CHAPTER 10

Financial Performance Measures

and Their Effects

The primary objective of for-profit organizations is to maximize shareholder (or owner) value,
or firm value for short. Thus, the results-control ideal would be to reward employees for their
contributions to fi rm value. However, because direct measurements of the contributions by
employees to value creation are rarely possible, firms have to look for measures that proxy for
this ultimate objective and resort to results-control alternatives to either reinforce desired
behaviors where the proxies leave gaps or mitigate undesired consequences that may arise from
relying on the proxies.
A commonly cited management “truism” is that what you measure is what you get. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 9, this truism is particularly pertinent when the performance measures are
linked to incentives that reinforce the attainment of the measured performance. But which per-
formance measure(s) should be used? At managerial levels in organizations, job responsibilities
are both broad and varied. In common jargon, managerial jobs are said to be multitasking in
nature. Reflecting this task variety, the list of measures used in practice to motivate and evalu-
ate managerial performance is long. That said, the list of measures can be classified into three
broad categories. Two of these categories include summary financial measures of performance,
expressed either in market (stock price) or accounting terms, and the third category includes
combinations of measures.
The summary measures reflect the aggregate or bottom-line impacts of multiple perfor-
mance areas (e.g. accounting profits reflect the aggregate effects of both revenue- and cost-
related decisions). The fi rst category of summary measures contains market measures; that
is, those that reflect changes in stock prices or shareholder returns. The second category
contains accounting measures, which can be defi ned in either residual terms (such as net
income after taxes, operating profit, residual income, or economic value added) or ratio
terms (such as return on investment, return on equity, or return on net assets). These two
categories of summary fi nancial (market-based or accounting-based) measures of perfor-
mance are the focus of this chapter. These measurement categories represent financial
measures of performance because they are either denominated in currency (e.g. quarterly
profits of $19.2 million); as a ratio of fi nancial numbers, such as $0.12 earnings per share
(EPS) or 12% return on equity (ROE); or as a change in fi nancial numbers, such as 11%
earnings growth.
The third measurement category consists of combinations of measures. These combinations
can involve the use of either type of summary measures, or both, plus some disaggregated
financial measures (e.g. revenues, expenses) and/or nonfinancial measures (e.g. market share,
customer satisfaction, employee turnover). We discuss the use of combinations of measures in
Chapter 11. In both chapters, we use the evaluation criteria introduced in Chapter 2, notably

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Chapter 10 • Financial Performance Measures and Their Effects

congruence, controllability, precision, objectivity, timeliness, understandability, and cost effi-

ciency to evaluate and to compare and contrast each measurement category.
Most organizations base their higher managerial-level results controls to a great extent on
summary accounting measures of performance. Earlier chapters (particularly Chapters 2 and 7)
elaborated the reasons why accounting measures of performance are in such common use. They
have some significant advantages over other measurement alternatives. In particular, at mini-
mal incremental cost, they provide a useful summary of the results of the many actions and
decisions that managers take. It must be recognized, however, that even the best accounting
measures are not perfect; they are only surrogate or proxy indicators of changes in firm value.
The use of accounting performance measures as a proxy for changes in firm value creates
various control problems. This chapter describes one of the most significant problems account-
ing measures cause: a tendency to make managers excessively short-term-oriented, or myopic.
This chapter also discusses the issue of suboptimization, a form of behavioral displacement
caused particularly by the use of accounting-based ROI-type (ratio or return) measures.
Chapter 11 focuses on how the myopia problem can be alleviated, at least to some extent.
A whole chapter is devoted to this subject because of its importance and complexity. The final
chapter in this section, Chapter 12, discusses how to handle problems caused when employees
are held accountable for results they cannot completely control.

Value creation

It is generally understood that the primary objective of for-profit organizations is to maximize

the value of the firm, subject to some constraints, such as compliance with laws and adequate
concern for employees, customers, and other stakeholders.1 As Michael Jensen, a financial
economist, phrases it, “200 years’ worth of work in economics and finance indicate that social
welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy attempt to maximize their own total firm
value.”2 Ideally, then, to reflect success properly, performance measures should go up when
value is created and go down when it is destroyed.
We hasten to add, however, that while the arguments presented in this chapter are based on
the assumption of value maximization as the ultimate organizational objective in the context of
for-profit corporations, we realize that corporations have responsibilities to a broader set of
stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, and society, and that fulfilling these
stakeholder responsibilities is both important and requires tradeoffs. Although it is beyond the
scope of this chapter to debate the question about the ultimate (balance of) objective(s) of cor-
porations, the evaluation framework presented in this and earlier chapters, and the congruence
criterion in particular, can be used to evaluate performance measures no matter which
objective(s) an organization pursues. The framework can be conceptually applied even to non-
profit settings (as we discuss in Chapter 16), where the organizational purposes (e.g. to provide
healthcare, education, or affordable housing) are not directed toward maximizing shareholder
value. But even where value maximization is the key objective, concerns related to sustainabil-
ity and corporate social responsibility, for example, also need to be addressed; we also discuss
this in Chapter 16.3
Returning to the strict context of “firm value” as alluded to by Jensen, the value of any eco-
nomic asset can be calculated at any specific time by discounting the future cash flows that the
firm is expected to generate, where the discount rate reflects the time value of money and risk.
Thus, employees can, all else equal, increase value by increasing the size of future cash flows,
by accelerating the timing of those cash flows (due to the time value of money), or by making
them more certain or less risky (thus allowing a lower discount rate). The change in firm value

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 Market measures of performance

over any given period is called economic income. Therefore, maximization of economic income is
an alternative way of phrasing the basic corporate financial objective of value maximization. As
we will see, economic income is different from accounting income, and the difference has impor-
tant management control implications.4

Market measures of performance

One way of assessing value changes is by using market measures of performance, which are
based on changes in the market value of the firm or, if dividends are also considered, return to
shareholders. The value created (return to shareholders) can be measured directly for any
period (yearly, quarterly, monthly) as the sum of the dividends paid to shareholders in the
measurement period plus (or minus) the change in the market value of the stock. For publicly
traded, exchange-listed firms whose stock is traded in actively traded and properly regulated
capital markets, the market value of the firm is generally viewed as the closest, although imper-
fect, measure of (hence, proxy for) the firm’s true intrinsic value. As we have seen in Chapter 9,
firms often employ a variety of stock-based compensation plans, such as stock option and
restricted stock plans, which link incentive payments to stock price. In this way, employees who
are eligible for equity-based compensation plans are rewarded for generating shareholder
returns as defined above, or at least its most significant component – changes in the value of
common stock.
In that sense, market measures have broad appeal in part because they provide relatively
direct indications of changes in firm value. Such measurement congruence allays political pres-
sure that outsiders otherwise might bring on the company. Who is to complain if managers
share rewards in synch with those enjoyed by the firm’s owners? If the market value changes
are measured in terms of recent transaction prices in an actively traded, efficient market, the
market measures also have other advantages. For publicly traded, exchange-listed firms, mar-
ket values are available on a timely (daily) basis. They are precise (no or little random error) and
relatively accurate (no or little systematic biases, assuming an efficient information environ-
ment), and the values are usually objective (not manipulable by the managers whose perfor-
mances are being evaluated; or, at least, not nearly as manipulable as some other measures).5
They are understandable, at least in terms of what the measures represent. And, they are cost
effective because they do not require any company measurement expense.
Market measures do have limitations, however. First, market measures suffer from control-
lability problems. They can generally be affected to a significant extent only by the top few
managers in the organization, who have the power to make decisions of major importance.
They say little about the performances of individuals lower in the organization, even those with
significant management responsibilities, except in a collective sense. Individually, the efforts of
virtually all employees below the very top level of management usually have an infinitesimally
small impact on stock prices, which is captured pertinently by the following quote: “So many
things can affect stock-price performance that have nothing to do with the individual employee
– employees may actually be demotivated upon realizing that it can be like a lottery; we should
only ask employees to control things they can influence, like earnings.”6 Or in the view of War-
ren Buffett, the legendary investor:

Buffett doesn’t like what he calls lottery ticket arrangements, such as stock options, in
which the ultimate value could range from zero to huge and is totally out of the control of
the person whose behavior we would like to affect. Instead, goals should be tailored to the
economics of the business, simple and measurable, and directly related to the daily
activities of plan participants.7

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Chapter 10 • Financial Performance Measures and Their Effects

But even for the top management team, market measures may be far from being totally control-
lable. Stock market valuations are affected by many factors that the managers cannot control,
such as changes in macroeconomic activity (economic growth), political climate (e.g. election
results), monetary policy (e.g. interest rate policy), industry events, and actions of competitors
(e.g. a major oil spill), as well as the general stock market mood (bearish or bullish). When this
is the case, stock prices are less informative about even top-level managers’ performances.
Therefore, one reason why accounting information is important in incentive contracting is that
earnings can shield executives against the noise inherent in firms’ stock prices.8
It is possible, however, to “improve” the market measures to make them more informative
of the controllable elements of performance, such as by using relative performance evalua-
tions (RPE). For example, managers can be held accountable for generating market returns
greater than those of the overall market or greater than those of a chosen peer group of com-
panies. When done well, and consistent with efficient contracting, RPE firms select peers that
allow effective removal of common risk and improve fairness in compensation.9 (We discuss
methods of making adjustments for the effects of uncontrollable factors in more depth in
Chapter 12.)
Second, market values do also not always reflect realized performance; instead, the values
merely represent expectations, and it can be risky to base incentives on expectations because
those expectations might not be realized. Indeed, markets can overreact to news (in either
direction, positive or negative), such as to the appointment of a new chief executive or to news
about a merger or a major project, or even to regular earnings announcements.
For example, Microsoft chief executive Steve Ballmer said that he was “surprised” by the
market reaction to the software giant’s web search deal with Yahoo. Microsoft’s share price was
hammered on Wall Street. “Watching the market reaction, nobody gets it,” Mr. Ballmer said,
even though he argued that the deal was a win-win strategic partnership that would create eco-
nomic value for the shareholders of Yahoo and Microsoft.10 Similarly, when Molycorp, owner of
the largest rare-earths deposit outside China, said it needed more time to file its annual report
so the company would be able to determine the size of a “substantial” goodwill write-down,
Jonathan Hykawy, an analyst for Byron Capital Markets Ltd., said that he was “surprised by the
ferocity of the market reaction to the news – this charge is non-cash, so would not of itself
impact the company’s production ramp or prospects in any way.”11
Who is right – Mr. Ballmer and Mr. Hykawy, or the markets – is hard to tell in advance, but it
shows that managers’ and market expectations are not always aligned, and that expectations
are not to be equated with realizations. Market valuations do not always fully reflect the under-
lying value of the firm; hence, decisions or transactions on any given day, such as stock option
grants or exercises, can be affected by the difference. Worse, as we have discussed in Chapter 9,
the possibility for such differences may even trigger opportunistic motivations by the executives
to try to affect stock prices coincident with certain decisions or transactions, such as by selec-
tively disclosing information to which the markets are expected to (over)react either with a
downward or upward effect on stock prices, to bring about more favorable conditions for the
granting or exercising of stock options, respectively.12
A third and related problem with market measures of performance is actually a potential
congruence failure. Markets are not always well informed about a company’s plans and pros-
pects and, hence, its future cash flows and risks. This hampers the use of market valuations
as a proxy for firm value. For competitive reasons, companies may treat information about
R&D productivity, pricing and sourcing strategies, product and process quality, and layoff
intentions, say, as confidential. Market valuations cannot reflect information that is not avail-
able to the market. If sizable rewards are linked to market valuations, managers might be
tempted to disclose this information to affect valuations, even if such disclosures could harm
their company.

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 Accounting measures of performance

But even market valuations with well-informed participants might not always be correct.
Over the years, a number of valuation anomalies – such as the “Monday effect” and the “January
effect,” just to name two – have been documented, although these tend to be relatively small
and temporary in duration. More significant for incentive purposes are some other, larger mar-
ket imperfections and lags; these are particularly likely, and more likely to be significant, in
markets where stocks are not as actively traded. For example, in developing countries, sugges-
tions to reward managers based on stock market valuation changes are met with skepticism.
Because regulations in certain countries are not as well established and not as well enforced as
those in developed countries, managers can time or slant their disclosures to affect market val-
uations, and large investors can manipulate the markets.
This, therefore, raises a fourth problem with market measures – that is, their feasibility in
certain circumstances. Market measures are also only readily available for publicly traded
firms; they are not available for either privately held firms or wholly owned subsidiaries or divi-
sions,13 and they do not apply to non-profit organizations.
To summarize the limitations, market measures are only available, and hence reasonably
feasible, for publicly traded firms. They are largely uncontrollable by any employees except the
top few individuals in the management hierarchy. Even for those few individuals, the measures
are buffeted by many uncontrollable influences, making the market measures noisy indicators
of performance. And, changes in stock price on any given day can be misleading for several of
the reasons discussed above. All told, then, a company’s stock price at any point in time can be a
poor guide to long-term value, and thus, although an emphasis on shareholder value seems
highly congruent conceptually, the use of short-term changes in stock price as a proxy for it can
cause problems. One of these problems is that, even though relying on market measures should
align managers’ incentives with the long-term value of the firm, they not always will. Worse,
they can even create adverse incentives.
But several studies have documented positive effects of market-based measures and associ-
ated incentives, such as of stock options (also discussed in Chapter 9) on, say, innovation which
is an inherently long-term endeavor requiring appropriate risk taking, even when used at lower,
non-executive levels in the organization.14 Thus, there is no one-size-fits-all approach, and
there are tradeoffs. But an exclusive reliance on market measures is likely ineffective, even
where the benefits are believed to exceed the drawbacks because, inevitably, market measures
do have limitations.
These limitations of market measures cause organizations to look for surrogate measures of per-
formance. Accounting measures, specifically accounting profits and returns, are the most important
surrogates used, particularly at management levels below the very top management team.

Accounting measures of performance

Traditionally, most organizations have based their managers’ evaluations and rewards heavily
on standard accounting-based, summary financial measures. Accounting-based, summary or
bottom-line performance measures come in two basic forms: (1) residual measures (or accounting
profit measures), such as net income, operating profit, earnings before interest, tax, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA), or residual income; and (2) ratio measures (or accounting return
measures), such as return on investment (ROI), return on equity (ROE), return on net assets
(RONA), or risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC). These measures are typically derived from
the rules defined by standard setters for financial reporting purposes.
Summary accounting-based measures have some appealing advantages. They satisfy many
of the measurement criteria. First, accounting profits and returns can be measured on a timely

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Chapter 10 • Financial Performance Measures and Their Effects

basis (in short time periods) relatively precisely and objectively. Accounting rules for assigning
cash inflows and outflows even to very short measurement periods have been set and described
in great detail by accounting rule makers, such as the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) or the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). It is possible to measure
accounting profits in short time periods, such as a month, with considerable precision. Precision
stems from the existence of accounting rules, and hence, different people assigned to measure
the profit of an entity for any given period will arrive at approximately the same number. We say
approximately because the accounting rules require some judgment, such as about certain lia-
bilities or the depreciable lives of certain types of assets, just to name two. Further, for large
firms or publicly traded firms, but also for privately held firms that require bond or equity capi-
tal, independent auditors provide, mandatorily or voluntary, an objectivity check of the account-
ing calculations. Objectivity is important when incentives are linked to measures because it
eliminates, or at least sharply reduces, the potential for arguments about measurement meth-
ods where judgments need to be made about the accounting treatment.
Second, as compared with other quantities that can be measured precisely and objectively on
a timely basis, such as cash flows, shipments, or sales, accounting measures are at least concep-
tually congruent with the organizational goal of profit maximization, where profit is an arche-
typal accounting construct. In this respect, accounting profits provide an advantage over cash
flows because accounting accruals are designed to provide a better matching of cash inflows
and outflows over time.
Third, accounting measures usually can be largely controlled by the managers whose perfor-
mances are being evaluated. The measures can be tailored to match the authority limits of any
level of manager, from the CEO down to lower management levels. As such, entity managers
are typically held accountable for fewer of the income statement and balance sheet line items
that they can control, compared to managers with more authority higher in the organizational
hierarchy (as we discussed in the context of responsibility centers in Chapter 7). Because of this,
the profit performance of an entity within the organization is almost certainly more controlla-
ble by the entity manager than the change in the company’s overall stock price. Accounting
profits also are not, or not as severely, affected by some of the uncontrollable factors discussed
above that affect stock prices.
Fourth, accounting measures are understandable. Accounting is a standard course in every
business school, and managers have used the measures for so long that they are well familiar
with what the measures represent and how they can be influenced, at least at a conceptual if not
fully accounting-technical level.
Finally, accounting measures of performance are inexpensive because most firms have to
measure and report financial results to outside users already, certainly when they are publicly
traded, but also in many countries when they exceed a certain size and require auditing (see
above). Even when these conditions do not apply, to obtain funding of any kind (debt or equity)
requires the reporting of at least some financial information to the fund providers, who will do
a due diligence or an audit of the numbers and the overall viability of the organization.
For all these reasons, pioneer business baron Alfred P. Sloan may have had a point when he
proclaimed that “no other financial principle with which I am acquainted serves better than
[accounting] rate of return as an objective aid to business management.”15 Nonetheless,
accounting measures of performance are far from perfect indicators of firm value and value
changes. While research has shown that the correlations between annual accounting profits
and stock price changes are positive,16 they are not a perfect surrogate and, thus, only imperfect
proxies for economic income.17
In some types of firms, accounting profit measures are essentially meaningless. A good
example is start-up firms. These firms almost inevitably report significant accounting losses
early in their life cycle. The losses are just an artifact of conservative accounting rules that

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require the immediate or rapid expensing of long-term-focused business-building investments

(such as investments in R&D and product and market development). In these cases, which
include virtually all start-up firms, managers are not, or should not be, greatly concerned with
short-term accounting profits (or rather losses) because the need for a long-term focus reduces
the degree of congruence between earnings and firm value.
More generally, measurement congruence, or the correlation between accounting profits and
firm value, increases with the length of the measurement period, which suggests a tradeoff
between the congruence and timeliness measurement evaluation criteria. The increasingly
higher correlations with increasingly longer measurement windows occur primarily because
accounting profits provide a lagged indicator of economic income. Changes in economic income
are often reflected only some time later in the profit measures. How much later depends on
what caused the economic income change and what type of accounting measurement rules is
being used.
There are thus various reasons why accounting profit measures fail to reflect economic
income perfectly. Many things affect accounting profits but not economic income, and vice
versa. First, accounting systems are transactions-oriented. Accounting profit is primarily a
summation of the effects of the transactions that took place during a given period. Most
changes in value that do not result in a transaction are not recognized in accounting profit.
When a firm receives a patent or regulatory approval for a new drug, the expectation of eco-
nomic income is affected; but there is no transaction, no accounting entry, and, thus, no effect
on accounting income.
Second, accounting profit is highly dependent on the choice of measurement methods. Multi-
ple measurement methods are often available to account for identical economic events. Depre-
ciation accounting choices (straight-line vs. accelerated methods) are but one example. These
methods also often require making judgments, such as in this example, about the depreciable
lives of the assets. Longer lives spread the costs over more years and thus affect the accounting
profits recorded over those years.
Third, accounting profit is derived from measurement rules that are often conservatively
biased.18 Accounting rules require slow recognition of gains and revenues but quick recognition
of expenses and losses. For example, accounting rules define strict criteria that must be satisfied
before revenue (and the associated profit) can be recognized, and expenditures on intangible
assets are generally expensed immediately. Thus, accounting measures do not always match
revenues and expenses well, and this problem is particularly acute where measurement periods
are shorter than the firms’ investment payoff horizons.
Fourth, profit calculations ignore some economic values and value changes that accountants
feel cannot be measured accurately and objectively. Investments in major categories of compa-
nies’ intangible assets, such as research in progress, human resources, information systems,
and customer goodwill, are expensed immediately. Consequently, these types of assets do not
appear on the balance sheet. The omission of intangible assets occurs even though, for many
companies, these types of assets are much more important than the old industrial-era-type
assets of property, plant, and equipment.19 The physical assets of companies like Apple, Google,
and Facebook, for example, are only a relatively small portion of each company’s total market
value. Profit also ignores the costs of investments in working capital. Managers sometimes
increase their sales and profits by making poor investments in extra inventory, the costs of
which do not appear on the income statement.
Fifth, profit reflects the cost of borrowed capital (through interest deductibility) but ignores the
cost of equity capital. Firms earn real income only when the returns on capital are greater than the
cost of that capital, and ignoring the cost of equity capital overstates the difference between
returns and costs (that is, profit). This omission is serious because equity capital is typically more
expensive than borrowed capital, and the cost of equity capital is even higher for companies with

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risky (volatile) stocks. Failure to reflect the cost of equity capital also hinders comparisons of the
results of companies with different proportions of debt and equity in their capital structures.
Sixth, accounting profit ignores risk and changes in risk. Firms, or entities within firms, that
have not changed the pattern or timing of their expected future cash flows but have made the
cash flows more certain (less risky) have increased their economic value, and vice versa. This
value change is not reflected in accounting profits.
Finally, profit figures also focus on the past. Economic value is derived from future cash
flows, and there is no guarantee that past performance is a reliable indicator of future
performance.
The multiple reasons why accounting income and economic income diverge have caused
some critics to make strong statements against the use of accounting performance measures.
Most managers, however, have found that the advantages of accounting measures outweigh
their limitations, and they continue to use them. But they must be aware that motivating
managers to maximize, or at least produce, accounting profits or returns, rather than eco-
nomic income, can create a number of behavioral displacement problems. Myopia is probably
the most potentially damaging. Managers who focus on accounting profits or returns meas-
ured in short periods tend to be highly concerned with increasing (or maintaining) monthly,
quarterly, or annual profits. When managers’ orientations to the short term become exces-
sive – that is, when they are more concerned with short-term profits or returns rather than
with long-term value creation – the managers are said to be myopic, which we discuss in the
next section.
In summary, then, the major failure of accounting measures of performance is in terms of
the congruence criterion for evaluation. Accounting measures do not reflect changes in eco-
nomic values well, particularly in shorter measurement windows. They also suffer some con-
trollability problems, although less than market measures; but these problems can be
addressed using the same methods that can be used to adjust the market measures, which
we discuss in more detail in Chapter 12. Accounting measures, however, rate highly in terms
of the other evaluation criteria – timeliness, accuracy, understandability, cost effectiveness,
and feasibility.

Investment and operating myopia

Accounting performance measures can cause managers to act myopically in making either
investing or operating decisions. Holding managers accountable for short-term profits or
returns may induce managers to reduce or postpone investments that promise payoffs in future
measurement periods, even when those investments have a positive net present value and meet
other criteria to make them worthwhile. This is investment myopia.
Investment myopia stems directly from two of the problems with accounting measures
described above: their conservative bias and their ignoring of intangible assets with predomi-
nantly future payoffs. Accounting rules do not allow firms to recognize gains until they are real-
ized; that is, until the critical income-producing activities (such as a sale) have taken place and
the earnings can be measured in an objective, verifiable way. On the other hand, the rules
require firms to begin recognizing costs when the investments are made. The understatement
of profits in early measurement periods is magnified because accounting rules are purposely
conservative. Projects with uncertain returns and little liquidation value, such as R&D projects
and employee development and customer acquisition initiatives, must be expensed as the costs
are incurred, and capital investments must be expensed over periods that are typically shorter
than those in which returns will be realized.

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 Investment and operating myopia

The motivational effect of these measurement rules is perverse because managers who are
motivated to produce accounting profits or returns can (in the short term) do so by not making
worthwhile investments. By not making the investments, the managers reduce expenses in the
current period and do not suffer the lost revenue until future periods. Even worse, the quest for
short-term profits and returns sometimes induces managers to engage in manipulative earnings
management practices, such as not booking operating expenses immediately, but instead push-
ing them into the future as capital investments. We discuss such manipulative behaviors in
more detail in Chapter 15, but the following indicative excerpt highlights this:

“A large fraction of CEO pay appears unrelated to periodic value creation,” said Lars Helge
Hass, Jiancheng Liu, Steven Young and Zhifang Zhang, the authors of a report on pay at
FTSE 100 companies by CFA UK, a society of investment professionals, and Lancaster
Business School. Relatively simplistic performance measures such as Earnings per Share
(EPS) and Total Shareholder Return (TSR) continued to dominate the measures against
which executives’ performance was benchmarked over the period [10 years from 2003 to
2013]. Value-based metrics that related performance to the cost of capital were rarely
used. […] The report said the dangers of over-reliance on such measures of executives’
performance were well documented and included: investment myopia, earnings manipu-
lation, excessive risk-taking, and threats to organizational culture.20

Managers can also boost current period profits and returns by destroying goodwill that has
been built up with customers, suppliers, employees, and so on. They can force employees to
work overtime at the end of a measurement period to finish production so that the product can
be shipped and the revenues and profits booked. But if the product is of lower quality, customer
satisfaction (and future sales) may diminish; the costs of service repairs or customer returns
may increase; and some employees may be demotivated and tempted to leave. As the excerpt
above suggests, such actions and decisions may ruin the organizational culture.
Another common “trick” is known as channel stuffing, which involves boosting near-term
sales by extending lower prices to distributors, encouraging them to load up while potentially
hurting later sales. These are examples of operating myopia, sometimes also colloquially
referred to as “shipping bricks and other tricks.” These are examples of employees and organi-
zations (through their culture) becoming “too aggressive, too focused on the short term, and
too disconnected from the needs of customers.”21
In many cases, determining whether managers are acting myopically is difficult. For example,
in 2014 when IBM, the information technology giant, announced a $1 billion global restructur-
ing with major job cuts in its US home market to maintain the company’s earnings growth in the
face of flagging revenues, some analysts started to question whether IBM’s pursuit of five-year
earnings targets, which were long seen as a mark of financial discipline, may have led to an
excessively short-term focus on profits. To quote one analyst, “many investors expect IBM to hit
its $20 EPS target [for 2015], but remain concerned about the long-term health of the business.”
This was in part because the cuts followed disappointing sales, which added to concerns on Wall
Street that IBM was missing out on some of the fastest-growing markets in cloud computing. The
firm’s view – unsurprisingly, perhaps – was that this was not the case, stating that “IBM continues
to rebalance its workforce to meet the changing requirements of its clients, and to pioneer new,
high-value segments of the IT industry.” Was the company acting myopically for the sake of hit-
ting its earnings targets, by slashing costs but eroding its capacity to move effectively into new
high-growth markets? Or, was it instead competitively positioning itself to achieve exactly that?
It is hard to tell, and judgments as to whether the cuts were myopic clearly varied.22
The IBM example illustrates the difficulty of making judgments that involve short-term ver-
sus long-term tradeoffs. We discuss several ways to address the myopia problem in Chapter 11.
But first we turn to another set of problems created by relying on return-on-investment (ROI)

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Chapter 10 • Financial Performance Measures and Their Effects

measures of performance, a specific form of accounting performance measure that is commonly

used in large, divisionalized firms.

Return-on-investment measures of performance

Divisionalized organizations are comprised of multiple responsibility centers, the managers of

which are held primarily accountable for profit or some form of accounting ROI, as discussed in
Chapter 7. The divisionalized form of organization dates back to the 1920s, when it was intro-
duced in the DuPont Company, but its use spread particularly quickly after World War II as one
response to increased organizational size and complexity. To this day, the divisionalized form
of organization is used by many firms above minimal size requiring delegation of decision
authority.
Referring to Chapter 7, divisionalization and decentralization are related concepts, but the
two words are not synonymous. An organization is said to be decentralized when authority for
making decisions is pushed down to lower levels in the organization. All divisionalized organi-
zations decentralize authority, at least to some extent, in specified areas of operations, notably
a line of business or a geographical area. But the converse is not true – not all decentralized
organizations are divisionalized. When decentralization is effected along functional lines of
authority (such as production and marketing), the responsibility centers are usually cost and
revenue centers, not profit or investment centers (divisions).
Divisionalization provides several advantages. Large, complex organizations are not able to
control behaviors effectively with action-dominated control systems involving, for example, the
direct guidance of a central manager or the enforcement of standard operating procedures by a
central administration. No central management can know everything about a complex organi-
zation’s many product-market combinations and operational capabilities and constraints. Even
if it could, it would take time for central management to direct its attention to each issue that
arises, become informed about the details, and reach a decision. Decision-making would be
unnecessarily delayed, even if it were informed.
When an organization is divisionalized, local managers become experts in their products
and markets, and they are able to make informed decisions more quickly. Because they control
their own success to a significant extent, the local managers are likely to be more motivated and
entrepreneurial. Their involvement in decision-making helps them acquire experience that will
benefit them as they move to higher organization levels through promotion. Top management’s
time becomes available to focus on strategic decisions.
Divisionalization is not without its problems and challenges, however. Many of the issues,
particularly, relate to the problems created by the measurement of performance in terms of ROI.

Return-on-what?
ROI is a ratio of the accounting profits earned by the division divided by the investment tied up
in the division. Divisionalized corporations typically use some form of various types of ROI
measures to evaluate division performance.
Variances from plans can be analyzed using formula charts (ROI trees) such as the one shown
in Figure 10.1. Such analyses might show that a division’s actual ROI of 15% was below the
planned level of 20%, even though sales profitability (profit as a percent of sales) was on plan
but asset turnover (sales divided by total investment) was below target:

Planned ROI (20%) = profit as percent of sales (20%) x asset turnover (1.0)
Actual ROI (15%) = profit as percent of sales (20%) x asset turnover (0.75)

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 Return-on-investment measures of performance

Figure 10.1 Formula chart showing relationship of factors affecting ROI

Source: K. A. Merchant, Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 543.

The measures can then be further decomposed to understand whether, in this example, the
variance was due primarily to a decline in sales or more capital tied up in a specific kind of
assets.
ROI formula charts are also useful for linking performance at various organizational levels.
The chart can be expanded out to the right to show specific measures that can be used for con-
trol purposes down to the lowest levels in the organization. Sales performance can be disaggre-
gated into sales volume and price factors. These factors can be further disaggregated by product,
geographical region, customer segment, or sales team.
The actual forms of ROI-type ratios that companies employ vary widely, as do the labels
companies put on their bottom-line investment center measures. Among the most common
are return on investment (ROI), return on equity (ROE), return on capital employed (ROCE),
and return on net assets (RONA). For a specific entity or division, firms might use return on
controllable assets (ROCA) to take account of the assets or capital that the entity or divi-
sion managers can control commensurate with the investments that they are authorized to
make. In these ratios, both the numerator and denominator can include all or just a subset
of the line items reflected on the corporate financial statements. The profit measure in the
numerator of the ROI calculation can be a fully allocated, after-tax profit measure, or it
can be a before-tax operating income measure. Similarly, the denominator can include all
the line items of assets and liabilities, including allocations of assets and liabilities not
directly controlled by the division managers; or it can include only controllable assets,
which generally include, at a minimum, receivables and inventories. The variations are
innumerable.
ROI-type measures are in widespread use because they provide several advantages. First,
they provide a single, comprehensive measure that reflects the tradeoffs managers must make
between revenues, costs (the balance of which translates into profit), and investments. Second,
they provide a common denominator that can be used for comparing returns on dissimilar

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businesses, such as divisions and outside competitors, or types of investments. Third, because
they are expressed in percentage terms, they suggest that ROI figures are comparable to other
financial returns, such as those calculated for stocks and bonds, although such a direct com-
parison should be qualified (as we explain later). Finally, because ROI measures have been in
use for so long in so many places, virtually all managers understand both what the measures
reflect and how they can be influenced, by changes in both the numerator and denominator.

Problems caused by ROI-type of measures

Relying heavily on ROI measures in a results-control system can cause some problems, how-
ever. One problem is that the numerator in the ROI measure is accounting profit. Thus, ROI has
all the limitations of profit measures, such as the tendency to produce management myopia, the
common form of behavioral displacement, which we address further in Chapter 11. A second
limitation is a tendency for the measures to induce suboptimization. A narrow focus on ROI can
lead division managers to make decisions that improve division ROI even though the decisions
are not in the corporation’s global best interest; that is, decisions that appear locally optimal (in
the division) may not be globally optimal (for the firm). Finally, ROI measures sometimes pro-
vide misleading signals about the performance of the investment centers (divisions) because of
difficulties in measuring the fixed asset portion of the denominator. These misleading signals
can cause poor investment and performance evaluation decisions, as we explain below.

Suboptimization
ROI measures can create a suboptimization problem by encouraging managers to make invest-
ments that make their divisions look good even though those investments are not in the best inter-
est of the corporation. Put simply, this problem arises because division managers are unlikely to
propose capital investments that are expected to yield returns below their divisional return tar-
gets, even if those investments are good from the company’s perspective. Table 10.1 shows a sim-
plified suboptimization example of this type. Assume the corporate cost of capital is 15%. If an
investment opportunity arises promising a 20% return, the investment should be made (assum-
ing the opportunity is consistent with the firm’s strategy and other considerations). The manager
of Division A, whose performance targets reflect historical performance of 10%, would be willing
to make this investment, but the manager of Division B, operating at 40%, would not.
Conversely, ROI measures can cause managers of unsuccessful divisions to invest in capital
investment projects that promise returns below the corporate cost of capital. This problem is illus-
trated in Table 10.2, which changes the Table 10.1 example only slightly by assuming the corporate
cost of capital is 25%. In this situation, Division A would be willing to make this investment promis-
ing a 20% return, even though this investment does not cover the corporation’s cost of capital.
Unless managers guard against these problems, the effect of situations like the examples
shown in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 is that the firm’s capital will gradually be allocated away from its
most successful or, at least, highest-earning divisions and toward its least successful divisions,
which is incongruent with the objective to maximize firm value, all else equal.
Where division managers have the authority to make financing decisions (to finance their
investment decisions), ROI-type measures can also lead to suboptimization at that level. For
example, return-on-equity (ROE) measures may induce managers to use debt financing (i.e. to
reduce the equity put into the denominator of the ratio). This may push their entity’s leverage to
levels in excess of the desired corporate leverage.23

Misleading performance signals

Difficulties in measuring the denominator of the ROI measure, particularly pertaining to fixed
assets, can provide misleading signals about the performance of an investment center (division).

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 Return-on-investment measures of performance

Table 10.1 Example of suboptimization: failure to invest in a worthwhile project

Assume: corporate cost of capital = 15%

Base situation Division A Division B

Profit before tax $100,000 $400,000

Investment $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Return on investment 10% 40%

Assume an investment opportunity that is good for the company: invest $100,000 to earn $20,000/year.

New situation
Profit before tax $120,000 $420,000
Investment $1,100,000 $1,100,000
Return on investment 10.9% 38.2%

Source: K. A. Merchant, Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 545.

Table 10.2 Example of suboptimization: investment in a project that is not worthwhile

Assume: corporate cost of capital = 25%

Base situation Division A Division B

Profit before tax $100,000 $400,000

Investment $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Return on investment 10% 40%

Assume an investment opportunity that is not good for the company: invest $100,000 to earn
$20,000/year.

New situation
Profit before tax $120,000 $420,000
Investment $1,100,000 $1,100,000
Return on investment 10.9% 38.2%

Source: K. A. Merchant, Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 546.

The asset values reflected on the balance sheet do not always represent the economic value of the
assets available to managers for earning current returns. The assets were added to the business
at various times in the past, under varying market conditions and varying purchasing power of
the monetary unit. As such, the book values of the various assets accumulated over time on the
balance sheet may say little about the economic value of the assets; that is, their ability to gener-
ate future cash flows. Nonetheless, many firms use net book values (NBV) to compute divisional
ROI. When NBV is used, ROI is usually overstated. The overstatement is larger if the entity
includes a relatively large number of older assets. Assuming inflation, the NBV of older assets are
below their replacement values because they were bought in a period of lower prices, but even
without taking inflation into account, also because they have been depreciated longer.
This ROI-overstatement problem is illustrated in Table 10.3. Assume that Divisions C and D
are identical operating units except that Division C purchased most of its fixed assets many
years ago and Division D has mostly new assets. For the sake of simplicity, assume there have
been no technological advancements; that is, the old assets perform the same tasks as efficiently
as the new assets (because if not, there could be productivity gains that need taking into
account). Profit before depreciation is identical, but Division D’s depreciation is twice that of

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Chapter 10 • Financial Performance Measures and Their Effects

Table 10.3 Example showing ROI overstatement when denominator is measured in terms of
net book value

Division C Division D

Profit before depreciation $110,000 $110,000

Depreciation $10,000 $20,000

Profit after depreciation $100,000 $90,000

Assets (net book value) $500,000 $3,000,000

ROI 20% 3%

Source: K. A. Merchant, Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 547.

Division C, so C’s profit after depreciation is slightly higher. But C’s ROI is dramatically higher
than D’s, mostly because its assets have a lower NBV. The difference between 20% and 3% ROI
is not real; it is an artifact of the measurement system.
Another quirk of ROI measures is that ROI calculated using NBV automatically increases
over time if no further investments are made. This is illustrated in Table 10.4. Assume that Divi-
sion E is operating in a steady state, earning an ROI of 12% in year 1. Because the assets are
being depreciated, the ROI increases to 13.3% in year 2, and 15% in year 3. This ROI increase is
not real, either.
These measurement quirks can cause managers who are using ROI-type measures to make
poor decisions:

● They encourage division managers to retain assets beyond their optimal life and not to invest
in new assets that would increase the denominator of the ROI calculation. (This dysfunc-
tional motivational effect is exacerbated when the managers expect their job tenures to be
short, illustrating another channel through which the myopia problem operates.)
● They can contribute to the problem illustrated in Tables 10.1 and 10.2; that is, the tendency
for capital allocations to be distorted.
● If corporate managers are unaware of these measurement effects or do not adjust for them,
they can cause distortions in evaluating division managers’ performances.

Measuring fixed assets at gross book value (GBV) – that is, gross of depreciation conventions
that are used for financial reporting purposes – minimizes some of these problems because GBV

Table 10.4 Example showing increase in ROI due merely to passage of time

Division E

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3

Profit before depreciation $110,000 $110,000 $110,000

Depreciation $50,000 $50,000 $50,000
Profit after depreciation $60,000 $60,000 $60,000

Assets (net book value) $500,000 $450,000 $400,000

ROI 12% 13.3% 15%

Source: K. A. Merchant, Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 547.

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 Residual income measures as a possible solution to the ROI measurement problems

is closer to replacement value than is NBV. In periods of inflation, as is almost always the case
(although, in recent years, only moderately so in most advanced economies), old assets valued
at gross book value are still expressed at lower values than new assets, so ROI will still be over-
stated. Another possibility is to use “adjusted NBVs” by depreciating the assets commensurate
with their economic lives, where the rate of depreciation can be different (slower or faster and/
or nonlinear) from the depreciation rates used or allowed for financial accounting or taxation
purposes. This takes the productivity of the assets into account, which may be more crucial in
times of rapid technological change but low inflation.
A final potential problem is that ROI measures create incentives for managers to lease
assets rather than buy them. Under some accounting rules,24 leased assets accounted for on
an operating-lease basis are not recognized on the balance sheet, so they are not included in
the ROI denominator. Managers can increase their divisional ROI by gaming the system in
this way. Of course, corporations can easily include the capitalized value of assets employed
in division ROI calculations even when those leases are not required to be capitalized for
financial reporting purposes. This adjustment avoids this potential problem, but adjustments
are costly and may complicate the administration of different books for different purposes.
The idea of “adjusting” accounting measures of performance, however, leads us to the next
section.

Residual income measures as a possible solution to the ROI

measurement problems

A number of researchers and consultants have argued that the use of a residual income measure
can help overcome the suboptimization limitation of ROI. Residual income is calculated by sub-
tracting from profit a capital charge for the net assets tied up in the entity or division (invest-
ment center). The capital is charged at a rate equal to the weighted average corporate cost of
capital. Conceptually, one could adjust the capital charge rate for each investment center’s risk,
thus making the performance measurement system consistent with the capital budgeting sys-
tem. (In the interest of focus, we do not carry this suggestion through in our discussion below
because it does not change the basic residual income calculations; it just causes them to be
matched to the risk profile of each of the divisions.)
If the residual income charge is made equal to the required corporate investment rate of
return, then the residual income measures give all division managers an equal incentive to
invest, thereby addressing the suboptimization problem inherent in ROI measures. Regardless
of the prevailing levels of return in each of the divisions, the division managers are motivated to
invest in all projects that promise internal rates of return higher than, or at least equal to, the
corporate cost of capital (again, all else equal, thus ignoring any strategic or other considera-
tions and options).25 This is illustrated in Table 10.5, showing a modified version of Table 10.1
with a row added for residual income. In both divisions, residual income is increased if the
worthwhile investment is made.
Residual income also addresses the financing-type suboptimization problem. By considering
the cost of both debt and equity financing (by using a weighted average corporate cost of capi-
tal), residual income removes the managers’ temptations to increase their entity’s leverage
through debt financing.
Residual income does not address the distortions often caused when managers make new
investments in fixed assets, however. Many desirable investments initially reduce residual
income, but then the residual income increases over time as the fixed assets get older and are
depreciated.

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Chapter 10 • Financial Performance Measures and Their Effects

Table 10.5 Example of suboptimization with residual income: failure to invest in a

worthwhile project

Assume: corporate cost of capital = 15%

Base situation Division A Division B

Profit before tax $100,000 $400,000

Investment $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Return on investment 10% 40%
Residual income $(50,000) $250,000

Assume an investment opportunity that is good for the company: invest $100,000 to earn $20,000/year.

New situation
Profit before tax $120,000 $420,000
Investment $1,100,000 $1,100,000
Return on investment 10.9% 38.2%
Residual income $(45,000) $255,000

Source: K. A. Merchant, Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 548.

One consulting firm, Stern Stewart & Company, recommends a measure called Economic
Value Added (EVA™) that combines several of the modifications to the standard accounting
model in a residual income-type measure.26 The generic EVA formula is:

EVA = Modified Net Operating Profit After Tax − (Modified Total Capital × Weighted
Average Cost of Capital)

The word “modified” refers to many adjustments to standard accounting treatments, such as
the capitalization and subsequent amortization of intangible investments such as for R&D,
employee training and advertising and the expensing of goodwill. Just which modifications
should be implemented in any given situation is subject to judgment. The weighted average cost
of capital reflects the weighted average cost of debt and equity financing.
Because it addresses some of the known weaknesses of accounting profit or return measures,
EVA should better reflect economic income than accounting profit does in many settings. It
should mitigate the investment myopia problem discussed above because it involves capitaliza-
tion of the most important types of discretionary expenditures managers might try to cut if they
were pressured for profits (such as on R&D, employee training and customer acquisition). EVA
also has all the advantages of a residual income-type measure.
It must be recognized, however, that despite its name, EVA is still only is a proxy at best for eco-
nomic income. It does not address all of the problems that differentiate accounting income from
economic income, although the proposed adjustments to the accounting numbers should attenuate
the gap. In particular, EVA still reflects primarily the results of a summation of transactions com-
pleted during the period, and thus, the past, while economic income reflects changes in future cash
flow potentials. This is an especially pertinent issue for firms that derive a significant proportion of
their value from future growth. Joel Stern, now chairman of Stern Value Management in New York,
would argue though that this is a matter of using an appropriate rate of return for risk, suggesting
that value management essentially “involves both selecting an appropriate measure of corporate
performance and also a required rate of return for risk in achieving that corporate performance,
[thereby] providing a way of measuring performance year-by-year contemporaneously.”27
EVA also has some other measurement limitations. It suffers from objectivity problems as the
EVA adjustments require considerable judgment. Managers therefore can bias EVA just as they
can accounting numbers. EVA also is probably not differentially affected by any of the usual

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 Conclusion

controllability problems. EVA, however, is more likely to create some additional understandability
problems, as the measures can be complex and are not as widely familiar. Many of the firms that
have decided not to use EVA or similar types of measures developed mainly by consulting firms,
such as Cash Flow Return on Investment (Holt Value Associates), Total Business Return (Boston
Consulting Group), Economic Profit (McKinsey & Co.) or Shareholder Value Added (LEK/Alcar), or
which have tried such a measure and then abandoned it, seem to have done so mainly because of
understandability failures.28 The survey of FTSE 100 companies by CFA UK and Lancaster Busi-
ness School that we quoted from above also states that “value-based metrics that relate perfor-
mance to the cost of capital are rarely used.”29 Maybe this is because, despite some key features,
implementing these measurement systems can be quite expensive, requiring considerable assis-
tance from consultants and systems and management development and training time.
In summary, EVA may have better congruence characteristics in some industry settings
when a carefully chosen (and not too complex) set of adjustments are made to the traditional
accounting profit measures. EVA also exhibits the features of any generic residual income meas-
ure. That said, and perhaps not surprisingly, EVA is hardly a measurement panacea, an ideal
that, as we discussed, is hard for any measure to meet.

Conclusion

The primary goal of managers of for-profit firms should be to maximize shareholder or firm value,
which is a long-term, future-oriented concept. Short-term accounting profit and return measures
provide imperfect, surrogate indicators of changes in firm value. Management myopia, an exces-
sive focus on short-term performance, is an almost inevitable side-effect of the use of financial
results control systems built on accounting measures of performance. In the next chapter, we dis-
cuss six alternatives that can be used individually or in combination to eliminate or reduce myopia.
In this chapter, we also discussed the issue of suboptimization, another form of behavioral
displacement caused particularly by the use of accounting-based ROI-type measures. Managers
who still rely on ROI-type measures do so probably because the conceptual weaknesses of ROI
are well understood and the potential suboptimization problems can be monitored through the
company’s capital budgeting and strategic planning processes. Managers of highly profitable
divisions can be encouraged to make more investments, and proposed investments from less
profitable divisions can be scrutinized carefully. And even the managers evaluated by these
measures should understand that when they “run down” their business by not investing in it or
by not replacing their old assets will eventually hamper their ability to generate revenues from
these assets, thereby hurting the numerator of their ROI measure, assuming of course that they
plan to be around long enough in the company for that to be a worry of them. In that sense, ROI
measures have, only over time though, a self-disciplining mechanism built into them.
It is true that the suboptimization problems can be avoided or mitigated to some extent
through the investment review processes, as well as through their inherent self-disciplining
mechanism. By using these processes, companies can use ROI-focused results control systems
with some degree of effectiveness. One might ask: Why use a measurement system that works
effectively only in conjunction with bureaucratic oversight and processes (or other balancing
control mechanisms) that are needed to prevent managers from taking undesirable actions?
The answer to that question in many settings is that the net benefits of such a system are greater
than those of several other feasible alternatives. There is no panacea, and better control is likely
to arise from a set of mutually reinforcing and balancing mechanisms. An all-purpose perfor-
mance measure (or performance measurement system) that meets all control objectives
effectively without triggering any potentially harmful side effects simply does not exist.

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