10 Criminal Justice Reform Vol 4 Community-Punishments
10 Criminal Justice Reform Vol 4 Community-Punishments
10 Criminal Justice Reform Vol 4 Community-Punishments
Michael Tonry*
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the most recent year for which standardized national European
data are available, 9.6% of convicted offenders in Sweden were sentenced to
confinement.1 In Germany, 5.4% of convicted offenders. In Finland, 3.1%.2
By contrast, in the United States in 2009, also the most recent year for which
national data are available, 73% of people convicted of felonies were sentenced
to jail or prison, including 83% of violent, 75% of property, and 71% of drug
offenders.3 In the federal courts in 2015, 92.8% of convicted people were
sentenced to confinement.4
Stop for a minute and think about the contrast between the extreme cases.
Ninety-three percent of convicted U.S. federal offenders received prison
sentences; 97% of convicted Finnish offenders did not. The explanation for
that stunning difference is neither that most federal offenders have committed
substantially more serious crimes than most Finnish offenders nor that Finland
is an extraordinarily pacific, Eden-like place. Well under 5% of sentenced
federal offenders in 2015 were convicted of violent crimes; nearly a third were
convicted of immigration offenses (mostly minor), a fifth of drug offenses, and
a fifth of property offenses. Both Finland and the United States have crime
patterns and rates that fall in the middle among developed countries.5 After the
United States, Finland has and long has had the highest homicide rate among
Western developed countries. The Finnish rate is typically two to three times as
high as those of other Western European countries.
The difference in punishment patterns between the United States and all
other Western developed countries results from differences in the salience of
crime and punishment as a political issue and in cultural attitudes toward the
severity of punishment. These differences can be seen in the American retention
and all other Western countries’ abandonment of capital punishment,6 in
the presence of three-strikes, truth in sentencing, life without parole, and
mandatory minimum sentence laws in the United States, and their absence
from other countries’ sentencing laws,7 and in four decades of largely failed
efforts to encourage the use of community punishments in the United States.
The single most common finding of evaluations of community punishment
programs meant to be used by judges in place of imprisonment has long been
that they are more often imposed on people who otherwise would have received
lesser punishments than on people who would have been locked up.8
The United States cannot avoid continued mass incarceration unless use
of community punishments increases enormously for people who otherwise
would be (and now are) sentenced to confinement.9 Shorter prison terms and
repeal of mandatory minimum sentence and similar laws also are necessary,
but those things by themselves will not do the job. A wide range of community
punishments could be adopted that are commonly used in other Western
countries. These include resolution by mediation; diversion from prosecution
conditioned on payment of fines, making restitution, or performance of
5. JAN VAN DIJK ET AL., CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: KEY FINDINGS
FROM THE 2004–2005 ICVS AND EU ICS (2007).
6. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, “Capital Punishment,” in the present
Volume.
7. See, e.g., Erik Luna, “Mandatory Minimums,” in the present Volume.
8. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990).
9. For a discussion of mass incarceration, see Todd R. Clear & James Austin, “Mass
Incarceration,” in the present Volume.
Community Punishments 189
community service; much greater use of fines for non-trivial crimes; suspended
prison sentences; community service; and diverse forms of supervision and
community-based treatment.
A complete package will also include substantially increased use of
unconditional discharges following conviction and sentences to unsupervised
probation. In neither instance do convicted offenders thereby escape
punishment. Anyone convicted of crime has endured fear and anxiety. All
experience demeaning assembly-line processing. Many spend overnight in jail
awaiting a preliminary hearing. Many remain in jail until they are convicted.
All will understand, as a classic study of criminal courts long ago showed, that
“the process is the punishment.”10 For such cases, unconditional discharges
should be the norm, unsupervised probation the exception. Otherwise,
probation agencies will have to allocate resources to lowest-risk offenders, and
probationers who judges believe do not warrant further state intrusion in their
lives will be at risk of revocations and imprisonments for violation of technical
conditions. New crimes, when they occur, should be handled as new crimes.
If policymakers want to adopt policies based on evidence, doing so is
rational, cost-effective, and easy. Community programs that are well-conceived,
well-managed, well-targeted, and adequately financed have repeatedly been
shown to reduce reoffending.11 Many hundreds of evaluations have shown that
participants in community punishments achieve reoffending rates no worse
than those of comparable people sentenced to confinement. That last finding
means that, except concerning a small percentage of unusually dangerous
people, vast sums spent on imprisonment are—from a crime-prevention
perspective—wasted. Historian James M. McPherson said, of the pre-Civil
War Southern response to abolitionism, “The South closed its mind.”12
American policymakers of the past three decades likewise closed their minds
to meaningful use of community punishments in place of imprisonment. Not
much will happen until that attitude changes.
A steadily accumulating literature confirms the observation two centuries
ago by John Howard, the first prominent English prison reformer, that prisons
are “schools for crime.”13 All else being equal, people sentenced to imprisonment
10. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL
COURT (1979).
11. E.g., DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONS: REDUCING THE CRIMINAL
ACTIVITIES OF OFFENDERS AND DELINQUENTS (2006).
12. James M. McPherson, America’s Greatest Movement, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 26, 2016, at 64
(reviewing MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITIONISM (2016)).
13. See generally JOHN HOWARD, THE STATE OF THE PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1777).
190 Reforming Criminal Justice
are more, not less, likely to reoffend than are comparable people sentenced to
community punishments.14 There is nothing surprising about this. Prisoners
are immersed in inmate subcultures and intensively exposed to the deviant
values of chronic offenders. Many prisons are brutal and brutalizing places to
which prisoners must accommodate for self-protection.15 Almost all prisons
are resource-poor and unable to provide adequate drug, mental-health, and
other treatment, training, and educational programs to meet prisoners’ needs.16
Being sentenced to imprisonment undermines and often impoverishes
prisoners’ families and children. The resulting stigma and collateral legal
consequences foreclose opportunities and access to resources that make released
prisoners’ later lives more difficult and their employment prospects worse.17
Nothing I’ve written here is new, controversial, or likely to surprise
knowledgeable corrections professionals or other well-informed people. Most
of it has been well known for decades, some of it for centuries. Nonetheless, it
has largely been ignored since imprisonment rates began their 35-year increase
in 1973. Despite the alternatives-to-corrections movement in the 1970s, the
intermediate-punishments movement of the 1980s, and the community-
corrections initiatives that began in the 1990s, most community punishments
programs are under-funded, poorly managed, and lack adequate access to
services and treatment programs.
Creating effective community punishments will require much more than
new programs, increased funding, and better management. It will require a
change of heart by policymakers. Despite much ballyhoo, however, bipartisan
support for change shows few signs of happening. One compelling sign is the
failure of most “justice reinvestment” efforts to reduce prison populations
substantially and reallocate enormous foreseeable savings in prison expenditure
to community-corrections programs. Most have not produced substantial
declines in actual as opposed to projected prison populations. Where prisoner
numbers have fallen significantly, the savings have seldom been reallocated
14. Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Re-offending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115 (2009);
Francis Cullen et al., Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science, 91
PRISON J. 48S (2011).
15. See Sharon Dolovich, “Prison Conditions,” in the present Volume.
16. Cf. Margo Schlanger, “Prisoners with Disabilities,” in the present Volume.
17. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCE (2014). For a discussion of collateral consequences
see Gabriel J. Chin, “Collateral Consequences,” in the present Volume.
Community Punishments 191
18. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: CHARTING A NEW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT
(2013); NANCY LAVIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE ASSESSMENT
REPORT (2014).
19. Newt Gingrich & Van Jones, Prison System Is Failing America, CNN (May 22, 2014), http://
www.cnn.com/2014/05/21/opinion/gingrich-jonesprison-system-fails-america/index.html.
20. See MICHAEL H. TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975–2025, at
206 (2016).
192 Reforming Criminal Justice
21. By contrast, laws in many European countries authorize prosecutors to resolve cases
without convictions if suspects agree to pay fines or restitution or perform community service.
See, e.g., Thomas Weigend, No News Is Good News: Sentencing in Germany Since 2000, 45 CRIME &
JUST. 83 (2016) (discussing conditional dismissals in Germany); Henk van de Bunt & Jean-Louis
van Gelder, The Dutch Prosecution Service, 41 CRIME & JUST. 117 (2012) (discussing transactions
in the Netherlands).
22. Michael Tonry, Why Crime Rates Are Falling Throughout the Western World, 43 CRIME &
JUST. 1 (2014).
Community Punishments 193
and save money instead sent more people to prison and increased costs. In
retrospect, proponents of intermediate punishments made a huge mistake in
not anticipating that the new programs would be used to toughen sentencing
rather than, as they hoped, to reduce the use of imprisonment.
Examples illustrate the toughening dynamic. The National Institute of
Justice (NIJ) provided funding for several states to establish and evaluate day-
fine systems for use as prison alternatives. Day fines are common in Germany
and Scandinavia as penalties for low- and moderate-severity offenses. The
seriousness of the crime determines the number of day-fine units (for example,
30). The individual’s daily income (adjusted for wealth) determines the amount
of a single unit. A low-income offender might be required to pay 20 euros per
day and an affluent one 300. The NIJ evaluation design called for randomized
allocation of eligible offenders to day fines or to whatever sentence the judge
ordinarily would order. The projects failed. In most, despite the federal grants
that paid for the pilot projects, practitioners refused to implement day fines at
all. In none did practitioners agree to random allocation.29
Intensive supervision programs offer a second example. NIJ funded a multi-
jurisdiction experiment to determine the programs’ effects on recidivism.
Eligible offenders were to be randomly allocated by judges or corrections
officials to intensive supervision or the default disposition. Researchers would
track the experiences of program participants and control group members to
learn what happened. There was, however, an insuperable obstacle. Judges in all
participating jurisdictions refused to follow the experimental research design
and insisted on being able to sentence eligible offenders to imprisonment on
a case-by-case basis. Follow-ups of programs in which parole or probation
officials randomly allocated cases showed that intensive supervision had no
effects on recidivism rates but increased revocation rates. This was no surprise
because, evaluators found, the closer supervision disclosed more breaches of
conditions and the program operators seldom had adequate access to treatment
programs and other services.30
Changes in the ethos of parole and probation revocation practice illustrate
a third obstacle. Throughout the 1980s, probation and parole revocations and
their shares of prison admissions steadily increased as judges’ and parole boards’
attitudes toward offenders became more unforgiving. Officials responded
more harshly to breaches of conditions than in earlier periods, especially for
29. Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, 12 CRIME & JUST. 49 (1990); Cheryl Lero Jonson &
Francis T. Cullen, Prisoner Reentry Programs, 44 CRIME & JUST. 517 (2015).
30. Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Intensive Probation and Parole, 17 CRIME & JUST. 281
(1993).
196 Reforming Criminal Justice
technical violations such as failing drug tests or not appearing for scheduled
appointments.31 In some states, revocations came to constitute a large fraction,
often more than half, of all prison admissions.
The new intermediate punishments often had the perverse effect that more,
not fewer, offenders wound up in prison.32 Their rationale was that diversion
of prison-bound offenders would reduce prison crowding and save substantial
money because the per capita costs of intermediate-punishment programs—
typically $1,000 to $10,000—are a small fraction of the per capita cost of
imprisonment ($30,000 to $75,000, depending on the state). The experience
was otherwise.
The new programs typically resulted in extensive “net-widening.”
Evaluations consistently showed that judges used new tougher community
sanctions mostly to impose harsher punishments on people who previously
were sentenced to ordinary probation. They were comparatively seldom
ordered for people who previously would have been imprisoned. Because
the more intensive new programs were strictly enforced, half to two-thirds of
participants were commonly imprisoned following revocations for breaches of
conditions. People who previously received ordinary probation were bumped
up to intermediate punishments and, when they breached conditions, were
bumped up again to imprisonment. More, not fewer, people wound up in
prisons, and corrections costs went up, not down.
31. Michael Tonry, Stated and Latent Functions of ISP, 36 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 174 (1990).
32. MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 8.
33. See Richard C. Boldt, “Problem-Solving Courts,” in Volume 3 of the present Report.
Community Punishments 197
34. MACKENZIE, supra note 11; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PAROLE, DESISTANCE
FROM CRIME, AND COMMUNITY INTEGRATION (2008). For a discussion of rehabilitation, see Francis T.
Cullen, “Correctional Rehabilitation,” in the present Volume.
35. Ojmarrh Mitchell et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of Drug Courts on Recidivism: A Meta-
Analytic Review of Traditional and Non-traditional Drug Courts, 40 J. CRIM. JUST. 60 (2012).
36. Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, SENT’G & CORRECTIONS
(May 2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/nij/181413.pdf; JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME
BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2005).
37. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY (2003).
198 Reforming Criminal Justice
Hawaii’s Project HOPE, a probation initiative based on “swift, fair, and certain”
sanctions.42 Probationers are told that any breach of conditions will result in
immediate sanctions, initially modest but progressing in severity with each
subsequent breach, eventually resulting in revocation and a trip to prison for
a period of years. An initial evaluation purported to show that probationers
subjected to the program reoffended less often than others and were less likely
to be imprisoned.43 NIJ funded a series of replications that were evaluated using
randomized assignments of eligible offenders to treatment and control groups.
The new evaluations concluded that the programs were ineffective.44
Project HOPE was misconceived from the outset. “Swift, fair, and certain”
is much more apt for conditioning dogs or horses than for dealing with
disadvantaged low-level offenders, many drug-dependent or mentally ill, and
most living socially disorganized lives. What they as a group need is structured
access to diverse services and forms of support to help them address human-
capital deficiencies and establish pro-social patterns of living. Operation HOPE
treated compliance with probation conditions as an end in itself.
HOPE is inconsistent with ways of thinking that are necessary if successful use
of community punishments is to be greatly increased. HOPE is fundamentally
punitive and indifferent to the complexities of the lives of the people it affects.
A disadvantaged, socially inadequate person subjected to HOPE will remain
a disadvantaged, socially inadequate person even if he or she successfully
completes a probation term.
42. MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LOW CRIME AND LOW
PUNISHMENT (2009).
43. ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, MANAGING DRUG INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND
CERTAIN SANCTIONS. EVALUATING HAWAII’S HOPE (Dec. 2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/229023.pdf.
44. Pamela K. Lattimore et al., Outcome Findings from the HOPE Demonstration Field
Experiment: Is Swift, Certain, and Fair an Effective Supervision Strategy?, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 1103 (2016); Daniel J. O’Connell et al., Decide Your Time: A Randomized Trial of a Drug
Testing and Graduated Sanctions Program for Probationers, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1073
(2016).
200 Reforming Criminal Justice
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Reduce use of community punishments for minor and low-risk
offenders. American judges and parole boards much too often use
community punishments for people convicted of minor crimes and for
people who present little risk of reoffending. In 2015, American prisons
and jails held 2.17 million people. Another 4.65 million were under
community supervision. Calculated as population rates, both of those
numbers are vastly higher than in any other Western country.46 Current
use of community supervision is enormously wasteful; the vast majority
of people being supervised present little risk to public safety. One of the
most robust findings of the last two decades’ research on correctional
programs is that resources should target high-risk offenders. The current
failure to do that makes little sense from cost-effectiveness or public-safety
45. Cullen, Rehabilitation, supra note 40; Cullen et al., Reinventing Community Corrections,
supra note 40.
46. DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015 (Dec. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf.
Community Punishments 201
47. Petter Asp, The Prosecutor in Swedish Law, 41 CRIME & JUST. 141 (1993); Bunk & Gelder,
supra note 21; Weigend, supra note 21.
48. Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 26.
49. See Beth A. Colgan, “Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures,” in the present Volume.
202 Reforming Criminal Justice
imprisonment for women convicted of welfare fraud. The idea was quickly
and successfully emulated in England and Wales, Scotland, and The
Netherlands and later spread throughout Europe. By the 1990s, however,
American use of community service as a freestanding punishment had
largely ended. When it was used, it was as one among many conditions of
probation.50 This is the federal court practice. No freestanding community
punishments other than probation are authorized in the federal sentencing
guidelines: All are available only as probation conditions.
Community service ought to be an obviously appropriate community
penalty in the United States. It is essentially a fine on time, paid in work
installments, and scaled to the seriousness of crime.
5. Probation with treatment conditions. The evaluation literature on
correctional treatment shows that a wide range of programs when
adequately funded, managed, and targeted, can change people’s lives.
Many including drug treatment, cognitive skills training, vocational
training, educational programs, and mental-health treatment are self-
evidently appropriate conditions for probation sentences in fitting
cases. Sometimes they may involve intensive supervision or intermittent
confinement in treatment facilities.
Whether such sentences are effective, however, fundamentally depends
on the availability, adequate funding, and professional operation of
treatment facilities. Simply imposing treatment conditions or intensive
supervision, without assuring that necessary services can be provided
and that necessary programs are available, invites failure. Failure is also
likely if supervision is rigid and unforgiving. Many conditions that affect
offenders, including especially alcohol and drug dependence and mental
illness, almost inevitably result in relapses. Like overeating or nicotine
addiction, alcohol and drug dependence are chronic, relapsing problems.
Failures are foreseeable. The realistic goal is not immediate abstinence (as
in Project HOPE), but fewer relapses, and longer intervals between them,
as part of efforts to help offenders establish satisfying, law-abiding lives.
CONCLUSION
Community punishments should be used much less for people whose
characteristics and lives do not warrant them, and much more for people who
would otherwise receive jail or prison sentences. Diverting a large percentage
of people now sentenced to jail or prison into well-run, adequately funded,
51. Katherine Beckett et al., The End of an Era? Understanding the Contradictions of Criminal
Justice Reform, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 238 (2016); TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS,
supra note 20.