REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1119-1120 OF 2016

[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 6754-55 of 2014]

MUKARRAB ETC. APPELLANTS

Versus
STATE OF U.P. RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

R. BANUMATHI, J.

The present appeals by special leave impugn the judgment dated 27.05.2014

passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby the appeal filed by

the appellants herein was dismissed affirming their conviction under Section 302 IPC

read with Section 149 and Section 148 IPC and also sentence of imprisonment for

life under Section 302 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years under Section

148 IPC.

2. Totally six accused including the appellants herein were convicted. The

Special Leave Petitions preferred by the other accused namely Babban, Moazzam,

Jahangir and Jamil were dismissed by this Court at the admission stage itself on

12.09.2014. Since the appellants Mukarrab and Arshad had raised the claim of

juvenility before this Court, notice was issued qua these accused to examine their

claim that they are juveniles in conflict with law under Section 7A of the Juvenile

Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

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3. Case of the prosecution is that on 22.03.1994, present appellants, Mukarrab

and Arshad alongwith four others viz. Babban, Moazzam, Jahangir and Jamil had a

quarrel with the deceased, Azamul Haq while he was coming back to his house from

the market at around 5.30 p.m., the accused persons abused the deceased on the

pretext that he was causing obstruction in Mangal Bazaar. Deceased tried to escape

from the clutches of the appellants and other accused; but he was caught and

attacked by tamanchas/guns and knives and killed. The occurrence was witnessed

by five eye witnesses who were coming behind the deceased.

4. The accused Moazzam, Jahangir, Jamil, Mukarrab (appellant), Babban and

Arshad (appellant), were charge-sheeted under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 IPC

and the case was committed to the Court of Session. Trial was conducted and a

number of witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution as well as the

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defence. Vide judgment and order dated 16.09.1995 passed by the VIII Additional

District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad in Session Trial No. 484 of 1994, all the

accused were convicted under Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC and

Section 148 IPC and sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC and

rigorous imprisonment for two years under Section 148 IPC was imposed. All the

sentences were to run concurrently. The accused challenged their conviction and

sentence imposed on them by filing three separate appeals before the High Court.

The High Court disposed of all the three appeals vide common judgment and order

dated 27.05.2014, thereby affirming the conviction of the accused persons and

sentence imposed thereof.

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5. The above judgment and order dated 27.05.2014 was challenged by filing

special leave petition before this Court. Appellants Mukarrab and Arshad for the very

first time raised the claim of juvenility before this Court. This Court vide order dated

12.09.2014 issued notice qua present appellants only viz. accused-Mukarrab and

accused-Arshad, only with regard to their claim that they are minors under Section

7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The trial court

which had conducted the trial was directed to examine the aspect of juvenility of the

present appellants and submit a report. As noted earlier, the special leave petitions

qua other accused were dismissed.

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6. VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad conducted an

inquiry and recorded his findings in a report dated 28.10.2014. The learned Judge

concluded that in all probabilities on the date of occurrence, accused-Mukarrab

could not have been younger than 22 years 2 months 21 days and accused-Arshad,

than 19 years 2 months 21 days on the date of the incident, thereby negatived the

claim of juvenility raised by the two accused-appellants. However, on perusal of the

above report dated 28.10.2014 as well as the objections filed thereagainst, certain

doubts were raised concerning the genuineness of the report. Accordingly, vide

order dated 06.04.2016, this Court observing that there is no document from which

date of birth of the appellants could be ascertained, directed ossification test to be

conducted, so as to ascertain the age of the appellants.

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7. Accused-Mukarrab and accused-Arshad who were lodged in Mathura and

Hardoi jails respectively in U.P. were produced before the Medical Board constituted

at the All India Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS), New Delhi on 02.05.2016 for

medical examination (ossification test for ascertaining bone age). Medical Board

constituted at AIIMS, New Delhi in its report dated 05.05.2016, opined that the age

of both the accused ranges between 35-40 years on the date of the examination.

8. The short question falling for consideration in these appeals is that whether

the appellants Mukarrab and Arshad were juveniles on the date of the occurrence

and the question of admissibility and reliability of medical opinion in age

determination under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000

vis-à-vis juvenility of the accused at the time of committing the offences.

9. We have heard the parties before us and have perused the materials and the

medical report available on record.

10. Age determination is essential to find out whether or not the person claiming

to be a child is below the cut-off age prescribed for application of the Juvenile

Justice Act. The issue of age determination is of utmost importance as very few

children subjected to the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act have a birth

certificate. As juvenile in conflict with law usually do not have any documentary

evidence, age determination, cannot be easily ascertained, specially in borderline

cases. Medical examination leaves a margin of about two years on either side even

if ossification test of multiple joints is conducted.

11. Time and again, the questions arise: How to determine age in the absence of

birth certificate? Should documentary evidence be preferred over medical evidence?

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How to use the medical evidence? Is the standard of proof, a proof beyond

reasonable doubt or can the age be determined by preponderance of evidence?

Should the person whose age cannot be determined exactly, be given the benefit of

doubt and be treated as a child? In the absence of a birth certificate issued soon

after birth by the concerned authority, determination of age becomes a very difficult

task providing a lot of discretion to the Judges to pick and choose evidence. In

different cases, different evidence has been used to determine the age of the

accused.

12. This Court in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488, clarified that the

review of judicial opinion shows that the Court should not take a hyper-technical

approach while appreciating evidence for determination of age of the accused. If two

views are possible, the Court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a

juvenile in borderline cases. This approach was further reiterated by this Court in

Rajindra Chandra v. State of Chhatisgarh and Another (2002) 2 SCC 287, in

which it laid down that the standard of proof for age determination is the degree of

probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

13. It is noteworthy that the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,

2000 does not lay down any fixed criteria for determining the age of the person.

Section 49(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000

provides for presumption and determination of age as under:-

“49. Presumption and determination of age.—(1) Where it appears to a

competent authority that person brought before it under any of the provisions
of this Act (otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a juvenile or
the child, the competent authority shall make due inquiry so as to the age of
that person and for that purpose shall take such evidence as may be
necessary (but not an affidavit) and shall record a finding whether the person
is a juvenile or the child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be.”

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From a reading of the above provision, it is clear that it provides that when it appears

to the competent authority namely, the Board that the person brought before it is a

juvenile, the Board is obliged to make it clear as to the age of that person and for

that purpose the Board shall take such evidence as may be necessary and then

record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as

nearly as may be.

14. Under Rule 12, the Board is enjoined to take evidence for determination of

age. Rule 12 is as under:-

“12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age: ―

(1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court
or the Board or as the case may be the
Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of
such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty
days from the date of making of the application for that purpose.
(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide
the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the
juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance
or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail.
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age
determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the
case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining –
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the
absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first
attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or
a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the
medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will
declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age
cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee,
for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give
benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within
the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration
such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion,

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 as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the
evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence
whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such
child or the juvenile in conflict with law.
(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to
be below 18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive
proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the
Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the
status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a
copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned.
(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in
terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry
shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the
certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule.
(6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off
cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance
with the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation
of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the
juvenile in conflict with law.”

15. Summarizing the legal position as to the claim of juvenility and observing that

such plea can be raised at any stage and after referring to various decisions,

three-Judges Bench of this Court in Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain v. State

of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489 held as under:-

“39. Now, we summarise the position which is as under:

39.1. A claim of juvenility may be raised at any stage even after the final
disposal of the case. It may be raised for the first time before this Court as well
after the final disposal of the case. The delay in raising the claim of juvenility
cannot be a ground for rejection of such claim. The claim of juvenility can be
raised in appeal even if not pressed before the trial court and can be raised for
the first time before this Court though not pressed before the trial court and in
the appeal court.
39.2. For making a claim with regard to juvenility after conviction, the claimant
must produce some material which may prima facie satisfy the court that an
inquiry into the claim of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to be
discharged by the person who claims juvenility.
39.3. As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the court and/or are
sufficient for discharging the initial burden cannot be catalogued nor can it be
laid down as to what weight should be given to a specific piece of evidence
which may be sufficient to raise presumption of juvenility but the documents
referred to in Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall definitely be sufficient for prima facie
satisfaction of the court about the age of the delinquent necessitating further
enquiry under Rule 12. The statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code

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 is too tentative and may not by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject
the claim of juvenility. The credibility and/or acceptability of the documents like
the school leaving certificate or the voters’ list, etc. obtained after conviction
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no
hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed that they must be prima facie accepted or
rejected. In Akbar Sheikh (2009) 7 SCC 415 and Pawan (2009) 15 SCC 259
these documents were not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra Singh
(2010) 13 SCC 523 the documents viz. school leaving certificate, marksheet
and the medical report were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry and
verification of the appellant’s age. If such documents prima facie inspire
confidence of the court, the court may act upon such documents for the
purposes of Section 7-A and order an enquiry for determination of the age of
the delinquent.
39.4. An affidavit of the claimant or any of the parents or a sibling or a relative
in support of the claim of juvenility raised for the first time in appeal or revision
or before this Court during the pendency of the matter or after disposal of the
case shall not be sufficient justifying an enquiry to determine the age of such
person unless the circumstances of the case are so glaring that satisfy the
judicial conscience of the court to order an enquiry into determination of the
age of the delinquent.
39.5. The court where the plea of juvenility is raised for the first time should
always be guided by the objectives of the 2000 Act and be alive to the position
that the beneficent and salutary provisions contained in the 2000 Act are not
defeated by the hypertechnical approach and the persons who are entitled to
get benefits of the 2000 Act get such benefits. The courts should not be
unnecessarily influenced by any general impression that in schools the
parents/guardians understate the age of their wards by one or two years for
future benefits or that age determination by medical examination is not very
precise. The matter should be considered prima facie on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability.
39.6. Claim of juvenility lacking in credibility or frivolous claim of juvenility or
patently absurd or inherently improbable claim of juvenility must be rejected by
the court at the threshold whenever raised.”

16. In the present case, the appellants by filing applications under Section

7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 read with

Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007 have claimed that at the time of

committing the offences they were juvenile i.e. below the age of 18 years.

Appellant-Mukarrab has claimed that he was born on 01.07.1978 and thus, on

the date of the incident i.e. 22.03.1994, he was a child aged 15 years 8 months

22 days. Likewise, appellant-Arshad has claimed that he was born on

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05.02.1979 and thus on the date of the incident i.e. 22.03.1994, he was a child

aged 15 years 1 month 17 days. Appellants did not raise the plea of juvenility

before any of the previous fora; it is only before this Court that they have raised

the plea of juvenility.

17. As already noted, by an order dated 18.02.2016, this Court had directed the

concerned District and Sessions Judge to conduct an inquiry and submit a report as

to the age of the appellants (Mukarrab and Arshad). As per the report submitted by

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the VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad both the appellants

(Mukarrab and Arshad) were major on the date of the incident. After perusing the

report of the District Judge, by order dated 06.04.2016, this Court has directed

medical examination of the appellants (Mukarrab and Arshad) to be conducted by a

duly constituted Medical Board of the AIIMS, New Delhi. Accordingly, the doctors of

AIIMS have examined the appellants (Mukarrab and Arshad) and given their opinion

as under:-

“Alleged history in Brief: On perusal of the documents submitted to AIIMS, it

was revealed that the year of commission of crime was 1994 i.e. 22 years
before today i.e. 02.05.2016.
The said accused Mukarrab alleged his date of birth to be 1st July, 1978.
The said accused Arshad has submitted the documentary proof of his age
stating date of Birth as 5th February, 1979.
Examination Proceedings: Both the accused were examined after taking due
informed consent along with signature and left thumb impression.
.....
Their physical, dental and radiological examinations were carried out. X-ray
examination of Skull (AP and lateral view), Sternum (AP and lateral view) and
Sacrum (lateral view) were advised and performed. There was no indication for
Dental X-rays since both accused were much beyond 25 years of age in any
case.

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 Physical and Dental Examination: In both cases, general physical
examination findings are consistent with findings of normal adult male. Dental
examination shows presence of complete 8 sets of permanent teeth in all 4
quadrants.

Report of Radiological Examination-

A. Mukarrab
1. Medical end of clavicle fused-age>more than 22 years
2. Xiphoid process not fused with sternal body-age<40 years
3. Manubrium not fused with sternal body-age<50 years
4. Complete fusion of sacral bodies-age>32 years
5. Saggital suture obliterated in posterior 1/3 rd and coronal suture obliterated in lower
½-age<40 years.

B. Arshad
1. Medical end of clavicle fused-age>more than 22 years
2. Xiphoid process not fused with sternal body-age<40 years
3. Manubrium not fused with sternal body-age<50 years
4. Complete fusion of sacral bodies-age>32 years
5. Saggital suture obliterated in posterior 1/3 rd and coronal suture intact-age<40 years.

Opinion: Both accused have been brought for examination at AIIMS on

02.05.2016, 22 years after the alleged date of incidence. After going through
the various findings of physical, dental and radiological examinations; medical
board is of considered opinion that the age of accused viz. Mukarrab s/o Mr.
Mulla Zafar as well as Arshad s/o Rashid is between 35-40 years on the date
of examination i.e. 02.05.2016.

18. The question falling for consideration is whether the opinion of the Medical

Board of AIIMS determining the age of the appellants between 35-40 years, can be

accepted or not.

19. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that the general rule

about age determination is that the age determined by the Medical Board vary plus

or minus two years but the Medical Board in this case had fixed the age of the

appellants at 35-40 years and going by the general rule, the age of the appellants is

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to be estimated as 38 years on the date of medical examination and giving

additional benefit of one year in lowering the age in terms of Rule 12(3)(b), age of

the appellants is to be determined as 37 years as on the date of medical

examination on 02.05.2016. It was, therefore, submitted that taking the age of the

appellants as 37 years as on 02.05.2016 which means that at the time of

commission of the offence in 1994, the appellants would have been only aged about

15 years and, therefore, the benefit of Juvenile Justice Act to be extended to the

appellants. Contending that the benefit of benevolent provisions of Juvenile Justice

Act and the Rules must be extended to the appellants herein, learned Senior

Counsel for the appellant relied upon Darga Ram alias Gunga v. State of

Rajasthan (2015) 2 SCC 775 wherein it has been held as under:-

“16. The medical opinion given by the duly constituted Board comprising
Professors of Anatomy, Radio diagnosis and Forensic Medicine has
determined his age to be “about” 33 years on the date of the examination.
The Board has not been able to give the exact age of the appellant on
medical examination, no matter the advances made in that field. That being
so, in terms of Rule 12(3)(b) the appellant may even be entitled to the benefit
of fixing his age on the lower side within a margin of one year in case the
Court considers it necessary to do so in the facts and circumstances of the
case. The need for any such statutory concession may not however arise
because even if the estimated age as determined by the Medical Board is
taken as the correct/true age of the appellant he was just about 17 years and
2 months old on the date of the occurrence and thus a juvenile within the
meaning of that expression as used in the Act aforementioned. Having said
that we cannot help observing that we have not felt very comfortable with the
Medical Board estimating the age of the appellant in a range of 30 to 36 years
as on the date of the medical examination.

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 17. The general rule about age determination is that the age as
determined can vary plus minus two years but the Board has in the case at
hand spread over a period of six years and taken a mean to fix the age of the
appellant at 33 years. We are not sure whether that is the correct way of
estimating the age of the appellant. What reassures us about the estimate of
age is the fact that the same is determined by a Medical Board comprising
Professors of Anatomy, Radiodiagnosis and Forensic Medicine whose opinion
must get the respect it deserves. That apart, even if the age of the appellant
was determined by the upper extremity limit i.e. 36 years the same would have
been subject to variation of plus minus 2 years meaning thereby that he could
as well be 34 years on the date of the examination. Taking his age as 34 years
on the date of the examination he would have been 18 years, 2 months and 7
days on the date of the occurrence but such an estimate would be only an
estimate and the appellant may be entitled to additional benefit of one year in
terms of lowering his age by one year in terms of Rule 12(3)(b) (supra) which
would then bring him to be 17 years and 2 months old, therefore, a juvenile.”

20. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted that the ossification

test is not the sole criteria for determining the age and that the medical opinion

has to be considered alongwith other cogent evidence. In support of this

contention, reliance was placed upon Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and

Anr. (2008) 13 SCC 133.

21. A reading of the above decision in Darga Ram alias Gunga’s case

shows that courts need to be aware of the fact that age determination of the

concerned persons cannot be certainly ascertained in the absence of original

and valid documentary proof and there would always lie a possibility that the

age of the concerned person may vary plus or minus two years. Even in the

presence of medical opinion, the Court showed a tilt towards the juvenility of

the accused. However, it is pertinent to note that such an approach in Darga

Ram alias Gunga’s case was taken in the specific facts and circumstances of

that particular case and any attempt of generalising the said approach could

not be justifiably entertained.

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22. It is well-accepted fact that age determination using ossification test does

not yield accurate and precise conclusions after the examinee crosses the age

of 30 years, which is true in the present case. After referring to Bhola

Bhagat’s case and other decisions, in Babloo Pasi’s case, this Court held as

under:-

“18. Nevertheless, in Jitendra Ram v. State of Jharkhand (2006) 9 SCC 428

the Court sounded a note of caution that the aforestated observations in Bhola
Bhagat (1997) 8 SCC 720 would not mean that a person who is not entitled to
the benefit of the said Act would be dealt with leniently only because such a
plea is raised. Each plea must be judged on its own merit and each case has
to be considered on the basis of the materials brought on record.
22. It is well settled that it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an
abstract formula to determine the age of a person. The date of birth is to be
determined on the basis of material on record and on appreciation of evidence
adduced by the parties. The medical evidence as to the age of a person,
though a very useful guiding factor, is not conclusive and has to be considered
along with other cogent evidence.
23. It is true that in Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 428 this Court
has, on a review of judicial opinion, observed that while dealing with a
question of determination of the age of an accused, for the purpose of finding
out whether he is a juvenile or not, a hyper-technical approach should not be
adopted while appreciating the evidence adduced on behalf of the accused in
support of the plea that he was a juvenile and if two views may be possible on
the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to
be a juvenile in borderline cases. We are also not oblivious of the fact that
being a welfare legislation, the courts should be zealous to see that a juvenile
derives full benefits of the provisions of the Act but at the same time it is also
imperative for the courts to ensure that the protection and privileges under the
Act are not misused by unscrupulous persons to escape punishments for
having committed serious offences.”

23. In Criminal Appeal No. 486 of 2016 dated 12.05.2016, Parag Bhati

(Juvenile) through Legal Guardian-Mother-Smt. Rajni Bhati v. State of Uttar

Pradesh and Anr., after referring to Abuzar Hossain case and other decisions of

this Court, this Court held as under:-

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 “26. It is no doubt true that if there is a clear and unambiguous case in favour
of the juvenile accused that he was a minor below the age of 18 years on the
date of the incident and the documentary evidence at least prima facie proves
the same, he would be entitled to the special protection under the JJ Act. But
when an accused commits a grave and heinous offence and thereafter
attempts to take statutory shelter under the guise of being a minor, a
casual or cavalier approach while recording as to whether an accused is
a juvenile or not cannot be permitted as the courts are enjoined upon to
perform their duties with the object of protecting the confidence of
common man in the institution entrusted with the administration of
justice.
27. The benefit of the principle of benevolent legislation attached to the JJ Act
would thus apply to only such cases wherein the accused is held to be a
juvenile on the basis of at least prima facie evidence regarding his minority as
the benefit of the possibilities of two views in regard to the age of the alleged
accused who is involved in grave and serious offence which he committed and
gave effect to it in a well-planned manner reflecting his maturity of mind rather
than innocence indicating that his plea of juvenility is more in the nature of a
shield to dodge or dupe the arms of law, cannot be allowed to come to his
rescue.” [Emphasis added]

From the above decision, it is clear that the purpose of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 is

not to give shelter to the accused of grave and heinous offences.

24. Keeping in view the above principles, let us consider the medical opinion of

the Medical Board determining the age of the appellants as between 35-40 years on

the date of examination that is on 02.05.2016. This wide variation in the age, even

as per medical opinion is because of the reason that it was now too late, because of

the advanced age of the appellants to have precise determination of his age. As

noted earlier, such a plea of juvenility is raised for the first time in this Court and the

same has to be considered on the material brought on record before this Court. On

the basis of the age of the appellants (Mukarrab and Arshad) determined between

35-40 years in May, 2016, giving a variation of two years in upper age limit i.e. age

of the appellants would be 38 years. Giving additional benefit of lowering their age

by one year in terms of Rule 12(3)(b) would bring their age as 37 years as on May,

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2016. That means the appellants are supposed to be born in 1979 and at the time of

occurrence in 1994, the appellants would have been of around 15 years of age.

25. Having regard to the circumstances of this case, a blind and mechanical view

regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of the medical

opinion by the radiological examination. At page 31 of Modi’s Text Book of Medical

th
Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 20 Edn., it has been stated as follows:

“In ascertaining the age of young persons radiograms of any of the main joints
of the upper or the lower extremity of both sides of the body should be taken,
an opinion should be given according to the following table, but it must be
remembered that too much reliance should not be placed on this table as it
merely indicates an average and is likely to vary in individual cases even of
the same province owing to the eccentricities of development.”

Courts have taken judicial notice of this fact and have always held that the evidence

afforded by radiological examination is no doubt a useful guiding factor for

determining the age of a person but the evidence is not of a conclusive and

incontrovertible nature and it is subject to a margin of error. Medical evidence as to

the age of a person though a very useful guiding factor is not conclusive and has to

be considered along with other circumstances.

26. In a recent judgment, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Anoop Singh (2015) 7

SCC 773, it was held that the ossification test is not the sole criteria for age

determination. Following Babloo Pasi and Anoop Singh’s cases, we hold that

ossification test cannot be regarded as conclusive when it comes to ascertaining the

age of a person. More so, the appellants herein have certainly crossed the age of

thirty years which is an important factor to be taken into account as age cannot be

determined with precision. In fact in the medical report of the appellants, it is stated

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that there was no indication for dental x-rays since both the accused were beyond

25 years of age.

27. At this juncture, we may usefully refer to an article “A study of wrist

ossification for age estimation in pediatric group in central Rajasthan”, which reads

as under:-

“There are various criteria for age determination of an individual, of which

eruption of teeth and ossification activities of bones are important.
Nevertheless age can usually be assessed more accurately in younger age
group by dentition and ossification alongwith epiphyseal fusion.
[Ref: Gray H. Gray’s Anatomy. 37 th ed. Churchill Livingstone Edinburgh
London Melbourne and New York: 1996; 341-342];
A careful examination of teeth and ossification at wrist joint provide valuable
data for age estimation in children.
[Ref: Parikh CK. Parikh’s Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and
Toxicology. 5th edn.: Mumbai Medico-Legal Centre Colaba:1990;44-45];
……
Variations in the appearance of center of ossification at wrist joint shows
influence of race, climate, diet and regional factors. Ossification centres for the
distal ends of radius and ulna consistent with present study vide article “A
study of Wrist Ossification for age estimation in pediatric group in
Central Rajasthan” by Dr. Ashutosh Srivastav, Senior Demonstrator and a
team of other doctors, Journal of Indian Academy of Forensic Medicine
(JIAFM), 2004; 26(4). ISSN 0971-0973].

28. In the present case, their physical, dental and radiological examinations were

carried out. Radiological examination of Skull (AP and lateral view), Sternum (AP

and lateral view) and Sacrum (lateral view) was advised and performed. As per the

medical report, there was no indication for dental x-rays since both the accused

were much beyond 25 years of age. Therefore, the age determination based on

ossification test though may be useful is not conclusive. An X-ray ossification test

can by no means be so infallible and accurate a test as to indicate the correct

number of years and days of a person’s life.

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29. Let us consider the medical report in the facts and circumstances of the

present case. The learned counsel on behalf of the respondent-State has brought to

our notice that the appellant-Mukarrab is involved in twenty four cases of various

offences allegedly committed between 1988 and 1995. He is alleged to have

committed murder and robbery in the year 1988. Likewise, appellant-Arshad is also

allegedly involved in commission of serious offences from 1993 to 2003.

Proceedings in the context of such offences are stated to be still pending against the

appellants before various courts. Learned Counsel for the State has produced a

chart before us to show that the appellant-Mukarrab is involved in at least twenty

cases for various offences right from the year 1988 in Case Nos. 160/1988,

327/1989, 96/1989, 184/1989 etc. and other cases under Sections 25A Act, 394 IPC,

323, 352, 504, 506 IPC, 323, 352, 504, 506 IPC and other offences till 2006.

Likewise, appellant-Arshad is involved in at least ten cases for various offences right

from the year 1993 in case Nos. 102/1993, 50/1994, 80/1994, 878/1994 etc. and

other cases under Sections 393, 363, 376, 147, 148, 149, 302, 147, 504, 506, 307

IPC respectively till 2003.

30. We are referring to the chart produced by the State neither for taking into

account the history sheet of the present appellants for the purpose of ascertaining

criminal antecedents of the appellants nor casting any remarks on the nature of the

offences for which the appellants are proceeded with. We are referring to the chart

only for the limited purpose of arriving at a logical and definite conclusion as to the

age of the appellants. As discussed earlier, in para No. 24 had the appellants been

born in 1979, in the years 1988, 1989, 1990, the appellant-Mukarrab would have

been only in the age of 9, 10, 11 years respectively. In the year 1993, (first case in

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which appellant-Arshad involved) the appellant-Arshad would have been only 14

years of age. Had it been so, when the appellants were produced in those cases the

appellants would have been considered as ‘children’ by the very appearance. They

would have been dealt with accordingly by the concerned juvenile court and the

matters would not have been kept pending till this date. This, in our view, is yet

another reason that the opinion of the Medical Board determining the age of the

appellants as 35-40 years in May, 2016 cannot be relied upon.

31. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the opinion of the medical board in

determining the age of the appellants cannot be relied upon so as to give benefit

under the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

In the absence of other cogent evidence, the plea of juvenility of the appellants is

liable to be rejected. The special leave petitions qua other accused were already

dismissed vide order dated 12.09.2014 as mentioned hereinbefore. Hence, the

appeals of these appellants are also dismissed.

...……………………….J.
[A.K. SIKRI]

.………………………..J.
[R. BANUMATHI]
New Delhi;
November 30, 2016.

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