Thermonuclear weapon

A thermonuclear weapon, fusion weapon or hydrogen bomb

(H bomb) is a second-generation nuclear weapon design. Its greater
sophistication affords it vastly greater destructive power than first-
generation atomic bombs, a more compact size, a lower mass or a
combination of these benefits. Characteristics of nuclear fusion
reactions make possible the use of non-fissile depleted uranium as the
weapon's main fuel, thus allowing more efficient use of scarce fissile
235 239
material such as uranium-235 ( U) or plutonium-239 ( Pu).

Modern fusion weapons consist essentially of two main components: a

235 239
nuclear fission primary stage (fueled by U or Pu) and a separate
A basic diagram of a
nuclear fusion secondary stage containing thermonuclear fuel: the
thermonuclear weapon.
heavy hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium, or in modern weapons
Note: some designs use
lithium deuteride. For this reason, thermonuclear weapons are often
spherical secondaries.
colloquially called hydrogen bombs or H-bombs.[note 1] A) fission primary stage
B) fusion secondary stage
A fusion explosion begins with the detonation of the fission primary 1) High-explosive lenses
stage. Its temperature soars past approximately 100 million Kelvin, 2) Uranium-238 ("tamper") lined
causing it to glow intensely with thermal X-radiation. These X-rays with beryllium reflector
flood the void (the "radiation channel" often filled with polystyrene 3) Vacuum ("levitated core")
foam) between the primary and secondary assemblies placed within an 4) Tritium "boost" gas (blue)
enclosure called a radiation case, which confines the X-ray energy and within plutonium or uranium
resists its outward pressure. The distance separating the two hollow core
assemblies ensures that debris fragments from the fission primary 5) Radiation channel filled with
(which move much slower than X-ray photons) cannot disassemble the polystyrene foam
secondary before the fusion explosion runs to completion. 6) Uranium ("pusher/tamper")
7) Lithium-6 deuteride (fusion
The secondary fusion stage—consisting of outer pusher/tamper, fusion fuel)
fuel filler and central plutonium spark plug—is imploded by the X-ray 8) Plutonium ("spark plug")
energy impinging on its pusher/tamper. This compresses the entire 9) Radiation case (confines
secondary stage and drives up the density of the plutonium spark plug. thermal X-rays by reflection)
The density of the plutonium fuel rises to such an extent that the spark
plug is driven into a supercritical state, and it begins a nuclear fission
chain reaction. The fission products of this chain reaction heat the highly compressed, and thus
superdense, thermonuclear fuel surrounding the spark plug to around 300 million Kelvin, igniting
fusion reactions between fusion fuel nuclei. In modern weapons fueled by lithium deuteride, the
fissioning plutonium spark plug also emits free neutrons which collide with lithium nuclei and supply
the tritium component of the thermonuclear fuel.

The secondary's relatively massive tamper (which resists outward expansion as the explosion proceeds)
also serves as a thermal barrier to keep the fusion fuel filler from becoming too hot, which would spoil
the compression. If made of uranium, enriched uranium or plutonium, the tamper captures fast fusion
neutrons and undergoes fission itself, increasing the overall explosive yield. Additionally, in most
designs the radiation case is also constructed of a fissile material that undergoes fission driven by fast
thermonuclear neutrons. Such bombs are classified as three stage weapons, and most current Teller–
Ulam designs are such fission-fusion-fission weapons. Fast fission of the tamper and radiation case is the
main contribution to the total yield and is the dominant process that produces radioactive fission
product fallout.[1][2]

The first full-scale thermonuclear test was carried out by the United States in 1952; the concept has since
been employed by most of the world's nuclear powers in the design of their weapons.[3] The design of all
modern thermonuclear weapons in the United States is known as the Teller–Ulam configuration for its
two chief contributors, Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam, who developed it in 1951[4] for the United
States, with certain concepts developed with the contribution of physicist John von Neumann. Similar
devices were developed by the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China.

As thermonuclear weapons represent the most efficient design for weapon energy yield in weapons with
yields above 50 kilotons of TNT (210 TJ), virtually all the nuclear weapons of this size deployed by the
five nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty today are thermonuclear weapons using
the Teller–Ulam design.[5]

Contents
Public knowledge concerning nuclear weapon design
Basic principle
Summary
Compression of the secondary
Radiation pressure
Foam plasma pressure
Tamper-pusher ablation
Comparing implosion mechanisms
Design variations
History
United States
Soviet Union
United Kingdom
China
France
India
Israel
Pakistan
North Korea
Public knowledge
DOE statements
The Progressive case
Nuclear reduction
Notable accidents
Variations
Ivy Mike
 W88
See also
Notes
References
Further reading
Basic principles
History
Analyzing fallout
External links
Principles
History

Public knowledge concerning nuclear weapon design

Detailed knowledge of fission and fusion weapons is classified to some
degree in virtually every industrialized nation. In the United States, such
knowledge can by default be classified as "Restricted Data", even if it is
created by persons who are not government employees or associated with
weapons programs, in a legal doctrine known as "born secret" (though the
constitutional standing of the doctrine has been at times called into
question; see United States v. Progressive, Inc.). Born secret is rarely
invoked for cases of private speculation. The official policy of the United
States Department of Energy has been not to acknowledge the leaking of
design information, as such acknowledgment would potentially validate the
information as accurate. In a small number of prior cases, the U.S.
government has attempted to censor weapons information in the public
press, with limited success.[6] According to the New York Times, physicist
Kenneth W. Ford defied government orders to remove classified Edward Teller in 1958
information from his book, Building the H Bomb: A Personal History. Ford
claims he used only pre-existing information and even submitted a
manuscript to the government, which wanted to remove entire sections of the book for concern that
foreign nations could use the information.[7]

Though large quantities of vague data have been officially released, and larger quantities of vague data
have been unofficially leaked by former bomb designers, most public descriptions of nuclear weapon
design details rely to some degree on speculation, reverse engineering from known information, or
comparison with similar fields of physics (inertial confinement fusion is the primary example). Such
processes have resulted in a body of unclassified knowledge about nuclear bombs that is generally
consistent with official unclassified information releases, related physics, and is thought to be internally
consistent, though there are some points of interpretation that are still considered open. The state of
public knowledge about the Teller–Ulam design has been mostly shaped from a few specific incidents
outlined in a section below.

Basic principle
The basic principle of the Teller–Ulam configuration is the idea that different parts of a thermonuclear
weapon can be chained together in "stages", with the detonation of each stage providing the energy to
ignite the next stage. At a bare minimum, this implies a primary section that consists of an implosion-
type fission bomb (a "trigger"), and a secondary section that consists of fusion fuel. The energy released
by the primary compresses the secondary through a process called "radiation implosion", at which point
it is heated and undergoes nuclear fusion. This process could be continued, with energy from the
secondary igniting a third fusion stage; Russia's AN602 "Tsar Bomba" is thought to have been a three-
stage fission-fusion-fusion device. Theoretically by continuing this process thermonuclear weapons with
arbitrarily high yield could be constructed. This contrasts with fission weapons which are limited in yield
because only so much fission fuel can be amassed in one place before the danger of its accidentally
becoming supercritical becomes too great.

Surrounding the other components is a hohlraum or

radiation case, a container that traps the first stage
or primary's energy inside temporarily. The outside
of this radiation case, which is also normally the
outside casing of the bomb, is the only direct visual
evidence publicly available of any thermonuclear
bomb component's configuration. Numerous
photographs of various thermonuclear bomb
exteriors have been declassified.[8]

The primary is thought to be a standard implosion

One possible version of the Teller–Ulam configuration
method fission bomb, though likely with a core
boosted by small amounts of fusion fuel (usually
50/50% deuterium/tritium gas) for extra efficiency;
the fusion fuel releases excess neutrons when heated and compressed, inducing additional fission. When
239 235
fired, the Pu or U core would be compressed to a smaller sphere by special layers of conventional
high explosives arranged around it in an explosive lens pattern, initiating the nuclear chain reaction that
powers the conventional "atomic bomb".

The secondary is usually shown as a column of fusion fuel and other components wrapped in many
238
layers. Around the column is first a "pusher-tamper", a heavy layer of uranium-238 ( U) or lead that
helps compress the fusion fuel (and, in the case of uranium, may eventually undergo fission itself).
Inside this is the fusion fuel itself, usually a form of lithium deuteride, which is used because it is easier
to weaponize than liquefied tritium/deuterium gas. This dry fuel, when bombarded by neutrons,
produces tritium, a heavy isotope of hydrogen which can undergo nuclear fusion, along with the
deuterium present in the mixture. (See the article on nuclear fusion for a more detailed technical
discussion of fusion reactions.) Inside the layer of fuel is the "spark plug", a hollow column of fissile
239 235
material ( Pu or U) often boosted by deuterium gas. The spark plug, when compressed, can itself
undergo nuclear fission (because of the shape, it is not a critical mass without compression). The
tertiary, if one is present, would be set below the secondary and probably be made up of the same
materials.[9][10]

Separating the secondary from the primary is the interstage. The fissioning primary produces four types
of energy: 1) expanding hot gases from high explosive charges that implode the primary; 2) superheated
plasma that was originally the bomb's fissile material and its tamper; 3) the electromagnetic radiation;
and 4) the neutrons from the primary's nuclear detonation. The interstage is responsible for accurately
modulating the transfer of energy from the primary to the secondary. It must direct the hot gases,
plasma, electromagnetic radiation and neutrons toward the right place at the right time. Less than
optimal interstage designs have resulted in the secondary failing to work entirely on multiple shots,
known as a "fissile fizzle". The Castle Koon shot of Operation Castle is a good example; a small flaw
allowed the neutron flux from the primary to prematurely begin heating the secondary, weakening the
compression enough to prevent any fusion.

Classified paper by Teller and Ulam on March 9, 1951: On Heterocatalytic Detonations I: Hydrodynamic Lenses and
Radiation Mirrors, in which they proposed their revolutionary staged implosion idea. This declassified version is
extensively redacted.

There is very little detailed information in the open literature about the mechanism of the interstage.
One of the best sources is a simplified diagram of a British thermonuclear weapon similar to the
American W80 warhead. It was released by Greenpeace in a report titled "Dual Use Nuclear
Technology".[11] The major components and their arrangement are in the diagram, though details are
almost absent; what scattered details it does include likely have intentional omissions or inaccuracies.
They are labeled "End-cap and Neutron Focus Lens" and "Reflector Wrap"; the former channels
235 239
neutrons to the U/ Pu Spark Plug while the latter refers to an X-ray reflector; typically a cylinder
made out of an X-ray opaque material such as uranium with the primary and secondary at either end. It
does not reflect like a mirror; instead, it gets heated to a high temperature by the X-ray flux from the
primary, then it emits more evenly spread X-rays that travel to the secondary, causing what is known as
radiation implosion. In Ivy Mike, gold was used as a coating over the uranium to enhance the blackbody
effect.[12] Next comes the "Reflector/Neutron Gun Carriage". The reflector seals the gap between the
Neutron Focus Lens (in the center) and the outer casing near the primary. It separates the primary from
the secondary and performs the same function as the previous reflector. There are about six neutron
guns (seen here from Sandia National Laboratories[13]) each protruding through the outer edge of the
reflector with one end in each section; all are clamped to the carriage and arranged more or less evenly
around the casing's circumference. The neutron guns are tilted so the neutron emitting end of each gun
end is pointed towards the central axis of the bomb. Neutrons from each neutron gun pass through and
are focused by the neutron focus lens towards the centre of primary in order to boost the initial
fissioning of the plutonium. A "polystyrene Polarizer/Plasma Source" is also shown (see below).

The first U.S. government document to mention the interstage was only recently released to the public
promoting the 2004 initiation of the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program. A graphic includes blurbs
describing the potential advantage of a RRW on a part by part level, with the interstage blurb saying a
new design would replace "toxic, brittle material" and "expensive 'special' material... [which require]
unique facilities".[14] The "toxic, brittle material" is widely assumed to be beryllium which fits that
description and would also moderate the neutron flux from the primary. Some material to absorb and re-
radiate the X-rays in a particular manner may also be used.[15]
Candidates for the "special material" are polystyrene and a substance called "FOGBANK", an
unclassified codename. FOGBANK's composition is classified, though aerogel has been suggested as a
possibility. It was first used in thermonuclear weapons with the W-76 thermonuclear warhead, and
produced at a plant in the Y-12 Complex at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for use in the W-76. Production of
FOGBANK lapsed after the W-76 production run ended. The W-76 Life Extension Program required
more FOGBANK to be made. This was complicated by the fact that the original FOGBANK's properties
weren't fully documented, so a massive effort was mounted to re-invent the process. An impurity crucial
to the properties of the old FOGBANK was omitted during the new process. Only close analysis of new
and old batches revealed the nature of that impurity. The manufacturing process used acetonitrile as a
solvent, which led to at least three evacuations of the FOGBANK plant in 2006. Widely used in the
petroleum and pharmaceutical industries, acetonitrile is flammable and toxic. Y-12 is the sole producer
of FOGBANK.[16]

Summary

A simplified summary of the above explanation is:

1. An implosion assembly type of fission bomb explodes. This is the primary stage. If a small amount of
deuterium/tritium gas is placed inside the primary's core, it will be compressed during the explosion
and a nuclear fusion reaction will occur; the released neutrons from this fusion reaction will induce
239 235
further fission in the Pu or U used in the primary stage. The use of fusion fuel to enhance the
efficiency of a fission reaction is called boosting. Without boosting, a large portion of the fissile
material will remain unreacted; the Little Boy and Fat Man bombs had an efficiency of only 1.4% and
17%, respectively, because they were unboosted.
2. Energy released in the primary stage is transferred to the secondary (or fusion) stage. The exact
mechanism whereby this happens is highly classified. This energy compresses the fusion fuel and
sparkplug; the compressed sparkplug becomes critical and undergoes a fission chain reaction,
further heating the compressed fusion fuel to a high enough temperature to induce fusion, and also
supplying neutrons that react with lithium to create tritium for fusion.
3. The fusion fuel of the secondary stage may be surrounded by uranium or enriched uranium, or
plutonium. Fast neutrons generated by fusion can induce fission even in materials normally not
238
prone to it, such as depleted uranium whose U is not fissile and cannot sustain a chain reaction,
but which is fissionable when bombarded by the high-energy neutrons released by fusion in the
secondary stage. This process provides considerable energy yield (as much as half of the total yield
in large devices). Although it is sometimes considered to be a separate stage, it should not be
confused with a true tertiary stage. Tertiary stages are further fusion stages (see below), which have
been put in only a handful of bombs, none of them in large-scale production.

Thermonuclear weapons may or may not use a boosted primary stage, use different types of fusion fuel,
and may surround the fusion fuel with beryllium (or another neutron reflecting material) instead of
depleted uranium to prevent early premature fission from occurring before the secondary is optimally
compressed.

Compression of the secondary

The basic idea of the Teller–Ulam configuration is that each "stage" would undergo fission or fusion (or
both) and release energy, much of which would be transferred to another stage to trigger it. How exactly
the energy is "transported" from the primary to the secondary has been the subject of some
disagreement in the open press, but is thought to be transmitted through the X-rays and Gamma rays
that are emitted from the fissioning primary. This energy is then used to compress the secondary. The
crucial detail of how the X-rays create the pressure is the main remaining disputed point in the
unclassified press. There are three proposed theories:

Radiation pressure exerted by the X-rays. This was the first idea put forth by Howard Morland in the
article in The Progressive.
X-rays creating a plasma in the radiation channel's filler (a polystyrene or "FOGBANK" plastic foam).
This was a second idea put forward by Chuck Hansen and later by Howard Morland.
Tamper/Pusher ablation. This is the concept best supported by physical analysis.

Radiation pressure

The radiation pressure exerted by the large quantity of X-ray photons inside the closed casing might be
enough to compress the secondary. Electromagnetic radiation such as X-rays or light carries momentum
and exerts a force on any surface it strikes. The pressure of radiation at the intensities seen in everyday
life, such as sunlight striking a surface, is usually imperceptible, but at the extreme intensities found in a
thermonuclear bomb the pressure is enormous.

For two thermonuclear bombs for which the general size and primary characteristics are well
understood, the Ivy Mike test bomb and the modern W-80 cruise missile warhead variant of the W-61
design, the radiation pressure was calculated to be 73 million bars (7.3 trillion pascals) for the Ivy Mike
design and 1,400 million bars (140 trillion pascals) for the W-80.[17]

Foam plasma pressure

Foam plasma pressure is the concept that Chuck Hansen introduced during the Progressive case, based
on research that located declassified documents listing special foams as liner components within the
radiation case of thermonuclear weapons.

The sequence of firing the weapon (with the foam) would be as follows:

1. The high explosives surrounding the core of the primary fire, compressing the fissile material into a
supercritical state and beginning the fission chain reaction.
2. The fissioning primary emits thermal X-rays, which "reflect" along the inside of the casing, irradiating
the polystyrene foam.
3. The irradiated foam becomes a hot plasma, pushing against the tamper of the secondary,
compressing it tightly, and beginning the fission chain reaction in the spark plug.
4. Pushed from both sides (from the primary and the spark plug), the lithium deuteride fuel is highly
compressed and heated to thermonuclear temperatures. Also, by being bombarded with neutrons,
each lithium-6 (Li6) atom splits into one tritium atom and one alpha particle. Then begins a fusion
reaction between the tritium and the deuterium, releasing even more neutrons, and a huge amount
of energy.
5. The fuel undergoing the fusion reaction emits a large flux of high energy neutrons
238 238
(17.6 MeV [2.82 pJ]), which irradiates the U tamper (or the U bomb casing), causing it to
undergo a fast fission reaction, providing about half of the total energy.

This would complete the fission-fusion-fission sequence. Fusion, unlike fission, is relatively "clean"—it
releases energy but no harmful radioactive products or large amounts of nuclear fallout. The fission
reactions though, especially the last fission reactions, release a tremendous amount of fission products
and fallout. If the last fission stage is omitted, by replacing the uranium tamper with one made of lead,
for example, the overall explosive force is reduced by approximately half but the amount of fallout is
relatively low. The neutron bomb is a hydrogen bomb with an intentionally thin tamper, allowing most
of the fast fusion neutrons as possible to escape.

Foam plasma mechanism firing sequence.

A. Warhead before firing; primary (fission bomb) at top, secondary (fusion fuel) at bottom, all
suspended in polystyrene foam.
B. High-explosive fires in primary, compressing plutonium core into supercriticality and beginning
a fission reaction.
C. Fission primary emits X-rays that are scattered along the inside of the casing, irradiating the
polystyrene foam.
D. Polystyrene foam becomes plasma, compressing secondary, and plutonium sparkplug begins
to fission.
3
E. Compressed and heated, lithium-6 deuteride fuel produces tritium ( H) and begins the fusion
238
reaction. The neutron flux produced causes the U tamper to fission. A fireball starts to form.

Current technical criticisms of the idea of "foam plasma pressure" focus on unclassified analysis from
similar high energy physics fields that indicate that the pressure produced by such a plasma would only
be a small multiplier of the basic photon pressure within the radiation case, and also that the known
foam materials intrinsically have a very low absorption efficiency of the gamma ray and X-ray radiation
from the primary. Most of the energy produced would be absorbed by either the walls of the radiation
case or the tamper around the secondary. Analyzing the effects of that absorbed energy led to the third
mechanism: ablation.

Tamper-pusher ablation

The outer casing of the secondary assembly is called the "tamper-pusher". The purpose of a tamper in an
implosion bomb is to delay the expansion of the reacting fuel supply (which is very hot dense plasma)
until the fuel is fully consumed and the explosion runs to completion. The same tamper material serves
also as a pusher in that it is the medium by which the outside pressure (force acting on the surface area
of the secondary) is transferred to the mass of fusion fuel.
The proposed tamper-pusher ablation mechanism posits that the outer layers of the thermonuclear
secondary's tamper-pusher are heated so extremely by the primary's X-ray flux that they expand
violently and ablate away (fly off). Because total momentum is conserved, this mass of high velocity
ejecta impels the rest of the tamper-pusher to recoil inwards with tremendous force, crushing the fusion
fuel and the spark plug. The tamper-pusher is built robustly enough to insulate the fusion fuel from the
extreme heat outside; otherwise the compression would be spoiled.

Ablation mechanism firing sequence.

1. Warhead before firing. The nested spheres at the top are the fission primary; the cylinders
below are the fusion secondary device.
2. Fission primary's explosives have detonated and collapsed the primary's fissile pit.
3. The primary's fission reaction has run to completion, and the primary is now at several million
degrees and radiating gamma and hard X-rays, heating up the inside of the hohlraum and the
shield and secondary's tamper.
4. The primary's reaction is over and it has expanded. The surface of the pusher for the
secondary is now so hot that it is also ablating or expanding away, pushing the rest of the
secondary (tamper, fusion fuel, and fissile spark plug) inwards. The spark plug starts to fission.
Not depicted: the radiation case is also ablating and expanding outwards (omitted for clarity of
diagram).
5. The secondary's fuel has started the fusion reaction and shortly will burn up. A fireball starts to
form.

Rough calculations for the basic ablation effect are relatively simple: the energy from the primary is
distributed evenly onto all of the surfaces within the outer radiation case, with the components coming
to a thermal equilibrium, and the effects of that thermal energy are then analyzed. The energy is mostly
deposited within about one X-ray optical thickness of the tamper/pusher outer surface, and the
temperature of that layer can then be calculated. The velocity at which the surface then expands
outwards is calculated and, from a basic Newtonian momentum balance, the velocity at which the rest of
the tamper implodes inwards.
Applying the more detailed form of those calculations to the Ivy Mike device yields vaporized pusher gas
expansion velocity of 290 kilometres per second (180 mi/s) and an implosion velocity of perhaps
400 km/s (250 mi/s) if 3⁄4 of the total tamper/pusher mass is ablated off, the most energy efficient
proportion. For the W-80 the gas expansion velocity is roughly 410 km/s (250 mi/s) and the implosion
velocity 570 km/s (350 mi/s). The pressure due to the ablating material is calculated to be 5.3 billion
bars (530 trillion pascals) in the Ivy Mike device and 64 billion bars (6.4 quadrillion pascals) in the W-
80 device.[17]

Comparing implosion mechanisms

Comparing the three mechanisms proposed, it can be seen that:

Pressure (TPa)
Mechanism
Ivy Mike W80
Radiation pressure 7.3 140
Plasma pressure 35 750
Ablation pressure 530 6400

The calculated ablation pressure is one order of magnitude greater than the higher proposed plasma
pressures and nearly two orders of magnitude greater than calculated radiation pressure. No mechanism
to avoid the absorption of energy into the radiation case wall and the secondary tamper has been
suggested, making ablation apparently unavoidable. The other mechanisms appear to be unneeded.

United States Department of Defense official declassification reports indicate that foamed plastic
materials are or may be used in radiation case liners, and despite the low direct plasma pressure they
may be of use in delaying the ablation until energy has distributed evenly and a sufficient fraction has
reached the secondary's tamper/pusher.[18]

Richard Rhodes' book Dark Sun stated that a 1-inch-thick (25 mm) layer of plastic foam was fixed to the
lead liner of the inside of the Ivy Mike steel casing using copper nails. Rhodes quotes several designers of
that bomb explaining that the plastic foam layer inside the outer case is to delay ablation and thus recoil
of the outer case: if the foam were not there, metal would ablate from the inside of the outer case with a
large impulse, causing the casing to recoil outwards rapidly. The purpose of the casing is to contain the
explosion for as long as possible, allowing as much X-ray ablation of the metallic surface of the
secondary stage as possible, so it compresses the secondary efficiently, maximizing the fusion yield.
Plastic foam has a low density, so causes a smaller impulse when it ablates than metal does.[18]

Design variations
A number of possible variations to the weapon design have been proposed:
235
Either the tamper or the casing have been proposed to be made of U (highly enriched uranium) in
235
the final fission jacket. The far more expensive U is also fissionable with fast neutrons like the
238 235
U in depleted or natural uranium, but its fission-efficiency is higher. This is because U nuclei
238
also undergo fission by slow neutrons ( U nuclei require a minimum energy of about 1
megaelectronvolt (0.16 pJ) 1 mega-electron volt), and because these slower neutrons are produced
235 235
by other fissioning U nuclei in the jacket (in other words, U supports the nuclear chain reaction
 238 235 238
whereas U does not). Furthermore, a U jacket fosters neutron multiplication, whereas U
nuclei consume fusion neutrons in the fast-fission process. Using a final fissionable/fissile jacket of
235
U would thus increase the yield of a Teller–Ulam bomb above a depleted uranium or natural
uranium jacket. This has been proposed specifically for the W87 warheads retrofitted to currently
deployed LGM-30 Minuteman III ICBMs.
In some descriptions, additional internal structures exist to protect the secondary from receiving
excessive neutrons from the primary.
The inside of the casing may or may not be specially machined to "reflect" the X-rays. X-ray
"reflection" is not like light reflecting off of a mirror, but rather the reflector material is heated by the
X-rays, causing the material itself to emit X-rays, which then travel to the secondary.

Two special variations exist that will be discussed in a subsequent section: the cryogenically cooled liquid
deuterium device used for the Ivy Mike test, and the putative design of the W88 nuclear warhead—a
small, MIRVed version of the Teller–Ulam configuration with a prolate (egg or watermelon shaped)
primary and an elliptical secondary.

Most bombs do not apparently have tertiary "stages"—that is, third compression stage(s), which are
additional fusion stages compressed by a previous fusion stage. (The fissioning of the last blanket of
uranium, which provides about half the yield in large bombs, does not count as a "stage" in this
terminology.)

The U.S. tested three-stage bombs in several explosions (see Operation Redwing) but is thought to have
fielded only one such tertiary model, i.e., a bomb in which a fission stage, followed by a fusion stage,
finally compresses yet another fusion stage. This U.S. design was the heavy but highly efficient (i.e.,
nuclear weapon yield per unit bomb weight) 25 Mt (100 PJ) B41 nuclear bomb.[19] The Soviet Union is
thought to have used multiple stages (including more than one tertiary fusion stage) in their 50 Mt
(210 PJ) (100 Mt (420 PJ) in intended use) Tsar Bomba (however, as with other bombs, the fissionable
jacket could be replaced with lead in such a bomb, and in this one, for demonstration, it was). If any
hydrogen bombs have been made from configurations other than those based on the Teller–Ulam
design, the fact of it is not publicly known. (A possible exception to this is the Soviet early Sloika design).

In essence, the Teller–Ulam configuration relies on at least two instances of implosion occurring: first,
the conventional (chemical) explosives in the primary would compress the fissile core, resulting in a
fission explosion many times more powerful than that which chemical explosives could achieve alone
(first stage). Second, the radiation from the fissioning of the primary would be used to compress and
ignite the secondary fusion stage, resulting in a fusion explosion many times more powerful than the
fission explosion alone. This chain of compression could conceivably be continued with an arbitrary
number of tertiary fusion stages, each igniting more fusion fuel in the next stage[20](pp192–193)[21]
although this is debated (see more: Arbitrarily large yield debate). Finally, efficient bombs (but not so-
called neutron bombs) end with the fissioning of the final natural uranium tamper, something that could
not normally be achieved without the neutron flux provided by the fusion reactions in secondary or
tertiary stages. Such designs are suggested to be capable of being scaled up to an arbitrary large yield
(with apparently as many fusion stages as desired),[20](pp192–193)[21] potentially to the level of a
"doomsday device." However, usually such weapons were not more than a dozen megatons, which was
generally considered enough to destroy even the most hardened practical targets (for example, a control
facility such as the Cheyenne Mountain Complex). Even such large bombs have been replaced by
smaller-yield bunker buster type nuclear bombs (see more: nuclear bunker buster).

As discussed above, for destruction of cities and non-hardened targets, breaking the mass of a single
missile payload down into smaller MIRV bombs, in order to spread the energy of the explosions into a
"pancake" area, is far more efficient in terms of area-destruction per unit of bomb energy. This also
applies to single bombs deliverable by cruise missile or other system, such as a bomber, resulting in most
operational warheads in the U.S. program having yields of less than 500 kt (2,100 TJ).

History

United States

The idea of a thermonuclear fusion bomb ignited by a smaller fission bomb was first proposed by Enrico
Fermi to his colleague Edward Teller when they were talking at Columbia University in September
1941,[12](p207) at the start of what would become the Manhattan Project.[4] Teller spent much of the
Manhattan Project attempting to figure out how to make the design work, preferring it to work on the
atomic bomb, and over the last year of the project was assigned exclusively to the task.[12](pp117,248)
However once World War II ended, there was little impetus to devote many resources to the Super, as it
was then known.[22](p202)

The first atomic bomb test by the Soviet Union in August 1949 came earlier than expected by Americans,
and over the next several months there was an intense debate within the U.S. government, military, and
scientific communities regarding whether to proceed with development of the far more powerful
Super.[23](pp1–2) The debate covered matters that were alternatively strategic, pragmatic, and
moral.[23](p16) On January 31, 1950, President Harry S. Truman made the decision to go forward with
the development of the new weapon.[22](pp212–214)

But deciding to do it did not make it a reality, and Teller and other U.S.
physicists struggled to find a workable design.[23](pp91–92) Stanislaw Ulam,
a co-worker of Teller, made the first key conceptual leaps towards a
workable fusion design. Ulam's two innovations that rendered the fusion
bomb practical were that compression of the thermonuclear fuel before
extreme heating was a practical path towards the conditions needed for
fusion, and the idea of staging or placing a separate thermonuclear
component outside a fission primary component, and somehow using the
primary to compress the secondary. Teller then realized that the gamma
and X-ray radiation produced in the primary could transfer enough energy
into the secondary to create a successful implosion and fusion burn, if the
whole assembly was wrapped in a hohlraum or radiation case.[4] Teller and Operation Castle
his various proponents and detractors later disputed the degree to which thermonuclear test, Castle
Ulam had contributed to the theories underlying this mechanism. Indeed, Romeo shot
shortly before his death, and in a last-ditch effort to discredit Ulam's
contributions, Teller claimed that one of his own "graduate students" had
proposed the mechanism.

The "George" shot of Operation Greenhouse of 9 May 1951 tested the basic concept for the first time on a
very small scale. As the first successful (uncontrolled) release of nuclear fusion energy, which made up a
small fraction of the 225 kt (940 TJ) total yield,[24] it raised expectations to a near certainty that the
concept would work.

On November 1, 1952, the Teller–Ulam configuration was tested at full scale in the "Ivy Mike" shot at an
island in the Enewetak Atoll, with a yield of 10.4 Mt (44 PJ) (over 450 times more powerful than the
bomb dropped on Nagasaki during World War II). The device, dubbed the Sausage, used an extra-large
fission bomb as a "trigger" and liquid deuterium—kept in its liquid state by 20 short tons (18 t) of
cryogenic equipment—as its fusion fuel, and weighed around 80 short tons (73 t) altogether.
The liquid deuterium fuel of Ivy Mike was impractical for a deployable weapon, and the next advance
was to use a solid lithium deuteride fusion fuel instead. In 1954 this was tested in the "Castle Bravo" shot
(the device was code-named Shrimp), which had a yield of 15 Mt (63 PJ) (2.5 times expected) and is the
largest U.S. bomb ever tested.

Efforts in the United States soon shifted towards developing miniaturized Teller–Ulam weapons that
could fit into intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. By 1960, with
the W47 warhead[25] deployed on Polaris ballistic missile submarines, megaton-class warheads were as
small as 18 inches (0.46 m) in diameter and 720 pounds (330 kg) in weight. Further innovation in
miniaturizing warheads was accomplished by the mid-1970s, when versions of the Teller–Ulam design
were created that could fit ten or more warheads on the end of a small MIRVed missile (see the section
on the W88 below).[8]

Soviet Union

The first Soviet fusion design, developed by Andrei Sakharov and Vitaly Ginzburg in 1949 (before the
Soviets had a working fission bomb), was dubbed the Sloika, after a Russian layer cake, and was not of
the Teller–Ulam configuration. It used alternating layers of fissile material and lithium deuteride fusion
fuel spiked with tritium (this was later dubbed Sakharov's "First Idea"). Though nuclear fusion might
have been technically achievable, it did not have the scaling property of a "staged" weapon. Thus, such a
design could not produce thermonuclear weapons whose explosive yields could be made arbitrarily large
(unlike U.S. designs at that time). The fusion layer wrapped around the fission core could only
moderately multiply the fission energy (modern Teller–Ulam designs can multiply it 30-fold).
Additionally, the whole fusion stage had to be imploded by conventional explosives, along with the
fission core, substantially multiplying the amount of chemical explosives needed.

The first Sloika design test, RDS-6s, was detonated in 1953 with a yield equivalent to 400 kt (1,700 TJ)
(15%-20% from fusion). Attempts to use a Sloika design to achieve megaton-range results proved
unfeasible. After the United States tested the "Ivy Mike" thermonuclear device in November 1952,
proving that a multimegaton bomb could be created, the Soviets searched for an alternative design. The
"Second Idea", as Sakharov referred to it in his memoirs, was a previous proposal by Ginzburg in
November 1948 to use lithium deuteride in the bomb, which would, in the course of being bombarded by
neutrons, produce tritium and free deuterium.[26](p299) In late 1953 physicist Viktor Davidenko achieved
the first breakthrough, that of keeping the primary and secondary parts of the bombs in separate pieces
("staging"). The next breakthrough was discovered and developed by Sakharov and Yakov Zel'dovich,
that of using the X-rays from the fission bomb to compress the secondary before fusion ("radiation
implosion"), in early 1954. Sakharov's "Third Idea", as the Teller–Ulam design was known in the USSR,
was tested in the shot "RDS-37" in November 1955 with a yield of 1.6 Mt (6.7 PJ).

The Soviets demonstrated the power of the "staging" concept in October 1961, when they detonated the
massive and unwieldy Tsar Bomba, a 50 Mt (210 PJ) hydrogen bomb that derived almost 97% of its
energy from fusion. It was the largest nuclear weapon developed and tested by any country.

United Kingdom

In 1954 work began at Aldermaston to develop the British fusion bomb, with Sir William Penney in
charge of the project. British knowledge on how to make a thermonuclear fusion bomb was rudimentary,
and at the time the United States was not exchanging any nuclear knowledge because of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946. However, the British were allowed to observe the U.S.
Castle tests and used sampling aircraft in the mushroom clouds, providing
them with clear, direct evidence of the compression produced in the
secondary stages by radiation implosion.[27]

Because of these difficulties, in 1955 British prime minister Anthony Eden

agreed to a secret plan, whereby if the Aldermaston scientists failed or were
greatly delayed in developing the fusion bomb, it would be replaced by an
extremely large fission bomb.[27]

In 1957 the Operation Grapple tests were carried out. The first test, Green
Granite was a prototype fusion bomb, but failed to produce equivalent
yields compared to the U.S. and Soviets, achieving only approximately
300 kt (1,300 TJ). The second test Orange Herald was the modified fission Operation Grapple on
bomb and produced 720 kt (3,000 TJ)—making it the largest fission Christmas Island was the
explosion ever. At the time almost everyone (including the pilots of the first British hydrogen bomb
test.
plane that dropped it) thought that this was a fusion bomb. This bomb was
put into service in 1958. A second prototype fusion bomb Purple Granite
was used in the third test, but only produced approximately 150 kt
(630 TJ).[27]

A second set of tests was scheduled, with testing recommencing in September 1957. The first test was
based on a "… new simpler design. A two stage thermonuclear bomb that had a much more powerful
trigger". This test Grapple X Round C was exploded on November 8 and yielded approximately 1.8 Mt
(7.5 PJ). On April 28, 1958 a bomb was dropped that yielded 3 Mt (13 PJ)—Britain's most powerful test.
Two final air burst tests on September 2 and September 11, 1958, dropped smaller bombs that yielded
around 1 Mt (4.2 PJ) each.[27]

American observers had been invited to these kinds of tests. After Britain's successful detonation of a
megaton-range device (and thus demonstrating a practical understanding of the Teller–Ulam design
"secret"), the United States agreed to exchange some of its nuclear designs with the United Kingdom,
leading to the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement. Instead of continuing with its own design, the
British were given access to the design of the smaller American Mk 28 warhead and were able to
manufacture copies.[27]

The United Kingdom had worked closely with the Americans on the Manhattan Project. British access to
nuclear weapons information was cut-off by the United States at one point due to concerns about Soviet
espionage. Full cooperation was not reestablished until an agreement governing the handling of secret
information and other issues was signed.[27]

China

Mao Zedong decided to begin a Chinese nuclear-weapons program during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis
of 1954–1955. The People's Republic of China detonated its first hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb on
June 17, 1967, 32 months after detonating its first fission weapon, with a yield of 3.31 Mt. It took place in
the Lop Nor Test Site, in northwest China.[28] China had received extensive technical help from the
Soviet Union to jump-start their nuclear program, but by 1960, the rift between the Soviet Union and
China had become so great that the Soviet Union ceased all assistance to China.[29]
A story in The New York Times by William Broad[30] reported that in 1995, a supposed Chinese double
agent delivered information indicating that China knew secret details of the U.S. W88 warhead,
supposedly through espionage.[31] (This line of investigation eventually resulted in the abortive trial of
Wen Ho Lee.)

France

The French nuclear testing site was moved to the unpopulated French atolls in the Pacific Ocean. The
first test conducted at these new sites was the "Canopus" test in the Fangataufa atoll in French Polynesia
on 24 August 1968, the country's first multistage thermonuclear weapon test. The bomb was detonated
from a balloon at a height of 520 metres (1,710 ft). The result of this test was significant atmospheric
contamination.[32] Very little is known about France's development of the Teller–Ulam design, beyond
the fact that France detonated a 2.6 Mt (11 PJ) device in the "Canopus" test. France reportedly had great
difficulty with its initial development of the Teller-Ulam design, but it later overcame these, and is
believed to have nuclear weapons equal in sophistication to the other major nuclear powers.[27]

France and China did not sign or ratify the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned
nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer space. Between 1966 and 1996 France
carried out more than 190 nuclear tests.[32] France's final nuclear test took place on January 27, 1996,
and then the country dismantled its Polynesian test sites. France signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty that same year, and then ratified the Treaty within two years.

France confirmed that its nuclear arsenal contains about 300

warheads, carried by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
and fighter-bombers in 2015. France has four Triomphant-class
ballistic missile submarines. One ballistic missile submarine is
deployed in the deep ocean, but a total of three must be in
operational use at all times. The three older submarines are armed
with 16 M45 missiles. The newest submarine, "Le Terrible", was
commissioned in 2010, and it has M51 missiles capable of carrying
TN 75 thermonuclear warheads. The air fleet is four squadrons at
four different bases. In total, there are 23 Mirage 2000N aircraft and
20 Rafales capable of carrying nuclear warheads.[33] The M51.1 One of France's Triomphant-class
missiles are intended to be replaced with the new M51.2 warhead nuclear-armed submarines, the
beginning in 2016, which has a 3,000 kilometres (1,900 mi) greater Téméraire (S617)
range than the M51.1.[33]

France also has about 60 air-launched missiles tipped with TN 80/TN 81 warheads with a yield of about
300 kt (1,300 TJ) each. France's nuclear program has been carefully designed to ensure that these
weapons remain usable decades into the future.[27] Currently, France is no longer deliberately producing
critical mass materials such as plutonium and enriched uranium, but it still relies on nuclear energy for
239
electricity, with Pu as a byproduct.[34]

India

On May 11, 1998, India announced that it had detonated a thermonuclear bomb in its Operation Shakti
tests ("Shakti-I", specifically).[35][36] Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, a Pakistani nuclear physicist, asserted
that if Shakti-I had been a thermonuclear test, the device had failed to fire.[37] However, Dr. Harold M.
Agnew, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said that India's assertion of having
detonated a staged thermonuclear bomb was believable.[38] India says that
their thermonuclear device was tested at a controlled yield of 45 kt (190 TJ)
because of the close proximity of the Khetolai village at about 5 kilometres
(3.1 mi), to ensure that the houses in that village do not suffer significant
damage.[39] Another cited reason was that radioactivity released from
yields significantly more than 45 Kilotons might not have been contained
fully.[39] After the Pokhran-II tests, Dr. Rajagopal Chidambaram, former
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India said that India has the
capability to build thermonuclear bombs of any yield at will.[38]

The yield of India's hydrogen bomb test remains highly debatable among
the Indian science community and the international scholars.[40] The
question of politicisation and disputes between Indian scientists further
complicated the matter.[41] Shakti-1

In an interview in August 2009, the director for the 1998 test site
preparations, Dr. K. Santhanam claimed that the yield of the thermonuclear explosion was lower than
expected and that India should therefore not rush into signing the CTBT. Other Indian scientists
involved in the test have disputed Dr. K. Santhanam's claim,[42] arguing that Santhanam's claims are
unscientific.[36] British seismologist Roger Clarke argued that the magnitudes suggested a combined
yield of up to 60 kilotonnes of TNT (250 TJ), consistent with the Indian announced total yield of 56
kilotonnes of TNT (230 TJ).[43] U.S. seismologist Jack Evernden has argued that for correct estimation
of yields, one should ‘account properly for geological and seismological differences between test
sites’.[39]

India officially maintains that it can build thermonuclear weapons of various yields up to around 200 kt
(840 TJ) on the basis of the Shakti-1 thermonuclear test.[39][44]

Israel

Israel is alleged to possess thermonuclear weapons of the Teller–Ulam design,[45] but it is not known to
have tested any nuclear devices, although it is widely speculated that the Vela Incident of 1979 may have
been a joint Israeli–South African nuclear test.[46][47](p271)[48](pp297–300)

It is well established that Edward Teller advised and guided the Israeli establishment on general nuclear
matters for some twenty years.[49](pp289–293) Between 1964 and 1967, Teller made six visits to Israel
where he lectured at the Tel Aviv University on general topics in theoretical physics.[50] It took him a
year to convince the CIA about Israel's capability and finally in 1976, Carl Duckett of the CIA testified to
the U.S. Congress, after receiving credible information from an "American scientist" (Teller), on Israel's
nuclear capability.[48](pp297–300) During the 1990s, Teller eventually confirmed speculations in the
media that it was during his visits in the 1960s that he concluded that Israel was in possession of nuclear
weapons.[48](pp297–300) After he conveyed the matter to the higher level of the U.S. government, Teller
reportedly said: "They [Israel] have it, and they were clever enough to trust their research and not to test,
they know that to test would get them into trouble."[48](pp297–300)

Pakistan
According to the scientific data received and published by PAEC, the Corps of Engineers, and Kahuta
Research Laboratories (KRL), in May 1998, Pakistan carried out six underground nuclear tests in Chagai
Hills and Kharan Desert in Balochistan Province (see the code-names of the tests, Chagai-I and Chagai-
II).[37] None of these boosted fission devices was the thermonuclear weapon design, according to KRL
and PAEC.[37]

North Korea

North Korea claimed to have tested its miniaturised thermonuclear bomb on 6 January 2016. North
Korea's first three nuclear tests (2006, 2009 and 2013) were relatively low yield and do not appear to
have been of a thermonuclear weapon design. In 2013, the South Korean Defense Ministry speculated
that North Korea may be trying to develop a "hydrogen bomb" and such a device may be North Korea's
next weapons test.[51][52] In January 2016, North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a hydrogen
bomb,[53] although only a magnitude 5.1 seismic event was detected at the time of the test,[54] a similar
magnitude to the 2013 test of a 6–9 kt (25–38 TJ) atomic bomb. These seismic recordings cast doubt
upon North Korea's claim that a hydrogen bomb was tested and suggest it was a non-fusion nuclear
test.[55]

On 3 September 2017, the country's state media reported that a hydrogen bomb test was conducted
which resulted in "perfect success". According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the blast resulted in
an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.3, 10 times more powerful than previous nuclear tests conducted by
North Korea.[56] U.S. Intelligence released an early assessment that the yield estimate was 140 kt
(590 TJ),[57] with an uncertainty range of 70 to 280 kt (290 to 1,170 TJ).[58]

On 12 September, NORSAR revised its estimate of the earthquake magnitude upward to 6.1, matching
that of the CTBTO, but less powerful than the USGS estimate of 6.3. Its yield estimate was revised to
250 kt (1,000 TJ), while noting the estimate had some uncertainty and an undisclosed margin of
error.[59][60]

On 13 September, an analysis of before and after synthetic-aperture radar satellite imagery of the test
site was published suggesting the test occurred under 900 metres (3,000 ft) of rock and the yield "could
have been in excess of 300 kilotons".[61]

Public knowledge
The Teller–Ulam design was for many years considered one of the top nuclear secrets, and even today it
is not discussed in any detail by official publications with origins "behind the fence" of classification.
United States Department of Energy (DOE) policy has been, and continues to be, that they do not
acknowledge when "leaks" occur, because doing so would acknowledge the accuracy of the supposed
leaked information. Aside from images of the warhead casing, most information in the public domain
about this design is relegated to a few terse statements by the DOE and the work of a few individual
investigators.

DOE statements

In 1972 the United States government declassified a document stating "[I]n thermonuclear (TN)
weapons, a fission 'primary' is used to trigger a TN reaction in thermonuclear fuel referred to as a
'secondary'", and in 1979 added, "[I]n thermonuclear weapons, radiation from a fission explosive can be
contained and used to transfer energy to compress and ignite a physically separate component
containing thermonuclear fuel." To this latter sentence the US
government specified that "Any elaboration of this statement will be
classified."[62] The only information that may pertain to the spark
plug was declassified in 1991: "Fact that fissile or fissionable
materials are present in some secondaries, material unidentified,
location unspecified, use unspecified, and weapons undesignated."
In 1998 the DOE declassified the statement that "The fact that
materials may be present in channels and the term 'channel filler,'
with no elaboration", which may refer to the polystyrene foam (or an
analogous substance).[63]
Photographs of warhead casings,
Whether these statements vindicate some or all of the models such as this one of the W80 nuclear
presented above is up for interpretation, and official U.S. warhead, allow for some speculation
government releases about the technical details of nuclear weapons as to the relative size and shapes of
have been purposely equivocating in the past (see, e.g., Smyth the primaries and secondaries in
Report). Other information, such as the types of fuel used in some of U.S. thermonuclear weapons.
the early weapons, has been declassified, though precise technical
information has not been.

The Progressive case

Most of the current ideas on the workings of the Teller–Ulam design came into public awareness after
the Department of Energy (DOE) attempted to censor a magazine article by U.S. antiweapons activist
Howard Morland in 1979 on the "secret of the hydrogen bomb". In 1978, Morland had decided that
discovering and exposing this "last remaining secret" would focus attention onto the arms race and allow
citizens to feel empowered to question official statements on the importance of nuclear weapons and
nuclear secrecy. Most of Morland's ideas about how the weapon worked were compiled from highly
accessible sources—the drawings that most inspired his approach came from none other than the
Encyclopedia Americana. Morland also interviewed (often informally) many former Los Alamos
scientists (including Teller and Ulam, though neither gave him any useful information), and used a
variety of interpersonal strategies to encourage informative responses from them (i.e., asking questions
such as "Do they still use spark plugs?" even if he was not aware what the latter term specifically referred
to).[64]

Morland eventually concluded that the "secret" was that the primary and secondary were kept separate
and that radiation pressure from the primary compressed the secondary before igniting it. When an
early draft of the article, to be published in The Progressive magazine, was sent to the DOE after falling
into the hands of a professor who was opposed to Morland's goal, the DOE requested that the article not
be published, and pressed for a temporary injunction. The DOE argued that Morland's information was
(1) likely derived from classified sources, (2) if not derived from classified sources, itself counted as
"secret" information under the "born secret" clause of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, and (3) was
dangerous and would encourage nuclear proliferation.

Morland and his lawyers disagreed on all points, but the injunction was granted, as the judge in the case
felt that it was safer to grant the injunction and allow Morland, et al., to appeal, which they did in United
States v. The Progressive (1979).

Through a variety of more complicated circumstances, the DOE case began to wane as it became clear
that some of the data they were attempting to claim as "secret" had been published in a students'
encyclopedia a few years earlier. After another H-bomb speculator, Chuck Hansen, had his own ideas
about the "secret" (quite different from Morland's) published in a Wisconsin newspaper, the DOE
claimed that The Progressive case was moot, dropped its suit, and allowed the magazine to publish its
article, which it did in November 1979. Morland had by then, however, changed his opinion of how the
bomb worked, suggesting that a foam medium (the polystyrene) rather than radiation pressure was used
to compress the secondary, and that in the secondary there was a spark plug of fissile material as well.
He published these changes, based in part on the proceedings of the appeals trial, as a short erratum in
The Progressive a month later.[65] In 1981, Morland published a book about his experience, describing in
detail the train of thought that led him to his conclusions about the "secret".[64][66]

Morland's work is interpreted as being at least partially correct because the DOE had sought to censor it,
one of the few times they violated their usual approach of not acknowledging "secret" material that had
been released; however, to what degree it lacks information, or has incorrect information, is not known
with any confidence. The difficulty that a number of nations had in developing the Teller–Ulam design
(even when they apparently understood the design, such as with the United Kingdom), makes it
somewhat unlikely that this simple information alone is what provides the ability to manufacture
thermonuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the ideas put forward by Morland in 1979 have been the basis for
all the current speculation on the Teller–Ulam design.

Nuclear reduction
In January 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev publicly proposed a three-stage program for
abolishing the world's nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century.[67] Two years before his death in
1989, Andrei Sakharov's comments at a scientists’ forum helped begin the process for the elimination of
thousands of nuclear ballistic missiles from the US and Soviet arsenals. Sakharov (1921–89) was
recruited into the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons program in 1948, a year after he completed his
doctorate. In 1949 the US detected the first Soviet test of a fission bomb, and the two countries
embarked on a desperate race to design a thermonuclear hydrogen bomb that was a thousand times
more powerful. Like his US counterparts, Sakharov justified his H-bomb work by pointing to the danger
of the other country's achieving a monopoly. But also like some of the US scientists who had worked on
the Manhattan Project, he felt a responsibility to inform his nation's leadership and then the world about
the dangers from nuclear weapons.[68] Sakharov's first attempt to influence policy was brought about by
his concern about possible genetic damage from long-lived radioactive carbon-14 created in the
atmosphere from nitrogen-14 by the enormous fluxes of neutrons released in H-bomb tests.[69] In 1968,
a friend suggested that Sakharov write an essay about the role of the intelligentsia in world affairs. Self-
publishing was the method at the time for spreading unapproved manuscripts in the Soviet Union. Many
readers would create multiple copies by typing with multiple sheets of paper interleaved with carbon
paper. One copy of Sakharov's essay, "Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual
Freedom", was smuggled out of the Soviet Union and published by the New York Times. More than
18 million reprints were produced during 1968–69. After the essay was published, Sakharov was barred
from returning to work in the nuclear weapons program and took a research position in Moscow.[68] In
1980, after an interview with the New York Times in which he denounced the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the government put him beyond the reach of Western media by exiling him and his wife to
Gorky. In March 1985, Gorbachev became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. More than a
year and a half later, he persuaded the Politburo, the party's executive committee, to allow Sakharov and
Bonner to return to Moscow. Sakharov was elected as an opposition member to the Soviet Congress of
People's Deputies in 1989. Later that year he had a cardiac arrhythmia and died in his apartment. He left
behind a draft of a new Soviet constitution that emphasized democracy and human rights.[70]

Notable accidents
On 5 February 1958, during a training mission flown by a B-47, a Mark 15 nuclear bomb, also known as
the Tybee Bomb, was lost off the coast of Tybee Island near Savannah, Georgia. The bomb was thought
by the Department of Energy to lie buried under several feet of silt at the bottom of Wassaw Sound.[71]

On 17 January 1966, a fatal collision occurred between a B-52G and a KC-135 Stratotanker over
Palomares, Spain. The conventional explosives in two of the Mk28-type hydrogen bombs detonated
upon impact with the ground, dispersing plutonium over nearby farms. A third bomb landed intact near
Palomares while the fourth fell 12 miles (19 km) off the coast into the Mediterranean sea.[72]

On 21 January 1968, a B-52G, with four B28FI thermonuclear bombs aboard as part of Operation
Chrome Dome, crashed on the ice of the North Star Bay while attempting an emergency landing at Thule
Air Base in Greenland.[73] The resulting fire caused extensive radioactive contamination.[74] Personnel
involved in the cleanup failed to recover all the debris from three of the bombs, and one bomb was not
recovered.[75]

Variations

Ivy Mike

In his 1995 book Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, author Richard Rhodes describes in
detail the internal components of the "Ivy Mike" Sausage device, based on information obtained from
extensive interviews with the scientists and engineers who assembled it. According to Rhodes, the actual
mechanism for the compression of the secondary was a combination of the radiation pressure, foam
plasma pressure, and tamper-pusher ablation theories described above; the radiation from the primary
heated the polyethylene foam lining the casing to a plasma, which then re-radiated radiation into the
secondary's pusher, causing its surface to ablate and driving it inwards, compressing the secondary,
igniting the sparkplug, and causing the fusion reaction. The general applicability of this principle is
unclear.[12]

W88

In 1999 a reporter for the San Jose Mercury News reported that the U.S. W88 nuclear warhead, a small
MIRVed warhead used on the Trident II SLBM, had a prolate (egg or watermelon shaped) primary
(code-named Komodo) and a spherical secondary (code-named Cursa) inside a specially shaped
radiation case (known as the "peanut" for its shape).[76]

The reentry vehicle for the W87 and W88 are the same size, 68.9 inches (1.75 m), with a maximum
diameter of 21.8 inches (55 cm).[77][78] The higher yield of the W88 implies a larger secondary, which
produces most of the yield. Putting the secondary, which is heavier than the primary, in the wider part of
the cone allows it to be larger, but it also moves the center of mass aft, potentially causing aerodynamic
stability problems during reentry. Dead-weight ballast must be added to the nose to move the center of
mass forward.

To make the primary small enough to fit into the narrow part of the cone, its bulky insensitive high
explosive charges must be replaced with more compact "non-insensitive" high explosives that are more
hazardous to handle. The higher yield of the W88, which is the last new warhead produced by the United
States, thus comes at a price of higher warhead weight and higher workplace hazard. The W88 also
contains tritium, which has a half-life of only 12.32 years and must be repeatedly replaced.[79] If these
stories are true, it would explain the reported higher yield of the W88, 475 kt (1,990 TJ), compared with
only 300 kt (1,300 TJ) for the earlier W87 warhead.

See also
COLEX process (isotopic separation)
History of the Teller–Ulam design
NUKEMAP
Pure fusion weapon

Notes
1. The misleading term "hydrogen bomb" was already in wide public use before fission product fallout
from the Castle Bravo test in 1954 revealed the extent to which the design relies on fission as well.

References
1. Gsponer, Andre (2005). "Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral
effects". arXiv:physics/0510071 (https://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0510071).
2. Andre Gsponer (2008). "The B61-based "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator:" Clever retrofit or
headway towards fourth-generation nuclear weapons?". CiteSeerX 10.1.1.261.7309 (https://citeseer
x.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.261.7309).
3. Conan, Neal (8 November 2005). "Sixty Years of Trying to Control the Bomb (Transcripts)" (https://w
ww.npr.org/transcripts/4994161). Talk of the Nation (Podcast). NPR. Retrieved 10 February 2021.
"But, yes, the hydrogen bomb--that is, a two-stage thermonuclear device, as we refer to it--is indeed
the principal part of the US arsenal, as it is of the Russian arsenal.."
4. Teller, Edward; Ulam, Stanislaw (9 March 1951). On Heterocatalytic Detonations I. Hydrodynamic
Lenses and Radiation Mirrors (http://www.nuclearnonproliferation.org/LAMS1225.pdf) (pdf)
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6. Broad, William J. (23 March 2015). "Hydrogen Bomb Physicist's Book Runs Afoul of Energy
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Further reading

Basic principles
Sublette, Carey (19 March 2019). "Section 4.0 Engineering and Design of Nuclear Weapons" (http://
nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4.html). Nuclear Weapon Archive. Archived (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20210206233652/http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4.html) from the original
on 6 February 2021. Retrieved 9 February 2021.
Hansen, Chuck, U.S. nuclear weapons: The secret history (Arlington, Texas: Aerofax, 1988). ISBN 0-
517-56740-7
Hansen, Chuck (2007). Swords of Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development Since 1945 (ht
tp://www.uscoldwar.com) (PDF) (CD-ROM & download available) (2 ed.). Sunnyvale, California:
Chukelea Publications. ISBN 978-0-9791915-0-3. 2,600 pages.
Barroso, Dalton E. G. (1 January 2009). A Fisica dos Explosivos Nucleares (https://www.google.com/
books/edition/A_f%C3%ADsica_dos_explosivos_nucleares/6bE6781f1Q8C?hl=en&gbpv=0) [The
Physics of Nuclear Explosives] (in Portuguese) (2nd ed.). Livraria da Física. ISBN 978-8578610166.
OCLC 733273749 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/733273749). OL 30689359M (https://openlibrary.or
g/books/OL30689359M). Retrieved 9 February 2020 – via Google Books.

History
Bundy, McGeorge (28 November 1988). Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First
Fifty Years (1st ed.). Random House. ISBN 978-0394522784. LCCN 89040089 (https://lccn.loc.gov/8
 9040089). OCLC 610771749 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/610771749). OL 24963545M (https://op
enlibrary.org/books/OL24963545M).
DeGroot, Gerard J. (31 March 2005). The Bomb: A Life (https://archive.org/details/bomblife00degr).
Harvard University Press. ASIN 068480400X (https://www.amazon.com/dp/068480400X). ISBN 978-
0674017245. OCLC 57750742 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/57750742). OL 7671320M (https://ope
nlibrary.org/books/OL7671320M) – via Internet Archive.
Galison, Peter; Bernstein, Barton J. (1 January 1989). "In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to
Build the Superbomb, 1952-1954". Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences. 19 (2):
267–347. doi:10.2307/27757627 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F27757627). eISSN 1939-182X (https://
www.worldcat.org/issn/1939-182X). ISSN 1939-1811 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1939-1811).
Goncharov, German A. (31 October 1996). "American and Soviet H-bomb development
programmes: historical background". Physics-Uspekhi. 39 (10): 1033–1044.
doi:10.1070/PU1996v039n10ABEH000174 (https://doi.org/10.1070%2FPU1996v039n10ABEH00017
4). eISSN 1468-4780 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1468-4780). ISSN 1063-7869 (https://www.world
cat.org/issn/1063-7869). LCCN 93646146 (https://lccn.loc.gov/93646146). OCLC 36334507 (https://
www.worldcat.org/oclc/36334507).
Holloway, David (28 September 1994). Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy,
1939-1956 (1st ed.). Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0300060560. OCLC 470165274 (https://www.
worldcat.org/oclc/470165274). OL 1084400M (https://openlibrary.org/books/OL1084400M).
Rhodes, Richard (1 August 1995). Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (https://archive.org/
details/darksunmakingofh00rhod) (1st ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster. ASIN 068480400X (https://
www.amazon.com/dp/068480400X). ISBN 978-0684804002. OCLC 717414304 (https://www.worldca
t.org/oclc/717414304). OL 7720934M (https://openlibrary.org/books/OL7720934M) – via Internet
Archive.
Schweber, Silvan S. (7 January 2007). In the Shadow of the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe, and the
Moral Responsibility of the Scientist (https://archive.org/details/inshadowofbombbe00schw).
Princeton Series in Physics. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0691127859. OCLC 868971191
(https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/868971191). OL 7757230M (https://openlibrary.org/books/OL7757230
M) – via Internet Archive.
Stix, Gary (20 October 1999). "Infamy and Honor at the Atomic Café: Father of the hydrogen bomb,
"Star Wars" missile defense and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Edward Teller has no
regrets about his contentious career" (https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/infamy-and-honor-a
t-the-a/). Scientific American. Vol. 281 no. 4. pp. 42–43. ISSN 0036-8733 (https://www.worldcat.org/is
sn/0036-8733).
Young, Ken; Schilling, Warner R. (15 February 2020). Super Bomb: Organizational Conflict and the
Development of the Hydrogen Bomb (1st ed.). Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-1501745164.
OCLC 1164620354 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1164620354). OL 28729278M (https://openlibrary.
org/books/OL28729278M).
Younger, Stephen M. (6 January 2009). The Bomb: A New History (https://archive.org/details/bombn
ewhistory00youn) (1st ed.). HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0061537196. OCLC 310470696 (https://www.w
orldcat.org/oclc/310470696). OL 24318509M (https://openlibrary.org/books/OL24318509M) – via
Internet Archive.

Analyzing fallout
De Geer, Lars‐Erik (1991). "The radioactive signature of the hydrogen bomb". Science & Global
Security. 2 (4): 351–363. doi:10.1080/08929889108426372 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F0892988910
8426372). ISSN 0892-9882 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0892-9882). OCLC 15307789 (https://ww
w.worldcat.org/oclc/15307789).
 Khariton, Yuli; Smirnov, Yuri; Rothstein, Linda; Leskov, Sergei (1 May 1993). "The Khariton Version".
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 49 (4): 20–31. doi:10.1080/00963402.1993.11456341 (https://doi.or
g/10.1080%2F00963402.1993.11456341). eISSN 1938-3282 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1938-32
82). ISSN 0096-3402 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0096-3402). LCCN 48034039 (https://lccn.loc.go
v/48034039). OCLC 470268256 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/470268256).

External links

Principles
"Hydrogen bomb / Fusion weapons" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/h-bomb.htm) at
GlobalSecurity.org (see also links on right)
"Basic Principles of Staged Radiation Implosion (Teller–Ulam)" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Libr
ary/Teller.html) from Carey Sublette's NuclearWeaponArchive.org.
"Matter, Energy, and Radiation Hydrodynamics" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq3.html)
from Carey Sublette's Nuclear Weapons FAQ.
"Engineering and Design of Nuclear Weapons" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4.html)
from Carey Sublette's Nuclear Weapons FAQ.
"Elements of Thermonuclear Weapon Design" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq4-4.htm
l) from Carey Sublette's Nuclear Weapons FAQ.
Annotated bibliography for nuclear weapons design from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues
(http://alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse=science/Nuclear+Weapons+Design)

History
PBS: Race for the Superbomb: Interviews and Transcripts (https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/fil
mmore/reference/interview/index.html) (with U.S. and USSR bomb designers as well as historians).
Howard Morland on how he discovered the "H-bomb secret" (https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/cardozo.html)
(includes many slides).
The Progressive November 1979 issue (http://progressive.org/?q=node/2252) – "The H-Bomb
Secret: How we got it, why we're telling" (entire issue online).
Annotated bibliography on the hydrogen bomb from the Alsos Digital Library (http://alsos.wlu.edu/qse
arch.aspx?browse=warfare/Hydrogen+Bomb)
University of Southampton, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Nuclear History Working
Paper No5. (https://web.archive.org/web/20080226213021/https://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/p
df/nuclear_history/Working_Paper_No_5.pdf)
Peter Kuran's "Trinity and Beyond" (http://www.atomcentral.com/trinity.html) – documentary film on
the history of nuclear weapon testing.

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