Naturalisms

And its plurality

Fernanda Cardoso

1
Introduction

2
Introduction

This presentation is part of an ongoing literature research project, funded by

FAPESP with support from SAE-UNICAMP (BAS-IC and BAM). The research is
titled "How to make science of cognition? The problem of the scientific
method in cognitive sciences from the perspective of the anti-reductionist
naturalism of Quine and Sellars' epistemologies."

In summary, the main objective of the research is to characterise and link the
concepts of science and cognition based on the epistemologies of Willard Quine
and Wilfrid Sellars, which combine naturalism and anti-reductionism, to address
the issue of how one can scientifically recognise and understand an object of
investigation that is inherently subjective: cognition.

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Willard Quine, Wilfrid Sellars,
1908-2000 1912-1989

4
Introduction

Naturalism became prominent in epistemology in the second half of the 20th

century, especially with Willard Quine's "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism"
(1951/1961) and "Naturalized Epistemology" (1969), which paved the way for a
reconnection between epistemology and the sciences, strengthening the
naturalistic program with the progress of cognitive and behavioral psychology.

However, naturalism as a philosophical approach did not begin or end with Quine.
It entails a broad and diverse range of philosophical commitments that vary in
type and degree according to the author and the context, and its influence spans
nearly all areas of contemporary analytical philosophy.

For example, Sellars, who is the other main author of my current research, is a
naturalist, but his theses are not identical to those of Quine.
5
Introduction

It is in this context that my presentation today is situated.

I would like to present to you a small part of my research, focusing on mapping

some aspects of naturalism in Philosophy.

The reason I chose this particular aspect of my research over others is primarily
due to the frequent misunderstanding and unjust criticism that naturalism as a
philosophical approach faces in the humanities in general, depicting it as
homogenous and simplistic.

Moreover, there is often an attack on a straw man rather than on naturalism

itself.

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So, today I plan to suggest that there are several ways to be a naturalist in
Philosophy, hoping that this will show at least a little of how rich and intriguing
naturalism can be.

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Naturalisms

8
Naturalisms
Naturalism is not a monolithic doctrine; it encompasses several distinct types that
not necessarily come together:

- Methodological Naturalism.

- Ontological Naturalism.

- Ethical Naturalism.

Besides that, inside these types of naturalism there is also many kinds of
philosophical compromises. Many methodological naturalists, for instance, do not
agree with each other.

However, let’s see a little bit of these types of naturalism.

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Naturalisms
- Methodological Naturalism: This form of naturalism, also known as
‘Epistemological Naturalism’, is a strategy for studying the world, emphasizing
that scientific inquiry should rely on natural causes without assuming the
existence or non-existence of the supernatural. For example, in biology,
methodological naturalism means studying organisms through genetics and
evolution, not through supernatural explanations, such as vitalism or creationism.
- Ontological Naturalism: Also known as ‘metaphysical naturalism’, it asserts that
reality consists only of natural entities, properties, and causes — including the
human realm, as society and mind. A common example is the belief that mental
states are brain states, and thus, consciousness arises from physical processes.
- Ethical Naturalism: This type of naturalism posits that moral values and duties
are rooted in human nature and the natural world. For instance, ethical naturalists
might argue that our sense of right and wrong has evolved to enhance social
cooperation and survival. Ethical naturalists not necessarily denies the central role
of society on human behavior. 10
 Method Being Conduct

Epistemology Ontology Ethics

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Naturalisms
In this presentation, I will focus on Methodological Naturalism, which is more
popular in Philosophy and also the type of naturalism that I research, since I am
an epistemologist.
We can list at least three fundamental commitments of Methodological
Naturalism, shared by all methodological naturalists:
(i) rejection of the supernatural and the transcendent;
(ii) promotion of science (natural and human) as a source of relevant information
for all aspects of human life, especially for philosophy;
(iii) rejection of the conception of “'first philosophy' as prior to or authoritative over
scientific understanding” (ROUSE, 2015, p. 3).
In this sense, epistemology is considered a venture as fallible as science, thus
losing its status as 'first philosophy' (which would allow for an 'external' critique of
the epistemic claims of science). 12
Naturalisms
In addition to these consensual commitments, naturalism in epistemology
generally involves the combination of all, or part, of the following teses:
a) Empiricism (rejection of the possibility of purely rational justification of beliefs);
b) Non-foundationalism (rejection of foundationalism in the theory of
justification);
c) Externalism (rejection of mentalism in the theory of justification);
d) Psychologism (the thesis that psychology is important for Philosophy of Mind);
e) Physicalism and/or materialism (the thesis that the world is strictly physical);
f) Methodological monism (there is only one legitimate method for acquiring
knowledge);
g) Scientism (the thesis that science is indispensable for philosophy);
h) Darwinism (the thesis that evolution shapes cognitive and social capacities). 13
Naturalisms

From the perspective of naturalists, philosophy

does not occupy a privileged position in the study
of our knowledge of the world; there is no such
thing as a ‘first philosophy’ by which we
evaluate the success of the scientific
investigative program.

In a metaphor, philosophy does not have the

right to scrutinize the success of science as if it
were in its ivory tower.

This aspect of naturalism is a settled point among

naturalists.

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Naturalisms

To illustrate this second aspect of naturalism, Quine uses Neurath's boat

metaphor.

In general terms, this metaphor suggests that, when we are in the middle of the
ocean, there is no way to rebuild our ship all at once if it needs repair; the best we
can do is to identify which parts are not functioning well and replace them, one
by one, as part of a gradual renovation.

After a long and hard effort, the ship that left the dock might not be the same as
the one that is now sailing. However, even though the ship may have been
completely rebuilt, this did not happen all at once.

The point here is that epistemology and science itself can be thoroughly
re-evaluated and reconstructed, but never from an external point of view, as if
the ship were not sailing. 15
16
Naturalisms

"The task of the philosopher differs from others [of other scholars] in detail, but
not in a drastic way as supposed by those who imagined for the philosopher an
advantageous standpoint outside the conceptual scheme he assumes. There is
no such cosmic exile. He cannot study and revise the fundamental conceptual
scheme of science and common sense without having some conceptual scheme
in which to work." (QUINE, 1960, pp. 275-276)

This thesis, according to Abrantes (2004, p. 26), "affirms the continuity between
philosophical and scientific investigation; in particular, it argues that there is no
clear distinction between the methods employed in each of these domains of
investigation."

Therefore, there is a deep continuity between science and philosophy.

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18
Naturalisms

However, while we can enumerate these fundamental commitments, it is

controversial, among other things,

"to what extent does epistemological naturalism imply a particular ontology,

such as physicalism — which rejects entities, properties, and processes beyond
those postulated by physics, casting suspicion, for example, on any form of
mind/body dualism" according to which the mind could not or should not be
studied as the body is studied (ABRANTES, 1998, p. 19).

It is also controversial "whether naturalists advocate for the reduction of

'high-level' or 'special' sciences (such as psychology, for example) to
'fundamental' sciences like biology or physics" (ABRANTES, 1998, p. 19).

So, when you see someone criticizing naturalism, you must say: which
naturalism? 19
Conclusion

20
Conclusion

With this presentation, I hope to have shown that naturalism is not a monolithic
approach in philosophy, and that there is much debate among naturalists
regarding the specific theses that compose it.

It turns out that naturalism, whether an epistemological program or an unfolding

of this program, necessarily refers to a conception of nature.

And this conception, in turn, like any other philosophical conception, is subject to
transformations due to the historical-conceptual context in which it is
embedded.

As Chalmers said, depending on the conception of nature in question, "we will

have different 'naturalisms'" (ABRANTES, 2004, p. 20, emphasis mine).

21
Conclusion

Unfortunately, in this presentation, I couldn't explore all the variants of naturalism

in philosophy, not even in epistemology.

Naturalism is a very vast field of study and allows for many variations within
it.

Just to mention a few names besides Quine and Sellars: John Dewey, John Searle,
Peter Godfrey-Smith, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, Richard Dawkins...

In conclusion, I invite you to enrich, with me, even further this great plurality of
naturalisms in philosophy.

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 Thank you!
I look forward to any questions you may have.

Fernanda C. Cardoso
(IFCH-Unicamp)
E-mail: [email protected]

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