamerk—but subsequently proof was obtained
that the police were supported by troops.
The RAF bombed the Turks at Hauris, but the Turks took Ashita. The
refugees from there came into Ain D ’Nuni, where Barke was with his mixed
force. Fie had left the native officer with the 70 Irregular Assyrians in Benawi.
In response to a signal from Barke, Levy H.Q. ordered two more companies
of the 3ld Battalion from Diana to Amadiya, and a company from the 4th
Battalion took over Diana on the 20th. Two 3ld Battalion platoons under a
British officer also left Mosul for Dohuk.

51 J.G. Browne, The Iraq L evies 1915-32 (London, 1932), pp.39-42 and 48.
 209

The occupation of Ashita by the Turks had caused a general Assyrian

retreat of families from the Hakkiari area of the fighting and many, with their
maliks, took refuge in Ain D ’Nuni. After a meeting with these maliks, Barke
persuaded them to establish piquets towards Ashita with two platoons in
support. The RAF, in spite of artillery and rifle fire, bombed the Turks on
sight, enabling some Assyrians to occupy Zawitha village by 22 September.
A system of ground-to-air signalling,52 which had been developed
previously by means of canvas strips, was understood by all native officers
and N.C.Os, and proved invaluable in maintaining RAF support.
It will be appreciated from this introduction to the developing affair,
that the Levies were being marshalled into this frontier section as quickly as
possible, as the need developed. The terrain being mountainous, this took
considerable time. The Levy pack battery stalled for Amadiya on the 22nd,
escorted by a troop of the 1st Cavalry Regiment. The affair lasted until 11
October 1924. During this time, the Kurds of Hajji Rashid Beg (already
mentioned) had joined in helping the Turks, and the latter had driven the Tiari
from Naramik and occupied it. A letter from the High Commissioner Iraq was
delivered by a British captain to the Turks through their lines to Ora, where a
junior Turkish officer received it. The British officer was ordered to return to
his own lines.
There were two more incidents worthy of note, which perhaps help to
convey the flavour of this border clash. An RAF intelligence officer, together
with “Lady Surma” (aunt of the Patriarch), assembled 400 Irregulars for
Barke. She also harangued the maliks, calling upon them to fight the Turks.,
For her work she received the M.B.E. In an attack on the Turks holding
Hayas, the Bishop Mar Yoallaha handed his cassock to his deacon, seized a
rifle, and went into the attack with the Irregulars, pushing the Turks back, to
reoccupy Benawi, Mai, and Ain D’Nuni.
It is ironic that this affair occurred while Ramsay MacDonald was
seeking to end the gift of a rifle and 200 rounds to all Assyrians on
completion of two years service. By 23 September, authority was granted53 by
H.M.G., for

52 FO 371/5 2 2 9 , Fs. 149-51.

53 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F.37.
 210

...recent events may make it desirable to give as free a hand as

possible to the Air Officer Commanding to take military measures to
meet military demands. Authority... to issue rifles and
ammunition...to Assyrians organised for defensive purpose under
responsible British control.

Only a maximum of 2,000 Irregulars could be armed, and they were to

be organised and supervised. The financial allowance was £6,000, less arms
and ammunition.
An extract from a telegram from Trenchard to A.O.C. on 23
September 1924, stated, “In view of various serious questions involved, action
against invaders well inside our boundary should be reduced to a minimum”.
As soon as the problem of this Turkish incursion was behind them,
H.M.G. recommenced the pressure for cost-cutting in the Levies. The Levy
Commandant, in response to a letter from the Colonial Office demanding at
least the reduction in strength of the 1st Levy Battalion of Marsh Arabs, wrote
to the A.O.C. on 21 October on this subject54 in the following terms: “...it is
necessary at least as a temporary measure to shorten the period o f enlistment
and re-enlistment for the native ranks”. However, he baulked at the Financial
Secretary’s request that “ ...this period should be shortened from 2 years to 6
months”. The Commandant’s argument against this proposal was:
A similar experiment with the Assyrian units in 1922 proved an
absolute failure, the loss of confidence and keenness among the rank
and file and the impossibility of carrying out any form of continuous
training seriously affecting both the morale and efficiency o f the
troops.

Once again officials, apparently without any military experience, were

trying to impose their ideas, regardless of the effect they might have.
The Commandant suggested that the minimum period for enlistment or
re-enlistment might be one year; this he was prepared to attempt. However, he
pointed out that the disbandment of a cavalry regiment was enforced to meet
the economies considered necessary by the Colonial Office, without having to
disband or reduce the fighting strength of the 1st Battalion. Fie further stated
that he was in no position to pronounce on the possibility of the officers and
men of that battalion being prepared to serve in the Iraq army, which, he

54 AIR 2/1450, F.39.

 211

understood, was being contemplated by the Secretary of State and he strongly

recommended the retention of the battalion in view of the existing uncertain
situation. (The annual cost of the battalion was Rs. 8,52,053.)
The A.O.C’s response was a strongly worded letter to the High
Commissioner Iraq, dated 27 October,55 in which he considers "...that the
Commandant has gone rather too far in his efforts to meet the wishes o f the
Treasury”. The reduction to one year would entail loss of efficiency. Also, it
was out of the question to hand over the 1st Battalion to the Iraq army in view
of the latter’s state of inefficiency, and would “...dangerously deplete the
forces at his disposal”. He suggested the High Commissioner should send a
wire “urging” the enlistment period to remain at two years. (This action was
taken.)
The proposed reply to the above by the Colonial Office is on file in
draft form, dated November 1924,56 the essence of which was: as will be
recalled, the policy for the reduction of imperial troops was not proceeding as
quickly as originally planned. The longer imperial troops were in the country
in considerable force, the longer it would take the Iraq army to become
adequately efficient to maintain internal security. This was to be achieved
before the end of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty (the Military Protocol dictated four
years).
Finally, it was suggested that the 1st Battalion (Levy Marsh Arabs) be
transferred to the Iraq army to form the first of the new “exemplar” battalions,
the existence o f which, it was understood, had been agreed with King Feisal
and the prime minister.
Generally, it has been the practice of this work not to devote too much
space to details of the actual actions in which the Levies were involved, as
these are well covered by Browne; but to concentrate on the background and
circumstances which contributed to their commencement and continued
existence— cause and effect. Nevertheless, it is felt necessary to recount a
number of operations which illustrate certain events and the areas in which
they took place, as they help to indicate the problems of distance and type of
terrain over which the Levies had to operate.

55 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F.27.
56 A IR 2 /1 4 5 0 , F.35.
 212

An Air Staff Internal Minute of 27 November 1924 to C.A.S., signed

by C.S. Burnett,57 with enclosures, stated that the A.O.C. Iraq could neither
agree to the disbandment or less of the 1st Levy Battalion (of Marsh Arabs) to
the Iraq army, nor to the lowering of the Levy period of enlistment to one
year. Also, that the transfer of those Levies to the Iraq Army would not lead to
its improved efficiency. The battalion, as it stood, was “good value as an
exemplar battalion”. His repeated requests for British officers to be placed in
executive positions in the Iraq army had not been executed, and this was the
most effective way to its improved efficiency. Finally, the withdrawal o f the
Levy pack battery and an armoured car company was agreed, but on the
understanding that the 1st Levy Battalion remained. It was also time that the
newly-projected “exemplar battalions” were implemented, and that the
Colonial Office (which had again raised the issues), “must not expect too
many changes at once”.
The “enclosures” headed “Air Staff Notes on Garrison in Iraq” and
dated 15 December 1924, as mentioned above, compared the decisions taken
at the Cairo Conference, which merit inclusion at the end of 1924:
Cairo Conference Garrison Garrison 1923-24
One British Battalion One British Battalion
Three Indian Battalions Three Indian Battalions
1 Indian Pack Battery 1 Indian Pack Battery
(leaving)
8 Squadrons R.A.F. 8 Squadrons R.A.F.
4 to 6 Armoured Car Coys. 4 Armoured Car
Coys, (one leaving)
15,000 Local Forces 10,000 Local Forces

Thus, by 1st April 1925, the Force will be less; Indian Pack Bty, 1 to
3 Armoured Car Coys., and 4 to 5 thousand Local Forces; less than
laid down at Cairo. We are therefore ahead of the programme.

The Air Staff considered the minimum imperial garrison should be:
one British battalion; three Indian battalions; eight squadrons RAF; three
armoured car companies; and 5,000 Levies.
Together with the Iraq Army of 5,000, in its present state of
inefficiency, before further reductions can be considered, this Army
must have British Officers in executive control; and its strength
considerably increased.

57 AIR 2/1450, F.122A, inc.318-21.

 213

The estimates for 1925-26, show a saving of £660,000 for Iraq. It is

suggested that part of this sum, should be expended on furthering the
organisation of the Iraqi Forces, which is an essential part of our
policy of bringing up Iraq to look after itself.

The document continued with the need for three exemplar units in the
Iraq army, one for each arm, together with their British officers; and if paid
for by Britain, this would still leave a saving of £500,000, or 10 per cent of
that year’s cost of the imperial garrison. It pointed out that a transfer of Levy
units to the Iraq army would be a paper transaction; the local forces thereby
would not be increased, nor would it help the efficiency of the Iraq army (but
the British Exchequer was concerned only with transferring ail the costs it
could to the Iraq government’s pay roll). The document further stated:
Bricks cannot be made without straw and if we are going to keep the
binding material away from Iraq, the structure which we have started
will be certain to collapse. Such a collapse may take our small
garrison with it and at any rate it would mean that the expenditure of
ten years would have been tin-own away. We would not be able to
recover our position without the expenditure o f millions where
thousands would suffice at present.

The Summary, main points:

a. British Officers must be employed in executive control in the Iraq
Army.
b. His Majesty’s Government will have to spend money to assist the
organisation of the Iraq Army.
c. The Iraqi military forces cannot become efficient within four
years.

Regardless of the forthright and positive expositions by the Air Staff

on the problems faced by Britain in Iraq and of the logical remedies, the
Treasury and Colonial Office appeared to keep on representing their own
answers to the same problems, which in reality only replaced one problem
with another. If there was a weakness in the Air Staff remedies, it was the
demand for British officers to be placed in executive control of the Iraq army.
The Iraq government would not accede to this, and politically could not do so.
1924 had been a year of little progress in so far as Iraq’s capability of
maintaining internal security was concerned. Nor had the pacification of
Kurdistan been achieved. The defence against frontier incursions remained a
running sore.
 214

In the face of the continued foregoing problems, and the inability of

the Air Staff, Colonial Office and Exchequer to agree with each other’s
suggested solutions, the following document in the form o f a Cabinet
Memorandum 011 the “Defence of Iraq’, of 14 January 1925, by the Secretary
r o
of State for Air, is considered important. It presents a resume o f some o f the
issues on which the departments were still in contention over Iraq. It is a long
document, but discussion will be limited to only those areas directly affecting
the Levies.
It stated:
When my colleagues remember that at the Cairo Conference, twenty
years was the accepted period for the continuance o f the Imperial
garrison, they will realise the need for quick action, if in so short a
time as four years, Iraq is to be put into a position to maintain order
and to defend its own frontiers.

The policy of Bonar Law’s Cabinet, on which the Air Staff had
attempted to act, was the gradual substitution over a period o f years of local
defence forces for the imperial garrison. The C.A.S. gave a tentative estimate
on how this principle might be earned out. In his paper o f 15 February 1923,
he had presupposed three necessary conditions, namely:
a. That a satisfactory peace is concluded with Turkey before the 1st
April 1923 [this was not achieved]; and
b. That a stable policy is decided 011 forthwith to govern our relations
with Iraq, providing definitely for the continuance o f a measure of
British control; and
c. That Iraq revenues provide sufficient funds for the maintenance of
an efficient Arab Army or the formation of additional levies, or a
combination of these two measures.

He pointed out that “If these three assumptions are not fulfilled”, with
particular regard to (a) and (b), it should be clearly understood that the whole
programme will be correspondingly set back. None o f these three conditions
had been met.
Trenchard continued:
The peace with Turkey was not ratified until the 29th July 1924,
stability cannot be attained whilst the Mosul frontier question is still
open and the last 12 months have not been any material improvement
in the efficiency of the Arab A rm y...

58 A IR 2 /1 4 5 l,F s.2 6 9 -7 3 .
 215

Also, the High Commissioner for Iraq claimed “they have witnessed a
serious deterioration in Iraq for resources supporting it”.
It was the latter issue which was presented as the fulcrum for progress,
namely, “ ...that Iraq revenue provide sufficient funds for the maintenance of
an efficient Arab Army or the formation of additional levies, or a combination
of these two measures”. It was pointed out that,
If therefore, things go on as they are going on now, we shall be faced
in 1928 with the same dilemma that faced us in 1923, namely, the
continuance of heavy and unpopular commitments or the surrender of
the country to chaos and foreign intrigue.

It was accepted that the imperial forces in Iraq were as planned in

Cairo. But the strength of local forces, the Iraq army and the Levies, on which
further Imperial reductions depended, were 5,000 short of the total approved
at Cairo. Therefore, irrespective of Turkish incursions and Kurdish problems,
imperial reductions were on schedule. However,
... unless definite progress can be swiftly made with the improvement
of the local forces, no substantial reductions in the Imperial garrison
can be effected until the time arrives when all the Imperial units will
be simultaneously withdrawn.

The key to the situation, therefore, was seen as the strength and
efficiency of the local forces.
The document continued,
The local forces...are the Arab Army, paid out o f the Iraq revenues
and commanded by Iraq officers, and the Iraq Levies (mainly
Assyrians) paid by the British taxpayer and commanded by British
officers. The continuance of the dyarchy is contemplated under the
Military and Financial Agreements signed between the British and
Iraq Governments on the 30th April 1923. (Sic.)

There had been created a constant British demand for the disbandment
of the Levies, or at least their transfer to the Iraq army, where their cost would
be borne by Iraq.
Militarily, however, the weakening of the levies would delay still
further the creation of a self-supporting Iraq defence force. For not
only are the Assyrians better fighters than the Iraqis, but the levies
have the predominating advantage of being commanded by British
officers.
 216

It was therefore suggested that the problem should be resolved by

bringing the joint strength of the two forces up to 14,000 men, with as little
delay as possible, thus making them both equally efficient, “ ...without
penalising the Iraq Treasury”.
However, this objective solution still retained two thorny points, which
continued to persist. The British taxpayer would have to pay for some 2,000
more levies, and the Iraq army would have to consent to British officer
executive control. Also, this paper had a six-year detailed programme, to be
presented to the Bonar Law Cabinet, of which only the Levy element will be
discussed. It is not proposed to go into the suggested financial machinations
by which it was hoped Feisal could be inveigled into allowing British officers
to adopt executive command in the Iraq army.
Under “Iraq Levies”, the following was proposed:
The Iraq Levies to be transferred to the Iraq Government in about
two years time, as follows:

(i) Arab Infantry Battalion (1st Marsh Arab Bn,), to Iraq Army, on
Iraq Army scale of British Officers.59
(ii) The two Cavalry Regiments, Pack Battery and Assyrian Infantry
Battalions, with their present scale of Officers and British N.C.Os, to
be transferred as a “Frontier Force” on special rates of pay.

To enable the transfer of the Assyrians to be carried out successfully,

it will be necessary to settle the whole Assyrian Community within
Iraq as a contented body.

The scheme in its entirely depended on the following assumptions:

1. That H.M.G. intend to remove the Imperial Troops from Iraq as
soon as possible without prejudicing the present policy of making
Iraq entirely a self-governing country.
2. That the Frontiers of Iraq will be settled before the 31st December
1925, without serious modification of the present position.
3. That H.M.G. pay a grant-in-aid to Iraq for defence purposes, in
addition to paying for the British Officers. This means that after the
withdrawal of the Imperial Garrison the Imperial expenditure will be
approximately £840,000.
4. That British Officers are in executive control o f all units in the Iraq
Army by the 1st October 1926.

This memorandum was signed by H. Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff.

 217

Here are to be found further echoes of previously frustrated plans. The

majority of this proposal was based on three premises: (a) That the Iraq
government would accept British officers in executive positions in the Iraq
army (b) that the Assyrians would be prepared by majority, to serve in the
Iraq army, under Arab officers, and (c) that the Iraq government was to give
the Assyrians lands in which to settle— and the Assyrians would accept those
areas designated for them.
Items (a) and (b) had been presented over a year ago, and yet no
documentation has been found to indicate that these “urgent” requirements
had been put to the Iraq government. If they had, and were accepted, then
there would be no need for further prognostication. Had the government
refused, there would be no need to go on planning on these hopes. It would
seem that no one would grasp the essential nettle of confronting the Iraq
government with these issues and requirements.
The scheme was yet subject to “Cabinet approval”— but in essence
was probably known to all departments. The whole business was considered
an urgent and vital matter—but was, it seems, “too hot to handle”.
In 1925, as far as operations were concerned, the only one of note was
a brief Kurdish rising in the area between Qaradagh and Baranand ranges
during August. This was initiated by Shaikh Mahmud and assisted by Kerim
Futteh Beg and his band of brigands. They attacked Qaradagh village, driving
out the police and burning houses of families who were known to support the
government. The A.O.C. ordered a composite column to march into the area
to restore order and reimpose government prestige. A new Mudir was
appointed, a site for a new police post chosen for Qaradagh with which to
impress the Jaf settled there and other posts established at Sarao and Sayid
Ishaq.
The column was composed as follows: 2nd Battalion Iraq Levies (less
one company); 4th Battalion Iraq Army (less two companies and one platoon),
and a detachment W/T Section, RAF.

59 The “scale” o f British officers it w as “hoped” to get Iraq governm ent to agree to w as fiv e
per cavalry regim ent, six per infantry battalion, and tw o per pack battery. There w as also
much more detail, but as the plan m ostly failed, h a lf this docum ent is not included.
 218

It is evident that units of the Iraq army accompanied the Levies on

some of these minor operations in order, it may be presumed, to gain “field
experience” as part of their much needed training.
The column carried six days rations and was supported by the RAF.
Only a few snipers at long range harassed the column. Air strikes were made
on villages known to house rebels, and houses of rebels were burnt by the
troops. The Iraq army sent out cavalry with extra rations, and the task was
completed by 26 August 1925. There were other similar small “composite”
columns of Levies and the Iraq army chasing either or both Mahmud and
Kerim Beg, in which a few casualties resulted, both by the Levies, the army
and the trouble-makers. The latter were not prepared to have their activities
curtailed without a fight.
By now (1925), the Levy Medical Branch was organised, with a pack
ambulance of “Cacolets”. It also cared for the Levy families and dependents.
The latter had been arranged with the Assyrian leaders. In the period o f July
1925, the introduction of Yezidis was tried, but they were found unsuitable—
the tenets of their religion being the problem.
Trenchard wrote a D.O. to A.F. Higgins, the A.O.C. Iraq, who had
replaced Salmond in about October 1925. The letter of 19 January 1925,60 was
in reply to a series of queries and observations raised by Higgins, which
included the Cabinet Memorandum on “Defence of Iraq”, above.
Higgins felt that unless the Assyrians were guaranteed British
protection somewhere, they would emigrate in a body to Russia or Syria. To
which Trenchard had answered that for the British government to give such a
guarantee as this and for an Assyrian community to be formed in Iraq, directly
under British control, would be impossible. However, he felt that the
Assyrians, if properly handled, with British officers in command, might agree,
as a tentative measure, to serve in the Iraq army under a British G.O.C.
Further, he suggested that time would show whether or not they would
be reconciled into becoming part of Iraq. Trenchard said:
... if the Iraqians are wise they will nominate most of the officers in
the frontier forces from the Assyrians, and perhaps in years to come
this will result in a contented Iraq. If not, I do not know what will

60 AIR 2/1451, Fs.230 and 236.

 219

become of the Assyrians themselves. They are a more warlike nation

than an agricultural one...it would pay them better to take some part
in the defence of the Frontier which is their own country than to
allow it to be overrun by Turkish irregulars.

On 30 March 1925, a discussion was held with the Prime Minister of

Iraq and his Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and the Secretaries of State for the
Colonies and Air, the High Commissioner Iraq, and the A.O.C., with their
staffs. The Minutes of the meeting are very lengthy,61 only a few extracts of
which will be quoted. The purpose was to discuss the proposals contained in
Trenchard’s letter to Churchill, discussed on p. 185. The Prime Minister of
Iraq stated that,
(a)...there was no necessity for the British officers in units (then
Advisers) to have executive command, (b) The scheme put forward
would be opposed by a general spirit of nationalism, (c)...under
British control...the people of the country would say it was not an
Iraq but a British force, and might even suggest that it might possibly
be used otherwise than in the interests of Iraq, (d) ...he and his
colleagues had accepted the principle of British executive control in
exemplar units.... They had, however, come to the conclusion that
the carrying out of this scheme should be postponed until
conscription had been enforced.

The High Commissioner explained that he had opposed the passing of

the Conscription Bill until after the elections, as it was exceedingly unpopular
with the townsmen.
The crux of much of the scheme was finance. This was quickly
dispensed with by the question posed by the Air Minister to Iraq’s Finance
Minister: “Can the Government carry out its treaty obligations to produce an
army of 15,000 men?” Answer: “No, especially considering the Ottoman
Debt”.
Thus there was no hope of British taxpayers’ money being saved by
the absorption of the Levies into the Iraq army, even if the Assyrians would
agree to serve.
Some of the results of the above discussion were mentioned in a D.O.
to Trenchard of 6 April 1925,62 by the A.O.C. Iraq on the question o f British
officers in executive control in the Iraq army. The High Commissioner said,

61 A IR 2/145 l , F s . 10 7 -24.
62 A IR 2 /1 4 5 1 , F. 163.
 220

“ ...if this was done a very difficult political situation would arise which might
have disastrous results on the country”. It had been agreed with the Iraq
government that an Inspector-General was necessary for the Iraq army, under
the A.O.C. As a result of discussions, Trenchard felt he “ ...could not see any
considerable reduction.. .in Imperial forces during the next few years”.
A Minute Sheet63 carried a note from D.D.O.I. and D.O.S.D. A.M.P.
dated 2 January 1926, stating:
Our whole policy for the future is to allow the Iraq Army to gradually
absorb the levies, and although there will be many difficulties with
regai'd to this, especially with the Assyrians, I do not feel at this
stage... we should increase the establishment of British officers.

The need to keep the Assyrians employed was on two main counts: (a)
it kept them quiet, and (b) for many of their tribes it was an economic
necessity.
A very considerable document of thirty pages was raised by the High
Commissioner, and addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
covering the period 16 September-22 November 1926.64 The subject was
“Comprehensive Scheme for the Organisation of the Defence Forces of the
Iraq Government”, based on discussions which had taken place between
himself, the A.O.C. and the Iraq Ministry of Defence. Only those items
referring to the Levies will be discussed. But because between 1925 and 1926
there were few changes in the Levies, their future and that o f the Iraq army
required some serious attention by those concerned—the terms of the Treaty
were forcing the pace.
The document stated:
.. .the only prospect of substantially increasing revenues of the Iraq
State seems to lie in the future royalties on o il....

IV. The Iraq Levies

The proposals outlined above must definitely envisage the ultimate
disbandment of the Levies and a measure o f absorption o f the
elements contained therein.... Of the seven units composing the
existing Levy Force, i.e., two cavalry regiments, one battery and four
infantry battalions, the two cavalry regiments and one battalion of
infantry are composed of Kurds and Arabs and Turcomans (leaving
out of count any Persian elements in the cavalry). The personnel of

63 A IR 5 /295 , no folio.
64 A IR 2 /1 4 5 2 , F s.61-75.
 221

these latter are then definitely Iraq subjects, and their continued
existence as Imperial troops constitutes a serious complication were
the Iraq Government to introduce conscription... The 1st Battalion of
the Levies, for instance...has its personnel drawn from precisely the
same sources as the bulk of the Iraq army.65 That special treatment as
regards pay, legal rights, etc. should be meted out to a limited
number of Iraq subjects who serve in their own country and
practically side by side with their own countrymen, but under the
aegis of a foreign Power, can scarcely be other than harmful to the
military efforts of their own Government.... Similar remarks., .apply
to cavalry regiments.

As regards the Assyrians, the question is obviously very much more

difficult and, in fact, must trench largely on the purely political
reasons.

It is precisely these political reasons that hamper a satisfactory

military solution.... The far greater bulk of the Assyrian man-power
at present serving in Iraq have served or are serving in the Levies (in
addition to those drawn from across the frontier) on which they have
been for some time dependent for their means of livelihood.
Economically the Assyrian people are so identified with the Levies
that any dissolution of that force would be a matter of grave
consequence to them, quite apart from the waste of such valuable
military material which, properly manipulated, would be a source of
considerable strength to Iraq, forming as they do now almost a caste
of professional soldiers.

It is believed, then, that with the proper safeguards the incorporation

o f the Assyrians in the Iraq army would not present any insuperable
obstacles.

There were about a hundred Assyrians at that time serving in the Iraq
army; they included two officers—it is assumed they were Iraqi
nationals.They formed part of the “Frontier Company” stationed in the
northern posts. (This company was not part of the Levies.)
For the absorption of the Levy Force, detailed and well-considered
plans would need to be elaborated if the process was to work
harmoniously...it would seem that by far the most satisfactory
method would be that which involved the disbandment of the
existing Levies and then re-enlistment the same day under the
voluntary system and under the terms of service as defined by the
Iraq Government. This procedure should lead to the minimum of
friction were all the circumstances thoroughly explained beforehand.

05 This is an error; they w ere Marsh Arabs, a “tribal” group, not then being enlisted into the
Iraq army.
 222

It is to delay the absorption o f the Levies until conscription was in

force in the remainder of Iraq that would lead to confusion and, it
might be expected, [to lead?] to a considerable measure of
dissatisfaction on the part of the personnel, who might be either
incorporated in the Army in a disgruntled state or lost to the Army
altogether. [Sic.]

These extracts are taken from Appendix (E) to enclosure N o.l, which
was signed by A.C. Daly, Major-General, Inspector-General the Iraq Army,
dated 7 March 1926. They were chosen because they dealt in some detail with
the proposed Levy transfers to the Iraq army. However, the proposals in their
entirety drew the following comment from IT Dobbs, the High Commissioner
Iraq in his covering letter, as follows:
24. It seems clear that the adoption of General Daly’s full scheme
would cost so much (whether under a voluntary system or under
conscription) that after the cessation of Imperial contributions in
1931 it would be beyond the strength of the Iraq Government to
maintain it...his scheme has grown far beyond what was
contemplated at the time of the visit of the two Secretaries of State....

The High Commissioner’s remarks were directed at Daly’s proposed

major reorganisation of the Iraq army on European lines, o f which the Levies
constituted only a small part, mostly as exemplar' units. Because the future of
the Levies was under constant review and change, it has been most difficult to
maintain the “Levy theme”, clear and separate from the overall planning of
the “Defence Forces of Iraq”. For example, it was then still proposed that Iraq
should have the nucleus of an air force.
There were also comments by the A.O.C. Iraq on Daly’s proposals,
which included the Levies :
Paragraph 6. General Daly’s remarks (on p.5) that the levy battalion
furnishing the guards is practically able to do no training at all is
quite erroneous. A great deal of training is done and the results are
extremely satisfactory. At the same time I am now inclined to think
that one battalion will not be enough to do guards both at Baghdad
and Hinaidi having due regard to facilities for training, and I should
propose that the infantry battalion proposed at Kirkuk should be
stationed at Hinaidi instead. Signed by J.F.A. Higgins, Air Vice-
Marshal, A.O.C. British Forces Iraq, on 19th October 1926.

There is evidence that some friction existed between the Inspector-

General and the A.O.C., as the following further quote indicates:
 223

I entirely disagree with General Daly’s remarks 011 page 16. I

consider that, for reasons which I have alluded to before in these
notes, that an up-to-date officer of responsible rank is wanted at the
head of affairs. For the same reasons a number o f really good and
efficient officers are required. The former state o f affairs in the Iraq
army is the best evidence of this.

Perhaps the most pertinent comment on all the proposals contained in

Enclosure No.6, in the above document, was a copy o f a letter from the
Treasury to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, stating:
It appears to their Lordships essential at this stage that the Iraq
Government should be asked to prepare the most economical scheme
possible for land and air forces, on the assumption that there will be
no further subsidy from the British Exchequer after 1927-28. Signed
G.L. Barstow, 22 November 1926.66

Also, at last there had been positive action taken on the transfer o f the
1st Levy Battalion of Marsh Arabs to the Iraq army. The intention embodied
in a letter67 from the High Commissioner Iraq to the Secretary o f State for the
Colonies 011 2 September 1926, stated that it was decided to ignore the
proposal of General Daly to disband the unit and then re-enlist it on the same
day. It appeal's that because of an agreement between Iraq’s Ministry of
Defence and the A.O.C., this could be achieved “en bloc” to the Iraq army.
The latter was reluctant to see the unit,
which is formed of excellent material, is well trained and has a
service tradition behind it, disappear completely. The Marsh Arabs
from whom it is recruited, are a very good stamp of man and their
connection with the 1st Battalion extends over a period of seven
years.

It was also suggested that the Iraq army should retain this connection
and ensure an ample supply of recruits from these tribes.
The O.C. of the unit anticipated that 70 per cent of the men would
agree to transfer to the Iraq army and complete their engagements under the
new conditions, provided that certain of their British officers were transferred
with them, and subject to those officers approving. As it was to be an
“exemplar unit” this latter condition offered 110 problem. The transfer would
take effect 0111 January 1927.

66 A IR 2 /1 4 5 2 , F s.61-75.
67 A IR 2 /1 4 5 2 , F .299.
 224

Those men not wishing to transfer would be given compensation of

two months paid leave, the same as granted 011 the amalgamation of the two
Levy cavalry regiments—provided only that they had two months service left,
as from 1st January. Britain was to provide subvention for this unit in the year
1927-28.
f R
Another letter by the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, dated 16 September 1926, concerned the approved
appointment of a British quartermaster for each Levy unit. The letter stated
this appointment should be suspended, or cancelled, because the
circumstances of the Iraq Levies had altered considerably. “It now appears to
be unlikely that the Levies will continue to exist as an Imperial force for a
longer period than twelve months from now.. . Steps to end the Iraq Levies
were quickening in pace.
The matter of rifles and ammunition as a gift to Assyrian Levies on
completion of their two-year service contract, was raised again in a Foreign
Office letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on 10 November
1926.69 It concerned a Turkish memorandum to the League o f Nations on the
position of the Christian population in the Jebel Tur district of Turkey. The
Turks had alleged that H.M.G. “had encouraged the natives o f the district
concerned to rebel against the Turkish Government or, authorised them to
bear arms for that purpose”. The Foreign Office suggested that “ ...the
discharged Levies should in future only be allowed to retain their arms upon
the undertaking, at any time when called upon, to return to the colours, for the
defence of Iraq”.
Also, “ ...a further condition should be made that the arms and
ammunition concerned are in 110 circumstances to be carried outside the
frontiers of Iraq”. It was felt that if this was clearly stated on the “permits”
issued, it would be impossible, in future, for those certificates to be quoted
against the British government, 01 *to be used for propaganda purposes, as in
the Turkish memorandum. It appears that photographs of the original permit
had been passed by the Turks to the League of Nations.

68 A IR 512 9 5 , F.85A .
69 A IR 2 /1 4 5 2 , F.98.
 225

So ended 1926, during which one of the Levy’s “old enemies”, Kerim
Futteh Beg, received a wound from which he died (24 June 1926).
From the time of the Cairo Conference in March 1921, the fortunes of
the Iraq Levies very slowly improved, on the basis of their importance in the
reduction of the imperial garrison. They acquired a senior officer to point the
way ahead. It was by misfortune that General Sadleir-Jackson quickly upset
the feckless Meinertzhagen by his impatience to get things done, and to that
end, he was prepared to evade a staff which had allowed the poor conditions
he found in the Force to exist.
By early 1922, the force was under the G.O.C.-in-C. M.E.F., except
for administration and finance. Cox felt that this period for the Levies was
“unsatisfactory”. Assyrian enlistments were on the increase in spite of
“misunderstandings” over conditions of service, lack of clothing and tentage.
There was great urgency for recruits to replace the loss o f almost the entire
Levy Arab element to the Iraq Army (with the exception of the 1st Levy
Marsh Arab Battalion).
The next major step forward came with the RAF assuming control of
Iraq from 1 October 1922. Many of the senior RAF officers at that time had
considerable war experience, involving ground troops, as well as aircraft.
They had organised and carried out the evacuation by air o f all imperial
personnel, including some families from Sulaimaniyah in September 1922
which is understood to be the first operation of its kind.
During the winter of 1922-23, the Levy Col.-Commandant met the
problem of the Assyrian reluctance to re-engage. A conference with the
maliks was followed by better terms of engagement, which included the long
debated gift of a rifle and ammunition on completion of two years service.
This ended their discontent and the failure to re-engage and to enlist. The gift
of the rifle and ammunition, in due course, caused the British government to
try to rescind this reward for service, but failed. From then on, financial
stringency, even more than before, was to plague the Levies—the budget for
1922-23 was not to exceed £600,000. Further, over the years, following the
Cairo Conference of 1921, many of the decisions taken there failed to
materialise, in spite of remonstrations by the A.O.C. Iraq and the Air Council.
 226

A number of operations were undertaken against the Kurds and

Turkish infiltrators in the period covered by this chapter. Shaikh Mahmud was
reinstated in Sulaimaniyah, only to break his promises to Cox, and turned to
intrigue with the Turkish agent Euz Demir. The latter, with his quasi-Turkish
troops together with Mahmud, were soon ousted by RAF air action in co­
operation with the Levies and the Assyrian frontier irregulars.
It became necessary to discuss the development o f the Iraq army in
relation to its effect on the Levies. The Iraq army had made poor progress,
with British officers only in an advisory capacity; whereas in the Levies, they
were in executive control. The efficiency of the Levies, when compared with
the army, provided a stark contrast. Therefore, because the Iraq government
felt, on political grounds that they could not have British officers in executive
control within their army, the idea of handing over the Levies, with their
British officers, to form “exemplar units”, was seen as a workable alternative.
Britain had promised a financial saving for the Iraq government, by way of
paying the salaries of those British officers in the exemplar units for the first
year. The first Levy “exemplar unit” sent with its British officers to the Iraq
army was the 1st Marsh Arab Battalion, which had roots in the Nasiriyah
Arab Scouts of 1917 (the N.A.S.).
Throughout the four years covered by this chapter, the trouble which
lay behind the stalemate which alternated between London and Baghdad,
could be ascribed to one failure—that was for the British and Iraq
governments to get together with the Air Ministry and the British Treasury
and to decide, face to face, what could and could not be agreed by all parties
to achieve the internal and external security of Iraq, and how their findings
were to be financed.
As will be seen in the next chapter, covering the years 1927 to 1932,
new problems were soon to arise, but old ones persisted.
 227

CHAPTER VI

This chapter, which covers the period from 1927 to 1932, contains few
of the dramatic incidents of armed clashes with rebellious tribes, and Turkish
infiltrations on the northern frontier, which played such an important part in
some of the earlier chapters. (That fact is perhaps indicative of the gradual
expansion and improved competence of the Iraq army and the consolidation of
the authority of the Baghdad government.) However, this chapter is far from
being without significance—but the major event encountered presents in
many ways, perhaps, a sad ending to this history of the Iraq levies until 1932.
As was seen in the last chapter, there had been a serious problem concerning
the morale of the serving Assyrians, who formed the backbone o f the Levies.
This is one of the major issues to be considered and its implications are
assessed in this chapter.
With the approaching end of the British Mandate, the majority of the
Assyrian people in Iraq were, understandably, fearful for their future. They
undoubtedly felt themselves to be a nation—but it seemed unlikely that they
could, or would, acquire a state of their own. In this matter, the D’Mar
Shimun and the serving Assyrian officers and men, formed the only effective
voice to express the fears of their people to the British authorities, on whom
they relied for their ultimate fate as an effectively stateless people.
The fact that the end of the British Mandate in 1927 was now in sight,
created an urgency, meaning that many issues affecting the Levies and the
defence of Iraq, had also to be addressed. One of the most important o f these
was the steady, if slow, improved efficiency of the Iraqi armed forces.
Hitherto, their incompetence had been a cause for some concern for the
A.O.C., particularly as Iraq was to be responsible for its own internal security,
and in view of the steady reduction in the size of the British garrison and
Levies. The future role of the Levies, as this chapter will show, was to become
a greatly diminished one. They were to decline in numbers and weaponry.
This process again was not a “neat and tidy” one, and as with much of their
earlier history, the outcome was often influenced by decisions which were
avoided, rather than those which were made and implemented.
 228

The main issues, therefore, for consideration in this chapter are the
transfer o f the Levy Marsh Arab Battalion, the so-called Exemplar Battalion
to the Iraq army; and British air policy for Iraq (it will be recalled that the
decision that Iraq should create the nucleus of an air force with Britain’s help
was mooted in 1923). This chapter also considers the continuing problem of
the resettlement of the Assyrians in Iraq, and the political issues
accompanying that question, together with the Assyrians’ concern for their
future; also, the change of responsibility for the Levy administration, followed
by the reorganisation and distribution of Levy units. Other issues to be
considered are: the Iraq army assuming the role o f internal security at
Sulaimani; and the RAF proposal for the Air Defence Force to be multi­
ethnic. This chapter concludes with the “strike” of Assyrian Levy troops and
its aftermath, and a new role for the Iraq Levies and their change of
nomenclature. Although it may be a rather melancholy chronicle, it is not an
unimportant one.
The first event to be considered in this chapter is the transfer of the 1st
Levy Battalion of Marsh Arabs to the Iraq army on 1 January 1927. It will be
recalled that this important decision had been agreed between the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, the High Commissioner and the A.O.C. Iraq, on 2
September 1926. This was the last “all-Arab element” in the Levies; the great
majority of the remaining troops were Assyrian. This situation gave the
Assyrians a latent power, but one which was also to reveal the “Achilles
Heel” in the British control of their hitherto proven reliable native force—as
will be shown later in this chapter.
A most important British decision on policy governing the RAF in Iraq
and its future tactical relationship with the Iraq army, was contained in a
crucial memorandum by the Air Staff of January 1927.1 (It will be recalled
that responsibility for military affairs in Iraq had been transferred from the
War Office to the Air Ministry as far back as October 1922.)
The memorandum stated that the Air Staff had no hesitation in
maintaining that the future basis of the military forces of Iraq should be air
power, and that in considering reorganisation of the Iraq army, it should be

1 AIR 2/1452, Fs.39-43.

 229

recognised that this must be ancillary to an air force. It was considered

immaterial whether that force was imperial or Iraqi— meaning, that until Iraq
could afford an adequate air force, Britain would fill that role. It was therefore
felt impractical in the circumstances, pending Iraq’s ability to finance a state
air force, to settle this question at that time. Like Britain, Iraq had to consider
the cost of her forces, and in those particular circumstances, air power was
considered “cost effective”.
All that had been decided in 1927 was that British air forces would
remain in Iraq until at least 1928. It was also noted that H.M.G. required that
imperial air squadrons would, by agreement with the Iraq government, remain
in the country for purposes of imperial defence for the duration of the new
Treaty of 1927, by which Britain recognised the independence o f Iraq. In this
context, the Levies would be required for the “reliable” protection of RAF
installations in Iraq in the interests of imperial defence, although it is
significant to note that the force is not specifically mentioned in the
memorandum.
In that document, the Air Staff presumed that Iraq would be unable to
support both an army and an air force for a considerable number of years.
However, Iraq’s military needs for the future would be those o f internal
security and the possible repression of tribal raids from across its frontiers.
The likelihood of formidable external aggression was considered remote.
Nevertheless, it was thought
...inadvisable to allow the Iraq Government to regard the external
defence of the country as outside the scope of its responsibilities. The
fact remains, that this small nation, apart from dealing with the
incursions of the surrounding tribes, cannot do more than fight a
delaying action until outside reinforcements arrive....

The above Air Staff memorandum stated that the current military
situation in Iraq had necessitated the location of ground forces in both small
and large detachments dispersed throughout the country. Because of poor
communications, created by marsh, desert and the mountainous nature of
large portions of the country, control and co-ordination could only be affected
by an air force. In confirmation of this fact similar problems had been faced
by the much larger and highly organised British imperial garrison in Iraq
 230

during 1920, which, as was seen in Chapter IV, had succeeded, only with
great difficulty, in re-establishing internal security.
The Air Staff, no doubt with future Iraqi defence costs in mind, felt
that an Iraq Army, together with an introductory element o f air power, should
be within the financial resources of the Iraq government. The question of the
formation of an Iraqi air force would currently be confined to training a
certain number of Iraqi pilot cadets at the Royal Air Force Cadet College,
Cranwell, and some mechanics at the Royal Air Force depot in Iraq; the cost
to be borne by Iraq. It was decided that Air Staff would also continue to
monitor Iraq’s financial position.
In the context of the consideration being given to the defence of Iraq,
and the future of its ground and air forces in 1927, the Levies were still
considered paid of the former “local troops”. However, in view o f their
impaired morale, a tentative attempt to address the “Assyrian Problem” was
made in a telegram from High Commissioner Dobbs (who had replaced Cox
on 25 September 1923), to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 24
May 1927. Dobbs stated that the settlement of Assyrians on Iraqi government
lands was pressing, because the prospect of Levy disbandment was causing
considerable agitation and unrest amongst both the serving Assyrians and
their community.
Dobbs had examined the Assyrian problems in consultation with their
leaders in Mosul, and concluded that their problems were too difficult for
local Iraqi officials to deal with, in addition to their own duties. He therefore
suggested that a British Liaison officer in whom the Assyrians had
confidence, together with a small staff, be appointed to undertake this role of
dealing with their problems. The appointment would be for at least a year,
with effect from 1 July 1927. The cost of this appointment, he felt, should be
borne by H.M.G.
A reply from the Treasury to the above request, dated June 1927,3 to
whom the matter had been referred, stated they were prepared to sanction the
proposal: with, however, the financial proviso that “They assume all the
expenses of settlement other than pay, allowances etc. here referred to will fall

2 CO 730/116/1 ,F .40.
 231

upon the Iraq Government and not on the Middle East Vote”. (The cost of the
officer was Rs. 15,000/-.) This was a typical Treasury reply, designed to avoid
an ongoing financial commitment.
Dobbs, being aware of the growing Assyrian unrest, had spent
considerable time and effort in trying to resolve the problem, and had failed to
initiate an urgent and responsible reply to his representations from the
Colonial Office. The inevitable delay in obtaining agreement from the already
financially overburdened Iraq government, came at a time when every day
lost in reassurance put the question of continued Assyrian loyalty in serious
doubt. Delay would clearly aggravate the growing Assyrian disquiet.
While the Assyrians’ concern for their future continued to smoulder,
the Levy disbandment progressed. The reorganisation of Levies and their
future deployment was discussed in a letter from the A.O.C. to Dobbs, dated
18 January 1928.4 In this, the A.O.C. stated “ ...that in future the
administration of the Levies should be undertaken by Air Headquarters and
the following Units or Levy Services should be abolished”. These were:
(a) Levy Pay Office
(b) Levy Ordnance Depot and Service
(c) Levy Mechanical Transport
(d) Levy Hospital and Medical Officers. (The Medical Subordinates
with the Battalions would remain.)

One of the objects of this new organisation was a saving to the British
Treasury of £23,000, achieved mostly by the established RAF services taking
over the abolished Levy Service units. This new organisation was to take
effect from 1 April 1928.
The A.O.C. further proposed that the Levy Units should, in future, be
located as:
Levy Headquarters
Levy Depot ) HINAIDI (later moved to
Headquarters Machine Gun Company ) Baghdad in June 1930)

1 Battalion (less 1 Company) ) DIANA

1 Section Machine Gun Company

with detachment at ) BARZAN

3 CO 7 3 0 /1 1 6 /1 , F.37.
4 CO 7 3 0 /1 3 3 /1 , F s.43-46.
 232

1 Battalion (less 1 Company) )

1 Section Machine Gun Company ) SULAIMANIAH

Transport Company ) KIRKUK

Detachment, Transport Company ) HINAIDI

2 Companies ) HINAIDI

(This reorganisation revealed the loss to the Levies o f one cavalry

regiment and one infantry battalion—the dismissal of approximately 1,200
men.) The Levy force was now reduced as follows:
As at October 1927

RAF Ground Troops Imperial Troops Levies

2 Armoured car companies 2 inf.battalions 1 cav. regiment

1 engr. company 3 inf.battalions
with 3 m.g.
sections

It will be remembered that the Levies had lost their last pack battery in
1926, as part of the general reduction and change o f role. The guns,
ammunition, technical stores and pack mules had been transferred to the Iraq
army on 1 March 1927.5
Pay, ordnance stores and medical were in future to be undertaken by
Air H.Q. Hinaidi, and would meet Levy motor transport requirements. Troops
at out-stations would continue to receive rations, forage and fuel found by
local contracts. Levy headquarters would be responsible for command,
training, discipline and records. Once again, issues of funding were discussed
at great length in Baghdad and London.
One of the main issues under consideration was the future location of
Levy headquarters. The A.O.C., in his letter,6 stated that a number of
objections had been raised by the Commandant in opposition to the move
from Mosul to Hinaidi. The A.O.C. felt that the reluctance was based on the
number of years the headquarters had been in Mosul. Whereas, in fact, the

5 CO 730/118/5, F .l.
 233

main objections of the Commandant were that the change of location might
interfere with recruiting (many Assyrian families being located in that area),
and would entail the loss of close contact hitherto enjoyed, and regarded as a
great advantage, with the D ’Mar Shiimm and his family.
The Levy commandant’s objection to losing contact with the D ’Mar
Shimun and his family was a most valid point, especially in the disturbed
climate of Assyrian fears for their future. The move o f Levy headquarters
from Mosul to Baghdad would probably have undermined Assyrian
confidence still further.
The A.O.C. countered this main objection by stating that:
An officer in this Headquarters who has long experience o f Assyrians
considers that, though at first there may be some reluctance to join or
re-engage in the Levies, it will soon disappear, and that there is 110
reason to think that Hinaidi will prove more unsuitable for the
Assyrians than Mosul.

It is arguable that the A.O.C. would have done better to have given
greater credence to the above wishes of Levy Commandant Browne who, by
1928, had four years service with the Force. Perhaps the motivation of the
A.O.C. was, in part, the exuberance o f a “new broom”.
The A.O.C. suggested that if the High Commissioner agreed with the
above proposals, by which the “administration” of the Iraq Levies would pass
to the Air Ministry’s administration, then the transfer should take place
between 1 April and 31 October 1928. (It may be recalled that the Iraq Levies,
for “tactical purposes” had been under the direct command of the A.O.C.
since October 1922.)
The High Commissioner was no doubt happy to agree to the
suggestion, as it would rid his office of the encumbrance of Levy
administration. He wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 16
n
February 1928 to seek approval for the transfer of the Levy administration
from the High Commission and Colonial Offices to come under the entire
control of the Air Ministry; especially as the move would entail the saving of
£23,000 to the British Treasury.

6 CO 730/133/1, F.43-46.
7 CO 730/133/1, F.37.
 234

The High Commissioner also stated:

I should make it quite clear that this move will be required to take
place whether the transfer of control advocated is agreed or not. The
Air Officer Commanding must have the two companies o f Levies at
Baghdad in any case.

This was the first step by the RAF in obtaining full control of “The
Iraq Levies”, a force which had acquired an enviable reputation for reliable
service, with the intention of converting it to “The Air Defence Force”. On 1
May 1928, the Air Ministry wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in
relation to the content of the High Commissioner’s letter above to provide
. .a more detailed explanation of the views of the Air Council as to the future
policy regarding this [Levy] Force”.8
This document is most important, and has therefore been quoted
almost in full. It encapsulates the future relationship between the Levies and
the RAF until final political approval for the proposed “Air Defence Force”
could be arranged with the Iraq government. An essential element in the
continued retention of the Force (regardless of nomenclature), was that the
Force would replace Indian troops of the imperial garrison, and would
continue to be funded by HMG. Another important factor was that “ ...no
reference to the absorption of the Iraq Levies into the Iraq Army was made in
the final draft of the Military Agreement, and the Council regard the policy as
to the eventual disposal of the force, as an open question”.
The above letter stated that during discussion with the Committee of
Imperial Defence and the Cabinet, in February 1927,
.. .it was decided, inter alia, that Iraq will, in principle, after 1927-28,
assume full financial responsibility for all her own forces, whether
land or air, and will bear the extra cost involved in stationing British
Air Forces (and any British troops necessary to their protection) in
Iraq instead of at home, but that the possibility of obtaining some
small financial assistance from Great Britain during the period of
transition should not be precluded without further investigation.

The Treasury had stated that they proposed to review the position
again in 1931, but the Air Council presumed that in the absence o f further
directions from the Cabinet,

8 CO 730/133/1, F.30.
 235

...for their part, and so far as they are able to judge at present, they
think it probable that so long as British Air Forces are retained in
Iraq, it will be necessary to retain the Levies under British control,
although as previously stated they are content to regard their future as
an open question to be settled in the light of future developments.

Regarding the possible future use of the Levies for the purpose of
control and defence of Iraq’s frontiers, both the Levies and the Iraq army were
considered by the Air Officer Commanding as in the category o f “local
forces”, and not part of the imperial garrison. As has already been seen,
between m id-1922 and 1925, the Levies had been involved in the defence of
the northern frontier against Turkish incursions, and for internal security in
Iraqi Kurdistan. It should be repeated that the Levies were never employed
against the Wahabi incursions on Iraq’s southern desert. The role o f the
Levies was now to be curtailed to that of garrison companies, providing
security for RAF installations in Iraq.
During 1928, the Levies were engaged in the redistribution of the few
troops left in the Force. This had included the move of Levy headquarters
from Mosul to Hinaidi (Baghdad), which took place in October. In May of the
following year, three Levy companies handed over their outlying security
duties to the Iraq army, and those companies thus released, retired to
Sulaimani. Other Levy companies were then being deployed to assume guard
duties on RAF installations, which included taking over guard and escort
duties from the imperial garrison Indian troops in Baghdad. The Levies
undertook guard duties on the High Commissioner’s Residence and that o f the
A.O.C.
By the end of 1929, therefore, the Levies had ceased to be a “Field
Force”, and were, to all intents and purposes, garrison troops. It appears from
the three companies left at Sulaimani that they were, nevertheless, still
retained in some sensitive areas in Iraqi Kurdistan. Perhaps this is why the
Levies had been allowed to retain their Vickers machine-guns— very potent
long-range weapons in both attack and defence. The retention o f these guns
could be attributed to the A.O.C’s precaution for dealing with any unexpected
threat—these weapons were not normally found in guard companies. Indeed,
 236

the new Levy organisation was still considered by Dobbs as being the
equivalent to a weak infantry brigade.
An incident at Sulaimani;, resulting from some serious election rioting,
took place on 6 September 1930, and troops from the Iraqi army were called
in to deal with it. Although there were three companies of Levies in a camp
nearby, they were not involved in restoring order. The writer feels that there
were two good reasons for this: first, that the riots were political, and therefore
the use of British sponsored troops (Levies) would be inappropriate, and
secondly, it was a good “training” opportunity for Iraqi troops in the
performance of internal security duties. It was, at this time, according to the
Iraq Command Report, 9
.. .a period of transition from control by British forces (with the Iraqi
army acting in an auxiliary capacity); to control by Iraqi forces (with
British forces remaining in reserve, or confining their actions to co­
operation only).

During October 1930, soon after the Sulaimani election riots, Shaikh
Mahmud suddenly returned from Persia to lead an attack on Penjvin. It would
seem reasonable to assume that Mahmud’s henchmen may have had a hand in
the Sulaimani riots, as a diversion.

On 3 November,10 the Air Officer Commanding ordered the Levy

Commandant to proceed immediately to Sulaimani, to take command there.
His task was to reorganise the defences of the town, and to prepare a defence
scheme. In view of the presence of detachments of the Iraq army being in the
area, the task should have been undertaken by an Iraqi officer. That a simple
military exercise for the defence of a town required the A.O.C. to despatch his
Levy Commandant for the purpose, affords proof of the A.O.C5s continued
lack of confidence in the Iraq army in the field, which has been discussed
previously.
During the Sulaimani affair, the Levy Animal Transport Company had
marched from Kirkuk to Sulaimani, arriving on 6 November 1930. It had been
despatched to provide the Levies with mobility in case of necessity.

9 A IR 5 /125 5 , p.3.
10 J.G. B row ne, The Iraq L evies (191 5 -1 9 3 2 ), pp.77-8.
 237

By the end of November, Mahmud had failed in his attempt to seize

Penjvin, and the area had been rendered safe again by the Iraq army. The
army then took over the defence of Sulaimani, and the advanced Levy
headquarters returned to Baghdad. Until the end of Mahmud’s uprising, the
Levies provided an experienced reserve and assisted in the defence scheme of
Sulaimani, finding fatigue parties for the RAF in loading aircraft during these
operations, but they did not take part in restoring order. Thus, the Levies had
provided an important, if unnoticed “support”. Indeed, in view o f their
previous military successes in confrontations with the Kurds, the presence of
the Assyrians would have had a salutary effect upon them.
Perhaps because of the Iraq army’s success in putting down the
Sulaimani riots, the Iraq Command Report for October 1930 to September
1932, Item 238, p.68,11 stated that in February 1931, the Levy Machine-gun
and Animal Transport Companies had been disbanded, and their elements
amalgamated with the two remaining Levy infantry battalions— the machine-
guns were allocated on the basis of one section (two guns) per battalion. This
was in line with the terms of the treaty with Iraq, which laid down that the
effective strength of the Levy Force was to be only 1,250. These reductions in
strength involved the dismissal of more Assyrians, which, in turn, would have
dealt a further blow to the Assyrian community’s morale. Perhaps the
Assyrians now felt they were but pawns in a political game, and with the end
of the Mandate due in only one year, they would be left without effective
British support.
The following extract from the above-mentioned report is quoted
because it confirms the act of transference of the Levies from a “field role” to
that of garrison troops under the direct control of the Air Officer
Commanding, Iraq. It states in the “Iraq Command Report”, ch,XIII,
paras.236 and 237 above:
In accordance with the policy of giving the Iraqi Army every
opportunity to prepare itself for its responsibilities after the coming
into force of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930, the Iraq Levies were not
employed on active operations during the period of this report, except
for the purpose of reconstructing defence o f Sulaimani in October
1931, during the operations against Shaikh Mahmud. They remained

11 AIR 5/1255, F.334.

 238

in reserve, however, and continued to carry out their essential

function of providing security for the main bases and for the outlying
detachments of the Royal Air Force Staff and Intelligence Officers.

The same report showed that there were still some Levy units on
detachment in 1931, and they were in the process o f handing over
responsibility for internal security to the Iraq army as follows:
a. Billeh Camp (near Barzan), where a Levy detachment had
remained since 1927, was handed over to the Iraq Army on 27 July
1931;
b. A Levy Company was sent to the Baradost area, in August 1931;
in connection with the attempt to settle some Assyrians there. As
they were ‘under canvas’, they had to return to Diana on 1 December
1931, because of the onset of winter.
c. The Levy 1st Battalion, provided a detachment for guard duties for
the summer Training Camp at Ser Annadia in 1931, and again in
1932.

It would appear from “The Iraq Annual Report for 1932”, dated 18
May 1933,12 and issued by the Foreign Office, that at the beginning of that
year, the strength of the Iraq Levies was as follows: 22 British officers, 10
British NCOs, and 1,723 native ranks. The organisation consisted of:
headquarters, a pack ambulance (section of Animal Transport Company), and
two infantry battalions 1st and 2nd. “It was proposed to effect the transition of
this Force [Iraq levies] into the ‘Air Defence Force’ provided for in the
annexure to the 1930 Treaty of Alliance.” The Report further stated,
This entailed a gradual reduction in the strength to 1,250 Iraqi ranks,
and also fresh recruitment of Arabs and Kurds, in substitution for a
proportion of the Assyrians, in order to give ‘a better tribal balance’
to the force, which was to be reorganised into a Battalion
Headquarters, a Subsidiary Headquarters for the Basra area, and eight
companies.

This introduction of Kurds into what remained o f the Assyrian Levies,

would undoubtedly have further upset the morale of the Assyrians. They stood
to lose men who would be replaced by Kurds— and the Kurds were unlikely
to display natural comradeship with Assyrians, given the bellicose history of
these two peoples.

12 FO 371/16922, pp.60-92.
 239

The Iraq Annual Report for 1932 also contains a further relevant and
interesting reference to the Assyrians. The “Air Defence Force” was initially
to be composed of men from various ethnic groups, that is, Arabs, Kurds and
Assyrians— the two former groups were Iraqi nationals by birth. As yet, the
Assyrian position with regard to their taking Iraqi nationality had not been
resolved; yet they are mentioned as “Iraqis” in this document. This may, of
course have been an error due to ignorance 011 the part of the compiler.
The next section of the document is also important, because it states
the change of designation for the Levies to “The Air Defence Force”, which
indicated the stated new role of the force. However, this change required the
creation of a draft law for the implementation of the new Force, timed to be
simultaneous with Iraq’s entry into the League of Nations in 1932. Iraq’s
entry to the League was delayed for some months, perhaps because of the
time taken to ratify the Anglo-Iraq Treaty by the Iraqi parliament. This may
have led to a further loss of confidence by the Assyrians for their future as a
British “levied” force.
Proof of the growing apprehension on the part of the Assyrians was
provided in June 1932, when the Assyrians of the Force, in furtherance of
their political aspirations in Iraq, made a collective demand for their services
to be terminated. Para. 165 from Section 2 of the above-quoted Iraq Annual
Report for 1932, headed “The Assyrians” described an incident involving the
presentation by the Assyrians of a manifesto, in which were listed a number of
demands. This incident, which was later to be referred to as the “Assyrian
Strike”, was to be a source of deep concern to the British authorities and, as
will be seen, it proved to be a rather shameful one.
A report from Air Headquarters Iraq to the Air Ministry 011 8 June
1R «
1932, stated that on 31 May the Air Officer Commanding had received
information that the Assyrian officers o f the Iraq levies were about to give one
month’s notice.
The grievances of the Assyrians were summarised in a manifesto,
signed by the Assyrian officers, which was received by Levy headquarters on

13 AIR 5/1255, Fs.39-43.

 240

1 June 1932,14 and passed, after translation, to the Air Officer Commanding.
Their demands were as follows:
(1) The Assyrians should be recognised as a ‘millet’ in Iraq, and not
a religious community.
(2) The Hakldari Sanjak in Turkey, in which many Assyrians had
lived, should be annexed to Iraq, and its villages restored to their
former owners.
(3) (a) If this is impossible, the Assyrians should be found a national
home, open to all the Assyrians now scattered throughout the world.
(b) This home should include all the Amadiya district, and the
adjacent parts of Zaldio, Dohuk and Aqra districts; to become a sub
liwa of the Mosul liwa; with its Headquarters in Dohuk; under an
Arab Mutessarif and a British Adviser.
(c) Existing settlements required revision by a committee, with
adequate funds; and that Assyrian lands for settlement, should be
registered as their personal property.
(d) Preference to be given to Assyrians, in selection of officials for
the sub liwa.
(4) The temporal and spiritual authority o f the Patriarch over the
Assyrian nation, should be officially recognised, and should receive
an annual subsidy.
(5) The Assyrians to have a member of the Chamber of Deputies
nominated by the people and the Patriarch.
(6) The Iraq Government to establish schools, in consultation with
the Patriarch, in which Syriac would be taught.
(7) The League of Nations, together with the Iraq Government,
should make a gift of Rs.5,000 for the creation of an Assyrian church
waqf.
(8) A hospital to be established at the H.Q. of the sub liwa; with
dispensaries at other places.
(9) Rifles earned by Assyrians, through their service in the levies,
were not to be confiscated.

It seems from these demands that the Assyrians were not aware o f the
settlement of the Mosul question between Britain and Turkey, of 5 June 1926,
by which the League of Nations recommended that Iraq’s relationship with
the United Kingdom should be extended if Mosul was to be assigned to Iraq.
Thus a new Treaty was signed, extending the “relationship” for 25 years, or
until Iraq joined the League.
However, the above agreement retained the “Hakldari” within the
Turkish frontier, therefore precluding the return of a large section of the
Assyrians to their former homeland (the Hakldari), “the Assyrians should be
found a national home” in the districts as specified in Item (3)b of the above

14 FO 371/16922, pp.29-33.
 241

manifesto. Had Iraq been prepared to accept the Assyrians in the status of a
“millet”, the Assyrians would have been granted conditions similar to those
previously experienced by them under Turkish jurisdiction. In the event of
Iraq not granting the status of a millet, then alternatively, according to Item
(3)a of the above manifesto, the League of Nations should find a national
home for the Assyrians—but this would involve the agreement of another
country. This thesis has attempted to present the probable British objections to
the main demands listed in the manifesto.
The Assyrians had wanted their demands to be placed before the
Council of the League of Nations for adoption and, by a Royal Iradah, made
part of the Iraqi Constitution. The petition concluded with an ultimatum that
unless these demands were granted before 28 June 1932, the Levies would not
withdraw their resignations, and the national movement would increase.
The High Commissioner and the Air Officer Commanding were faced
with a serious situation, because unless the British government agreed to
safeguard the interests of the Assyrians, the whole levy Force would cease to
exist within one month.
The A.O.C. wisely requested the ex-Levy Commandant Browne, who
had completed his tour of Levy service but had not yet left the country, to
interview both David D’Mar Shimun (father of the Patriarch), and the D ’Mar
Shimun (the Patriarch himself) as quickly as possible and report back to him.
Commandant Browne returned from his mission on 6 June to deliver
his report to the A.O.C., who then sent extracts of the report as an amiexure to
his letter of 8 June to the Air Ministry.15 It appears that Browne had found the
Lady Surma D ’Beit Mar Shimun at Dohuq on 3 June. She was apparently able
to direct Browne to the D ’Mar Shimun at Zawita, where he was picnicking
with the Bishop and others.
Browne took the D ’Mar Shimun aside for an hour’s discussion, during
which the latter stated that,
...the Assyrian officers had not resigned their commissions in any
mutinous spirit. They had decided that, now Iraq was about to
become independent, and that nothing more would be done for the
Assyrians, the time had come to throw in their lot altogether.

15 AIR 5/1255, Fs.57.

 242

The Assyrians’ “dilemma” was a reflection of Iraq’s “uncertain”

political future.
In response, Browne stated,
...that the Air Defence Force was to be formed and that there would
be this detachment of 600 Assyrians there for many years, as a link
with the British and to provide pay for themselves and dependants.

Browne then reported that the D’Mar Shimun had asked him “ .. .what
we would do if we did not get Assyrians?” Browne’s reply was, “We should
then get other people”.
When the D’Mar Shimun asked what Browne wanted him to do,
Browne advised him to use his influence as the D ’Mar Shimun to get the
officers to withdraw their resignations. The D’Mar Shimun, after further
questions, said, “Well, I will tell them the truth”.
Browne’s report further stated that the D ’Mar Shimun
...intends to hold a conference at SER AMADIA on 15th June to
decide what the Assyrians are to do. A scheme will be drawn up and
presented to the High Commissioner by 20th June. A scheme which
involves the settlement of the Assyrians in an enclave in territory at
present occupied by Kurds, and that the Assyrians would willingly
remain in IRAQ if they could remain as a united body.

During Browne’s visit, David D ’Mar Shimun had asked that “the
terms of the manifesto might be extended for a month and that in the
meantime, discharges from the Levies might be delayed”. However, at a
subsequent meeting at Arbil on 7 June, it was confirmed that the officers
intended to abide by the terms of the manifesto.
In the same document, Browne stated that the situation on the 8th
meant that unless some unexpected development took place, the disbandment
o f the Levies would start on the 18th, and be completed by the end of June.
Beyond the fact that the Assyrians intended to concentrate in the north, he had
been unable to discover anything of their future plans. Also, rumours were in
circulation among the Assyrians to the effect that “men who did not join the
movement, would be shot by their comrades”.
In the meantime, it appears that London was being kept informed of all
developments by the Air Officer Commanding, whose report to the Air
Ministry on 8 June concluded with,
 243

As a result of this decision of the [Assyrian] Council, GREAT

BRITAIN has been faced with a problem that has, so far, proved
insoluble and has now led to the Assyrian people, in desperation to
seek their own salvation.

The fact that the A.O.C. felt it necessary to use capital letters for Great
Britain in his report may, perhaps, reflect a measure of concern for the
prestige of Great Britain in failing her erstwhile allies.
After Browne’s report to the A.O.C., he continued his investigations,
and during further consultations, the Assyrian officers explained why they had
not requested permission to sign the manifesto, and the reason for maintaining
such secrecy over the “movement”. They argued that they had to sign the
document or become outcasts from their people. Had they asked for
permission to sign, they would certainly have been ordered not to sign; they
would then have been placed in an awkward position by having to commit the
additional offence of disobeying a definite order, and in so doing, they felt
they would be “blackening the face” of any British officer responsible for
them.
This concern shown by the distressed Assyrian officers for the
reputations of their British officers is rather touching. The comradeship
developed is evident, and also shows the problem of potentially divided
loyalties between a minority ethnic group recruited by an imperial power, and
their fear of desertion by Britain.
Browne felt that in the circumstances, as explained, it was difficult to
see how the Assyrian officers could have arrived at any other decision. It
seemed to them that they stood to lose everything if they did not side with
their own people, whilst loyalty to the British government promised only a
doubtful future in Iraq. Browne said, “The aim of the Assyrians had always
been to keep together”.
The Assyrian problem, made manifest by the Levy officers, had a
much wider implication than that of their military service—they were
presenting the predicament of their people as a whole. This is confirmed in the
Air Officer Commanding’s Report to the Air Ministry on 8 June,16 which
states,

16 AIR 5/1255, Fs.39-43.

 244

...the movement was initiated by the large number of destitute

Assyrians in the country. The numbers of unemployed men have
been increased recently by discharge from the Iraq Levies and the
Iraqi Petroleum Company (owing to reductions in staff). These
people have been, for a long time, constantly agitating for some
drastic action on their behalf.... The fact that the present situation has
been created by the poverty-stricken and discontented unemployed
must not be allowed to obscure the real importance of the movement
in the eyes of the more fanatical tribesmen. They are adamant in their
determination to preserve the unity and integrity of their nation and
o f their religion and they intend now to stake everything in one last
attempt to realise their aims.

The tenure of the A.O.C’s report clearly reflects his humanistic

feelings for these appealing people, who had served the British cause so well.
The threatened Assyrian action had been a well-kept secret. Even
Dobbs, the High Commissioner, had not anticipated that the Assyrians would
resort to such a serious action to force the issues relating to their national
aspirations. In some of the A.O.C’s letters to the Air Ministry, it was apparent
that he felt that the Assyrians were being taken too much for granted by the
British government, which seemed to lack the will, imagination and drive for
obtaining a just and permanent solution to the Assyrian question.
On 19 June 1932, the day following his receipt of the Assyrian
petition, the High Commissioner despatched a letter to the Patriarch by air,17
pointing out the impossibility of granting such far-reaching demands within
the stipulated time. He urged the postponement of the threatened
abandonment of their Levy service until the petition had been referred to the
League of Nations, and an answer received.
This letter was discussed by the D ’Mar Shimun, with all the leaders, at
Ser Amadiya on 19 and 20 June 1932. They replied that they insisted on the
acceptance of all their demands, except those which referred to the Hakldari
(Item 2 of the manifesto), as a condition for the withdrawal of the manifesto
dated 1 June.
According to “The Iraq Command Report 1932 to 1934” previously
1R
quoted, further negotiations proved fruitless. Therefore, under the prevailing
Assyrian Levy threat, leading to the possible loss o f security which they

17 A IR 5/1255.
18 A IR 5 /1 2 5 5 , F.60.
 245

provided for RAF installations throughout Iraq, the A.O.C. and Dobbs had 110

alternative but to proceed with necessary precautions. It may be assumed that

it was the A.O.C. who had decided that a British infantry battalion would be
required to replace the anticipated loss of the Assyrian Levies, if they still
insisted on discharging themselves. No doubt the A.O.C’s plan was concurred
by Dobbs. The nearest British troops to reinforce Iraq would have to come
from Egypt. There was, by then, considerable urgency attached to such
decisions— with only some three weeks left in which to deal with the crisis.
In the Command Report quoted above, there are 110 details on how the
decisions were taken in London, or by whom, in response to the plans
proposed by the A.O.C. and Dobbs. However, it was mentioned that it
required a Cabinet decision for the movement of a British infantry battalion
from Egypt to Iraq by RAF Air Transport, which involved overflying Syria;
the latter factor requiring French approval.
Among the actions considered was first the possible need to disarm the
Assyrians—in other words, to overawe and convince them that resistance was
impracticable. The use of Iraqi police or troops was out of the question. In any
case, some eight of the ten Iraqi battalions, together with the police, were
engaged in operations in the Barzan area. Secondly, it had been considered
possible that any attempt to restrain and confine the Assyrians to their
cantonments, might lead this formidable aimed body to revolt and forcibly
break out. However, it was hoped that the Assyrians would accept taking their
discharge “in slow time”.
I-Iowever, the following dates and actions taken are available,
subsequent to the above quoted A.O.C’s letter to the Air Staff on 8 June 1932.
The innovation of transporting troops by air lent a new dimension by
increasing the speed by which preparations for the troop movements had to be
made. This fitted into the time-scale set by the Assyrians in their manifesto—
28 days, or the Levy Force would be inoperative.
The British troops were to proceed from Egypt to Iraq via Syrian air­
space— diplomatic approval from the French having been obtained. “The men
were to travel unarmed in order to avoid possible objections by the French
authorities.”
 246

Events then moved quickly. On 11 June, Air Officer Commanding Iraq

informed the Air Officer Commanding Middle East Command that a British
infantry battalion would be required to replace the Assyrian Levies, which
might disband. Also, that a plan for these troops to be moved by air be
prepared.
On 12 June, preliminary arrangements had been made for the 1st
Battalion, the Northamptonshire Regiment, to be flown by the RAF from
Egypt to Iraq to take over Levy duties, pending the recruitment o f a special
replacement force, the manpower source for which was not indicated in this
report.
The A.O.C’s proposed plan required the British infantry battalion to be
airlifted, using aircraft of Nos.216 and 70 (Bomber Transport) squadrons to
Hinaidi, employing a total of 36 aircraft. The move was to be completed in
five days—the first two companies to arrive in Iraq on the 18th and the second
two by 25 June. Spare kit for the battalion was to be despatched by rail and
Nairn motor transport to Baghdad; the convoys to be under guard.
On 14 June, the British Cabinet decided not to reinforce Iraq, and the
operation was halted. No explanation is given for this decision. The Air
Ministry warned the A.O.C’s Middle East and Iraq Commands that the
reinforcement might yet go ahead, enabling the preparations to proceed.
However, by 18 June, the British Cabinet finally gave approval for Iraq to be
reinforced by one British infantry battalion—no reasons are given for this
change of policy.
The air-lift commenced on 22 June 1932, and the entire battalion had
been moved by the 27th, five days later—a considerable feat in those days,
and one day before the Assyrian ultimatum expired. On their arrival, the four
British companies were distributed to Levy stations at Mosul, Diana,
Sulaimani and Hinaidi. There were strict instructions regarding British
soldiers not using force against the Assyrians, “ ...and arrangements were
made, for wherever a show of force might be necessary, or wherever there
might be a risk of conflict with the Assyrians, Air Force personnel should be
used”.
The remarkable speed of the arrival of the British battalion was not
without effect on the Assyrians leaders, and on 29 June,
 247

...the Mar Shimun, consented to issue an encyclical letter to the

Assyrian officers and men of the levies enjoining 011 them continued
loyal and obedient service in the force until the national petition of
the 17tli June had been considered by the League of Nations and an
answer given. Adding that if they then wished to take their discharge
they must do so in accordance with the orders of their British
officers.

In consideration of the D ’Mar Shhmm’s letter, the High Commissioner

promised the Levies they would be maintained at their present strength until
an answer was received to their representations from theLeague of Nations,
or until15 December 1932, whichever was the earlier.
The Levies at Diana, Sulaimani and Mosul submitted without trouble
to the injunction of the Patriarch, but those at Hinaidi showed themselves to
be less compliant, and for some days behaved in a mutinous manner,
It was considered advisable to permit the more restless men to go,
and for several days a daily quota of about thirty men took their
discharge. In all, some 250 men were released from service in this
maimer.

By the end of the first week of July, the remaining men in all stations
had undertaken to obey the Patriarch’s instructions. Thus, the strike o f the Iraq
Levies was, in effect, at an end. In retrospect, it might be argued that had as
much energy and determination been put into solving the Assyrian problems
when they were first made manifest, as was demonstrated in moving the large
body of troops from Egypt to Iraq as a temporary pacification, then this
serious and regrettable affair might never have occurred. This was a most
unfortunate experience for all concerned and, it might be argued, could and
should have been avoided. Perhaps the errors on the British side may be most
charitably described, once again, as “talcing one’s friends too much for
granted”.
By the second week of July 1932, the situation permitted the return of
the British battalion to Egypt by air, and “ .. .it was clear of the Iraq Command,
by 11th August 1932”.
The disruptive action by the Assyrians, and the fact that, as a minority,
their requests for permanent sanctuary in Iraq had not, as yet, been effectively
dealt with by the Iraq government, came at a time when Iraq was seeking to
become a member of the League of Nations. King Faisal and his government,
 248

who were anxious to acquire membership of the League, could have felt that
the Assyrian petition to the League might have adversely affected Iraq’s
application.
It may be for this reason, perhaps, that it was stated in “The Iraq
Annual Report 1932”,19
In the meantime, King Faisal had visited Amadiya and had given a
long audience to Mar Shimun, at which he discussed the Assyrian
petition and their future in Iraq. His Majesty seems to have done his
utmost to persuade the Patriarch to trust the Iraqi Government, and
promised that he would himself watch over their interests and
safeguard their rights. Mar Shimun, however, while thanking the
King for his kindness, said that he felt obliged to await the result of
the petition to the League.

Considerable progress was made throughout 1932—regardless of the

Levy strike— in arrangements for the organisation of the “Air Defence Force”,
which entailed the changeover from the Levy organisation to that of the new
detailed organisation, as laid down by the Air Officer Commanding Iraq prior
to the strike.
In “The Iraq Command Report October 1930 to September 1932”,20 it
is stated that,
It is proposed that the new force (Air Defence Force) shall consist of
Force Headquarters, a Wing Headquarters and eight companies. Of
these companies two or a maximum of three will be composed of
Assyrians, one of Kurds and two of Marsh Arabs. This leaves the
composition of two companies to be decided later... one of these two
companies should be a transport company. The intention had been to
reserve four companies for the Assyrians, both because of our long
connection with these people, because they are Christians and
because they are undoubtedly the best fighters in Iraq. Unfortunately
their behaviour in the summer o f 1932 demonstrated once more the
wisdom of mixing nationalities and religions in an alien force and so
avoiding a dangerous preponderance of any one class.

Detailed establishment had been prepared for this new force; terms of
service for all ranks had been promulgated, and procedures for recruiting had
been worked out. The RAF seem to have done their “Staff Work” well in
preparation for the new acquisition of troops.

19 FO 3 7 1 /1 6 9 2 2 , para. 181.
20 A IR 5 /12 5 5 , p.70, para.245.
 249

However, an RAF experiment to send an Assyrian company to Margil

to take over guard duties for the RAF station Basra from the Iraq army in
February 1932, had proved unsatisfactory. The climate of the south was found
to be unsuitable for the Assyrians, causing a high rate of sickness. Therefore,
the Assyrian contingent was reduced to three companies, and confined to
service in Mosul and Hinaidi.
There remained the necessary legal acceptance for the A.D.F.(Air
Defence Force) by Iraq. Preliminary discussions between the High
Commissioner (Sir Francis Humphreys) and the Iraq government concerning
the formation of the A.D.F, had opened early 1932, when a new designation
had been mooted. However, further progress on the matter was hindered by
the Barzani operations, followed by the “Levy strike”. At the beginning of
August 1932, it was possible for the Air Ministry, Colonial Office and
Foreign Office to resume negotiations with the Iraqi prime minister.21 A draft
law was drawn up for insertion in the Anglo-Iraq Treaty which, it was
intended, should serve as a basis for detailed discussion on the creation of the
“Air Defence Force”.
Because it had been desired to convert the Levy Force into the A.D.F.
simultaneously with Iraq’s entry into the League of Nations (3 October 1932),
the draft was prepared in the form of an ordinance. This was to save time by
avoiding passage through the Iraq parliament, which was not then sitting.
However, at the beginning of some discussions which followed,
...the Prime Minister [of Iraq] maintained the view that legislation
was not necessary, and that full effect could be given to the
requirements of the treaty, and of his secret letter (the content of
which was not mentioned), by means of Army Orders, issued by the
Ministry of Defence.

The complex events in the chapter were to have a direct influence on

the development of the Iraq Levies, and their immediate future with the RAF.
During the years covered by this chapter, the strength and structure o f the
Levy Force suffered a steady decline, prior to their metamorphosis as “The
Air Defence Force”.

21 FO 371/16922, F.61, Item 16.

 250

As a final tribute to the Iraq Levies in the period covered by this thesis,
it is worth noting the words of “The Iraq Command Report of October 1930 to
September 1932”,22 which states:
These unavoidable changes cannot be contemplated without feeling
the deepest regret for the disappearance of that magnificent body, the
‘Iraq Levies’. Their efficiency and smartness are profoundly
impressive, and officers with long practical experience of mountain
warfare have often expressed their conviction that it would be
difficult to find anywhere in the world better hill fighters than these
Assyrian soldiers are when well led. The Assyrian Levies have,
during the comparatively short time they have been in existence,
earned for themselves a reputation as mountain troops which might
well be coveted by the best regiments in the armies of the world
today.

It could be said that had the value of the Iraq Levies been appreciated
sooner in London, then the course of their early history until 1932, might have
been a very different one.

22 AIR 5/1255, p.70, para.247.

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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

“From what I have seen in different parts of the world, forces of this
nature tend to be so-called, ‘Private Armies’ because there have been
no normal formations to fulfil this function—a role which has been
found by all commanders to be a most vital adjunct to their plans.”
Brigadier J.M. Calvert, memorandum, “Future of S.A.S. Troops”
1945, quoted in Strawson, A History o f the S. A. S. Regiment (London,
1984).

In the long and very rich history of Britain’s imperial military forces,
the role and importance of the Iraq Levies might seem to be of minor
significance. It was, after all, a small force—its maximum strength during the
period covered by this thesis was probably approximately 6,500 men in
October 1923. When this thesis ends in 1932, the Force had shrunk to around
1,250 men. Such basic figures can, however, be deceptive. As this thesis has
tried to show, on certain critical occasions in the creation of the new state of
Iraq, the Levies had a major role to play in the maintenance, or re­
establishment, of public order and security. So in that sense, the importance of
the Levies far exceeded their numerical strength. Not unlike the British
S.A.S., their tasks were varied—they were a very necessary “adjunct” to the
British garrison.
The size of the Levies is perhaps deceptive in other ways, for within
that small force there was, as the thesis has repeatedly shown, a considerable
measure of diversity and complexity. Unlike some imperial military forces,
raised for dealing with particular events, and in whose creation there was an
element of prior evaluation and planning, the origins of the Levies were about
as ad hoc an affair as it is possible to conceive. The Levies’ initial tasks were
varied, and this fact found reflection in the diversity of the nomenclature
employed in their early years, as discussed in Chapter II. As that chapter and
later ones have shown, one of the major problems facing the Civil
Administration was that of “rationalising” and “formalising” the Levies in an
attempt to acquire a closer “conformity” with the established structure of the
British Military forces in Iraq. These changes may have been due to
influences in G.Ii.Q.M.E.F., and were not always suitable. Unlike the British
 252

army, the Levy units were not called upon to fight en masse, but more usually
as detachments. Thus in the study of the various ways by which the
“remodelling” of the Levies was carried out, it appears that not all the changes
were successful in meeting “Levy” requirements. For example, the Medium
Machine-guns were “brigaded” during 1921-22, after which time M.M.G
Sections were distributed among the battalions, thus providing greater
flexibility for the battalions on detachment.
The history of the Levies is important in several other ways. Some of
the most significant issues in British imperial military history have found
repeated reflection in the course of research on this Force. These include the
difficulties of recruitment in ethnically very diverse societies where different
communities were sometimes deeply and mutually mistrustful and suspicious
of each other, often for reasons which were centuries old.
The element of linguistic diversity serves to highlight another
important factor in this research into military history— the great value of the
learning of the native language, or languages, for the successful command by
British officers of such troops. As the bibliography shows, officers, such as
E.B. Soane, recorded and published their linguistic knowledge for the benefit
of other people.
Yet another major theme which has found repeated illustration here, is
the importance of decisions being made by men “ 011 the ground”, who had
little or no opportunity, and 011 occasions, no time, in which to refer to “higher
authority”. This, in turn, casts further light on the debate as to what extent was
there something called “British policy” in the immediate post-war period with
regard to Iraq. Or were these impromptu “decisions” made “ 011 the ground”
later to be regarded and then interpreted as “official policy”.
On reflection, an equivalent force to the Shabanah/Levies would have
had to be raised in the circumstances created by the Mesopotamian campaign
of 1914-18, because international law made it incumbent 011 any power which
occupied territory in the prosecution of a war, to administer the civil
population and maintain law and order in those territories occupied by force
of arms. Britain simply could not spare regular troops for this task, and so
local Arabs, with 110 obvious affinity for the Turks, were recruited and trained
during the Mesopotamian campaign to represent the executive power of the
 253

Civil Administration. It was in these circumstances that the Iraq Levies were
born—the sons of expedience— and this factor remained dominant throughout
the Force’s existence.
The use of local manpower was further enhanced by the availability of
British Indian army officers, especially, as has been noted, those possessed of
linguistic ability in Arabic, Persian or Turkish, and who had held various
posts in tribal areas of India. These qualifications quickly enabled them to
establish a rapport with their new charges. In this respect, expedience and
experience were wedded in the face of necessity, and so British Field
Intelligence Officers of the military, and Political Officers of the Civil
Administration, obtained able support from their “Shabanah” in the task of
bringing normality to the territories vacated by the retreating Turkish forces.
This thesis has shown that although there were sufficient reports by
Political District Officers indicating the use o f their “Shabanah” and the
conditions under which they served, regrettably there was no such information
apparently available regarding the performance of the first recruited “Arab
Guides”, who worked with the British Field Intelligence in July 1915.
However, information on the performance of the remainder o f these “Arab
Guides” only appears with their change of nomenclature, when they became
the “Nasiriyah Arab Scouts” (N.A.S.) on being transferred from the British
Field Intelligence of I.E.F. ‘D ’, to the District Shabanah o f Major Dickson,
P.O. Nasiriyah.
The confused situation in the country following the end o f hostilities
against the Ottoman Empire, may well have contributed to the several changes
of Levy nomenclature in that period. At the same time, Wilson, or senior
members of his staff, may have been, and probably were, very unsure of
precisely what role the force then had to fulfil. The ultimate name “Levies”
was adopted in July 1919, and may well have been arrived at during
discussions with G.H.Q.I.E.F. “D”. At the same time, it was decided to divide
the force into two groups— the “Levy Striking Force” and the “Shabanah or
Gendarmerie” of the Political districts, for implementation in April 1920.
In the context of civil unrest, the Anglo-French Declaration of
November 1918, which had echoed President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” for
self-determination for the Ottoman minorities, opened the way for would-be
 254

political dissidents to oppose the two anticipated Mandates for Iraq and Syria,
to be given to Britain and France in April 1920.
The political climate in Iraq during 1919 and early 1920 was not
helped by events in Syria. The British had withdrawn their troops from there,
and transferred control to France in September 1919. There followed
hostilities between the Syrians and the French in December o f that year. In
this connection, this thesis has tried to show that the incidents at Deir-es-Zor
in December were, in fact, the precursors of the Arab uprising in Iraq early in
the following year.
The motivation for these violent events and the unrest in Egypt, Syria
and Iraq during the period 1919-20 were, in the writer’s opinion, broadly the
same. The Arabs of Syria and Iraq wanted independence and not the
imposition of mandates, which they may have felt were an insult to the Arab
psyche, and which they were not prepared to tolerate. In this troubled political
climate, the decision to expand and reorganise the Levies was justified for
maintaining internal security, but was taken too late.
As this thesis has indicated, had General Haldane been prepared to
listen to the warnings of Wilson, his official local political mentor, and those
of his own staff, the subsequent insurrection of 1920 may well have been less
serious. Also, and perhaps for reasons o f political popularity at home,
Churchill’s often over-parsimonious behaviour and his frequent reluctance to
listen to the requirements of the man in the field, aggravated the situation—
yet again a repeated theme in military history.
One of the main problems concerning the development of the Levies
from 1918, was the lack of single-minded co-ordination for the Force. It might
be suggested that once it was realised that the Levy Force would continue to
be required for maintaining internal security for the foreseeable future, and on
that premise, its strength increased, a senior military officer should have been
appointed to plan its reorganisation and development. He could also have
instigated the necessary military training for the Force’s many different tasks
in that role. Such decisions were not, however, made, and the consequences of
that omission were examined in Chapter III.
It was not until the Cairo Conference of March 1921, that the Iraq
Levies really came into their own as a military force with a distinctive identity
 255

and role. They owed this impetus and growth momentum partly to the
aspirations of the Royal Air Force, which had struggled to obtain
independence as a service in its own right. This was reinforced by the Air
Ministry replacing the War Office in the control of Iraq. The R.A.F. required a
dependable ground force with which to co-operate in the field during internal
security operations, as well as to secure their installations and encampments.
This situation was to continue until the Iraq army, assisted by the R.A.F,, was
seen to be capable of maintaining internal security, it was hoped by c.1925.
However, at the Cairo Conference in March 1921, the Levies also
received a considerable setback in their development, when it was decided to
transfer the entire Arab element of their strength to the newly-created Iraq
army, for the purpose of hastening its development. There can be little doubt
that the impetus for this important decision stemmed from the immediate
stringent financial climate which faced the British government—the sooner
the Iraq government could maintain internal security, the quicker the imperial
garrison could withdraw, but leaving the R.A.F. As was seen in Chapter IV,
this decision was the sole reason for bringing the Assyrians (then Christian
refugees) into the Levies to replace the lost Arab element. This not only
entailed recruiting and training new men, but also produced a new language
problem to overcome.
More importantly, there were attendant problems in the use of
Assyrians as replacement manpower. They were a warlike people, who had
traditional enemies among the Kurds. There was also the more difficult
problem of integrating a stateless Christian people into a Muslim country. It is
doubtful if the full implications of this important decision for the long term
had been considered at the Conference. As far as it was possible to discover
from the documentation of the Cairo meetings, the Assyrians had not been
approached on serving as replacements for the Levy Arab element; nor were
the possible repercussions discussed— only that the Assyrians were informed
that the refugee camp at Ba’quba was to close within the year. This fact alone
would have left the Assyrians with little or no alternative but to comply with
the proposal for Levy service.
The loss of the Levy Arab element to the Force was followed in March
1922 by the dismissal of the Levies’ first Field Commander (Commandant
 256

Sadleir-Jacks on) through what was, perhaps, no more than personal jealousy.
This, without doubt, slowed the impetus for their expansion as a military
force. It was not clear 011 what grounds the dismissal was achieved, in view of
Churchill’s calm reaction to Sadleir-Jackson’s report of December 1921,
regarding the neglect of important supplies for the Levies. As even Cox had
been mentioned, there can be little doubt that others on Churchill’s staff
would have been implicated, including Meinertzhagen. An apparently
mischievous cover-up appears to have lost the Levies a successful and battle-
tried Field Commander.
The years 1920 to 1924 represented a time of considerable change for
the Levies. After they had proved, beyond doubt, their loyalty during the
Insurrection, they lost, in Sir Arnold Wilson, their original mentor.
Nevertheless, they managed to survive the transfer of the majority of their
trained men to the newly-initiated Iraq army.
The blame for the Assyrian disturbances in Mosul and Kirkuk in
August 1923 and May 1924, could be seen as unfairly placed upon the
shoulders of those Levy troops involved. It was but another serious error of
judgment on the part of the British authorities, who were responsible for
placing two volatile peoples, with “old scores” between them, in close
proximity. It appears that no lesson had been learnt from the first fracas of
1923. In May the following year, when the second and more serious incident
occurred, the Levies were barracked in an old Turkish fort, which was on the
perimeter of the Kirkuk township. This could be compared to “putting a
lighted match near dry tinder”.
The lack of comprehension and foresight by the senior British Levy
Command in this matter, begs the question as to why, for example, did not
High Commissioner Dobbs point out the folly of such a practice? This
reinforces the contention that throughout the period covered by this thesis, the
authorities in London, though less so in Iraq, were both often culpable for the
lack of competent direction of affairs in Iraq.
This study has indicated that there remains the question: Why did the
British executive fail to maintain closer contact with, and observation of the
stateless Assyrians’ concern for the future of their people as a whole? Such
action may have avoided the resultant “strike” in June 1932. Not only did the
 257

Assyrians represent the best possible fighting material available for enlistment
in the region, but their loyalty to the British had already been proved.
Although Commandant Browne stated to the Mar Shimun on 3 June 1932 that
other manpower would be brought in to replace the Assyrians, this would
have been a very difficult task to perform. Britain had failed to obtain the Iraq
government’s approval for British officers’ executive control in the Iraq army,
let alone to bring in foreigners to serve as Levies. The R.A.F. in Iraq were
adamant on their security being independent of the Iraq army, and as a result,
the “Iraq Levies” became the “Air Defence Force” in October 1932.
The A.O.C. Iraq, who showed some understanding for the stateless
Assyrians, was, nevertheless, deeply concerned with the possibility of well-
armed Assyrians, both civilians and serving Levies, attempting, in their
frustration, some desperate armed action. Therefore, the decision by the
British government in June 1932, to airlift into Iraq a British infantry battalion
from Egypt, enabled the situation to be contained without violence.
Nevertheless, a considerable number of the Assyrian levies insisted on taking
their discharge, and this was granted.
The result of the “strike” brought a measure of shame to both parties
concerned, and achieved virtually nothing. The Assyrians should not have
resorted to indiscipline, and so besmirched their hitherto impeccable record of
service; and the British should not have taken their war-time allies for granted.
The British government could, perhaps, have used its considerable influence
in the League of Nations to better effect for the security of the Assyrians’
future. But this omission is again indicative of the lack of attention paid in
London to the affairs of Iraq.
After this research, some important questions remain unanswered.
Why did these Levies of diverse ethnic background and religious beliefs,
continue to serve in the Force throughout its 40 years o f existence, and what
was their motivation? Some may contend that they owed their allegiance to
their pay masters. But if that were so, then many sold their lives and limbs
very cheaply. Their small financial reward was an inadequate reason to hold
these diverse ethnic groups together in support of a foreign power, with little
in common to be shared outside military service; for it must be remembered
that all were volunteers.
 258

The answer may be ascribed to the fact that all the Levies were more
or less warlike peoples, and the British officers under whom they served, had
also freely chosen military service for their careers. Thus was created a Force
united by comradeship in military service, where admiration for soldierly
qualities overcame prejudices. The most efficient of these soldiers became
natural leaders, and were then accepted without question by their men,
because all lives depended on their military abilities.
Perhaps the most poignant assessment of the Iraq Levies lies in the re­
quoted words of Sir Arnold Wilson after the fighting at Hillah in July 1920,
during the Arab Insurrection:
.. .they have done most enterprising and gallant work at heavy cost in
killed and wounded against their own people, in spite of every
temptation and appeal to their tribal, family and religious feelings....

This thesis provides the background to the beginnings and the gradual
evolution of a military force, which became the Iraq Levies, and explains the
reasons for the retention of the Force in the years which followed World War
One. It relates the effects of personalities on its history. It also deals with the
loss in Iraq of the British garrison’s “ground troops”, pending the fitness of
the Iraq army, backed by the R.A.F., to maintain internal security. Where
possible, this thesis has provided examples of the field operations in which the
Levies were engaged. Some of these were to prevent invasion; others were, in
the interests of maintaining internal security, but unfortunately necessitated
action against the people from whom the Levies were recruited.
There can be few similar forces, raised under such difficult and
unusual circumstances, or which were more heterogeneous in their ethnic and
religious manpower structure, as the Iraq Levies. It is hoped that perhaps the
legacy of this thesis is that the early history of a one-time excellent Force has
been rescued from possible obscurity, and that thereby the service o f the most
important element of its existence—the soldiers—will be remembered.
Who shall record the glorious deeds of the soldier whose lot is
numbered with the thousands in the ranks who live and die and fight
in obscurity? (Private Wheeler, letter of 1813, quoted in Liddell Hart
(ed.), The Letters o f Private Wheeler (London, 1951).
 259

APPENDIX

CAVALRY VERSUS MOUNTED INFANTRY CONTROVERSY

During and after the Boer War, a very heated argument was conducted
in British military circles as to which possessed the greater efficiency in
battle— the “old-school” Cavalry (Arme Blanche), or the “Mounted Infantry”.
The matter was still under discussion in 1929. The main protagonists in the
“Shock” v. “Fire” controversy of 1902-13, were Field-Marshals Earl Roberts
and Earl Haig. The latter advocated “shock tactics” (meaning a cavalry
charge), in which the “horse’s momentum” was considered as important as its
rider’s weapon. This school felt that as soon as the cavalryman dismounted he
could lose his “elan” and the initial ability to establish “moral superiority”. On
the other hand, the supporters of Mounted Infantry believed in the power of
the “controlled fire of the rifleman”, the horse being used only for speed in
mobility.
For the official definition of “Mounted Infantry” (M.I.) see the War
Office manual “Yeomanry and Mounted Rifle Training”, Parts I and II, for
1912 (London), p .l. The pertinent extract states:
By Mounted Infantry is meant, fully trained infantry, mounted solely
for purposes of locomotion. Such troops are not to be regarded as
horse-soldiers, but as infantry possessing special mobility. They fight
on foot only, and are not armed or trained for mounted shock-action,
which they are not intended to employ.
 260

SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

OF PERSONALITIES

These biographical sketches are taken from Martin Gilbert, Winston S.

Churchill, vol.IV, 1916-1922 (London, 1975). The sketch of the Rev. W.A.
Wigram, however, was compiled from miscellaneous sources.

COX, Percy Zachariah, 1864-1937. Entered army, 1884. Served in India,

1884-93. Captain, 1892. Assistant Political Resident, Zeila, British
Somaliland, 1893. Led an expedition which defeated a tribal uprising at
Berbera, 1895. Political Agent and Consul at Muscat, 1899-1904. Political
Resident in Persian Gulf, 1904-14. Knighted, 1911. Accompanied Indian
Expeditionary Force to Mesopotamia as a Chief Political Officer, 1914-17.
Major-General, 1917. Acting Minister to Teheran, 1918-20. High
Commissioner, Mesopotamia, 1920-3. (Vol.IV, p.493.)

GUEST, Frederick Edward, 1875-1937. Third son of 1st Baron Wimborne,

Churchill’s cousin. Served in South African War as captain, Life Guards,
1899-1902. Private Secretary to Churchill, 1906. Liberal MP, 1910-29,
Treasurer, HM Household, 1912-15. ADC to Sir John French, 1914-16. On
active service in East Africa, 1916-17. Patronage Secretary, Treasury, May
1917-April 1921. Secretary of State for Air, April 1921-October 1922.
(Vol.IV, p. 16.)

HARDINGE, Charles, 1858-1944. Entered Foreign Office, 1880. Knighted,

1904. Ambassador at Petrograd, 1904-6. Permanent Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, 1906-10. Created Baron Hardinge of Penshurst, 1910.
Viceroy of India, 1910-16. Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, 1916-20. Ambassador to France, 1920-3. (Vol.IV, p.291.)

H IR TZ EL, Arthur, 1870-1937. Entered India Office, 1894. Secretary to

Political Department, 1909-17. Knighted, 1911, Assistant Under-Secretary for
India 1917-21; Deputy Under-Secretary 1921-4; Permanent Under-Secretary,
1924-30. (Vol.IV, p.512.)

M EINERTZHAGEN, Richard, Lt.-Colonel, 1878-1967. Of Danish origin.

Often erroneously believed to be Jewish. Second-Lt. Royal Fusiliers, 1899.
Served in India, 1899-1902. Transferred to King’s African Rifles, 1902.
Served in East Africa, France and Palestine, 1914-18. Colonel in charge of
Field Intelligence Section of General Allenby’s army, 1917-18. Employed at
War Office, 1918-19, Member of the British delegation at Paris Peace
Conference, 1919. Chief Political Officer in Palestine and Syria, 1919-20.
Military Adviser, Middle East Department, Colonial Office, 1921-4.
Published his Middle East Diary in 1959. (Vol.IV, p.582.)

M ONTAGU, Edwin, 1879-1924. Liberal MP, 1905-22. Financial Secretary

to the Treasury, February 1914-February 1915; May 1915-July 1916.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, February-May 1915; January-June
1916. Minister of Munitions, May-December 1916. Secretary of State for
India, June 1917-March 1922. (Vol.IV, p.28.)
 261

SALMOND, John Maitland, 1881-1968. Entered army, 1901. On active

service in South Africa, 1901-2. Instructor, Central Flying School, 1912. Lt.-
Colonel, 1915. Major-General, 1917. Director-General, Military Aeronautics,
1917-18. Officer Commanding Inland Area, 1920-2. Air Officer Commanding
British Forces in Iraq, 1922-5. Air Marshal, 1923. Air Officer Commanding-
in-Chief, Air Defence of Great Britain, 1925-9. Air Chief Marshal, 1929.
Chief of the Air Staff, 1930-3. Marshal of the Royal Air Force, 1933. (Vol.IV,
p.204.)

SAMUEL, Herbert Louis, 1870-1963. Liberal MP, 1902-18; 1929-35.

Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, 1909-10, Postmaster-General, 1910-14.
President of Local Government Board, 1914-15. Home Secretary, January-
December 1916. Knighted, 1920. High Commissioner for Palestine, 1 July
1920-2 July 1925. Home Secretary, 1931-2. (Vol. IV, p.176.)

SHUCKBURGH, John Evelyn, 1877-1953. Entered India Office, 1900.

Secretary, Political Department, India Office, 1917-21. Appointed Assistant
Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office by Churchill, 1921. Knighted, 1922.
Remained Assistant Under-Secretary of State until 1931. Deputy Under­
secretary of State, 1931-42. (Vol.IV, p.512.)

TRENCHARD, Hugh Montague, 1873-1956. Entered army, 1893. Active

service South Africa, 1899-1902. Major, 1902. Assistant Commandant,
Central Flying School, 1913-14. Lt.-Colonel, 1915. General Officer
Commanding Royal Flying Corps in the Field, 1915-17. Major-General, 1916.
Knighted, 1918. Chief of Air Staff, 1919-29. Air Marshal, 1919. Created
baronet, 1930. Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, 1931-5. (Vol.IV, p. 199.)

W IGRAM , Rev. William Ainger, 1872-1953, B.D. (Cantab.), D.D.

(Lambeth). Formerly Hon. Chaplain to Archbishop of Canterbury; Head of
Archbishop of Canterbury’s Mission to the Assyrian Christians in the
Hakkiari; Assyrian repatriation, Mesopotamia; Chaplain to British Legation,
Athens, 1922-8; Canon of St. Paul’s, Malta, 1928-36. Publications: The
Cradle o f Mankind; Assyrians and Their Neighbours', and Our Smallest Ally.
Source: Who Was Who, 1951-1960 (London, 1960).

W ILSON, Arnold Talbot, 1884-1940. Entered army from Sandhurst, 1903.

On duty in Persia guarding Ahwaz oilfields, 1907-9. Transferred to Indian
Political Department, 1909. Consul at Mohammerah, 1909-11. Deputy Chief
Political Officer, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 1915; Deputy Civil
Commissioner, 1918. Acting Commissioner, Mesopotamia, and Political
Resident Persian Gulf, 1918-20. Knighted, 1920., Adviser to Anglo-Persian
Oil Company, 1921-32. Author of several works on Mesopotamia and the
Persian Gulf, including Loyalties (1930), and A Clash o f Loyalties (1931).
Conservative MP, 1933-40.

N.B. These notes refer only to the period covered by the thesis. Several of the
individuals listed had distinguished careers in later years.
 262

ABBREVIATIONS

A.M. Air Marshal/Air Ministry

A.H.C. Assistant High Commissioner
A.O.C. Air Officer Commanding
A.P.O. Assistant Political Officer
A.S. Air Staff
Arty. Artillery
A.T. Animal transport
A.V.M. Air Vice-Marshal
Bde. Brigade
B.O. British officer
B.O.R. British other rank
B.O.I.A. British officer Indian Army
B.O.I.A.R. British officer Indian Army Reserve
C.A.S. Chief of Air Staff
Cav. Cavalry
C.I.G.S. Chief of Imperial General Staff
c .o . Commanding Officer/Colonial Office
Comdt, Commandant
Coy. Company (Infantry)
D.C.A.S. Deputy Chief of Air Staff
D.D.O.I. Deputy Director Operations Iraq
D.H.C. Deputy High Commissioner
Div. Division
D.O. Demi official
D.O.S.D. Director Operations Staff Duties
F.O. Foreign Office
G.O.C. General Officer Commanding
G.O.C.-in-C. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
H.C. High Commissioner
I.E.F. “D” Indian Expeditionary Force “D”
Inf. Infantry
I.O. Indian officer/India Office/Intelligence officer
I.O.R. Indian other rank
LAMB. Light armounred motor battery = armoured car
L.M.G. Light machine-gun
M.E.F. Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force
M.M.G. Medium machine-gun
N.O. Native officer
N.O.R. Native other rank
O.C. Officer Commanding
PI. Platoon (Infantry)
P.M. Prime Minister
P.O. Political Officer
Pte. Private (infantryman)
R.F.C. Royal Flying Corps
R.A.F. Royal Air Force
S. of S. Secretary of State
S.D. Special Duties
 263

Tp. Troop (cavalry)

Tpr. Trooper (cavalryman)
Sqn. Squadron (cavalry/air force)
W.O. War Office
 264

TERMINOLOGY USED IN LEVY DOCUMENTS

Agha Kurdish Tribal Chief

Argal Head-rope to retain kafiyah
Bel lam Local river cargo boat, could carry up to half a ton
of stores
Barishynas White Russians
Bash Chaoush Sergeant-major
Bolos Bolsheviks
Cacolets Pannier-type seats for carrying wounded, one on
each side o f a pack saddle
Chai-khana Tea-house
Colchis Tax collector
Iradah Royal decree
Kafiyali/chafiyah Head cloth. Chafiyali - colloquial pronunciation
Kunjar Curved dagger (Levy badge was crossed lcunjars)
Kurta Long coat reaching to knees
Lakh 100,000 rupees
Lashkar Contingent/group of irregulars as used in thesis
(classical Persian word meaning an army)
Liwa Arabic for district
Mahaila Marsh Arab heavy canoe
Malik Assyrian tribal leader
Mar-shimun Assyrian patriarch (Nestorian)
Mashoof Small Marsh Arab canoe
Mejlis A tribal council/meeting
Millet A non-Muslim people, or “Simmi” (Turkish) living
as a group within the Ottoman state under a
bilateral pact which guaranteed religious tolerance
and protection, in return for a poll tax of “jizya”
collected by official appointed by the patriarch on
behalf of the Ottoman treasury
Mujtahid Senior Muslim cleric (Persian)
Mulditar Arab village headman
Mulla Muslim cleric (Arabic)
Muntafiq Tribal coalition
Mutasarrif Arab/Turkish governor
Mutasarriflik Turkish governorship
Nafar (Nefer) Infantryman (Turkish)
Piada Foot soldier or infantry (Persian derivative)
Puttee Cloth wound round leg
Qadha Sub-district
Qaimmaqam Deputy Governor
Sangar Protective wall of stone/rocks
Sanjaq District (Turkish)
Shabana Iraqi coloquial for Turkish gendarmerie
Shabraque Decorated saddle cloth
Shaildi Arab tribal leader
Silladar cavalry Irregular cavalry (Indian) (men supply own horse
and equipment)
 265

Sowar Cavalry trooper

Tarada Marsh Arab war canoe
Wakil Thabit Warrant Officer
Wali District Governor (Turkish)
W aqf Islamic endowment
Wilayat Province
Yuzbashi Captain of 100 men (Turkish)
Zabit Officer

Native Officer Ranks - Assyrian

Rab Khaila Captain of 400
Rab Tremma Captain of 200
Rab Emma Captain of 100
Rab Khamshee Captain of 50
 266

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Winstone, H.V.F., Leachman: O.C. Desert (London, 1982)
, The Diaries of Parker Pasha, War in the Desert 1914-18 told from the secret diaries
o f Colonel Alfred Chevallier Parker, nephew of Lord Kitchener, Governor o f Sinai, and
military intelligence chief in the Arab Revolt (London, 1983)

Yapp, M.E., The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923 (London, 1987)
, The Near East since the First World War (London, 1991)
Yusuf, M., The British Betrayal of the Assyrians (New Jersey, 1935)

b) Journal articles

Ali, O. (Othman), “The Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations 1922/23”, Middle
Eastern Studies, vol.33, no.3, 1997, pp.521-34

Browne, J.G., “The Cavalry Regiments of the Iraq Levies”, The Cavalry Journal,
vol.XVIII, Jan.-Oct. 1928, pp.273-401

Lewis, K.F. McK., “The Iraq Levies”, Journal o f the Royal Artillery, vol.LIII, 1926-1927,
pp.301-6

Omissi, D.E., “Britain, the Assyrians and the Iraq Levies”, The Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, vol.XVII, no.3, May 1989, pp.301-22

Renton, J.M.L., “Modem Iraq”, The Rifle Brigade Chronicle, 1948, pp. 192-8
Renton, J.M.L. and T.R. Shepherd-Cross, “The Iraq Levies”, The Rifle Brigade Chronicle,
1926, pp.204-10
 271

Map X: Areas of Employment of Levies 1915-1921

L a k a V an

TABRIZ
L a k a U r m ia

» Urmia

Zakkho
Nl.tbln)
ly a w ' .
Dohuk-r*- N ^ DLanai t
\r I *Rowandux
N ineveh /v t B alas So
Tel Alar ■* I /S Ranla'
MOSUL

C haorlah. y
C ham chem al eP onlvIn
/ • STS ulalrnanl
KIRKUK
S Y R I
IRAQ PERSIA

Delr e i Zot
K h an aq l n
Sam arrah
Shahraban
/ V
^►Baqubah \

Ramadi
BAGHDAD
Mahmudiyeh

Hindiyah
Karbala*
Hlllah

Kul al Hai
Boundaries
* D iw anl ya h
- “ — Tui key A ma ta h
Imam Ham za
Persia
Rum eltha
S yr ia
S a m a w a h \ »Khidr Qurnah <
100mflos N a s ir iy a h
Suq-ash-ShuyukH
100 km
BASRA
Shaiba
 272

Map 2: Civil Administrative Divisions in the Occupied

Territories of Iraq, 29 June 1918

• Kirkuk

'V
►
Tuz Khurmatli

• Kifri
/ f

\
• Tikrit V
** *
* 15 -1
f* Qasr-i-Shirin
>Anah \ s amarrah;
* •S a m a r r a h ! .D eli V
\ , A bbas %• Qizil Rubat
• » * \ t

B a le d * S ,h ahraba"« S
DU L A I M \ y * 0 a ita w a h \ KHANAQIN
^ Bagubah \ *M andali

b a g h d a d \ baqubah\ ^
R am adi* 'K adhim aih * ,............- \ »
F a llu ja h \ " ■ BAGHDAD \ \

- \ ) i
A ziziyah* *9 * ”” "'%**
** <
M usaiyib* ‘ ^ B u g h a ila h * '
Karbala* V
r .
\
e »» * Kut-al-Amarah - « .
Hindiyah . h^ ^ ---------- j Gharbi \
\ H I L L A H -31 ; \

Kufah i
• • Otwaniyah \3l
‘‘\ A M A R A H
\ ^
N ajaf* * J .......................... \ _ ' .
* * A b u fSukhair ! • * * Amarah S.
% > Q alat Sikar * /
\S H A M IY A H \ .................... \
'** g, « » Qalat Salih J
Shinafiyah R um aithah, * S h a tr a h \ .

* Sam aw ah 1 N A S I R I Y A H V ..................... \
S A M A W A H ’ : Qurnah '
r t Ivl M V¥ M n , * N asiriyah .* • ! ------
*. • ** Hammar <
Note:* 1 H eadquarters ol division s underlined. J ^ J *
2 Only tow ns which are the Headquarters of a Political ***, J S u k -a sh -Sh u yu kh I Q U R N A H *
division or sub d ivision are sh ew n . ■ » * '* » /
3 Anah & Kirkuk are not at p resen t in British o ccup ation . **** ■ 9 *** *** S
4 Kirkuk, Kifri & Tuz Khurmatli form part of Mosul Vilayat. ****^ „## * * Basrah*

100 miles
B A S R A H Zubair*

I
0
I
100km

S ou rce; S .D .O . No. 2 4 6 2 N ovem ber 1918

 273

ILLUSTRATIONS OF SHABANAH/LEVY UNIFORMS

NOTE: It will be recalled that Brigadier-General A.G. Wauchope, together

with Major C.A. Boyle, Inspecting Officer Levies, inspected the Levies in
training at Hillah on 4 April 1920 (Ch.IV, p. 133). The Force had just been
divided into two parts: “The Striking Force” (consisting of mounted infantry),
and the “District Police”. The latter were to carry on the duties of the old
Shabanah, under the District Political Officers, while the former were to be
trained as a military force. Both were similar in dress and armament at this
time. The uniforms, equipment and armament of the Force left much to be
desired.
The situation with regard to equipment and small arms was no better than the
motley uniforms. There were no “rifle buckets” and so the mounted infantry
are depicted carrying their rifles while mounted, and it will be noted that those
rifles vary in type. The arms have been identified by the staff of the National
Army Museum.
With the exception of Item 1 on the illustrations, which is taken from J.G.
Browne’s book The Iraq Levies 1915-32, the remainder, for which the exact
dates are unknown, are by courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.
The brief captions of the Museum are not correct for these illustrations. They
state “Arab Police Training”. No doubt the photographer(s) confused the
“District Police” with the “Municipal Police” who were a completely different
force trained only in police work. They wore a brass number plate over the
left breast, and the headdress was a black astrakhan cap with badge.
The last two illustrations have been included to show how the Force had
improved and the uniform established by c. 193 8.
 274

IL L U S T R A T I O N S
1. T he d evelop m en t o f the dress and uniform o f the Iraq L e v ie s, fro m 1 9 1 6 -1 9 1 7 .

2. Typical Shabanah/Levy dress/uniform c. 1918-20. Note the variations in

headdress supplied by the men; also the rifles which, in this picture, are .577
Snider carbines.
 275

E a rly 1 9 1 6 . 1 9 1 6 -1 9 1 7 . L a te 1 9 1 7 .

THE IRAQ LEVIES.

3. A British NCO Instructor adjusting the very ornate headdress of, perhaps, an Arab
NCO in basic training, c. 1919-20.

4. Recruits’ rudimentary musketry training. Note yet another type of rifle in use in
c. 1918-20: from left to right, the first two men have .450 Martini carbines, the
third man has a .450 Remington carbine, and the fourth a Martini carbine. In
view of the condition of some of the weapons, they may well have been, in this
case, privately owned.
276
5 and 6.Mounted infantry training 1919-20. The negotiation of a nullah/wadi; also
mounted troop and squadron drill in the field. The mounts are mostly Arab
ponies of about fourteen hands.
277
Newly arrived Assyrian Levy recruits, still in their tribal dress, being introduced
to drill by an Assyrian Rab Khamshee (native lieutenant) c.1938. Note the
typical round Assyrian caps, and the Assyrian “Kunjar” (dagger) worn in the sash
of the second man in the front row.

Assyrian Levies on kit inspection, Habbaniyah c.1938 - a transformation.

 278

B liL \
LONOm.J
m i/