TC 19p Moot Court Memorial
TC 19p Moot Court Memorial
TC 19p Moot Court Memorial
Writ Jurisdiction
V.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.4. SC can play a significant role for strengthening the democracy in political parties: ....... 18
2.3. The population of 18% is delivering 35% of national GDP due to which the southern
states face financial discrimination. ............................................................................................ 21
3.3. It violates Article 172 and Article 174 of the Constitution of Indica. ............................ 25
PRAYER .............................................................................................................................................. 29
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
¶ Pilcrow
Art. Article
Edn. Edition
Consti. Constitution
Sec. Section
LR Law Reporter
Ors. Others
Anr. Another
p./pg. Page
Para Paragraph
No. Number
SC Supreme Court
EC Election Commission
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. Haryana State Industrial Corporation. v Cork Mfg. Co., (2007) 8 SCC 359. 14
3. Writ Petition (MD) No. 18725 of 2020 and W.M.P. (MD)No. 15646 of 2020, 14
LIVELAW (Aug. 17, 2021).
9. Public Interest Foundation and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr., (2019) 3 SCC 19
224.
13. K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375; State of 24
West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar is AIR 1952 SC 75; State of Punjab v.
Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 1689.
STATUTES
S. No. Statute Pg no.
1. Delimitation Act, 2002 16, 19
2. The Representation of the Peoples’ Act, 1951 18
3. The Constitution of India, 1950 passim
OTHER AUTHORITIES
S. Others Pg no.
No.
1. Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, 2011 Census 16
Data, Population Enumeration Data, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
2. The Constitution (Fifty Second) Amendment Bill, Bill No. XXII of 1985. 28
ARTICLES
S. Article Pg
No. no.
1. Sanjay Kumar, Fourth Delimitation Commission: Old and New Issues, 38 16
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, 1111–13 (2003).
3. Akhil Kumar Singh & Swapnil Katiyar, One nation one election: From inception 17
to constitutional/logistical issues, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2022).
5. Rohit Kumar, The BJP’s Election Strategy Obscures the Local in Favour of the 17
National, EPW (Oct. 3, 2019).
10. K.S. Sridhar, The delimitation paradox of India’s north-south divide, THE HINDU 22
BUSINESSLINE (Jan 17, 2022)
11. S. Tharoor, Modi Govt opens a pandora’s box: States can lose political clout if ..., 22
THE PRINT (March 24, 2018).
13. Tushar Chakrabarty, Discussion Paper The Anti-defection Law, PRS LEGISLATIVE 28
RESEARCH (2022).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioners have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica by the means of a writ
petition under article 32 of the constitution.
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided
for by this Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Republic of Indica holds the distinction of being the largest democratic nation in the
world. The two dominant political parties in Indica are the Conservative Republic Party
2. In 2029, Conservative Republic Party won the General Election to the Parliament of
Indica.
3. The Prime Minister of Indica, Mr. Pravin Kalra inaugurated the new Parliament to expand
the Lok Sabha seats to 888 and the Rajya Sabha seats to 348 on 28th May 2033, just
4. Another significant thing Conservative Republic Party’s promised in their manifesto was
5. As the 2034 election was approaching, the ruling decided to set up a delimitation
commission for delimitation of constituencies under the Delimitation Act, 2033 (on the
basis of census of 2031) which would start its work in January 2034.
6. The Government of Indica stated that they are going as per the provisions of the
Constitution.
7. The southern states that promoted family planning faced the possibility of having their
seats reduced. To allay these fears, the Constitution was amended during in 1976 to
suspend delimitation until 2001. Another amendment postponed this until 2033.
8. This was justified on the ground that a uniform population growth rate would be achieved
throughout the country by 2033. So, the last delimitation exercise — started in July 2002
and completed on May 31, 2008 — was based on the 2001 Census and only readjusted
boundaries of existing Lok Sabha and Assembly seats and reworked the number of
reserved seats and did not touch the number of seats in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies.
9. Mr. Aaron Rao, the Leader of Opposition filed a string of petitions against the
10. Another constitutional amendment bill ‘The Constitution (One Hundred And Ninety-
Seventh Amendment) Bill, 2033’ was introduced in the Lok Sabha by the Government of
Indica, which the Prime Minister had promised earlier, was the ‘One Nation-One
Election’ and introduction of ‘common electoral rolls’ for Parliamentary, Assembly and
local body elections plan, which his party would implement when they would come in
power.
11. It was enacted and it suitably amended Articles 83, 172, 85 and 174 along with some
amendments in the ‘The Representation of People Act 1950 and 1951’ and it was passed
by both the houses of Parliament of Indica as ‘The Constitution (One Hundred And
12. A few days after, a leading news channel ‘Senate TV’ revealed that several members of
the ruling CRP had opposed these constitutional amendments but could not vote against it
because of the existing ‘Paragraph 2 (b) of the 10th schedule of the Constitution of
Indica’, which would have disqualified them as a Member of Parliament for voting
13. A petition was filed in the Supreme Court that the existing Anti Defection Law is failing
in its purpose and aim and should be suitably struck down as being unconstitutional.
14. The Supreme Court admitted the petition of Mr. Aaron Rao and clubbed it with the other
petitions, the Court fixed a date for hearing all these petitions together before a
10
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
THESE PETITIONS?
ISSUE 2
ISSUE 3
ISSUE 4
11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.1.Firstly, it is humbly submitted that under Article 32, the Supreme court of Indica have
the jurisdiction to entertain the petition of delimitation of constituencies as the
Delimitation exercise will violate the fundamental rights and is unconstitutional.
1.2.Secondly, it is humbly submitted that the delimitation exercise will violate the rights of
the reserved categories by not providing them with adequate reservation. Therefore, the
Supreme Court of Indica has the jurisdiction to entertain the said petition as it is
unconstitutional.
1.3.Thirdly, it is humbly submitted that 137th Amendment Act, 2033 is violating
fundamental rights and involves a substantial question of law. It comes under Article 32
of the Constitution of Indica. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Indica has the
jurisdiction to entertain the petition regarding the said amendment act.
1.4.Fourthly, it is humbly submitted that the Supreme Court has the power to play a
significant role in strengthening democracy in political parties and jurisdiction to
entertain
12
3.1.Firstly, it is humbly submitted that the said amendment violates the basic structure
of the constitution.
3.2.Secondly, it is humbly submitted that the amendment violates Schedule 7 because
Local Body Election is a State subject.
3.3.Thirdly, the amendment curtails the fundamental right to freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).
3.4.Fourth, the amendment violates Article 172 and Article 174 of the Constitution of
Indica.
3.5.Fifth, it lays the scope for misuse of Article 356 and President’s Rule, and it
provides no specific political mechanism in case of an untimely dissolution of the
Parliament or any State Assembly.
4.1.It is humbly submitted that the anti-defection law is failing in its purpose and
violating the fundamental rights. It should be suitably struck down. The Hon’ble
court has the jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
13
ARGUMENT ADVANCED
1. It is humbly submitted before the Supreme Court of Indica that the petitions filed by
the petitioners is maintainable before the Hon’ble Court and it has the jurisdiction to
entertain the petitions, if they are found to be unconstitutional.
2. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that plenitude of power
rests with the Court and it is not restrictive in nature but corrective.1 The Hon’ble
Court has the jurisdiction to entertain all petitions under Article 32 of the Indian
Constitution.
3. It is also humbly submitted that the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court in
Romesh Thappar2 observed that “the Court is constituted the protector and
guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so
laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against infringements
of such rights.”3
1
Haryana State Industrial Corporation. v Cork Mfg. Co., (2007) 8 SCC 359.
2
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
3
Id.
4
Order of the Court was passed by Justice N.Kirubakaran, Writ Petition (MD) No. 18725 of 2020 and W.M.P.
(MD)No. 15646 of 2020, LIVE LAW (Aug. 17, 2021).
14
Uttar Pradesh would gain up to 21 seats, while Tamil Nadu and Kerala together
would lose 16 seats, if the delimitation is carried out according to the 2031 Census5.
6. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Constitution also mandates
that seats be redistributed following each Census. The last such exercise, however,
was conducted following the 1971 Census as a result of choices made by succeeding
administrations and Parliaments, commencing with a prohibition in 1976 and
subsequently a ban in 2002. According to the Constitution (84th Amendment) Act,
2002, there was a freeze on readjustment of constituencies till 2031.6
7. It is humbly submitted that Indica's population has almost doubled in the previous 50
years. A MP would be chosen by 1.8 million people in Tamil Nadu, as opposed to 3
million voters in Uttar Pradesh. Though there may be malapportionment of
electorate, it is appropriate in the interest of the nation to maintain the very same
number of MPs. Any change in the number of constituencies shouldn't have an
impact on the political bargaining power of any State that effectively carried out its
population control programme.
8. It is humbly submitted that Delimitation is done primarily to ensure that all
demographic groups are fairly represented and that geographical regions are fairly
divided so that no political party has an unfair advantage over the others. Due to
unfair constituency distribution and uneven representation, the Constitution's Articles
14 and 21 are being violated.
9. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that under Article 32, the Supreme
court of Indica have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition of delimitation of
constituencies as the Delimitation exercise will violate the fundamental rights and is
unconstitutional.
15
Lok Sabha seats based on population. The planned delimitation and seat reallocation
might lead to an increase in power for political parties with their bases of support in
the north as well as a loss of seats for southern states. The exercise will have an
impact on the distribution of seats designated for the SC/ST in each state.7
12. The reservation of constituencies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is
governed by Article 330 and 332 of the Constitution of Indica. Article 3328 deals with
reservation of constituencies for Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes in State
Assemblies. Under the provision read with sections 9 (1) (c)9 and 9(1) (d)10 of the
Delimitation Act, 2002, the seats in the assembly constituencies are determined.11
13. It is humbly submitted that as per Census of 2011, the number of scheduled castes in
12
Indica is 16.6% of the total population of Indica. As per Census of 2001; it was
16.2% of the total population of Indica. It clearly shows an increase of 0.4% of SC
population in Indica.13 Similarly, the delimitation exercise carried on basis of 2031
census will result in reduced number of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes in southern states as no uniform population growth is achieved till now.
14. In Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission and Others14 case, it was held that
“once orders were made by the Commission under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act and
published in the gazette of India under section 10 of the Act, the same must be treated
as law made under Article 327 which cannot be questioned in any Court of law in
view of Article 329”. However, since this delimitation exercise will take place in
2033 and the same has not been published, the Supreme Court of Indica has the
jurisdiction to entertain the said petition. Furthermore, the delimitation exercise will
violate the rights of the reserved categories by not providing them with adequate
reservation. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Indica has the jurisdiction to entertain
the said petition as it is unconstitutional.
7
Sanjay Kumar, Fourth Delimitation Commission: Old and New Issues, 38 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY,
1111–13 (2003).
8
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art, 322.
9
Delimitation Act, 2002, Illustration to§ 9(1)(c).
10
Delimitation Act, 2002, Illustration to§ 9(1)(d).
11
Supra note 4.
12
Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, 2011 Census Data, Population Enumeration
Data, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
13
Schedule Castes in India, JAGRAN JOSH (Dec. 1, 2015).
14
Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission and Others, AIR 1967 SC 669.
16
15
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
16
Rohit Kumar, The BJP’s Election Strategy Obscures the Local in Favour of the National, EPW (Oct. 3, 2019).
17
Akhil Kumar Singh & Swapnil Katiyar, One nation one election: From inception to constitutional/logistical
issues, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2022).
18
Praveen Chakravarty, Nudging the Voter in One Direction, THE HINDU (Apr. 6, 2016).
19
The Constitution of India, Art. 14.
20
Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. The Maharashtra State Legislative Assembly, (2020) SCC 1100.
17
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India would amount to serious and direct
interference in the administration of justice in the country”.
20. It is humbly submitted that 137th Amendment Act, 2033 is violating fundamental
rights and involves a substantial question of law. It comes under Article 32 of the
Constitution of Indica. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Indica has the jurisdiction to
entertain the petition regarding the said amendment act.
1.4. SC can play a significant role for strengthening the democracy in political
parties:
21. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Supreme Court of Indica
can play a significant role by making recommendations and clarifying existing laws.
The ruling party offers the citizens the form of government of their choice and the
opposition holds the ruling party accountable and responsible, political parties play a
critical role in democracies.21
22. It is humbly submitted that like in every other contemporary democracy, the political
parties have been the main force behind democratic politics and governmental
authority in the nation. Section 29A22 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
mandates the registration of political parties. The Election Commission of India
(ECI) is also not equipped to regulate the functioning of the political parties.23 Thus,
the stable operation of Indica's parliamentary democracy is seriously hampered by
the absence of accountability and openness in the internal workings of the political
parties. The Supreme Court in various cases have also issued guidelines for
strengthening democracy in political parties.
23. It is humbly submitted that presently, in Indica, there is no statutory support for
internal democratic governance of political parties, and the only regulating statute is
Section 29A is the only regulating statute. 24of the Representation of the Peoples’ Act,
1951. Therefore, there is no legitimate basis for mandating elections inside political
parties. The holding of fair and consistent internal elections by political parties is not
something that even the Election Commission of Indica (ECI) can guarantee. In the
landmark judgment in Indian National Congress (I) vs Institute of Social Welfare 25,
21
Prawin Subash, Constitutionalising Political Parties, LAWGICSTRATUM (2022).
22
The Representation of the Peoples’ Act, 1951, § 29 A.
23
Ambar Kumar Ghosh, India: Reinstating the imperative of inner-party democracy,ORFONLINE (Nov. 6, 2022).
24
Supra note 20.
25
Indian National Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare, (2002) 5 SCC 685.
18
the Supreme Court had reiterated that “the ECI cannot take punitive action against
registered parties for violating the principles of inner-party democracy”.
24. In the case of PUCL v. Union of India 26(2013), it was held that “democracy is all
about choice. This choice can be better expressed by giving the voters an opportunity
to verbalize themselves unreservedly and by imposing least restrictions on their
ability to make such a choice”. In the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India27, “the
Supreme Court struck down a provision that allowed convicted legislators to retain
their seats during the pendency of their appeals. This judgment sought to prevent
individuals convicted of serious criminal offenses from continuing in public office”.
In Public Interest Foundation and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr.28 “the Supreme
Court held that each contesting candidate shall fill up the form as provided by the
Election Commission and the form must contain all the particulars as required
therein”.
25. It is humbly submitted before the Supreme Court of Indica that the above case laws
clearly proves that the Supreme Court has the power to play a significant role in
strengthening democracy in political parties and jurisdiction to entertain the petition
related to this matter.
26. It is humbly submitted that under Article 81 of the Constitution provides for how the
seats in Lok Sabha would be divided among different states as per their share in the
population but if the Lok Sabha seats are reallocated in proportion as per Section 329
of the Delimitation Act, 2002 to each state’s projected population in 2033, it will be a
gross injustice to Southern States.
26
P.U.C.L. v. Union of India, (2013) 10 SCC 1.
27
Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 653.
28
Public Interest Foundation and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr., (2019) 3 SCC 224.
29
Delimitation Act, 2002, Illustration to§ 3.
19
27. It is also submitted that setting up of the delimitation commission for the delimitation
of Lok Sabha seats will give rise to injustice to the Southern States who have strictly
implemented progressive policies of population control while those states who were
unable to control their population were benefitted through delimitation. It will result
in a fewer number of Lok Sabha seats in South and more in North.
28. According to the report by ‘Ashoka Civil Union Society’, if the delimitation exercise
would have been done based on 2011 census, Tamil Nadu (Southern State) would
have lost 7 seats and in 2033 there will be a decrease of 8 seats. Whereas state of
Uttar Pradesh would have gained 8 more seats and an increase of 11 seats in 2033
delimitation exercise.30 These pattern shows the inequality that southern states are
being punished for curbing population growth effectively than those states with
exploding population like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. This unfair political
representation violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
29. It is humbly submitted that Federalism is considered a part of the basic structure of
the Constitution of Indica which cannot be amended or destroyed through any
constitutional amendments without undergoing judicial review by Supreme
Court.31The Supreme Court of India's decision in State of West Bengal v. Union of
India32 was one of the key pronouncements in which the concept of federalism was
discussed. The basic structure doctrine was first articulated in the landmark case of
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, 1973.33
30. It is also humbly submitted that setting up of delimitation commission for
delimitation of constituency and proportional reservation aim at ensuring fair
representation of every state irrespective of its population but it has violated the
federal structure of Indica due to the population disparities.
31. The federal structure of Indica is based on the principle of equal representation of
states, irrespective of their population size. However, the delimitation of constituency
in the next delimitation exercise will result in over-representation and under-
30
Supra note 5.
31
S.Aney and A. Anturkar, Recasting of Federal Structure of the Indian Constitution, SCC ONLINE (April 2,
2021).
32
State of West Bengal v. Union of India, (1964) 1 SCR 371.
33
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1973) 4 SCC 225.
20
representation of certain states. This will give some states an upper hand of political
autonomy over other states which has been under represented. This has challenged
the principle of equal representation and has shaken the balance of power between
states.
32. It is also humble submitted that the delimitation exercise will also impact the State
Autonomy. States have a certain amount of autonomy in governance and decision-
making in a federal system. However, if the process of delimitation inequitably
impacts the representation of states, it will threaten the Southern States autonomy
and limit their capacity to protect their interests. States with larger populations might
have a bigger say in national politics, potentially pushing the issues and interests of
smaller states to the side.
33. Article 1 of the Constitution of Indica states that ‘Indica shall be a union of
states.’34This would violate an unwritten federal compact that binds the Indian
Union. This involves the non-domination of any one constituent unit of the union.
34. It is humbly submitted that there is a significant population disparity in Indica
between the northern and southern states. The delimitation process set up by
delimitation commission is solely based on population which can lead to a situation
where the southern states, with relatively lower population density will end up with
very less seats in legislative bodies compared to their northern counterparts. This gap
between the north and south divide will overshadow the concern and interests of
southern states. The delimitation process violates the federal structure as it has not
adequately addressed the concerns arising from population disparities to maintain
equitable representation of states.
2.3.The population of 18% is delivering 35% of national GDP due to which the southern
states face financial discrimination.
35. It is humbly submitted that the 18% of the population which residing in Southern
states contributes 35% of National GDP and such progressive States contributing to
the nation’s economy and development should not be ignored and put at a
disadvantage.
36. It is important to note that the combined GDP of just three States — Karnataka,
Kerala and Tamil Nadu — is greater than 13 States in the East.35 As it is the
34
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 1.
21
Northern states with huge population that is taking away all the central funds, which
are mainly contributed by the south. If southern representation is also reduced, the
South will become powerless for ever.
37. For every one rupee of tax contributed by Uttar Pradesh that state receives 1 rupee 79
paise back from central taxes whereas for very one rupee tax contributed by
Karnataka that state receives 47 paise back.36 This malapportionment of resources is
due to the inequitable representation at the centre because southern states have been
successful in implementing progressive population control policies and literacy rate.
38. Kerala uses 72% from their own taxes and 28% from the central taxes whereas in
Bihar its exactly reverse where they use only 23% from their own taxes and 77%
from central taxes.37 This put a strain on the federal idea because the increasing
perception in the South would clearly seem to be that people of the south are getting
the raw end of the financial deal.
It is humbly submitted that the 137th Constitutional Amendment Act is unconstitutional, and
this contention is dealt in a 5-fold manner –
39. It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that, they said amendment is in
contravention of the Basic Structure doctrine given by the 13 judge-bench in the
landmark judgment of Kesavananda Bharati and Ors. v. State of Kerala and
Anr.38Federalism was given to be a part of the Basic Structure in the case. According
to the Britannica English Dictionary, “Federalism is a mode of political
organization that unites separate states or other polities within an overarching
35
K.S. Sridhar, The delimitation paradox of India’s north-south divide, THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE (Jan 17,
2022).
36
S. Tharoor, Modi Govt opens a pandora’s box: States can lose political clout if ..., THE PRINT (March 24,
2018).
37
K. Sivaramakrishnan, North-South Divide and Delimitation Blues, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (Aug.
26 - Sep. 8, 2000).
38
Id
22
political system in a way that allows each to maintain its own integrity.”39 Since
ONOE will result in concentrating power in the central government and reducing the
autonomy of the state governments, it completely goes against the principle of
federalism, violating the Basic Structure of the Constitution.
40. It is most humbly submitted that some necessary autonomy of states over their
territory is necessary for a well-functioning democracy. Every state knows and
understands or at least has the appropriate mechanism to research and resolve the
conflicts within its territory. This autonomy of the states is necessary for the
democratic regime to proceed in the future without unnecessary complications. In the
case of State of Rajasthan v. Union of India40, the Supreme Court ruled that the
central government should exercise restraint and allow state governments to function
autonomously unless there are compelling reasons for central intervention. This case
recognized the importance of state governments in maintaining regional stability and
addressing local issues.
41. Furthermore, ONOE would render multiple regional issues invisible and lesser-
known and hence there would be little to no scope for the popularization and
awareness of specific regional problems, which are better represented by local
leaders without their campaign ground being annexed by the bigger and powerful
parties. The same is substantiated in the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of
India41, in which Hon’ble court gave that “The Constitution of India is not truly
Federal in character. The basis of the distribution of powers between the Union and
States is that only those powers which are concerned with the regulation of local
problems are vested in the States and the residue, especially those which tend to
maintain the economic industrial and commercial unity of the country are left to the
Union.”42
42. It is humbly submitted that schedule 7 of the Constitution of Indica enlists the
specific areas of legislative operation and policy-making for both central and state
governments. It provides List 1 (Union List), List 2 (State List), and List 3
39
The Editors of Encyclopaedia, federalism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (30 Mar. 2023).
40
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592.
41
State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 1963 AIR 1241.
42
State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 1963 AIR 1241.
23
(Concurrent List). In the Schedule, Local Body elections are a subject in the State
List, under Entry no. 5.43
43. It is humbly submitted that according to the said amendment, the overly-powerful
Centre would wrongfully interfere with a subject that it was previously unable to
operate with. Applying the Doctrine of Colourable Legislation44, it can be identified
that given the Centre lacks any direct jurisdiction on the subject of Local Body
elections, it cannot do so indirectly, under the name of ONOE. Given that local body
election is a state subject, the Parliament has no competency to frame laws on it. This
makes the amendment unconstitutional.
3.3 It curtails the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) and fundamental right to equality guaranteed under Article 14.
3.3.1. Curtailing of Right to Freedom of Speech & Expression under Article 19(1)(a)
44. It is humbly submitted that the fundamental right to freedom of speech and
expression45 guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) will be massively curtailed in the
situation where big and powerful political parties may engage in restricting behavior
towards smaller parties during election campaigns. The national/powerful parties
may completely encroach the space for campaigning, leaving no scope for smaller
parties to campaign and express their ideas. Additionally, the powerful parties may
even encroach all other forms of campaigning and hence not allowing regional issues
to come to notice at all. Such an amendment that deprives people of their opportunity
to express their ideas and freely campaign for their representation counts to be
unconstitutional.
45. It is humbly submitted that any law that curtails the voices of any group of people or
a minority is bad law. Minorities and several groups of people are suffering just due
to lack of political representation and the non-acknowledgment of their issues. And if
simultaneous elections are to be conducted, according to the amendment, these
voices will be buried even deeper than they already are.
43
The Constitution of India, 1950, Schedule VII, State List, Entry 5.
44
K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar is
AIR 1952 SC 75; State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 1689.
45
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(a).
24
46. It is humbly submitted that the Fundamental Right to Equality46 is guaranteed under
Article 14 of the Constitution of Indica. It provides equality before law and prohibits
discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, gender, caste, and birth place. It
additionally includes equality of opportunity in matters of employment.
47. It is humbly submitted that any law that is unfair in the representation of people (in
this case, minorities, ethnic groups, etc.), is bad law. Powerful national parties have
the economic and logistic resources to run large-scale campaigns. These campaigns
often fail to acknowledge local issues because naturally these parties give highest
priorities to issues of national and international importance than regional importance.
The campaigning by these parties will render the local elections to be highly
ineffective due to lack of campaigning and public awareness. This failure of
decentralization would lead to the fall of the democracy as a whole, due to the loss of
stability and trust of voters. Hence, the amendment poses a threat to the internal
stability of the nation, and thus is unconstitutional.
3.3.It violates Article 172 and Article 174 of the Constitution of Indica.
48. It is humbly submitted that the amendment violates Article 174 of the Constitution of
Indica. Article 172 provides that the duration of each term of the State Legislative
Assembly is 5 years. Under Article 174(2), only the Governor of a State has the
power to prorogue or dissolve a Legislative Assembly before the completion of its
term of 5 years.
49. It is submitted that due to the amendment, the dissolution of all State Legislative
Assemblies before the 2034 elections has become mandatory. Given that Indica has a
diverse population with frequent elections, it is obvious that there will be multiple
such states whose tenures would have not completed by 2034. But nevertheless, the
amendment would dissolve such Legislative Assemblies as well, before their
statutory dissolution.
50. It can be derived that this proves the clear-cut violation of Article 174(2), because
here, the ONOE code of conduct is causing the dissolution of legislative assemblies,
and not the Governor. The effects of dissolution of a legislative assembly were given
lucidly in the Gujarat Assembly Election case47, quoting that “Dissolution of
Legislative Assembly ends the representative capacity of legislators and terminates
46
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 14.
47
Gujarat Assembly Election case, (2002) 8 SCC 237.
25
the responsibility of the Cabinet to the Members of the Lok Sabha or the Legislative
Assembly, as the case may be.” Having proven that the said amendment is in
contravention of Article 174, it is unconstitutional.
51. It is humbly submitted that the amendment does not provide any mechanism or
procedure to be followed in case any legislative assembly or even the parliament
dissolves before the completion of its term of 5 years48, as given in Article 172 and
Article 83(2)49.
52. It is humbly submitted that if in case there is dissolution of the legislative assembly
of a state or more states before the conclusion of 5 years from the date of their
election, the amendment has no specific regulations for it. The amendment rules out
any scope of re-election, since only simultaneous elections are supposed to be
conducted by the Election Commission and the State Election Commissions. Even if
re-election takes place, the new legislative assembly would only be allowed to stay in
power till the next simultaneous elections, before which it would have to be
dissolved. This would also be a clear violation of Article 172. Alternatively, if this
new legislative assembly is allowed to complete its 5-year term, all the upcoming
elections would not be simultaneous, hence rendering the amendment inoperative.
53. It is humbly submitted that if the amendment intends to impose President’s rule 50 in
all the states in which Legislative Assemblies get dissolved before completion of
their 5-year terms, it could lead to a misuse of Article 356. The important judicial
precedent of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India51 gave that it is not permissible for the
president to take any irreversible action under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article
356(1), and that the dissolution of the legislative assembly of any state shall be done
only after the approval of both the houses of the parliament. In this case, it is also
entirely possible that due to some political conflict between some particular state and
48
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 172.
49
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 83(2).
50
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 356.
51
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
26
the Centre, the same article may be misused to impose President’s rule, as had
happened in the S.R. Bommai case.
54. It is additionally submitted that the governor may misrepresent the legislative
machinery of the respective state to be irretrievably broken down, hence facilitating
President’s rule. This would further result in totally arbitrary and forced rule of the
President over the particular states, harming the overall political atmosphere of the
country and ground-treading the principles of democracy and decentralization.
55. It is humbly submitted that the amendment contains no provision as to what shall be
the course of action in the case of premature dissolution of the Parliament. If re-
election has to be done according to the amendment, it would lead to unnecessary
dissolution of legislative assemblies of all the states of the country. This would
further cause immeasurable financial losses to the national exchequer. Good and
well-functioning assemblies would have to face untimely dissolution before the
completion of 5 years only due to the said amendment. This is not at all fit for any
democracy, and in a democracy as big and diverse as Indica, this is nothing less than
complete wastage of funds and time.
56. It is humbly submitted that if re-election is done with the condition of staying in
power only until the following pre-planned simultaneous elections, this would be in
contravention of Article 83(2). Alternatively, if re-election is done without the above
condition, the following elections would not be simultaneous anymore and hence
would render the amendment inoperative. Given all these contentions and judicial
precedents, it is only fair that the amendment be declared unconstitutional.
57. It is humbly submitted that the present anti-defection law is failing in its purpose.
The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, also known as the anti-defection law, was
added to prevent political defections.52 The justification for preventing such
defections was that they threatened the values and foundations of Indian
democracy.53
52
The Constitution of India, 1950, Schedule X.
53
The Constitution (Fifty Second) Amendment Bill, Bill No. XXII of 1985.
27
58. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that because it prevents lawmakers
from exercising their right to free speech and the opportunity to work freely and
limits decision-making in legislatures to a small group of people who dominate
political parties, Paragraph 2(b) of the 10th Schedule has damaged democracy. 54
Legislators are required to support the official stance adopted by their party on every
topic by virtue of the Anti-Defection Law's disqualification clauses. They run the
danger of losing their House membership if they veer from this position. Their ability
to apply their own judgement to evaluate proposals placed before the House is
negatively impacted by this.55
59. In the case of KihotoHollohan v. Zachillhu and Others56, the petitioner contested
this clause on the grounds that it violated the right to freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed in Article 1957 to exclude someone for holding contrary
opinions of the Indian Constitution and freedom of dissent and freedom of
conscience. The dissenting judgment58 opined that the anti-defection law to be
unconstitutional and anticipated its use without neutrality by the appointed
adjudicators. It was held with majority that Paragraph 6 did not exclude
extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme and High courts. 59
60. Furthermore, in the case of Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. the Hon’ble Speaker
Manipur (2020), it was held that “the courts could not be prevented from taking
jurisdiction when all alternative remedies present in the 10th Schedule were
exhausted and the Speaker was deliberately not taking action”.60 Thus, the anti-
defection law is failing in its purpose and violating the fundamental rights. It should
be suitably struck down. The Hon’ble court has the jurisdiction to entertain the
petition.
54
Tushar Chakrabarty, Discussion Paper The Anti-defection Law, PRS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (2022).
55
Id.
56
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others, (1992) SCR (1) 686.
57
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19
58
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others, (1992) SCR (1) 686 [Dissenting opinion of Justices Lalit Mohan
Sharma & J.S. Verma].
59
Id.
60
Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. the Hon’ble Speaker Manipur, (2020) SCC 55.
28
PRAYER
FOR THESE REASONS, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACTS STATED, ISSUES RAISED, AUTHORITIES
CITED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED, IT IS MOST HUMBLY PRAYED AND IMPLORED BEFORE THIS
HON’BLE COURT THAT IT MAY BE GRACIOUSLY PLEASED TO ADJUDGE , HOLD AND DECLARE
THAT –
3. Declare that the constitutional amendment to have ‘one nation-one election’ and
introduction of common electoral rolls for parliamentary, assembly and local body elections
is unconstitutional.
4. Declare that the Anti-defection law is violating fundamental rights and should be suitably
struck down.
AND/OR PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT IT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE. ALL OF WHICH IS HUMBLY
AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Sd/-
COUNSELS FOR PETITIONER
29