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325 Phil. 1053

[SYLLABUS]

[ G.R. No. 120715, March 29, 1996 ]

FERNANDO SAZON Y RAMOS, PETITIONER, VS. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

 RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of

the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 13777

which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 161 of

Pasig City, in Criminal Case No. 58939, convicting the petitioner of the

crime of libel.

The relevant antecedents are not disputed.

Petitioner Fernando Sazon and private complainant Abdon Reyes were

both residents of the PML Homes in East Drive, Parang Marikina, Metro

Manila. They were likewise members of the PML-Parang Bagong Lipunan

Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners

of PML Homes. The association had a monthly newsletter, the PML-

Homemaker, of which the petitioner was the editor.

On December 11, 1983, the PML-BLCA held an election for the members
of its board of directors. Among those who ran in the election were the

private complainant and the petitioner. The petitioner was elected as a

director. He was likewise elected by the new board as president of the

homeowners’ association. The private complainant lost in said election.

Unable to accept defeat, the private complainant, on January 16, 1984,

wrote a letter to the Estate Management Office of the Home Financing

Corporation (EMO-HFC) protesting the election of the petitioner as a

director and president of the homeowners’ association. He alleged that the

election was a nullity because of: (1) the lack of authority of the petitioner to

call for such an election; (2) the absence of a quorum; and (3) lack of the

required notice to the homeowners. -

On January 18, 1984, the private complainant wrote his co-homeowners

explaining to them his election protest and urging them not to recognize the

petitioner and the other members who won in the election.

Meanwhile, in response to the election protest, the EMO-HFC ordered the

PML-BLCA to conduct a referendum to be supervised by the EMO-HFC.

The private complainant then notified his co-homeowners about this

development and requested them to attend a general meeting with the

representatives of the EMO-HFC which was to be held before the

referendum.

Soon after the general meeting, several copies of a leaflet called the "PML

Scoop" were received by the homeowners. The leaflet was entitled

"Supalpal si Sazon," obviously referring to the affirmative action taken by

the EMO-HFC in connection with the private respondent’s election protest.

At about the same time, the phrase "Sazon, nasaan ang pondo ng

simbahan?" was seen boldly written on the walls near the entrance gate of

the subdivision. There was no proof, however, as to who was responsible

for these writings.

Thinking that only private complainant was capable of these acts, petitioner

Sazon started writing, publishing, and circulating newsletters to his co-

homeowners, culminating in the appearance in the February 10, 1984 issue

of the PML-Homemakers of the following article:

"USAPAN NG BOARD v. ABDON NAG-COLLAPSE SA ESTATE

MANAGEMENT OFFICE
Dala ng mahigpit na pakiusap ng Estate Management Office (EMO) na

gawin ang lahat na nararapat upang magkaroon ng katahimikan at

pagkakaisa ang mga tiga PML Homes, ang Board Secretary, Mr. Pacis at

President F.R. Sazon ay nagpaunlak na pagbigyan ang kahilingan ng ating

kasama na si Abdon Reyes.

Ang kahilingan: Anyayahan ang EMO-HFC na magconduct ng Plebiscite or

Referendum para sa possibility ng isa pang halalan ng Board of Directors.

Sa meeting na dinaluhan ni Abdon Reyes na nagdala ng isang cameraman

at may kasamang pagyayabang at kaunting panggolpe de gulat (na tila

baga puro tanga yata ang akala niya sa mga kausap), ipinipilit pa rin nitong

ang Board sa PML Parang ay binubuo pa rin nuong mga taong inilukluk ng

developer na nag 1-2-3.

Halos pag-pupukpukin ng bag ng mga kababaihang nagsisama sa miting

ang ating pobreng super kulit na walang pakialam sa mga taga atin.

Ang mga nagsipagbigay suporta sa Pangulo at Board Secretary ay sina

Gng. Cavarosa, Gng. Triffie Ladisla, Gng. Nitz Rodriguez at Dra. Sazon.
Kung di dahil sa pakiusap nina Messr’rs. ABNER PACAIGUE at HOMER

AGNOTE, kasama na ng Board Secretary at Pangulo, malamang ay

nagulpi sana ang mandurugas.

Dahil sa patuloy na kabulastugan ni Abdon, ang meeting na ginaganap sa

EMO kaninang umaga ay nag-collapse nang malaman na may ikinalat na

liham ang mandurugas, na nagsasabing di umano ay hindi tutoo ang

ibinabalita ng ‘Homemaker’ na siya ay turned-down sa HFC.

Matagal na po tayong niloloko ng magkasamang Abdon at Evangeline

Lopez. Dahil sa tagal ay alam na tuloy natin kung papaanong maipapatigil

ang kanilang kabulastugan.

Sila rin ang mastermind sa paninirang pun sa Pangulo sa pamamagitan ng

pag-susulat ng panira sa mga pader natin. Diumano’y itinatanong daw nila

kung saan dinala ang pondo ng simbahan. Bakit hindi sila tumungo sa

kinauukulan: Treasurer, Auditor, at iba pang officials.

UPHELD PO ANG ATING BOARD, ITO AY MABUBUWAG LANG KUNG

INYONG NANAISIN.

Mag-iingat po tayo sa panlilinlang ng mga taong gaya ni Abdon at Vangie.

UNITED WE STAND DIVIDED WE FALL LET’S UNITE AND FIGHT

EVIL!!!

F.R. SAZON - Editor"[1]

Aggrieved by the aforequoted article, the private complainant initiated the

necessary complaint against the petitioner, and on May 25, 1984, an

Information was filed before the trial court charging the petitioner with libel.

On March 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision finding the

petitioner guilty of the crime charged, and accordingly sentenced him, thus:

"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the accused is found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer

imprisonment of FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor as

minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision

correccional as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law,

and to pay a fine of P200.00 in accordance with Art. 353, in relation to Art.
355 of the Revised Penal Code.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED."[2]

The petitioner appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. On June 19,

1995, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of

the trial court.

Hence, petitioner brought the present action, and in seeking a reversal of

the challenged decision, he claims that the Court of Appeals, erred:

"1. x x x IN NOT HOLD1NG THAT THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE (EXHIBIT

"A") IS IN THE NATURE OF A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND

HENCE, PROTECTED AND NOT ACTIONABLE.

2. x x x IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WORDS IN CONTROVERSY ARE

NOT DEFAMATORY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AS THEY ARE NON-

ACTIONABLE EPITHETS WRITTEN WITHOUT MALICE.

3. x x x IN NOT HOLD1NG THAT THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE DID NOT

CAUSE DAMAGE TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S REPUTATION.

4. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-PETITIONER’S

CONVICTION IS WARRANTED, x x x IN NOT LIMITING THE PENALTY

IMPOSED UPON HIM TO FINE ALONE WITHOUT IMPRISONMENT x x

x."[3]

In fine, the principal issue posited in this petition is whether or not the

questioned article written by the petitioner is libelous.

We rule in the affirmative.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel in this wise:

"ART. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation

of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,

condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,

or contempt of a natural or juridical person, on to blacken the memory of

one who is dead."

For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:

"(a) it must be defamatory;

(b) it must be malicious;

(c) it must be given publicity; and

(d) the victim must be identifiable."[4]

Petitioner concedes the existence of the third and fourth requisites in the

case at bench. Accordingly, only the first and second elements need to be

discussed herein.

Petitioner insists that the allegedly offensive words found in the subject

article are not actually defamatory. According to petitioner, the word

"mandurugas" and other words and phrases used in the questioned article

do not impute to private complainant any crime, vice or defect which would

be injurious or damaging to his name and reputation. As far as petitioner is

concerned, the descriptive words and phrases used should be considered

as mere epithets which are a form of non-actionable opinion, because while

they may express petitioner’s strong emotional feelings of dislike, they do

not mean to reflect adversely on private complainant’s reputation.

We do not agree. In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an

alleged libel means, but what the words used by him mean.[5] Here, the
defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner are shown by the

very recitals thereof in the questioned article. No evidence aliunde need be

adduced to prove it. Petitioner used the following words and phrases in

describing the private complainant: "mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa

panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong niloloko," "may kasamang pagyayabang,"

"ang ating pobreng super kulit," "patuloy na kabulastugan," "mastermind sa

paninirang puri," etc.[6] Jurisprudence has laid down a test to determine the

defamatory character of words used in the following manner, viz:

"Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to

destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and

metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is

sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose

and understand that the person or persons against whom they were

uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach

their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons

up to public ridicule. x x x."[7]

This test was satisfied in the case at bench. Branding private complainant

Reyes "mandurugas," et al. most certainly exposed him to public contempt

and ridicule. No amount of sophistical explanation on the part of petitioner

can hide, much less erase, the negative impression already created in the
minds of the readers of the libelous material towards private complainant.

Respondent Court of Appeals is, thus, correct in holding that "these words

and phrases (‘mandurugas,’ et al.) are indisputably defamatory for they

impute upon the private complainant a condition that is dishonorable and

shameful, since they tend to describe him as a swindler and/or

a deceiver." (Italics Ours).[8]

Petitioner also maintains that there was no malice in this case. He argues

that the prosecution failed to present evidence demonstrating that the

accused was prompted by personal ill-will or spite or that he did not act in

response to duty but acted merely to cause harm to private complainant.

Consequently, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving

malice on the part of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.

We are not persuaded. The general rule laid down in Article 354 of the

Revised Penal Code provides that:

"Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is

presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and

justifiable motive for making it is shown. x x x"

Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is defamatory, as in

this case, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the

defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the

defendant’s imputation is malicious (malice in law). The burden is on the

side of the defendant to show good intention and justifiable motive in order

to overcome the legal inference of malice. Unfortunately, petitioner

miserably failed to discharge this burden in the case before us.

Petitioner however submits that malice should not be presumed in the

instant case, but must be proved as a fact (malice in fact), since the

questioned article is a privileged communication covered under the two

exceptions enumerated under Article 354, viz:

"1. A private communication made by any person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and,

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or

remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are

not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in

said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the

exercise of their functions."

Petitioner avers that he wrote the article not to malign the private

complainant, but merely to correct the misinformation being circulated by

Reyes and some quarters within the community about the petitioner and

the association he heads. He did it therefore, in response to some moral,

social or civic duty as he was at that time the President of their

homeowners’ association and editor of its newsletter. Hence, the article

falls under the first exception of Article 354.

The argument has no basis. In Daez v. Court of Appeals[9] we held that:

"As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any

misconduct on the pant of public officials, which comes to his notice, to

those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is

qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on

privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement. Such

complaints should be addressed solely to some official having

jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the

grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection

therewith."

In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was

published was vested with the power of supervision over the private
complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against the

latter. Moreover, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be

classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the

public,[10] as what the petitioner did in this case.

In his final attempt to come under the protective mantle of privileged

communication, petitioner alleges that the subject article likewise

constitutes a fair and true report on the actuations of a public official falling

under the second exception of Article 354, since private complainant was a

public relations consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry at the

time the allegedly libelous article was published on February 10, 1984."[11]

On this point, the rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the

conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of

their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth

of the imputation. But any attack upon the private character of the public

officer on matters which are not related to the discharge of their

official functions may constitute libel.[12] This is clear by express provision

of Article 354, exception number two (2) which refers to "any other act

performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions."

A perusal of the petitioner’s article reveals that it has no reference

whatsoever to the performance of private complainant’s position as a public

relations consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry. The article

attacked solely the private character of the complainant and delved on

matters completely unrelated to his official functions. It cannot therefore fall

under the protective coverage of privileged communication.

However, even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that petitioner’s article

qualifies under the category of privileged communication, this does not still

negate the presence of malice in the instant case. It is well to note that the

existence of malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that the

defendant bore a grudge against the offended party, or that there was

rivalry or ill-feeling between them which existed at the date of the

publication of the defamatory imputation or that the defendant had an

intention to injure the reputation of the offended party as shown by the

words used and the circumstances attending the publication of the

defamatory imputation.[13] The circumstances under which the subject

article was published by the petitioner serve to buttress the inference that

petitioner was animated solely by revenge towards the private complainant

on account of the leaflet entitled "Supalpal si Sazon,’ earlier circulated

among the homeowners as well as the writings near the entrance gate of

the subdivision, all of which petitioner believes to be the handiwork of the

private complainant. Furthermore, the words used in the questioned article

were mostly uncalled for, strongly sending the message that petitioner’s

objective was merely to malign and injure the reputation of the private

complainant. This is certainly indicative of malice in fact on the part of the

petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that, in lieu of imprisonment and

fine, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Three

Thousand (P3,000.00) PESOS with subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 16-18.

[2]
Rollo, pp. 18-19.

[3]
Rollo, pp. 22-23.

[4]
Alonzo v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51 [1995].

[5]
Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, Volume Three, 1988

edition, p. 514 citing Encarnacion, CA 48 O.G. 1817.

[6]
Rollo, pp. 16-18.

[7]
Lacsa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 161 SCRA 427 [1988] citing U.S.

v. O’Connell, 37 Phil. 767 [1918].

[8]
Rollo, p.61.

[9]
191 SCRA 61 [1990].
[10]
Ibid., citing Lacsa vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 427 [1988].

[11]
Rollo, pp. 29-30.

[12]
Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, Thirteenth Edition,

pp. 86 1-862, citing People v. Del Fierro and Padilla, C.A. G.R. No. 3599-R,

July 27, 1950.

[13]
Ibid., p. 857.

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