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http://globalmedia.journals.ac.za/
Global Media Journal

African Edition
2014 Vol 8(2):318-346
‘We Are after Ideals’: A Critical Analysis of Ideology in the Tweets by Boko Haram
Innocent Chiluwa & Esther Ajiboye
Abstract
This study critically examines the influence and power of ideology in the activities of Boko
Haram – an Islamic radical group that claims responsibility for several bombing attacks in
northern Nigeria. Data comprise tweets and retweets presumably produced by members of
this group in their effort to promote their ideological stance and mobilize followers.
Discursive content of the tweets show that the Islamic radicals adopt some existing African
socio-cultural norms to champion Islamic religious ideologies that are intolerant to opposing
views. The Boko Haram tweets generally reflect the positive construction of the ‘we’ in-group
and negative representation of the ‘others’ who are referred to as ‘infidels’, and are worthy of
death. This study also shows that twitter/tweeting has been used in recent times to popularize
religious and political ideologies.
Keywords: twitter, tweets, ideology, terrorist, Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, government, Nigeria
I. Introduction
‘Tweet’ is viewed in this study as a type of computer-mediated discourse (CMD), which is
communication produced when individuals or groups interact with one another by
transmitting messages via networked computers (Herring, 2001). This has recently attracted
global scholarly studies within the wider interdisciplinary study of computer-mediated
communication (CMC). With the innovative additions to the Internet such as instant
messaging, Internet forums, and social networking, online communication has enabled and
enhanced new forms of human interactions. Users now network and form virtual communities
as a platform for information exchange and coordinated group actions. Most interesting in
recent times is the adaptability of online social networks for social activism and civil protests
(Chiluwa, 2012b). The Egyptian revolution that ousted Hosni Mubarak, for example, has been
referred to in media as a ‘twitter revolution’ due to its primary use of Twitter as alternative
press, where ‘tweeters’ saw themselves as citizen journalists, and professional journalists also
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used Twitter to transmit news and photographs (Idle & Nunns, 2011). In the so-called Arab
Spring, generally, planning discussions were carried out on Twitter and Facebook where
activists talked to each other, mobilized protesters and advanced new strategies (Chiluwa,
2012b). As a matter of fact, ‘the North African revolutionary experience, with its huge
implications for the rise of new paradigms for political change and government, demonstrates
the potential for similar uprisings, not only in the Muslim world but also in other parts of
Africa” (Chiluwa, 2012b, p. 217).
When the bomb attacks in Nigeria – attributed to the Boko Haram radical group in the
north – began, the Islamic sect was described in the Nigerian media as ‘faceless.’ Some
politicians until recently even denied the existence of any organized terrorist group known as
‘Boko Haram.’ They consider it rather a mere distraction to destabilize the Jonathan
administration. The current study critically examines the formation and activities of this
group, their demands, what they stand for or their ideologies. Thus, we adopt a critical
discourse analytical approach to examine the ideological stance of these Islamic extremists as
enunciated on their twitter profile. Until the time of this research, Boko Haram maintained
two separate twitter profile sites namely: Boko Haram@BokoHaram (Chadian Border) and
BokoHaram@BokoHaram (Republic of Arewa). The former, which was short-lived, was
presumably hosted by group members in Chad and Niger and attracted more followers. Since
our study is based on the sect’s activities in Nigeria, we focus on the latter, which is
presumably the main site, emanating from Nigeria. The ‘Republic of Arewa’ accounts may be
accessed by googling ‘Boko Haram on Twitter.’
II. Background
Boko Haram is a nickname for an Islamist terrorist group known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna
Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, meaning ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's
Teachings and Jihad.’ Like the Taliban, their targets have been churches, the Nigerian police
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and state officials. The recent bombing of the Kano central mosque (on November 29, 2014)
in which over 100 worshippers were killed added yet another alarming dimension to the
terrorists’ attacks (Nossiter, 2014). When two separate offices of ThisDay newspaper (a
popular Nigerian daily) were bombed two years ago, the sect attributed the attack to the
newspaper’s ‘negative representation’ of their ideological position and activities (Madunagu,
2012). They are also claimed to fight against the political elite of the country and Muslim
governors in northern Nigeria who were accused of compromising Islamic teachings.
Founded in 2002 by a Muslim cleric in Maiduguri, Northeastern Nigeria, Boko Haram,
which in Hausa stands for ‘western education is sacrilegious’ has carried out a series of
attacks in northern Nigeria. In June 2009 when the group first embarked on an armed
uprising, they claimed to be fighting corruption as well as Islamizing the entire northern
states. The uprising was confronted by the Nigerian military, resulting in the death of over
700 people, mostly the sect members. During the unrest, the group’s leader, Mohammed
Yusuf, and several other members were killed. Yusuf died in police custody. Subsequently,
the sect splintered into several groups, and began a series of bombings in Nigeria (IRIN
Africa, 2011; Adesoji, 2010; Chiluwa & Adetunji, 2013). Boko Haram have since declared
their allegiance to Al-Qaeda with a strong link with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) which operates in other African regions, such as Somalia and Mali. The group is also
said to have split into three factions operating in Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Onuah and
Eboh, 2011).
III. Jihadism, Sharia and Boko Haram
Jihadism, which represents the Sunni Islamist armed struggle (Abbas, 2007), is directly
associated with Islamic revivalist ideology, which has been enforced through armed conflicts
and terrorism at both local and international levels. Since the 2000s, jihadist terrorism, mostly
propagated by the activities of al-Qaeda has been on the increase. According to Kramer
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(2003), jihadism is used to refer to the most violent persons and movements in contemporary
Islam. Boko Haram, who has since formally confirmed its link with Al-Qaeda and the
Somalia-based Al Shabaab (Olagunju, 2012; Blair, 2012; Didymus, 2012; Murdock 2012),
represents another manifestation of this movement. Like other jihadist movements, they claim
to defend the Islamic law expressed in the Sharia. Sharia for Muslims is the infallible law of
God as embodied in the Quran and the teachings and examples of the Prophet Muhammad,
which is supposed to govern the lives of all Muslims (Hamann, 2009). Sharia addresses
secular laws as well as personal matters such as marriage, sex, diet, and prayer among others
(Tibi, 2008). The implementation of the Sharia Law penal code in northern Nigeria had
resulted in a major political and religious disagreement between Muslims and Christians, and
it led to an outbreak of violence between Christians and Muslims in 2000 (Paden, 2008).
Before this time, Muslims applied Sharia law only in civil domains, but the twelve northern
states that adopted the law extended its application to the criminal and corporate arenas.
Christians and human right groups viewed the implementation of the Sharia as a major
challenge to the sovereignty of the Nigerian state (Torty, 2009).
With the growing impact of globalization, there has been a widespread exchange of ideas
and cultures among different people. Muslims around the world, who are part of this
globalization process, are also connected to the Internet and modern information technology.
Islamic fundamentalists believe that the Sharia law is being eroded by western values obtained
from this global cultural exchange (Horrie & Chinppindale, 2007). Their efforts to curtail this
development have also resulted in the violation of fundamental human rights. Some jihadist
extremists have even used the Quran and some versions of Sharia law to justify terror against
people with western ideas, including Muslims who are believed to have imbibed western
cultures (Brachman, 2008).

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Boko Haram insists on a strict adoption of Sharia in all parts of Nigeria, particularly the
north where their activities have been most profound. They claim to reject everything
Western, including education and social lifestyle, and they have carried out attacks on beer
halls and schools. A series of bombings in the north before and after the general elections of
April 2011 left many people dead and several others wounded. Of note was the bombing of
the United Nations headquarters at Abuja on August 26, 2011 which left at least twenty-three
people dead and about 116 others wounded. Earlier attacks on Christian churches had
attracted widespread condemnation from the international community. In particular, the St.
Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla (a town in the Niger state) was bombed on Christmas day
(2011) killing about thirty-nine worshippers after the Christmas morning mass. As highlighted
above, more recent suicide bombings and gun attacks have targeted Christians and Muslims
alike at market places, bus stations and mosques. For instance, two bomb attacks at a bus
station at Nyanya (Abuja) on the 14th of April 2014 claimed the lives of 75 people and injured
over 200 others (Chiluwa & Ifukor, 2015).
IV. Boko Haram and Conflicts in the Sub-Sahara
Until recently, there were no clear indications that events and conflict situations in Sub-
Sahara Africa (e.g. Mali) had any direct link with the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.
Boko Haram’s effort to Islamize northern Nigeria began earlier than the declaration of
independence of Northern Mali by the Tuaregs in 2012, though there is no ruling out of
intelligence exchanges between the two Muslim enclaves as they share similar religious
ideologies. Up till now, some analysts still do not agree that Boko Haram command the same
global jihadist scope as Algeria’s Al-Qaeda or the Somalia’s Al Shabaab. Rather, they are
viewed as “a kind of personality cult, and Islamic millenarianist sect, inspired by a heretical
but charismatic preacher” (Walker, 2012, p. 9). This implies that to describe Boko Haram as
an international terrorist group with the same anti-West aims as Al-Qaeda will be an over
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statement. After all, since the bombing of the UN building in 2011, there had not been any
further attacks on international interests (Walker, 2012). However, after the declaration of the
so-called independence of the Northern Mali in April 2012, Boko Haram were said to join
forces with the Tuaregs. Some reports in the media (e.g. antiwar news.com) confirmed that
the ‘Nigerian Mujahedeen’ joined forces with their Malian counterparts in the Tuaregs’
control of the city of Gao (Ditz, 2012). Boko Haram was also said to constitute the majority of
a militant group that attacked the Algerian Consulate in Gao in which seven Algerian
diplomats were kidnapped (The Punch, April 10, 2012). According to Tanchum (2012), Boko
Haram have successfully expanded their operation and influence beyond their initial ethnic
and geographical base because some Nigerian militants have already been engaged by Ancar
Dine (an armed Islamist group in northeast Mali referred to as ‘defenders of the faith’) to
instruct segments of Timbuktu’s population in the Salafi practice of Islam. Before then, Boko
Haram assisted the Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria, a segment of Mali’s Fulani population who
may prove more amenable to the Boko Haram-allied Ancar Dine (Tanchum, 2012 p. 1). This
cooperation between the Nigerian Boko Haram and the Tuareg secessionist group is
beginning to throw some more light on the capabilities of these groups. This also has some
very huge security implications for Nigeria. Interestingly, the United States Department of
State on the 13th of November 2013 announced the designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru
as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) (U.S. Department of State, November 2013). It
earlier announced a $7 million reward for information that would lead to the arrest of
Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram’s current leader (cf. www.newswatch24.com).
V. Social Media Use in Nigeria
According to World Internet Stats (2011), Nigeria ranks first in Internet use in Africa with
about 44 million users, who are mostly young people. Facebook and Twitter are the most
popular with the youth. About 71% of people within the age bracket of 18-34 are said to
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engage in social media communication (Socialbakers.com). To these people, the Internet is
gradually replacing the traditional media as the main source of entertainment, communication
and education. As interest in social media has increased, especially with divergent views and
interests on social matters, virtual communities are being formed, though mostly along ethnic
lines (Ifukor, 2011). Socio-political and economic interests, as well as events in Nigeria, have
further helped in the formation of more virtual communities and discussion forums. The
‘Nigerian Village Square’ established in 2003, for example, is used by members of the civil
society to evaluate the socio-political and economic developments in the country. Weblog and
Twitter were used as social mobilization media in the 2007 general elections in Nigeria
(Ifukor, 2010). Political associations as well as social and civil rights groups have also utilized
the Internet and networking sites as active media for political participation (Chiluwa 2011b,
2012a.)
There is no doubt that Boko Haram tweeters, who are strong advocates of the Sharia and
jihad, derive inspirations from numerous online sites that promote and support militaristic
jihad. Al-Qaeda has frequently used the Internet for messaging among its members, and
according to Bunt (2003), the jihadists’ use of the Internet is linked with jihad and fatwas
because these two are viewed as the most significant integration of online activity with
religion. E-jihad, for example, is often expressed in the issuing of online fatwas and the
militaristic aspects in hacking and cracking other websites.
VI. Twitter and Tweeting
Twitter is a type of microblogging that has been popular since 2006 and became the most
rapidly growing Internet brand in 2010 with about fifty million tweets a day being posted
during the first half of the year (Crystal, 2011). Members may send and receive posts or
tweets of up to 140 characters. Often referred to as the SMS of the Internet, tweets are
displayed on the author’s profile page and delivered to the author’s followers and may be read
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by anyone else. An ‘@’ symbol followed by a user name identifies the history of a semantic
thread, signaling a reaction to a tweet on the user’s page. The ‘@user’ syntax is used to direct
conversations to other tweeters and address messages to them (Honeycutt & Herring, 2009).
Prefixing an item with a hashtag (i.e. #) indicates that some posts have been grouped under a
semantic topic such as #government or #bokophilosophy. This is to enable others to follow
conversations that centre on a particular topic. A trendy or recent topic may bear the hashtag.
There is also a‘re-tweeting’ practice which occurs when a tweet is forwarded to another user
or to all one’s followers (often with the abbreviation RT). Structurally, retweeting is the
Twitter equivalence of email forwarding where users post messages originally posted to
others (Boyd, Golder & Lotan, 2010). As an Internet-based microblogging tool, Twitter
enables users to make comments and share brief messages about social situations, report and
respond to ongoing events, contribute to discussions or share their interest and activities to a
network of friends and followers. Since its emergence, Twitter (or tweeting) has been used for
conversational exchanges, collaboration among users with common interests and goals,
coordination of events, and for dissemination of news and information (Ifukor, 2010).
Scholarly studies have further established the uses, linguistic contents, style and
technology of Twitter as one of the fastest growing members of the new social media.
Honeycutt and Herring (2009), for instance, emphasize the conversationality of Twitter as it
supports user-to-user exchanges and as a tool for collaboration. Subasic and Berendt (2011)
conclude that social media or citizen journalism do not create news, rather extend news
through comments. Hermida (2010), however, argues that Twitter makes data available to
para-journalists and can be situated within the trend in citizen journalism and as a system of
communication with its own media logic, shapes and structures. Thus, Twitter is viewed as an
awareness system like other forms of computer-mediated communications, which enable
people form ‘ambient affiliations’ (Zappavigna, 2011) to construct and maintain awareness of
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each other’s activities, even when the participants are not at the same location (Hermida,
2010). Leinweber (2009) further argues that Twitter is suitable for real-time information such
as news, pre-news, rumours, and the formation of social media and subject-based networks
(Chiluwa & Adetunji, 2013).
VII. Ideology in the Media and Discourse
The traditional theory of ideology identifies it as beliefs, ideas and values that are
maintained and propagated by social classes, groups and institutions, and inherently
associated with class struggle and group interest. According to De Beaugrande (1999), it is a
concept that claims exclusive possession of truth and rejects all opposition, thereby claiming
to direct the affairs of society and culture in the image of its ideals and upholding the pure
‘we’ and the evil ‘they.’ In other words, it maintains the status quo that says, ‘he who is not
with us is against us.’ By its nature, ideologies have the power to manipulate what people
think, form their opinions, and direct their attitudes (either positively or negatively). This,
often (unfortunately) results in controlling people minds to the extent that they accept social
conditions that equal subjugation, denial of rights and suffering.
Marx and Engels viewed ideology generally as a false idea or ‘misguided beliefs’ by which
the ruling class brainwash the working class and blindfold them from seeing the true nature of
their exploitation (van Dijk, 1998). Since the dominant ideas are the ruling ideas (belonging to
the ruling class), which ultimately serve the interest of the rulers, the dominant idea (or
ideology) simply creates false consciousness. However, modern approaches to ideology have
sought to identify some positive kinds of ideologies. An example is those ideologies that are
opposed to or resist domination and social inequality such as anti-racism or feminism
ideologies (van Dijk, 1998).
In relation to ideology, Fowler (1991) argues that language use in the media (e.g. the press)
is not value free. Formal choices (in the news or social media) constitute choices of meaning,
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which reveals how media language works ideologically (Fairclough, 1995a). For example,
Taiwo (2007) identified ‘emotive vocabulary’ and certain ‘rhetorical graphological devices’
(p. 19) in the news headlines of some Nigerian newspapers as conveying ideological views
about people and situations in Nigeria. The choice of certain sets of vocabulary or patterns of
framing rather than other available options reveals something about their intentions,
knowingly or unknowingly (Baker, 2006). This choice is always significant especially
because of its power to shape peoples’ perceptions of social realities. Hall (1985) argues that
ideology is embedded in the news media, though often unnoticed by journalists themselves
who though may be inscribed by an ideology to which they do not commit themselves;
instead, they express these ideologies in their writings (as cited in Grayantes & Murphy,
2010).
The ideological work done by (new) media language includes the ways in which
individuals or groups, identities and relations are represented. Particular representations of
social identities specifically define how the actions of those represented are to be judged or
evaluated (Chiluwa, 2011a). In other words, meanings repeatedly and consistently associated
with certain people can link them with particular patterns of behaviour and attitudes, which
may be detrimental to the public opinion about them especially if these patterns are associated
with violence or terrorism. The fact that the media provide a medium for the expression,
amplification and dissemination of ideology (Grayantes & Murphy, 2010) negates some
earlier assumption that ideology is absent or merely expressed implicitly in news stories
(Tuchman, 1978). Grayantes & Murphy (2010), however, argue that Tuchman’s argument is
now outdated because with the emergence of the Internet and social media information is
made available to the public without any restrictions and with different ideological
perspectives that are expressed explicitly and implicitly. Many social or political ideologies
involve group relations, conflicts, domination and resistance; hence, they involve debates that
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are often publicized by the mass media or the Internet. Most group members recognize the
main ideological tenets of their group as well as that of other groups, and when their interests
are threatened are ready to resist. The main social function of ideologies, therefore, is the
coordination of the social practices of group members for the effective realization of their
goals and the protection of their interests (van Dijk, 2005). Jihadism is essentially ideological
and the Boko Haram group, for example, promotes religious and cultural practices that are
reflective of Islamic ideologies. Hence, their activities seek to institutionalize these practices
in order to establish their group and institutional identity.
VIII. Methodology
Until the time of this research, there were a total of 144 tweets on the Boko Haram profile
page, i.e. Boko Haram@Boko Haram (Republic of Arewa) or
https://twitter.com/BOKO_HARAM, and it was followed by 490 accounts and was following
eight (8) accounts. On their page is a logo with an inscription ‘I hate School.’ The sect’s
slogan reads, ‘To hate is human; to bomb is divine. We hate western inventions including
twitter: however, we feel the necessity to use it to reach out to our fans.’ This website is still
quite active.
Analysis will focus on the 144 Boko Haram tweets (including retweets) and the tweets of
the 8 accounts Boko Haram was following, totaling 152. Interestingly, it appears this account
has been dormant since 2013 as at the last check there were no new conversations. The
conversations are often marked by the @ sign and sometimes with # where a topic had
become trendy, which showed the writer’s answer to questions or an attempt to clarify the
Boko Haram’s position. The ‘followers’ represent both their supporters, referred to as ‘our
fans’ and their critics.
The real identity and locations of the tweeters are not certain. While it is safe to conclude
that the tweeters were radical Muslim youths in northern Nigeria, with the evidence that some
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of the tweets were written in Hausa and some end with Islamic slogans (e.g.
Twt150&Twt151below), it is also difficult to conclude that the supporters of Boko Haram
who were the presumed tweeters were exclusively Muslim youths. Some Nigerian youths,
who do not lay claim to any religion, may have hidden under the Boko Haram voice to
express their own feelings. The tweets may also have been written by southern Muslims. It is
again difficult to assume that all Boko Haram followers and tweet writers reside in Nigeria. It
is even possible that some writers live in North Africa or elsewhere. Hence, the audience of
the tweets is not necessarily Muslims or Hausa speaking northerners/Fulanis, rather Nigerian
(unemployed) youths who support the Boko Haram radical approach and people from other
regions who have access to the Internet. The tweets might have also aimed at reaching
outsiders and probably radicalized Muslims from other African countries. This is perhaps the
reason why the tweets are mostly written in English. The tweets have the potential to
radicalize Muslims from other parts of the continent where they are less likely to speak Hausa.
Twt150.@melifew213kafiri, ubankashegedanbanza
Twt151. @_BokoHaram@_Boko_Haram@BokoHaram_
As drops of water we are firing Arewa and infidel Nigeria. Yarodan is cene.
We adopted a qualitative approach to analyze the contents of the tweets, which we viewed
as ‘ideological discourse.’ Ideological discourse very often demonstrates evidences of the
positive ‘we’ representation (‘we’ representing a radical group, an ethnic group, or a particular
political persuasion) and the negatives ‘other’ representation (‘other’ being either the
government or a political opposition group etc). This illustrates the ideological square of van
Dijk (1998) (i.e. the stressing of the positive actions of the ‘we’ in-group and the negative
actions of the ‘they’ out-group). In other words, (i) emphasize ‘our’ good properties/actions,
(ii) emphasize ‘their’ bad properties/actions, (iii) mitigate ‘our’ bad properties/actions, (iv)
mitigate ‘their’ good properties/actions’ (p. 33). Hence, meanings are structurally manipulated
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by the principle of in-group preference and out-group rejection. Discourse meaning
influenced by ideologies frequently features information that enunciates (a) self-identity
descriptions, (b) activity description, (c) goal descriptions, (d) norm and value descriptions.
(d) position and relations descriptions, and (e) resource descriptions (van Dijk, 1995).
In the current study, we identify some categories of ideological discourse analysis (van
Dijk, 2005). The categories applied in the analysis include: (i) actor description (involving the
neutral or positive ‘we’ in-group description while highlighting the negative attributes of
‘others,’ (ii) argumentation or authority (e.g. the formal presentation of ‘our’ case and ‘we’
having the right to be heard), (iii) comparison (i.e. the in-group versus the out-group, e.g.
Boko Haram versus MEND), (iv) exaggerations (e.g. of government corruption and excesses),
(v) disclaimers (e.g. dissociating from corrupt politicians or denouncing the
government/security agencies).
The tweets are numbered TWT1-TWT152. (‘TWT’ stands for ‘tweet.’) In the analysis,
however, only a few relevant tweets and retweets from the various discursive categories are
reproduced.
IX. Analysis and Discussion
A. Actor Identification and Description
In the context of this study, the Boko Haram is principally the ‘we’ and ‘us,’ while the
government and politicians, Christians, and security operatives are the ‘they’ and ‘them.’ In
the tweets, the various positive representations of ‘we,’ ‘us’ and ‘our’ merely reflect how the
radical sect and their supporters present their position and ideals. According to the
‘ideological square’ of van Dijk’ (1998), the in-group’s good side is generally maximized and
often nominalized/thematized in discourse, while the other’s good side is minimized.
Generally, ideology seeks to accept ‘us’ and reject ‘them,’ defend ‘us’ and attack ‘them,’ and
protect ‘ours’ and destroy ‘theirs.’ These are expressed in some of the tweets such as ‘the
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Nigerian police has 1950 AK47s, we have the new M16s,’ ‘if the reason you are not going to
church today is because of us, we love you (Twt107), ‘Mend is after money, we are after
ideals ...’ (Twt74), etc. Unfortunately in the case of the Boko Haram, it is not certain which
faction of the sect the ‘we’ refers to because Boko Haram has broken into several strains and
orientations. An example is the Ansaru. According to Zenn (2013), the Ansaru now operates
as an independent terrorist group with foreign-trained militants, and it has links with al-Qaeda
in Algeria and Mauritania. However, in the Boko Haram Twitter profile, there is sufficient
textual evidence to conclude that the site was managed by the most radical group, e.g. the
tweets that boast of bombings and killings.
In the tweets, there is general negative lexicalization of the persons and activities of
Christians, the police, and the Nigerian government (the ‘others’). The governments are
generally constructed as fraudsters and thieves, while the sect is constructed as the Messiah.
The ‘others’ are ‘fools’ (Twt114),‘mad dogs’ (Twt111), and ‘a gang’ (Twt30). They are also
described as killers, either directly by shooting innocent citizens or indirectly through
corruption and embezzlement of state funds (Twt32). The writer of tweet111, for example,
claims that ‘innocent people’ are killed by the army. To buttress this argument, he/she cited a
retweet that reported sporadic shooting in Maiduguri that killed some civilians (cf. Tweet113
below). While it is possible that certain people might have been killed during the armed
forces’ confrontations with the extremists, there has not been still established evidence that
the army indeed killed innocent people. Rather, some members of the Nigerian military are
said to constitute a joint military task force (JTF) to arrest the escalating crisis in the north.
The governments are also negatively represented as the real ‘terrorists,’ while the Boko
Haram members are ‘freedom fighters’ – the defenders of the Nigerian people (e.g. Twt42).
The sect members and their supporters are Jihadists and are also constructed as the defenders
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of the teachings of Allah, while all others are referred to as ‘infidels’ that are worthy of death
(e.g. Twt110).
Twt113. @eggheader. ON MY RADAR: Bomb blast around Bulumkutu area of

Maiduguri. Soldiers of the JTF reportedly shooting sporadically all over town. Retweeted
by BOKO HARAM
For Boko Haram to appear as ‘saviours,’ and ‘lovers of Nigerians,’ the Nigerian economic
problems are frequently exaggerated (e.g. unemployment and corruption often constructed as
‘killing’ e.g. Twt115). However, as a matter of fact, Nigeria had shown a considerable growth
rate in the last seven years rising from a GDP growth of 6.9% in 2005 to 8.4% in 2010 (see
The World Factbook) and an overall growth of 6.61% at the end of 2012 (National Bureau of
Statistics, 2013). Nigeria’s GDP for 2013 totalled N80.3 trillion ($509.9bn) making it the
largest economy in Africa, compared with South Africa’s GDP of $370.3bn at the end of
2013. (BBC, April 4, 2014 quoting the Nigerian Office of Statistics). Boko Haram, however,
attempted to blow the problems out of proportion in order to construct the failure of the
government. In Twt 24 below, Nigeria is said to be 100 years ‘behind time’ in terms of
development and education. This, of course, is an obvious exaggeration although Nigeria’s
wealth is hardly reflected in the lives of the people.
Twt24. Reason the infidel rulers like Nigeria: it is 100 years behind time; education is no
use, citizens too placid to criticize #bokophilosophy.
Twt109. @Boko_Haram. As you have seen, we have been causing havoc and bad infidel
federal government stil clueless as ever. Long live Boko Haram
Twt110. @Boko_Haram I wonder how many years of bombing the infidels in Aso rock
can survive? We plead with Nigerians to join us in our actions
Twt111. @Boko_Haram The truth is it's the army killing innocent people the army is a
mad dog. We are for you.
Twt114. @Boko_Haram What matters is the size of the fight in the dog, not the dog size. a
big buffoon like the Nigerian govt is a fool anytime.
Twt115. @Boko_Haram@daldino. Do you see the innocent people the infidel government
is killing complain? No!
The Boko Haram tweets also apply negative comparison to emphasize the bad qualities of
the ‘other.’ By so doing, their own bad actions appear excusable and insignificant. For
example, the tweets frequently compared Boko Haram’s activities with that of MEND in
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order to assert their supposed value-based actions. MEND (Movement for the Emancipation
of the Niger Delta) is an ethnic militia group, which was among the several other armed
militia groups that sought resource control for the Niger Delta (ND) region of Nigeria
(Chiluwa, 2011a). The group, like other radical groups in the southeast (e.g. MASSOB –
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra), has also used the Internet to
express their grievances. While MEND is negatively represented as merely materialistic (i.e.
they ‘are after money’), ‘we’ (Islamic radicals) are after ‘ideals.’
In order to formally maximize their ‘good’ side, Boko Haram presents an interesting re-
definition of terrorism and emphasize their achievements. Islam is generally portrayed as a
religion of peace. This is briefly discussed below.
B. Ideology: Terrorism Redefined
Boko Haram espouses traditional beliefs and norms that are rooted in religion ideologies
that are both anti-government and anti-Christian or, better still, may be described as ‘anti-
Western.’ The entire data comprise tweets that pledge support for the Boko Haram uprising.
More than 90% of the tweets and retweets (both from the ‘following’ and ‘followers’)
celebrate the activities of the terrorist group and attempt to defend the Islamic religion as a
peaceful religion, whose positive contributions have been undermined by ‘terrorists’ who are
not real Muslims.
Ideology is expressed not only in propagating knowledge or belief but also in
(subjectively) constructing the context (by a group) and reconstructing existing ideologies to
suit their perspective. This is clearly reflected in Boko Haram’s redefinition of the term
‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist.’ Rather than view a terrorist as someone who commits a criminal act
intended to provoke state terror in the general public or who for political, religious, ethnic or
ideological purpose (in unjustifiable circumstance) cause harm or destroy people’s lives (see
Chiluwa, 2011a), Boko Haram defines terrorism from an interesting moral and religious
334
perspective. Thus, ‘terrorists are those who drink all day and don’t take care of their families.’
‘Terrorists are women who sell their bodies’ (Twt62). ‘Terrorists are those who go to western
schools to learn how to thief money; they learn to bribe from there’ (Twt63). ‘Terrorists (who)
steal government funds in Aso Rock ...; terrorists (who) refuse to maintain roads’ (Twt65).
The Nigerian government is, therefore, described as ‘infidels’ who kill people by fraud and
corruption (Twt66). Nigeria is referred to as ‘a joke’ and the government, the police and the
army are ‘jokers’ because ‘they kill more innocent people everyday than Boko has done in a
year’ (Twt67). Thus, Boko Haram claims they are in pursuit of social and religious ideals
rather than money, unlike some rebel groups in Nigeria (Twt8). This tends to provide both the
ideological and logical argument for their armed resistance. However, the question remains:
must the realization of these ideals, no matter how logical they sound, justify the reckless
destruction of lives and property like those characteristic of the bombings of Christian
churches and public property?
C. Augmentation and Position
The ideological position of the sect is revealed or clearly implied in many of the tweets that
attempt to define their mission (e.g. Twt5) and showcase some ‘positive’ results of the attacks
that have occurred so far in the north and Abuja (e.g. Twt80etc). While the tweets appear to
be self-identifying (of the Islamic sect), they demonstrate defiant and unrepentant voices of
anger, justifying their actions and urging youths who are passionate about Nigeria’s future to
join in their struggle.
Twt5. @Boko_Haram. We love Nigerians; it’s only the Nigerian polis, Nigerian army,
drunkards, prostitutes, politicians, usurers, teachers, touts we can’t stand.
Twt6. @Boko_Haram. Armypeople you are hungry, polis you are tired. Go home. We are
your friends. Our enemies are the infidels at Aso Rock #gaskiya.
Twt7. @Boko_Haram. Jonathan, abati, omokri are a threat to Nigeria not Boko Haram.
We fight for your liberation even though you are not grateful #longterm.
335
Twt8. @Boko_Haram. MEND is after money, we are after ideals. Ideas that come at the
right time flourishes. #deadideals
Tweets 6-8 above are among the tweets that make the points of view of Boko Haram much
clearer. Firstly, they are enemies of the government and friends of the Nigerian people.
Secondly, they are fighting to liberate the people, and thirdly, they are defending socio-
cultural and moral ideals. These all reflect positive representations of the in-group (i.e. Boko
Haram). Some of these ideals (or ‘ideas’ as embodied in the Islamic religious ideology) are
presented in Tweets10-14 below in the form of their ‘achievements,’ for example, the
restoration of social morality in the north, quietness in the cities (e.g. rejection of modern
‘rap’ music), marriage and family reunions, reduction of alcohol consumption and general
well-being of the people. In other words, the Boko Haram’s religious ideology upholds some
legitimate social and cultural ideals of the African people. For example, they demand integrity
and social morality; hence, they reject clubbing, infidelity, stealing, noisy music, etc.
Interestingly, these ‘ideals’ or ideologies are not unique to Islamic the religion alone. They are
also common among Christians as well as traditional worshippers. These form the basis of
their position as expressed in the Sharia, for example, about women not wearing trousers, not
drinking alcohol, not committing adultery, etc. These are reflected in the following tweets:
Twt10. @Boko_Haram. Pls come to Maiduguri to see the good job we have done. quiet.
no siren. No thieves only us, polis and army. #tourismhttp.
Twt11. @Boko_Haram. Wives and children now see their husbands in the night in Abuja
and Maiduguri. Countless marriages have been saved #collateraleffect
Twt12. @Boko_Haram. Rate of alcoholism has reduced in Abuja and Maiduguri because
of our good work #collateraleffect
Twt13. @Boko_Haram. Maiduguri looks better with our fireworks. Roads look more even
and streets quieter #collateraleffect
Twt14. Also, none of those horrible music again from dbanj, terryyg, wbanky, wande coal
and Duncan might...danmarayajos rules #goodmusicisbliss
Twt16.RT‫@‏‬Omohthurlah@Boko_Haram.youpple are the bomb. Ride on guyz Retweeted
by BOKO HARAM
Notice that the concern about quietness, integrity and security is systematically grouped
under tourism (i.e. #tourism). One of the fundamental ways of establishing a difference
336
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is to portray the ‘other’ as the violators of the norms and values that
Nigerians cherish as a people. Islamic ideologies as reflected in some of the tweets include
complete banning of cigarette smoking and replacing it with ‘sheesha,’ (smoke piping) which
the Jihadists claim is healthier to the body (e.g. Twt18). Secondly, there would be a complete
ban on wearing of Jeans and T-shirts and replacing them with ‘Jelabia,’ which they also claim
is more suitable for the Maiduguri weather (Twt19) (Chiluwa & Adetunji, 2013). Most of the
tweets denounce the police and the Nigerian government and promise further attacks. Some
appeal to the police and security agents to deflect to the terrorist group since the government
is viewed as the real terrorists. In order to justify their activities, western lifestyle is
constructed as evil and a cultural aberration to the African people. This is discussed in detail
below:
Twt18. @Boko_Haram. Boko Haram thinking of replacing cigarettes with

sheesha…healthier and with more vitamins #Progress
Twt19. @Boko_Haram. We are thinking of banning Jeans, Tshirt and Tmlewin
shirts…Jelabia is more suitable to the Maiduguri sun and for banks #1STEPHEAD
D. Rejection of Western Education and Social Lifestyle
The hatred for Western education and social lifestyle must have prompted the bombing of
schools, beer pubs and churches. This is clearly explained in the sect’s ideological redefinition
of terrorism, as highlighted above. For instance, on April 14, 2014 Boko Haram attacked and
kidnapped over 276 girls at a government school in Chibok (Borno state), and burnt down the
school. Until the time of doing this research, over 200 girls were still missing prompting a
global outcry and twitter campaign #BringBackOurGirls (Chiluwa & Ifukor, 2015). This was
in addition to several other bomb attacks at schools that have killed hundreds of school
children. Modern schools are blamed for producing corrupt people, especially modern ways of
stealing (money) through technology. Western education is also viewed as a failure because it
merely produces cowards and ‘fools’ who are afraid of criticizing and confronting the
337
government (e.g. Twt20 and Twt24). Ironically, the sect uses Twitter (a product of western
education) to disseminate its messages. They try to explain this contradiction in their profile
page where it is boldly written: ‘we hate western inventions including twitter: however, we
feel the necessity to use it to reach out to our fans.’ Notice that semantic topics under
#banschools #stopNYSC show that these topics have been under debates. The call for the
scrapping of the compulsory national service (i.e. NYSC – National Youth Service Corps) has
generated heated argument in the media, especially when some corps members were killed in
the north during one of Boko Haram’s bombings in 2011.
Twt20. You are a proof of why school is wasted. Stop those secular education, breeds
jerkies and fools @qafro
Twt21. We are happy to announce the closure of 3 universities: unimaid, ui, uniben.
slowly but surely we shall overcome #upboko
Twt22. Notice people cannot spel, even univasity graduates. What’s the purpose of
western education.#BOKOHARAM#BANSCHOOLS#STOPNYSC
Twt23. another reason for our bomblasts is to stop decadence on twitter such
#rapeherif#nigeriangovtrapesyouenuf. Bomb off their fucking pricks.
Twt24. Reason the infidel rulers like Nigeria: it is 100 years behind time; education is no
use, citizens too placid to criticize #bokophilosophy.
Christians are blamed for permitting their women to wear mini-skirts and expose their
bodies in public. Social vices generally, e.g. prostitution, alcoholism, and fraud among others,
are blamed on western education and its influence on the social life of the average Nigerians.
Significantly, the seeming negative influence of western values, especially on the social
norms and cultures of the African people has also been criticized by individual scholars and
social groups who have questioned the impact of globalization on African traditions (Obioha,
2010; Kwame, 2006). Boko Haram, is therefore, not the only group that has expressed
concern over the destructive influence of western cultures on Nigerians (e.g. western music
overshadowing traditional music, revealing female dresses in place of traditional ones, etc).
However, the terrorist sect has adopted a method of cleansing which is also inimical to
African culture. Another argument put forward by Boko Haram is the break-up of Nigeria.
E. Demand to Split Nigeria

338
One of the main objectives of Boko Haram is to create an independent Islamic state of
northern Nigeria, which is an effort to divide the country. Assertive statements such as
‘Nigeria is a joke’ (Twt34), ‘we have left Nigeria; we are in boko republic of Arewa …’
(Twt58), ‘there is no country called Nigeria’ (Twt 59), for instance, are not only a direct
demand to be granted political independence but also an implied dissociation from the present
Nigeria. According to Campbell (2012), a recent negotiation between the Nigerian
government (represented by the Supreme Council for Sharia) and a Boko Haram spokesman
ended in a stalemate, following what the radical sect described as insincerity on the part of the
government. While a faction of the sect (i.e. the immediate followers of the late Mohammed
Yusuf) was willing to negotiate and present their demands (e.g. punishment of Yusuf’s killers,
restoration of seized Boko Haram assets, and the release of Boko Haram members in
detention), the other strain (the more radical Islamic anti-government) demanded a radical
introduction of the Islamic law in some parts of Nigeria, which the government could not
grant. The Jihadists rather views the Nigerian government’s readiness to negotiate with the
sect as a form of bribe (Twt62).
Twt58. @kasaliolalekan@melifew213. We have left Nigeria. We are in Boko Republic of

Arewa. The infidel Nig. Govt and Kafiri Army should leave us
Twt59.@drcomely1. What part of we are Nigerians. Don’t you get? #FREEYOURSELF.
There is no country called Nigeria.
Twt60. @xaxxoo Matters of urgent importance, coordinating the routing of
infidels from Arewa land. No time.
Twt61. @Boko_Haram @Boko_Haram. Federal government wants to negotiate with Boko
Haram … more like bribe us #Foolsall
Twt62. RT@jemc2: i wonder why it has taken this long for some to realize that Boko
Haram doesn't want negotiations. They aren't money-hungry MEND. Retweeted by Boko
Haram.
Topics of conversations on Twitter bordering on the splitting of Nigeria into several
independent states have been discussed extensively. One of the groups under which posts on
this subject is discussed is #Freeyourself (Twt59). The call for the breakup of Nigeria has
also been made by non-Islamic extremists. For example, online agitations by the Biafra
339
campaign groups also seek a separate state for the Igbos of the southeast Nigeria (Chiluwa,
2012b). This call is made not only on twitter but also on comments and reactions to online
reports of the bombings. Some of the comments show that Boko Haram’s demand for the
Arewa Islamic state revitalizes the Igbo dream for political independence. The reactions
clearly show that both a section of the Muslim north and a section of the Christian south
demand political independence, again throwing some doubts on the continual existence of
Nigeria as a single geo-political entity. However, the creation of a separate state of the
Muslim north in Nigeria will no doubt further strengthen the foothold of Al- Qaeda in the
Sub-Sahara. It is possible that a cessation attempt like that of northern Mali is being
anticipated in Nigeria by Al-Qaeda, who is likely motivating the Boko Haram agitations.
F. Disclaimers
One interesting definition of terrorism by Boko Haram is the attribution of suffering and
death of the Nigerian people to the government through corruption. Hence, the sect dissociates
itself from the Nigerian politics and government. 37.5% of the tweets in the data reflect both
explicit and implicit accusations of the Nigerian government as the root cause of the crises in
the country. The government, described as ‘a gang’ (e.g. of thieves or criminals), is said to
‘kill people by fraud and corruption’ (Twt32, 34). In other words, the failure of political
leadership can only breed crimes and insecurity and the Boko Haram insurgency has been
viewed by their supporters merely as reactionary to suffering and unemployment. The
government is said to ‘rape’ the country, for example, through misappropriation of public
funds, leaving the people ‘hungry.’ (Twt31, 33).
Twt30. @Boko_Haram. Boko haram would not sit by and allow a gang rape. The infidel
government of Nigeria has done enug#ABSU#EVIL5
Twt31. Who needs 25 million naira for their family to spend on their
behalf?http://dlvr.it/m39wH #BLOODMONEY. We know where we are … do we
qualify?
Twt32.@Boko_Haram. Federal govt of Nig has killed more people thru incompetence this
year than Boko Haram, armed robbers, kidnapaz and MEND. #GASKIYA
340
Twt33. @Boko_Haram. People you are hungry, polis you are tired. Go home. We are your
friends. Our enemies are the infidels at Aso Rock #Gaskiya
Twt34. @daldino. Nigeria is a joke. Polis, army &govt are jokers. They kill more innocent
pple everyday than Boko has done in a year.
Generally, Nigeria’s underdevelopment has often been attributed to corruption and
incompetent political leadership. This has also provided the main argument and the strong
point for the apologists of Boko Haram resistance. The bad qualities of the government are
assumed to be well known and are to be viewed as sufficient evidence for the revolt. The
writers of Twt40 and Twt42, who are probably members of the Islamic sect, see themselves as
heroes. Some revolutionary questions that tend to portray the Jihadists as revolutionary
fighters (e.g. ‘How many jets does the President have? How many jobs would that have
created?’ (Twt40)) sound quite valid. Thus, the tweets implicitly identify with the Nigerian
people. Attacks on public facilities and the police are also implicitly viewed as revolutionary
efforts to rescue the people from the oppressive political system. Again, the government is
viewed as ‘the terrorist,’ while Boko Haram have come ‘to the rescue’ and are viewed as
‘freedom fighters.’
Twt40. How many jets does the president have? How many jobs would that have created?
Boko Haram to the rescue (#wherewedarethread)
Twt42. @Boko_Haram.The government is the terrorist. When last did you have light for
24 hrs? Boko Haram are the freedom fighters.
Twt43. Nigerians would rather tolerate their thieving rulers than face them. We are not the
problem, the government is #Faceyaproblem
X. Conclusion
We conclude that Boko Haram has the legitimate right to uphold their ideologies,
propagate their religion or seek a separate existence if they feel insecure in the Nigerian state.
However, they certainly do not have the right to carry out terrorist attacks on people who do
not share their beliefs. In spite of efforts by the Nigerian government to dialogue with the sect
(Campbell, 2012), they have continued their bombing in several northern cities, recently
sacking whole villages and taking over some. This clearly suggests that the sect is rather not
341
willing to negotiate. With their presence on Twitter, they are all the more mobilizing northern
youth through the subtle interpretation of ideology that validates their action and positively
portrays their position. Thus, hiding under popular feelings and general political sentiments,
they are selling their intolerant ideologies through the Internet. This study, therefore,
concludes that ideology can indeed be destructive. Agreed that there are positive sides to
ideology, but ultimately it is often one sided: there appears to be always the selfish protection
of oneself or ‘our group’ to the detriment of others.
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318

Global Media Journal

Innocent Chiluwa & Esther Ajiboye

‘Tweet’ is viewed in this study as a type of computer-mediated discourse (CMD), which is

communication produced when individuals or groups interact with one another by

global scholarly studies within the wider interdisciplinary study of computer-mediated

Africa” (Chiluwa, 2012b, p. 217).

BokoHaram@BokoHaram (Republic of Arewa). The former, which was short-lived, was

accessed by googling ‘Boko Haram on Twitter.’

Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, meaning ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's

newspaper’s ‘negative representation’ of their ideological position and activities (Madunagu,

governors in northern Nigeria who were accused of compromising Islamic teachings.

Founded in 2002 by a Muslim cleric in Maiduguri, Northeastern Nigeria, Boko Haram,

III. Jihadism, Sharia and Boko Haram

challenge to the sovereignty of the Nigerian state (Torty, 2009).

cultures (Brachman, 2008).

over 200 others (Chiluwa & Ifukor, 2015).

IV. Boko Haram and Conflicts in the Sub-Sahara

as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) (U.S. Department of State, November 2013). It

Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram’s current leader (cf. www.newswatch24.com).

V. Social Media Use in Nigeria

engage in social media communication (Socialbakers.com). To these people, the Internet is

militaristic aspects in hacking and cracking other websites.

VI. Twitter and Tweeting

semantic topic such as #government or #bokophilosophy. This is to enable others to follow

awareness system like other forms of computer-mediated communications, which enable

(Chiluwa & Adetunji, 2013).

VII. Ideology in the Media and Discourse

conditions that equal subjugation, denial of rights and suffering.

opposed to or resist domination and social inequality such as anti-racism or feminism

ideologies (van Dijk, 1998).

knowingly or unknowingly (Baker, 2006). This choice is always significant especially

individuals or groups, identities and relations are represented. Particular representations of

in order to establish their group and institutional identity.

page, i.e. Boko Haram@Boko Haram (Republic of Arewa) or

https://twitter.com/BOKO_HARAM, and it was followed by 490 accounts and was following

fans’ and their critics.

Twt150&Twt151below), it is also difficult to conclude that the supporters of Boko Haram

as ‘ideological discourse.’ Ideological discourse very often demonstrates evidences of the

by the principle of in-group preference and out-group rejection. Discourse meaning

influenced by ideologies frequently features information that enunciates (a) self-identity

(v) disclaimers (e.g. dissociating from corrupt politicians or denouncing the

IX. Analysis and Discussion

A. Actor Identification and Description

often nominalized/thematized in discourse, while the other’s good side is minimized.

tweets that boast of bombings and killings.

described as killers, either directly by shooting innocent citizens or indirectly through

Twt113. @eggheader. ON MY RADAR: Bomb blast around Bulumkutu area of

development and education. This, of course, is an obvious exaggeration although Nigeria’s

wealth is hardly reflected in the lives of the people.

definition of terrorism and emphasize their achievements. Islam is generally portrayed as a

religion of peace. This is briefly discussed below.

B. Ideology: Terrorism Redefined

not real Muslims.

Ideology is expressed not only in propagating knowledge or belief but also in

churches and public property?

C. Augmentation and Position

join in their struggle.

Twt18. @Boko_Haram. Boko Haram thinking of replacing cigarettes with

D. Rejection of Western Education and Social Lifestyle