JM Financial - Initiating Coverage On Power Financiers.
JM Financial - Initiating Coverage On Power Financiers.
JM Financial - Initiating Coverage On Power Financiers.
Power Financiers
India | Banking & Financial Services | Initiating Coverage
9 December 2011
Power Financiers
Light at the end of the tunnel
POWF and RECL are best placed to leverage on the massive investment opportunity: Over the next five years, c.$236bn is estimated to be invested in the power sector as India scales-up infrastructure in generation, transmission and distribution. REC and POWF are best positioned to leverage on the massive investment opportunity given a) IFC status which gives exposure limits advantage, easier access to ECBs. IFCs have a competitive edge over banks given better asset-liability profile. Further, most banks are approaching their sectoral limits for infrastructure sector which should reduce competitive intensity for specialised power financiers like POWF and RECL. SEB default unlikely losses may have peaked, tariff hike trend encouraging: SEBs have been under financial distress due to non-revision of tariffs, non-payment of subsidies and high merchant power rates. However, recent measures offer hope that their finances will improve going ahead led by a) 5-40% tariff hike across states over the last 18 months (Exhibit 2). Further, 3 of the 4 states (TN, UP, MP, Rajasthan) that account for c.70% of cash losses have already raised/proposed to raise tariff while UP will raise tariff post election early next year. b) APTEL facilitating suo-motu tariff increase by the regulator. c) Increasing pressure from lenders to improve finances by raising tariffs/improving efficiency. d) Declining power purchase costs which would provide much needed relief to SEBs. These measures are a step in the right direction and we believe financial position of SEBs will improve going forward, implying that default from SEBs for POWF and RECL is unlikely. Fuel availability - A key risk: Coal and gas availability, in our view, is a significant threat which could restrict power supplies and impact financial viability of projects. Coal supply has been severely hampered due to a) Coal India unable to achieve sufficient production growth, b) delayed environmental clearances, c) infrastructure bottlenecks, d) blending limitation in existing plants, e) pricing issues on imported coal from Indonesia and Australia. However, recent steps by government to scrap go and no-go policy and granting environment clearances to some delayed projects should reduce this concern over the medium term (3 years); though fuel availability remains a key near-term risk which could lead to restructuring of projects (especially IPPs in the capacity range of 50Mw-100mW) and result in some NPV loss for power financiers. Initiate coverage on POWF and RECL BUY with TP of `205 and `220 respectively - recent SEB/government measures and decline in wholesale rates should act as key catalysts: POWF and RECL have de-rated significantly over the past 12 months due to concerns over financial health of SEBs (POWF currently trades at 0.95x 1yr fwd book, down from a peak of 2.9x; while RECL at 1.1x 1yr fwd book, down from a peak of 2.9x. Going ahead, we believe recent SEB/government measures and decline in wholesale borrowing rates from 1QFY13 (which will impact spreads positively) should act as key catalysts for stock outperformance. We initiate coverage on POWF with Mar13 TP of `205 current valuations are attractive at 0.9x FY13E book with dividend yield of c.5% (based on FY13E dividend). We value the stock at 1x FY14P/B (at 1.05x Mar14 ABV - adjusted for bad and doubtful debt reserves) Initiate coverage on RECL with Mar13 TP of `220 - current valuations are attractive at 1x FY13E book with dividend yield of c.5% (based on FY13E dividend). We value the stock at 1.1x FY14P/B (at 1.15x Mar14 ABV adjusted for bad and doubtful debt reserves).
JM Financial Institutional Securities Private Limited
Karan Uberoi, CFA,FRM [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3082 Amey Sathe, CFA [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3027 Puneet Gulati [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3072 Prashant Kumar [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3061
Ravi Singh [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3058
Summary Financials FY12E POWF Net Profit (` mn) Net Profit (YoY) (%) Loans (` bn) Loans (YoY) (%) ROA (%) ROE (%) EPS (`) EPS (YoY) (%) PE (x) BV (`) BV (YoY) (%) P/BV (x) RECL Net Profit (` mn) Net Profit (YoY) (%) Loans (` bn) Loans (YoY) (%) ROA (%) ROE (%) EPS (`) EPS (YoY) (%) PE (x) BV (`) BV (YoY) (%) P/BV (x) 27,687 7.7% 994 21.0% 2.9% 20.2% 28.0 7.7% 6.7 148.6 14.7% 1.26 33,558 21.2% 1,183 19.0% 2.9% 21.1% 34.0 21.2% 5.5 172.9 16.4% 1.08 40,069 19.4% 1,407 19.0% 2.9% 21.6% 40.6 19.4% 4.6 202.1 16.9% 0.93 26,021 -0.7% 1,215 22.0% 2.2% 14.4% 19.71 -13.6% 8.5 157.6 17.3% 1.06 37,367 43.6% 1,470 21.0% 2.6% 16.8% 28.31 43.6% 5.9 178.5 13.3% 0.94 44,663 19.5% 1,764 20.0% 2.6% 17.7% 33.84 19.5% 4.9 203.6 14.0% 0.82 FY13E FY14E
JM Financial Research is also available on: Bloomberg - JMFR <GO>, Thomson Publisher & Reuters. Please see important disclosure at the end of the report
Power Financiers
9 December 2011
Feb-11
Apr-11
Jul-11
Sep-11
Nov -11
Feb-11
Apr-11
Jul-11
Sep-11
Nov -11
a)
Significant tariff hikes across SEBs which would improve cash flows
Absence of tariff revision is one of the key reasons for the poor financial health of SEBs. However significant tariff hikes over the last 18 months should lead to improved financials going ahead. Further, 4 states - TN, UP, MP Rajasthan account for c.70% of the cash losses. Out of these, 3 states have already raised/proposed to raise tariff while UP will raise tariff post election early next year.
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9 December 2011
Date Apr-10 Apr-10 Apr-10 Jun-10 Aug-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jun-11 Aug-11 Aug-11 Aug-11 Oct -11 Nov-11
Hike 5-10% 13-15% 3-8% `0.30-0.50 `0.30-1.10 20% 5% 8% / 40-80% 2-10% 10% 20-40% 7-12% 19% 6% 18.5% 22% 19-27% 10% 36.5%
Applicability* Agri / Dom/ Ind Agri / Dom/ Ind Agri / Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Ind Dom/ Ind Dom / Comm/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Agri / Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom Dom/ Ind / Agri Agri / Dom/ Ind Agri / Dom/ Ind
b) Decline in wholesale rates Given our expectation of lower borrowing costs from 1QFY13, we expect these stocks to outperform going ahead on the back of lower rates which should improve spreads. As shown below, both POWF and RECL witnessed significant underperformance since AAA 5 yr yields started increasing from Oct10. This resulted in compression of spreads from 2.76% in 3Q11 to 2.26% in 2Q12 for POWF and 3.44% to 3.21% for RECL during the same period.
Exhibit 3. POWF vs India - AAA - 5 Year (LHS) and RECL vs India AAA 5 Year
400 320 240 160 80 0 Feb-07 POWF India - AAA - 5 Yr. 13.0 11.6 10.2 8.8 7.4 6.0 Nov -11 RECL 350 280 210 140 70 0 Mar-08 India - AAA - 5 Yr. 13.00 11.60 10.20 8.80 7.40 6.00 Dec-11
Dec-07
Sep-08
Jul-09
Apr-10
Feb-11
Oct-08
Jun-09
Jan-10
Sep-10
Apr-11
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Power Financiers As shown below, both POWF and RECL witnessed compression in spreads as borrowing costs (proxy used is AAA 5 yr yield) started increasing from Oct10. This resulted in compression of spreads from 2.76% in 3Q11 to 2.26% in 2Q12 for POWF and 3.44% to 3.21% for RECL during the same period
9 December 2011
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
Exhibit 5. Trends in energy shortfall (power deficit) (LHS) and power deficit rate (%) (RHS)
100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 48.1 52.7 39.9 43.3
6% 3% 0% FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11
Energy Shortfall (bn units KWh) 86.0 66.1 73.3 84.0 73.1
8.4%
9.6%
9.9%
10.1% 8.5%
India has relatively low per capita energy consumption The per capita energy consumption in India is extremely low in comparison to rest of the world due to unreliable supply and inadequate distribution networks. In FY09, India's per capita electricity consumption was 597 units (KWh) per year vs 2,730 units/year world average, 1,884 units in LatAm countries, 2,648 units in China, and 741 units in Asian countries. According to Ministry of Power, per capita consumption of energy is projected to increase to c.1,000 kWh/year by 2012 from current levels (FY09) of 597 KWh/year, indicating massive scope for scaling up power consumption. The low per capita consumption of electricity in India compared to world average presents significant potential for sustainable growth in demand for electric power in India.
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Power Financiers Exhibit 6. Annual per capita electricity consumption levels (2002-2009)
4,000 3,200 (KWh per year) 2,400 2373 1,600 800 0 World Average Middle East China Latin America Asia 3.0% 2.0% 1534 1208 3.0% 563 741 1884 5.1% 4.0% 1.3% 514 561 421 2730 2659 2002 11.9% 3278 2648 2009 CAGR:2002-09 (%)
9 December 2011
Africa
India
Large power deficit to drive significant additional capacity requirement It is evident that power deficit in India is a significant impediment to economys development. In this context, bridging the gap in demand and supply has become critical and consequently, large projects are being undertaken in different segments of the sector. Exhibit 7 shows projected installed and incremental capacity requirements in next two decades. According to Planning Commission, in order to sustain a GDP growth rate of 8-9%, India would require additional capacity of 67-78 GW by 2012, 153-182 GW by 2017 and 272-333 GW by 2022 based on normative power. However, during the last three five year plans (8th, 9th and 10th), India has managed to achieve barely half of the capacity addition that was planned.
Exhibit 7. Trends in total installed capacity projected (LHS) and incremental capacity required (RHS)
1250 1000 750 GW 500 250 0 2003-04 2006-07 2011-12
Source: Planning commission, CSO, JM Financial.
8% GDP
325 260
8% GDP
151
150
131131
153155
220233
306337
488 425
2016-17 2021-22
2026-27 2031-32
2006-07
2011-12
2016-17
2021-22
2026-27
2031-32
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Power Financiers Leading to huge investment opportunities across Generation and T&D Generation: In order to match the increasing demand for power within India, substantial increase in generation capacity along with more improved transmission and distribution systems will be required. This will result in significant investment needs which are estimated at a whopping $236bn (`11.4trn) over FY12-17; of which $103bn (`5.0trn) in FY12-17 is expected in Generation. Transmission: The focus on increasing generation capacity over the next 8-10 years will likely result in a corresponding increase in investments in the transmission sector. The Ministry of Power plans to establish an integrated National Power Grid in the country by FY12 with close to 200,000 MW generation capacities and 37,700 MW of inter-regional power transfer capacity by FY13. Investment requirement in transmission is estimated at c.`2.4trn over FY12-17. Distribution: Additional investment is needed to modernise the existing capacity, strengthen distribution and MIS network and improve efficiency of human resources. Investment requirement in distribution is estimated at c.`4trn over FY12-17.
9 December 2011
Exhibit 8. Trends in investment in electricity sector (LHS) and funding requirement in five year plans (` bn) (RHS)
Inves tment in Electricity (` bn) 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 535 500 0 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12
Source: Planning commission, CSO, JM Financial.
YoY Growth (%) 30% 1,986 25% 1,580 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%
Generation
12,500
Transmission
10,589
Distribution
11,351
R&M etc
181 4,001
2,400
570
2,500
4,951
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
125% $60bn 100% 22% 75% 50% 78% 25% 0% 10th Plan
Source: Planning Commission, JM Financial
$133bn 28%
$171bn 35%
72%
65%
11th Plan
12th Plan
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Power Financiers Private sector exposure for POWF and RECL to increase Given increasing share of private sector projects, proportion of private sector loans has increased for POWF from 6% in 2Q10 to 9% as of 2Q12 while that for RECL from 7% in 2Q10 to 11% in 2Q12. We expect private sector exposure to increase going ahead given the increasing share of private players in the generation/distribution sector. However, the loan mix for POWF and RECL will continue to be dominated by State/Central utilities.
9 December 2011
Exhibit 11. Quarterly trends in loan mix (borrower wise) for POWF (LHS) and RECL
State Sector 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 1Q12 2Q12 70% 69% 68% 66% 66% 65% 65% 65% 64% 6% 16% 6% 18% Central Sector 5% 19% 7% 19% 7% 19% Joint Sector 7% 19% 7% 20% Priv ate Sector 8% 20% 9% 19% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 1Q12 2Q12 84% 84% 84% 86% 86% 84% 83% 82% 82% State 7% 10% 6% 9% 6% 9% 7% 7% PSUs 7% 7% 9% 7% 10% 7% Priv ate 11% 7% 11% 7%
Exhibit 12. Quarterly trends in disbursements (LHS) and sanctions mix (sector wise) for POWF
State Sector 100% 80% 31% 60% 40% 20% 0% 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 1Q12 2Q12 54% 57% 66% 5% 4% 29% Central Sector 3% 21% 23% 21% 77% 53% 11% 7% Joint Sector 9% 16% 5% 21% Priv ate Sector 100% 19% 7% 21% 9% 80% 60% 70% 68% 67% 66% 40% 20% 0% 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11 1Q12 2Q12 54% 30% 83% 49% 79% 76% 91% 80% 90% 27% 46% State Sector Central Sector 17% 21% Joint Sector 24% 9% Priv ate Sector 16% 8%
34%
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
Sectoral limits, ALM and exposure norms to reduce competitive intensity Going forward, we expect competitive intensity of power financing sector to moderate due to various constraints faced by the banking sector such as: Sectoral limits: Generally banks have internal sectoral limits at 15-20% of gross advances for each sector, beyond which they dont lend. Given the strong lending rate towards this sector, most banks are nearing their sectoral limit. Consequently, banks are likely to moderate their exposure towards the sector. ALM mismatch: Banks have a typical liability profile of 2-3 years whereas infrastructure financing is required for 10-15 years and beyond. This creates ALM mismatch for banks and banks are facing incremental problems in raising such resources. However, certain recent initiatives directed towards take out financing (still in nascent stage) and setting up of infrastructure debt fund will likely ease the situation for banks. Exposure norms: Single and group exposure limits set by RBI create problems for large projects as banks can lend only 20% and 35% of its capital funds to single and group borrowers. Most banks are facing constraints to lend further as they have already reached the maximum group exposure limit for such borrowers.
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Power Financiers RBI has classified POWF and RECL as Infrastructure Finance Company (IFC), benefits of the same are as under: Lower cost of borrowings: IFCs would benefit from a lower risk weight on their bank borrowings (from a flat 100% to as low as 20% for AAA rated borrowers). So, cost of borrowings will come down for AAA rated companies. Both, POWF and RECL are AAA rated companies. Higher borrowing limit from banks, IFC to get higher share of funding: New guideline has allowed for less restrictive caps on bank lending to NBFCs. Now for an infra-NBFC, banks can lend upto 20% of their net worth vs. 15% earlier. Hence, going forward, there is a 33% increase in lending capacity that IFCs can access additionally. Easy access to ECB: IFCs are eligible to raise, under the automatic route, ECBs up to $500mn each fiscal year, subject to the aggregate outstanding ECBs not exceeding 50% of owned funds. Higher exposure to single and group party borrowers (assets side): IFCs can have higher exposure to group (50% owned funds vs 35% earlier) and individual borrowers (30% vs 20%). This will benefit POWF as then it will be in a position to underwrite large projects on its own.
9 December 2011
Source: RBI, JM Financial. * Additional exposure applicable in case the same is on account of infrastructure loan and/or investment.
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Power Financiers POWF and RECL to witness healthy 21% and 20% CAGR in loan book over FY11-14E Given the advantages IFCs like POWF, RECL enjoy over banks which are restricted due to exposure limits, ALM mismatch, we expect POWF and RECL to gain market share in power financing from banks. We expect POWF and RECL to witness healthy 21% and 20% CAGR in loan book over FY11-14E on the back of 17% CAGR each (i.e. both POWF and RECL) in disbursements over FY11-14E.
9 December 2011
Exhibit 15. Trends in loan book and loan growth for POWF (LHS) and RECL
2,250 1,800 1,350 900 450 0 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E 356 439 1,215
FY06-11 CAGR: 23% Loan Book (` bn) YoY Growth (%) FY11-14E CAGR: 21%
Loans (` bn)
1,764
1,407
1,183 994
FY06-11 CAGR: 27%
821 665
516
644
321
393
514
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
4 states account for 70% of SEBs losses 4 states Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh account for c.70% of the losses (revenue and subsidy realised basis). The total loss for these 4 states was c.`311bn in FY10 while for all SEBs combined; it was `444.0bn. Exhibit 17. Trend in cash profit/losses on revenue and subsidy received basis (` bn) (Discoms)
(` bn) Tamil Nadu Madhya Pradesh Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Total losses of 4 States SEBs - Total Losses (%) Proportion Tamil Nadu Madhya Pradesh Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Total
Source: Company, JM Financial.
FY06 -5.4 -1.8 -5.1 -46.6 -58.9 -88.3 FY06 6.1% 2.0% 5.8% 52.8% 66.7%
FY07 -9.0 -13.0 -3.0 -48.8 -73.8 -128.8 FY07 7.0% 10.1% 2.3% 37.9% 57.3%
FY08 -31.1 -21.4 -31.1 -52.9 -136.4 -166.1 FY08 18.7% 12.9% 18.7% 31.8% 82.1%
FY09 -71.1 -42.4 -67.2 -55.9 -236.6 -369.7 FY09 19.2% 11.5% 18.2% 15.1% 64.0%
FY10 -97.9 -36.2 -109.8 -67.1 -311.0 -444.0 FY10 22.1% 8.2% 24.7% 15.1% 70.0%
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
FY06 1,109
FY07 1,287
FY08 1,548
FY09 1,985
FY10 2,631
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
Source: SERC, JM Financial * Note: Dom Domestic; Ind Industrial; Agri Agricultural; Comm Commercial, ** Proposed
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
(p/kWh)
90 Apr'05 Oct'05 Apr'06 Oct'06 Apr'07 Oct'07 Apr'08 Oct'08 Apr'09 Oct'09 Apr'10 Oct'10 Apr'11
Source: Ministry of Commerce & Industry, JM Financial * Base: Apr04
With mounting SEB losses, government bodies have realised the importance of further reforms in last-mile connectivity. GoI is planning VGF (viability gap funding) based schemes for incentivising privatisation in distribution and providing loans (convertible to grants) for reducing T&D losses via R-APDRP. PMO has setup VK Shunglu committee and CERC ordered studies on financial viability of SEBs (CRISIL recommending c.20% increase in tariffs in many states). Forum of Regulator (FoR) has standardised distribution franchisee (DF) model bidding documents and as many as 14 states have floated tenders for DF circles after successful experience at Bhiwandi. UP has awarded DF for Kanpur and Agra, while Nagpur, Maharashtra and Patna, Bihar were recently awarded. Few states like MP and Rajasthan are also progressing with DF (Exhibit 21).
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9 December 2011
Impact of distribution reforms has been very positive with two prominent examples of NDPL in Delhi and Torrent in Bhiwandi. Since privatisation, the AT&C losses in NDPL areas have declined to record lows of 13.2% in FY11 as against 53% in FY03. Similarly in Bhiwandi, Torrent has been able to bring down T&D losses to 18.0% in FY11 from 49% in FY06.
53%
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
5.6
5.3
6.0
4.0 2.4
2.0
0.0
3.2
10 33
3.7
20 29 20 21 FY10
26
5 30 16 5 FY07
6 30 18 4 FY08
31
25 20 FY09
28 10 FY11
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
2005-08*
FY09
FY10
FY11BE
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9 December 2011
In order to gauge risks of future payables and power subsidisation, we have analysed fiscal position and debt burden of key states. UP, WB, Rajasthan and Punjab have high debt levels vs 12th Finance Commission (FC) target of 30.8% (Exhibit 26). However, compared to historical levels, debt/GSDP improved for most states during 2006-10 (Exhibit 27). In terms of fiscal deficit almost all states are below the 12th FC target levels (3%) except UP and Punjab. The deficit, in our view, is yet to reach an alarming proportion to predict financial distress in the near-term and hence, power subsidies may continue to fund losses/free power in the meantime. Having said that, we believe immediate steps need to be taken to reduce the subsidy burden in states like Rajasthan (>17% of total state expenditure).
Exhibit 26. Consolidated position of state finances (%) (LHS) and trend in position of state finances Fiscal deficit to GSDP (%)
2005-08* 60.0% 48.0% 36.0% 24.0% 12.0% 0.0%
Maharashtra Rajasthan Karnataka WB Gujrat UP AP MP Haryana Punjab TN
FY09
FY10
FY11BE
2005-08*
FY09
FY10
FY11BE
Maharashtra
Rajasthan
Karnataka
WB
Gujrat
UP
MP
AP
FY07 34 36 23 29 40 32 42 48 25 54 47
FY08 32 33 20 26 39 27 40 45 24 52 45
FY09 29 33 18 24 35 27 37 42 25 47 43
FY10 30 32 19 24 34 25 35 41 26 43 43
FY11E 31 31 19 25 37 27 34 41 25 46 41
35 38 25 27 43 33 47 52 27 56 50
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Haryana
Punjab
TN
Power Financiers
9 December 2011
RECL was not included in the scheme of things RECL and POWF were not included in the scheme because dues to these organisations were on capital account. As a matter of principle, group felt that scheme should not go into the recovery or rescheduling of loans given by financial institutions. These must be left to the respective lenders and borrowers. However, RECL was allowed one-time settlement The group felt that having regard to the predominantly social orientation of RECL lending, the benefit of one-time settlement could also be extended to the outstanding dues of RECL. The Group recommended that the Ministry of Power, which is the administrative Ministry responsible for RECL, may consider advising RECL to settle its dues on a similar basis as the scheme proposed by the Group. The Ministry of Power could also take a view whether the States owing overdues to RECL should be required to settle with RECL before the benefit of this scheme is extended to them. What RECL did? In FY03FY05: Overdues of Madhya Pradesh SEB were settled by a rescheduled package involving the issue of bonds of `14.15bn by the Government of MP, bearing 8% interest rates. In FY04, RECL had (calculated) yield on loans of 10.7%. Balance of `3.35bn was payable by MP SEB in installments as per MOU. Overdues from Jharkhand SEB were fully settled through cash payment of `1.7bn. Overdues from Assam SEB and Bihar SEB were also re-scheduled during FY05.
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
State Power Ministers Conference on Distribution Sector Reforms: Actions will speak louder than words
The State Power Ministers Conference on Distribution Sector Reforms underlined the need for urgent steps to arrest and reverse the growing losses in power distribution. State governments unanimously decided to bring down commercial losses and ensure financial sustainability of discoms and state utilities. The Conference agreed upon a set of measures to bring down the distribution losses. We analyse impact of the same on power financing sector if timely and efficient implementation is ensured.
Exhibit 28. Resolutions passed in State Power Ministers Conference on Distribution Sector Reforms
Adopted Resolution 1. The state governments to ensure audited accounts of SEBs up to the FY10 - Also ensure that the accounts for a year are audited by September of the next financial year and computerization of accounts would be undertaken on priority. 2. The states would ensure that the distribution utilities file their Annual Tariff Revision Petition every year, by December January of the preceding financial year to the State Regulators as stipulated by the National Tariff policy. Impact if timely and efficient implementation is ensured Will ensure better and timely data availability regarding financial position of SEBs
3. The Annual Tariff Revision Petition would be filed before the SERC and states will To improve financial position of SEBs hence reducing funding requirements ensure that the difference between ARR and ACS is positive to generate internal of PFC, REC and banking sector surpluses. 4. The state governments would ensure automatic pass through in tariff for any increase in fuel cost by incorporating the same in the regulations, as provided in Section 62(4) of Electricity Act, 2003. 5. The state governments would not only clear all the outstanding subsidies to the utilities, but ensure advance payment of subsidy as per the Section 65 of the Electricity Act, 2003 in future. 6. The eligibility criteria for inclusion of towns under R-APDRP assistance with population of 30,000 (10,000 for special category states) should be reduced to 15,000 (5,000 for special category states). 7. The state governments would ensure payment of all outstanding dues from various departments of state government and institutions to the distribution utilities or release payments from the State budget directly. 8. The state governments would consider converting loans due from the state governments to the distribution utilities as state government equity to ensure capital infusion and improvement in net worth of utility. 9. The state governments would take effective steps to reduce AT&C losses to less than 15%. 10. States would immediately initiate steps to appoint distribution franchises in urban areas through competitive bidding. 11. States would immediately invite bids for meeting the uncovered generation capacity gap viz- a -viz the requirement in their States by the end of 12th Plan. The process will be completed by March, 2012. 12. States would create a unit in their states for integrated planning of generation, transmission and distribution to meet the future requirement of their states.
Source: Company, JM Financial.
Lead to automatic passing on of increased cost, helping SEBs to maintain its profitability
To solve the problem of timely repayment and nullify risk of default by SEBs
To improve D/E ratio of SEBs and consequently overall financial position of DISCOMs
To reduce AT&C losses if implemented properly To improve operating efficiency of SEBs To identify additional generation requirement; however there is already too much of demand supply gap in generation Another layer of administration may not benefit much
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Power Financiers
9 December 2011
b) Infrastructure bottlenecks: Based on MoP estimates, 270mtpa of imported coal will be required to meet 12th plan targets (215GW of coal based capacity). However, lack of logistics infrastructure (port issues, wagon shortage, railway infrastructure issues) does not give us confidence of such scale of imports in India. c) Blending limitation in existing plants: Our channel checks indicate that boilers of existing coal-based stations are not designed to consume imported coal in more than 10-15% blending and hence, imported coal cannot be relied upon to make for domestic shortfalls.
d) Inflationary concerns to discourage high-cost imported coal blending: 10% blending leads to c.`0.40/unit increase in costs for discoms. Given inflationary concerns and limited ability of bleeding discoms to pass higher power purchase cost to customers, we expect much lesser coal imports to materialise (JMFe c.80mtpa vs CEA estimates 270mtpa by FY17). e) leading to international acquisition spree: As domestic fuel availability is constrained, IPPs have recently started acquiring unexplored resources internationally (Exhibit 43). Although associated development costs are high in most cases, fuel security is a must for larger capex back home for power projects. However international coal prices are rising post new laws in Indonesia and Australia: Indonesia (the largest coal supplier) has said it would not allow exporting companies to sell coal at prices below notified rates after September 23, 2011 i.e. annual alignment of coal prices with international rates. Australia also issued a draft mining law to impose levy on coal and iron ore projects from next year (FY12) as miners in Australia would like to pass on the increase in levies to consumers. Indonesia and Australia contribute c.55% of India's coal imports. The current contractual framework does not protect power companies from coal price changes triggered by any change in law in the exporting country. As mentioned earlier, reliance on imported coal will be going up in coming years but prices of imported coal also have been rising putting significant upward pressure on the cost of power generation. and increasing awareness of high purchase cost, we backing down of plants on lower offtake by SEBs renegotiation of competitively bid Power Purchase fuel price risk is not covered, cannot be ruled out.
f)
Given SEBs financial state have witnessed significant Therefore possibilities of Agreements (PPAs), where
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9 December 2011
Power Financiers
India | Banking & Financial Services | Initiating Coverage
9 December 2011
| POWF IN
Karan Uberoi, CFA, FRM [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3082 Amey Sathe, CFA [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3027 Puneet Gulati [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3072 Prashant Kumar [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3061
Ravi Singh [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3067
Loan book to register 21% CAGR for FY11-14E: POWF delivered robust loan book CAGR of 23% for FY05-11. Given outstanding sanction of `1.7trn (1.6x FY11 loan book) and investment pick-up in FY12 (being the last fiscal of the 11th five year plan), we expect 18%/17%/17% disbursement growth in FY12/FY13/FY14, leading to loan book CAGR of c.21% for FY11-14E. Equity issuance to lead to stable margins in FY12E: We expect 14bps decline in spreads for POWF in FY12E and stable spreads over FY11-14E given a) increase in borrowing cost by 65bps over FY11-14E, b) company has a marginally negative repricing schedule of `30bn i.e. excess of loan liabilities (`230bn up for re-pricing) over loan assets (`200bn). Thus we expect POWFs spreads to decline by 14bps to 2.1% in FY12E and improve to 2.27% over FY12FY14E (on lower borrowing costs). We expect margins to remain stable over FY11-14E, leading to 23% CAGR in NII over FY11-14E. Higher exposure to generation is comforting factor, conservatively model 14bps of credit costs; reserves for bad debts (1% of loans) should act as buffer: POWF has c.84% of the loans towards generation companies which are much better financially positioned than distribution and transmission companies which form c.13% of POWFs book. However, given risks gencos face from poor financial health of state-owned discoms, we conservatively factor 14bps of credit costs for FY13E and 14E. Further, POWF maintains reserve for bad debts (c.1% of O/S loan book) which should act as a buffer in case of any restructuring/NPLs. Solid 20% net profit CAGR over FY11-14E with ROE of c.18%: We expect earnings CAGR of 20% over FY11-14E driven by 23% CAGR in NII on the back of robust loan book CAGR of 21%; however, we have modeled elevated credit costs (14bps in FY14E vs 4bps in FY11). Return ratios should remain healthy with ROA of 2.6% and ROE of 18% in FY14E. Current valuations at 0.95x 1yr fwd book (down from a peak of 2.9x); initiate coverage with BUY and TP of `205: POWF has witnessed significant de-rating from peak multiple of 2.9x 1yr fwd book to 0.95x currently. We believe current valuations are attractive at 0.9x FY13E book with dividend yield of c.5% (based on FY13E dividend). We value the stock at 1x FY14P/B (at 1.05x Mar14 ABV; adjusted for reserves for bad and doubtful debt), implying Mar13 target price of `205, upside of c.30%, including dividend.
Key Data
Market cap (bn) Shares in issue (mn) Diluted share (mn) 3-mon avg daily val (mn) 52-week range Sensex/Nifty ``/US$ ` 234.1 / US$ 4.6 1319.9 1319.9 ` 603.0/US$ 11.8 ` 339.5/130.2 16,805/5,039 51.3
Daily Performance
400 320 240 160 80 0 Jan-10 Jan-11 Sep-10 Mar-10 Sep-11 Mar-11 Jul-10 Jul-11 Nov-10 May-10 May-11 Nov-11 Power Finance Corp. 40% 20% 0% -20% -40% -60%
1M 8.0 12.3
3M 21.3 20.8
Shareholding Pattern
Promoters FII DII Public/others 2Q FY11 89.78 3.76 2.99 3.47
(%)
2Q FY12 73.72 6.47 10.11 9.70
(` mn)
FY14E 44,663 19.5% 19.8% 2.61% 17.7% 33.8 19.5% 4.9 203.6 14.0% 0.82
JM Financial Research is also available on: Bloomberg - JMFR <GO>,Thomson Publisher & Reuters. Please see important disclosure at the end of the report
9 December 2011
Source: Company, JM Financial, Note: * Figures for ratios signify change over the specified period.
Page 25
9 December 2011
Sanctions at 1.6x loan book size provide growth visibility over FY11-14E
Outstanding sanction at `1.7trn (1.6x of the loan book) provides strong growth visibility The robust demand for power financing has been reflected in strong sanctions and disbursement pipeline for POWF. Sanctions witnessed 26% CAGR and disbursements 24% CAGR over FY05-11 while net outstanding sanctions as of 2Q12 were at `1,791bn, which would be typically utilised over next 3-4 years. Given the size of outstanding sanctions at almost 1.6x the loan book, we believe growth outlook for POWF is robust over the medium term.
(`bn)
400 320 240 160 80 0 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 94 117 141 162 16% 8% 0% 211
Dis burs ements (` bn) YoY Growth (%)
695 570
752 655
341 258
Loan book to register 21% CAGR over FY11-14E POWF has delivered robust loan book CAGR of 23% over FY05-11. As of 2Q12, it had sanctions of `1.8trn and has already commenced disbursements for projects having outstanding sanctions of `810bn (47% of total sanctions). This is likely to support near-term loan book growth. Additionally, POWF has executed agreements for `253bn (15% of the sanctions) though disbursements are yet to begin. All these factors do give us confidence on the growth outlook for POWF over the next three years. We have modeled in 18%/17%/17% disbursement growth in FY12/FY13/FY14E respectively leading to c.21% loan CAGR over FY11-14E.
Page 26
Power Finance Corporation Exhibit 31. POWF: Trend in loan book and disbursements
2,000 1,600 1,215 1,200 800 400 0 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E
Source: Company, JM Financial.
9 December 2011
(`bn)
650 520 390 260 130 0 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E 117 141 162 211 258 20% 15% 10% 341
Dis burs ements (` bn) YoY Growth (%) 35% 551
471 403
30% 25%
356
439
Generation will continue to dominate the loan mix POWF has historically focused on financing of generation projects, share of which has continuously increased over last few years (constituted 84% of loan book in 2Q12 vs 60% in FY03). Over the years, POWF has diversified its portfolio through participation in large power sector projects such as R-APDRP, independent transmission projects, non-conventional energy sources, distribution reforms (DRUM), consortium lending etc. However, considering sanctions and disbursements in the last 15-18 quarters (Exhibit 6), we believe generation will continue to dominate the loan mix for POWF. POWF has limited exposure to state distribution and transmission companies (at 13% as of 2QFY12) while exposure to private players forms 9% of the loan book. Generation companies (which form c.14% of POWFs book) are much better financially positioned than distribution and transmission companies. Exhibit 32. POWF: Loan mix discipline (LHS) and borrower wise as of 2Q12
Distribution Others 4% 5% Transmission 8% Priv ate Sector Joint Sector 8% 9%
Generation 83%
Page 27
Power Finance Corporation Exhibit 33. POWF: Trends in discipline wise composition of loan book
Generation Transmission Distribution Others
9 December 2011
120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 60% 20% 0% FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 1Q12 2Q12 16% 14% 12% 11% 11% 12% 10% 8% 8% 8% 8%
62%
67%
72%
75%
77%
81%
84%
85%
85%
84%
Exhibit 34. POWF: Sanctions (LHS) and disbursements discipline (` mn) wise in last 16 quarters
Generation 325,000 260,000 195,000 130,000 65,000 0 2Q08 4Q08 2Q09 4Q09 2Q10 4Q10 2Q11 4Q11 2Q12 Transmission Distribution Others Generation 130,000 104,000 78,000 52,000 26,000 0 2Q08 4Q08 2Q09 4Q09 2Q10 4Q10 2Q11 4Q11 2Q12 Transmission Distribution Others
Page 28
Power Finance Corporation Private sector share to increase going ahead Government sector has accounted for majority of the loan book with state electricity boards and state utilities (e.g. NTPC, NHPC) being major customers. However, various government initiatives and guidelines (such as Electricity Act, 2003, unbundling of SEBs) have encouraged private sector to enter generation and transmission businesses. Of 87GW capacity addition, private sector will account for c.57%. Naturally, we expect private sector share to increase from current level of c.9%.
9 December 2011
Exhibit 35. POWF: Trend in sanctions borrower wise (`bn) (LHS) and in % terms
State Sector 900 720 540 360 527 180 0 FY08
Source: Company, JM Financial.
Central Sector
Joint Sector
R-APDRP 752
62 158 85 327 22
State Sector Central Sector Joint Sector 100% 8% 14% 2% 17% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 76% 52% 32%
50%
56%
FY10
FY11
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
Page 29
Power Finance Corporation Exhibit 36. POWF: Outstanding sanctions as on 30, Sept11
Outstanding Sanctions as on September 30, 2011 Doc. executed & disb. commenced Discipline-wise (Rs mn) Generation Transmission Distribution R-APDRP (Part A) R-APDRP (Part B) Others* Total Discipline-wise (%) Generation Transmission Distribution R-APDRP (Part A) R-APDRP (Part B) Others* Total Borrower-wise (Rs mn) State Sector Central Sector Joint Sector Private sector Total Borrower-wise (%) State Sector Central Sector Joint Sector Private sector Total
Source: Company, JM Financial.
9 December 2011
Doc. executed but disb. not commenced 273,980 49,090 3180 620 0 2900 329,770
Page 30
Power Finance Corporation Troubled states account for 31% of loan book POWFs exposure to troubled states (Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir which account for c.80% of total SEB cash losses) is 31% of the loan book. Exhibit 37. POWF: Segment wise composition of loan book as of 2Q1
Troubled States Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh Tamil Nadu Jammu & Kashmir Total Other Sates Maharashtra Haryana Andhra Pradesh West Bengal Delhi Uttarakhand Gujarat Chattisgarh Jharkhand Himachal Pradesh Karnataka Others Total
Source: Company, JM Financial.
9 December 2011
% Loan Exposure 8.8% 8.1% 7.4% 5.6% 1.3% 31.1% % Loan Exposure 12.8% 8.6% 8.5% 8.0% 6.9% 4.4% 4.1% 4.1% 3.1% 2.9% 2.4% 3.2% 68.9%
Page 31
9 December 2011
Exhibit 38. POWF: Trend in borrowings composition (` bn) and duration of assets and liabilities
Bonds 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 281 47% 40% FY06 348 43% 47% FY07 417 36% 56% FY08 67% 68% 531 25% 65% ECB Term Loans CP WCDL / OD Infra Bonds Interest Subsidy 861 678 24% 24%
Loans (in y rs.) 8.00 6.80 5.64 5.60 4.40 3.20 2.00 4.15 5.97 4.78
6.32 5.46
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY09
FY10
FY11
1Q12
Source: Company, JM Financial. WCDL = Working Capital Demand Loan, Duration is weighted average
Page 32
Power Finance Corporation Unhedged foreign borrowings could add volatility to earnings As of Sept11, POWF has foreign currency borrowings of c.`56 bn (6.1% of total borrowings) of which 48% were US$ denominated, 49% were JPY and balance were in euros. Only c.14% of POWFs foreign borrowings have been hedged, leaving it exposed to currency movement. POWF booked MTM loss of `5.3bn during 2QFY12. However, losses are notional and since these borrowings are long term in nature (due FY15 onwards), MTM losses could reverse with strengthening of the rupee going ahead.
9 December 2011
Exhibit 39. POWF: Trends in PBT before and after forex MTM (LHS) and forex MTM
40.0 32.0 24.0 16.0 8.0 0.0 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11
PBT before Forex MTM (`bn) PBT after Forex MTM (`bn)
1,462
874 286
1,267
(389)
FY06
FY07
FY08
(2,664) FY09
FY10
FY11
Page 33
9 December 2011
(` bn)
346
NII (` bn)
32%
16%
12.3
14.4
18.0
0%
2.2%
2.3%
2.1%
2.2%
2.3%
-16%
0.0% FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E
Page 34
9 December 2011
0.7%
Higher exposure to generation companies which are financially better positioned than distribution companies is a comforting factor POWF has 84% of lending to the generation sector which is performing much better financially than the state-owned distribution sector (POWFs exposure is 13%). However, POWF does face risks from poor financial health of state-owned discoms indirectly as it leads to delay in payments for generation companies; consequently, we factor 13/14bps of credit costs for FY13E/14E. Further, POWF maintains reserve for bad debts (c.1% of O/S loan book) which should act as a buffer in case of any restructuring/NPLs.
Page 35
Power Finance Corporation Escrow mechanism with state utilities and state guarantees provides asset quality comfort POWF also has an escrow account mechanism in place with the utilities, which acts a credit enhancement mechanism. Under this, revenue of SEBs flows into the escrow account and is available to the SEBs. In case of any default, POWF would have the first right to claim the money on demand. This mechanism would ensure timely payment of all the dues to the company. As of 31 Mar11, 81% of its outstanding loans to State and Central sector borrowers involved such escrow account mechanism. However, we note that, in the event that end users do not make payments to their SEBs, the escrow account mechanism and the trust and retention account arrangements will not be effective. In the past, POWF has invoked escrow mechanism twice (1997 Andhra Pradesh and 2001 Madhya Pradesh) and both times it worked successfully. Smaller private sector power projects may face problems due to unavailability of fuel (coal) According to POWF, as of now, it does not expect any significant risk to private players due to coal linkage problems. According to POWF, Coal India was providing private players c.60% of the total coal requirement; though, as per revised agreement, it is now providing only 50% of the requirement. POWF expects the shortfall of 10% to get easily fulfilled through coal import. As a precaution, since 11 April, POWF is not sanctioning/disbursing loans to projects which are without Fuel Supply Agreement (FSA) and Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). According to POWF, it has also done an indepth stresstest analysis on all power projects it has lent till now. The analysis reveals that c.700MW of power projects (less than 0.5% of loan book) are currently under stress. The company has not witnessed any defaults from SEBs and even loss making SEBs (Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh) are making payments on time. Having said that, we do expect small private sector power projects (50-100MW) to face problems due unavailability of coal as these projects have very limited financial ability to sustain business losses. Modeling credit cost of 14bps and reserves for bad and doubtful debts (currently 1% of loans) should also act as a buffer Over the last 5 years (FY06-11) POWF enjoyed benign asset quality and virtually zero credit costs. Asset quality remained impressive with gross NPLs of 0.23% in FY11 and 0.02% in FY10 (FY07: 0.10%). However going forward, we expect some hiccups in asset quality especially from private generation sector. We assume zero default probability of SEBs but higher slippages from private sector exposure. While risks exist, we believe it has taken steps to ensure timely repayment, including conservative assumptions on project profitability, adequate fuel linkage and on cash flows and assets. We have built higher slippages over next 2 years mainly emanating from private sector, and consequently higher credit costs. We conservatively factor credit costs of 13/14bps over FY13E/14E. Further, POWF maintains reserve for bad and doubtful debts (currently 1% of O/S loan book) which should act as a buffer in case of any restructuring/NPLs.
JM Financial Institutional Securities Private Limited
9 December 2011
Page 36
Power Finance Corporation Exhibit 44. POWF: Reserve for bad and doubtful debts and as % of O/s loans
Res erve for Bad and Doubtful Debts (` bn)
20.0 16.0 12.0 8.0 4.0 0.0 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E 5.5 6.4 1.4% 1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 7.2 1.1% 8.5 9.8 1.0% 11.2
9 December 2011
4.8
0.9%
0.9%
We expect gross NPLs of c.0.5% and net NPLs of 0.4% by FY14E and higher credit costs of 14bps in FY14E from 4bps in FY11. Exhibit 45. POWF: Trend in asset quality
Gross NPLs (%) 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E
Source: Company, JM Financial.
Cov erage (RHS) (%) 75% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 60% 45% 30%
LLP (bps)
13 8 4
14
0.2%
15% 0%
Page 37
9 December 2011
7.5 17.2% 16.1% 14.7% 17.1% 16.7% 15.6% 14.9% 6.8 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.0 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E
Page 38
9 December 2011
Exhibit 47. POWF: Trends in PBT before and after forex MTM (LHS) and Forex MTM
40.0 32.0 24.0 16.0 8.0 0.0 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11
PBT before Forex MTM (`bn) PBT after Forex MTM (`bn)
1,267
-389
FY06
FY07
FY08
-2,664 FY09
FY10
FY11
ROA (%)
9.9
12.1
Page 39
9 December 2011
Feb-11
Apr-11
Jul-11
Sep-11
Nov -11
Feb-11
Apr-11
Jul-11
Sep-11
Nov -11
POWF
Dec-07
Sep-08
Jul-09
Apr-10
Feb-11
Page 40
Power Finance Corporation Current valuations at 0.95x 1yr fwd book (down from a peak of 2.9x); initiate coverage with BUY and TP of `205 POWF has witnessed significant de-rating from peak multiple of 2.9x 1 yr fwd book to 0.95x currently. We believe current valuations are attractive at 0.9x FY13E book with dividend yield of c.5% (based on FY13E dividend). We value the stock at 1x FY14P/B (at 1.05x Mar14 ABV (adjusted for reserves for bad and doubtful debt), implying Mar13 target price of `205, upside of c.30 %( including dividend).
9 December 2011
Exhibit 51. POWF: One-year forward P/BV (x) and One-year forward P/E (x)
Fw d. P/BV (x ) SD+2 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Mar-08 Oct-08 Jun-09 Jan-10 Sep-10 Apr-11 Dec-11 4.0 0.0 Mar-08 Av erage SD-1 SD+1 SD-2 20.0 16.0 12.0 8.0 Fw d. PE (x ) SD+2 Av erage SD-1 SD+1 SD-2
Oct-08
Jun-09
Jan-10
Sep-10
Apr-11
Dec-11
Page 41
9 December 2011
FY09 3.92% 3.73% 0.20% 5.2% 3.93% 6.5% 0.26% 3.67% 0.01% 94.3% 0.43% 3.24% 1.0% 3.20% 18.28% 17.5%
FY10 3.91% 3.73% 0.22% 5.5% 3.95% 5.2% 0.21% 3.74% 0.00% 94.2% -0.19% 3.94% 21.8% 3.08% 16.35% 18.8%
FY11E 3.64% 3.48% 0.29% 7.8% 3.77% 4.5% 0.17% 3.60% 0.04% 93.6% -0.13% 3.70% 26.1% 2.73% 15.00% 18.2%
FY12E 3.68% 3.53% 0.22% 5.8% 3.75% 4.1% 0.15% 3.59% 0.08% 93.7% 0.53% 2.98% 26.0% 2.21% 15.36% 14.4%
FY13E 3.80% 3.66% 0.21% 5.4% 3.87% 3.8% 0.15% 3.72% 0.13% 94.3% 0.00% 3.60% 27.0% 2.63% 15.59% 16.8%
FY14E 3.78% 3.64% 0.20% 5.3% 3.85% 3.7% 0.14% 3.71% 0.14% 94.5% 0.00% 3.58% 27.0% 2.61% 14.74% 17.7%
3.72% 3.55% 0.22% 5.7% 3.76% 5.1% 0.19% 3.57% -0.02% 94.1% 0.09% 3.50% 32.5% 2.36% 20.42% 11.6%
Page 42
9 December 2011
Key risks
Project delays in generation leading to slower growth: Project delays in generation sector due to a) lack of environmental clearances, b) lack of or unavailability of gas/coal linkages, and c) project becoming unattractive due to fall in merchant tariff prices may lead to slower loan growth as well as sharp increase in slippages. Higher than expected credit costs: Although we are conservative in our credit cost assumptions, higher than expected delinquencies emanating from SEBs poor financial health and private sector defaults remain a risk to our estimates. Regulatory risks: POWF and RECL are exempted from prudential exposure guidelines of RBI and provisioning norms applicable to other NBFCs. These exemptions are applicable till Mar12 and RBI will review whether to continue with the exemption post the deadline. Spike in interest rates: Being a wholesale funded institution, any sustained liquidity shock could impact spreads adversely and affect profitability.
Page 43
9 December 2011
Company background
A specialised development financial institution, POWF was set up in 1986 to fund projects in the domestic power sector. Held 73.72% by the GoI as on June 30, 2011, POWF provides loans for a range of power-sector activities, including generation, distribution, transmission, and plant renovation and maintenance. POWF finances State sector entities such as State Electricity Boards and State Generating Companies, as well as IPPs. In addition, the corporation has been appointed the nodal agency to develop 16 UMPPs in the country. As on June 30, 2011, POWFs gross NPLs stood at 0.23%. Recently it was granted the status of infrastructure financing company (IFC) that will support loan growth through easier exposure norms and better access to borrowing sources. POWF was listed in 2006 and had an FPO in 2011. POWF with its track record of 20 years in power financing, focuses exclusively on power generation sector (c.85% of 1Q12 loan book). The company works closely with Central and State governments and power sector utilities and other power sector intermediaries. It has been playing key role in development and implementation of various policies and structural and procedural reforms for the power sector in India. It is also involved in various GoI programs for the power sector such as acting as the nodal agency for the UMPP and the R-APDRP and as a bid process coordinator for the ITP scheme. Exhibit 53. POWF: Business strategy
Page 44
Power Finance Corporation Enjoys operational flexibility to capitalise on both fundraising and lending opportunities: As a government-owned NBFC, loans given by POWF to Central and State entities in the power sector have been exempted from RBI's prudential lending (exposure) norms (applicable until 31 Mar12). In addition, POWF has been classified as an IFC which enables it to be operationally more flexible and effectively capitalise on available financing opportunities. Advantages of Infrastructure NBFC; POWF to benefit positively Less restrictive cap on bank lending; POWF to get larger share of funding: New guideline has allowed for less restrictive caps on bank lending to NBFCs. Now for an infra-NBFC, banks can lend up-to 20% of their net worth vs 15% earlier. Hence, going forward, there is a 30% increase in lending capacity that POWF can access additionally. Risk weighted capital requirement as per the ratings assigned to result in lower cost of funding for POWF: Banks exposures to NBFC-IFCs will be risk weighted as per the ratings assigned to these NBFCs by the rating agencies as against current practice of charging 100% risk weight irrespective of credit rating. Higher the credit rating lower will be the capital requirement, hence lower will be the cost of funding. However, the impact of this will be very difficult to quantify. Higher exposure to group and single party borrowers: IFCs can have higher exposure to group (50% owned funds vs 35% earlier) and individual borrowers (30% vs 20%). This will benefit POWF as it will be in a position to underwrite large projects on its own.
9 December 2011
Source: Company, JM Financial. * Additional exposure applicable in case the same is on account of infrastructure loan and/or investment.
Liberalisation of ECB policy for infra-NBFC: IFCs are eligible to raise, under the automatic route, ECBs up to $500mn each fiscal year, subject to the aggregate outstanding ECBs not exceeding 50% of owned funds.
Page 45
9 December 2011
(` mn)
FY14E 62,339 3,450 65,789 2,405 63,384 2,202 0 0 2,202 61,182 0 61,182 0 61,182 16,519 44,663 0 44,663 11,612 33,051
Balance Sheet
Y/E March Capital Reserves and Surplus Reserve for Bad and Doubtful Debts Share holders equity Borrowed Funds Deferred Tax Liability Interest Subsidy Fund Current Liabilities and Provisions Total Liabilities Loans Investments Cash & Bank Loans & Advances CA Other Current Assets Fixed Assets Deferred Tax Asset Total Assets Source: Company, JM Financial FY10 11,478 113,389 8,451 133,318 671,084 469 6,635 37,116 848,622 798,558 314 13,943 18,952 16,108 747 0 848,622 FY11 11,478 132,792 9,849 154,118 855,986 830 4,519 52,707 1,068,159 995,707 539 23,503 28,223 19,421 767 0 1,068,159 FY12E 13,199 183,543 11,228 207,971 1,014,343 788 4,293 62,351 1,289,746 1,214,763 657 24,295 27,940 21,293 797 0 1,289,746
(` mn)
FY13E 13,199 209,215 13,208 235,622 1,240,542 749 4,078 75,234 1,556,224 1,469,863 795 29,397 30,867 24,339 962 0 1,556,224 FY14E 13,199 239,898 15,576 268,673 1,501,055 711 3,874 90,135 1,864,448 1,763,836 954 35,277 35,277 27,952 1,153 0 1,864,448
Key ratios
Y/E March Borrowed Funds Loans Total Assets NII Non-Interest Income Operating Expenses Operating Profits Provisions Reported PAT Yields / Margins (%) Interest Spread (%) NIM (%) Profitability (%) ROA (%) ROE (%) Cost to Income (%) Assets Quality (%) Gross NPAs (%) LLP (%) Capital Adequacy (%) CAR (%) Source: Company, JM Financial 18.27% 15.71% 17.59% 16.48% 0.02% 0.00% 0.23% 0.03% 0.27% 0.36% 0.43% 0.18% 3.08% 18.83% 5.1% 2.73% 18.23% 4.5% 2.21% 14.37% 4.1% 2.63% 16.85% 3.8% 2.46% 3.91% 2.27% 3.64% 2.13% 3.68% 2.21% 3.80% FY10 28.7% 23.9% 24.3% 24.6% 30.6% -2.0% 26.7% -157.1% 19.7% FY11 27.6% 24.7% 25.9% 16.6% 73.0% 4.8% 20.4% NM 11.1% FY12E 18.5% 22.0% 20.7% 24.9% -8.2% 12.0% 22.8% 194.6% -0.7% FY13E 22.3% 21.0% 20.7% 25.1% 16.1% 15.3% 24.9% 84.5% 43.6%
(%)
FY14E 21.0% 20.0% 19.8% 19.8% 16.1% 15.9% 19.8% 27.6% 19.5% 2.27% 3.78% 2.61% 17.71% 3.7% 0.53% 0.18% 15.64%
DuPont Analysis
Y/E March NII / Assets (%) Other income / Assets (%) Total Income / Assets (%) Cost to Assets (%) PPP / Assets (%) Provisions / Assets (%) PBT / Assets (%) Tax Rate (%) ROA (%) Leverage (%) ROE (%) Source: Company, JM Financial FY10 3.73% 0.21% 3.94% 0.11% 3.74% 0.00% 3.94% 21.78% 3.08% 6.1 18.83% FY11 3.48% 0.29% 3.77% 0.10% 3.60% 0.03% 3.70% 26.09% 2.73% 6.7 18.23% FY12E 3.53% 0.22% 3.74% 0.09% 3.59% 0.08% 2.98% 26.00% 2.21% 6.5 14.37% FY13E 3.66% 0.21% 3.86% 0.09% 3.72% 0.12% 3.60% 27.00% 2.63% 6.4 16.85%
(%)
FY14E 3.64% 0.20% 3.85% 0.09% 3.71% 0.13% 3.58% 27.00% 2.61% 6.8 17.71%
Valuations
Y/E March Shares in issue (mn) EPS (`.) EPS (YoY) (%) PE (x) BV (`) BV (YoY) (%) P/BV (x) DPS (`) Div. yield (%) Source: Company, JM Financial FY10 177.0 20.5 19.7% 8.6 116 13.9% 1.52 5.3 3.0% FY11 177.0 22.8 11.1% 7.8 134 15.6% 1.32 6.1 3.4% FY12E 177.0 19.7 -13.6% 9.0 158 17.3% 1.12 4.9 2.8% FY13E 177.0 28.3 43.6% 6.3 179 13.3% 0.99 7.4 4.2% FY14E 177.0 33.8 19.5% 5.2 204 14.0% 0.87 8.8 5.0%
Page 46
9 December 2011
Power Finance Corporation
India | Banking & Financial Services | Initiating Coverage
9 December 2011
| RECL IN
Karan Uberoi, CFA, FRM [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3082 Amey Sathe, CFA [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3027 Puneet Gulati [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3072 Prashant Kumar [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3061 Ravi Singh [email protected] Tel: (91 22) 6630 3058
Key Data
Market cap (bn) Shares in issue (mn) Diluted share (mn) 3-mon avg daily val (mn) 52-week range Sensex/Nifty `/US$ ` 198.8 / US$ 3.9 987.5 987.5 ` 469.0/US$ 9.1 ` 344.8/153.6 16,805/5,039 51.3
Daily Performance
500 400 300 200 100 0 Jan-10 Sep-10 Jan-11 Nov-10 Sep-11 Mar-10 Mar-11 Jul-10 Jul-11 May-10 May-11 Nov-11 Rural Electrification Corp. 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% -10% -20% -30% -40%
1M 2.6 6.9
3M 18.8 18.2
Shareholding Pattern
Promoters FII DII Public/others 2Q FY11 66.80 20.40 5.09 7.71
(%)
2Q FY12 66.80 18.52 6.62 8.06
(` mn)
FY14E 40,069 19.4% 19.4% 2.95% 21.6% 40.6 19.4% 4.6 202.1 16.9% 0.93
JM Financial Research is also available on: Bloomberg - JMFR <GO>,Thomson Publisher & Reuters. Please see important disclosure at the end of the report
9 December 2011
Loans (` bn)
253
321
393
514
665
821
994
1,183
1,407
26.5%
19.7%
300 21.2%
363 20.9%
430 18.6%
549 27.6%
695 26.7%
865 24.4%
1,038 20.0%
1,239 19.3%
1,479 19.4%
23.6%
19.6%
Income statement NII (` bn) Operating profits (` bn) PAT (` bn) 8.9 8.3 6.5 10.8 10.3 8.0 14.6 13.6 9.6 19.0 19.1 13.8 26.3 26.5 20.0 33.9 33.9 25.7 39.5 39.0 27.7 47.3 46.8 33.6 56.7 55.9 40.1 30.7% 32.6% 31.8% 18.7% 18.1% 16.0%
Profitability Interest Spread (%) NIM (%) ROA (%) ROE (%) 2.37% 3.40% 2.36% 16.2% 2.40% 3.38% 2.41% 17.7% 2.74% 3.79% 2.42% 17.3% 2.69% 3.96% 2.83% 22.2% 2.89% 4.28% 3.22% 23.2% 2.97% 4.39% 3.29% 21.5% 2.62% 4.18% 2.91% 20.2% 2.67% 4.20% 2.95% 21.1% 2.75% 4.22% 2.95% 21.6% 0.60% 0.98% 0.93% 5.36% -0.22% -0.17% -0.35% 0.11%
Asset Quality Gross NPL (` mn) Gross NPL (%) Net NPL (` mn) Net NPL (%) Loan Loss Charge (` mn) Coverage (%) 4,261 1.68% 4,054 1.60% 0 4.9% 6,197 1.93% 5,779 1.80% 210 6.7% 3,161 0.80% 2,344 0.60% 400 25.8% 689 0.13% 209 0.04% 24 69.7% 195 0.03% 20 0.00% 2 89.8% 195 0.02% 20 0.00% 2 89.8% 1,339 0.13% 402 0.04% 782 70.0% 2,723 0.23% 817 0.07% 1,103 70.0% 4,080 0.29% 1,224 0.09% 1,494 70.0% -46.0% -1.66% -65.4% -1.60% NM 84.9% 175.4% 0.27% 294.1% 0.08% NM -19.8%
Source: Company, JM Financial, Note: * Figures for ratios signify change over the specified period.
Page 48
9 December 2011
Sanctions (` bn)
140 70 0
79
80
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
Loan book to register 20% CAGR over FY11-14E RECL has delivered robust loan book CAGR of 25% over FY05-11. We expect 20% CAGR in loan book over the next three years driven mainly by a) As of 1Q12, the company had sanctions of `1.5trn which is 1.8x FY11 loan book, b) massive investment and funding requirements of power sector in excess of `11trn as per 11th and 12th five year plan, c) being a nodal agency for UMPP, RECL intends to fund UMPPs that have financing requirements in excess of `150bn each. These factors give us confidence on near term growth outlook of RECL. We have modeled 18%/17%/17% disbursement growth in FY12/FY13/FY14E, leading to loan book CAGR of c.20% for FY11-14E.
Page 49
Rural Electrification Corporation Exhibit 58. RECL: Trend in loan book and disbursements (`bn)
1,750 1,400 1,050 700 350 0 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E
Source: Company, JM Financial.
9 December 2011
Loans (` bn)
253
321
393
514
271
285
Loans (` bn)
Transmission and Distribution 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 20% 13% 24% 23% 18% 26% 11% 36%
Others 6% 44%
1,407
74%
63%
58%
63%
57%
56%
51%
50%
FY10
FY11
1Q12
2Q12
Page 50
Rural Electrification Corporation Going ahead, we expect some increase in proportion of generation and private sector exposure given a) generation sector offers massive investment opportunities, b) reforms in the distribution sector to reduce fund requirement of T&D sector (although this will happen gradually over the medium term), c) considering the sanction and disbursement composition in the last few years, we expect proportion of private exposure to rise going ahead.
9 December 2011
Exhibit 60. RECL: Loan mix by discipline (LHS) and borrower wise as of 2Q12
Others 6% Central PSUs 7% Priv ate 11%
State 82%
Exhibit 61. RECL: Trend in loan mix composition customer wise (%)
100% 80% 60% 98% 40% 20% 0% FY06
Source: Company, JM Financial.
Public sector 2%
2%
Joint sector 6% 4% 6% 2% 9%
98%
96%
92%
84%
83%
82%
82%
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
1Q12
2Q12
Page 51
Rural Electrification Corporation Troubled states account for c.34% of loan book RECLs exposure to troubled states (Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir which account for c.80% of total SEB cash losses) is 34% of the loan book. Exhibit 62. RECL: Segment wise composition of loan book*
Troubled States Tamil Nadu Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Total Other Sates Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh Haryana Punjab West Bengal Uttaranchal Chattisgarh Karnataka Others Total
Source: Company, JM Financial. * As of August 31, 2011
9 December 2011
% Loan Exposure 13.0% 10.4% 8.3% 1.3% 0.7% 33.7% % Loan Exposure 15.5% 9.3% 7.7% 7.0% 6.0% 2.7% 1.4% 1.4% 15.3% 66.3%
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9 December 2011
ECB 6% 4% 12% 6%
18%
15%
Others 3% 11% 9% 4%
31%
40%
55%
57%
38%
46% 29%
43%
32%
18% FY10
16% FY11
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
Enjoyed very low effective cost of funds due to various tax concessions; however, GOI is withdrawing those benefits gradually Certain tax concessions (e.g. SLR bonds and tax-free bonds) and guarantees of GoI enabled RECL to price its borrowings at a lower rate of interest than other players. Thus, historically RECL has enjoyed very low effective cost of funds. However, we believe this trend is unlikely to continue going forward as a) GoI has not allowed RECL to issue SLR bonds since FY99 and tax-free bonds since FY02, b) In addition, since January 2007, GoI has limited the amount of bonds that an individual investor can utilise to offset capital gains to `5mn, which has reduced attractiveness of such bonds offerings. As compared to peers (PFC and IDFC), RECL enjoys one of the lowest cost of borrowings as shown in Exhibit 66, although gap between them has been coming down.
Page 53
Rural Electrification Corporation Exhibit 64. RECL: Trend in cost of borrowings Peer comparison
RECL 10.0% 9.0% 8.0% 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% FY05
Source: Company, JM Financial.
9 December 2011
POWF
IDFC
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
Borrowings profile for RECL has been diversifying as the company is reducing its reliance on 54 EC bonds and intends to increase proportion of ECBs further. Due to `5mn cap on 54 EC bonds, demand for these bonds has gone down; consequently, their proportion in total borrowings was 16% in 2Q12 from 38% FY05. IFC status enables RECL to diversify its borrowings through the issuance of infrastructure bonds and to raise ECBs (under the automatic route) up to $500mn each fiscal year, not exceeding outstanding ECBs by 50% of owned funds. In FY12, RECL intends to borrow c.`300bn from the market and plans to raise $1.5bn through ECB. Till now, it has borrowed `130bn from the market, including $300mn through ECB, at an incremental cost of 8.25%.
Unhedged foreign borrowings As of Sept11, RECL had foreign currency borrowings of `91bn (c.12% of its total borrowings) out of which only $250mn remains unhedged.
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9 December 2011
NII (` bn)
NIM (%)
Spread (%)
4.4%
4.2%
4.2%
4.2%
8.9
10.8
14.6
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
230 123 78 48 77
107
Page 55
9 December 2011
2.99% 1.93%
1.68%
0.03% FY10
0.02% FY11
Proportion of rescheduled loans have stabilised Historically, state sector utilities have had a relatively weak financial position and in the past defaulted on their indebtedness. Consequently, RECL had to restructure loans sanctioned to certain SEBs, which resulted in rescheduling of their loans. However, management has indicated that in last 4-5 years, RECL has not rescheduled any loans given to SEBs and there have been recoveries from such reschedule loans. Consequently, quantum of restructured loans has gone down to `22.8bn in FY09 (4.4% of advances) from `24.3bn in FY05 (11.2% of advances). However, during the last 2 years, the same has witnessed substantial jump and now constitutes c.10% of loans (`82bn) Exhibit 69. RECL: Trend in rescheduled loans
100.0 80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 FY05
Source: Company, JM Financial.
% of O/s Loans
82.2
11.2%
10.5% 70.1
10.0%
24.3
24.3
23.4
23.4 22.8
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
Page 56
Rural Electrification Corporation Escrow mechanism with state utilities and state guarantees provides asset quality comfort RECL has an escrow account mechanism in place with the utilities, which acts a credit enhancement mechanism. Under this, revenue of SEBs flows into the escrow account and is available to the SEBs. In case of any default, RECL would have the first right to claim the money on demand. This mechanism would ensure timely payment of all the dues to the company. As of 31 Mar11, 81% of its outstanding loans to State and Central sector borrowers involved such escrow account mechanism. However, we note that, in the event that end users do not make payments to their SEBs, the escrow account mechanism and the trust and retention account arrangements will not be effective. Recent initiatives by RECL, rising proportion of secured loans, state guarantees and recent tariff hike should allay significant asset quality concerns Over last 12 months RECL has taken many pro-active initiatives such as a) it did not sanction any loan to projects that are supplying power on a merchant basis, b) it sanctioned loans only for those where at least 70% generation capacity will be sold under a PPA, on a long-term basis, to ensure repayment of loans, c) from Apr11 RECL has been insisting on a FSA and a PPA having been signed already, without which no disbursement has taken place, d) RECL is well protected till plant loan factor of c.60-65% for all its generation projects, e) it has also put restrictions on providing short-term loans to discoms, mainly in states like Haryana, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, f) since June, RECL has not sanctioned short-term loans to these discoms, due to which Rajasthan has been forced to increase the tariff. Tamil Nadu is likely to increase tariffs by Dec/Jan. There has been 5-40% tariff hike across several SEBs over last 18 months (Exhibit 16).
9 December 2011
Page 57
Rural Electrification Corporation Exhibit 70. 5-40% tariff hikes across states in last 18 months
State Punjab UP West Bengal HP Tamil Nadu Andhra Pradesh Maharashtra Haryana Karnataka West Bengal Orissa Punjab Bihar Madhya Pradesh Zharkhand Delhi Rajastan Maharashtra Tamil Nadu** Date Apr-10 Apr-10 Apr-10 Jun-10 Aug-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jun-11 Aug-11 Aug-11 Aug-11 Oct -11 Nov-11 Hike 5-10% 13-15% 3-8% `0.30-0.50 `0.30-1.10 20% 5% 8% / 40-80% 2-10% 10% 20-40% 7-12% 19% 6% 18.5% 22% 19-27% 10% 36.5% Applicability* Agri / Dom/ Ind Agri / Dom/ Ind Agri / Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Ind Dom/ Ind Dom/ Comm/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Agri / Dom/ Ind Dom/ Ind Dom Dom/ Ind / Agri Agri / Dom/ Ind Agri / Dom/ Ind Previous hikes Date Sep-09 FY10 Nov-09 Nov-09 Jul -10 2009-10 2009-10 2009-10 2009-10 2010-11 2010-11 Quantum 9-19% unknown 20-25% 8-25% 11% 30% 10% 5% 40% SME and BPL exempted After 7 years to flat tariffs SME and agri consumers exempted Opposed by industries BPL exempted Consistent increase twice an year Steep increase after >10 years Remarks NA BPL exempted, but rural tariffs hiked
9 December 2011
Next hike in Summer of 2011 of c.12%; Higher increases for industry and heavy domestic users CESC proposes power tariff hike to West Bengal government in August11 After 9 years of flat tariffs NA Proposed increase in tariff rates of 65% with a hike in all categories of consumers NA Demanded for a 100% increase in tariff NA Hike done against election manifesto of not increasing tariffs for 5 years for agri Power surcharge of 9% instead of effecting a full-fledged tariff hike 42% to domestic users, 19% to industrial users and 589% to agricultural users.
Source: SERC, JM Financial * Note: Dom Domestic; Ind Industrial; Agri Agricultural; Comm Commercial, ** Proposed
Likewise proportion of secured loans (secured either by assets or a state government guarantee as collateral) has witnessed rising trend. Together it accounted of c.98% of loan book in FY11 vs c.93% in FY04. However, we note that share of loans backed by state government guarantees has seen a declining trend (from 77% in FY04 to 27% in FY11).
77%
71%
Page 58
Rural Electrification Corporation Thus various measures from SEBs like tariff hikes etc, increasing proportion of secured loans along with facility of escrow mechanism makes us believe that actual credit losses from SEB exposure is unlikely. Modeling credit cost of 12bps; reserves for bad and doubtful debts (currently 0.8% of loans) should also act as a buffer Historically, RECL has been able to maintain healthy asset quality (FY06 gross NPLs of 1.7% vs 2bps in FY11). Given exposure to discoms which are incurring significant losses currently, there has been perception of significant asset quality pressure on RECL. However, we believe actual credit losses would not be significant given a) escrow account mechanism and state level guarantees on these exposures, b) recent tariff hikes which should ease the burden for SEBs, c) in FY01-03, RECL had restructured SEB loans but without taking any significant loss on NPV basis. However, given risks on private sector exposure, we conservatively factor 10bps of credit costs for FY12 /FY13E and 12bps for FY14E. Further, RECL maintains reserve for bad debts (c.0.8% of O/S loan book) which should act as a buffer in case of any restructuring/NPLs.
9 December 2011
Exhibit 72. RECL: Reserve for bad and doubtful debts and as % of O/s loans
12.5 10.0 7.5 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 FY06 0.7% 1.7 2.1 0.6% FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E 2.6 0.7% 4.5 3.4 0.7% 0.7% 6.0 0.7% 0.8% 0.8%
20 16 12 11 7
LLP (bps)
1.9% 1.7%
10
12
8 25% 0% 4 0 FY06 0
0.0% 0.0%
0 FY10
Page 59
9 December 2011
RECL was allowed one-time settlement RECL was not included in the scheme but expert group allowed RECL one-time settlement. The Group recommended that the Ministry of Power, which is the administrative Ministry responsible for RECL, may consider advising RECL to settle its dues on a similar basis as the scheme proposed by the Group.
What RECL did in FY03-05 when SEBs dues were restructured? Overdues of Madhya Pradesh SEB were settled by a rescheduled package involving the issue of bonds of `14.15bn by the Government of MP, bearing 8% interest rate. In FY04, RECL had (calculated) yield on loans of 10.7%. Balance of `3.35bn was payable by MP SEB in installments as per MOU. Overdues from Jharkhand SEB were fully settled by cash payment of `1.7bn Overdues from Assam SEB and Bihar SEB were also re-scheduled during FY05. Further, RECL restructured/settled SEB loans but without taking any significant loss on NPV basis. This gives us confidence that in case of restructuring, RECL is not likely to incur any significant loss on principle/interest.
Page 60
9 December 2011
ROA (%)
Page 61
9 December 2011
Recent correction provides attractive entry opportunity; initiate with BUY and TP of `220
Massive 1year and 6months underperformance to BSE Bankex; offers attractive entry points RECL has been a significant underperformer over the last 12 months which can be attributed to: a) concerns over project execution and coal availability for power projects, b) concerns over asset quality in the light of mounting losses at the SEBs, and c) sharp increase in wholesale fund rates resulting in margin and spread compression. RECL has witnessed a significant de-rating from peak multiple of 2.9x 1yr fwd book to 1.1x currently. Over last 1year, RECL has underperformed BSE Bankex by 16%. Exhibit 75. RECL: Stock performance visavis BSE Bankex
120 100 80 60 40 20 Dec-10 RECL - 1 Year Price Performance (%) RECL - 1 Year Price Performance (%) 120 100 80 60 40 20 Dec-10 BANKEX
Feb-11
Apr-11
Jul-11
Sep-11
Dec-11
Feb-11
Apr-11
Jul-11
Sep-11
Nov -11
India - AAA - 5 Yr. 10.00 9.60 9.20 8.80 8.40 8.00 Nov -11
Feb-11
Apr-11
Jul-11
Sep-11
Page 62
Rural Electrification Corporation Attractive valuations at 1.1x 1yr fwd book (down from a peak of 2.9x), initiate coverage with BUY and `220 TP RECL has witnessed significant de-rating from peak multiple of 2.9x 1yr fwd book to 1.1x currently. We believe current valuations are attractive at 1.1x FY13E book with dividend yield of c.5% (based on FY12E dividend). We value the stock at 1.1x FY14P/B (at 1.15x Mar14 ABV; adjusted for reserves for bad and doubtful debt), implying Mar13 target price of `220, upside of c.23% (including dividend).
9 December 2011
Exhibit 77. RECL: One-year forward PE (x) and one-year forward P/BV (x)
Fw d. P/BV (x ) SD+2 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Mar-08 Oct-08 Jun-09 Jan-10 Sep-10 Apr-11 Dec-11 6.0 3.0 0.0 Mar-08 Av erage SD-1 SD+1 SD-2 15.0 12.0 9.0 Fw d. PE (x ) SD+2 Av erage SD-1 SD+1 SD-2
Oct-08
Jun-09
Jan-10
Sep-10
Apr-11
Dec-11
Page 63
9 December 2011
FY09 3.96% 3.89% 0.18% 4.5% 4.07% 6.1% 0.25% 3.82% 0.01% 92.7% -0.12% 3.94% 27.9% 2.84% 12.72% 22.3%
FY10 4.28% 4.23% 0.19% 4.2% 4.42% 5.9% 0.26% 4.16% 0.00% 94.7% -0.11% 4.27% 24.5% 3.22% 13.88% 23.2%
FY11 4.39% 4.34% 0.15% 3.3% 4.49% 5.2% 0.23% 4.26% 0.00% 95.2% -0.20% 4.46% 26.1% 3.30% 15.30% 21.6%
FY12E 4.18% 4.15% 0.13% 3.1% 4.28% 5.0% 0.21% 4.07% 0.09% 95.4% 0.05% 3.94% 26.0% 2.91% 14.43% 20.2%
FY13E 4.20% 4.16% 0.13% 2.9% 4.28% 4.8% 0.21% 4.08% 0.10% 95.6% -0.01% 3.99% 26.0% 2.95% 13.94% 21.2%
FY14E 4.22% 4.17% 0.12% 2.8% 4.29% 4.6% 0.20% 4.09% 0.12% 95.3% -0.01% 3.99% 26.0% 2.95% 13.62% 21.7%
3.79% 3.69% 0.05% 1.4% 3.74% 8.1% 0.30% 3.44% 0.11% 90.1% 0.02% 3.32% 27.0% 2.42% 13.96% 17.4%
Page 64
9 December 2011
Key risks
SEB losses a key risk: RECL has been able to maintain healthy asset quality despite having significant exposure to SEBs with stressed financials. However, despite massive losses, SEBs have fulfilled their payment obligations on time. Although SEBs have not defaulted since FY03, such mounting loss levels are not sustainable and timely tariff hikes/operational improvement are critical for SEBs. One time settlement package and possibility of RECL taking hair cut in restructuring of SEBs remains key risk. Spike in interest rates: Being a wholesale funded institution, any sustained liquidity shock could impact spreads adversely and affect profitability. Regulatory risks: POWF and RECL are exempted from prudential exposure guidelines of RBI and provisioning norms applicable to other NBFCs. These exemptions are applicable till Mar12 and RBI will review whether to continue with the exemption post the deadline. Higher than expected credit costs: Although we have been conservative in our credit cost assumptions, higher than expected delinquencies emanating from SEBs poor financial health and rising exposure to private sector remain a risk to our estimates.
Page 65
9 December 2011
Company background
RECL is a government owned (GOI owns 66.8%) institution that was initially involved in electrification of rural areas. The company provides long-term, short-term and working capital loans to power utilities (state, central and private sector) and power equipment manufacturers. It is a strategic player in financing of entire power infrastructure space which includes financing for generation, transmission, distribution and rural electrification projects, across the country without any limit. RECL continues to play an integral role in implementing the rural electrification strategy of the GOI through implementation of the Rajeev Gandhi Gramin Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY). RECL through its two subsidiaries- RECL PDCL and RECL TPCL also provides third party monitoring, consultancy and bid process coordinating services respectively. RECL has also jointly promoted Energy Efficiency Services Ltd with other PSUs to play a key role in implementation of the National Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency under the Jawahar Lal Nehru National Solar Mission. RECL leverages its pan-India presence with a network of 18 zonal and project offices for development and conduct of business.
Description - Launched for electrification of all villages and providing access to electricity to all rural households in the country - Launched to improve financial viability of state power utilities, reduce aggregate technical and commercial losses in power sector - Aims to promote competitive procurement of transmission services and encourage private investment in transmission lines - GoI and Unites States Agency for International Development have established Distribution Reforms Upgrades and Management Project (DRUM)
Role of RECL - RECL is the nodal agency for implementation of the scheme - RECL expects to provide counterpart funding for the projects sanctioned by GoI to the extent not covered by GoI grant and/or loan - RECL has been appointed as nodal agency to invite private sector investment in three transmission projects to be executed on BOO basis - RECL has been appointed by the MoP as one of the DRUM partner implementing agencies - RECL has Guarantees from Government of India for funding availed from Multilateral Agencies
Page 66
9 December 2011
(` mn)
FY14E 56,701 1,948 58,649 2,708 55,942 1,494 0 0 1,494 54,447 -300 54,147 0 54,147 14,078 40,069 0 40,069 11,219 28,850
Balance Sheet
Y/E March Capital Reserves and Surplus Reserve for Bad and Doubtful Debts Share holders equity Borrowed Funds Deferred Tax Liabilities Current Liabilities and Provisions Total Liabilities Loans Investments Cash & Bank Balances Loans & Advances Other Current Assets Fixed Assets Deferred Tax Asset Total Assets FY10 9,875 96,416 4,513 110,803 559,482 0 25,149 695,435 664,526 9,099 13,903 1,141 5,793 899 74 695,435 FY11 9,875 112,058 5,954 127,886 700,038 0 36,976 864,900 821,321 8,124 28,319 736 5,393 881 128 864,900 FY12E 9,875 129,367 7,472 146,713 842,496 0 48,786 1,037,995 993,798 10,932 24,050 994 7,115 953 153 1,037,995
(` mn)
FY13E 9,875 151,741 9,092 170,707 1,009,731 0 58,217 1,238,656 1,182,620 13,009 30,748 1,183 9,900 1,013 183 1,238,656 FY14E 9,875 178,655 11,027 199,557 1,210,163 0 69,525 1,479,245 1,407,317 16,466 39,405 1,407 13,369 1,062 218 1,479,245
Key ratios
Y/E March Growth (YoY) (%) Borrowed Funds Loans Total Assets NII Non-Interest Income Operating Expenses Operating Profits Core Operating Profits Provisions Reported PAT Yields / Margins (%) Interest Spread (%) NIM (%) Profitability (%) ROA (%) ROE (%) Cost to Income (%) Assets Quality (%) Gross NPAs (%) LLP (%) Source: Company, JM Financial 0.03% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.13% 0.09% 0.23% 0.10% 3.22% 23.2% 5.8% 3.29% 21.5% 5.1% 2.91% 20.2% 5.0% 2.95% 21.1% 4.8% 2.89% 4.28% 2.97% 4.39% 2.62% 4.18% 2.67% 4.20% 24.5% 29.3% 26.7% 38.4% 37.0% 33.8% 38.6% 38.7% -93.5% 44.5% 25.1% 23.6% 24.4% 28.7% 4.2% 11.6% 28.1% 28.0% 0.0% 28.4% 20.4% 21.0% 20.0% 16.4% -15.8% 12.7% 14.9% 16.4% 35160.9 % 7.7% 19.9% 19.0% 19.3% 19.9% 12.1% 14.6% 19.9% 20.0% 41.1% 21.2% FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E
(%)
FY14E
DuPont Analysis
Y/E March NII / Assets (%) Other income / Assets (%) Total Income / Assets (%) Cost to Assets (%) PPP / Assets (%) Provisions / Assets (%) PBT / Assets (%) Tax Rate (%) ROA (%) Leverage (%) ROE (%) Source: Company, JM Financial FY10 4.23% 0.29% 4.52% 0.26% 4.26% 0.00% 4.26% 24.45% 3.22% 7.2 23.18% FY11 4.34% 0.24% 4.58% 0.23% 4.35% 0.00% 4.46% 26.08% 3.29% 6.5 21.53% FY12E 4.15% 0.17% 4.31% 0.21% 4.10% 0.08% 3.93% 26.00% 2.91% 6.9 20.17% FY13E 4.16% 0.15% 4.31% 0.21% 4.11% 0.10% 3.98% 26.00% 2.95% 7.2 21.14%
(%)
FY14E 4.17% 0.14% 4.32% 0.20% 4.12% 0.11% 3.98% 26.00% 2.95% 7.3 21.64%
19.9% 19.0% 19.4% 19.8% 10.7% 16.0% 19.7% 19.8% 35.5% 19.4% 2.75% 4.22%
Valuations
2.95% 21.6% 4.6% 0.29% 0.12% Y/E March Shares in issue (mn) EPS (`.) EPS (YoY) (%) PE (x) BV (`) BV (YoY) (%) P/BV (x) DPS (`) Div. yield (%) Source: Company, JM Financial FY10 987.5 20.3 25.7% 9.9 112 55.7% 1.79 7.1 3.6% FY11 987.5 26.0 28.4% 7.7 130 15.4% 1.55 8.7 4.4% FY12E 987.5 28.0 7.7% 7.2 149 14.7% 1.35 9.0 4.5% FY13E 987.5 34.0 21.2% 5.9 173 16.4% 1.16 9.7 4.8% FY14E 987.5 40.6 19.4% 4.9 202 16.9% 0.99 11.4 5.7%
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POWF vs RECL
9 December 2011
Source: Company, RBI, JM Financial. * Exposure of banks to power sector ** Excludes ECB for power sector
II. Loan book composition Discipline wise: POWF is more tilted towards generation sector (c.84% of 2Q12 loan book) while RECL has balanced exposure to generation (44% of 2Q12 loan book; T&D 50%). However, going forward we expect proportion of generation to rise in case of RECL (increased to 44% in 2Q12 from 7% in FY05) as a) the sector is likely to offer more funding opportunities, b) reforms in T&D sector are likely to reduce fund requirements over the medium term.
Exhibit 81. POWF (LHS) vs RECL: Trend in portfolio composition discipline wise
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 1Q12 2Q12 67% 72% 75% 77% 81% 84% 85% 85% 84%
Generation Transmission Distribution Others
Transmission and Distribution 20% 7% 24% 13% 18% 23% 11% 26% 7% 36%
12%
11%
11%
12%
10%
8%
8%
8%
8%
Others 6% 44%
43%
74%
63%
58%
63%
57%
56%
51%
50%
50%
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
1Q12
2Q12
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POWF vs RECL III. Loan book composition Borrower wise: c.92% of POWFs loans are towards the public sector while private sector accounts for 8% (this proportion has remained stable over last 3 years). However, private sector accounted for 11% of RECLs 2Q12 loan book (up from 4% in FY08). Going forward, we expect both POWF and RECL to witness increased private sector exposure. Exhibit 82. POWF (LHS) vs RECL: Trend in portfolio composition discipline wise
Public sector 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 1Q12 2Q12 90% 87% 87% 85% 84% 83% 8% 2% 7% 7% Joint sector 5% 8% 7% 8% Priv ate sector 8% 8% 9% 8% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 96% 92% 84% 83% Public sector 4% 6% Joint sector 6% 9% 10% 7%
9 December 2011
82%
82%
1Q12
2Q12
IV. Exposure to troubled states: Exposure of POWF and RECL to troubled states (Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Rajastan, Madhya Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir that account for c.80% of total SEB cash losses) is 31% and 34% respectively. Exhibit 83. POWF* (LHS) vs RECL**: Exposure to troubled states
Troubled States Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh Tamil Nadu Jammu & Kashmir Total Other Sates Maharashtra Haryana Andhra Pradesh West Bengal Delhi Uttarakhand Gujarat Chattisgarh Jharkhand Himacha Pradesh Karnataka Others Total % Loan Exposure 8.8% 8.1% 7.4% 5.6% 1.3% 31.1% % Loan Exposure 12.8% 8.6% 8.5% 8.0% 6.9% 4.4% 4.1% 4.1% 3.1% 2.9% 2.4% 3.2% 68.9% Troubled States Tamil Nadu Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Total Other Sates Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh Haryana Punjab West Bengal Uttaranchal Chattisgarh Karnataka Others Total % Loan Exposure 13.0% 10.4% 8.3% 1.3% 0.7% 33.7% % Loan Exposure 15.5% 9.3% 7.7% 7.0% 6.0% 2.7% 1.4% 1.4% 15.3% 66.3%
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POWF vs RECL V. Borrowings profile: Only RECL is allowed to raise capital gain bonds, which accounted for c.16% of total borrowings in 2Q12. RECL has also resorted to higher ECB (11% of borrowings) while POWF has c.6% of borrowings from ECB. Going forward, we expect proportion of ECBs to go up in borrowings for POWF and RECL as they are a cheaper source of funding (even on fully hedged basis).
9 December 2011
VI. Cost of borrowings: RECL has always maintained its borrowing cost below that of POWF as it is allowed to raise capital gains bond under section 54 EC (constituted c.16% of total borrowings in 2Q12 vs 40% in FY05). However, in Jan07, GoI limited the amount of bonds an individual investor can utilise to offset capital gains to `5mn, which has limited the market for such bonds.
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
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POWF vs RECL VII. Asset Quality: Over the last 5 years (FY06-11), both POWF and RECL enjoyed healthy asset quality. Their gross NPLs stood at 23bps and 31bps respectively as of 1Q12.
9 December 2011
Gross NPLs (%) 4.00% 3.20% 2.40% 1.60% 0.80% 0.80% 0.00% FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 0.13% 2.99%
0.66%
1.68%
1.93%
0.03% FY10
0.02% FY11
FY09
VIII. Profitability: POWF and RECL have witnessed significantly improved profitability (measured by ROA and ROE) due to margin expansion, virtually zero credit cost and very low cost ratios. Consequently, POWF reported ROA and ROE of 2.7% and 18% while RECL witnessed ROA and ROE of 3.3% and 22% in FY11.
Exhibit 87. POWF (LHS) vs RECL: Trend in ROA and ROE (%)
20.0% 17.0% 14.0% 11.0% 8.0% 5.0% FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12E FY13E FY14E
Source: Company, JM Financial.
ROA (%)
ROA (%)
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POWF vs RECL IX. Valuation: POWF has witnessed significant de-rating from peak multiple of 2.9x 1yr fwd book to 0.95x currently (average multiple of 1.7x since IPO). Similarly, RECL also witnessed a considerable de-rating from peak multiple of 2.9x 1yr fwd book to 1.1x currently (average multiple of 1.5x since IPO).
9 December 2011
Dec-07
Sep-08
Jul-09
May-10
Feb-11
Dec-11
Oct-08
Jun-09
Jan-10
Sep-10
Apr-11
Dec-11
X. Current government holding: Government owns 73.7% in POWF (stake down from 89.8% due to FPO in 1Q11) and 66.8% in RECL.
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POWF vs RECL
9 December 2011
Analyst Certification
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