Air Force Flight Wright-Patterson: Dynamics Laboratory AFB, Ohio 45433

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N79-15615

A HEAD-UP DISPLAY FOR MID-AIR DRONE RECOVERY i

i W.L. Augustine, E. L. Heft

Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory


Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433

I. G. Bowen

llth lactical Drone Squadron


Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona 85707

and

R. L. Newman

Crew Systems Consultants


Yellow Springs, Ohio 45387

SUMMARY

During mid-air retrieval of parachute packages, the absence of a natural #


horizon creates serious difficultiesfor the pilot of the recovery helicop-
ter. A head-up display (HUD) was tested in an attempt to solve this problem.
Both a roll-stabilizedHUD and a no-roll (pitch only) HUD were tested.

lhe results show that fewer missed passes occured with the roll-stabi-
lized HUD when the horizon was obscured. The pilots also reported that the
workload was greatly reduced. Roll-stabilizationwas required to prevent
vertigo when flying in the absence of a natural horizon. Any HUD intended
For mid-air retrieval should dispiay pitch, roll, sideslip, airspeed, and
vertical velocity.

INIRODUCTION

One of the most successful ways to recover drones is the mid-air re-
trieval system (MARS). During these recoveries,a parachute system is de-
ployed from a descendingdrone prior to retrieval. A typical pazachute sys-
tem consists of an engagement parachute connected by a load line to the drone
and a main parachute canopy supporting the drone. The main canopy is de-
signed to release when the load line from the drone to'the engagement para-
chute is under tension. The load line is routed up the main canopy risers 1
to a break-tie at its apex, then up to the engagement parachute. _

To recover the drone or other object, the pilot flies the helicopter to
approach the engagement parachute from the side opposite the load line.
• 0
381 II_TE_TIO_L_LLY _LAN_
This location is shown by an aiming panel on the main canopy. The helicopter
has three hooks rigged beIow it which catch load carrying members in the en-
gagement parachute. These hooks are connected to an energy absorbing winch
aboard the helicopter. As the ioad line absorbs the tension after engage-
ment, the apex tie releases, Followed by main canopy separation, and the
drone is carried by the load line supported from the helicopter. Figure l
shows the heiicopter and parachute system just prior to engagement.

Safe and consistent MARS operations depend on the pilot's ability to


match the helicopter'svertical veiocity with the parachute's while cIosing
with the top or the engagement parachute. At the same time, the helicopter
must approach From a specific directinn to ensure that the load line will not
be pulled through the main canopy.

The pilot's primary visual cue is the alignment of the helicopter, the
top of the engagement parachute, and the horizon. If the horizon is obscured
by smoke, haze, or clouds, or if false horizons are present, the pilot has
extreme difficuIty in judging his position relative to the target. Under
these circumstances,attempted recovery can be dangerous and Fruitless.

Variations in the size of the parachute canopies can produce illusions


or being too high or too low relative to the engagement parachute. The pilot
must allow the canopy top to pass beneath the Fuselage as the helicopter
closes with the engagement parachute. The apparent change in position from
level to approximately twelve Feet below the helicopter can make engagement
difficult to judge. These visual problems are compounded by the need for
precise heading and roll control since any degree of uncoordinated Flight is
magnified in the pole position. Airspeed must be maintained within a small
band (45 to 60 knots) for proper operation of the energy absorbing winch.

The head-up display has been used to assist pilots during visual track-
ing tasks. The HUD is an outgrowth of the reflecting gunsight and presents
Flight instrument data in the pilot's Field of view as he looks at external
visual cues. Io date, HUDs have been applied to two main areas: weapons
delivery(_) and landing approach(_,_). A survey of HUD technology is also
available(_).

HUDs serve to combine real world visual cues with derived data. These
data sources are complementary. It would be difficult to reproduce the real
world cues artificially. At the same time, the derived data presents infor-
mation that the pilot cannot perceive directly, or only with greatdifficulty.
One must be careful, however, to ensure that both data Fields are compatible.
As Singleton points out(_), there is a basic incompatibilitybetween the
redundant, analogue data of the real world and the symbolic, often digital
data of artificial displays, lhe problem is Further complicated by the need
for careful attention to retain proper balance, so that the proper display
(real world or artificial data) dominates. During visual tracking, the real
world must dominate with the flight instrument data providing supplementary
information, lhe roles reverse during instrument flight. However, the HUD
must not be such a compelling sight that the pilot Fixates on it to the ex-
clusion of the real world. This has definite implications on pi]ot learning
andhas been reporLedelsewhere(2). Thesecomments were verified by conversa-

382

• J
_m
Br - -

tions with HUD-qualifiedpilots prior to the development of the test p/an


for this study, as well as during preliminary HUD flights.

EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION
t

The particular HUD evaluated in this study is a modified electro-mechan-


ical unit manufactured by SundstrandData Control. The system consists of
two pilot display units, a control module, and a computer. The HUD was de-
veloved from a commercial t:ansport display known as the Visual Approach
Monitor (VAM). lhe VAM presents pitch and longitudinal flight patch infor-
mation to the pilot. No roll or heading information is supplied. The VAM
was designed to minimize the problems of judging final approach path angles
during visual approaches. It is presently in operational use with Pacific
Western Airlines in their arctic support flights(_). It has also been eval-
uated in several military and civilian airplanes.

Roll information is not considered essential since the VAM was designed
for use on final approach in visual conditions only. Later VAMBincorporate
an airspeed index showing deviation from a reference speed. A color-coded
index shows deviation with a red S for slow, a yellow F for fast, and a green
O for correct airspeed, lhis peripheral cue is simlliar to the angle-of-
attack indexes on some military airplanes.

lhe Light Line is a further development of the basic VANdisplay. De-


veloped under support from the AFFDL, the Light Line presents both pitch and
roll information as well as a flight path angle display appearing as a beam
of light emanating from the airplane to the projected impact point. Ihis
display was evaluated as an approach aid in USAF I-}B airplanes at the In-
strument Flight Center(6).

The HUD used in this study is a further development of the VAM/Light


Line displays. At the start of the pro(.am, it was not clear if roll-stabil-
ization would be required, lherefore a roll/no-roll option was provided
through a roll cut-out switch. Airspeed data was provided with a VAM-type
airspeed index, and a "ball bank" indicator _howed sideslip information.
Figure 2 shows the symbology of the test M_:S HUD.

SCOPE OF EXPERIMENI _

lhe overall purpose of this program was to determine whether a HUD will
assist the pilot of a MARShelicopter with recoveries in low visibility con-
ditions and will also enhance training and standardization, lhe experimen-
tal objective was to determine whether a no-roll presentation is acceptable
for MARSoperations. If not, is a roll-stabilized horizon bar acceptable?
Specific questions to be answered were: (1) What changes in MARSperformance
(precision and smoothness of control, airspeed control, and maintenance of
the sight picture) are attributed to the HUD? (2) What is the pilot workload
change induced by the HUD? (3) What are pilot preferences for, and potential

383
operational problems associated with roll-stabilized and non-roll-stabilized
HUD formats? and (4) What changes in HUD format, data, or procedures will
help lmprove MARS performance?

The evaluation was originally pIanned to be conducted in two phases,both


to be flown from Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, in visual flight conditions.
Phase I was to be flown using 80 Ib weights with modified personnel para-
chutes (fWs) as targets. Actual engagement was not planned. A counterbal-
anced experiment was designed using the two HUD presentations (roll-stabi-
lized - RH, and rig-roll- NR) and a no HUD control (NH). The experiment
was arrat_gedto yield useful data with as few as four subJectsand six sorties,
although the planned numbers were six subject pilots and ten sorties.

Phase IT was to follow and consist of two MARS recoveries of 1800 lb


dummy vehicles (DVs) with tandem parachutes (main and engagement parachute
system described above). This phase was intended to validate the results of
Phase I which used single parachutes as targets with no recoveries. During
Phase I, the advantages of the HUD were so obvious that Phase I was curtailed
at the minimum allowed in the experimental design. Phase IT was expanded to
include a thirty day operational evaluation at an operating location (Ol).
During this evaluation, eighteen operational drones were recovered using
the HUD.

PIIASEI: INITIAL TESTING

Each subject pilot flow on one or two sorties. A sortie consisted of


approximatelythirty minutes of familiarizationwith the HUD, followed by up
to twelve simulated MAR5 passes to TWs. All three HUD configurationswere
used on a given sortie: RH, NR, and NH. The order was varied to minimize the
effect of learning. Each subject pilot completed a pre-experimentquestion-
naire, rating cards after each series of passes, a post-flightquestionnaire,
and a post-experimentquestionnaire, the safety pilot completed a rating
card after each pass.

A total of six sorties were flown using four subject pilots. All four
subjects were well qualified in CH-3 MARS operations. CH-3 flying experience
ranged from 800 to 1800 hours with a total flying experience range of 2500
to 2950 hours. All pilots were CH-} instructor pilots. The safety pilots
were also CH-3 instructorp/lots. One of the subjects also served as a safe-
Ly pilot after he completed his flights as a subject. None of the pilots had
flown any HUD-equipped aircL'aft prior to this evaluaLion.

Pre-experiment Ouestionnaire

In addition to establishing the subjects' qualitications,the question-


naire asked for their assessment of the MARS mission. Counting the safety
pilot and the copilut on one Phase IT DV recovery, six questionnaires were
compleled. The consensus was that the most significant visual problem was
determining the position relative to the engagement parachute in the absence

384
i

+
of a natural horizon. The pilots also commented on the difficulty of transi-
tioning from keeping the parachute on the horizon to passing over the canopy
just prlor to engagement. Two pilots felt that roll information would be very
important in a MARSHUD, but not essential. Three felt that it would be
desirable, and one pilot had a neutral opinion.

SubJective Workload

There was no major change in overall subjective workload as reported by


the pilots. However, sideslip was perceived as easier to control with either
HUDthan with no HUDo Roll was reported to be easier with the RH configura-
tion than wlth the NR HUD. Table I shows the data.

Need for Additional Data

rile pilots all felt a need to come "inside" for more data than was shown
on the HUD. All reported a need for airspeed until they adapted to the aic-
speed indexes. All required vertical velocity data. Rest required sideslip
information with NH, but either HUD provided this data to the pilots' satis-
faction. Roll and pitch data were required in the absence of a HUDby some
pilots; the RH configuration eliminated the need to come lnside for either.
One pilot felt a need for torque oc RPN,

The need for additional data is sun,narized in Table If. The HUD was felt
to be useful only during final approaches since the horiz=_ bar was displaced
beyond the limits of the combiner glass during the turns to final approach,

No focus or visual conflict was reported. Two pilots reported difficulty


with the airspeed cue. Commentswere also made about the HUD blocking the
view of the parachute as it passed beneath the helicopter.

Performance

Under the excelJent visibiliLy conditions present aL Davis-Nonthan AFB_


there was no difference in the miss rates (reported by the safety pLlot or
by the pole operator) between the RH and the Nit confiqurations. Both had
miss rates of 22._ (4 misses in 18 passes), lhe absence of roll data causes
the miss PaLe to increase to 28_ (4 misses in 14 passes). [his is not statis-
tically significant.

i Concern Over High or Low Passes i

: The pilots were generally less concerned over high or low passes with the _
HUD than wiLhouL. One pilot eolnmented that while he was less concerned in
general, the lo_s of sight of the parachute on short final (blocked by the HUD
hardware) did bother him° (Note= this subject pilot also fle_ as a safety
pilot and as a subject pilot during Phase ]l and felt that it was not a prob-
lem after adaptation.) Either HUOconfiguration caused the "hits" to be con-
centrated at the pole tips.

385

at
Other Comments

Additional commente were made. Significant comments (paraphrased)are:


(I) Airspeed too far From center () subjects), (2) Display should be moved
closer Lo pilot (3 subjects), (3) HUD would help training by providing a com-
mon sight picture Lo instructor and student (3 subjects), (4) Practice Lime
was Leo limited (3 subjects) and the ]earning curve was slow For aiCspeed con-
trol (I subject), and (5) The horizon line should be made more intense than
the aiming V (I subject).

PHASEII: OPERATIONALEVALUATION

Following the decislon to conduct an operational evaluation at the OL,


the two pilots chosen to fly the evaluation each flew a training sorties con-
sisting of practice MARSapproaches to two TWs, followed by a sorties with an
actual recovery of an 1800 lb DV. The two pilots were already experienced with
the HUD, having flown as safety pilots in Phase I (one also Flew as the first
subject).

The HUDwas removed from the helicopter used for Phase I and for the four
sorties described above, it was then taken to the OL and installed in another
CH-3. Eighteen operational recoveries ware made at the OL during the month of
April 1975. Only the RH display was used for recoveries during this phase, al-
though the NR moae was briefly evaluated during other Flying in the haze con-
ditions prevalent at the Ol.

Both DV recoveries at Davis-HonthanAFB were made on the First pass. OF


the eighteen HUD-assistedengagements at the OL, sixteen were made on the
first pass*, one on the second, and one on the third pass. One mission had a
no-HUD recovery (4th pass) because of excessive display vibration, ]he miss
rate using the HUDwas 14% (per pass),

Benefit of HUD

The second operational sortie typifies the benefit of the HUD. On this
sortie, the load line break-ties had separated from the main canopy resulting
in the engagement parachute lying over and remaining at the same altitude as
the main canopy. With the horizon obscured by haze, rain, and clouds, the HUD
alJo_ed a BuccessFul recovery on the first pass. The pilots Felt that in the
absence of a HUD, there would have been multiple missed passes an6 very likely
a lost drone.

The pilots felt that pilot workload was much lower with the HUO.

_isu_l Illusion_

Both pilots co_ented on an illusion during passes with the HUD in mar-
gins1 weather, lhey had the illuslon of being correctly lined up with the
engagement parachute, but the fILM)showed them to be high. Confidence in the

* Counting one tear-out as a successful pass

386
.!

HUD from their experience in Arizona allowed them to use the HUD to correct
their flight paths and make consistent catches.
t

Need for Roll-Stabilization

lhe HUD proved to be highly satisfactory under adverse _eather conditions


with roll-stabilization; but without roll a serious problem was encountered.
Both pilots felt that manuevering in haze induced vertigo, lhey considered
that roll-stabilization was an essential requiremant for use in reduced visi-
bility.

DISCUSSION "_

Operational Effectiveness

[here were 77 NARSpasses during the evaluation. Of these_ fifty passes


were made to 80 lb IWs and success/failure was estimated by the safety pilot
or pole operator. The remaining 27 passes were made to DVs or to actual
drones with success being defined as an engagement (or a tear-out). Of the
77 total passes, twenty-five were made during drone recoveries in haze at the
0L. ]he remaining passes (50 IWs and 2 DV_) were made in good weather in
Arizona.

Wemust further separate the data intu learning and steady-state perform-
ance. To do this, we shall classify all no-HUD passes as steady-state _ince
all subjects were considered to be highly qualified by their organizations.
All Phase I passes with either HUD should be considered as learning passes.
Ihe actual recoveries made using the roll-stabilized HUO, both DVs and opera-
tional drones, can be classed as steady-state performance. Thus we have _2
]earning passes and 45 steady-state performance passes.

]he performan('e comparison between the two HUD versions can only be based
on the learning data. Because of the small sample size, the differen:e in
miss rates is not significant.

]o cow, are the performance of the RH and the no-flUe baseline, we must use
steady-staLe performance and, as a result, e_late the difficulty of making
passes to IWs and to tar=demparachutes, although the motion of the tandem
parachute system makeu actual recoveries harder. Likewise_ we must equate the
difficulty or operating in Arizona in good visibility to the difficulty of i
operating at the OL in haze and smoke. Since the NH passes were mostly made i
to INs at Davis-Nonthan AFB, these assumptions are heavily weighted against
the HUD. !

Nevertheless, the miss rates were ._uch lower with tim }IUO (] misses in
23 passes or 13_) than witt_0ut the tlUD (J2_ missed). Again the limited data
precludes mly statistical test (XZ=2.29, dr=l, O.2>p>O.l). HoweverD in view
of the heavily biassed test conditions, this difference in miss rates should
be considered valid.

387

1979007417-37'
Mission Success Rate

To convert from miss rate (i. e., fraction of passes missed) to mission
success rate (i. e., fraction of drones recovered), we use the familiar par-
allel redundancy formula:

MISSION SUCCESS RA]E = 1 - (MISS RATE)n

where n is the number of passes possible befor_ the drone is too low for a
safe pads. With a typical value of n = 3, we can compute the mission success
rates. For the roll HUD, the learning curve performance is 98.9% and the
steady-sLateperformance in 99.8% of all drones recowred. The steady-state
baseline (no HUD) performance is 96.8,%.

Again, the assumptions favor the no HUD case. If we look at the one
sortie where the HUD malfunctioned (3 misses out of four passes), the corres-
ponding mission success rate for no HUD in haze would be 58%. This figure
is consistentwith mission recovery r3tes of less than fifty percent which
have been reported in no-horizon conditions.

Flight Safety

The primary hazard during MARS operations is collision with the para-
chute. During Phase I, it was noticed that the successful passes with the HUD
were concentrated at the pole tips. This effect is probably the result of the
aiming V helping the pilot to make a smooth transition to allow the parachute
to pass beneath the helicopter into the engagement window. While this effect
was only noticed with passes to TWs, it will undoubtedly reduce the number of
nose or belly slaps during training and certainly minimize the risk of a ca-
tastrophiccollision. It is not ciear whether the aiming V should be adjus-
table to accommodiatedifferent size parachutes. The pilot opinions were
divided and no tests were conducted.

While no particular problems with the no-roll HUD were noted during
flights in good weather, the pilots at the OL did report a strong tendency
toward vertigo when flying the no-roll HUD in restricted visibility. This
represents an unacceptablehazard.

One sortie was cancelled because of invalid pitch data on one HUD. This
can be a serious hazard in instrumentweather conditions or if the horizon is
not visible. Serious considerationshould be given to incorporating an in-
strument comparator to warn against invalid data. Failing this, crew proce-
dures must be developed to ensure that discrepanciesare noted. However, it
will be difficult for the non-flying pilot to crosscheck his HUD with his
panel instruments.

Displayed Data Requirements

The basic MARS HUD was intended to display pitch, sideslip, and airspeed
with an optional roll display. The pitch display was the primary display
needed for MARS. Since sideslip and airspeed were critical for successful
engagements,they were also included. Part of the experimental design was to

388
i ]

evaluate the need For roll. The HUD also included an aiming V to assist the _:
pilot during the transition just prior to engagement. During the evaluation,
pilot comments suggested that vertical velocity data be added.

Pitch. Lack of adequate pitch cues from the horizon was the original
reason for the HUD. We can, therefore, presume that pitch is a requirement
for a MARS HUD. However, with a pitch malfunction, the airspeed, sideslip,
, and vertical velocity data would still be useful. Pitch failure, then, need
only extinguish the pitch and roll displays (and the aiming V).

Roll. Roll can be considered a requirement primarily as a vertigo


avoid'_'measure. Roll failure must extinguish the pitch and roll displays.

Airspeed. No test without airspeed was conducted. We conclude from _=


pilot comments that it is required. Airspeed failure need only extinguish
the speed indexes.

While the use of the three symbol airspeed display is adequate for de-
termining both the actual airspeed and trends, some learning over and above
the normal HUD familiarizationseems to be needed.

Sideslip. likewise, no specific evaluation of a no-aidesIip HUD was


done. Based on pilot comments, we conclude that it is a requirement° The
original ball bank display was too hard to read For small sideslip angles.
As a result, the opaque ball was changed to a triangular shaped sideslip in- ]
dex. The display, as modified, is adequate for the BARS mission. Bad side-
slip data need onIy extinguish the ball bank display.

Vertical Velocit_z. The original display had no vertical velocity data.


However, the majority of the pilot comments indicated a need for such data.
The reason for this can be Found in the Air Force handbook on instrument fly-
ing(_). This approach divides the flight instruments into control and per-
formance instruments. The pilot makes his control inputs be reference to tho
control instruments (such as ADI or power/thrust) and monitors the aircraft's
response by reference to the performance instruments (airspeed, heading, or
vertical veloeily).

The BARS pilots, having made a pitch or power correction to fly up or


down relative to the parachute, felt the absence of a vertical performance i
instrument to monitor their corrections. This explains the need for vertical ::_
velocity data. Apparently, they fell able to do without a power control in- _"i_.
strument. Perhaps, kinesthetic feedback From the collective position was
sufficient. One pilot did comment on the absence of torque or RPMdata.
24
During the recovery after engagement, the pilot must, at maximum torque, _
trade altitude for airspeed. During this transition, the vertical velocity
data is also needed. A torque display is not needed since the pilot can sense
maximum torque from the RPM droop. As a result of these observations, the
production MARS HUD incorporates a vertical velocity display. Preliminary
pilot comments to this addition were favorable.

389
Aiming V. The aiming V was commented on favorably by the subject pilots.
However, no concensus could be reached on the need for different Vs for dif-
ferent sized parachute canopies.

Modified Display. As a result of the testing and pilot comments, the


symbology was changed for the production MARS HUD hardware. The revised
format it shown in Figure 3.

CONCLUSIONS

The HUD system (with roll) will enhance MARS performance during periods
of reduced visibility. It will also enhance safety during training by causing
the passes above the target parachute to be higher -- reducing the chances of
the helicopter'sstriking the parachute. Roll stabilization is a safety-of-
flight requirement to avoid vertigo in no-horizon weather conditions. Roll-
stabilizationappeared to improve performance over the no-roll case; however
insuffient data was available for a statistically valid test.

Pilot workload is much lower when using the HUD. Iraining to use the HUD
should require practice passes to 2-4 training weights, assuming a MARS-quali-
fied pilot. The ability to make full use of the airspeed cue on the HUD may
require additional time. The airspeed learning curve seems to be quite var-
iable from pilot to pilot.

[he MARS HUD should display pitch, roll, sideslip, airspeed, and vertical
velocity data. A reliable self-test circuit is highly desirable. The horizon
line should be more distinct than the aiming V.

While the HUD should enhance crew training and standardizationas well as
mission performance, operational flight procedures should be reviewed shortly
after fleet use begins.

REFERENCES

I. A-7D Navigation/WeaponDelivery System, Vought Report 2-14000/412-i0,


1974

2. Naish, J. M., Properties and Design of the Head-Up Display (HUD), McDon-
nell-Douglas Report MDC-JI409, 1968; revised 1970

) Mackie, R., Jet Transport Operations in the Arctic, presented at the Air-
craft Operations in the Canadian Arctic Meeting of the Canadian Aeronau-
tics and Space Institute,Edmonton, 1973

4 Augustine, W. L., Head-Up Display Area Survey, AFFDL-TM-72-11-FGR,1972

5 Singleton, W. I., Display Design: Principles and Procedures, ERGONOMICS,


12, 1969, 519-531
39O
6. Tapia, M. and Intano, G., Light Line Visual Landing Head-Up Display Eval-
uation, USAF IFC-TR-76-1, 1976

7. Instrument Flying, USAFManual AFM-51-37, 1971

B. Partial (MARS) Flight Manual, USAF CH-3E Helicopters, USAF Technical Or-
dec 1H-3(C)C(I)-I, 1974

Controlled ;1 I 2 ''_ 3 4 5
1Very Med- ' Very _d
_- Parameter Easy Easy ium Hard Hard

Airspeed 1 2 1 1 3.4
Vertical Velocity 1 2 1 1 3.4
Ieitch 2 3 2.6
_" Sideslip 2 2 1 2.8
z° IRolZ 3 Z 2.4 ,_
Overall 1 2 1 1 3.4 :

rAirspeed 1 3 1 1 3.33 J
Vertical Velocity 4 1 1 3.5
IPitch 3 2 1 2.67
Sideslip I 4 I 2.0
Roll 5 i 2.17
a:
Overall I 3 I i 3.33

Airspeed 2 I 3 3.17
Vertical Velocity 2 I _ 3.17
=: Pitch 3 2 2.4
Sideslip 1 4 1 2.0
Roll 4 I I 2,83
I
0
z Overall 1 3 2 3.17

SUBJECTIVE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING PASSES

TABLE I _._

391 .'
0
_j --i

._ "_ 0
q_ -r _ o:
0 0 0 0
tJ Z n_ Z

392
ORIGINAL PAG_ IS
flFm3OR QUAI,IT¥

APPROACHAND PASS

SIGHTPICTURE- ESTABLISHED
AIRSPEED- 50 KNOTSI,_S(DESIREDI
RATEOF DESCENT- AS REOUIRED
HEADING - ADJUSTFORLOADLINE
LOADLINE

MARGINAL

,20_LOAD LINE

MARGINAL
WHITE KEYHOLE AIMING PANEL

Figure i

Helicopter Approach and Pa,_s .i,


(From Reference 8)

393
l !

1 Pointer and Index


__01 | ! I _--=

• 0
Horizo-_n $
F

i Airspeed j
;, Aiming V /

.__ Sideslip _/

Figuce Z

MARSHUDDisplay Format

(As Tested)

I I i I I

oll Pointec and Index

F Horizon Line _ .__ "

S ]
/\ .....

Airspeed \Pitch Cues Vertical

.' Velocity
Aiming V
--__
/ '
I ' I'
Sideslip
I
_ i

Figure 3

Revised Display Format

394

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