The Philippine Maharlika Investment Fund
The Philippine Maharlika Investment Fund
The Philippine Maharlika Investment Fund
sg)
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
2023
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/168728
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SYNOPSIS
COMMENTARY
While the Philippines is currently a lower middle-income country (LMIC) with a gross
national income (GNI) per capita of US$3,622, it is only US$400 shy of meeting the
US$4,046 threshold to be classified as an upper-middle income country (UMIC). In
2022, its GDP grew by 7.6 per cent, the fastest in 40 years, putting it on track to
become an UMIC by 2025.
Achieving UMIC status is an honour for the country, but it also comes with the
disadvantage of being deprioritised for official development assistance (ODA) loans
and grants, which are primarily for LMICs and low-income countries.
The MIF’s raison d’etre is to serve as an investment vehicle for drawing both domestic
and foreign investments into infrastructure development initiatives in the Philippines,
and to replace ODA when the Philippines no longer qualifies for it, which is likely to be
in 2025.
The establishment of the Philippines’ SWF can be seen as a form of state capitalism,
or a market intervention by the state. Essentially, the government is taking control of
infrastructure development ahead of the anticipated termination of ODA. This
intervention is needed since ODA has historically contributed significantly to
infrastructure development initiatives in the country. In fact, ODA provided 49 per cent
of total financing for the preceding Duterte administration’s flagship infrastructure
development programme, “Build, Build, Build”.
These expand the country’s geographic base for economic activity and job creation,
while also fixing congestion problems in Metro Manila. They contribute to the economic
security of individuals, with multiplier effects that are reflected in improved health,
sanitation and education outcomes. Moreover, MIF profits can further expand the
country’s fiscal space for redistribution programmes that support the country’s poor,
including income-support programmes.
The Philippines is not unique in establishing an SWF to prepare for UMIC status.
Indonesia established the Indonesia Investment Authority under President Joko
Widodo’s leadership in 2021. This was also one year before Indonesia regained its
UMIC status in 2022, after losing it briefly amid the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, the
MIF is being patterned after the Indonesian model, which had pushed infrastructure
projects amid the pandemic.
Malaysia and Indonesia had been peers of the Philippines in economic development
during the 1960s to 1980s. During those years, they trailed the “Asian Tigers” – South
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong – all of which have reached high-income
country (HIC) status, and which have their own respective SWFs.
In the case of the Philippines, however, the MIF’s interests may conflict with private
sector interests in big-ticket infrastructure projects. For example, in 2022, an US$11
billion contract to build an international airport south of Manila was awarded to a
consortium of businesses affiliated with the founder of the flagship carrier Philippine
Airlines, South Korea’s Samsung and Germany’s Munich Airport. Likewise, San
Miguel corporation, one of the largest conglomerates in the Philippines, succeeded in
its PhP736 billion (approximately US$14 billion) bid to build and to operate a four-lane
international airport north of Manila for 50 years.
The Marcos administration’s proposal of a SWF has drawn flak because of reports
about the misdeeds of the late President Ferdinand Marcos. Given that Bongbong
Marcos envisions the MIF to engage in big-ticket infrastructure, a potential risk is that
of rent-seeking as the government could potentially influence the bidding outcomes
for such projects in favour of the MIF or the companies the MIF supports.
Transparency will be the current administration and the MIF’s best defence against
criticisms of corruption and misuse of public funds should losses occur. This is critically
important since there is no guarantee that losses are completely avoidable in high-
return infrastructure projects which come at higher risks. Transparency in the
procurement process will also be needed to avoid criticisms of bias in the award of
tenders for projects.