Supreme Court of India Page 1 of 15
Supreme Court of India Page 1 of 15
Supreme Court of India Page 1 of 15
PETITIONER:
V. JAGANNADHA RAO & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF A.P. & ORS.
BENCH:
G.P. PAttanaik, Ruma Pal & Arijit Pasayat
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
5. When the matter was placed for hearing after grant of leave reliance
was placed by learned counsel for the appellants on the decisions in V.
Sadanandam (supra) and B. Satyanarayana Rao (supra) to contend that this
Court has upheld similar provisions which have been struck down by the
Tribunal as void. However, the Bench hearing the appeals expressed doubt
about the correctness of the view expressed in these cases and as noted
above the appeals were directed to be placed before a 3 Judges Bench.
6. Mr. P.N. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants
submitted that the two decisions referred to above were squarely applicable
to the facts of this case. In any event the Rules have been made in
consonance with the Presidential Order and there is no inconsistency. Para
5(2) of the Presidential Order authorises the State Government to pass
necessary orders in the circumstances indicated in the said paragraph.
According to him, public interest is paramount in the case and taking into
account the background facts it was felt by the Government that in order to
provide for equitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to
different parts of the State in the matter of public employment, impugned
Rules were formulated. If the interpretation by the Tribunal is accepted it
would mean the denial of opportunities and would be against the very spirit
of the Presidential Order. It was also submitted that the expression transfer
used in para 5(2) has to be given a wider meaning, and promotional
prospects are clearly inter-linked and cannot be divested from a transfer. If
necessary, according to him, a purposive interpretation has to be made.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents who were
the petitioners before the Tribunal submitted that the very object of the
Presidential Order is to provide better employment facilities to persons of
neglected areas and the scope for a departure is rather limited and if the State
wanted to make a departure it is authorized to do so within the four corners
of the prescriptions in the Presidential Order. Transfer according to him, is
permissible in respect of similar posts, and by no stretch of imagination this
is permissible to include a promotional prospect or avenue.
(4) ..
(5) ..
(6) ..
(7) ..
(8) ..
NOTIFICATION
RULES
1. Senior Assistant
2. Senior Assistant
3. Senior Assistant
4. Labour Welfare Centre Staff
5. Senior Assistant
6. Senior Assistant
7. Senior Assistant
8. Senior Stenographer
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9. Senior Assistant
10. Senior Assistant;
ORDER
(a).
(b)
(g)..
(i)..
(j)..
(l).
(6)..
4. ..
6. Local areas:
12. We find that para 5(2) of the Presidential Order speaks of transfer and
not of promotion. It would be hazardous to accept the contention of the
appellants that promotion is included in the expression transfer and no
assistance can be availed from the distinction made in para 5(1) of the Order.
No provisions or word in a statute has to be read in isolation. In fact, the
statute has to be read as a whole. A statute is an edict of the legislature. It
cannot be said that without any purpose the distinction was made in para
5(1) between transfer and promotion and such distinction was not intended
to be operative in para 5(2). The intention of the legislature is primarily to
be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be
paid as to what has been said as also to what has not been said. See Mohd.
Ali Khan vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, New Delhi (AIR 1997 SC 1165)
and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. M/s. Price Water House
(AIR 1998 SC 74). As a consequence a construction which requires for its
support addition or substitution of words or which resorts for rejection of
words as meaningless has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in
Robert Wigram Crawford vs. Richard Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1) We
cannot aid the Legislatures defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or
mend and, by construction make deficiencies which are left there. The
aforesaid decision was referred to by this Court in State of Gujarat and Ors.
vs. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel & Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253). It is contrary to
all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely
necessary to do so. (See Stock vs. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 [1]
All.ER 948 (HL). Similarly, it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by
substituting some other words for words of the statute. (See Pinner Vs.
Everett (1969 [3] All.ER 257). In other words, there should be no attempt to
substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined
to what is necessary for deciding a particular case. Much trouble is made by
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substituting other phrases assumed to be equivalent, which then are reasoned
from as if they were in the Act. In Union of India vs. Deoki Nandan
Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96), it was observed that the Court cannot refrain
the legislature for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. It is
incumbent on the Court to avoid the construction if reasonably permissible
on the language which would render a part of the statute devoid of any
meaning or application. In the interpretation of statutes, the Courts always
presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the
legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have an effect.
We, therefore, find no reasons to accept this stand of the appellant that
the expression transfer takes within its scope a promotion.
13. We may note here that learned counsel for the State of Andhra
Pradesh submitted with reference to the counter affidavit filed in this Court
that the impugned Rules were not intended to carve out a class of employees
in terms of para 5(2)for public interest. That being the position, we need
not go into the question whether a consideration on a case to case basis is
called for in terms of para 5(2).
The appeals are without any merit and are accordingly dismissed.
..J.
(G.B. PATTANAIK)
..J.
(RUMA PAL)
.J.
(ARIJIT PASAYAT)
November 7, 2001
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