BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

Chapter 3: Negotiations
Contents

The Bargaining Zone............................................................................................................. 3

The Bargaining Zone: Positive ........................................................................................... 3

The Bargaining Zone: Negative ......................................................................................... 3

The Bargaining Zone: Bargaining Surplus ......................................................................... 4

The Bargaining Zone: Negotiator’s Surplus ....................................................................... 4

Value-Claiming Strategies ..................................................................................................... 5

The most commonly asked question about negotiation is: ................................................. 5

Some conditions allow negotiators to be more confident about the counterparty’s

reservation point: ............................................................................................................... 5

If negotiators follow these basic value-claiming strategies, they can substantially increase
the probability they will obtain a favourable slice of the pie. ............................................... 5

1. Accurately assess your BATNA (Best alternative to a negotiated agreement). ......... 5

2. Unpack your multiple alternatives............................................................................. 6

3. Improve your BATNA. .............................................................................................. 6

4. Determine your reservation point, but do not reveal it. ............................................. 6

5. Research the counterparty’s BATNA and estimate their reservation point. ............... 7

6. Set high aspirations (be realistic but optimistic). ....................................................... 7

First Offers ............................................................................................................................ 8

First Offers – The AIM Model (Anchoring Information Model) ............................................ 8

First Offers – Symmetric Information .............................................................................. 9

First Offers – Asymmetric Information ............................................................................ 9

First Offers – Anchoring Effect ........................................................................................... 9

First Offers – Range Offers.............................................................................................. 10

First Offers – Precise v s. Round-Numbers...................................................................... 10

First Offers – Early v s. Late First Offers .......................................................................... 11

First Offers – Re-anchoring ............................................................................................. 11

Concessions ....................................................................................................................... 11

Concessions – Reciprocity v s. Aversion ......................................................................... 12

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 Concessions Pattern ....................................................................................................... 12

Magnitude of Concessions .............................................................................................. 12

Concessions – GRIT Model ............................................................................................. 13

Concessions – The Even-Split Ploy ................................................................................. 13

Timing of concessions ..................................................................................................... 13

Substantiation ..................................................................................................................... 13

Substantiation – Power Conversation Tactics .................................................................. 14

Substantiation – Constraints vs. Disparagement ............................................................. 14

Substantiation – “Agreement” versus “Option” ................................................................. 14

Substantiation – Fairness arguments .............................................................................. 14

Substantiation – Egocentrism affects judgment of fairness .............................................. 15

Substantiation – Relationships affect Judgement of Fairness .......................................... 16

Substantiation – social comparison ................................................................................. 16

Substantiation – Equity Principle ..................................................................................... 16

Restoring equity ........................................................................................................... 17

Final Offers ......................................................................................................................... 18

Final Offers – Face-Saving .............................................................................................. 18

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Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more people or parties to reach a desired outcome
regarding one or more issues of conflict (Wikipedia)

The entire process of making an opening offer and then reaching a mutually agreeable
settlement is known as the negotiation dance.

The Bargaining Zone

• The bargaining zone, or Zone of Possible Agreements (Z O P A), represents the
range between each party’s reservation points.
• A bargaining zone can be positive or negative:
o In a positive bargaining zone, negotiators’ reservation points overlap.
o In a negative bargaining zone, there is no positive overlap between the
parties’ reservation points; therefore, parties should pursue other alternatives
rather than spending fruitless hours trying to reach an agreement.

The Bargaining Zone: Positive

The Bargaining Zone: Negative

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The Bargaining Zone: Bargaining Surplus
• The bargaining surplus is the amount of overlap between negotiating parties’
reservation points.
• The bargaining surplus is a measure of the value that a negotiated agreement offers
to both parties compared to the value of not reaching a settlement.
• Skilled negotiators know how to reach agreements even when the bargaining zone is
small.

The Bargaining Zone: Negotiator’s Surplus

• The negotiator’s surplus is the positive difference between the settlement outcome
and the negotiator’s reservation point.
• The total surplus of both parties adds up to the size of the ZOPA (Zone of Possible
Agreements) or bargaining surplus.
• The bargaining surplus illustrates the mixed-motive nature of negotiation: negotiators
are motivated to both cooperate and compete with the other party.

• The best possible economic outcome for the negotiator is one that just meets the
counterparty’s reservation point, thereby inducing the other party to agree, but allows
the focal negotiator to gain as much as possible.

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 • This outcome provides the focal negotiator with the greatest possible share of the
resources to be divided. In other words, one person gets all or most of the pie.
• The fact that negotiated settlements fall somewhere in the ZOPA, and that each
negotiator tries to maximize his or her share of the bargaining surplus, illustrates the
mixed-motive nature of negotiation: negotiators are motivated to cooperate with the
other party to ensure that a settlement is reached in the case of a positive bargaining
zone, but they are motivated to compete with one another to claim as much of the
bargaining surplus as they can.

Value-Claiming Strategies
The most commonly asked question about negotiation is:
• How can I claim most of the bargaining surplus for myself?
• Most negotiators will not reveal their reservation point.
• Even if someone reveals their reservation point, we have no way to verify whether
the information is valid or an exaggeration.

Some conditions allow negotiators to be more confident about the

counterparty’s reservation point:
• One party may be able to independently verify price, terms, or other details of the
offer from a 3rd party.
• If a person says something that is not in their interest, you may have more reason to
believe the information.
• Negotiators should be willing to settle for outcomes that exceed their reservation
point and reject offers that are worse than their reservation point.
• It is not necessarily in your best interest to misrepresent your reservation point
because you risk the possibility of disagreement.
• With regard to claiming value, negotiators should be willing to settle for outcomes
that exceed their reservation point and reject offers that are worse than their
reservation point.

If negotiators follow these basic value-claiming strategies, they can

substantially increase the probability they will obtain a favourable slice of the
pie.
1. Accurately assess your BATNA (Best alternative to a negotiated agreement).
• Everyone has a BATNA—even if it means waiting and hoping!

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 • As a first step in accurately assessing your BATNA, brainstorm every option you can
imagine in the event that you do not reach an agreement in your current negotiation.
Generate as many options as you can.
• As a second step, assign a probability to the likelihood of being able to exercise that
BATNA. For most negotiators, BATNAs involve some uncertainty. However,
uncertainty is not a good excuse for failure to assess your BATNA. Nothing can help
a negotiator get a bigger slice of the pie than having a great BATNA.
• After you have assigned a probability to the likelihood of being able to exercise a
given BATNA, the third step is to rank order your alternatives in terms of
attractiveness to you.

2. Unpack your multiple alternatives.

• Negotiators who have multiple alternatives may actually perform worse (than those
with a single alternative), because they make fewer demands and achieve worse
outcomes.
• In the event that negotiators unpack extremely negative outcomes (e.g., not receiving
another job offer), they develop lower aspirations and ultimately claim less value.

3. Improve your BATNA.

• Think of your BATNA like a living plant: at any given time, it is either flourishing or
withering. Thus, BATNAs need maintenance and nourishment.
• Negotiators should spend a considerable amount of time attempting to improve their
BATNA before entering into a negotiation.

4. Determine your reservation point, but do not reveal it.

• If you reveal your reservation point, be prepared for the other party to offer you your
reservation point—but not more.
• Some negotiators reveal their reservation point to demonstrate good faith. These
negotiators rely on the counterparty’s goodwill and trust their opponent not to take
advantage of this information. There are more effective ways to build trust. For
example, you could show a genuine concern for the needs and interests of the other
party.
• If you do reveal your reservation point, the counterparty has no incentive to offer you
more. In only two circumstances do we think it is appropriate to truthfully reveal your
reservation price:
o You have exhausted your time to negotiate and are about to exit the
negotiation without a deal and you sense that the bargaining zone may be
very small or perhaps negative.

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 o You have a great BATNA and consequently, an aggressive reservation price,
and you would be happy if the counterparty matched or barely exceeded your
reservation point. In this sense, negotiators “signal” their BATNA.

5. Research the counterparty’s BATNA and estimate their reservation point.

• This information allows you to make the counterparty an offer that barely exceeds
their reservation point and to claim the entire bargaining surplus for yourself.
• Negotiators can use a variety of tactics to garner information that may reveal
information about the counterparty’s alternatives. However, be careful when the other
party discloses their BATNA early. When the counterparty discloses their BATNA at
the outset of the negotiation, negotiators actually make less demanding offers,
disclose more truthful information, and settle for less profit than when the
counterparty does not disclose a BATNA.

6. Set high aspirations (be realistic but optimistic).

• Your aspiration point defines the upper limit of what you can get in a negotiation.
• Because you will usually never get more than your first offer, your first offer
represents an important anchor point in the negotiation

The Chilling Effect

• The chilling effect can occur when negotiators make proposals the counterparty
considers extreme and can cause the counterparty to be offended and walk away.
• For these reasons, it is strategically wise to make your first offer slightly inferior to
what you discern to be the counterparty’s reservation point, and then you can bargain
up to their reservation point.
• Most people are not going to immediately accept your first offer, but they ultimately
might accept an offer that is equivalent to their reservation point

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Goal-setting paradox
• When a negotiator focuses on his or her target point during negotiation, this
increases the value of the outcome that is ultimately received.

Promotion-focused negotiators
• Promotion focused negotiators conceptualize goals, ideals, and opportunities and
excel at claiming value.

Prevention-focused negotiators
• Prevention focused negotiators conceptualize goals as obligations and necessities.

The Winner’s Curse

• The winners curse occurs when the negotiator’s first offer is immediately accepted by
the counterparty, signalling that the negotiator did not set his or her aspirations high
enough.

Boulwarism
• Boulwarism is named after Lemuel Boulware, former C E O of General Electric, who
believed in making one’s first offer one’s final offer; this often unsuccessful strategy
engendered hostility from the counterparty.

First Offers
The practitioner-researcher paradox refers to the fact that intuition and folklore advise
negotiators to never open first, yet much scientific research argues that negotiators should
always open first due to a “first mover advantage.”

First Offers – The AIM Model (Anchoring Information Model)

• The Anchoring Information Model (AIM) states that first offers have two effects:

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 o They serve as anchors that pull final settlements toward the initial first-offer
value (anchoring).
o They convey information about the sender’s priorities which makes the
sender vulnerable to exploitation and increases the risk of a first-mover
disadvantage.
• When senders did not reveal their priorities, they had a first-offer advantage;
however, when they revealed their priorities (either implicitly or explicitly), the first
offer became a distinct disadvantage. This effect was strongest when the recipient of
the offer was pro-self (as opposed to pro-social).

First Offers – Symmetric Information

• When the negotiator has good information and the counterparty is believed to also
have good information, it is wise to make the first offer.
• When negotiators have good information, they are not likely to fall prey to the
winner’s curse or the chilling effect.
• Instead, they can make an assertive opening offer that operates as a psychological
anchor.

First Offers – Asymmetric Information

• When one party is prepared and has good information and the counterparty does not,
the prepared negotiator does not run the risk of being anchored by the counterparty.
• In this situation, the nonprepared negotiator can be anchored by the prepared party
and also has a higher possibility of falling victim to the winner’s curse.

First Offers – Anchoring Effect

• In this scenario, it is advantageous to the informed party to prompt the naïve
negotiator into making the opening offer.
• The first offer that falls within the bargaining zone acts as a powerful anchor point for
the counterparty’s counteroffer.

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 • Ideally your opening offer should not give away too much of the bargaining zone.
• Buyers who use the anchoring tactic claim more value than those who don’t use the
tactic, but the counterparty often believes their own outcome is worse than what they
expected and are less willing to negotiate in the future.
• Negotiators who make the first offer are protected from being psychologically
anchored by the counterparty’s offer. A negotiator’s first offer acts as an anchor for
the counterparty’s offer.

First Offers – Range Offers

• The key disadvantage with stating a range is that the counterparty may focus
overwhelmingly on the attractive endpoint from their point of view.
• In other words, the counterparty will consider the lower end of the range and
negotiate down from there.
• The tandem anchoring account argues that counterparties are influenced by both
endpoints of the range as they evaluate the proposer’s reservation price as well as
how polite they believe an extreme counteroffer would be.
• One investigation examined four types of offers:
o point offers (e.g., $100);
o back-down range offers ($80–$100);
o bracketing-range offers ($90–$100); and
o bolstering-range offers ($100–$120).
• Recipients who received bolstering-range offers assumed the negotiator had a more
attractive reservation price than the negotiator who made a point offer. Backdown-
range offers led to perceptions that the negotiator had the least attractive reservation
price.

First Offers – Precise v s. Round-Numbers

• People habitually use round numbers as first offers in negotiation.
• However, precise offers are more potent than round number anchors because
precise offers are viewed as based on more information and greater negotiator
competence.
• The proposer’s offer is likely to anchor the recipient, but it is not as aggressive.
• A word of caution: precise offers work when the recipient is an amateur but can
backfire when the recipient is an expert.

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First Offers – Early v s. Late First Offers
• Late first offers are more likely to lead to creative agreements that meet parties’
interests as compared to early first offers.
• Late first offers give negotiators more time to learn about each other’s interests.

First Offers – Re-anchoring

• Even though as a negotiator you have a plan for whether to open first or not, the
counterparty may not follow your plan.
• Negotiators whose first offers are accepted engage in counterfactual thoughts about
how they could have done better (e.g., “What could have been different?”) and are
less satisfied than negotiators whose first offers are not immediately accepted.
• Counteroffers do two things:
o They diminish the prominence of the counterparty’s initial offer as an anchor
point.
o They signal your willingness to negotiate.
• Suppose you have determined that both parties have good information and so, you
want to open first, but the other party surprises you by opening first. In this situation,
you should counteroffer.
o Your risk of being anchored by the counterparty is reduced if you’ve planned
your opening offer and presented it.
o If you do not plan your opening offer, you risk being anchored by the
counterparty.
• Do not adjust your BATNA based upon the counterparty’s offer, and do not adjust
your target (unless you have under-aspired, such as when the other party makes an
opening offer that is more attractive than your target!).
• It is extremely important not to be “anchored” by the counterparty’s offer. An effective
counteroffer moves the focus away from the other party’s offer as a reference point.

Concessions
• Concessions are the reductions that a negotiator makes during the course of a
negotiation.
• Negotiators need to consider four things when formulating counteroffers and
concessions:
1. Concession reciprocity
2. The pattern of concessions
3. The magnitude of concessions

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 4. The timing of concessions

Concessions – Reciprocity v s. Aversion

• Concession reciprocity: the tendency of negotiators to reciprocate concessions
• Concession aversion: the tendency for some negotiators to be disinclined to make
concessions.
• Negotiators show stronger concession aversion and ultimately claim more value
when negotiation proposals are framed to highlight their own, rather than the
counterparty’s, resources.
• Specifically, proposal senders show greater concession aversion when they offer
their own resources (versus requesting the counterparty’s resources) in both buyer
and seller negotiations.
• The opposite is true for recipients: recipients show stronger concession aversion
when receiving requests rather than offers.

Concessions Pattern
• Unilateral concessions are concessions made by one party.
• Bilateral concessions are concessions made by both sides.
• Premature concessions happen when one party makes more than one concession in
a row before the other party responds or counteroffers.
• Always wait for a response before making a further concession.
• Negotiators who make fewer and smaller concessions maximize their slice of the pie,
compared to those who make larger and more frequent concessions.
• Wait for a concession from the counterparty before making further concessions. An
exception would be a situation in which you feel that the counterparty’s offer is truly
at his or her reservation point.

Magnitude of Concessions
• Another consideration when making concessions is to determine how much to
concede.
• The magnitude of a negotiator’s concessions is a powerful communication tool, and it
is unwise to make consistently greater concessions than the counterparty.
• Making concessions may not have the desired effect. For example, salespeople who
make concessions to customers do not improve customer satisfaction.
• Negotiators who make large concessions may lose credibility and the other party
may be less willing to concede.

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 • Negotiators are advised to match the concession magnitude of the counterparty or
make concessions that are slightly smaller in magnitude.
• Negotiators can signal they are getting near their reservation point by reducing the
size of their concessions
• It is far better to make a large number of small concessions than a small number of
large concessions.

Concessions – GRIT Model

• The Graduated Reduction in Tension (GRIT) model is a conflict resolution method in
which parties avoid escalating conflict to reach mutual settlement within the
bargaining zone.
• The concession offered by the first party is significant, but not so much that the
offering party is tremendously disadvantaged if the counterparty fails to reciprocate.
• The model, based on the reciprocity principle, calls for one party to make a
concession and invites the other party to reciprocate with a concession.

Concessions – The Even-Split Ploy

• Even-split ploy: where one party suggests “meeting in the middle” of the offer.
• However, depending on each party’s concessions leading up to this “even-split,” the
outcome of this division may not really be fair.
• Often, the person who suggests the even split is in an advantageous position. You
can avoid the even-split ploy by watching the magnitude of your concessions.

Timing of concessions
• The time of concessions refers to whether they are immediate, gradual, or delayed.
• Analysis has shown that sellers who made immediate concessions received the most
negative reactions from buyers.
• In contrast, when the seller made gradual concessions, the buyer’s reaction was
most positive, with high satisfaction.

Substantiation
• Substantiation refers to the arguments or persuasive rationale that often
accompanies an offer.
• Ideally, a rationale is presented that is objective and invites the counterparty to buy
into the rationale.
• Conversely, if your facts can be easily counter-argued by the other party, you will not
benefit by making arguments.

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Substantiation – Power Conversation Tactics
• When first offers are presented in negotiation, they are often preceded by
conversational language.
• Negotiators tend to use five different conversation tactics to gain power:
1. Information-seeking
2. Patronizing
3. Organizing
4. Proposing
5. Sharing
• Information-seeking leads to greater power, whereas failure to seek information,
patronizing, and proposing lead to loss of power.

Substantiation – Constraints vs. Disparagement

Negotiators often use two types of rationales:

• Constraint rationales refer to one’s own limited resources (Ex: “I can’t pay more…”).
• Disparagement rationales critique the negotiated object or service (Ex: “It’s not worth
more…”).
• Negotiators who highlight their own constraints are more successful than negotiators
who argue down the value of an item. Constraint rationales signal negotiator’s limits
and are therefore more believable. Moreover, constraint rationales are less likely to
insult the counterparty.

Substantiation – “Agreement” versus “Option”

• At some point in negotiation, a negotiator might label a proposal as an “agreement”
or an “option.”
• In one investigation, negotiators chose to give up real value and sacrifice economic
efficiency when the proposal was labelled as an “agreement,” rather than as “option
A.”
• Moreover, a personally advantageous option was avoided significantly more often
when it was labelled “impasse” rather than “option B.”
• The appeal of agreement and the aversion to impasse are potent conversational
phrases that affect negotiator behaviour.

Substantiation – Fairness arguments

• People’s utility functions are social rather than individual
o Individual satisfaction is strongly influenced by the payoffs received by the
counterparty, as well as the payoffs received by the self.

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 • Negotiators often use one of three fairness principles when it comes to slicing the
pie: equality, equity, and need:
1. Equality rule, or blind justice, prescribes equal shares for all. Outcomes are
distributed without regard to inputs, and everyone benefits (or suffers)
equally.
2. Equity rule, or proportionality of contributions principle, prescribes that
distribution should be proportional to a person’s contribution.
3. Needs-based rule, or welfare-based allocation, states that benefits should be
proportional to need.

Substantiation – Egocentrism affects judgment of fairness

• Egocentrism affects judgments of fairness:
o People will reject outcomes that entail one person receiving more than others
and instead take a settlement of lower joint value but equal-appearing shares.
o People pay themselves substantially more than they are willing to pay others
for doing the same task.
• Egocentric judgments of fairness emerge when people select fairness rules in a self-
serving fashion:
o When people make minimal contributions, they often prefer equality (same
input) rather than equity (same result).
o When people’s contributions are substantial, they opt for equity rather than
equality.
• However, in many situations, people would ultimately benefit by not having
egocentric views. Consider arbitration situations: people’s predictions of judges’
behaviour are biased in a manner that favours their own side. Efforts to eliminate
bias among litigants are met with virtually no success. Informing parties of the
potential bias or providing them with information about the counterparty’s point of
view does little to assuage biased perceptions of fair-ness, suggesting that
egocentric biases are deeply ingrained.
• Most situations are ambiguous enough that people can construe them in a fashion
that favours their own interests. One unfortunate consequence is that people develop
different perceptions of fairness even when they are presented with the same
evidence.
• Reducing egocentrism is not easy. In general, leading people to consider other
members ‘contributions to a joint task reduces self-centred judgments. However, this
can backfire by activating egoistic theories of people’s behaviour and claiming more
in subsequent situations

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Substantiation – Relationships affect Judgement of Fairness
• When negotiators share similar attitudes and beliefs, are physically close to one
another, or when it is likely they will engage in future interaction, they prefer equality
rule.
• When the allocation is:
o public (others know what choices are made), equality is used;
o when allocation is private, equity is preferred.
o Friends tend to use equality, whereas non–friends or acquaintances use
equity
• People in relationships with others do not consistently employ one rule of fairness but
use different fairness rules in specific incidences.
• Fairness rules also depend on whether people are dealing with rewards versus costs.
Equality is often used to allocate benefits, but equity is more commonly used to
allocate burdens.
• Fairness rules also depend on whether people are dealing with rewards versus costs.
• Social comparisons also affect negotiators’ perceptions of fairness.
• When a situation is complex, involving multiple inputs in different dimensions, people
are more likely to use the equality rule.
• Different fairness rules are a potential source of conflict and inconsistency

Substantiation – social comparison

• Negotiators who feel more envious about their counterparty’s outcomes, actually
perform better in negotiations than those who do not feel envy. For this reason, when
it comes to pay and compensation, people are more concerned about how much they
are paid relative to other people than about the absolute level of their pay.

Substantiation – Equity Principle

• Equity exists in a relationship if each person’s outcomes are proportional to his or her
inputs:
o Equity refers to equivalence of the outcome/input ratio of parties.
o Inequity exists when the ratio of outcomes to inputs is unequal.
• Complications arise if two people have different views of what constitutes a legitimate
investment, cost, or reward and how they rank each one.

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Restoring equity
• When people find themselves in an inequitable relationship, they become distressed;
the greater the perceived inequity, the more distressed people feel. Distress drives
people to attempt to restore equity.
• Example: Two vice presidents of a company were promoted to senior vice president
at about the same time. Both of them moved into new offices, but one of them
suspected an inequity. It turned out the VP1’s office was bigger than VP2’s by a few
feet. VP2 decided to move the walls to make his office bigger.
• People use the following six means to eliminate the tension arising from inequity:
1. Alter the inputs.
• VP2 could work less hard, take on fewer projects, take more days off.
2. Alter the outcomes.
• VP2 could make his office bigger—which he did.
3. Cognitively distort inputs or outcomes.
• V2P could minimize the importance of his contributions and maximize the
perceived value of his office—for example, by deciding that his office was
quieter than that of his counterpart.
4. Leave the situation.
• VP2 could quit his job.
5. Cognitively distort either the inputs or the outcomes of an exchange partner.
• VP2 may view VP1 as contributing more, or perhaps regard the big office
to be less attractive than it actually is.
6. Change the object of comparison.
• VP2 may stop comparing himself to VP1 and start comparing himself to
someone else in the company.
➢ The use of the first two strategies depends on whether the person has been over-or
under-rewarded.
o Over-rewarded individuals can increase their inputs or decrease their
outcomes to restore equal ratios, whereas
o under-rewarded people must decrease their inputs or increase their
outcomes.
o Conversely, people may cheat or steal if they are underpaid.
➢ The equity drive is so strong that people who are denied the opportunity to restore
equity will derogate others, thereby restoring psychological equity.
➢ If distortion must occur, people focus on the other person’s inputs or outcomes
before distorting their own, especially if such distortion threatens their self-esteem.

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Final Offers
• Making an irrevocable commitment such as a “final offer” should be done only when
you really mean what you say and are prepared to walk away from the bargaining
table
• You should only walk away from the bargaining table if your BATNA (Best Alternative
to a Negotiated Agreement) is more attractive than the counterparty’s offer.

Final Offers – Face-Saving

• “Face” is the value a person places on his or her public image, reputation, and status
vis-à-vis other people in the negotiation.
• Direct threats to “face” in a negotiation include making ultimatums, criticisms,
challenges, and insults.
• When a person’s “face” is threatened, it can tip the balance of their behaviour away
from cooperation toward competition, resulting in an impasse.
• The best way to help the other party “save face” is to not indicate that you think he or
she has lost face.
o If the other takes an irrevocable stance, such as labelling an offer as “final,”
what can you do? First, do not acknowledge their statement as final. Instead
of saying, “So, if this is your final offer, I guess things are over,” you might
say, “Let me consider your offer and get back to you.” By not acknowledging
the finality of an offer, you provide the other party with an “out” to resume
negotiations later.
• In other situations, you may have to help the other party by finding a face-saving
strategy, perhaps achieved by relabelling some of the terms of the negotiation.

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