DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA

AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Pe oners,

vs.
Case Name HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro, Respondent.
GR No . & Date G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005 Ponente CORONA, J.
Topic Period of Appeal
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford li gants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it prac cal to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
Doctrine
file the no ce of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a mo on for a new trial or mo on for reconsidera on.
Laws Rule 41, Sec on 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
The Neypes v. Court of Appeals case introduces the "fresh period rule," allowing a new 15-day
Case Summary period to file an appeal from the denial of a mo on for new trial or reconsidera on, standardizing
appeal periods and ensuring li gants a fair opportunity to appeal their cases

Facts:

 Pe oners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faus no, Rogelio Faus no, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania, and Domingo
Cabacungan filed an ac on for annulment of judgment and tles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion
with preliminary injunc on against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the
Philippines, and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.
 The case was ini ated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro.
 Pe oners filed a mo on to declare the respondent heirs and government agencies in default, while the
respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines filed mo ons to dismiss.
 On May 16, 1997, the RTC granted the mo on to declare the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
Development in default but denied it against the respondent heirs due to improper service of summons.
 Mo ons to dismiss from the Land Bank and the respondent heirs were denied.
 The respondent heirs filed a mo on for reconsidera on, leading to the RTC dismissing the pe oners'
complaint on the ground of prescrip on on February 12, 1998.
 Pe oners received the dismissal order on March 3, 1998, and filed a mo on for reconsidera on on March 18,
1998, which was denied on July 1, 1998.
 Pe oners subsequently filed a no ce of appeal on July 27, 1998, and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
 The RTC denied the no ce of appeal as being filed late, and the pe oners' mo on for reconsidera on was
also denied.
 Pe oners filed a pe on for cer orari and mandamus under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA), which
dismissed the pe on on September 16, 1999.
 The CA ruled that the appeal period should have been counted from the receipt of the February 12, 1998 order.
 The CA denied the pe oners' mo on for reconsidera on on January 6, 2000.
 Pe oners brought the case to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
Issue:

 Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the pe oners' pe on for cer orari and mandamus and in affirming
the RTC's order dismissing the pe oners' appeal?
 Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the pe oners' appeal was filed out of me?
 Did the Court of Appeals err in interpre ng the term "final order" in Sec on 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure?

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court granted the pe on and reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
 The Supreme Court ruled that the pe oners' appeal was filed within the reglementary period.
 The Supreme Court held that the "final order" referred to the order denying the mo on for reconsidera on.

Ra o:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised in accordance
with the provisions of law. The period to appeal is fixed by statute and procedural rules, and the appeal should be taken
within 15 days from the no ce of judgment or final order. The Court clarified that a final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do. The Court cited the cases of Quelnan v. VHF
Philippines, Inc. and Apuyan v. Haldeman to support the view that the order denying a mo on for reconsidera on
cons tutes the final order. The Court introduced the "fresh period rule," allowing a new 15-day period to file a no ce
of appeal from the denial of a mo on for new trial or reconsidera on, to standardize appeal periods and ensure
li gants a fair opportunity to appeal. The Court held that the pe oners seasonably filed their no ce of appeal within
the fresh period of 15 days from the receipt of the order denying their mo on for reconsidera on. This new rule aims
to regiment the appeal period uniformly and to minimize confusion regarding the start of the appeal period. The Court
concluded that the pe oners' no ce of appeal was filed on me and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.

Timeline:

Year Date Event Key Details

Trial court resolves mo ons filed by pe oners and

1997 May 16 Order by Trial Court
respondents.

Trial court dismisses pe oners' complaint on the ground

1998 Feb 12 Order by Trial Court
of prescrip on.

1998 Jul 1 Order by Trial Court Trial court denies pe oners' mo on for reconsidera on.

Pe oners receive copy of the order denying their mo on

1998 Jul 22 Receipt of Order
for reconsidera on.

1998 Jul 27 Filing of No ce of Appeal Pe oners file no ce of appeal.

1998 Aug 3 Payment of Appeal Fees Appeal fees paid by pe oners.

1998 Sep 3 Denial of No ce of Appeal Court denies the no ce of appeal as filed late.

1999 Sep 16 Dismissal by Court of Appeals Court of Appeals dismisses pe on to appeal.

Denial of Mo on for Court of Appeals denies pe oners' mo on for

2000 Jan 6
Reconsidera on reconsidera on.

Supreme Court introduces "fresh period rule" for filing a

2005 Sep 14 Neypes v. Court of Appeals
no ce of appeal.

DETAILED DIGEST

FACTS:

 Pe oners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faus no, Rogelio Faus no, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo
Cabacungan filed an ac on for annulment of judgment and tles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunc on before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of
Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
 In the course of the proceedings, the par es (both pe oners and respondents) filed various mo ons with the
trial court. Among these were: (1) the mo on filed by pe oners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau
of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the mo ons to dismiss filed by the
respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respec vely.
  In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales,
resolved the foregoing mo ons as follows: (1) the pe oners’ mo on to declare respondents Bureau of Lands
and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as
against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the subs tuted service of summons on them was
improper; (2) the Land Bank’s mo on to dismiss for lack of cause of ac on was denied because there were
hypothe cal admissions and ma ers that could be determined only a er trial, and (3) the mo on to dismiss
filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescrip on, was also denied because there were factual
ma ers that could be determined only a er trial.1
 The respondent heirs filed a mo on for reconsidera on of the order denying their mo on to dismiss on the
ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescrip on from the bare allega ons of the
complaint itself without wai ng for the trial proper.
 In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed pe oners’ complaint on the ground that the
ac on had already prescribed. Pe oners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,
1998 and, on the 15th day therea er or on March 18, 1998, filed a mo on for reconsidera on.
 On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the mo on for reconsidera on3 which
pe oners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, pe oners filed a no ce of appeal4 and
paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
 On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the no ce of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.5 This
was received by pe oners on July 31, 1998. Pe oners filed a mo on for reconsidera on but this too was
denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.6
 Via a pe on for cer orari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, pe oners
assailed the dismissal of the no ce of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

Pe oner’s Argument:

 In the appellate court, pe oners claimed that they had seasonably filed their no ce of appeal. They argued
that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying their mo on for reconsidera on. When they filed their no ce
of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for
appeal.7

Court of Appeals – Dismissed the Pe on

 On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the pe on. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under
the Rules.
 Pe oners filed a mo on for reconsidera on of the aforemen oned decision. This was denied by the Court of
Appeals on January 6, 2000.
 In this present pe on for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, pe oners ascribe the following errors allegedly
commi ed by the appellate court:

ISSUE/S:

 WON the CA is correct in ruling and affirming the decision or order of the respondent Hon. Antonio M. Rosales
that pe oners’ appeal was filed out of me when pe oners received the last or final order of the court on
July 22, 1998 and filed their no ce of appeal on July 27, 1998 and paid the appeal docket fee on August 3,
1998. – NO.
 WON the CA is correct in ruling that the words "final order" in Sec on 3, Rule 41, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure will refer to the [first] order of respondent judge Hon. Antonio m. Morales dated February 12, 1998
instead of the last and final order dated July 1, 1998 copy of which was received by pe oners through counsel
on July 22, 1998. - NO

RULING:
 The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to
avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so o en leads to the
loss of the right to appeal.10 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,11 as
amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolu ons, awards, judgments, or decisions of
any court in all these cases shall be fi een (15) days counted from the no ce of the final order, resolu on,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the no ce of judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Sec on 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fi een (15) days from the no ce of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
no ce of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the no ce of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a mely mo on for new trial or reconsidera on. No mo on for
extension of me to file a mo on for new trial or reconsidera on shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

 Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the no ce of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the
court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudica on on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obliga ons of the par es are; or it may be an order or
judgment that dismisses an ac on.12
 As already men oned, pe oners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their mo on for reconsidera on
should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint.
Since they received their copy of the denial of their mo on for reconsidera on only on July 22, 1998, the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their no ce of appeal on July 27, 1998.
 What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998
order dismissing the MR?
 In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial court declared pe oner Quelnan non-suited
and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus mo on
to set it aside. When the omnibus mo on was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this me dismissing his omnibus mo on. He then filed his no ce
of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of me.
 The court a quo ruled that pe oner should have appealed within 15 days a er the dismissal of his
complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court
and declared that it was the denial of the mo on for reconsidera on of an order of dismissal of a complaint
which cons tuted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.
 This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.14 where we again
considered the order denying pe oner Apuyan’s mo on for reconsidera on as the final order which finally
disposed of the issues involved in the case.
 Based on the aforemen oned cases, we sustain pe oners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying
their mo on for reconsidera on was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
 We now come to the next ques on: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal,
did pe oners in fact file their no ce of appeal on me?
 Under Rule 41, Sec on 3, pe oners had 15 days from no ce of judgment or final order to appeal the decision
of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), pe oners did not file a
no ce of appeal but instead opted to file a mo on for reconsidera on. According to the trial court, the MR
only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.15 It ruled that pe oners, having filed their MR on
the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day le to file the no ce of appeal
upon receipt of the no ce of denial of their MR. Pe oners, however, argue that they were en tled under the
Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their mo on for
reconsidera on.
 In Quelnan and Apuyan, both pe oners filed a mo on for reconsidera on of the decision of the trial court.
We ruled there that they only had the remaining me of the 15-day appeal period to file the no ce of appeal.
We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,16 premised on the long-se led doctrine that the perfec on
of an appeal in the manner and within the period permi ed by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdic onal.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated considera ons of public policy and sound prac ce
that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite me
fixed by law.18
 Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Sec on 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the
trial court within thirty (30) days from no ce of order or judgment, a no ce of appeal, an appeal bond, and
a record on appeal. The me during which a mo on to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has
been pending shall be deducted, unless such mo on fails to sa sfy the requirements of Rule 37.

But where such mo on has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the
appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing received no ce of the
denial of said mo on.19 (emphasis supplied)

 According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however,
reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the delibera ons of the Commi ee on Judicial Reorganiza on20 that
dra ed BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of appeal21 and enhance
the efficiency and dispensa on of jus ce. We have since required strict observance of this reglementary period
of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of no ces of appeal,22 and only in very excep onal instances
to be er serve the ends of jus ce.
 In Na onal Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan,23 however, we
declared that appeal is an essen al part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied
rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cau ous about not depriving a party of the
right to appeal and that every party li gant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just disposi on of his cause, free from the constraint of technicali es.
 In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require li gants to do certain acts
must be followed unless, under excep onal circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused
on grounds of substan al jus ce. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong
considera ons of fairness and jus ce.
 In se ng aside technical infirmi es and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious
to or unmindful of the extraordinary situa ons that merit liberal applica on of the Rules. In those situa ons
where technicali es were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effec vity
of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not
stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injus ce. Our
judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement
of procedural laws and the guarantee that every li gant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper
disposi on of his cause.25
 The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.26 It has the sole preroga ve to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposi on
of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, par cularly Rules 42,27 4328 and
45,29 the Court allows extensions of me, based on jus fiable and compelling reasons, for par es to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
 To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford li gants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it prac cal to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the no ce of appeal
in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a mo on for a new trial or mo on for
reconsidera on. 30
 Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on pe ons for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by cer orari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
 period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the mo on for new trial, mo on for
reconsidera on (whether full or par al) or any final order or resolu on.
 We thus hold that pe oners seasonably filed their no ce of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of no ce denying their mo on for reconsidera on). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Sec on 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from no ce of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunc ve word
"or" signifies disassocia on and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the no ce
of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the no ce of judgment or within 15 days from no ce of the "final
order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the mo on for a new trial or
reconsidera on.
 Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Sec on 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period
from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposi on of cases
 In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should
be counted – from receipt of no ce of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of no ce of "final order"
appealed from (July 22, 1998).
 To recapitulate, a party li gant may either file his no ce of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his mo on
for new trial or mo on for reconsidera on. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
mo on is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory a er the lapse of the original appeal
period provided in Rule 41, Sec on 3.
 Pe oners here filed their no ce of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their
mo on for reconsidera on on July 22, 1998. Hence, the no ce of appeal was well within the fresh appeal
period of 15 days, as already discussed.34
 WHEREFORE, the pe on is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.