Theory of Intersubjectivity Alfred Schutz

THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY: ALFRED SCHUTZ
Author(s): RICHARD M. ZANER

Source: Social Research, Vol. 28, No. 1 (SPRING 1961), pp. 71-93
Published by: The New School
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40969317
Accessed: 14-02-2017 12:20 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
The New School is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Research
This content downloaded from 175.111.89.8 on Tue, 14 Feb 2017 12:20:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY:
ALFRED SCHUTZ
BY RICHARD M. ZANER
A N his many writings Alfred Schutz conceived his w

as a "philosophy investigating the presuppositions" o
as a "piece of phenomenological psychology," and,
papers, as "the constitutive phenomenology of the n
tude." x The fundamental theme of all his work, however, was
the problem of intersubjectivity, in spite of the fact that he was,
regrettably, prevented from developing a detailed theory on that
problem. Seeking, on the one hand, to probe the roots of common-
sense reality and, on the other, to furnish a foundation for the
social sciences, Schutz was led at every point to the problem of
intersubjectivity, as Scheler and Dilthey were before him.2
The essence of the social world, conceived as the constituted
texture of meaningfully interlocking activities of actors on the
social scene, was for him its commonness, the fact that it is a
world shared by the multiplicity of individuals living and acting
within it, in mutually interlocking activities. Because of this
i The material for this article has been taken mainly from the body of Alfred
Schutz's work in English, especially the following: "Choosing Among Projects of
Action," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (hereafter referred to as
PPR), vol. 12, no. 2 (December 1951) pp. 161-84; "Common -sense and Scientific
Interpretation of Human Action," in PPR, vol. 14, no. 1 (September 1953) pp. 1-37;
"Das Problem der tranzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl," in Philosophische
Rundschau, vol. 5, no. 3 (1957) pp. 81-107; "Husserl's Importance for the Social
Sciences," in "Edmund Husserl, 1859-1959," Phaenomenologica, vol. 4 (1959) pp.
86-98; "Making Music Together," in Social Research, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 1951)
pp. 76-97; "On Multiple Realities," in PPR, vol. 5, no. 4 (June 1945) pp. 533-75;
"Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," in PPR, vol. 9, no. 2 (December 1948) pp.
184-98; "Scheler 's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter
Ego," in PPR, vol. 2, no. 3 (March 1942) pp. 322-47; "Symbol, Reality and Society,"
in Symbols and Society, edited by Lyman Bryson and others (New York 1955)
pp. 135-202.
2 See Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy (New Haven 1954) pp. 213-28; Wil-
helm Dilthey, "Psychologie descriptive et analytique," in Le monde de l'esprit
(translated from vol. 5 of Gesammelte Schriften), vol. 1 (Paris n.d.) pp. 145-245.
72 SOCIAL RESEARCH
commonness, all the sciences that have to
part of it, have intersubjectivity as their
understanding; 3 that is, intersubjectivity
lem for these sciences. Hence all empiric
ning with the socio-cultural world as alr
as their ground "the constitutive phenom
attitude" - that inquiry which has as its
problem of intersubjectivity. For the sam
intersubjectivity cannot avail itself of eit
theories belonging to the empirical socia
developed as an autonomous discipline,
methods from the phenomenon itself.
An initial difficulty thus presents itsel
subjectivity itself thematic, how to bring
from all theories, interpretations, and as
Further crucial difficulties are presented
analysis of intersubjectivity as a genuine
right. The mere fact that we are all act
concretely engaged in a variety of intersu
means guarantees that we can forthwith g
structures of these relationships, any mor
shoemakers because we all have feet. A
agreement with Scheler,4 the problem
levels, each presenting its own specific
particular concerns, the problem of inter
"ultramundane." It is one that lies at the root of all the social
sciences and at the heart of our existence - that is, "the concrete
understanding of the Other whose existence is taken for granted."
As he expresses it in one of his last articles, "So long as men are
s As Marcel puts it, what is lived at the level of concrete social action is a category
of thought for the interpretation of that experience. Or, as Maurice Natanson
states concisely, "The category is made possible by the experience and then the
category makes possible the interpretation of the experience": "Existential Cate-
gories in Contemporary Literature," in Carolina Quarterly (1959) p. 25.
* Compare Scheler, op. cit., pp. 81&-18, and Schutz on "Sender's Theory of
Intersubjectivity," p. 335.
THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY 73
born of mothers, intersubjectivity and the 'We-relation' fo
all other categories of human being/'
In order to grasp the significance of intersubjectivity as an "intra-

mundane" problem, it is necessary first to characterize, if only
briefly, Schutz's investigations of "what makes the social world
'tick,' " as he often put it. To make the exposition manageable,
it must be restricted to only one stratum of the social world:
"paramount reality/' as distinguished from the world of dreams,
of scientific theory, of games, and the like. The world in which
I find myself at any moment in my "wide-awake" living is at the
outset peopled with others, not only individuals with whom I am
acquainted and others whom I know less well or not at all, or
groups of others equally well or less well known to me, but also
a multiplicity of "products" of the activities of others ("cultural"
objects, institutions, values, and the like), all of which intrinsically
refer to others.
Aside from this, however, the world in which I live, work, and
act is taken for granted by me as my reality; so far as I must come
to terms with it and take my bearings within it, I must under-
stand it, and to this extent it is given to my experience and inter-
pretation. I take it for granted that this world existed before
I did and will continue to exist after my death, and that it was
and will be a socio-cultural world organized and interpreted by
my predecessors and successors in a way typically similar to the
way in which I myself organize and interpret it. In so far as it
refers to the world handed down to me, this assumption combines
with the knowledge derived from my own experience to form my
"stock of knowledge at hand." In terms of this progressively
sedimented stock of experiences, the objects, facts, and events I
encounter and deal with in the course of my life are experienced
as "things of such and such a kind," in other words as types ("dogs,"
"trees," "strangers," and so on).
This world is at once the framework and the object of my ac-
74 SOCIAL RESEARCH
tions. To cany out my projects I must act o
experience its resistance to my efforts; th
reality, my interest is preeminently pragm
world is oriented and organized for my act
poral continum, with my actual "here" an
as the center "O" of a system of coordin
organization of my surrounding field. As s
ganized into a hierarchy of zones within
and restorable reach, within which is my i
"manipulatory sphere," with its own typ
horizons. These zones of interlocking actua
riences are taken for granted by me as t
always questionable, matrix of my action
the basic idealizations that Husserl calls t
and the "and so forth," my concrete situati
on-going course of typical experiences of typi
At any moment, then, I find myself in a
mined situation, which, though it is only in
myself, I must define and come to terms w
in a particular situation is as constitutiv
situation as if I were to "gear" into the
acting-performing. Hence my situation
sedimentation of all my previous experienc
bear at every moment of my life. How I def
I select these instead of those circumstances
or irrelevant, depends on what my "purp
moment in question, and ultimately on wh
is. This fact reveals the motive structure at
In spite of our common vernacular, which
every kind of motive by the term "because
from the "because motive" the "in-order-to motive." In so far as
I am actually engaged in my on-going acting, my motive is always
of the "in-order-to" type (I move my arm in order to pick up the
glass); my "because motive" appears only on reflection (I picked
up the glass because I was thirsty). The "in-order-to motive"
refers intrinsically to the future, to what is going to
plished in and by my acting; the "because motive" refer
has already been accomplished. Finally, every elemen
everyday knowledge has a necessarily equivocal trait: if
is p," I in my natural attitude also recognize that S is q,
well. In so far as I take this for granted, however, these po
are not contradictory, for I now take S as p for my pa
purposes at hand, and ignore as irrelevant to these pur
"q-ness," "r-ness," and "t-ness" of S.
An everyday knowledge of the world is, then, a system
structs of its typicality. We have thus far ignored, how
fact that this world is fundamentally a common world,
with others. In my natural attitude I take it for gra
others, fellowmen, exist; I take it for granted that the
in ways typically similar to mine, will be motivated by
similar motives, will take my actions in substantially the
as I mean them; and I assume that my fellowmen, in t
my own acting and motives as typically similar to the
commonness of the world has several dimensions. There are, in
the first place, my contemporaries, with whom I am interconnected
in mutual action and reaction and who thus live "at the same
(historical, objective) time" as I; secondly, my successors, of whom
no experience by me is possible, but toward whom I may and do
direct my actions; thirdly, my predecessors, on whose world I
cannot act, but whose actions and products are handed down to
me in the form of a tradition that I can modify, partially reject,
accept, or take for granted. But since all social relationships and
the other dimensions of social reality derive from and are founded
on "my contemporaries," more particularly "my consociates,"
those whom I encounter in the "face-to-face relation," the problem
of intersubjectivity is to be met with fundamentally on this level.
Intersubjectivity as an "ultramundane" problem concerns, then,
this taken-for-granted commonness of the world of daily life.
"How is a common world," Schutz asks, "in terms of common
intentionalities possible?" How, that is to say, does it come about
76 SOCIAL RESEARCH
that in spite of the fact that I, being "her
for a system of coordinates defining my su
you, being "there" and the center "O" for a
nates defining your surrounding world (you
surrounding world, and me forming a part
come to have something in common (an
mately a common world)? How is it pos
cannot live in your seeing of things, canno
hatred, cannot have an immediate and dire
mental life as it is for you - how is it possib
less share your thoughts, feelings, and att
"problem" of intersubjectivity is here encount
What has been described thus far as the "paramount" reality is

paramount mainly because communication (the primary vehicle
of which is language) "can occur only within the reality of the
outer world," that is, within the everyday "working" world. But,
Schutz asks, is then communication, whether by means of the
spoken word, the expressive gesture, or a non-cognitive communi-
cative scheme (such as music), the foundation for the social process
and thus for intersubjectivity - or does communication presup-
pose, on the contrary, the existence of a more fundamental social
interaction, which would then be the basic intersubjective con-
nection between man and fellowman? This question is obviously
central, not only for philosophy but also for the social sciences in
general. As regards the latter, if communication were funda-
mental to the existence of the social world, then the primary task
of the empirical social sciences would be that of "linguistic"
analysis, in one form or another. An empirical study of lan-
guages and their various usages would be fundamental to the
study of individuals and groups, of social roles, and the like, for
therein would be found the condition for the possibility of the
social process as such; or at least, the communicative process would
be the core of the social process.
Thus one should be able to explain the emergence of mea
and correlatively, of intelligence, in terms of the process of
munication - by means, for instance, of a "conversation of
tures/' as Mead attempted to do.5 Indeed, as Mead puts i
because "Mind arises through communication by a convers
of gestures in a social process . . . - not communication th
mind," the "awareness or consciousness of gestures is not ne
to the presence of meaning in the process of social experie
Meanings, constituted by means of the conversation of gest
are "objectively there as a relationship between certain ph
the social act," and not first something "psychical."
But in order to give this "objective thereness" of meaning
sense, one must suppose, as Mead does, that the gesture
responses to gestures are themselves merely biological pheno
intrinsically without meaning and with no meaning-end
quality, yet constituting the matrix from which meaning a
Mead goes on to contend, however, that the response to a g
is the meaning of that gesture; by extension, the gesture itself
first be meaningful in order to be able to evoke a meanin
sponse). From this results the enigmas characteristic of M
"behaviorism." The interpretations of gestures, while supp
meaning-endowing, are said to be merely "an external,
physical, or physiological process." But if the interpretati
gestures are merely physiological processes, it is a myster
they could ever be meaning-endowing; and if they are me
endowing, the gestures cannot be merely, much less fundamen
physiological in nature, even though they may have a physio
substratum. To be sure, Mead's principal point is well t
meanings and even new sets of objects of common sense a
and because of the social process, and especially the conver
of gestures. What is at issue, however, is the foundation o
social process. Mead's response that it is communication
broad sense) involves him in irresolvable problems, for com
8 George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society (Chicago 1934) p. 77; the quo
that follow are taken from pp. 50 and 76-81.
78 SOCIAL RESEARCH
cation, as will be clear shortly, presuppo

phenomenon: intersubjectivity.
Put most briefly, communication with
way, must presuppose the existence of
recipient and interpreter of the commun
ingly, as Schutz clearly recognizes, ther
social interaction which, though it is an
of all possible communication, does not
process and is not capable of being grasp
It has been pointed out that communica
reality of the outer world, and for this r
of "paramount" reality. This means that
cation between man and his fellowman .
or a series of events in the outer world which functions, on
the one hand, as a scheme of expression of the communicator's
thought, and, on the other hand, as a scheme of interpretation of
such thought by the addressee." It is not enough to say simply
that the body is a "field of expression," for, as Schutz points out,
this is ascribable to almost anything at all (a painter's landscape,
a Japanese garden). To be a "field of expression" is not a quality
inherent in things, but is rather an intentional characteristic,
something meant, or intended, as such.
Almost everyone agrees that, apart from mental telepathy,
knowledge of the Other - more generally, any encounter with
the Other - is possible only through the medium of events occur-
ring in or produced by the body. Thus in Mead's example of
the wrestlers, events occur on the body of the one as events gearing
into the outer world and thus perceivable and interpretable by
his opponent, as events of such and such a kind having such and
such a meaning and calling out in him these and those responses.
All such phenomena, according to Schutz (following Husserl),6
are examples of "appresentational reference," or "appresentation,"
by means of which one object or state of affairs, now presented,
« See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, translated by Dorion Cairns (The

Hague i960) sects. 48-54.
is "paired" (gepaart) with another object or state of affair
is not now presented. By virtue of "pairing," the non-pres
state of affairs becomes "appresented." The most obvious ex
of this is symbolization, analyzed in detail by Schutz in his
bol, Reality and Society."
As regards the present problem, Schutz believes that appr
tation provides the clue for understanding how the Other i
constituted as such in my experience. The Other is given t
as a psycho-physical entity. His body is given in my exper
originally, immediately, as a purely physical thing, as an
of sensuous perception. His mental life, however, is on
present, that is, it is appresented as the psychical compon
this concrete psycho-physical unity. By means of the auto
synthesis Husserl calls "associative transfer of sense," the O
organism is automatically constituted for me as an organism
ilar to mine, and, more particularly, as a bodily organism
körper), such as I would have and experience (in the way I
experience my organism) were I over there where that ph
body now is.
This appresentation is not, however, an inference, a specific
process in which I actively infer on the basis of certain data to
something else (the Other qua Other). Rather, on the basis of
the automatic associative synthesis, the Other is constituted for
my experience as already present, given, for my spontaneous activ-
ities.7 In fact, on the level at which this automatic transfer of
sense occurs, every "body" acquires the sense of being an "organ-
ism" similar to mine. In the course of experience only certain
organisms harmoniously verify this transferred sense; in others
the transferred sense conflicts with their intrinsic sense, thus dis-
verifying the synthesis. Of those that are harmoniously verified,
certain of their parts become experienced as organs sensuously
perceiving affairs that I would perceive were they my organs of
sensuous perception. And, by means of this, I apprehend the
Other as sensuously perceiving the very body that I perceive and
7 Ibid. See also Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg 1954) sects. 33-46.
8o SOCIAL RESEARCH
take to be his organism; as a

organism is constituted as the
occurs a cancellation of the transferred sense "mine/1 and in its
place is constituted the sense "organism, not of my mind but of
an Other's mind." The physical object, "the Other's organism"
and events taking place in or on it, are now apprehended by me
as expressing the Other's "spiritual 'I.' "
On this ground, so-called "cultural objects" point back by their
very meaning to the human activity that produced them, and
therefore we are always aware to some degree of our historicity.
For the same reason we are able to understand such objects;
indeed, as Schutz has shown, cultural objects can be understood
only if one understands the purposes for which they were made.
And this, he points out, is the source for Weber's "principle of
subjective meaning": not only all human activities, but also all
the products of these actions, intrinsically refer back to the sub-
jective meaning given them by the actors and producers.
More important for Schutz, at this point, is the fact that by
means of this appresentational reference through which the Other
is first constituted as Other, "a communicative common environ-
ment" is established. Once the Other is apprehended as Other,
it becomes possible for higher-level connections to develop. And
it is precisely this environment that Schutz has described as the
"paramount" reality, with its web of socially derived and socially
approved knowledge, typical "recipes" for acting, thinking, and
planning.
Nevertheless, we have still not come to the peculiarly social
relationship that underlies, according to Schutz, these social rela-
tionships of a higher level. We have, to be sure, circumscribed
the terrain: on the one hand, we have seen the typified stratifica-
tion of the biographically determined situation; and, on the other,
we have traced the fundamental constitutive basis for the appre-
hension of the Other. But all this, Schutz says, "constitutes merely
the setting for the main social relationship."
I encounter and experience the Other's organism, and experi-
enee my self as experienced by the Other, only within the "fac
face" relationship, the relationship obtaining between any t
more consociates whose worlds within actual and potential r
with their corresponding manipulatory spheres, partially ov
and are thus shared, held in common. That is to say, the fa
face relation implies a community of time and space amon
sociates - but in Schutz's usage of this term it does not imp
degree of intimacy, since it is equally applicable to the co-pr
of friends and of strangers.
Now, when certain events occur on, or are produced by,
Other's body, it is the complex time structure of this occur
and its interpretation by the actors, which holds the clue
sharedness of the occurrence. As an illustration, consider verbal
communication. By a series of processes going on within the
Other's inner durée, the Other articulates his thought step-by-step
(polythetically) into a verbal expression that is manifested by a
series of bodily movements occurring in the "ou ter " world, in
objective time (lip movements, voice inflections, arm gestures,
and the like). These events, the single phases of the speaker's
"articulated thought," are "polythetically . . . co-performed or
re-performed by the recipient, and thus a quasi-simultaneity of
both streams of thought takes place." In and by the bodily move-
ments of "working acts," that is, overt performances requiring a
bodily gearing into the outer world, the transition from inner
durée to objective time is accomplished, and these working actions
thereby partake of both. "In simultaneity we experience the
working action as a series of events in outer and inner time,
unifying both dimensions into a single flux which shall be called
the living present." In the living present (lebendige Gegenwart)
I and my fellowman simultaneously live through a pluri-dimen-
sionality of time. "This sharing of the other's flux of experiences
in inner time, this living through a living present in common,
constitutes . . . the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience
of the 'We,' which is at the foundation of all possible communica-
tion," and thus of intersubjectivity.
82 SOCIAL RESEARCH
The "mutual tuning-in" relation,

or aspects. The first is the series o
sion in which the Other's though
and in which the listener polythetic
the thought thus built up by the
cative process is an event in outer
face-to-face relationship, "which u
and warrants their synchronizatio
and most important, there is ther
- a relation that transcends both
graphical situations - in terms of
in a living present, which is our l
bodied in your speech. In the We-
intersubjectivity, our simultaneou
and outer dimensions of time con
nomenon: "We grow older togeth
Schutz to grow older with anothe
Only by means of this "mutual tu
cation of any kind whatever possi
it can the Other's body and its
"field of expression of events with
all other social relationships are d
tion, and to each derivative form
structure, itself derived from the li
tive of the "We."
As a consequence of this foundation relation it becomes possible

to define the meaning of the "alter ego." But before doing so it
is in Schutz's view necessary to distinguish carefully between two
essentially different kinds of attitudes: the "straightforward" and
the "reflective." It is only in reference to Me that I and Others
obtain the sense of being a "We"; it is only in reference to an
Us, whose center I am, that Others stand out as "You"; and it is
only in reference to You, who refer back to Us and to Me, that
a "They" is constituted. In daily life, however, I am rarely, if
ever, aware of these strata, or of the fact that only my existence
as a self in this world makes these relationships, and this relati
possible. I simply live straightforwardly in my acts, busie
with my acts but with their various objects; I live in m
directed straightforwardly to their objects. It is an overstat
to describe my usual straightforward attitude in terms of "I th
or "I feel" or the like; indeed, James speaks of an "It th
and Dewey goes even further and speaks of an "on-going c
of experienced things." 8 I can, however, "stop and think"
is, I may, while still remaining in the natural attitude, ref
my acts and not live straightforwardly in them. Now, acc
to Schutz, my "self" appears; my acts, my beliefs, my feelin
revealed through reflection as mine. (It might be suggeste
Marcel does, for example, that not all reflection, ipso fact
"my" self as its object, but rather only a specific kind of r
tion, which he calls "second reflection" or pensée pensante
In my straightforward attitude I live in my acts as pres
am directed toward the immediate future and still have in
grasp (in Husserl's phrase noch-im-Griff -habend) the imm
past, but the time dimension is the living present. In the refle
attitude, however, I grasp not my living present, but only
always the past, which was a present. I experience my actin
the objects thereof modo presenti; I experience my acts an
self as actor modo preterito.
Only in my straightforward attitude do I apprehend the
as himself present, given. Thus, for Schutz, "the alter ego
subjective stream of thought which can be experienced
living present." I experience the Other straightforwardly
living present as that subjective stream of thought with w
share this present in simultaneity; that is, we grow older toget
This experience of the alter ego in living simultaneity
calls "the general thesis of the alter ego's existence." The t
implies, he goes on, that "this stream of thought which is
mine shows the same fundamental structure as my own con
ness. This means that the other is like me, capable of actin
«Quoted by Schutz in "Sender's Theory of Intersubjectivity," p. 339.
84 SOCIAL RESEARCH
thinking; that his stream of thoughts s

and through connectedness as mine. ... I
that the other can live, as I do, either in
directed towards their objects or turn
thinking . . . that, consequently, he has
of growing old with me as I know that
I share the We-sphere straightforward
I-sphere only reflectively.
in
On the ground of the mutual tuning-in relationship all other

social relationships become possible - those pertaining to my con-
temporaries as well as to my successors and predecessors. Having
explicated the ground for the experiencing of the Other, Schutz
has explicated the ground for the fact that the world is experienced
as common, not as my private affair, but as "our" world, the
world for you and me, for "us," and also for "them" and "you."
Because of the intersubjective nature of the socio-cultural world,
the knowledge (in the broadest sense) that any of us has is the
result of a complex process of socialization. Knowledge is social-
ized, on the ground of the mutual tuning-in relation, by means
of three fundamental "theses," which, as I interpret Schutz, are
three moments of the general thesis of the alter ego's existence
(it should be noted that Schutz uses the term "thesis" in the sense
used by Husserl, especially in Ideen, i, sect. 30). Though Schutz
never put it in this way, these three theses all explicate, are so
to speak the concrete working out of, the general thesis. In this
way, I believe, Schutz's investigations into the structure of the
social world can be seen to be a part of the more fundamenta
problem of intersubjectivity.
The first of the three theses is the reciprocity of perspectives,
or the structural socialization of knowledge. Taking it for
granted that fellowmen exist, I take it for granted that objects
are for others as well as for me, but also that these objects mean
»"Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity," p. 343.
something different for me and for them. The reason is tw
In the first place, since I am here, the aspects I experie
typical of the object are different from those so experienced b
Other, who is there; certain objects are within my manipu
sphere but not his, and vice versa. In the second place, our
graphical situations differ, and therewith our systems of relev
and purposes at hand differ.
Commonsense thinking overcomes these limitations, how
by means of two fundamental idealizations. One is the
changeability of standpoints. It is a basic axiom of commo
thinking that the coexisting systems of coordinates can be
formed one into the other. Thus I take it for granted,
assume my fellowman does the same, that he and I would
typically the same experiences of the common world if we chan
places, thus transforming my here into his here, and his into m
The other idealization is the congruency of the systems of
vance. I take it for granted, and I assume my fellowman do
same, that differences in perspective are irrelevant for our pur
at hand; that is, "We" assume we have selected and interpret
actual or potential common objects in a "practically" ide
way (identital for all practical purposes). These two idealiz
constitute the thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives. It is
ous, on the other hand, that they have as their constitutive bas
mutual interlocking of inner and outer time dimensions, wh
turn, is founded on the constitution of the Other's organi
the first common object.
The second of the three theses is the social origin of know
or the genetic socialization of knowledge. Only a small p
my stock of knowledge at hand originates with me; most o
socially derived. I am taught how to define my situation (th
how to define, in regard to the relative natural aspect o
world, the typical features that prevail in the in-group
unquestioned but always questionable ambit of things take
granted until further notice); and I am taught how typica
structs have to be formed in accordance with the purpose a
86 SOCIAL RESEARCH
and its system of relevances acc

point of the in-group (ways of lif
For this socialization the typify
common vernacular, a language
marily, and thus of the typifica
in the in-group whose vernacula
Finally, the third thesis is the
Our actual stocks of knowledge a
only by * 'acquaintance/' others
James' terms), while about othe
an "expert" in only a small area
at any moment structured into
cision, originating in my prevail
biographically determined. The
ences is itself an element of com
example, whom I have to consu
buy old coins. I thus construc
acquaintance, and of their scope
tain relevance structures experi
motives that lead to typical action
Thus the "general thesis of t
unstated, unquestioned, taken-f
ness of the everyday world, by
tive stream of thought shows t
as one's own, implies that our re
ciple be exchanged without th
purposes, the objects, facts, an
moment. It implies as well tha
biographically determined situa
how to define your situation, co
so on, in accordance with the ty
group. Finally, it implies that
this or that field, but that you
typically similar zones of clarity
- and that in certain typically p
ing certain typically pre-defined procedures and recipes, w
on me for advice or help, as I call on you in other circumst
All social interaction is thus founded on the general the
the alter ego's existence, and is concretely "worked out,
speak, by means of the three theses of socialization, the ide
tions belonging to them, and the typifications constructed
actors on the social scene.
However, these theses, and especially the general thesis of which

they are moments, are as such the ground for the commonness of
the social world. This means that the belief in the Other, as
another psycho-physical self like me, is never itself brought into
question, never itself made thematic within the natural attitude.
All doubtings and questionings regarding the Other and the com-
mon, intersubjective world leave untouched this fundamental be-
lief in the Other, "our" world and its objects. In fact, says
Schutz, man in his everyday, natural attitude makes constant and
unthematic use of a specific epoche. He suspends all doubt of
the world, its objects, and Others; he refrains from the doubt that
they might be otherwise than they are assumed to be.
Accordingly, in order to raise the "problem" of intersubjectivity,
it is necessary to make this specific "epoche of doubt" itself the-
matic; that is, it is essential, in order to apprehend intersubjectivity
itself, to effect an epoche on the epoche of doubt, to refrain from
participating in this fundamental belief in the Other and the
world as a whole, and to take it itself as the theme for inquiry.
Only by making intersubjectivity itself thematic is it possible to
develop a genuine theory of intersubjectivity in the intramundane
sphere, that is, a "constitutive phenomenology of the natural atti-
tude." And this inquiry, a fundamental part of the systematic
whole of phenomenology, is, as was indicated at the beginning of
this discussion, at the heart of Schutz's work.
IV
It is clear from what has preceded that the reciprocal interlocking

of time dimensions is, for Schutz, the core phenomenon of inter-
88 SOCIAL RESEARCH
subjectivity. Since intersubjecti

time dimensions, it signifies an
tives, and behavior - and ultimat
tions into a system of meaning
a world common to you and me
Only in the face-to-face relati
ficial it may be, is the Other en
with his own biographically d
dimensions of the social world
apprehended as "typical," in ter
and behavior. Nevertheless, Sch
to-face relation of consociates, t
with only a part of their respec
I encounter and have to do with one another most often in terms
of "social roles." And even this is only half the story: my con-
structing the Other as a performer of social roles plays its part
in my own self-typification. In defining the role of the Other, I
myself assume a role; in typifying his behavior, I typify my own
(becoming, for example, "a passenger," "a teacher," "a stranger").
Finally, these typifying constructs are themselves to a considerable
extent socially derived and approved, some of them becoming
institutionalized in the course of our on-going experience.
How these typifications are worked out at the level of social
action is, of course, a crucial problem; but it calls for a more exten-
sive analysis than can be given here.10 What occurs by means of
this complex typification is, however, of great interest for a theory
of intersubjectivity. For, hand in hand with an increase in
typification, there goes, according to Schutz, an increase in ano-
nymity and a decrease in the fullness of the relationship, such
that, in a completely anonymous relationship, the individuals are
taken by each other as interchangeable, that is, as "anyone." In
such cases, since you could as well be Smith or Jones, and I Peter
or Paul, n'importe qui, we cease to form what Schutz calls the
10 For such an analysis see Schutz's "Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation
of Human Action," pp. 14-20.
"We-relation": this relation is inversely proportionate to th
gree of typification arising through our actions. Thus a cru
problem arises. How is it possible for you and me to br
through the masks of our social roles and to experience each
in a mutual relating that transcends the spheres of our resp
private experiences and constitutes a We-relation? One w
expect Schutz to hold that with a decrease in typification t
would be an increase in fullness, and a consequent intimacy o
relationship. Unfortunately he did not explicitly engage
question; nevertheless I believe that there are grounds in his
for an answer. In this concluding discussion some indic
can be given as to one direction, at least, toward which Sch
indicated theory of intersubjectivity leads.
The clue to the way in which Schutz might have responde
such a question lies in the concept of "fullness," and, more
erally, in the concept of mutually interlocking actions. The
ent interpretation of these concepts rests, as will be seen,
interpretation of the "principle of subjective meaning" w
Schutz does not seem to have emphasized.
All such interaction is, as was emphasized above, an interloc
of time dimensions, behavior, attitudes, and motives. In que
ing and answering, for instance, I anticipate that the Other
understand my action (uttering an interrogation) as a quest
and that this will induce him to respond in such a way that I
understand his behavior as a response. My "in-order-to motiv
say, to obtain information ("How do I get the train to Chicag
and this presupposes that his understanding of the question will
come his "because motive" in performing an action "in-orde
give me this information. Such interaction is based, the
an idealization of the reciprocity of motives, which itself fo
from the thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives, and, in
from the general thesis of the alter ego's existence.
More often, however, my in-order-to motives are more compl
involving many levels of motives (I want to get to Chicago in or
to apply for a position, which, if I am successful, will chang
go SOCIAL RESEARCH
course of my life). In this event it is

know when my action starts, where it en
significance is. Even if I confided in m
able to understand my action only by re
stratification of my motives and plans.
action is different for me, for my partn
It follows that in everyday life there is
Other will understand me; in order for h
standing he must grasp the meaning my
one who does the acting. To the degree, h
man is able to grasp this "subjective mea
has succeeded in going beyond a more or
my behavior; or, as Schutz puts it, he h
"course-of-action" type into a "personal"
tion, as I interpret Schutz, has the signi
"fullness" in the relationship; that is,
into a We-relation.
Here two problems arise. In the first place, how does this full-
ness arise, and what are its conditions for appearance? Second,
how does this fullness constitute a genuine We-relation? As to
the first question, there are indications in Schutz's work that the
mutual tuning-in relation reaches a "fullness" to the extent that I
and my fellowman are able to grasp and understand the subjective
meaning of our respective actions. But, if this is not to become
an empty platitude, how is such understanding itself possible?
In order to grasp the concept of fullness, it seems fruitful to
turn to the work of Gabriel Marcel, who, in emphasizing that
the concepts of "the full" and "the empty" are far more descriptive
of human reality than any other,11 seems to use these concepts in
much the same way that Schutz intends them. Similarly, Marcel
has shown throughout his work that in so far as I regard the
Other as a mere object (in Schutz's terms, as "typical" or "anony-
mous"), I tend to ignore him as this person, and he becomes "just
11 Gabriel Marcel, Position et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique (Paris
1949) P- 49-
anyone." As a consequence of this reduction, our rel
becomes more and more "empty" ("typified" or "anonym
fellowman becomes typified, and consequently I myself
fied (absorbed in "playing a role," that is, in "shammin
versely, the more I am able to understand him from h
tivity (the subjective meaning his actions have for him
Thou, the more intimate he becomes to me: "our" re
becomes "fuller," we are truly "with" one another, and
front each other as persons.
But for this "fullness" to come about, it is not enough
and I are merely willing to understand one another;
each be able to do so (thus being enabling to one anothe
thermore, it is essential that each of us be both willing
to be treated as a Thou by the Other: to "be with" the Ot
a mere matter of taking him as a Thou, but is somethi
and perhaps more difficult, for it means also being taken a
by him. To be able to give, freely and openly, is a rare
virtue; but to be able to receive such a gift is even rarer
for you and me to "keep faith" with one another, to
faithful" to our We-relation by seeking to understand ou
tive subjective meanings, it is essential, to borrow Marce
that each remain "available to" the Other: "being
(disponibilité) is the condition for "keeping faith with"
for "being with," the Other.12 Briefly, while the mutual
relation is a reciprocal grasping and understanding of th
tive subjective meanings, the condition under which this
can occur is openness. In order to realize a We-relation
Other, I must "be open" to him, "be available" for him t
"appeal" to me. Here, I believe, Marcel enunciates t
mental categories for an understanding of the genuine W
- appeal, response, and their foundation: care or concer
This takes us to our second problem: having seen th
12 See especially Marcel's Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphy
(Chicago 1951) pp. 26, 49-50; also Pietro Prini, Gabriel Marcel et la m
de l'invérifiable (Paris 1953) p. 91.
92 SOCIAL RESEARCH
mental condition for my understanding o

of my fellowman's action, and his under
trace the way in which the consequen
We-relation. For one to engage in mut
with an Other is to appeal to him to r
understand the meaning this action has f
Other must respond to the appeal in the
by the actor himself, and not pre-interpr
in order to merit such a response the ap
the recognition of the responsibility it i
to assume by his response. This recognit
one who appeals is itself a fundamental
contracted by the very fact that it is an ap
In order to respond, however, the Ot
open) to apprehend the appeal as such. M
be made only with recognition of the re
timed, open to refusal, to betrayal by th
emphasized, to the possibility that the O
respond. Thus the genuine appeal is a fre
The We-relation stands under the possib
to it, of failure; it is accompanied by
therefore it is constituted as a test, or
reason it is essentially subject to betray
as by myself.
Accordingly, to be open to the Other
the subjective meaning of his actions, is
as I "give him credit," at the outset and w
a person; that is, to be open to him is
him as himself. I must make it possible i
Other to become himself; what happens
But "care" is here no easy matter. To
once to put myself freely at his disposa
and to expect from him a mutually conce
(which may or may not occur); and it is
way to give him, by my very making
(whether through an appeal or a response), the means of re
ing to this expectation. Holding myself open to the Other,
out to him the possibility for his own being open to me.
in this sense, is precisely a creative reciprocity in which,
"tuning in" to the Other, and his to me, I in some way m
possible for him to respond freely to me: caring for him,
it possible for him to be able to care for me (and, dialectica
himself). I collaborate in his freedom, and he in mine, and
precisely through freedom that he is truly Other and
myself.
Thus it is not sufficient, in order to realize the "fullness" of
the We-relation, that I actively refrain from typifying my fellow-
man's behavior and attempt to reach his subjective meaning, that
I refrain from pre-judging and pre-interpreting him. More funda-
mentally, his action must be allowed to take its own shape, to be
expressed as such. The Other must make it possible for me
to respond, and I must make it possible in advance for him to
appeal, by my very being open to him. This "must" expresses
the condition without which the We-relation could not arise:
"being open to," or availability. By "giving credit to," or "keep-
ing faith with," the Other, as a Thou, a genuinely creative reci-
procity becomes possible. This "mutual tuning-in relation," then,
whose fundamental stratum is the interlocking of time dimen-
sions, becomes an interlocking of mutually recognizing actions,
that is, a mutual tuning-in of reciprocal concern: love.
The dialectical nature of this We-relation is, of course, more
complicated than has here been indicated. These few remarks
may serve to point out, however, the direction in which our two
concluding questions can be answered, within the spirit, if not
the letter, of Schutz's work. In the dialectics of appeal and re-
sponse (of care), the mutual interlocking behavior of two conso-
ciates in a face-to-face relation becomes a genuinely interlocking
mode of conduct. It becomes, that is, a genuine mutual tuning-in
relationship whereby "We," you and I, grow older together by
caring what becomes of each other.

Theory of Intersubjectivity Alfred Schutz

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Theory of Intersubjectivity Alfred Schutz

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Theory of Intersubjectivity Alfred Schutz

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

THEORY OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY: ALFRED SCHUTZ

Author(s): RICHARD M. ZANER

A N his many writings Alfred Schutz conceived his w

In order to grasp the significance of intersubjectivity as an "intra-

What has been described thus far as the "paramount" reality is

cation, as will be clear shortly, presuppo

« See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, translated by Dorion Cairns (The

take to be his organism; as a

The "mutual tuning-in" relation,

As a consequence of this foundation relation it becomes possible

thinking; that his stream of thoughts s

On the ground of the mutual tuning-in relationship all other

and its system of relevances acc

However, these theses, and especially the general thesis of which

It is clear from what has preceded that the reciprocal interlocking

subjectivity. Since intersubjecti

course of my life). In this event it is

mental condition for my understanding o

You might also like