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    Sarmiento v. Mison

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    Patricia Nicole Uy

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    Sarmiento v. Mison

    Uploaded by

    Patricia Nicole Uy
    4 views2 pages

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    4 views2 pages

    Sarmiento v. Mison

    Uploaded by

    Patricia Nicole Uy

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 2

    Sarmiento v.

    Mison,
    G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla

    FACTS:
    The petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
    and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from
    performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
    respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
    disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
    appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
    having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other
    hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation
    of the Commission on Appointments.

    ISSUES:
    1) What are the groups of officers whom the President shall appoint?
    2) W/N confirmation of the appointments of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by
    the Commission on Appointments required.

    RULING:
    It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are
    four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we
    will hereafter refer from time to time, are:

    First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
    officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
    appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

    Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
    by law;

    Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;


    Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
    President alone.

    The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
    Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is
    confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

    The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they
    be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
    Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
    express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
    appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation)
    of the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of
    constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the
    1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention
    of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments
    by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation)
    of the Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice
    J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:

    In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be
    presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing
    laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a
    constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its
    provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption."
    (Barry vs. Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.)

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