Legal Ethics

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 6

RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS

OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO.


Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern
Samar, is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely remittance of
judiciary funds in his custody as required by OCA Circular No. 8A-93. In his explanation,
Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance of the cash deposited with him
was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money in the court’s safety vault
and never once used it for his own benefit. Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and his ready
admission of the infraction, although certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his
failure to remit ₱65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was contrary to the mandatory
provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission was a breach of his oath to obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and of his duties under Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the Constitution and obeying the
law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer’s responsibilities under Canon 1
mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law. As servants of the law and officers
of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the
rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. This, in
fact, is what a lawyer’s obligation to promote respect for law and legal processes entails. The
least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful
conduct. By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. It does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although it is broad enough to include it. Thus, the
presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act
or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from
engaging in unlawful conduct.

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant, vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.


While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant) overtook the car driven by
herein respondent. Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a
turn. An altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that the respondent fired and shot
complainant hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the respondent so the latter pushed
him out and sped off.

Issue: WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.


Ruling:
Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that respondent
seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his acts
such as illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm, wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities,
extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road,
who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a
simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His
overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any
individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not
the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to
assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge. The totality of the facts
unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude.

Thus, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances –
not the mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the
legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen
dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the
bar.
- Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances.

SELWYN F. LAO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.


Respondent has been brought to the Court for failure to pay his debts and for issuing
worthless checks as payment for his loan from complainant. While acknowledging the
fact that he issued several worthless checks, he contends that such act constitutes
neither a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the
records that he made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his
obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing
and transferred the blame to complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused
to accept the former’s plan of payment.
- Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly
pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional
or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.
- As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general
rule with many exceptions x x x. The nature of the office, the trust relation which
exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the
statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an
attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition
precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him
- Regarding the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt with Commissioner
Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was expected to settle his
obligation with complainant. We cannot countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He
should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his
membership therein. Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer
assigned to investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very important personal matter
to attend to, he could have politely explained his predicament to the investigating
commissioner and asked permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately, the former
showed dismal behavior by raising his voice and leaving without the consent of
complainant and the investigating commissioner. We stress that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. It demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as
a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice
of law. In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice. He is suspended for 1 yr.
WILSON CHAM, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, respondent.

FACTS:
Respondent stayed at the leased premises of Greenville Realty and Development Corp.
(GRDC) up to October 2000 without paying her rentals from July to October 2000 and also
failed to settle her electric bills for the months of September and October 2000. The Statement
of Account as of 15 October 20043 shows that respondent’s total accountability is P71,007.88.
Sometime in October 2000, a report reached complainant’s office that respondent had secretly
vacated the apartment unit, bringing along with her the door keys. Also, respondent did not
heed complainant’s repeated written demands for payment of her obligations despite due
receipt of the same, compelling complainant to file the present Complaint.
ISSUE:
WON ATTY. PAITA MOYA BE SUSPENDED
Yes, Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar,
to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their
financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations,
the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing
them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy
to continue as officers of the Court. The Court stresses that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. It demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. In
this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of her as a guardian of law
and justice. Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his or her professional or private capacity is a
ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is
an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such
privilege.

[ A.C. No. 13521. June 27, 2023 ]


IN RE: ATTY. LORENZO G. GADON'S VIRAL VIDEO AGAINST RAISSA ROBLES
RULE 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
This is an administrative case commenced by the Court,1 pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, against Atty. Lorenzo G. Gadon (Atty. Gadon) after a video clip (subject
video clip) of him lashing out and uttering profanities against Raissa Robles (Robles), a
journalist, surfaced online and went viral on various social media platforms. The Court noted in
the January 4, 2022 Resolution that this was not the first time that Atty. Gadon has displayed
similar behavior in public.

According to Atty. Gadon, Robles' tweets were false and libelous.17 Enraged by these
purported constant lies peddled by her, he recorded the subject video clip to stop and rebuke
her.18 He claimed that he uttered those words out of passion, in order to express his anger,
disgust, and displeasure against Robles.19
Atty. Gadon, however, alleged that he did not post or upload the subject video clip in any social
media platform as he intended to directly send it to Robles, and only for her. On the contrary, he
argued that it was Robles who uploaded the video on social media in order to gain sympathy
from friends and supporters and to besmirch his name considering that he had just announced
his intention to run for Senator.20
As to the finding of the Court that Atty. Gadon's utterances in the subject video clip could be
considered as prima facie gender-based online sexual harassment under Sections 3(e) and 12
of R.A. 11313, he argued that the said law was not applicable because his expletives were "an
attack against her as a journalist and not by virtue of her gender."
Should Atty. Gadon be disbarred?
The Court finds that Atty. Gadon has shown himself to be unfit to be part of the legal profession.
Thus, the Court imposes on him the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Court has always
maintained that the practice of law is a privilege given to a few, and it is granted only to
those of good moral character. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The
use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. In this regard, all lawyers should take
heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of
the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Thus,
respondent ought to temper his words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an
officer of the court. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court
speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct, which — albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession — would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which their license and the law invest in them
When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary
purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public
confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other
lawyers from similar misconduct.

SOCORRO T. CO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO, respondent.

Socorro T. Co alleged that in October 1989, as she was following up the documents for her
shipment at the Bureau of Customs, she was approached by respondent, Atty. Godofredo N.
Bernardino, introducing himself as someone holding various positions in the Bureau of Customs
Respondent offered to help complainant and promised to give her some business at the Bureau.
In no time, they became friends and a month after, or in November of the same year,
respondent succeeded in borrowing from complainant P120,000.00 with the promise to
pay the amount in full the following month, broadly hinting that he could use his
influence at the Bureau of Customs to assist her. To ensure payment of his obligation,
respondent issued to complainant several postdated Boston Bank checks. However, the
checks covering the total amount of P109,200.00 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds and
closure of account.

Pressed to make good his obligation, respondent told complainant that he would be able to pay
her if she would lend him an additional amount of P75,000.00 to be paid a month after to be
secured by a chattel mortgage on his Datsun car.1 As complainant agreed respondent handed
her three (3) copies of a deed of chattel mortgage which he himself drafted and six (6) copies of
the deed of sale of his car with the assurance that he would turn over its registration certificate
and official receipt. The agreement was not consummated as respondent later sold the same
car to another. Despite several chances given him to settle his obligation respondent chose to
evade complainant altogether so that she was constrained to write him a final demand letter
dated 22 September 1992 2 preceding the filing of several criminal complaints against him for
violation of BP Blg. 22. 3 Complainant
also filed a letter-complaint dated 5 October 1992 with the Office of the Ombudsman.
It may be worth mentioning that a certain Emelinda Ortiz also filed several criminal and civil
cases against respondent similarly involving money transactions.
RULING:
HE IS SUSPENDED FOR 1YR.
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private
capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the
lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be
justified in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569
[1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross
misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the
bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him
a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant,
albeit very much delayed.

You might also like