IMCAD078 Guidance On Diving Umbilical Management
IMCAD078 Guidance On Diving Umbilical Management
IMCAD078 Guidance On Diving Umbilical Management
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Version History
Date Reason Revision
January 2024 Texts of point 8) of Section 4 and Section 7.1.1 amended for clarity. Appendix 4 Anchor Rev. 0.2
Pattern Checklist added
June 2023 Correction made to Figure 29 Rev. 0.1
May 2023 Initial publication
Guidance on Diving Umbilical Management
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 6
2 Application......................................................................................................................... 7
3 Definitions ......................................................................................................................... 8
4 Philosophy ......................................................................................................................... 9
5 General Umbilical Management ....................................................................................... 10
6 Identification and Treatment of Hazards ........................................................................... 11
6.1 General......................................................................................................................................... 11
6.1.1 Diving Operations from Conventionally Moored Vessels and from Static Structures.... 11
6.1.2 Diving Operations from Vessels Operating in a Dynamically Positioned (DP) Mode ..... 11
6.2 Azimuth Thrusters........................................................................................................................ 12
6.3 Tunnel Thrusters .......................................................................................................................... 13
6.4 Propellers ..................................................................................................................................... 14
6.5 Voith Schneider Propeller (VSP) .................................................................................................. 15
6.6 Miscellaneous Hazards ................................................................................................................ 16
6.6.1 Sea Chests ....................................................................................................................... 16
6.6.2 Taut Wires ....................................................................................................................... 17
6.6.3 Acoustic Beacon Monitoring Equipment ........................................................................ 17
6.6.4 Subsea Structures ........................................................................................................... 18
6.6.5 Platform Structures & Intakes......................................................................................... 18
6.6.6 Tides and Currents .......................................................................................................... 19
7 Main Umbilical ................................................................................................................. 21
7.1 Diving Within an Anchor Pattern ................................................................................................. 21
7.1.1 Safety Principles .............................................................................................................. 21
7.1.2 Mooring Line Identification ............................................................................................ 22
7.1.3 Mooring Line Adjustments.............................................................................................. 22
7.1.4 Permit-to-Work and Reporting Procedures .................................................................... 22
7.1.5 Minimum Operating Clearance ....................................................................................... 22
7.1.6 Position References ........................................................................................................ 23
7.1.7 Operational Plots ............................................................................................................ 23
7.1.8 Checklist .......................................................................................................................... 23
8 Excursion Umbilical .......................................................................................................... 24
8.1 Normal Umbilical Operations ...................................................................................................... 24
8.1.1 General............................................................................................................................ 24
8.1.2 Umbilical ......................................................................................................................... 24
8.2 Extended Umbilical Operations During DP Diving Operations .................................................... 26
8.2.1 Safety Considerations ..................................................................................................... 27
Table of Figures
1 Introduction
The subject of Diving Umbilical Management has previously been covered in IMCA D010 Diving Operations
from Vessels Operating in Dynamically Positioned Mode and Sections 8.22 & 10.3 of IMCA D022 Guidance for
Diving Supervisors. These discuss: length, marking, properties, examination and testing, and the safe
deployment and tending of diving umbilicals from conventionally moored or dynamically positioned (DP)
vessels and static structures.
This document aims to bring these subjects together in one place and expand on the topic of using an in-
water tending point (IWTP) during DP diving operations, ultimately providing a clear explanation of the
calculations required for the restrictions to the length of the excursion umbilical during normal and extended
umbilical DP diving operations.
In order to conduct DP diving operations safely, it is essential to follow the guidance contained within this
document (IMCA D078) as well as that set out in IMCA D010.
2 Application
This guidance is intended to apply internationally, but it is recognised that some countries will have legislation
that requires different standards or practices to be followed. Where local or national laws are more stringent
than the advice contained herein, they will always take precedence over this guidance.
3 Definitions
2D 2 Dimensional
3D Three Dimensional
α Cmax of Deployment Device
β Cmax of IWTP
A Vertical coordinate of the deployment device (Hazard Elevation)
B Horizontal distance between deployment device and IWTP
Bplan Plan dimension between deployment device or IWTP and hazard
Cmax Maximum Excursion Umbilical Length
Cmin Minimum Excursion Umbilical Length
Ctrue True distance (3D) between deployment device or ITWP and hazard datum
DP Dynamic Position
DSV Dive Support Vessel
HiPAP High Precision Acoustic Positioning
IWTP In Water Tend Point
m Metre
nr Number
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
r Radius
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
VSP Voith Schneider Propeller
4 Philosophy
The guidance is applicable to both Saturation and Surface Orientated (Air) Diving.
If the work requires the diver to enter a structure or restricted access area, then this should be subject to a
risk assessment that may indicate a requirement for tending at the entrance by a second working diver.
6.1 General
The primary hazards for consideration are those presented by the vessel itself. Propulsion systems
and unprotected intakes present significant danger should the diver(s) or umbilical(s) come into
contact with them.
6.1.1 Diving Operations from Conventionally Moored Vessels and from Static Structures
Secure isolation of dangerous ships’ machinery must be maintained until diving operations
have ceased and all divers are confirmed to be clear of the water by an authorised person
and by cancellation of the Permit-to-Work / Dive.
If underwater hazards cannot be made safe for any reason, then control measures as
described below for DP diving operations should be put in place.
6.1.2 Diving Operations from Vessels Operating in a Dynamically Positioned (DP) Mode
During DP diving operations it is clearly not possible to isolate all dangerous underwater
hazards. Diver’s umbilicals must be physically restrained to prevent them coming within 5 m
of such hazards. As the bellman/standby diver has to have full access to the working diver
(to facilitate a rescue) they must be able to excurt beyond the working diver by 2 m and so
their umbilical should be restrained at 3 m from the hazard.
For surface orientated diving where the launch positions differ between standby and
working diver(s), the working divers’ umbilical is further restricted to account for the
distance between deployment positions.
This section will outline the specific properties of these hazards and will provide guidance
on how to establish the hazard datum point for the maximum allowed umbilical length
calculations (see Section 8).
An azimuth thruster is a configuration of marine propellers placed in pods that can be rotated to any
horizontal angle (azimuth), making a rudder unnecessary. These give ships better manoeuvrability
than a fixed propeller and rudder system and are necessary on vessels with Dynamic Positional (DP)
capability.
When identifying hazards all thrusters (including drop down thrusters) should be considered with
respect to their status, e.g. lowered or retracted, online / available or isolated. All non-isolated
thrusters must be considered as potential hazards.
Consideration should be given to an as-built verification such as survey during a dry dock.
The kort nozzles on the thruster are to enhance performance, whilst also preventing damage by large
items or debris, and are not necessarily capable of providing protection to divers or their equipment.
These guards should be treated as the outermost edge of the thruster and will be the extent of the
hazard envelope.
For the purposes of the distance to hazard calculations the datum point for the position of the
thruster will be the intersection of the vertical rotation axis and the propeller rotation axis (see
Figure 2):
The hazard envelope will then be a sphere with a radius set by the outermost point of the guard:
A tunnel thruster is a transversal propulsion device built into, or mounted to, either the bow or stern
of a ship to make it more manoeuvrable. Bow thrusters allow the vessel to turn to port or starboard
without using the main propulsion mechanism which requires some forward motion for turning.
Large ships might have multiple bow and stern thrusters.
Tunnel thrusters will generally have some form of grating over the opening to prevent damage by
large items or debris which are not necessarily capable of providing protection to divers or their
equipment.
For the purposes of the distance to hazard calculations the datum point for the position of the
thruster will be the intersection of the propeller rotation axis and the ship’s side. The aperture on
the side of the ship’s hull shall be considered the extent of the hazard envelope. However, to simplify
the calculation, the hazard envelope shall be considered as a sphere with a radius from the datum
point to the edge of the aperture closest to the deployment device.
6.4 Propellers
If azimuth thrusters are not used then the ship will be propelled by shaft propulsion, which is a
mechanical system consisting of an electric motor or engine turning a revolving drive shaft with three
or more broad, angled blades attached to it – a propeller.
Propellers will generally be unprotected and so for the purposes of the distance to hazard
calculations the datum point for the position of the propeller will be the centre of the rotation axis.
The hazard envelope will be a sphere with a diameter of the propeller and this envelope will be
critical for divers’ approach from the stern.
The second hazard point to be considered will be the drive shaft as there may be a section of this
exposed between propeller and the hull.
The datum point for this will be the intersection of the centre of the drive shaft and the forward most
point of the exposed shaft. The envelope will be a sphere with a radius equal to the drive shaft:
The Voith Schneider Propeller is a propulsion system manufactured by Voith Group. Propeller blades
protrude from the rotor casing at right angles and rotate around a vertical axis. The casing is flush
with the vessel hull.
For the purposes of the distance to hazard calculations the datum point shall be taken to be the mid-
point of the blade at the centre of rotation.
Isolation of this type of propulsion system should be carefully considered. Depending on the drive
mechanism this may be free to rotate if de-activated, so some form of mechanical locking should be
assessed if required.
A sea chest is a rectangular or cylindrical recess in the hull to provide an intake reservoir for
piping systems to draw raw water. Many are designed to prevent them being a hazard to
divers and will be protected by removable gratings.
The position and type should be risk assessed to determine if they present a hazard to divers.
Without a risk assessment then all sea chests are to be considered a hazard to divers.
For the purposes of the distance to hazard calculations the datum points for the position of
the sea chest will be corners of the opening on the side closest to the deployment device.
As the corners may be rounded then the intersection of the top & bottom horizontal edge
and the vertical edge shall be taken for calculations.
A constant tension wire runs via a davit to a weight on the seabed. The wire runs through a
wire measuring device, along the davit, through a sensor head pulley and down to the
weight. As the vessel moves, the changing wire length and the angle of the wire to the
vertical give the vessel’s position relative to the weight.
The two elements that present hazards are the weight and the wire.
The weight is very heavy, typically several hundred kilos and so it needs to be deployed
carefully as a moving weight presents a hazard to divers on the seabed.
Problems may occur if there is contact between the bell wire, main and excursion umbilicals,
ROV umbilical or crosshaul and the taut wire.
As the wire position is one of the inputs into the DP system any accidental snagging / moving
of the wire will cause the DP system to react and the vessel will attempt to re-establish
position. This will cause an unplanned vessel movement to occur.
The routing of excursion umbilicals near or past the taut wire should be avoided and good
communication between the Bridge and the Dive Supervisor must take place prior to any
taut wire movements.
For vessel positioning using High Precision Acoustic Positioning (HiPAP), signals are
transmitted from transponders placed on the seabed and received by a transducer beneath
the hull of the vessel.
The position of the transducers should be considered as these can extend 2.7 m below the
vessel hull. These are generally lowered during vessel setup and retracted prior to departure
so therefore should remain down, in a static position, for the duration of diving operations.
These may pose a greater risk when divers are launched through a moonpool and are
working close to the keel of the vessel. A risk assessment should determine if these are to
be added to the restrictions to umbilical lengths.
The lack of visual references on the surface makes diving from a DP vessel on to or close to
a subsea structure potentially hazardous.
The location of subsea structures should be recorded and displayed on the Navigation
Screen. Consideration should be given to providing a reference point to verify their positions,
such as an ROV or marker buoys.
After risk assessment and planning, the location of the bell or basket should take into
account the environmental conditions, the height of the structure, the diver’s entry point (if
applicable), the vessel footprint, available position reference systems and the diver’s upward
and downward excursion limits.
If the diver is entering an enclosed structure, consideration should be given to tending at the
entry point by a second diver. This should be addressed in the risk assessment and included
in the dive plan.
In the risk assessment, consideration should also be given to other potential hazards. These
might include leakage of hydrocarbons or other harmful substances from a wellhead. The
location of the bell or basket, and the diver’s approach should be arranged to ensure that
the prevailing current carries any such substances away safely.
A survey should be carried out to assess potential snagging or other hazards for all areas
within the divers’ potential umbilical excursion sphere.
Platform intakes and outlets should be taken into account when planning operations. In
addition to the suction hazards from intakes; high localised water flow rates, chemical
discharges, aerated water and poor visibility can also be become hazardous at intakes or
outlets.
Where the integrity of a caisson is partially lost, an effective inlet will be created in the
damaged section and, if identified during onsite survey or dive planning, requires to be
considered in the Risk Assessment.
At a minimum, the following information will be required to assess the hazard potential of
any intake/outlet:
discharge composition
flow rate
size of opening
grating or other protective structure spacing
any interdependency of isolation (e.g. for fire pumps A&B, both not permitted to be
isolated together).
IMCA D076 Protection of water intake points for diver safety provides guidance on the design
and configuration of protective structures or guards that may be installed at water intake
points on platform structures to prevent a diver or his umbilical being drawn into a water
inlet.
In addition to the mechanical hazards, the environmental conditions of tides and currents
can affect the divers and umbilicals and should be considered.
The diver’s umbilical is subject to considerable drag. If a diver is working from a bell or wet
bell, with a short umbilical aligned with the current, that diver will suffer far less than a diver
tended from the surface. Other considerations for diving in currents are:
the ability of the surface crew to recover the diver safely after the dive. Conditions on
the surface and at the worksite should be taken into account. Surface current could be
strong enough to carry a bell underneath a vessel and hinder recovery, although the
current at working depth may pose no problem;
the ability of the standby diver to reach the diver in an emergency
the physical strength and endurance of the diver
the type of equipment being used
the type of work being carried out
whether the work is being carried out mid-water or on the seabed
whether both hands are required to carry out the task
changes in strength and direction of the current
the possibility of using an underwater tender, swim lines, etc.
− Note that a diver working in the lee of a structure may not be aware of an
increase in current.
Potential damage to main bell umbilical if contact made with cursor or moonpool
edge.
IMCA D067 suggests the following restrictions on working in currents, but notes that
conditions vary enormously and the restrictions should be applied flexibly, taking into
account diver feedback and operational requirements.
Current 0.0 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.0 & beyond
(knots)
Notes
Diving in currents between 1 and 1.2 knots should not be considered as a normal operation.
Prior to deciding whether or not to conduct a diving operation in the 1 to 1.2 knot range, the diving supervisor
should ensure a suitable and sufficient risk assessment has been carried out, and appropriate risk control
measures implemented, if diving is to be authorised.
The assessment should carefully consider:
the feasibility and practicability of being able to safely deploy and then recover a standby diver, along
with the working diver(s), should an incident occur during such operations; and
all other factors listed above and in Section 5.2 of IMCA D067.
When diving in the 1 to 1.2 knot range a method of constantly monitoring the current speed should be
available to the diving supervisor. Diving activities should be aborted if the current is seen to be increasing
above safe limits.
Tide meters provide accurate information on current at different depths and can be used to
assess diving conditions.
Deflection of deployment devices in currents
Operating in currents or tidal flows may offset the divers’ deployment device or IWTP from
its calculated position invalidating the safe umbilical length calculations. If working in such
conditions due consideration must be taken of the equipment specifications, deployment
geometries and current flows both present and predicted. Some of our members have
observed offsets of the deployment devices of up to 2 metres whilst remaining in diving
workable current conditions. The current and tidal flow induced offsets cannot be predicted
in a general manner to allow for inclusion of detailed guidance. For example, a heavy
streamlined IWTP deployed in shallow water on a short wire will have much lower
displacement from currents than a lightweight, bulky unit deployed on a long wire even if
deployed to the same depth.
The effects of currents can be overcome in several ways and the choice or combination of
methods needs to be engineered for each situation, appropriately risk assessed,
proceduralised and operational personnel familiarised prior to starting operations.
Where operational depth allows, the deployment device or IWTP can be fitted with a survey
beacon(s) to allow its actual location to be plotted and displayed on screen, for the dive
supervisor and DP operators, along with its planned target point to ensure it is deployed in
the correct location.
A simple approach to current and tidal flow induced deflections, is to assess the maximum
offset that will occur and reduce the allowable diver excursion distance appropriately for the
deployment device or IWTP at its worst location. This may be appropriate for easy access job
sites and is the best first approach. Deeper operations with the diver well below the bottom
of the vessel may also be less affected by the change in deployment or IWTP position
minimising the changes required to the umbilical lengths. Again all these variables have to
be fully assessed, engineered and documented to ensure safe operations.
Extended umbilicals are often used to position divers as far as practicable from the vessel
and into structures etc. In such instances more sophisticated controls may need to be used,
e.g. rigging restraining lines to the IWTP to provide a triangulated suspension to maintain the
IWTP in its target location in both present and predicted current and tidal flows.
7 Main Umbilical
The Main Umbilical that services the deployment devices must be considered in relation the potential hazards
in the deployment of a bell through a moonpool or over the side.
During diving operations, it is important to avoid excessive tension or slack in the main umbilical.
Deployment and recovery procedures for the main umbilical should address the management of the umbilical
to prevent:
overloading of the umbilical, either directly or by paying out excessive length, and
snagging or chafing of the umbilical on seabed hazards, the bell itself, or on other obstacles within the
water column – e.g. a mid-water arch, dynamic riser, cursor or moonpool edge.
This becomes increasingly important as the water current increases causing any excessive length to be
displaced from its intended path. Controls, (ROV monitoring, brakes & tension controls etc.) should be in
place to prevent this. The umbilical path through the LARS must be well engineered and free from chafing
and snagging points which can cause or accelerate wear and damage to an umbilical when offset by a current.
In the absence of tension control the umbilical should be secured to the bell wire at regular intervals.
Even when managed correctly, the main bell umbilical may be vulnerable to contact with a suspended asset,
umbilical, riser, anchor chain or mooring line.
In addition to the guidance below, the guidance contained within IMCA D010 Diving Operations from
Vessels Operating in Dynamically Positioned Mode should also be consulted and followed.
Diving within an anchor pattern restricts the movement of the vessel and may introduce
additional hazards. Special consideration should be given to emergency and contingency
procedures during the evaluation, planning and risk assessment of this type of operation.
The primary hazard to be considered when performing manned intervention from a DSV
within an anchor pattern is that in the event of a DP failure or ‘black ship’ incident, when in
the ‘blow-on’/ ’drift-on’ position, the DSV could drift across the mooring catenary.
The environmental forces should be assessed, and the direction and rate of vessel drift taken
into account, along with the distance to the anchor line and the time taken to recover the
bell, including the deepest part of the bell deployment system, to a position above the
catenary. Drift trials and diver recovery trials (with divers at the fullest extent of their
excursion umbilicals) should be conducted to determine whether the vessel would drift onto
the anchor line before recovery of the bell is possible. The Master will assess the
environmental conditions on an ongoing basis and repeat the drift trials if they consider the
environmental parameters have changed to the extent which invalidates the location’s drift
trial values.
When supporting divers from a position inside the mooring pattern of another vessel, drill
rig or offshore installation, it is essential that anchor positions are confirmed by the other
vessel, drill rig or installation, and the position of the mooring lines confirmed by two
independent means, one of which may be by calculation.
On arrival of the DSV it is necessary to survey the anchor positions, chain catenaries,
proximity mooring, and touchdown points.
If a vessel returns to the same location, it is necessary to recheck there has been no change
to these positions. If there have been changes, a new survey will need to be undertaken.
If the risk assessment has indicated that a mooring line can be safely lowered to the seabed,
it is still necessary for the position of the line to be identified, for example, by verifying that
the tension has been lowered at the installation, or by ROV inspection, etc.
The other vessel, rig or installation must not move or adjust mooring line tension or position
during the diving operation. If necessary, the OIM should inform the vessel master of any
environmental changes or proposed draught changes that will affect the catenaries of
mooring lines. This should invoke management of change procedures. The OIM must be
informed prior to moving a mooring line.
The DSV DP operator must be able to monitor the other vessel, rig or installation from which
the mooring lines are deployed at all times, either with radar or by radio. Diving operations
should be stopped immediately if communications to the installation are lost.
A reporting procedure should be established between the vessel master and the OIM to
provide relevant information, such as the operation of other vessels in the area. There
should also be an interface between the permit-to-dive procedure on the vessel and the
permit-to-work system on the other vessel, rig or installation concerning mooring line
adjustment or any other activity that might adversely affect the diving operation.
If the DSV master, the OIM, the diving superintendent, the diving supervisor and the client
agree that a clearance of less than 50 m is essential for executing the work, the following
should be adhered to:
The position of the mooring line should be plotted, and remain traceable throughout
the operation. This can be achieved with an ROV-mounted transponder or other
suitable means.
The time spent with the bell in water with a clearance of less than 50 m should be
minimised.
Twin bell systems should not have their bells deployed simultaneously within the
anchor pattern.
Emergency provision for the loss of the bell needs to be considered during the
evaluation, planning and risk assessment.
Movement at the touchdown point of the mooring line is inevitable, unpredictable and can
result in poor seabed visibility and entrapment of a diver and/or his umbilical. This should
be addressed during the evaluation, planning and risk assessment.
Care should be taken to prevent vessel position reference taut wires from coming into
contact with the mooring lines because this will result in the loss of the seabed position
reference. Seabed DP reference systems can be used to reduce taut wire use.
The on board navigation display system should include the position of mooring lines in an
easy-to-assimilate form. The vessel should also have on board diagrams showing the
catenaries and touchdown points for various mooring-line tensions.
7.1.8 Checklist
8 Excursion Umbilical
8.1.1 General
Normal umbilical operations are when the diver’s umbilical can be tended from:
a tender/bellman located in the deployment device from which the working diver is
deployed
a tender located on the vessel from which the working diver is deployed
a tender located in an additional device deployed from the DSV, either on or above the
surface, such as a stage or gondola.
The working divers’ umbilicals must be securely tended at all times during routine operations
and during any foreseeable emergency intervention. Where an excursion is planned such
that the diver could be brought within range of any physical hazard identified by the risk
assessment (such as vessel thrusters, propellers, water intakes, etc.), that diver’s umbilical
must be physically restrained to prevent it from coming within 5 metres of such hazards.
The reach or length of the bellman / standby diver’s umbilical should be 2 metres greater
than that of the working diver’s umbilical to provide manoeuvrability. At the same time, it
must also be restrained to prevent it coming within 3 metres of any identified hazard. This
rule should apply whether the standby diver is located on the surface, in mid-water, or in a
diving bell.
For surface demand diving operations using a dive cage a common way to control the length
of the umbilical is to use a ‘stopper’ attached to the umbilical. Stoppers are designed not to
be able to pass through the umbilical guide on the dive basket.
For surface diving where the launch positions differ between standby and working diver(s),
the working divers’ umbilical is further restricted to account for the distance between
deployment positions.
8.1.2 Umbilical
Properties
The umbilical may be positively, neutrally or negatively buoyant and any implications of the
umbilical buoyancy should be included in the risk assessment. The use of negatively buoyant
umbilicals may provide an inherently safer operation in some circumstances.
The umbilical also acts as a lifeline and should be strong enough to lift a fully equipped diver
from the water.
Divers’ umbilicals are used in harsh offshore conditions and are frequently immersed in
seawater for extended periods. They are often dragged across submarine structures covered
in sharp and abrasive marine fouling. When handling divers’ lines all dive team members,
including the divers and tenders, should make every effort to protect the umbilicals from
harm. The aim should be to minimise degradation or damage both in the water and on deck.
Surface crew should be strongly discouraged from standing on coiled umbilicals (an all too
familiar sight).
All diving plant and equipment, including diver umbilicals, require regular inspection,
maintenance and testing to ensure every item is fit for purpose and safe to use, e.g. that it
is not damaged or suffering from deterioration. Regular maintenance is an important factor
in ensuring the safe operation of diving equipment. The diving contractor will need to have
an effective system for planned maintenance and should have on site an adequate supply of
spares for all plant and equipment.
IMCA D018 contains comprehensive guidance on the frequency and extent of examination,
testing and certification required for all items of diving plant and equipment used in a diving
project, together with the levels of competence required of those carrying out the work.
Length
In order that the length of umbilical deployed can be monitored, the umbilical should be
marked at appropriate intervals; at least every 10 m and often every 5 m. The system below,
for example, uses a turn of red tape for every 5 m and a turn of black tape for every 10 m. If
the different coloured tapes are also of different widths, it is possible to check umbilical
length by touch in poor visibility.
The working diver, tender and bellman should each monitor the marking and relative
position of the umbilical, and immediately inform the supervisor of any concern regarding
its safety.
Weak Link
In certain circumstances, a diver may secure himself underwater in order to achieve stability.
In such cases, a recommended ‘weak link’ should be used. The means by which the diver’s
umbilical is prevented from coming into contact with a hazard should not be dependent on
this weak link. Refer to IMCA D058 for more details.
The term Extended Umbilical refers to works where an In-Water Tending Point (IWTP) is used to
increase the umbilical length beyond that of normal operations. This may be necessary when access
to worksites are restricted by platform overhangs, flare towers, lifeboats, bridges and such like. This
can be carried out in either saturation or surface diving techniques.
An IWTP can be located mid-water or near the seabed and is a separate device (basket, hoop,
rectangular frame or similar) deployed from the vessel, in addition to the deployment device.
This can be suspended from a cherry picker, crane or working platform on the vessel and must be
able to hold position relative to the vessel if DP failure occurs. It is preferred but not essential that
the IWTP be deployed on a man riding lifting device. The position of the IWTP deployment system
should be taken into account when determining an appropriate steel to steel distance between the
vessel and the platform.
The depth of the IWTP should be maintained at the same depth as the deployment device and this
should be monitored during operations by suitable means.
In an emergency the rescue diver is the bellman or surface standby and their umbilical must be 2 m
longer than that of the working diver.
Prior to the publication of this document, IMCA provided separate guidance for active (manned)
tending at the IWTP and passive (unmanned) tending at the IWTP. It has now been recognised that
there is no need for such separate guidance. This is because, whether manned or unmanned, the
following setup criteria is applicable to both situations, as any diver positioned at the IWTP in a
tending role will still be classified as a working diver.
the IWTP plus 2 metres. The bellman’s umbilical should be pre-attached to the swim line prior
to the last working diver departing the bell stage.
Note: For bell diving, any excess length of the bellman’s umbilical beyond the maximum
allowable must be restrained from being deployed if the bellman releases his umbilical from
storage.
8) Where available, divers should be monitored by ROV when using the IWTP – during setup and
while transiting through.
9) A task-specific risk assessment is carried out and, where appropriate, additional measures
identified are provided.
10) Suitable procedures should be in place, based on the particular circumstances of the diving
operation, to permit recovery of a diver in an emergency.
11) For surface orientated diving consideration should also be given to the safe recovery of the
diver to the surface.
9 Distance Calculations
Once the various hazards have been identified the next stage is to calculate the physical distance between
the hazard and the deployment device or IWTP.
It should be remembered that this needs to be considered in 3-dimensions. The plan distance will remain
constant but the true distance between the 2 points will vary as the depth increases/decreases.
In order to calculate the true distance between the points, two calculations will be required:
1) The plan distance between deployment device & hazard – Bplan (ref. Figure 13).
2) The true distance between deployment device & hazard – Ctrue (ref. Figure 16).
Figure 13 – Bplan Example Between Stbd Bell and Aft Stbd Thruster
It is recognised that CAD packages can be used to draw these distances however the following sections
provide a suggested system for hand calculations.
The positions of all deployment devices, IWTPs, and hazards must be established in relation to each
other, so a suggested method would be to split the vessel into a coordinate grid system.
The vessel centre line would be the X-axis and the transverse frame number zero would be the Y-axis
so the origin (0,0) would be the centre line of frame zero on the vessel construction drawings.
In this grid coordinate system anything forward of frame zero will have a positive ‘X’ value and
anything aft will be negative. For the ‘Y’ coordinate, Port will have a positive ‘Y’ value and Starboard
will be negative:
Vessel drawings should be consulted which will call out positions of thrusters etc. relative to the
frames and offsets from vessel centreline.
This will then give (X,Y) positional coordinates for the hazards and the deployment devices.
The plan distance between any 2 sets of coordinates can then be calculated with the following
formula:
The true distance between the deployment device and the hazard datum can be calculated by a
simple Pythagoras calculation of a right-angled triangle where the hypotenuse is the distance (Ctrue);
the horizontal is plan distance (Bplan) as calculated in Section 9.1; and the vertical distance (A), the
difference in depth between the deployment device and the hazard.
For this calculation we need to know the vertical distance of each hazard above or below the
keel of the vessel.
Vessel construction detailing would usually relate the position with reference to the baseline
of the vessel (normally the underside of the keel) and so it is suggested in this coordinate
system to treat positions above the baseline as having a positive value and those below a
negative value.
In the example below, the position of the tunnel thruster is 2300 A/B (above baseline) –
therefore the value to be used in the calculations should be +2.3 m.
The vertical distance of the deployment device(s) is normally referenced to the water line
and is described as a negative value i.e. bell deployed to -30 m.
The calculation of the vertical distance between the deployment device and the hazard
elevation is a two-stage process in order to account for the draft of the vessel and the depth
of the hazard. For the purposes of this document, vessel draft values are described as
positive.
Note: Vessel drawings are normally based on nominal draft and so the calculations may have
to be revised if the draft changes.
Calculation Steps
1) Calculate the vertical distance between deployment device and keel (baseline) to give
the vertical coordinate of the deployment device:
Note: As the depth is negative the draft value is added. Remember, the signage is important.
Depths are negative, drafts are positive, and hence the vertical coordinate will be negative.
2) Calculate the vertical distance between the deployment device and the selected hazard
(A) by subtracting the vertical coordinate.
Note: Maintaining the signage convention is critical. As the depth is negative the hazard
elevation is subtracted.
We now have 2 sides of the triangle and using Pythagoras we can calculate the true distance
between the deployment device and the hazard:
See Figure 21 – True distance diagram overleaf and also Appendix 1 for a worked example.
With the true distances calculated, the restrictions outlined in section 4 can be applied in order to
calculate the maximum umbilical length (Cmax) allowed:
1) The length of working umbilical allowed must be physically restricted to ensure the diver
cannot reach within 5 m of a hazard.
2) The length of the standby diver/tender umbilical allowed must be physically restricted to
ensure the diver cannot reach within 3 m of a hazard, but can reach beyond the working diver
by 2 m.
The true distances, as described in section 6, are to the hazard datum point therefore the
hazard envelope must now be applied and so this distance must be subtracted from the
umbilical length.
The principle restrictions are then applied and so either 5 m or 3 m must be subtracted
depending whether the working diver or the standby diver is being calculated.
This gives the figure for the Maximum Excursion Umbilical length for that hazard:
Note: All umbilical length calculations should be rounded down to the nearest half metre.
When operating with extended umbilicals then the distance from the IWTP to the nearest
hazard must be considered and a comparison made to the deployment device.
It is not the case that the Cmax from the deployment device can be applied directly at the
IWTP.
The true distance between the IWTP and the hazard should be calculated as per the
deployment device and then the maximum umbilical allowed beyond the IWTP should be
taken as the smaller of the 2 values:
or
β = Cmax of IWTP
In addition to the maximum umbilical allowance, there is also a minimum requirement principle:
When working on extended umbilicals there must be a minimum umbilical allowed to ensure that
the working diver can return to the deployment device without passing through the IWTP. The length
of umbilical beyond the IWTP (Cmin) must be greater or equal to the length of the umbilical between
the deployment device and the IWTP (B) plus 2 metres (Cmin ≥ B+2).
While always ensuring that Cmax is not exceeded, the total length of a deployed umbilical must be
longer than twice the distance between the IWTP and the deployment device plus 2 metres: Total
umbilical ≥ (B x 2) + 2 m.
This principle makes provision so that if the diver is returning to the deployment device, in an
emergency or poor visibility, and misses passing through the IWTP then they can still reach the safe
haven of the deployment device without the need to pass back through the IWTP or unclip their
karabiner from the swim line.
For Surface Orientated Diving the distance to in water hazard calculations remains the same –
however, an additional aspect that needs to be considered when calculating the maximum allowable
umbilical is where the standby diver and working diver are launched from separate deployment
devices.
When dealing with different deployment devices Principle 6) in Section 4 and the distance
between deployment devices must be considered.
The length of the standby / tender umbilical allowed must be physically restricted to ensure
the diver cannot reach within 3 m of a hazard, but can reach beyond the working diver by
2 m.
and
For surface diving where the launch positions differ between standby and working diver(s),
the working divers’ umbilical is further restricted to account for the distance between
deployment positions.
This means that the calculation for the maximum umbilical must be carried out first for the
standby diver at the standby diver deployment device and then the working diver’s umbilical
must be restricted to 2 m less than this calculated value.
The difference in position between the deployment devices must then be applied to the
working diver’s umbilical length to ensure that he does not encroach into the standby diver’s
additional 2m zone.
Working Diver Cmax = Standby Diver Cmax – 2 m – distance between deployment devices
Deduct 2m restriction = -2 m
If the Working Diver’s Maximum Umbilical was applied at his deployment device then his
umbilical length would allow him to encroach into the 2m restriction zone of the standby
diver (see Figure 28).
Therefore, the difference between the deployment devices must be allowed for and
subtracted from the Working Diver’s Umbilical (see Figure 29):
Figure 29 – Working Diver Cmax After Difference Between Deployment Devices Subtracted
If present, the saturation system standby diver (aka the bell intervention diver) should be
assessed in accordance with these rules and an appropriate vessel hazard diagram prepared.
The saturation system standby diver should not be permitted to approach within 3 metres
of a hazard, but as a minimum must be able to safely reach the bell +2 m.
In DP control, the position of ground-based reference systems and their status should also be displayed.
In dive control and, where appropriate, in ROV control, there should also be an indication of the reference
systems used and the various diving-related working lines that have been deployed, e.g. deployment devices,
downlines, cranes, winches, hydraulic and electric lines, taut wires and acoustic transponder locations. The
supervisor should have a method for maintaining a status record of deployment devices.
11 Pre-Job Preparation
Having established the maximum permissible umbilical length(s) for the working depth, the
restrictions to umbilical lengths can be applied.
The umbilicals (working and standby) should be suitably marked and secured at the
maximum length e.g. using a D-ring or stopper device. These devices will prevent the amount
of umbilical deployed exceeding the maximum permissible.
The datum point from which to measure and set the maximum umbilical length (D-ring
position) is the hose end fitting.
When using extended umbilicals an additional constraint is required. This takes the form of
a D-ring on the diver’s excursion umbilical with a sliding maximum excursion karabiner which
is attached to the swim line between the deployment device and IWTP. The swim line D-ring
and its maximum excursion karabiner, the position of which has been calculated as shown
in this document, will limit the diver’s excursion beyond the IWTP by stopping against the
IWTP at the end of the swim line.
The maximum excursion karabiner must never be removed from the swim line until it is
returned to the deployment device and all spare umbilical secured. At no time must the
umbilical be detached with greater than the normally maximum permissible umbilical length
deployed for non-extended umbilical techniques.
The datum point from which to measure and set the maximum umbilical length (D-ring
position) is the hose end fitting.
In order to provide the diver with additional control over depth and direction wherever
swimlines are installed, an additional short restraint is recommended to maintain the diver
in close proximity to the swimline. This can be either an additional karabiner positioned on
the umbilical 3m back from the diver’s harness, or other suitable alternative like the
attachment of a diver rescue tether between the diver and the swimline. Whilst either of
the above methods is suitable, this short restraint is described as the 3m karabiner
throughout this document.
For the attachment to the worksite an expendable breaker or weak link should be used.
When using the IWTP the swim lines should have sufficient tensile strength and be durable material,
such as 6 mm Ø wire rope, 18 mm polypropylene rope or climbing rope.
Swim lines should be made of single lengths in order to minimise snagging potential.
They may differ in colour and be marked for example as: Red – Working Diver 1 & Green – Working
Diver 2.
Additional markings on the vertical members of the IWTP indicating Working Diver 1 and Working
Diver 2 may also be beneficial to aid the standby diver / bellman.
Note: If there is only one Working Diver, then there will only need to be one swim line. Although the
use of 2 lines could be used to stabilise and orientate the IWTP.
The method of attaching the swim lines may differ from vessel to vessel but they are normally
connected between the deployment device clump weight and the In Water Tend Point (IWTP). This
allows subsequent recovery of divers without the requirement to recover the swim lines after each
dive.
13) Tender takes up any umbilical slack (until the maximum excursion karabiner reaches the
basket) and the diver can proceed back to the basket.
14) Once in the basket the diver disconnects the maximum excursion karabiner and the tender
takes up the slack.
15) Diver disconnects the 3m karabiner from the swim line and the basket can be recovered to
surface for diver change out.
All successive divers use the established swim lines and the above methodology for moving between
Basket, ITWP & Worksite.
13 References
i) IMCA D010 Diving operations from vessels operating in dynamically positioned mode
ii) IMCA D018 Code of practice for the initial and periodic examination, testing and certification of diving
plant and equipment
iii) IMCA D058 Diver attachment to structures by means of a weak link.
iv) IMCA D067 The effects of underwater currents on divers’ performance and safety
v) IMCA D076 Protection of water intake points for diver safety
vi) UK HSE Research Report RR761 – Differential pressure hazards in diving
In this example we shall consider the case of twin air dive baskets launched on the port side of a DSV
and their relationship with the nearest thruster. The Fwd basket is the Standby Diver and the Aft
basket the Working Diver and the working depth is -30 msw.
Plan Distances
Drawings (CAD or otherwise) have been consulted and the following plan dimensions from
frame 0 and the vessel centre line were established:
Item X Y
Aft Azi T5 14.875 0.000
Fwd Azi T4 87.725 0.000
Fwd Azi T3 92.874 0.000
Aft Air Basket 62.610 13.400
Fwd Air Basket 64.210 13.400
In our example we will consider the standby diver first and so the plan distance between the
Fwd Air Basket (X1 ,Y1) and the nearest thruster Fwd Azi T4 (X2 ,Y2) so:
The plan distance between can then be calculated with the following formula:
Bplan =√732.575
Bplan = 27.065 m
Elevations
This would now add the Hazard Elevation – vertical dimension (Z) and the hazard radius to
the table:
The vertical difference between the deployment device and the hazard can now be
calculated with the 2 steps in Section 9.2.2:
And then:
A = (-23.75) - (-1.5)
A = -22.25
We now have 2 sides of the triangle and using Pythagoras we can calculate the true distance
between the deployment device and the hazard:
Ctrue =√1227.572
Ctrue = 35.037 m
Ctrue is the distance from the deployment device to the centre of the hazard envelope and
we must now calculate the maximum allowable umbilical by subtracting the radius of the
hazard envelope (hazard radius) and the limitations as per principals 4 & 5 in Section 4 of
this document:
In this example the radius of the hazard envelope is 2.14 m. Therefore, the standby diver’s
maximum umbilical from the Fwd basket at 30 m depth would be:
Cmax = 29.897 m
Cmax = 29.5 m
The working diver’s maximum umbilical can be calculated taking into account the difference
between baskets:
This calculation should be repeated for all hazards and at a range of depths to produce a
hazard diagram as shown in Appendix 2.
Plan Distances
Drawings (CAD or otherwise) have been consulted and the following plan dimensions from
frame 0 and the vessel centre line were established:
Item X Y
Aft Azi T5 14.875 0.000
Fwd Azi T4 87.725 0.000
Fwd Azi T3 92.874 0.000
Aft Air Basket 62.610 13.400
Fwd Air Basket 64.210 13.400
IWTP 49.500 21.500
We must now calculate the true distance between the IWTP and the closest hazard, which
in this case is Aft Azi T5.
The plan distance between can then be calculated with the following formula:
Bplan =√1661.14
Bplan = 40.757 m
Elevations
This would now add the Hazard Elevation – vertical dimension (Z) and the hazard radius to
the table:
The vertical difference between the deployment device and the hazard can now be
calculated with the 2 steps in Section 9.2.2:
And then:
A = (-23.75) - (-1.5)
A = -22.25
We now have 2 sides of the triangle and using Pythagoras we can calculate the true distance
between the IWTP and the hazard:
Ctrue =√2156.196
Ctrue = 46.434 m
Ctrue is the distance from the IWTP to the centre of the hazard envelope and we must now
calculate the maximum allowable umbilical by subtracting the radius of the hazard envelope
(hazard radius) and the limitations as per principals 4 & 5 in Section 4 of this document:
In this example the radius of the hazard envelope is 2.14 m. Therefore, the standby diver’s
maximum umbilical from the IWTP at 30 m depth would be:
Cmax = 41.294 m
Cmax = 41.25 m
However – The maximum umbilical allowed beyond the IWTP is the smaller or either
or
β = Cmax of IWTP
Therefore as α < β the deployment device determines the allowable Cmax beyond the IWTP
so
The working diver’s maximum umbilical can be calculated taking into account the difference
between baskets as per previous example:
When using an IWTP the Minimum Excursion Umbilical Length must be checked (Section
9.4):
Cmin ≥ B+2
Item X Y
Fwd Air Basket 64.210 13.400
IWTP 49.500 21.500
The plan distance between can then be calculated with the following formula:
B=√(14.71)2 + (- 8.1)2
B=√216.38 + 65.61
B=√281.99
B = 16.79 m
= 29.50 m ≥ 18.79 m
= ok
This calculation should be repeated for all hazards and at a range of depths to produce a
hazard diagram as shown in Appendix 2.
Both ends of the swim line attached to basket clump weight and the clump weights deployed.
Diver secures the swim line to the external face and proceeds to job.
To return to the basket diver secures the 3m karabiner to the swim line.
At the basket diver disconnects the 3m karabiner from the swim line.
Basket can be recovered to surface for diver change out with the swim line still in place.
Process repeats for all dives.
Last diver to return takes the swim line back to the basket and secures to the clump weight for recovery.
2 swim lines are connected the IWTP whilst on the surface (to aid orientation of the IWTP).
IWTP positioned close to vessel side and the swim lines are attached to the basket clump weight.
IWTP & clump weight are deployed simultaneously to working depth, confirm depth with ROV.
IWTP to be moved to the correct position, by slewing the lifting device, with the diver monitoring the
tension in the swim lines.
Diver secures the 3m karabiner to the swim line (basket to IWT) and then pulls his umbilical slack from the
surface until the maximum excursion karabiner reaches the basket.
Diver clips the maximum excursion karabiner to the swim line (Basket to IWT), behind the 3m karabiner.
Diver proceeds to the IWTP with both karabiners attached to the swim line, ROV to monitor.
Diver to pull his umbilical slack through the IWTP until the maximum excursion karabiner reaches the IWTP.
Diver can now unclip the 3m karabiner and proceed to the worksite with the 2 nd swim line (IWTP to
worksite).
To return, the process should be reversed.
The GREEN swim line is pre-attached to the bell stage or clump weight and the RED swim line is pre-
attached to the IWTP.
The Bell and the IWTP are deployed to depth with the IWTP close to the vessel side.
When both are at depth Diver 1 takes the GREEN swim line and proceeds to the IWTP and secures it to the
IWTP whilst being tended by the bellman.
Diver 1 then picks up the RED swim line from the IWTP and takes it back to the deployment device and
secures it to the bell stage or clump weight.
With Diver 1 located at the bell stage the IWTP is located into position with the Diver monitoring the
tension in the swim lines.
Once the IWTP is in position Diver 1 should clip his 3m karabiner to the RED swim line and can now proceed
to the IWTP tended by the bellman.
Once Diver 1’s maximum umbilical karabiner exits the bell, Diver 2 clips this to the RED swim line.
Upon reaching the IWTP Diver 1 can pull his umbilical slack, passing it through the IWTP, until the maximum
umbilical karabiner reaches the IWTP.
Diver 2 can then proceed to the IWTP whilst being tended by the bellman.
Once Diver 2 is at the IWTP can pull his umbilical slack, passing it through the IWTP, until the maximum
umbilical karabiner reaches the IWTP.
Diver 1 can now unclip his 3m karabiner and proceed to the worksite taking the swim line, whilst being
tended by Diver 2.
Diver 1 secures the swim line close to a suitable location close to the job.
Diver 2 clips his 3m karabiner to the worksite swim line and proceeds to the job.
To return, the process should be reversed.
Task Yes No
Have written procedures been produced of work scope complete with scaled drawings and
1
are the positions of the anchors and mooring chains/wires accurately identified?
Are the mooring chains/wires catenaries and tensions available? (Determined by calibrated
2
equipment)
Has the ROV as found ‘mooring chains/wires catenaries and debris survey’ been completed?
3
Have the survey results been plotted on the vessel navigational screen?
Is the horizontal clearance between the Bell/Bell wires at least 50 metres from any suspended
4
mooring chain/wire?
If working with the bell / bell wire closer than 50 metres, has a HIRA been agreed that
5
concludes that the operation may proceed? (If no, operation must not proceed)
6 Can the mooring chains/wires within which the DSV will operate be lowered?
7 Is a procedure in place for the emergency lowering of mooring chains/wires?
Has the closest DSV (or vessel with the ability to render assistance) been informed of
8 intensions?
Name of Closest Vessel:
Has a dedicated radio communication channel(s) been established between anchored Rigs,
9
FPSO/Dive control/DSV Bridge/ROV control?
Has agreement been received from the anchored Rig that the DSV will be informed
10 immediately of any proposed or actual change to the anchored Rig draft or mooring
chains/wires tension? No changes without prior agreement!
Has the Bell recovery time from the working depth using the emergency/secondary recovery
11
system been established?
Has the Vessel drift-off distances (direction/time) been plotted against the Bell emergency
recovery time?
12
No diving to take place if the Vessel drift-off time towards mooring chains/wires is less than
the Bell emergency recovery time!
13 Has a pre-determined escape zone(s) been identified on the navigation screens?
Is the PTW documentation in order and issued to the DSV via the OIM on the anchored Rig,
14
FPSO?
15 Is the DP Consequence Analysis active/DP class 2 or 3 operations?
Has the weather status, forecast and weather window been reviewed and agreed satisfactory
16
for the operation?
17 Have the DP and Diving checklists been completed?
18 DSV to inform the anchored Rig control room of Bell left surface and Bell at surface times.
Confirm that working in the anchor pattern when visibility is reduced, or in circumstances
19 where line of sight to the Offshore Structure is reduced/obstructed, has been included in the
HIRA and found to be acceptable.
Task Yes No
No anchored Rig, FPSO ‘over the side lifting’, including crane and derrick operations or other
20 vessel coming in close proximity, are to be allowed unless detailed in the PTW and agreed with
DSV personnel.
21 Twin bell systems should not be deployed simultaneously within the anchor pattern.
22 Master and OM concur that all points are addressed.
If diving with a clearance of less than 50 metres is essential for executing the work, please adhere to the following:
The position of the mooring chain/wire should be plotted and remain traceable throughout
23 the operation. This can be achieved with an ROV-mounted transponder or other suitable
means.
24 The time spent with a clearance of less than 50 metres should be minimised.
Emergency provision for the loss of the bell needs to be considered during the evaluation,
25
planning and risk assessment
Where any items within this checklist are marked with a ‘No’ response, the Master must be immediately informed,
and further reviews and risk assessment conducted to assess if operations may continue.