Civil Military Relations in Pakistan

FUTURE OF
DEMOCRACY &
CIVIL-MILITARY
Relations in PAKISTAN
Developments in 2017
a study by PILDAT
Pakistan Institute of Legislative

Development And Transparency
FUTURE OF
DEMOCRACY &
CIVIL-MILITARY
Relations in PAKISTAN
a study by PILDAT

PILDAT is an independent, non-partisan and not-for-profit indigenous research and training institution with the
mission to strengthen democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan.
PILDAT is a registered non-profit entity under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860, Pakistan.
Copyright © Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency - PILDAT
All Rights Reserved
Printed in Pakistan
Published: March 2018
ISBN: 978-969-558-713-3
Any part of this publication can be used or cited with a clear reference to PILDAT.

Islamabad Office: P. O. Box 278, F-8, Postal Code: 44220, Islamabad, Pakistan
Lahore Office: P. O. Box 11098, L.C.C.H.S, Postal Code: 54792, Lahore, Pakistan
E-mail: [email protected] | Website: www.pildat.org
STUDY BY PILDAT
Future of Democracy & Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan
CONTENTS
Preface 05
Introduction 07
Key Questions 07
The Context 09
Major Irritants in Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan 09
Conclusions 25
List of Tables
Table 1: Regional & International Visits and Interactions of COAS in 2017 11

Table 2: Call-ons & Interactions of COAS with Visiting Foreign Dignitaries and Ambassadors 12
in Pakistan
Table 3: Timeline displaying major Irritants in Civil-Military Relations: 2013-2017 15
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Preface
Preface
The state of Civil-Military relations in Pakistan continues to be the biggest stumbling block to consolidation of
democracy in Pakistan. While the relations have never followed the intent of the Constitution and therefore have never
been ideal, developments in 2017 have brought further critical challenges for Pakistan's democratic future.
As an independent think tank dedicated to strengthening democracy and democratic institutions, PILDAT believes an
objective analysis of the current challenges must be carried out to develop policy recommendations that can help steer
the country and its democratic order at this time.
Studying and analysing civil-military relations is a flagship area of PILDAT's work. With the belief that at this time
state of civil-military relations in Pakistan is the single most important factor upon which the quality of democracy in
Pakistan depends, PILDAT began its work in the area in 2004. PILDAT's work has ranged from undertaking research
and study in issues relating to civil-military relations in Pakistan and cataloguing the best strategies and practices to
improve civil-military relations in other countries with similar transitions to democracies after prolonged military
rules. Facilitating the formation of a Dialogue Group on Civil-Military Relations, PILDAT has continued to promote
and facilitate civil-military dialogue process. International Conferences and regional dialogues on the subject have also
been a key plank of PILDAT's initiative. The key outcome of PILDAT's focus has been defining and creation of space
for credible, fact-based and non-emotive discussion on the issues affecting civil military relations and to facilitate
dialogue in the public domain that the civil-military equation, as experienced in Pakistan, is deterimental to Pakistan's
journey towards democratic consolidation. PILDAT has contributed a rich body of knowledge in the area spanning over
170 publications and growing, which are developed through research and study, including regional and international
comparative analyses, and proposals for reforms for democratic consolidation through improving civil-military
relations in Pakistan.
This PILDAT study attempts to provide an objective analysis of recent developments and is based on individual
interactions and interviews with influential and knowledgeable cross-section of country's civil and military elite who
have first-hand knowledge of the key developments affecting Pakistan's democratic order and civil-military relations.
These persons have included senior politicians, former key ministers, opinion makers from the media, legal and
constitutional experts, seasoned MPs and former military officials. The interviews for the study were conducted using
the Chatham House rule and has used interactions to capture various perspectives and outlines recommendations and
reform proposals.
Lahore
December 2017
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Introduction indicate that instead of being received as a Supreme

Court verdict, the disqualification is seen by a large
Ascendancy of the military to political power has been number of persons as being orchestrated by the Army in
a recurrent feature of Pakistan's governance. It has what appears to be a Get-Nawaz agenda. While some
manifested in various ways ranging from direct resorted to whispers and innuendo on media, others,
assumption of power, displacement of one civilian including the international media considered the
government by another, manipulation of divided disqualification to be an outcome of sour civil-military
political and societal forces, making policy inputs from relations and questioned future of democracy in
the side-lines to threaten or actual use of coercion in Pakistan. National media offered analyses that said
support of their demands. “elected governments in Pakistan have less to fear from
the Indian army than from their own;” and that
As Pakistan turns 70, it has been ruled directly by “[Pakistan's] security establishment regularly betrays
Military for over 30 out of 70 years while not a single contempt for civilians. There is a view that elected
elected Prime Minister of Pakistan has, so far, been able governments are regarded as unwanted pregnancies, to
to complete the Constitutional tenure of 5 years in be aborted whenever need be, to save the motherland.
office. Other than 4 direct interventions by the military The latest still-birth is the ouster of a third-time prime
since Pakistan's independence in 1947, successive minister Nawaz Sharif.”3 The criticism of the
military commanders have exercised de-facto authority disqualification was even more scathing in
on crucial aspects of national security management international media which said that “the judicial farce
including regional and international affairs. As a result, that resulted in Sharif's most recent ouster
state of civil-military relations in Pakistan is the single demonstrates that the courts remain tools for the
most important factor upon which the quality of generals to clip democracy's wings.”4
democracy in Pakistan depends.
Key Questions
With Pakistan's Supreme Court disqualifying Mr.
Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan's Prime Minister elected to Do sour civil-military relations indeed provide the
office on June 01, 2013 through the 10th General singular lens to view and interpret the developments? If
Election in Pakistan, for being 'not honest' under Article the innuendo is correct and military has an axe to grind,
62(1)(f) of the Constitution,1 critical challenges have is it only directed at Mr. Sharif or no elected
appeared on the democratic horizon for Pakistan that Government is immune to that? The study investigates
require to be understood and addressed. this through interactions and interviews on a number of
questions:
The 6-member 'Joint Investigation Team-JIT' which
submitted a report to the Supreme Court based on
which the Court gave its decision included two serving
military officers from Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) JIT included two serving military
and Military Intelligence (MI). Earlier than that, the
expansion of a looming shadow of military's over-reach officers from ISI and MI while
in civilian, political and policy affairs was already legitimate questions were raised
becoming a concern based on the belief that sucking
military into non-professional spheres would be at the that not only military institutions
cost of their primary focus of the defence of the country. do not have professional role to
Legitimate questions were raised that not only that
military institutions such as the ISI and the MI do not investigate white collar crime,
have the professional role to investigate white collar Supreme Court should not have
crime, the Honourable Supreme Court should not have
inducted military agencies into highly politicized inducted military agencies into
Panama Case enquiry.2 highly politicized Panama Case
Widespread local and international media reports enquiry
1. Nawaz Sharif steps down as PM after SC's disqualification verdict – Dawn, July 28, 2017
2. PILDAT Monitor on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan | Jun 2017: http://www.pildat.org/eventsdel.asp?detid=941
3. F. S. Aijazuddin, An Unburied Lion – Op-ed in Dawn, August 10, 2017: https://www.dawn.com/news/1350643/an-unburied-lion
4. The Only Enemy Pakistan's Army Can Beat is Its Own Democracy: FP: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/09/the-only-enemy-pakistans-
army-can-beat-is-its-own-democracy/
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Is there a specific policy/doctrine

by the Military on Pakistan's
stance in relations towards India,
Afghanistan & the USA? What is
the cornerstone of that policy? In
case there is a disagreement
between the Civilian elected
Government, who is to be the
final arbiter on what policy
should be adopted by Pakistan?
1. What are the factors behind the disqualification of
Mr. Nawaz Sharif? Is it legal issues alone or
Military had a role to play in pursuing the case?
2. In his various public appearances, Mr. Sharif has

been hinting at a “hidden hand” behind his
disqualification. Should Mr. Sharif be specific
about those 'hidden hands'?
3. What were the major irritants in Civil-Military

Relations under the tenure of Prime Minister
Sharif?
4. Is there a specific policy/doctrine by the Military

on Pakistan's stance in relations towards India,
Afghanistan & the USA? What is the cornerstone
of that policy? In case there is a disagreement
between the Civilian elected Government, who is
to be the final arbiter on what policy should be
adopted by Pakistan?
5. In the case of disagreement, does the Military

resort to destabilising an elected Government that
represents the citizens' aspirations?
6. Recommendations to diffuse the crisis and offer

policy reforms to address the civil-military
equation
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The Context
Civil-military imbalance in
The seeds of disquiet between the civil elected Pakistan seemed to have
governments and the military have indeed played a part
in straining the relations between the elected increased, with the Military
Government of Mr. Sharif and the Pakistan Army. The leadership seemingly
cleavages were on public display, perhaps by design,
many a times, during the course of the tenure of Gen. establishing itself as the final
Raheel Sharif, Chief of Army Staff who served from arbiter on national security and
November 2013-2016 and later General Qamar Javed
Bajwa who took the charge of the office of the Chief of certain domains of our foreign
Army Staff in November 2016. Table 1 carries a policy. Elected Government
detailed timeline of major irritants in civil-military
relations under the tenure of Premier Sharif until appeared to be relegated to an
November 2017. auxiliary role
Under the leadership of both the Chiefs of Army Staff,
the overreach of the Army and the role of the COAS extraordinary pro-activeness exhibited by the ISPR,
continued to grow in national, regional and foreign which was seen to be taking the lead even on
policy issues. The international profile of the COAS announcements such as the formation of Military
continued to increase under Gen. Sharif and is carried Courts or of Provincial Apex Committees. It is a
out under Gen. Bajwa as in their individual capacities debateable point whether this scenario developed
of COAS, each held exclusive interactions with because of civilian authorities complacency in giving
international political leadership. out the information efficiently and effectively. The
resultant creation of a messiah-like image of the COAS
By the end of Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif's tenure, the is perhaps best epitomized by the popular tagline of
civil-military imbalance in Pakistan seemed to have #ThankYouRaheelSharif. This was also accompanied
increased, with the Military leadership seemingly by a reported regrettable culture of media advice by the
establishing itself as the final arbiter on national ISPR, leading to concerted media management.
security and certain domains of our foreign policy. The
elected Government, on the other hand, appeared to be Thus, at the beginning of the tenure of incoming COAS
relegated to either an auxiliary role, or a parallel Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, an anxiety may have existed
national security regime. There were various contours that this was a tough act to follow for Gen. Qamar Javed
of this imbalance, including public disagreements upon Bajwa as if he failed to maintain the media standing
the implementation of the National Action Plan; an surrounding Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif, the public
increased domestic and international profile of the might needlessly question his performance. Instead of a
COAS; an operation in Karachi, which increasingly careful rollback of this policy so as to protect the
took a political hue; increased preponderance in military and its leadership from any unwarranted
internal security by the Military due to weak policing; criticism, gradually, the role and personal publicity of
creation of a security doctrine, which linked Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa have only grown with time.
criminality, corruption and terrorism; and, most From announcing Umrah for Pakistan cricket team at
importantly lack of institutionalization in matters of winning Champions Trophy to holding Youth
national security. All of these issues seemed to come to Seminars; from ending political dharnas to
a head with the daily Dawn's exclusive story of October international visits and receiving diplomatic
06, 2016, which brought out into the open the civil- dignitaries, COAS Bajwa is as active on the diplomatic
military friction that had been brewing for a long time. front, if not more, as his predecessor.
Therefore, although a narrative of the civil-military
leadership 'being on the same page' was perpetuated Major Irritants in Civil-Military Relations
partly through these 3 years, the relationship remained
frayed at best. in Pakistan
One particular manifestation of the civil-military Following are major issues of concern and irritants and
imbalance associated with Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif apparent causes of continuing polarisation:
was his larger-than-life profile both internationally and
at home. This was perpetuated through the 1. Civilian space is shrinking in Policy Spheres
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2. Elected Governments and political leadership is on foreign and internal security policies is favourably
ceding space through lethargic and slow decision- suited to the military which has its own perspective on
making at the top executive level national security issues, experts belonging to the
3. Military is increasing its overreach into areas military seemed to concur with the perspective in a
outside of its professional domain including different manner by saying that the weaknesses and
domestic issues (development of FATA & inability of the civilian elected politicians to understand
Balochistan, Economy, Regional & Foreign Policy) and develop cogent policy options for Pakistan remains
4. Palpable apparent and verbally confirmed tension the major irritant and distrust of the military in
between military establishment and a popular politicians. “Politicians do not read and do not think
political party is spilling out in the public leading to and certainly do not focus on critical policies including
the conclusion that civil-military relations have defence, national security and foreign affairs,”
moved into an era of 'open warfare'. According to believed the military experts whose perspective was
some analysts and media comments, a Military- similar to the erstwhile DG ISI Mr. Pasha who was
Judiciary nexus is seemingly created to manage and reported to have said in his testimony to the Abbottabad
undercut a popularly-elected party Commission that civilians have “no culture of reading”
5. Military is accused of brokering political alliances important government documents, and as Mr. Pasha
6. Foreign countries are apparently and increasingly saw it, their “thinking process was also non-existent.” 33
reaching out to the military because they perceive
power to be residing there. There is a consistent perception among the public that
Mr. Nawaz Sharif does not get along with the Military -
This has meant an alarming increase of a legitimate but Ms. Benazir Bhutto also did not work; Mr. Zardari
concern in Pakistan that military that is being sucked did not work, Mr. Shaukat Aziz had no political
into non-professional spheres and it should resist legitimacy and Mr. Sharif's personality is difficult -
temptation of trying to fix every problem. which begs the question as to who can the Military
work with, civilian experts said. The issue, therefore, is
The disqualification of Premier Sharif took place in this broader and includes any and every civilian elected to
context. To many experts, the military's perceived office who rightly believes that having been elected by
hidden hand orchestrated the disqualification. That the people of Pakistan, it is his or her territory to govern,
military wanted Mr. Nawaz Sharif out at any cost is a which includes not just building motorways and
stance that has been corroborated by many in the highways, but govern in terms of making decisions that
civilian and military circles. That Mr. Sharif was have an impact on national security and welfare of the
disqualified for “having failed to disclose his un- State, said the civilian experts. On the other hand,
withdrawn receivables” and “having furnished a false
declaration under solemn affirmation” 30 in a case that
was based on Panama papers is termed by many to be an There is a perception that Mr.
indication of claims in international media that Nawaz Sharif does not get along
Pakistan's Supreme Court is 'collaborating with the
Pakistan Army against civilian rulers.'31 with the Military, but Ms.
Benazir Bhutto also did not
Following the NAB references against Mr. Sharif and
his family, legal experts quoted NAB officials saying work; Mr. Zardari did not work,
that while apparently NAB has to work under the SC's Mr. Shaukat Aziz had no
appointed Supervisory Judge, NAB is really answering
to the Military (ISI & MI) in these proceedings.32 political legitimacy and Mr.
Sharif's personality is difficult -
Experts were also asked whether Mr. Nawaz Sharif as
the elected Premier is the anathema for the military or which begs the question as to
there is a general distrust. While civilian experts who can the Military work with?
believed that independent stance of no elected Premier
30. For details, please see Full text of Supreme Court order in Panama Papers case, Dawn, July 28, 2017:
https://www.dawn.com/news/1348209
31. For details, please see: 'With Nawaz's ouster, Pakistan Military's chokehold over parliament tightens,' The Wire, Mohammad Taqi, July 31,
2017, accessed on August 01, 2017 at: https://thewire.in/163101/nawaz-sharif-pakistan-military/
32. Interviews conducted for the Study
33. Pakistan's civil-military imbalance. The bad in Abbottabad: The Economist, July 11, 2013:
https://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/07/pakistan-s-civil-military-imbalance
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Table 1: Regional & International Visits and Interactions of COAS in 2017
No. Month Visit Details

1 November 2017 Visit to Iran COAS met with Iranian President, Foreign Minister,
Chief of General Staff (CGS), Defence Minister.
2 October 2017 Visit to Afghanistan COAS met the Afghan President one-on-one, and held
delegation level talks with the Afghan Government
representatives.
3 October 2017 Visit to Middle East COAS met the ruler of Dubai and Prime Minister of the
(Kingdom of Saudi UAE. Later, he ew to KSA, where he met Saudi
Arabia and UAE) Crown Prince.
4 September 2017 Visit to Australia COAS met the Australian Army Chief, Australian
Foreign Minister, and Defence Minister as well as
Australian Senate's Committee for Foreign and Defence
Affairs, Australian Chief of Defence Staff and visited
the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the Ofce
of National Assessment.
5 June 2017 Visit to Turkey COAS received briengs on regional security at the
Turkish Land Forces Headquarters, and met Chief of
Turkish General Staff. Later, he met Turkish President,
Turkish Defence Minister and Turkish Prime Minister.
6 April 2017 Visit to UK COAS visited the UK Ministry of Defence, where he
met UK Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Special
Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan and also
US Resolute Support Mission (RSM) Commander. He
addressed UK think tank International Institute for
Strategic Studies, as well as Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI).
7 March 2017 Visit to Qatar The COAS called on the Qatari Minister of Defence
Affairs and Chief of Staff of Qatar Armed Forces. He
also met Prime Minister of Qatar, Commander Qatar
Emiri Land Forces, and Commander Qatar Emiri Guard.
He also met Emir of Qatar.
8 March 2017 Visit to China COAS met Executive Vice Premier, Vice Chairman
Central Military Commission, Chief of Joint Services
Department and Commander People's Liberation Army
(PLA). He also met Chinese Foreign Minister.
9 January 2017 Visit to Kingdom of COAS met with the King of Saudi Arabia, Deputy
Saudi Arabia Crown Prince and Defence Minister.
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Table 2: Call-ons & Interactions of COAS with Visiting Foreign Dignitaries and Ambassadors
in Pakistan
No. Date Call Ons/Interactions
1 November 24, 2017 Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan met the COAS at the GHQ to bid farewell to the
COAS at the end of his tenure in Pakistan.
2 November 21, 2017 Assistant Foreign Minister and Special Envoy on Korean Peninsula Affairs of
China and newly appointed Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, called on the COAS
at the GHQ.
3 November 17, 2017 Special Envoy on Afghan Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic
of China met with the COAS.
4 November 09, 2017 US Ambassador to Pakistan met with the COAS, at the GHQ.
5 October 13, 2017 Ambassador of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia called on the COAS at the GHQ.
6 October 12, 2017 A U.S. delegation comprising Deputy Assistant to the President and National
Security Council Senior Director for South Asia, Acting Assistant Secretary of
State and US Ambassador to Pakistan called on COAS at the GHQ.
7 September 26, 2017 Ambassador of China to Pakistan met the COAS at the GHQ.
8 September 22, 2017 British High Commissioner to Pakistan called on the COAS at the GHQ.
9 September 21, 2017 German Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS at the GHQ.
10 September 20, 2017 Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS at the GHQ.
11 September 18, 2017 Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS
12 August 25, 2017 Afghan Media Delegation met with the COAS
13 August 23, 2017 US Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS.
14 August 09, 2017 Saudi Deputy Defence Minister, while on a visit to Pakistan, called on the COAS.
15 August 02, 2017 Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS.
16 July 13, 2017 Canadian High Commissioner to Pakistan called on the COAS at the GHQ.
17 July 12, 2017 Ambassador of France to Pakistan called on COAS at GHQ.
18 July 02, 2017 Delegation of US Senate (Armed Services Committee) called on the COAS at the
GHQ. The delegation was taken to South Waziristan, and briefed about the security
situation.
19 June 25, 2017 Chinese Foreign Minister and his delegation called on COAS.
20 June 12, 2017 British High Commissioner to Pakistan called on the COAS at the GHQ.
21 June 06, 2017 Russian Ambassador to Pakistan met the COAS.
22 June 05, 2017 Ambassador of Japan called on COAS.
23 May 22, 2017 US Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS at the GHQ.
24 May 04, 2017 German Special Representative for Pakistan-Afghanistan met the COAS .
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Table 2: Call-ons & Interactions of COAS with Visiting Foreign Dignitaries and Ambassadors
in Pakistan
No. Date Call Ons/Interactions
25 May 03, 2017 Iran's Foreign Minister met with the COAS at the GHQ.
26 April 19, 2017 Ambassador of Iran to Pakistan called on the COAS.
27 April 14, 2017 Afghanistan's Ambassador to Pakistan met the COAS at the GHQ.
28 April 11, 2017 US Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS.
29 March 27, 2017 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans Affairs South Africa called on the COAS
at the GHQ.
30 March 06, 2017 Ambassador of Germany to Pakistan called on the CJCSC at GHQ.
31 March 04, 2017 Ambassador of Iran to Pakistan called on COAS.
32 February 28, 2017 Russian Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS.

33 February 09, 2017 US Secretary of Defence had a twenty minutes telephone conversation with the
COAS.
34 January 27, 2017 German Ambassador to Pakistan met the COAS at the GHQ.
35 January 20, 2017 Ambassador of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia called on the COAS at the GHQ.
36 January 18, 2017 Ambassador of United Arab Emirates (UAE) met the COAS.
37 January 15, 2017 COAS made a telephone call to Afghan President to condole the loss of life in
terror attacks in Afghanistan.
38 January 13, 2017 Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS at the GHQ.
39 January 06, 2017 British High Commissioner to Pakistan called on the COAS at the GHQ.
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Pakistan Army has genuinely come to believe that the

civilians consist of 2 groups: either they are corrupt or What could have driven a wedge
they are incompetent and some of them are both corrupt
and incompetent and therefore have no interest, idea or between Army and Mr. Sharif?
conviction about welfare of the State and if the Army Both civilian and military
does not step in to save the day, the country will suffer.
The Military also genuinely believes, since the time of experts opined that treason trial
Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, that they have a responsibility beyond of Gen. (Retd.) Musharraf,
the territorial frontiers of Pakistan to also protect the
ideological frontiers of the country. Here too, they are refusal to grant extension to
convinced that every civilian government is weak. Gen. Sharif and differences in
While there are no two views about the requirements
for each political party and resultant government to be perspective, perhaps best
efficient and honest, it is not the constitutional job of categorised under Dawn Leaks
the Military to sit in judgement of elected governments.
Worldwide, even in developing democracies, the appear to be main drivers
challenges of governance are overcome through
sustenance of the system in which citizens vote Those who worked with Prime Minister Sharif also
governments in and out, believed civilian experts. added that whenever any recommendation came from
Gen. Raheel Sharif as COAS or Gen. Qamar Javed
Mr. Nawaz Sharif's Government has been weakened Bajwa, whether it was for a job or anything else, Mr.
since the beginning of the current term in June 2013 by Nawaz Sharif never said no to them. Responding to a
the Military, believed some experts. The first of such question whether Mr. Sharif, in his capacity as PM,
efforts was the PTI and PAT dharna in 2014. Everyone tried to engage candidly with the COAS/Military,
in Government believed that martial law was in the experts responded that a lot of meetings used to take
offing and ministers had even packed their offices. It place between the COAS and Premier, in addition to the
was so humiliating that a Prime Minister elected by the meetings of the NSC and COAS Gen. Sharif did not
people of this country was orchestrated to be put under differ or even appeared to differ with the elected
a siege in the very Prime Ministers House. The whole Government. Could Premier Sharif have done anything
world watched this embarrassing saga while Pakistan differently for smooth relations? Those privy to
could not host the Chinese President due to visit in Government say they saw extensive discussions taking
September 2014 where CPEC agreements would have place on foreign and regional policy between the
been signed, said experts. elected Government and the Military leadership and
can not think of what could have been done differently.
Responding to a question on what could have driven
such a wedge between the Army and Mr. Sharif, both Successive Chiefs of Army Staff have continued to
civilian and military experts opined that treason trial of amass more and more power over time. On foreign
Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf, refusal to grant policy, Mr. Sharif took Chief of Army Staff and DG ISI
extension to Gen. Raheel Sharif and differences in with him on his first visit to Kabul, Afghanistan to
perspective, perhaps best categorised under the “Dawn allow for an agreed State policy, but later developments
Leaks,”34 appear to be the main drivers of the wedge. showed that COAS directly took the initiative of
The extension of Gen. Raheel Sharif as COAS was holding individual meetings with heads of State and
reportedly quite a big issue as he, again reportedly, Governments around the World. In Afghanistan, Gen.
asked Prime Minister Sharif to give him 3 more years Sharif would even leave Pakistan's Ambassador to
and the Army will eliminate terrorism. However, as the Afghanistan out of his meetings with the Afghan
reported stories go, Premier Sharif declined the President, only taking along his military colleagues.
proposal. Much like the practice in the World, virtually, in all the
Pakistani missions in the world have a representative of
34. The exclusive Dawn Story of October 06, 2016 titled Exclusive: Act against militants or face international isolation, civilians tell military
which was denied both by Government and the Military, became a major controversy between the civil government and the military during
the premiership of NS. The story was said to be based on conversations with Dawn of individuals present in the crucial meetings (that)
week. In the leaked meeting, a verbal confrontation between Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif and then DG ISI Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar was
narrated in which Chief Minister claimed that security establishment works behind the scenes to set certain groups free whenever action is
taken against them. In the end, Prime Minister Sharif directed Lt. Gen. Akhtar to 'tour the provinces at the direction of the prime minister,
issue fresh orders to ISI sector commanders and meet with provincial apex committees to chalk out specific actions that need to be taken in
various provinces' and Lt. Gen. Akhtar 'readily agreed.'
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Table 3: Timeline displaying major Irritants in Civil-Military Relations: 2013-2017

(In chronological order beginning with developments from June 2013 going to December 2017)
No. Date Development

01. April-May The decision taken by the Federal Government to pursue a Treason Trial against Gen.
2014 (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf for his imposition of Emergency in November 2007, and the
latter's indictment on May 31, 2014 create irritants in civil-military relations.
02. April 2014 Irresponsible statements of the Government Ministers regarding the trial created the
perception that the Federal Government was conducting the trial to only settle personal
scores. 5
03. January 2014 The former President's dash to the Armed Forces Institute of Cardiology (AFIC) on
January 02, 2014 (ostensibly due to critical health concerns) and his long sojourn there as
he was discharged on April 3, 2014 – a stay of 3 months - gave the impression as if the
Military leadership was sheltering him from facing legal proceedings. The Federal
Minister for States and Frontier Regions, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Abdul Qadir Baloch, MNA,
also asked the Army Chief to move the former dictator out of the Military hospital as his
prolonged stay over there was damaging the reputation of the Military'.6
03. April 2014 Assassination attempt on Mr Hamid Mir, senior journalist of Geo Television, served to
cast a long shadow on civil-military relations in Pakistan. Geo Television, using the
sound bites of Hamid Mir's brother, launched a 24-hour long ferocious and
unprecedented campaign against the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its Director
General, Lt. Gen. Zaheer ul Islam, blaming him personally and the ISI as an institution
for the attempt on the life of Hamid Mir. Although the ISI reports to the Prime Minister
and technically works under Prime Minister's ofce, Prime Minister's ofce maintained a
deafening silence while the media house, through its popular TV channel and several
newspapers, went on an irresponsible rampage against the ISI and its head. The Pakistan
Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) simply took no notice of this vicious
campaign. Once a public backlash began to appear, the public relations wing of the
Armed Forces, ISPR, also tried to rebut the accusations. In a stark contrast to his and his
Government's total inaction in the case of defending the ISI or its chief, Prime Minister,
Nawaz Sharif, showed extra-ordinary swiftness to convene a high level meeting on a
Sunday (April 20) and announced the constitution of a very high level judicial
commission to probe into attack on Mr. Mir, consisting of three supreme court judges
(The Hamood ur Rehman Judicial Commission formed to probe the dismemberment of
Pakistan in 1971 had two judges of the Supreme Court along with a high court judge).
The Prime Minister also undertook an extraordinary step of visiting convalescing Hamid
Mir in a Karachi Hospital the next day (21 April) along with his Minister of Defence and
Minister for Information. The Information Minister, speaking to media on the occasion,
said that Prime Minister's visit to Hamid Mir was a show of solidarity with the reason
(Daleel) and Intellect (Danish) opposed to the sling (Ghulail) – a message that was open
to diverse and somewhat dangerous interpretations in the charged atmosphere.7
5. For example, during April 2014, the Federal Minister for Defence, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, MNA ridiculed Gen. (Retd.) Pervez
Musharraf by saying that the latter puffed up his chest because he used to be wearing a life jacket. The Federal Minister for Railways,
Khawaja Saad Rafique, MNA also said that the former ruler committed the 'mother of crimes' by abrogating the Constitution time and
again. During the period, a speech made by the Federal Minister for Defence, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, MNA also went viral on the
internet and on TV channels in which he directed scathing criticism at the Military and alluded to their failures in all the wars. For details,
please see the heading titled Mercury rising in Civil-Military relations, on page 02 of the PILDAT publication Monitor on Civil-Military
Relations in Pakistan, April 01, 2014-April 30, 2014, which can be accessed at:
http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/CMR/MonitoronCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_April012014_April302014.pdf
6. For details, please see the heading Indictment of Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf, on page 03, of the PILDAT publication titled Monitor on
Civil-Military Relations in Pakista, March 01, 2014-March31, 2014, which can be accessed at:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/CMR/MonitorOnCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_March012014_March312014.pdf
7. For details, please see the PILDAT publication titled Monitor on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, April 2014, which can be accessed at:
http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/CMR/MonitoronCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_April012014_April302014.pdf
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04. August - PTI and the PAT begin a dharna in August 2014, which led to signicant doubts about the
December continuity of the elected Government, and were considered by many to be orchestrated by
2014 the establishment to reduce the elected Government's preponderance and sway vis-à-vis
the Musharraf Treason Trial. The ISPR statement 'all stakeholders to resolve prevailing
impasse through meaningful dialogue in larger national and public interest' 8 showed as if
the Military leadership was treating both the protestors and the Government at par, and
sitting in judgment about their conduct. Because of this equidistant position of Army,
Gen. Raheel Sharif was asked to mediate in the crisis, although at whose behest, was a
matter of much controversy. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, during the Joint Session of the
Parliament, had stated that the PTI and PAT chiefs had made the request, with Dr. Tahir-
ul-Qadri and Mr. Imran Khan claiming the opposite.9
Mr. Javed Hashmi accused Mr. Imran Khan of following a “scripted plan” on the behest
of the Military. 10
The ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Zaheer-ul-Islam was replaced with Maj. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar. 11
The appointment of the new DG ISI was significant at a time when the Army was
accused of involvement in the political crisis of the twin sit-ins seeking to overthrow the
incumbent PML-N government. The ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Zaheer-ul-Islam, was considered
to be pushing for the Premier's ouster as Government sources claimed they had evidence
of the ISI “backing Imran to get rid of Nawaz.” 12
05. January 2015 The formation of Military Courts, paved by the Parliament passing the 21st
Constitutional Amendment, 2015 (that had a sunset clause of two years and later
reconstituted for another two years in January 2017) after the Peshawar Tragedy, signied
yet another institutional imbalance for Pakistan's civil-military relations as all political
parties agreed to the constitution of military courts after the military indicated its support
for such a move.
Following the amendment, formation of the Provincial Apex Committees, without any
constitutional or legal basis13 have been a peculiar by-product of the NAP in the centre
and provinces, giving military commanders a commanding seat at the executive table.
Important decisions regarding the provinces' internal security emanated from the Apex
Committees
06. April 2015 The Federal Minister for Interior, Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan, MNA, in his remarks of
April 13, 2015, acknowledged the presence of 'an irritant' in civil-military relations but
was condent that these would be overcome.
07. May 2015 Lt. Gen. Naveed Mukhtar, Commander V Corp (Karachi) delivered an extraordinary
speech in May 2015 openly criticising the elected Sindh Government. Considering that
Lt. Gen. Naveed Mukhtar's speech represents a well-considered institutional view of the
Military, he said “police and administration should be free from political interference” in
Sindh along with the resolve to “bring the Karachi Operation to its logical conclusion.”
Corp Commander expressed concerns regarding the distribution of development funds by
the Sindh Government by saying that “parallel governments and centres of power must
8. For details, please see Army calls for restraint, dialogue on August 20, 2014: http://nation.com.pk/20-Aug-2014/army-calls-for-restraint-
dialogue
9. For details, please see SC dismisses all petitions seeking PM Nawaz's disqualification, Dawn, December 09, 2014, as accessed on May 10,
2015 at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1149778
10. For details, please see Javed Hashmi announces resignation from PTI, Dawn, October 1, 2014: https://www.dawn.com/news/1135523
11. For details, please see Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar to take reigns of the ISI today, the Express Tribune, November 08, 2014, as accessed on
June 08, 2015 at: http://tribune.com.pk/story/787606/lt-gen-rizwan-akhtar-to-take-reins-of-isi-today
12. For details, please see Pakistan Army Chief Holds Off Generals Seeking PM's Ouster, Reuters, September 05, 2014 at Voice of America:
http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-pakistan-army-debate-prime-minister-nawaz-sharif-ouster-protests/2439957.html
13. The ISPR issued a Press Release regarding the formation of Apex Committees on January 09, 2015 may be accessed at:
https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2015/1/3
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STUDY BY PILDAT

07. May 2015 come to an end in the province.” In an apparent rejoinder issued by the Chairperson of
the PPP, and the former President of Pakistan, Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, in which he did not
directly refer to the Corp Commander's speech, but made a vague allusion to it, he urged
restraint from any 'lecturing', all the while iterating that the people should be the judge of
the performance of the elected Sindh Government. 14
08. November Press Release issued by the ISPR criticizied the Government for its governance,
2015 especially in the context of the implementation of the National Action Plan stating that
'while appreciating progress of ongoing operation and Intelligence Based Operations
(IBOs), their achievements and effects, COAS underlined the need for
matching/complimentary governance initiatives for long-term gains of operation and
enduring peace across the country'; rejoinder issued by the Government the next day
saying that implementation of NAP is a shared responsibility.15
09. March 2016 COAS directed concerned commander and intelligence agencies to commence operations
against perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Lahore on March 27, 2016; It was not clear if
the operation coud be directly ordered by the COAS and whether any consultation took
place with the Provincial Government of the Punjab or the Federal Government prior to
the operation.
10. May 2016 According to a Press Release issued by the ISPR, the Pakistan Army handed over a newly
constructed border crossing facility at Angoor Adda to the Afghan authorities.
Apparently, this had been done without consultation with the Federal Ministry of Interior,
with Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, MNA writing a letter to the Prime Minister, expressing
his reservations over it.
11. May 2016 One-on-one meeting held between the Prime Minister and the COAS. Media reports on
the meeting suggested that the COAS had asked the Prime Minister to resolve the
Panama Papers crisis 'as soon as possible'.
12. October 2016 The Dawn story of October 06, 2016 titled Exclusive: Act against militants or face
– May 2017 international isolation, civilians tell military which was denied both by Government and
the Military, became a major controversy and cause for an investigation known as “Dawn
Leaks.” 16 The issue of 'Dawn Leaks' Inquiry hit a new high on April 29, 2017, after a
letter of the Prime Minister Ofce on the Dawn Leaks Inquiry Committee appeared on
the social media and communicated the Prime Minister's approval of the withdrawal of
the portfolio of the Special Assistant to Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs Syed Tariq
Fatemi and proceedings under Efciency and Discipline Rules 1973 against Rao Tehseen
Ali, Principal Information Ofcer (PIO) of the Ministry of Information. The same day,
DG ISPR Maj. Gen. Asif Ghafoor tweeted 'Notication on Dawn Leak is incomplete and
not in line with recommendations by the Inquiry Board. Notication is rejected.17The
14. For details, please see the PILDAT publication titled Monitor on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, May 2015, which can be accessed at:
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/CMR/MonitorOnCivil-MilitaryRelationsinPakistan_May012015_May312015.pdf
15. The ISPR statement read as follows: “While appreciating progress of ongoing operation and Intelligence Based Operations (IBOs), their
achievements and effects, COAS underlined the need for matching/complimentary governance initiatives for long-term gains of operation
and enduring peace across the country. Progress of National Action Plan's implementation, finalization of FATA Reforms, and concluding
all ongoing JITs at priority were highlighted as issues which could undermine the effects of operations.” Complete statement can be
accessed at: https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2015/11/10
16. The exclusive Dawn Story of October 06, 2016 titled Exclusive: Act against militants or face international isolation, civilians tell military
which was denied both by Government and the Military became a major controversy. The story was said to be based on conversations with
Dawn of individuals present in the crucial meetings (that) week. In the leaked meeting, a verbal confrontation between Chief Minister
Shahbaz Sharif and then DG ISI Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar was narrated in which Chief Minister claimed that security establishment works
behind the scenes to set certain groups free whenever action is taken against them. In the end, Prime Minister Sharif directed Lt. Gen.
Akhtar to 'tour the provinces at the direction of the prime minister, issue fresh orders to ISI sector commanders and meet with provincial
apex committees to chalk out specific actions that need to be taken in various provinces' and Lt. Gen. Akhtar 'readily agreed.'
17. Tweet also released in the form of a press release that can be accessed at: https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-
press_release&id=3952&cat=army
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12. October 2016 Tweet of DG ISPR was nally withdrawn on May 10, 2017 through an ISPR Press
– May 2017 Release in which it was claried that the Tweet was 'not aimed at any government ofce
or person.' The press release also went on to reiterate its 'rm commitment and continued
resolve to uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and support the
democratic process.' The Interior Ministry issued a notication on the Inquiry Committee
Report on the same day in which the noticeable new entry compared to the leaked letter
of the Prime Minister Ofce of April 29, 2017 was the endorsement of the 'action already
taken by the Federal Government against Senator Pervaiz Rashid.' 18
12. January – The extension of Gen. Raheel Sharif remained a topic of much debate and discussion and
November an important issue for civil-military relations even though in January 2016, a public
2016 statement by the ISPR refuted the rumours regarding the extension of the COAS' service.
This, however, did not put an end to the matter. Mysterious banners appeared in the major
cities of Pakistan (sponsored by a political party called 'Move On Pakistan') calling on the
COAS Sharif, in a thinly veiled manner, to impose martial law. After his retirement,
many TV anchors said that Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif had personally pressurised Prime
Minister Sharif for extension of his service, which the Prime Minister refused. 19
13. December Gen. Raheel Sharif as CoAS had protected Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf from his
2016 treason trial, claimed Gen. (Retd.) Musharraf. 'Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif had 'a role to
play in releasing the pressure behind the scenes … Once he [Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif]
got the Government to relieve the pressure that they were exerting, the courts gave their
judgment and allowed me to go abroad for treatment'. Earlier, Federal Minister for States
and Frontier Regions, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Abdul Qadir Baloch, MNA, made a statement
during a television programme that saving Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf 'had the
signatures' of Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif. 20
14. November The change of command of the Chief of Army Staff witnessed in November 2016 was
2016 seen as a modest win for the maturing of system in Pakistan.
15. April 2017 The Joint Investigative Tribunal (JIT) announced by the Supreme Court to investigate the
Panama Case on April 20, 2017 included one member of the Military Intelligence and
one of the Inter-Services Intelligence. The inclusion was not questioned by Mr. Nawaz
Sharif or the Federal Government. However, PILDAT believed that the inclusion was
unprecedented and inappropriate as neither the two agencies held any expertise in
investigating matters of nance and law, nor was it advisable to involve military in a
highly politicised issue. The Supreme Court gave the JIT two months to investigate the
Sharif family and then deliver its ndings
The Corps Commanders' Conference however supported the inclusion stating that
'Institution through its members in JIT shall play its due role in a legal and transparent
manner fulfilling confidence reposed by the Apex Court of Pakistan.'21
16. June 2017 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was asked as a witness to appear before the JIT while he
appeared on June 15.
18. July 28, 2017 Supreme Court of Pakistan disqualied Mr. Nawaz Sharif for being 'not honest' under
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. 22
18. A copy of the notification can be viewed in the news report, Interior Ministry notification echoes ISPR stance, Dawn Leaks matter 'settled,'
May 10, 2017, which can be accessed at: https://www.geo.tv/latest/141238-Interior-Ministry-notification-echoes-ISPR-stance-Dawn-leaks-
matter-settled
19. For details, please see: http://www.awaztoday.pk/News-Talk-Shows/163349/Raheel-Sharif-Ne-Extension-Lenay-Ki-Koshish-Ki-Thi-
Mohammad-Malick-Reveals.aspx
20. The interview was aired on November 27, 2016 on Geo Television by Mr. Saleem Safi. The complete interview can be see at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJokqIrueDY
21. ISPR Press Release can be accessed at: https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&cat=army&date=2017/4/24
22. Nawaz Sharif steps down as PM after SC's disqualification verdict – Dawn, July 28, 2017
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19. August 2017 Ousted Premier Sharif addressed rallies on GT Road on his way from Islamabad to
Lahore saying “for 70 years, no prime minister has been allowed to complete his tenure.
This is not an insult of your prime ministers, but of the 200 million people of Pakistan.
You vote a prime ministers into power, and some dictator and some judge comes along
and rips up your ballot paper and hands it back to you.” 23
20. August 2017 Ahead of the ofcial celebrations where traditionally the President of Pakistan, as head of
the State, hoists Pakistan's ag with Premier and service chiefs in attendance - the COAS
General Qamar Bajwa hoisted the largest national ag in the history of Pakistan at
Wahgah border at midnight between August 13 and 14. The ag hoisted by the COAS
was reportedly the largest ag in the history of Pakistan with the size of 120 feet by 80
feet. Hoisted on a 400 feet high pole, the ag is said to be the highest in South Asia and
the 8th highest ag in the world.
21. October 2017 In one of the most blatant face-offs in civil-military relations in recent times, the Federal
Interior Minister, in full view of the nation, was denied access by Rangers into the
Federal Judicial Complex in Islamabad on the day of hearing of former Prime Minister
Mr. Nawaz Sharif's trial. When the Interior Minister asked the soldier on duty at the gate
to call the commander present inside, the commander did not show up. Mr. Ahsan Iqbal
openly and rightly claimed that, legally, the Ministry of Interior is the administrative
Ministry of the Rangers. The Interior Minister had reached the Judicial Complex to
personally ascertain the situation as several other PML-N leaders and media persons were
denied entry, and the civil administration had claimed that the Rangers were not
requisitioned by them. The Interior Minister was visibly upset at the treatment and the TV
channels showed him saying that “this is not a banana republic…"and that "Two States
cannot function within one State.” 24
22. October 2017 Mr. Khurram Dastgir Khan, MNA, Federal Minister of Defence, as reported by ISPR
"called on the Chief of Army Staff"at the GHQ on October 10, 2017, whereas it should
have been the other way around. Mr. Khuram Dastgir Khan also called on the newly
appointed Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi, at the Naval
Headquarters in Islamabad on October 23, 2017.
23. November In a Press Conference held on November 11, 2017, Mr. Mustafa Kamal, Chairman Pak
2017 Sarzameen Party (PSP) said that the deal between the PSP and Mr. Farooq Sattar's
Muttahida Quami Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) was brokered by Sindh Rangers. He
said that “today I want to tell all of Pakistan that, yes, the establishment called us and
made us meet Farooq Sattar. When we reached, Sattar was already there and it was on
his request that we were called. This did not happen a few hours ago. Sattar and his team
have been calling us with help from the establishment for the past eight months.” 25
Responding to the statement by Mr. Mustafa Kamal, DG Rangers Major General

Mohammad Saeed, said that Sindh Rangers Director General Maj Gen Muhammad Saeed
said that the military establishment did not support any particular political party in
Karachi. “We just don't want a clash between them.” “Since September 2013, we have
had an intense interaction with all political parties that were allegedly involved in
committing violence in Karachi. However, we have not dictated any organisational policy
for the political landscape of the metropolis.” Saeed went on to say that during the
meeting [between MQM, PSP and LEAs] a military ofcial might have shared an opinion
that an alliance would be in the interest of the city, “but this is not our institutional
policy.”26
23. GT Road rally: 'Only the people should kick out those they vote into power,' Nawaz says in Jhelum, Dawn, August 10, 2017:
24. Punjab Rangers chief told to explain court takeover: Ahsan Iqbal, DAWN, October 04, 2017, as accessed on November 03, 2017 at
25. Establishment brokered MQM-PSP alliance meet at Sattar's request: Mustafa Kamal, Dawn, November 11, 2017:
26. Establishment has not supported any particular political party, clarifies DG Rangers Sindh, Dawn, November 14, 2017:
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The manner in which the Faizabad sit-in was ended and the terms of the agreement
24. November signed by the Government with protesters through the corroboration of the Army
2017 –marked a disappointing watershed in the history of Pakistan. That the Army, tasked by
the Federal Government, facilitated an agreement that capitulated the State to demands of
a mob has all but disastrous connotations written all over it. Subsequent statements by the
leader of the protest and actions, such as the DG Rangers distributing cash amongst
dharna protesters, have not only raised serious questions about the writ of the
Government and the State but also about the role of the Armed Forces during the protest.
The disturbing facilitation by the Army can be best summed up using the words of
Islamabad High Court Judge, Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, who termed it “alarming,”
that a serving military ofcer signed [the agreement] as guarantor (In fact, the exact word
in the agreement was bawisatat or 'through'), and that the COAS and his team were
thanked separately in the agreement for helping reach the agreement. “Prima facie, [the]
role assumed by the top leadership of army is besides the Constitution and law of land.
Armed forces, being part of the executive, cannot travel beyond its mandate bestowed
upon it by the organic law of the country, i.e., the Constitution.” Chastising the Army for
their role, the Judge said “Army officers eager to participate in politics should first return
their guns to the State, take retirement and then join politics.”
Chief of Army Staff reportedly declined to involve the troops to end the 19 day long sit in
at the Faizabad interchange. In a meeting with Prime Minister, he opposed the Army's
use of force against its own people since the population's trust in the institution of the
Army “can't be compromised for little gains.” 27
Earlier, the advice by the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, to the Prime
Minister Shahd Khaqan Abbasi through a telephonic conversation was made public
precisely through a tweet by the DG ISPR as the Government carried out an operation on
the directives of the Islamabad High Court on November 25. The COAS - “suggested to
handle the Islamabad dharna peacefully to avoid violence from both sides as it is not in
national interest” said the DG ISPR's tweet which gave the impression as if the Army has
a role above and beyond the executive of the State and that it equated both the State, and
the protesters holding the State hostage. Similar advice and the tweet were earlier
directed at the elected Government during the PTI-PAT dharna that held the capital
hostage in 2014 by an erstwhile DG ISPR during the term of another COAS who advised
“all stakeholders to resolve prevailing impasse through meaningful dialogue in larger
national and public interest.” 28
Announcing the end of the dharna in a Press Conference on November 27, 2017, Mr.
Khadim Hussain Rizvi highlighted the role the Chief of Army Staff played to resolve the
issue. He said, “Mohtaram General Qamar Javed Bajwa Sahab ne apne khasoosi
numaiinde hamare pass bheje. Hum ne kaha kay hum ne hakumat se baat nahin karni. Ye
hamari qatil hai. Hamare beesiyon karkunaan ko unhon ne bilawaja shaheed kiya. Aur
mulk kay halaat taizi se kharab hone ki taraf ja rahe thay tou General Sahib ne zaati
dilchaspi li, aur apni team bheji, kay hum iss main zamin bantey hain. Aap k mutalibaat
hum purey karwatey hain. Unn ki taraf se Mohtaram Major General Faiz Hameed
(Director (Internal), ISI) tashreef laey, aur hamara muahida unn kay sath hua. Zahid
Hamid ka istifa hamarey Shuhada kay khoon ki qeemat nahin hai. Ye tou Khatm-e-
Nabuwwat ka jo masla tha, us ki waja se iss ka istifa aaya… Baqi hum aur bhi
mutalibaat kar sakte thay. Iss waqt hum General Sahab ko jo bhi kehtey, unhon ne maan
jana tha. Lekin logon ney kehna tha kay ye tou hakumat uthane ke liye aye hain. Hum ne
27. An overview of the crisis that forced the government to capitulate, Dawn, November 27, 2017: https://www.dawn.com/news/1373200
28. For details, please see Army calls for restraint, dialogue on August 20, 2014: http://nation.com.pk/20-Aug-2014/army-calls-for-restraint-
dialogue
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24. November koi aur baat nahin ki hai. Ab jo hamare darmiyaan muahida hua, iss main General
2017 Sahab khud bhi zamin hain.”[Honourable General Qamar Javed Bajwa Sahab sent his
special representatives to us. We said that we do not want to speak to the Government.
They are our murderers. They killed tens of our workers for no reason. And the situation
in the country was deteriorating fast. So, General Sahab took a personal interest in the
situation, and sent his team to us to be guarantors. They said that they would get our
demands accepted. From their side, Honourable Major General Faiz Hameed (Director
(Internal), ISI) came to us, and we made an agreement with him. Zahid Hamid's
resignation is not the price of the blood of our martyrs. His resignation is to resolve the
issue of Khatm-e-Nabuwwat… We could have made further demands. At this time,
General Sahab would have given us anything we would have asked for. But then people
would have said that we came to dismantle the Government, so we did not talk about
anything else. Now the agreement that took place between us, General Sahab himself is
also a guarantor in it.] 29
The agreement brokered by the Army and signed by the Federal Government, specically
thanks the COAS and his team for their facilitation.
25. December Defence Minister only a facilitator, not boss of Pakistani defence organization: On
2017 December 30, Federal Minister of Defence, Engr. Khurram Dastgir Khan, MNA, made
highly signicant pronouncements on civil-military relations and the role of Minister of
Defence. Talking to Mr. Saleem Sa in his talk show Jirga, Mr. Khan said that there is
indeed 'tanao' or tension in civil military relations in Pakistan. He also said that Defence
Minister is not the boss or in-charge of Defence Organization, as is the diktat of the
Constitution; that Defence Minister is merely a facilitator at best and most of the time
even marginalised at that while Prime Minister directly deals with leadership of the
Armed Forces. Some of the key excerpts paraphrased below from his interview are:
i. We [PML-N] have learnt that individually good relations between Services

Chiefs and PM do not solve issues in civil-military relations. There have to be
good inter-institutional relations
ii. We have to “search for truth in facts;” that while the Constitution is an ideal and
inspiration but facts, on the ground, are different
iii. National Security Committee (NSC) is perhaps the best forum for dialogue on
civil-military relations and now we [PML-N Government] are using it more
regularly
iv. PML-N party leader Nawaz Sharif felt that merely winning the next election
would be meaningless unless “awam ka haq-i-hakmiat” or the people's right to
rule was not established and accepted. PML-N will go to the next General
Election with the manifesto of supremacy of people
When asked what is the minor difference of opinion on foreign relations between the
civilian Government and the Armed Forces, he said that they are absolutely on the same
page as far as relations with the US are concerned but on Afghanistan there are minor
issues. He rather profoundly said that “ham bar bar yeh clarity chahtey hain Afwaj-e-
Pakistan sey keh jo kuch bhi Afghanistan mein ho raha hai, us ka koi ta'aluq Pakistan sey
nahin hona chahiyey.”
29. Press Conference of Mr. Khadim Hussain Rizvi, November 27, 2017, Islamabad Dharna ENDS Announcement, YOUTUBE, November 27,
2017, as accessed on December 04, 2017 at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0cn_RJ1efNE
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the ISI who have their own line of communication to civilian bureaucracy does not bring to the table any
the DG ISI and COAS – a communication which is not well-considered policy options. In an informed policy
necessarily shared with the civilian elected leaders discussion, civilians do not stand ground as the policy
while telegraphs of ambassadors are marked to COAS options proposed by them are developed without
and DG ISI as well. This disconnect was also thorough homework. “There is no policy vigour on the
documented in the Abbottabad Commission report that civilian side,” lament military experts. Though Nawaz
talked of the similar “disconnect between the civilian Sharif has a vision and policy on relations with India, it
and intelligence administration,” in particular between suffers from same weak grounds. The Government
the country's government and its top spy agency, the capitulated on the question of banning the Jamaat-ud-
military-run Inter-Services Intelligence directorate Dawa (JuD) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT); only Military
(ISI). 35 defended the banned organisations because even the
United Nations as well as the United States
Some, however, also believe that it is the responsibility distinguishes between terrorists and freedom fighters,”
of elected Prime Ministers to carry every institution opined military experts. The military is willing to listen
along. The stature of the office of Premier demands that if there are cogent arguments in an institutionalised
Prime Minister leads the country with harmony with all forum of dialogue. Both sides may present their views
State Institutions and not create unnecessary but they do not talk in the National Security Committee
dissonance. Pakistan is categorised as a Security State (NSC); they merely talk at each other and hence
by many and therefore security establishment will differences of opinion are expressed in open forums.
always need to be consulted. If the security Contrary to the popular belief, military is a very
establishment has a doctrine about regional relations, democratic institution; it promotes policy debates even
there is no harm in taking that into considerations. up to the level of the meetings of the formation
History of decision making in Pakistan has also proved commanders who, in the case of a disagreement, go
time and again that political parties must make even by voting on an agenda, said one Military expert.
decisions for overall stability and sustainability of
democracy. Political decisions based on narrow “We are not un-parh (illiterate) in the military and there
personal interests have ultimately harmed prospects is a lot of emphasis on education,” said military
and sustainability of democracy in Pakistan. experts. In comparison, politicians believe that it is
their munshi's (roughly equivalent to a personal
Military indeed has a doctrine on foreign policy, assistant or secretary) job to read and write for them and
especially on relations with India, especially the not theirs. That attitude is unworkable towards a
Kashmir issue, trade with India and Afghanistan, sustainable democratic governance rooted in well-
believed both civil and military experts. However, developed policies. For instance, military is very well
Military is also stuck in policies developed in 1980s aware that development and defence spending have to
and requires to update those with changing scenarios, go hand in hand or we face a scenario that of USSR or
opined military experts. The civil side, including what we experienced in East Pakistan. On Afghanistan,
the concept of 'strategic depth' is to ensure a peaceful
NS Govt. has been weakened western border which stems from the perspective that if
we have hot borders on both eastern and western fronts,
since June 2013 by the Military, the entire Army will be engaged with only frontier
believed experts. First such effort corps remaining to deal with other emergencies which
is not desirable. Therefore, a peaceful, stable and
was PTI and PAT dharna in friendly Afghanistan is in the interest of Pakistan.
2014. Everyone in Govt. believed Military insists that Afghanistan Government should
include Pashtuns as a key part of Afghanistan
martial law was in the offing and population. Vis-à-vis India, military understands that
ministers had even packed their we can not match Indian spending on budget and there
has to be another way to fight a war and defeat the cold-
offices. It was so humiliating start doctrine. While military may rely on non-State
that elected PM was orchestrated actors, they do not constitute more than ½% of military
strategy, said military experts.
to be put under a siege
35. Pakistan's civil-military imbalance. The bad in Abbottabad: The Economist, July 11, 2013:
https://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/07/pakistan-s-civil-military-imbalance
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STUDY BY PILDAT
By its training, military sees black and white; there is no

grey. Either someone is a friend or a foe. But politicians
work with a lot of grey. Military needs more than a seat
at the table of decision-making. It wants politicians to
be prepared and be knowledgeable. Sustainability of
system is the most important consideration and military
wishes to improve the democratic system.
Military experts also agreed that while final authority

on decision-making should constitutionally be that of
elected Governments, their incompetence makes
military jittery to let them remain fully in-charge. They
agreed that for the outside world, it does create multiple
power centres and shows a divided house.
Why resort to weakening the writ of elected

governments in the case of a policy disagreement?
After all, civilian governments are elected by the
citizens and are not governments of enemy countries.
In destabilising governments, how much is too much
and what is a red line, military experts were asked. It
should not happen in an ideal world; however, it does,
they said.
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STUDY BY PILDAT
Conclusions
There are indeed full-blown, out-of-control, critical issues and irritants in civil-military relations as experienced today in
Pakistan. Where military overreach in policy spheres is unprecedented, it tries to justify that on the reason that politicians
and elected governments are corrupt, ill-organised and have no capacity for the required, knowledgeable thought
process that can develop cogent policy options for the welfare of the State and citizens. This perceived weakness of the
civilian political leadership by the military also leaves the country's security, as well as its 'ideological security' in the
lurch. Military simply has to step in to save the day. However, it wants to preferably do so from the sidelines and not by
taking reigns of power directly.
Political leadership especially the civilian governments share the responsibility as well as blame for receding civilian
authority because in the face of a military used to its ascendant ways, political leadership has failed to strengthen national
institutions and has often preferred political expediency over merit. Successive civilian elected governments have been
remiss in institutionalizing national security management through an ingrained consultative process on vital national
strategic issues. In part, this has also strengthened the military perception that elected governments are neither serious
nor methodical in making well-considered decisions on vital national security issues.
However, the Military leadership can not continue to believe that the final onus of deciding 'national interest' rests on
them. For democratic governance to take root in the country, Military can not insist on its interpretation of the national
interest relating to any issue including regional and foreign relations and the security policy. PILDAT believes that
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STUDY BY PILDAT
Military needs to recognize that the elected Government is the final arbiter on national interest matters. The people of
Pakistan have mandated them to do so. Although the Military leadership may have its views on national security, and it
should present its views as effectively as it can at all appropriate fora, the mandate for the final decision resides
exclusively with the Elected Governments. Even if the Elected Government makes any mistakes in this regard, these
should be recognised as the risks associated with any decision-making. After all, military governments too have not
been immune to making serious mistakes in the past.
Similarly, PILDAT believes that elected governments are not elected so as to work as monarchies and have to follow
institutionalised consultative system of decision-making. Cabinets, both at the Federal and Provincial levels, need to be
empowered to make all major decisions in an informed manner. The system of weekly cabinet meetings should be
strictly followed and decision-making by circulation should not be adopted. Members of the cabinet should be
encouraged to express their views freely while an issue is discussed.
Political parties, whether or not in power, can also not be absolved of the blame. No meaningful consultation appeared
to be taking place on matters of national security within political parties. Decision-making process in almost all parties
is so arbitrary and whimsical that it inspires little confidence in their decision-making.
Much the same inability is evident in the Parliament and its relevant Committees to develop the requisite oversight of
the executive in general and defence and security sector in particular. Recent examples of the capitulation of the elected
Government to the Faizabad protestors finds its roots in almost complete failure of all political parties in not being
mindful of the sensitivity of the subject while en masse agreeing on amending the Elections Bill 2017 relating to a
candidate's belief in the finality of the prophethood of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and replacing the
Khatm-e-Nabuwwat oath with the words “I believe” in place of “I solemnly swear.”
From the constitutional perspective, rule of law has to govern the State and citizens. In the face of such stark and glaring
gulfs in the perceptions of the civil and the military, the State has to develop widespread consensus in institutions in
critical foreign policy and strategic areas. Political Parties have to prepare themselves by creating within them
structures on policy development.
Democratic Oversight on Defence
Constitution of Pakistan designates the elected Federal Government to have control and command over the Armed
Forces. However, the intent of the Constitution is not followed in practice when the sitting Defence Minister claims
merely to be a “facilitator” and not the boss or in-charge of Defence Organization. The first logical step, therefore, is to
strengthen democratic oversight of defence. PILDAT proposes following recommendations:
1. Democratic control on Defence can only be established through an effective Ministry of Defence (MoD). The
Ministry needs to be the principle authority in all matters of policy, finance and budget of the defence sector
2. Federal Minister of Defence must be a part of all meetings of any service chief and the Prime Minister unless an
extra-ordinary situation warrants otherwise
3. MoD should be manned, in the main, by professional career bureaucrats except where the nature or duties of the post
mandate that it should be filled by a serving officer of the armed forces
4. Ministry of Defence, Services Headquarters, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and National Security Committee
should develop close coordination in terms of policy input and strategic thinking
5. While the State has been battling with a number of national security issues over the years, there is a critical need to
address these issues in a holistic manner through preparing a well-coordinated and comprehensive national security
and defence policy of Pakistan. Once the policy is final and made public, a periodic Defence and Security Review of
Pakistan must be prepared and made public based on the national security and defence policy of Pakistan.
6. Defence Council' should be activated and strengthened by regular meetings (at least once a quarter) of the Defence
Council chaired by the Federal Minister of Defence to co-ordinate the defence, foreign and finance policies of
Pakistan, and to approve major works including induction of new weapon systems proposed by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee. The Defence Council is provided for in the Rules of Business of the federal government.
7. A spokesperson of the Ministry of Defence should be appointed to speak on behalf of the Ministry on all defence and
security affairs including those relating to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. A military spokesman may join too when
operational details of the military are the subject.
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STUDY BY PILDAT
8. MoD must review and oversee industrial, business & commercial interests of the Armed Forces and bring these in
line with the rules and practices especially relating to transparency and accountability in other spheres of
Government
9. MoD must prepare proposals to strengthen the higher defence organisation. While the PML-N Government
deserves credit for putting in place the required structure of National Security Committee, NSC is only a part of the
higher defence organisation (HDO) structure of Pakistan, which largely, has not been reformed since 1976. Detailed
recommendations are contained in PILDAT paper titled Restructuring Higher Defence Organisation in Pakistan.
10. All Defence Agreements/MOUs should be presented to and ratified by the cabinet. In selective cases, the ratification
by the parliament may also be considered.
Need for Institutional Dialogue
Perhaps the most telling statement indicating the need for an institutional dialogue has been made by Federal Minister of
Defence, Mr. Khurram Dastgir Khan, MNA, when he said that “We [PML-N] have learnt that individually good
relations between Services Chiefs and PM do not solve the issues in civil-military relations. There have to be good inter-
institutional relations.”
A real dialogue between civil and military has to be promoted through existing institutional structures chief among
which is the National Security Committee (NSC). PILDAT believes an inter-institutional Dialogue is indeed required.
Its not just required because Pakistan's Supreme Court has disqualified another premier from holding office through the
working of a JIT including serving military officers from ISI & MI, but it has long been required due to a continuing lack
of constitutional equation between institutions. Such a dialogue, however, can not be a one-off, time-barred event. It has
to be a continuing dialogue that brings to table all stakeholders that are genuinely intent on resolving the crucial
challenges and engage in understanding perspectives instead of talking at each other.
Who should host the Dialogue

It is a pity that despite having institutions already in place to engage in a dialogue, successive governments and
institutions have chosen not to fully utilise them. Lets see what can be some of these institutions
National Security Committee

The National Security Committee provides the best forum where such a dialogue can take place on national security
issues. The NSC, however, has to be a consultative forum and not a decision-making body, to conduct such a dialogue.
The NSC should meet more frequently and regularly and its support infrastructure as originally envisaged should be
strengthened in the form of various committees and think tanks.
a. NSC Meetings dedicated to strategic Civil-Military Issues: Civil-Military Dialogue on long term strategic
issues like the Key strategic foreign relations and long-term security perspective is extremely important to
understand each others' perspective and to develop a unified national position. Since Understanding divergent
perspectives and reaching a common ground can not be accomplished in one or a few meetings. This requires
consistent, regular and long-term engagement. At least one meeting in a month (preferably) or two months be
devoted to these strategic subjects alone. There may be other NSC meetings to deal with routine operational
matters but one meeting each 30 or 60 days should be dedicated to strategic issues.
b. Research and Planning Infrastructure at NSC: NSC meetings, especially on strategic questions, need to
have high quality research input. Various Civil and Military institutions may have their own research inputs
but NSC needs to have its own infrastructure to collate the available research and carryout its own original
research, where needed, in order to assist NSC in informed decision-making. When the NSC (originally as
Cabinet Committee on National Security) was formed back in 2014, an independent secretariat and two
subsidiary bodies, the Planning Committee and an Advisory Board were also to be established along with it.
However, it has not come into our knowledge how the two subsidiary bodies are functioning and whether they
are operational at all. It would be in the best interest of the country to operationalize them to assist the NSC.
Expanded Civil-Military exchange at NDU

While NSC remains the apex body for civil-military exchange of views, a more informal but extremely useful exchange
at second, third and fourth tiers of civil-military leadership may also be facilitated. National Defence University (NDU)
has been conducting such an interaction in various courses and workshops. The Government of Pakistan especially the
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STUDY BY PILDAT
Ministry of Defence may look at the possibility of further facilitating and streamlining such dialogues in collaboration
with NDU management.
Mechanism of Dialogue
a. The dialogue has to be initiated with all stakeholders agreeing to resolve the malaise of institutional disconnect
harming Pakistan. Interlocutors and stakeholders must agree on the agenda and timeline of the dialogue
b. Inter-institutional dialogue must not be used as an opportunity of pointing fingers. A fruitful dialogue forum
can not be used as a means to humiliate, humble or criticise any institution but as a forum to listen to and
understand each others' perspectives and find a way forward that harnesses those perspectives for the ultimate
benefit to the country and the citizens.
c. Perhaps by nature, politicians require publicity and media for every initiative. A dialogue of this nature,
however, must not be open for publicity. Dialogue must be held away from the gaze of media and must follow
strictly the rules of non-attribution
Proposed Agenda
The most crucial questions that constitute the agenda of the dialogue are as follows:
i. Objective identification of irritants in inter-institutional relations

ii. Inter-institutional perspectives on irritants and major national issues
iii. On matters of national concern, including security, Constitutional and legal issues, while everyone needs to be
on board, who should be the final, lawful and authoritative arbiter on decision-making in case of
disagreement?
iv. Developing of policy reform proposals, with defined targets timelines and performance indicators.
v. National Security Policy and Strategies to implement the agreed policy.
28
Islamabad Office: P. O. Box 278, F-8, Postal Code: 44220, Islamabad, Pakistan
Lahore Office: P. O. Box 11098, L.C.C.H.S, Postal Code: 54792, Lahore, Pakistan
E-mail: [email protected] | Website: www.pildat.org

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Pakistan Institute of Legislative

Pakistan Institute of Legislative

Copyright © Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency - PILDAT

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Published: March 2018

Pakistan Institute of Legislative

Major Irritants in Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan 09

Table 1: Regional & International Visits and Interactions of COAS in 2017 11

Introduction indicate that instead of being received as a Supreme

Is there a specific policy/doctrine

2. In his various public appearances, Mr. Sharif has

3. What were the major irritants in Civil-Military

4. Is there a specific policy/doctrine by the Military

5. In the case of disagreement, does the Military

6. Recommendations to diffuse the crisis and offer

Table 1: Regional & International Visits and Interactions of COAS in 2017

No. Month Visit Details

11 September 18, 2017 Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS

13 August 23, 2017 US Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS.

15 August 02, 2017 Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS.

17 July 12, 2017 Ambassador of France to Pakistan called on COAS at GHQ.

26 April 19, 2017 Ambassador of Iran to Pakistan called on the COAS.

28 April 11, 2017 US Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS.

31 March 04, 2017 Ambassador of Iran to Pakistan called on COAS.

32 February 28, 2017 Russian Ambassador to Pakistan called on the COAS.

Pakistan Army has genuinely come to believe that the

Table 3: Timeline displaying major Irritants in Civil-Military Relations: 2013-2017

No. Date Development

No. Date Development

No. Date Development

No. Date Development

No. Date Development

Responding to the statement by Mr. Mustafa Kamal, DG Rangers Major General

No. Date Development

No. Date Development

i. We [PML-N] have learnt that individually good relations between Services

By its training, military sees black and white; there is no

Military experts also agreed that while final authority

Why resort to weakening the writ of elected

Democratic Oversight on Defence

Need for Institutional Dialogue

Who should host the Dialogue

National Security Committee

Expanded Civil-Military exchange at NDU

i. Objective identification of irritants in inter-institutional relations

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