5 - Money and Banking
5 - Money and Banking
5 - Money and Banking
OVERVIEW
This chapter:
• points out that credit-money creation is demand-led and that the main-
stream supply-determined perspective on bank lending is erroneous
and leads to misguided policies such as the quantitative easing policies
implemented in many countries during and after the global financial
crisis of 2007–08 and during the COVID-19 crisis of 2020–21.
KEYWORDS
conceived and designed the wheels of a cart to make it easier to move goods
and reduce transport costs as individuals sought to trade their commodity
surpluses more efficiently, according to this view, so was money invented
in order to grease the wheels of commerce and to engage with less effort in
commodity exchange.
On the basis of this mainstream narrative on the origin of money and mon-
etary exchange that is told repeatedly in economics textbooks, there is often
also associated the tale of how banks, as particular institutions arising from
this profit-seeking behaviour of individual economic agents, first made their
appearance, and whose history is intertwined with that of money.
Ostensibly, the only constraint on this multiple expansion of bank money envis-
aged within this traditional framework was the desire by profit-seeking banks
to hold idle reserves of this commodity money in their vaults exclusively for
precautionary purposes, and the desire on the part of the public to hold some
cash for day-to-day transactions purposes. Moreover, this leveraged banking
system could only function as long as only a small portion of depositors with-
drew their funds regularly and predictably for transactions needs. Otherwise,
if depositors collectively sought to withdraw their gold all at once, as in times
of financial panic, this banking ‘house of cards’ would collapse. There would
just not be enough ‘hard money’ in the system, owing to the fact that the total
money supply (that is, the coins in circulation and bank deposits) would actu-
ally be some multiple of the initial commodity money that had originally been
In this traditional story, while banks can create bank money as some multiple
of the initial commodity money that was originally deposited in the gold-
smiths’ vaults and that is re-lent over and over through a circulatory process
of deposit/loan expansion, banking institutions are conceived merely as
depositories or storehouses of some pre-existing money that was deposited,
say, for safekeeping (Realfonzo, 1998). Regardless of whether this particular
tale of banking (resting on either commodity money or surrogates of such
commodity money, such as central bank notes) may or may not reflect actual
historical reality, this particular perspective on banks as storehouses, whose
principal function is that of profit-maximizing intermediation between
savers and investors, has changed little in modern times. Instead of resulting
from the depositing of precious metals nowadays, we are told that it results
from the depositing of exogenous base money initially created and issued
by the central bank, which, through bank lending and subsequent deposit
creation, leads to a multiple expansion of the money supply; a relation some-
times described as the base money multiplier. Mainstream theorists would
argue, therefore, that ‘deposits make loans’. Banks are conceived as passive
deposit takers that serve the useful function of intermediaries, namely private
institutions whose purpose was to transfer depositors’ money (supplied by
households that save) to creditworthy borrowers who would use those liquid
funds for investment (traditionally business firms seeking credit advances).
This is depicted in Figure 5.1, with investment being determined by the rate
of interest in the market for loanable funds.
Income Flow
HOUSEHOLDS FIRMS
Deposits BANKS Loans
(SAVING) (INVESTMENT)
Figure 5.1 The mainstream conception of banks as intermediaries between savers and
investors
was an abstract social unit, which was sanctioned by the legal apparatus of
the state, and which would then become the means to discharge liability in a
creditor–debtor relation. From this, it would ensue that money was not just
a particular commodity with some special characteristic feature to facilitate
exchange in the context of a natural, previously organized barter exchange
system. Instead, the heterodox view suggests that money, as a means of can-
celling debt, probably pre-dated organized market exchange itself. Emerging
through the expenditures of the state, the legally sanctioned currency enter-
ing circulation eventually would not only assume the role of a means of
payment in extinguishing debt obligations, but also the role of medium of
exchange, and an evolving store of liquidity within organized markets.
Unlike the tale of goldsmith banking, this process of money creation is not
driven by some initial deposits entering the banking sector. If such were the
case, then where would the deposit first come from, unless it comes from
some outside source, such as a government? Within the private banking
sector, deposits can only appear when loans are made to either businesses
FIRMS HOUSEHOLDS
BANKS
Bank Deposits
Figure 5.2 The heterodox conception of banks as creators of credit money within the
framework of a rudimentary monetary circuit
FIRMS HOUSEHOLDS
BANKS
FINANCIAL
MARKETS
Bank Deposits
Figure 5.3 The heterodox conception of banks as creators of credit money with organized
financial markets
vis the banking sector. This is described by the arrows going from house-
holds choosing to save a portion of their incomes being channelled into the
financial markets, and firms simultaneously accessing these savings for final
finance.
The causality of this mainstream story is thus the following: depending on its
objectives, mainly concerned with a stable aggregate price level, the central
bank creates a certain amount of reserves. This then allows the creation of a
multiple amount of loans and deposits, the latter with the addition of bank-
notes, constituting the supply of money, which hopefully is in line with the
needs of the economy.
There are however countries where there are no reserve requirements; this
obviously makes the mainstream story rather questionable if not meaningless.
The creation of money must follow some other mechanism. It is the purpose
of the following subsections to examine this more realistic mechanism.
Suppose that an individual wishes to buy a new car worth $30 000 and needs
to borrow to do so. This person will need to show that they are creditworthy,
for instance, by showing that they have a regular income, that this income is
likely to be large enough to make the monthly payments, and that interest
and principal have been paid on previous loans (that is, the person has a good
credit record).
What happens next? As pointed out in our previous discussion, the loan
is created at the stroke of a pen, or rather by punching a couple of keys on
the banker’s computer. As the bank grants the loan, there is a simultaneous
creation of a bank deposit: money gets created. This is shown in Table 5.1,
which shows the changes in the balance sheet (the T-account) of the bank
of the borrower: the bank now has $30 000 more in loans on the assets side
Table 5.1 Changes in the balance sheet of a bank that grants a new loan
Assets Liabilities
Loan to car purchaser +$30 000 Deposit of car purchaser +$30 000
Table 5.2 Changes in bank balance sheets after the payment is made
Loan to car purchaser Debit position at Credit position at Deposit of car dealer
+$30 000 clearinghouse clearinghouse +$30 000
+$30 000 +$30 000
What then happens next? The individual obtained a car loan because they
wanted to buy a car. So the purchaser goes to the car dealer, most likely with a
certified cheque, and once all papers are signed, drives off with the car, while
the car dealer rushes to deposit the cheque in their bank account. Once this
is done and the cheque goes through the payments system, the new balance
sheets are shown in Table 5.2.
All banks are members of a payments and settlement system, either directly,
or indirectly in the case of small banks that use the account of a larger bank.
Indeed, their participation in the payments system is one of the key services
rendered by banks. As payments go through banks, bank deposits move from
one account to another. These payments are centralized at a clearinghouse,
which keeps the tabs, so to speak. As the cheque (in paper form or elec-
tronic form) clears the payments system and goes through the clearinghouse,
the $30 000 are taken away from the car purchaser and end up in the bank
account of the car dealer. However, now the bank of the car purchaser owes
$30 000 dollars to the clearinghouse, while the clearinghouse owes $30 000
to the bank of the car dealer, which is what Table 5.2 illustrates.
Table 5.3 Changes in bank balance sheets when banks lend to each other
Loan to car purchaser Loan taken from Loan to bank of car Deposit of car dealer
+$30 000 bank of car retailer purchaser +$30 000 +$30 000
+$30 000
As was the case with the loan to an individual, we see that the banking system
relies on trust and creditworthiness. Banks must have sufficient confidence
in other banks. When banks start lacking trust, the overnight market so
described, where banks in a daily surplus position at the clearinghouse lend
funds to banks that are in a negative position, will freeze and banks will
decline to lend to each other. This happened in Europe in August 2007, when
all financial institutions were scared to make overnight loans to German
banks, because of the failure of two German banks. Fears spread to the rest of
the world and overnight markets lost their fluidity elsewhere as well, as banks
became reluctant to lend large amounts to each other.
What then happens if the overnight market does not function properly or if,
for some reason, a bank in a negative position at the clearinghouse cannot
get an overnight loan from some other bank? Does the payment made to the
car dealer still go through? It will, and this is where the central bank plays its
role of lender of last resort. In this case, using again the two banks described
in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the central bank makes an overnight loan to the bank of
the car purchaser, thus allowing it to settle its position at the clearinghouse,
as shown in Table 5.4. And what happens to the bank of the car dealer? If it
declines to lend its surpluses at the clearinghouse, it has no other choice than
to deposit its surpluses in its account at the central bank. The deposits of
Table 5.4 Changes in the balance sheet of banks and the central bank when banks decline
to lend to each other
Loan to car purchaser Loan taken from the Deposit at the Deposit of car dealer
+$30 000 central bank +$30 000 central bank +$30 000
+$30 000
Central bank
Assets Liabilities
Advance to the bank of car purchaser Deposit of the bank of car dealer +$30 000
+$30 000
the bank of the dealer at the central bank are what mainstream authors call
reserves; central bankers now refer instead to clearing balances or settlement
balances. Table 5.4 also illustrates the fact that the size of the balance sheet
of the central bank will balloon any time overnight markets do not function
properly.
As noted previously, there are many possible set-ups for payments and set-
tlement systems. In the set-up assumed so far, unless the overnight market
collapses, all the activity occurs in the clearinghouse, which can be run by a
private entity, owned by the bankers’ association for instance. Another pos-
sible set-up, often assumed in textbooks and actually existing in several coun-
tries, is that clearing and settlement occurs on the books of the central bank.
In that case, payments can only go through, and hence settlement occurs, if
the bank making the payment – here the bank of the car purchaser – already
has deposits at the central bank (if it has reserves). Table 5.5 illustrates this
situation: the bank of the car purchaser sees its reserves at the central bank
diminished by $30 000, while those of the bank of the car dealer get aug-
mented by the same amount.
When an individual bank starts to run out of reserves, it will have to borrow
funds on the overnight market, thus borrowing the funds from banks that
have a surplus of reserves (this is the federal funds market in the United
States); or it might borrow the reserves from the central bank, as illustrated
in Table 5.4. Thus the role of the central bank is not to put limits on the
creation of reserves; its role is purely defensive: it needs to provide enough
Table 5.5 Changes in balance sheets when the central bank acts as the clearinghouse
Central bank
Assets Liabilities
Table 5.6 An open-market operation when the central bank wishes to increase the amount
of reserves or to compensate for a previous fall in reserves
However, there are other ways in which reserves are created (or destroyed).
As reflected in mainstream textbooks, reserves are created whenever the
central bank purchases assets from the private sector. Table 5.6 provides such
an example. It is assumed that the central bank purchases a government secu-
rity from the banking sector; for instance, a Treasury bill that had been issued
earlier by the government and bought by a bank. This transaction, whether
it is outright or whether the central bank promises to sell it back within a
period of time (in which case it is a repurchase agreement, a repo), leads to
the creation of new reserves for the banking sector. This type of transaction
is called an open-market operation. Of course, it can go the other way; for
instance, when the central bank sells the Treasury bills that it holds to the
private sector, in which case reserves are destroyed.
The central bank is usually the fiscal agent of the government. This means
that the central bank is empowered with the responsibility of selling the secu-
rities that the government issues when it borrows funds; it also means that
the central bank manages the cash balances of the government and, in par-
ticular, it implies that the government has an account at the central bank.
Consequently, any time there is an outgoing or incoming payment involving
the government deposit account at the central bank, there will be a creation
or a destruction of reserves (Box 5.1). Central bankers call these the ‘autono-
mous factors’ that affect the amount of reserves in the banking system.
Take the example of a civil servant receiving their monthly pay, assuming that
it comes out of the account of the government at the central bank. Table 5.7
illustrates this case: the bank account of the civil servant will now increase
by $5000. As the payment goes through the clearinghouse, and is settled, the
Box 5.1
government deposits at the central bank decline by $5000, while the reserves
of the bank of the civil servant increase by $5000. Thus, when the govern-
ment makes a payment to the private sector, through its account at the central
bank, this creates reserves. Things go in reverse gear if the civil servant has to
pay their income taxes; say, at the rate of 40 per cent. The deposits of the civil
servant will fall by $2000 and, if the proceeds are deposited in the account of
the government at the central bank, the reserves of the banking system will
be reduced by $2000 (Wray, 2012, Ch. 3).
Box 5.2
The lesson to be drawn here is that commercial banks are the institutions
that grant loans and create money ex nihilo. There is no constraint on how
much can be created, with one exception. A banker must keep the trust and
confidence of depositors and of fellow bankers, and so must make sure that
the number of ‘non-performing loans’ – loans on which borrowers default,
thus creating losses for the bank – is minimized, to avoid the arising of sus-
picion. Commercial banks do not need central bank reserves to grant loans.
On the contrary, the role of the central bank is to make sure that there is the
right amount of reserves in the banking system, to ensure that the payments
system is running smoothly. The central bank will react to changes in the
‘autonomous factors’ affecting reserves, which we discussed above either by
pursuing open-market operations or by providing advances to the banking
sector. To sum up, we may say that the supply of money is endogenous,
responding to the demand of the economy, and that the supply of reserves is
also endogenous, responding to the needs of the payments system (Box 5.2).
Concluding remarks
The heterodox view of money and banking stands on its head much of
the mainstream theorizing on the role of money and banks that still reign
supreme in popular textbooks. Money is not a commodity that is dropped
NOTE
1 The ‘real bills’ doctrine rested on the belief that prudent banking practices required that commercial banks
engage only in short-term lending, in the sense that banks would discount commercial bills or promissory
notes on the basis of collateral representing ‘real’ goods engaged in the production process. This essentially
meant that commercial banks should passively accommodate the ‘needs of trade’ by financing the short-
term circulating capital requirement, such as the wage bill, and not finance the purchases of fixed capital
assets. For further discussion, see Humphrey (1982).
REFERENCES
Graziani, A. (2003), The Monetary Theory of Production, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Humphrey, T.M. (1982), ‘The real bills doctrine’, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic
Review, 68 (5), 3–13.
Jakab, Z. and M. Kumhof (2015), ‘Banks are not intermediaries of loanable funds – and why this
matters’, Bank of England Working Paper, No. 529.
Parguez, A. (1975), Monnaie et macroéconomie: théorie de la monnaie en déséquilibre, Paris:
Economica.
Parguez, A. and M. Seccareccia (2000), ‘The credit theory of money: the monetary circuit
approach’, in J. Smithin (ed.), What is Money?, London, UK and New York, USA: Routledge,
pp. 101–23.
Peacock, M. (2013), Introducing Money, London, UK and New York, USA: Routledge.
Realfonzo, R. (1998), Money and Banking: Theory and Debate (1900–1940), Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Rochon, L.-P. and M. Seccareccia (eds) (2013), Monetary Economies of Production: Banking and
Financial Circuits and the Role of the State, Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, USA:
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Smith, A. (1776/1937), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, New York:
Modern Library.
Wray, L.R. (2012), Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary
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? EXAM QUESTIONS
7. As happened during the global financial crisis, many commercial banks facing a negative posi-
tion in the clearing system were unable to obtain an overnight loan from other banks which
found themselves in a surplus position because of the fear of bank insolvencies. What could
banks mostly likely do if they find themselves in a negative position?
a) They could pretend that nothing has happened and announce that their books are bal-
anced in the hope that the bank supervisory authorities do not recognize their balance
sheet problem.
b) They could sell some of their assets to the public.
c) The could declare bankruptcy and merge with banks in a positive settlement position.
d) They could borrow directly at the discount window of the central bank.
8. It has been shown that, while the total reserves within the banking sector remain unaffected
by the volume of transactions within the private sector, the overall amount of reserves in the
banking system adjusts only when transactions are with the public sector. In particular, total
bank reserves go up:
a) when the central government cuts various taxes and service charges, without cutting pro-
portionally its overall spending;
b) when the central bank buys government securities in the financial markets as occurred
under quantitative easing (QE) interventions;
c) when the government transfers some of its deposits from its account at the central bank to
a commercial bank;
d) if any of the above occur.
9. What happens to the balance sheets of the banks and of the central bank when households
pay their income taxes by drawing on their bank deposits?
a) Deposits of households at banks go up, but the deposits of banks at the central bank go
down.
b) Deposits of households at banks go down, but the deposits of banks at the central bank go
up.
c) Both the deposits of households at banks and those of banks at the central bank go down.
d) Both the deposits of households at banks and those of banks at the central bank go up.
10. Following the global financial crisis of 2007–08, a number of central banks implemented a
policy of quantitative easing (QE) to encourage bank lending and re-establish private spend-
ing by flooding the banking sector with excess reserves.
a) The effect was to reduce interest rates dramatically and stabilize asset prices, thereby
leading to high economic growth.
b) The effect was to bring down the interest rate on the overnight interbank funds market to
its lowest possible level, but its effect on bank lending and economic growth was marginal.
c) The massive rise in bank reserves directly stimulated bank lending and, therefore, pre-
vented a drop in private spending.
d) Since fiscal policy was seen as an ineffective tool and counterproductive because it would
push interest rates up, policy-makers had no other choice but to opt for QE to stimulate
private spending.