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CRW Pack OCT Print
CRIMINAL LAW 1
REVISION PACK
Question 1
Ius acceptum implies that a court can only find an accused guilty
of a crime if the kind of act performed by the accused is
recognised by the law as a crime .This explicitly show that a court
cannot create crime in accordance to the ius acceptum rule. The
word ius means law and acceptum means which has been
received. Ius acceptum refers to common law and statutory law.
In M it was held by Kotze J that the court do not possess the
power to create crimes upon the ground that in our view the
conduct in clearly contrary to good morals and our courts are
not guardians of morals. This shows that if there is no provision
of the common law declaring that certain conduct constitutes an
offence whence no crime have been committed and the courts
have held that there can be no crime.
In the set of facts, the fifteen year old girl who was detained to a
rehabilitation centre and escaped, by escaping (conduct) the
girls conduct does not constitutes a crime in the sense that this
kind of conduct is not recognised by the as a crime its contrary
to the morals of the society In M the court stated that if there is
a need to make which in immoral to society punishable, it is the
duty of the legislature to declare such conduct punishable. In a
nutshell, the girls conduct is not declared by the legislation as
a crime so she did not commit any crime.
Question 2
In order to find that there is causal link between X’s act and the
prohibited condition that is Y’s death, X’s act must be both factual
cause and legal cause of Y’s death. X’s act is the factual cause of Y’s
death if it is a conditio sine qua non for Y’s death. An act is a condtio
sine qua non for a situation if the act cannot be thought away without
the situation disappearing at the same time. In the given sets of facts,
it is explicitly that if X had not bump into the back of the Y’s car, Z
would not have collided with Y’s car which caused him(Y) to die
instantaneously therefore X’s act is regarded as condition sine qua
non for Y’s death in the sense that in Daniels it was held that factual
causation is determined on the basis of the condition sine qua non
theory.
The mere fact that an act is regarded as conditio sine qua non and
the factual cause of a certain result is not sufficient. The act must
also be a legal cause of the certain result. There are three theories
According to the individualisation theory one must look, among all the
factors that qualify as factual cause of the prohibited situation (Y’s
death), for that one which is the most operative and regard it as the
legal cause. In Daniels, the court rejected to accept that an act can be
the legal cause of a situation only if it can be described as a proximate.
The state will have to prove that X’s act was the factual, as well as the
legal, cause of Y’s death. Factual causation is easy to prove: had X not
shot Y in the chest and stomach, he would not have been admitted to
hospital and would not have contracted septicaemia. Therefore, X’s
act is a conditio sine qua non of Y’s death. X’s act can also be viewed
as the legal cause of Y’s death.
The relevant authority is S v Tembani 2. In this case, the Supreme
Court of Appeal held that the deliberate infliction of an intrinsically
dangerous wound from which the victim is likely to die without
medical intervention must generally lead to liability for an ensuing
death, even if the medical treatment given later is substandard or
negligent. However, the negligent medical treatment may be viewed
as a novus actus interveniens if, at the time of the treatment, the victim
had recovered to such an extent that the original injury no longer
posed a danger to his life. In terms of the stated facts, this is not the
position. Therefore, X’s act can be viewed as the factual, as well as the
legal, cause of Y’s death.
ANSWER
iii) Cognitive leg refers to where a person can appreciate the wrongfulness
of
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10
his/ her act whereas conative leg is where a person acts in accordance
with the appreciation of wrongfulness. In the set of fact X lacked the
conative leg of capacity.
In Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (A) the court held that necessity can
be raised as a defence on a charge of murdering an innocent
person in a case of extreme compulsion. Discuss the question
whether a person may kill another person in a situation of
necessity?
In the case of Goliath the court held that necessity may be raised
as a defence against a charge of murdering an innocent person
in a case of extreme compulsion. The facts of this case were the
following , X was ordered by Z to hold onto Y so that Z might stab
and kill Y.X was unwilling but Z threatened to kill him if he refused
to help him. X then helped Z to kill Y.X was subsequently charged
with murder. The court found that it had been impossible for X to
run away from Z since Z would then have killed him. The only way
that he could save his life was to do what he was asked. X was
acquitted of murder on the basis that he had acted in a situation
of necessity. However, the court held that such a finding would not
be made easily and would require the closest scrutiny of the facts.
Rumpff JA made the following important points:
OR
Y is an air hostess who does not fasten her safety belt when the
plane lands. X threatens to have her fired unless she consents
in writing that he may punish her. Y is scared that she will lose
her job and consents in writing to X punishing her. X smacks
her three times on her hands with a stick and is then charged
with assault. Discuss whether X has a defence with reference
to the requirements for a valid plea of consent.
The requirements for a valid plea of consent are , the consent must
be given voluntarily ,given by a person who has certain minimum
mental abilities, based upon knowledge of the true and materials
facts , given either expressly or tacitly, given before the commission
of the act and given by the complainant herself.
The relevant case is McCoy’s case which the facts are the same as
those in the scenario in question. In this case, the court rejected
that the air hostess had consented to chastisement on the following
grounds that the consent was not voluntary in the sense that she
consent out fear and in order to avoid being dismissed. See McCoy
case
In the set of facts, the consent was not given voluntarily, without
any coercion. The consent was obtained as a result of fear/
intimidation in the sense that she was afraid to be dismissed if she
was not chastised.
For a valid consent which X relies on must comply with the following
requirements. It must be
(1) given voluntarily
(2) given by a person who has certain minimum mental abilities
(3) based upon knowledge of the true and material facts
(4) given either expressly or tacitly
(5) given before the commission of the act
(6) given by the complainant herself
The requirement, that consent must be based upon knowledge of
true and material facts is the contentious point on the facts of
this case.
• For X to be successful in his defence, it must be shown that the
act to which Y gave her consent is “sexual penetration”.
On the facts given, Y consented to an operation, and not to sexual
penetration.
• In Flattery , a woman thought that X, a quack surgeon, was
operating on her to cure her of her fits, whereas he was in fact having
sexual intercourse with her.
Question 3
Yes (1)
OR
from mental illness or mental defect which makes him or her incapable
of appreciating the wrongfulness of his or her act or omission or of
acting in accordance with an appreciation of the wrongful of his act or
omission, shall not be criminally responsible for such act or omission.
(5)
iii) A person acts with dolus directus if the causing of the forbidden
result is his aim or goal.
(c) X leaves a party in a very drunken state. He gets into his car
and drives home. On his way he is stopped by the police who
requests him to get out of his car. X knows that he is very
drunk and is afraid that he will be arrested and charged with
drunken driving. He drives away as fast as he can. The police
officer pursues him in the van but because X has a fast car, he
manages to get away from the police officer. In his rush to get
away he suddenly turns left into an alley and collides into a
In Chretien the court was faced with the similar facts that is X
coming from a party and under the influence of alcohol had
driven into a group of people. One person died and five were
injured. X was charged with murder and attempted murder.
In regard to the charge of murder X was acquitted and
convicted of culpable homicide. His defence that he lacked
intent because he expected the people to move out of the way
was accepted.
The four basic principles enunciated by the Appellate Division are: (1)
If a person is so drunk that her muscular movements are involuntary,
there can be no question of an act, and although the state in which
she finds herself can be attributed to an excessive intake of alcohol,
she cannot be found guilty of a crime as a result of such muscular
movements.
(2) In exceptional cases a person can, as a result of the excessive
intake of alcohol, completely lack criminal capacity and as a result
not be criminally liable at all. This will be the case if she is ``so
intoxicated that she is not aware that what she is doing is unlawful,
or that her inhibitions have substantially fallen apart''.
The application of the rules laid down in Chretien as well as in the Act
on the present set of facts is as follows: The fact that X was not able
to distinguish between right and wrong means that she did not have
criminal capacity as a result of the intoxication. In terms of Chretien
criminal incapacity, even if it was the result of intoxication,
constitutes a defence. However, the effect of the provisions of section
1of Act 1of 1988 is that X will be convicted of the crime created by this
section. Z acted with criminal capacity but did not have the intention
to murder. Z accordingly cannot be convicted of murder or of a
contravention of section 1of Act 1of 1988. She can, however, be
convicted of culpable homicide, as she caused Y's death negligently.
The test for negligence is objective, that is: How the effect of
intoxication on liability would the reasonable person in Z's position
have acted? Such a person would have foreseen that her act would
result in death. Although it was not mentioned specifically in the
question that X and Z started to drink voluntarily, and although it is
not mentioned expressly that they had not started drinking with the
exclusive aim of gaining courage, it can nevertheless be assumed that
they started drinking voluntarily and that this was not a case of actio
libera in causa. These two situations are so extraordinary that, unless
specifically mentioned in the question, it can be assumed that the
intoxication referred to in the question does not refer to these
situations
QUESTION 4
TEMBANI CASE
FACTS
X shot Y with the intention to kill. Y was admitted to the hospital and
the medical personnel cleaned the wounds and gave her antibiotics
but the following day X, had abdominal pains and she was
insufficiently attended to in the ward and died 14 days later of
septicaemia, resulting from the gunshot wound to the chest and the
abdomen. X was convicted of murder and appealed against his
conviction.
EADIE CASE
FACTS
QUESTION 5
ii) If there was no intruder and that the person who had
tried to enter X’s bedroom was her son Z who was worried
about his old mother and tried to break down the door
because he under the impression that she had died in her
bed. If charged with murder, is there any defence that X
can rely upon? Name this defence and refer to relevant
case law in which such defence was raised.
The defence that X can rely upon is known as putative private defence.
This clearly means that X was under the impression that her act was
lawful, that she had made a mistake regarding the unlawfulness of
her act and subjectively thought that she was acting in private
defence. In S v De Oliviera putative private defence was raised. X had
a noise at the gate and fired six shots in that direction. One person
was killed and one injured. These were friends of his employee who
tried to enter the premises. His defence was that he believed that his
life and property were in danger. There, X relied on the defence of
putative private defence but was convicted of murder. The trial court
found that X had intention on his part in form of dolus eventualis .
On appeal the court pointed out that the unlawfulness of his conduct
was not at issue, only whether he had the intention to kill. The
conviction was upheld on appeal. The court reasoned that because
the accused did not testify, it had to focus on such other evidence as
reflected on his state of mind and inferential reasoning. Although the
reasonable man would have known that the area was dangerous and
that robberies occurred, there was no indication that any attack had
commenced or was imminent. In these circumstances, the court
inferred that it was inconceivable that a reasonable person could have
believed that he was entitled to fire at or in the direction of persons
outside in defence of his life or property (and that without even a
warning shot).
In the absence of the accused’s oral testimony, the court found that
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the prima facie
evidence of the particular circumstances was that he could not have
entertained an honest belief that he was entitled to act in private
defence, but that he by necessary inference did foresee the possibility
of death ensuing to the persons outside and reconciled himself to that
possibility.
QUESTION 6
X and Z are both taxi drivers. They work in the same areas, and
use the same route. X knows that Z’s taxi is always filled to
capacity. X feels that he has the sole right to that particular
route, and decides to shoot and kill Z. One day, having stopped
next to each other at a red traffic light, X is overcome with anger.
The windows of Z’s taxi are tinted, so that it is impossible to see
whether there are any passengers inside. X fires a shot in the
direction of the driver’s seat of Z’s taxi, hoping to kill Z. The
bullet misses Z, but hits Y, who is sitting next to Z. Y is very badly
QUESTION 7
that X may use the knife in the shop and that somebody may get
killed as a result. However, he does not say anything to X about
the knife and voluntarily goes with the others to the shop. Q does
not know that X has a knife concealed under his clothes. X, P and
Q go into the shop. X points the toy pistol at Y and threatens to
shoot him if he refuses to hand over the money. A scuffle ensues,
and during the commotion P and Q remove the money from the
cash register. In the course of the scuffle between X and Y, X
draws the knife from under his clothes and stabs Y in the chest
while P shouts: “Kill him!” X, P and Q run away with the money.
Y dies as a result of the stab wound. Discuss the question whether
X, P and Q may all be convicted of murder in terms of the doctrine
of common purpose.
X complies with all the requirements for murder. His act was the direct
cause of Y’s death. X’s act was unlawful. He cannot rely on any ground
of justification. Because X stabbed Y in the chest, the reasonable
inference can be drawn that X had intention to kill Y.
P and Q can only be found guilty of murder if the state can prove that
they shared a common purpose with X to kill Y. The mere fact that
they all had the intention to rob Y is not necessarily sufficient to
warrant the inference that all of them also had the common
purpose to kill. A common purpose is established by proving a
previous agreement to kill or active association with the execution of
the common purpose (Safatsa; Mgedezi). In terms of the doctrine of
common purpose X’s act of killing Y is then imputed to the other
accused. The intention or purpose which triggers the operation of
common purpose is not confined to dolus directus, but includes dolus
eventualis. It may be argued that P had performed an act of
association with the execution of the common purpose by shouting
“Kill him!” and he had intention to kill in the form dolus eventualis.
He knew that X had a knife with him and foresaw the possibility that
X might use the knife in the shop and that somebody might get killed
as a result and reconciled himself with this possibility (Mambo).
Q was unaware that X had a knife with him. Neither can the
inference be drawn that he foresaw that their conduct in the shop
might result in Y’s death and that he reconciled himself to this
possibility. Although he took part in the robbery, the inference cannot
be drawn that he had the intention to kill Y and he cannot, together
with X, be held responsible for Y’s death by virtue of the doctrine of
common purpose (Mambo)