Overruling the protectionist exclusionary rule: DPP v JC

Dr Yvonne Marie Daly*

Keywords: exclusionary rule; improperly obtained evidence; police investigations;

constitutional rights; Ireland

Introduction
In the investigation of criminal offending, through search, arrest, detention, questioning, forensic
sampling and so on, important rights of suspects, and others, are sometimes transgressed by
police. Such transgressions, by agents of the state, may occur in differing contexts, may be
deliberate, reckless or accidental, and may affect relevant rights to varying extents. While every
effort should be made to avoid the breach of rights in the first instance, the ideal of a clean slate
in this regard is simply unobtainable. Accordingly, a criminal justice system requires a defined
approach to police breaches of rights during an investigation and, more specifically, a criminal
process requires a clear policy in relation to the admissibility at subsequent trial of any evidence
obtained in breach of a suspect’s rights.

In the mid-1990s, Judge Harold J. Rothwax, acting New York State Supreme Court justice,
expressed the view that the exclusionary rule applicable in the United States was the strictest in
existence in the democratic world: “We [the United States] are the only country in the world,
certainly the only democracy in the world, that has a mandatory exclusionary rule.” 1 However,
the learned judge was incorrect in that regard. The exclusionary rule in operation in Ireland in
relation to unconstitutionally obtained evidence, certainly from 1990 onwards, was in fact much
stricter than the U.S. rule. The latter operated, and continues to operate, only in the context of
deterrence, i.e. where the exclusion of the impugned evidence would highlight the transgression
of rights to police and prosecutors and result in such rights being properly observed in the
future.2 By contrast, the Irish rule, originally set out in the 1965 case of People (AG) v O’Brien3

* Senior Lecturer, Socio-Legal Research Centre, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Ireland
1
Cossack, R. “Are too many Guilty Defendants going free? The Right Honorable Harold Rothwax vs. Professor
Alan Dershowitz” (1995-1996) 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1169, 1178.
2
U.S. v Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1983); U.S. v Calandra 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Wolf v Colorado 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Although it has been argued that there are a number of rationales for the exclusionary rule adopted and applied in
but refined and clarified in People (DPP) v Kenny (1990),4 was expressly centred on a rationale
of protectionism such that evidence obtained in breach of constitutional rights had to be
automatically excluded in almost all circumstances. As the U.S. rule is based solely on
deterrence, evidence is only excluded where police knowingly breach suspects’ rights. To
exclude where rights were unknowingly or inadvertently breached would have no deterrent
value. Indeed, relatively recent U.S. case-law seems to suggest that even where rights are
knowingly breached a high degree of deterrent value may be required before exclusion will be
justified as a remedy.5 A protectionist rationale was expressly preferred by the Irish Supreme
Court in Kenny over what was viewed as the weaker protections of a deterrence rationale.
Accordingly, under the Irish rule, evidence was excluded not only on the basis of knowing garda
(police)6 breaches of constitutional rights, but also where such breaches were accidental or
unintentional (unless there were “extraordinary excusing circumstances” in existence justifying
admission).

In April of this year, however, the Irish Supreme Court in DPP v JC7 expressly overruled Kenny,
declaring it to have been erroneously decided, and established a new exclusionary rule in its
place. This was a 4-3 majority decision of the Court (Denham CJ, Clarke, O’Donnell and
MacMenamin JJ in the majority; Hardiman, Murray and McKechnie J dissenting), which
Hardiman J (dissenting) described as a “revolution in principle” and “an alteration of [a]
fundamental decision which is based on [the] exegesis of the Constitution itself.”8 Before
looking at the judgment in JC in detail, some background on the Kenny rule is provided below.

The Kenny Rule

the United States, the deterrence rationale has been most often relied on in the courts. See, for example, Jackson,
H.A. “Arizona v. Evans: Expanding Exclusionary Rule Exceptions and Contracting Fourth Amendment Protection”
(1995-1996) 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1201 and Lynch, T. “In Defense of the Exclusionary Rule” (1999-2000)
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 711. See also the judgment of Alito J. (Roberts C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Kagan
J.J. concurring) in Davis v United States 564 U. S. ____ (2011).
3
[1965] I.R. 142.
4
[1990] 2 I.R. 110.
5
Hudson v Michigan 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
6
The Irish police force as a whole is known as the “Garda Síochána” (the Guardians of the Peace is the direct
translation from the Irish language). An individual police officer is known either as a member of the Garda
Síochána, or as a “garda”, with the plural being “gardaí”.
7
[2015] IESC 31.
8
Ibid. per Hardiman J. at [134].
A two-tiered approach to improperly obtained evidence was established by the Irish Supreme
Court in People (AG) v O’Brien9: a discretionary approach was adopted in relation to evidence
obtained in breach of legal rights only, with a stricter rule operating where there was a
“deliberate and conscious” breach of constitutional rights. Evidence obtained unconstitutionally
became automatically inadmissible. The only circumstance in which such evidence might be
admitted was where there were so-called “extraordinary excusing circumstances”, such as the
need to rescue a victim in peril or to prevent the imminent destruction of vital evidence.

“Deliberate and Conscious” Breach of Rights

The courts grappled with the concept of “deliberate and conscious” breach in a number of cases
subsequent to O’Brien,10 attempting to determine whether or not this phraseology required that
gardaí should have knowingly breached rights in order for evidence to be excluded. Ultimately,
the matter was clarified in Kenny: because the dominant rationale for the exclusion of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in Ireland was the protection of a suspect’s constitutional
rights there was no requirement of mala fides on the part of the gardaí in obtaining the impugned
evidence in order for it to be excluded at trial. The phrase “deliberate and conscious”, then,
related to the actions of the gardaí rather than their knowledge of the breach. For example, as in
Kenny itself, the impugned evidence had to be excluded where gardaí purposefully entered a
dwelling to execute a search warrant, not realising that the warrant had not been properly issued.
The majority of the Supreme Court rejected a rationale of deterrence which would necessitate
exclusion only where the gardaí knowingly breached constitutional rights. The exclusionary rule
was restated by Finlay C.J. in Kenny in the following terms, omitting the confusing terminology
of “deliberate and conscious” breach:

9
The decision on the facts in O’Brien, as noted in the text below, was that the impugned evidence had been obtained
in breach of legal and not constitutional rights and that the trial judge had correctly employed his discretion to admit
the evidence. Accordingly it might be considered that comments relating to the exclusionary rule on
unconstitutionally obtained evidence within the judgments are obiter dicta. However, there is no doubting the fact
that the rule on unconstitutionally obtained evidence stems from this case and McGrath suggests that any question as
to the true ratio decedendi of O’Brien is of academic interest only at this juncture as the judgment of Walsh J.,
which contains the two-tiered approach, has generally come to be regarded as containing the ratio of the case:
McGrath, D. Evidence (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2005), para.7.07 fn.23.
10
For example, People (D.P.P.) v Shaw [1982] I.R. 1; People (D.P.P.) v Madden [1977] I.R. 336; People (D.P.P.) v
Walsh [1980] I.R. 294; People (D.P.P.) v Healy [1990] 2 I.R. 73; [1990] I.L.R.M. 313.
 “… [E]vidence obtained by invasion of the constitutional personal rights of a citizen must
be excluded unless a court is satisfied that either the act constituting the breach of
constitutional rights was committed unintentionally or accidentally, or is satisfied that
there are extraordinary excusing circumstances which justify the admission of the
evidence in [the court’s] discretion.”11

Finlay CJ acknowledged that the adoption of this high protectionist stance could create problems
in criminal trials given its propensity to exclude evidence of immense probative value. However,
he was of the opinion that:

“[T]he detection of crime and the conviction of guilty persons, no matter how important
they may be to the ordering of society, cannot … outweigh the unambiguously expressed
constitutional obligation ‘as far as practicable to defend and vindicate the personal rights
of the citizen’.”12

Resultantly, for the past twenty-five years, evidence has been excluded at trial in Ireland where it
has been obtained in breach of the constitutional rights of the accused, and the actions of the
gardaí which led to the breach could not be said to have been accidental or unintentional.13

How strict is strict?

The majority of the Supreme Court in JC seemed eager to present the Kenny rule as an absolute
rule of exclusion which has been operating in an overly strict manner. O’Donnell J., for example,
stated that “one of the troubling features of Kenny is that it adopts a rule on its face qualified, but

11
[1990] 2 I.R. 110, at 134.
12
Ibid.
13
See, for example, DPP v Yamanoha [1994] 1 I.R. 565; DPP v Connell [1995] 1 I.R. 244; People (DPP) v Dillon
[2002] 4 I.R. 501; and, People (DPP) v Laide and Ryan [2005] 1 I.R. 209. For more on the Irish exclusionary rule
prior to DPP v JC see Martin, F. “The rationale of the exclusionary rule of evidence revisited” (1992) 2(1) I.C.L.J.
1; Walsh, D. Criminal Procedure (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2002) Chapter 9; McGrath, D. “The exclusionary
rule in respect of unconstitutionally obtained evidence” (2004) 26 D.U.L.J. 108; McGrath, D. Evidence (Dublin:
Thomson Round Hall, 2005) Chapter 7; O’Malley, T. The Criminal Process (Dublin: Round Hall, 2009) Chapter 19;
Fennell, C. The Law of Evidence in Ireland (3rd ed.) (Dublin: Bloomsbury Professional, 2009) Chapter 4; Daly, YM
“Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence in Ireland: Protectionism, Deterrence and the Winds of Change” (2009) 19
(2) I.C.L.J. 40; Collins, D. “The Exclusionary Rule – Back on the Agenda?” (2009) 19 ICLJ 98; Conway, V., Daly,
Y. M., & Schweppe, J. Irish Criminal Justice: Theory Process and Procedure (Dublin: Clarus Press, 2010) pp. 77-8;
and Heffernan, L. and Ní Raifeartaigh, U. Evidence in Criminal Trials (Dublin: Bloomsbury Professional, 2014)
Chapter 8.
in reality absolute or near absolute, at least in the field of warrants.”14 Arguably, however, this
does not give the full picture.

The facts of the O’Brien and Kenny cases were rather different and, although the Kenny
judgment is viewed as at least a clarification of and at most an overruling of O’Brien,15 a
dichotomy in the types of cases subject to the exclusionary rule can be traced back to this factual
distinction. In O’Brien, gardaí executed a search warrant at 118 Captain’s Road but were
unaware that the address innocently but erroneously listed on the face of the warrant was 118
Cashel Road. While establishing the parameters of the Irish exclusionary rule, the Supreme
Court in O’Brien in fact held on the facts that the evidence could be admitted in circumstances
such as this, which the Court designated a “mere illegality”. In Kenny, there was no apparent
defect on the face of the search warrant, rather it was found to be invalid because it had been
issued by a Peace Commissioner without any evidence that he himself was satisfied, as required
by statute, that there were reasonable grounds for the suspicion held by garda who swore
information before him. Accordingly the search warrant had been issued without lawful authority
and the evidence obtained had to be excluded.

In the 1998 case of People (D.P.P.) v Balfe,16 Murphy J. suggested that there were two different
rules formulated in O’Brien and Kenny respectively to deal with two different scenarios: the
O’Brien formula being relevant where a mistake in the recording of the order of a District Court
judge or Peace Commissioner issuing a search warrant is made and is apparent on the face of the
warrant; and the Kenny formula applying where a search warrant is made without lawful
authority.17 As the facts in Balfe related to defects on the face of the warrant, they were held to
fall under the O’Brien rule, were deemed to be mere illegalities, and ultimately it was held that
the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion to admit the relevant evidence.

This dichotomy of approach to the factual scenarios which have given rise to claims for
exclusion due to breach of constitutional rights in Ireland, while arguably artificial, has provided

14
[2015] IESC 31 per O’Donnell J. at [49].
15
Ibid. per Clarke J. at [4.2]: Clarke J in DPP v JC states that Kenny overruled O’Brien.
16
[1998] 4 I.R. 50.
17
Ibid. at 60.
the courts with something of an escape valve and has mitigated the hard edges of the strict rule to
a notable extent.18 However, surprisingly, this was not given any real acknowledgement or
subjected to any analysis by the Court in JC. It might be argued that there is a danger in
providing courts with an “out” such as this, as it could give rise to contrived reasoning and the
drawing of questionable parameters in order to avoid the application of the strict rule. It is
perhaps more intellectually honest to operate a less strict rule through the application of clear
principles. In New Zealand where the prima facie rule of exclusion in relation to breaches of the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 199019 operated in a comparatively strict manner to Ireland’s
Kenny rule (prior to the case of R v Shaheed20 and the introduction of s 30 of the Evidence Act
2006), there was some evidence of distortion of rights at the “front-end” so as to avoid the “back-
end” remedy of exclusion.21 However, such distortion of the definitional parameters of
constitutional rights has not been a feature of the jurisprudence under Kenny in Ireland.

Along with the Balfe dichotomy, a further escape valve existed within the Kenny rule itself
whereby the presence of “extraordinary excusing circumstances” might justify the admission of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Little if any use has been made of this proviso by the
courts,22 but the judicial reluctance to avail of it does not seem like a compelling reason to deem
Kenny to have been erroneously decided and to effectively throw it out.

McKechnie J, dissenting in JC, pointed to an evidential gap in terms of statistical information

showing that the Kenny rule has led to significant frustration of prosecutions in the twenty-five
years of its operation. While O’Donnell J (in the majority) listed examples of cases where the

18
See also DPP v Mallon [2011] 2 IR 544, 573 where O’Donnell J (then a High Court judge, later in the majority in
the Supreme Court in DPP v JC) stated that “so long as Irish law maintains an almost absolute exclusionary rule for
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal and therefore unconstitutional search of a dwelling house, courts should be
slow to invalidate warrants on the grounds of typographical grammatical, or transcription errors, which are neither
calculated to mislead, nor in truth do mislead, any reasonable reader of the words.” This is discussed further in Daly,
YM ““Improperly Obtained Evidence, Silence and Legal Advice: Ongoing Change In Seemingly Settled
Situations?” (2014) 1 Criminal Law and Practice Review 1, 5-9.
19
Set out in R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257.
20
[2002] 2 NZLR 377.
21
See Optican, Scott “ ‘Front-End’/‘Back-End’ Adjudication (Rights Versus Remedies) Under Section 21 of the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990” (2008) 2 New Zealand Law Review 409.
22
McGrath has suggested that the courts wish to avoid undermining the exclusionary rule and therefore adopt a
restrictive approach to extending this list: McGrath, D. Evidence (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2005) para.7.46.
Kenny rule had applied,23 McKechnie J suggested that in each of those cases the outcome was
either favourable to the prosecution or unknown, such that they did not illustrate a significant
difficulty with the rule to the level necessary to involve the Supreme Court in overruling its own
previous decision,24 which should only be done for the most compelling reasons.25

Criticism of the Kenny Rule and Opportunities for Review

The Kenny rule was never universally popular. Indeed, strong dissents were issued by two of the
Supreme Court bench in the case itself: Griffin and Lynch JJ. favoured a deterrence-based
approach centred on proof of blameworthiness, culpability or unfairness in terms of the
evidence-gathering procedures26 and preferred to interpret “deliberate and conscious breach” as
applying to the intentions of the gardaí rather than their actions.

More recently, the majority of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group, an ad hoc
committee established by the Minister for Justice in 2006 to examine a number of issues within
criminal procedure, advocated a change to the Kenny rule. They argued that a trial judge should
have discretion to admit unconstitutionally obtained evidence, having regard to the totality of the
circumstances in a given case, with particular regard to the rights of the victim.27 The Chairman
of the Committee, Dr Gerard Hogan SC (now a judge of the Irish Court of Appeal), added a note
of dissent from the majority view on this issue wherein he stated:

“Our society has committed itself to abiding by the rule of law and to respect and
vindicate the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. It behoves us to take
these rights and freedoms seriously and if the occasional exclusion of otherwise relevant
evidence is the price of respecting these constitutional rights, then that is a price society
should be prepared to pay in the interests of upholding the values solemnly enshrined in
our highest law...”28

23
[2015] IESC 31 per O’Donnell J.at [6].
24
Ibid. per McKechnie J.at [236].
25
As per The State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] IR 70.
26
See People (DPP) v Kenny [1990] 2 IR 110, 142 per Lynch J.
27
Final Report of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group, March 15, 2007, p.166.
28
‘Note of Dissent on Exclusionary Rule’ in the Final Report of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group
March 15, 2007, pp.287–88.
A potential opportunity for Supreme Court review of the Kenny rule arose in DPP (Walsh) v
Cash, which was before the High Court in 2007 and the Supreme Court in 2010.29 Defence
counsel in Cash sought to have a set of fingerprints taken from the appellant following his arrest
on a burglary charge excluded from evidence at trial. He had been arrested on the basis of a
match between fingerprints taken from the scene and prints that had been taken from him in
relation to another matter some years previously which were held on file. The prosecution had
been unable to state clearly the legal position of the retained prints, specifically, whether or not
they ought to have been destroyed following the passage of time and the fact that no proceedings
had been instituted in relation to the earlier matter.

Although Charleton J., in the High Court, had deemed the Kenny rule to be inapplicable on the
facts, he took some time in his judgment to outline his grievances with the rule, stating that “[a]
rule which remorselessly excludes evidence obtained through an illegality occurring by a mistake
does not commend itself to the proper ordering of society which is the purpose of the criminal
law.”30

The majority of the Supreme Court also deemed the Kenny rule inapplicable in Cash, preferring
to base its decision in that case on the law of arrest. In submissions before the Supreme Court in
JC the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) appeared disappointed that the Court had not taken
the opportunity presented by Cash to review the Kenny rule.31 It seems that an appropriate case
to allow for such review was being actively sought. Five years after Cash the DPP brought JC to
the Supreme Court.

DPP v JC
Facts and Jurisdiction
Before outlining the new exclusionary rule set out in JC, the manner in which this case came
before the Supreme Court cannot be ignored. JC was suspected of involvement in three
robberies. His dwelling was searched in May 2011 under the authority of a search warrant issued

29
[2007] IEHC 108; [2010] 1 IR 609. See Daly, YM “Exclusion of Evidence: DPP (Walsh) v Cash” (2011) 15 E&P
62.
30
[2007] IEHC 108 at [65].
31
[2015] IESC 31 per McKechnie J. at [96].
pursuant to s 29 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939. He was thereafter arrested, detained
and questioned by gardaí and made a number of inculpatory statements. Section 29 was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case of Damache v DPP32 in February 2012,
several months prior to JC’s trial before the Circuit Criminal Court in Waterford. As s 29
warrants were now viewed as unconstitutional, the Circuit Court judge effectively found that
there had been no lawful authority in the warrant to allow the gardaí to enter JC’s dwelling and
thereafter effect an arrest. Accordingly, and because there was no evidence to support any claim
that the gardaí had entered the dwelling on foot of any other legal power, the accused was in
unlawful custody at the time when he made the inculpatory statements, which were therefore
inadmissible. Under the Kenny rule, this was absolutely the correct outcome of the circumstances
which arose before the Circuit Criminal Court.

However, the DPP appealed to the Supreme Court under s 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act
2010. This provision, in pertinent part, allows for “with prejudice” prosecutorial appeals against
acquittal on a question of law to the Supreme Court where a trial court has “erroneously
excluded compelling evidence”.33 While it was accepted by all members of the Supreme Court
that the trial judge had correctly applied the Kenny rule, the majority accepted jurisdiction to hear
the appeal under s 23 by contending that Kenny had been erroneously decided and accordingly
exclusion of the evidence at JC’s trial, while precedent-compliant, was erroneous.

This is a most unsatisfactory approach to the interpretation of s 23. It required significant

linguistic acrobatics by the Supreme Court and it opened up the possibility that the respondent
might be retried on the basis of the new exclusionary rule which was about to be set out by the
Court, despite the fact that the trial judge had correctly applied the law as it had stood for almost
a quarter of a century. As noted by McKechnie J (dissenting), even if no retrial was ordered, the
finding of the Supreme Court in this case that there was compelling evidence which was wrongly
excluded could lead to an ongoing query of guilt over the respondent, despite his acquittal.
McKechnie J declared the use of s 23 in this case a “… frontal attack on the acquittal” which

32
[2012] IESC 11. See Daly, Y.M. “Independent Issuing of Search Warrants: DPP v Damache” (2013) 17(1) E&P
114.
33
Criminal Procedure Act 2010, s 23(3)(a).
would leave “…a public blur on the character of the respondent who has no legal means of
correcting that life lasting stigma.”34

The distortion of language and threat to the rule of law necessitated by the use of s 23 proved
superfluous in this particular case in the end as the Court unanimously refused to order a retrial
of JC “in the interests of justice”.35 The same outcome could have been achieved under s 34 of
the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 (as inserted by s 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006) which
allows for a “without prejudice” appeal following acquittal and does not require the Court to find
that the trial judge fell into error in excluding evidence. The willingness of the majority of the
Supreme Court to accept jurisdiction through a contortion of the language of s 23 is
disappointing, if not disingenuous. Arguably the decision of the DPP to pursue this case under s
23 rather than s 34 is even more questionable.

The new exclusionary rule

The fundamental and express decision of the majority of the Irish Supreme Court in DPP v JC
was that the Kenny case was erroneously decided and that the exclusionary rule as set out therein
is no longer to be applied. There is some indication in the majority judgments that modern
developments in terms of garda accountability and suspect rights might have led to the view that
the Kenny rule is no longer appropriate,36 although the actual decision is to the effect that it was
erroneously decided from the start. The newly-stated rule, while there is more to it than this (as
discussed below), allows for evidence obtained in inadvertent breach of constitutional rights to
be admitted at trial while evidence obtained in knowing, reckless or grossly negligent breach
must be excluded, except in exceptional circumstances.

Six separate judgments were issued by the Supreme Court (the Chief Justice did not issue a
judgment of her own, but concurred with the majority), amounting to over 155,000 words. The
majority acknowledged the difficult balance to be achieved by the need to ensure that all
potentially relevant evidence is considered at a criminal trial and the need to ensure that

34
[2015] IESC 31 per McKechnie J. at [78].
35
DPP v JC (No.2) [2015] IESC 50.
36
See, for example, [2015] IESC 31 per McMenamin J. at [18] where he asks “Are there now circumstances where
the continuance of the rule is less warranted than at the time of its adoption?”
investigative and enforcement agencies (including the Garda Síochána) operate properly within
the law.37 O’Donnell J. noted the societal cost which can come from the exclusion of probative
evidence:

“the exclusion of evidence of undoubted cogency extracts a significant price in terms of

the capacity of the court to perform its primary function [to determine contested matters
to a requisite standard of proof], and accordingly in terms of confidence in, and respect
for, the legal system. Such a course must always be justified by considerations sufficient
to pay that price.”38

The majority held that Kenny had been erroneously decided. O’Donnell J., for example, declared
himself satisfied that “the decision in Kenny is wrong by any standard.”39

Strong dissents were issued by Hardiman, Murray and McKechnie JJ. Rejecting the contention
that Kenny was erroneously decided, McKechnie J stated:

“Whether one favours or dislikes the result in Kenny, it cannot be doubted but that all
issues and matters of relevance were considered, that such issues were fully debated, that
means of engaging with both interests were looked at and that reasons were given for the
court’s ultimate conclusion. Moreover, by openly acknowledging that disadvantages or
anomalies might result from the approach taken, the court must be credited with having
been ever so mindful of the consequences which might flow from its decision.”40

In the view of Hardiman J. the judgment in Kenny is “one of the monuments of the constitutional
jurisprudence of independent Ireland”41 and he contended that the outcome sought, and achieved,
by the DPP in JC was “quite inconsistent with the gradualist, minimalist and ‘interstitial’ power
of the Common Law judges to develop or evolve the law in light of changing circumstances.”42

37
See [2015] IESC 31 per Clarke J. at [4.8]-[4.11].
38
Ibid. per O’Donnell J. at [4].
39
Ibid. per O’Donnell J. at [99].
40
Ibid. per McKechnie J. at [247].
41
Ibid. per Hardiman J. at [198].
42
Ibid. per Hardiman J. at [132].
As to any question of changes in the past twenty-five years which might make it desirable to
abandon the Kenny rule, Hardiman J., referencing the Morris Tribunal,43 amongst other matters,
stated that, to the contrary “there have, during that time, been a considerable number of deeply
disturbing developments both in relation to the Garda Síochána itself and to the arrangements for
its oversight.”44

The internal consistency of the three majority judgments issued is likely to require some
attention in future cases. While a clear decision was made to state the new rule only once - in the
judgment of Clarke J. - the existence of a number of majority judgments may still create some
confusion. For example, O’Donnell J specified that the decision in JC applies only in the context
of search warrants, while Clarke J was not quite as restrictive. He suggested that the new rule
applies only where there is a question about the manner in which a relevant piece of evidence
was gathered, as opposed to any question relating to the probative value of the evidence given
the way in which it was obtained. Accordingly, the decision does not relate to cases where, for
example, a confession is alleged to have been obtained through oppression or threats. But what if
the admissibility of inculpatory statements was in issue due to a garda breach of a suspect’s right
to legal advice, for example? Would that now be ruled by JC? It seems that it would have to be,
given the express overruling of Kenny, though the judgment of O’Donnell J. is arguably more
restrictive than that.

In any event, the rule as now constructed is set out clearly in the judgment of Clarke J,45 and he
helpfully provides clear reasons for the inclusion of each individual aspect of this rule. The main
elements are as follows:
 The onus is on the prosecution to establish the admissibility of all evidence.
 If a claim is raised that evidence was obtained in breach of constitutional rights, the onus
is on the prosecution to establish either (i) that there was no unconstitutionality, or (ii)
that despite any interference with constitutional rights the evidence should still be
admitted.

43
Tribunal of Inquiry into complaints concerning some Gardaí of the Donegal Division. See www.morristribunal.ie
44
[2015] IESC 31 per Hardiman J. at [160].
45
Ibid. per Clarke J. at [7.2].
  Where evidence is obtained in deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights
(in the sense of knowing breach of rights) it should be excluded, except in exceptional
circumstances.
 Whether or not a breach of constitutional rights was deliberate and conscious requires
analysis of the conduct or state of mind of the individual who actually gathered the
evidence, as well as any senior official or officials within the investigating or
enforcement authority concerned who was involved either in that decision or in decisions
of that type generally or in putting in place policies concerning evidence-gathering of the
type concerned.
 Where evidence was taken in breach of constitutional rights, but this was not deliberate
and conscious, there is a presumption in favour of exclusion, which can be rebutted by
evidence that the breach of rights was either (i) inadvertent or (ii) derived from
subsequent legal developments.

Basically, while the Kenny rule operated on a rationale of protectionism, the JC rule operates on
a rationale of deterrence: evidence will not be excluded if it was obtained in inadvertent breach
of constitutional rights. Hardiman J (dissenting) profoundly objected to the “finding that
‘inadvertence’ by public officials with coercive powers will sufficiently excuse a breach of a
citizen’s constitutional rights to allow material obtained by such breach to be proved in evidence
against that citizen.”46 He stated that he regarded this “as a gratuitous writing down of the respect
due to the Constitution, which is an absolutely retrograde step which I deeply deplore.”47

“Deliberate and Conscious” Breach of Rights (again)

The shift from protectionism to deterrence in JC was partly achieved through the determination
that the term “deliberate and conscious” relates to the state of mind of the person obtaining the
evidence (and/or any relevant senior officials) rather than his/her actions. One might have
thought that in boldly overruling the Kenny case, as the majority of the Supreme Court has
expressly done in JC, it would have been better to avoid this particular turn of phrase altogether,
as its meaning has been so contentious over the years since O’Brien and on through Kenny.

46
Ibid. per Hardiman J.
47
Ibid.
Indeed, the “deliberate and conscious” formulation is not fully accurate in terms of the test
emanating from the Court in JC as Clarke J clarifies that the concept of “inadvertence” for the
purposes of the rule does not include recklessness or gross negligence. 48 O’Donnell J concurs
with this view.49 Accordingly, evidence obtained in knowing, reckless or grossly negligent
breach of constitutional rights will be excluded, except in exceptional circumstances. So,
“deliberate and conscious” breach of rights also includes reckless and grossly negligent breach of
rights, which the everyday meaning of “deliberate and conscious” might not readily impart.

What will be the impact of a “deliberate and conscious” breach of rights, within the meaning of
the JC rule? It seems that a garda who knows he holds an invalid search warrant will obtain
evidence that will later be excluded; a garda who is subjectively reckless, in the sense that he
knows there is a risk that the warrant he holds may be invalid, will obtain evidence that will later
be excluded; and, a garda who takes an objectively unreasonable risk that the warrant he holds
may be invalid which falls so far below the standard of care that he ought to take in executing a
warrant that it amounts to gross negligence, will also obtain evidence that will later be excluded.
Only a garda who has no idea that the warrant he holds may be invalid will obtain evidence that
can be admitted.

The exact operation of the new rule in practice obviously remains to be seen in individual,
subsequent cases. But, it seems possible that the outcome could be something of a reversal of the
dichotomy which has come about since Balfe: O’Brien allowing for admission of the evidence
where there is an error on the face of the warrant and Kenny leading to exclusion where there is a
deficiency in the authorisation of the warrant or its legal value. If evidence is to be excluded now
in circumstances involving gross negligence on the part of the gardaí, the O’Brien scenario could
attract more serious consequences under JC. In O’Brien-type cases, the difficulty in the warrant
is usually visible on its face – an incorrect address, for example, as in O’Brien itself, or in the
more recent case of DPP v Mallon.50 In such cases, will the newly-expressed rule now require
that gardaí check their warrants for the correct information before executing them? Surely a
failure to do so could, and should, be viewed as reckless, or at least grossly negligent. Will these

48
[2015] IESC 31 per Clarke J. at [5.14].
49
Ibid. per O’Donnell J. at [96].
50
[2013] IECCA 29.
errors, previously viewed as mere typographical errors, now take on a greater significance? This
remains to be seen and is certainly arguable, though it is unlikely to have been the intent of the
majority in JC.

Unconstitutionality derived from subsequent legal developments

A further notable aspect of the newly-stated rule is the notion that evidence ought to be admitted
where its unconstitutionality arises as a result of a subsequent legal development. This matter is
directly related to the facts of JC itself, given the impact of the finding of unconstitutionality in
the Damache case between the execution of the warrant at JC’s dwelling and his trial.

Under Kenny, the statements obtained in JC were correctly excluded. However, under the new
JC rule, such statements would be admissible as although s 29 warrants are now invalid and
could not be used to gain entry to a dwelling from the date of the Damache decision onwards,
they were valid at the time of execution at JC’s dwelling. This gives rise to some concern.

The constitutional difficulty with s 29 was that it allowed for warrants to be authorised by senior
gardaí who were involved in the investigation for which the warrant was deemed necessary.
This, as the Supreme Court found in Damache, provided no independent oversight of garda
conduct and inadequate protection for the rights of citizens. Section 29, accordingly, was struck
down for good reason: independence and impartiality are essential to the integrity of the criminal
process, and were not provided for by the s 29 procedure. The notion that because it was viewed
as good law at the time of the execution of a specific warrant – largely because no case had yet
made it to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality – evidence obtained thereunder should
be admitted at a trial arising after it has been declared to be bad law, undermines the declaration
of unconstitutionality. Perhaps more significantly this approach also draws the relevant trial
court into acting upon evidence obtained in breach of the Constitution. Although the gardaí in the
relevant circumstances were unaware of the unconstitutionality, as it had yet to be declared, a
later trial court admitting and acting upon the evidence obtained does so knowing that such
evidence was obtained in what are now viewed as unconstitutional circumstances. Surely this
would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than any alleged frustration of a
prosecution by the Kenny rule. The fact that Ireland is a small jurisdiction which generates a
correspondingly limited pool of litigation makes this concern all the more profound; as Damache
demonstrated, some time may elapse before a challenge to the constitutionality of a practice is
raised before the courts. The approach advocated in JC would allow for evidence obtained under
such a practice over the course of that time to be admitted at trial despite an eventual finding of
unconstitutionality.

Conclusion
There are many more facets to the judgments in DPP v JC which will require attention in the
fullness of time. The nuances of operating the new rule will only become apparent as cases come
through the trial and appellate courts. What might be noted in conclusion at this juncture,
however, is that the Kenny rule was one of the few remaining true “due process” aspects of Irish
criminal procedure. While the Supreme Court recently enhanced the constitutional right to legal
advice, by acknowledging that this right includes a prohibition on questioning a detained suspect
prior to the arrival of his/her requested solicitor,51 in recent years there has been much
curtailment of suspect rights within the criminal process, both in the pre-trial investigative stage
and at trial. Since the decision in Kenny, for example, we have seen extended detention periods,52
extremely broad intrusions on the right to silence,53 the curtailment of the right to bail,54 an
increase in reliance on opinion evidence from gardaí at trial,55 alterations to the rule against
hearsay in relation to witness statements56 and so on. The existence of the strict exclusionary rule
from Kenny may have been thought of as a last refuge of “due process” in a swell of “crime
control” rights-limiting enactments.57 But it is definitively no more as a result of DPP v JC.

51
DPP v Gormley and White [2014] 1 ILRM 377.
52
Including provision for up to seven days detention under s.2 of the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 1996
and s.50 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007.
53
For example under s.19A of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 as inserted by s.30 of the Criminal Justice Act 2007.
54
By virtue of a constitutional referendum in 1996 and the Bail Act 1997.
55
Under s.7 of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009.
56
Under s.16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006.
57
On the concepts of “due process” and “crime control” see Packer, H.L. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction,
Stanford: Stanford University Press (1968).