Input from the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)

to the upcoming report on the global water crisis

by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights & environment

Submitted on November 20, 2020

Since 1989, the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) has used the power of law to
protect the environment, promote human rights, and bring about a just and sustainable society. In
the sections that follow, we provide responses to the Rapporteur's questionnaire that draw from
CIEL's various areas of expertise and experience.

Fracking, Plastics, and Toxic Chemicals: Threats to the Right to Water

Adverse impacts on the enjoyment of human rights

Fracking affects water supply and safety. Hydraulic fracturing or “fracking”, as it is commonly
known, is an explosive disruption of subsurface geological layers through the injection of a
composition of water, chemicals and sand at high pressure, to release oil or natural gas.1 This
process undermines the right to water in numerous ways, through its impacts on the
availability and accessibility of water, as well as its impacts on water quality. The hydraulic
fracturing process utilizes massive quantities of water. (For example, according to FracFocus, an
industry registry site in the United States, in 2015, wells required an average of nearly 5.5 million
gallons of water injected per tap, a figure that increased to over 9.5 million gallons in 2017.2)
Whether sourced from surface or groundwater sources, this water use can strain the availability of
water to local populations in the affected areas.3 The injection of a toxic stew of water and
chemicals below the ground also risks contaminating water sources, through the spread of metal
and radioactive chemicals into fresh water from the hydrological cycle, surface water, and aquifers.
Harmful chemicals used in fracking can enter drinking water resources—from spills, improper
handling of wastewater, or faulty infrastructure— and lead to negative impacts on human health.
In just four US states —Colorado, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania— 6,648
fracking-related spills were recorded from 2005-2014.4 Of the 240 chemicals used or created
during fracking whose biological effects on humans have been studied, 157 chemicals, (or 65%)
are toxins found to affect reproductive or developmental health.5 These include many known

1
CIEL et al., Plastic & Climate: The Hidden Costs of a Plastic Planet (2019), p. 28, https://www.ciel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Plastic-and-Climate-FINAL-2019.pdf
2
Idem at 29 & n.87.
3
Heller, L. Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights to drinking water and sanitation,
Doc. A/74/197 (19 July 2019), paragraph 20; https://undocs.org/A/74/197
4
CIEL et al., Plastic & Health: The Hidden Costs of a Plastic Planet (2019), p. 14 & n.54, https://www.ciel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/Plastic-and-Health-The-Hidden-Costs-of-a-Plastic-Planet-February-2019.pdf
5
https://www.tribunalonfracking.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/AO-final-4-12-19.pdf

1101 15th St NW, Ste 1100, Washington, DC 20005 USA | Tel 1.202.785.8700 | Fax 1.202.785.8701 | [email protected]
15 rue des Savoises, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland | Tel 41-22-789-0500 | Fax 41-22-789-0739 | [email protected]
www.ciel.org
carcinogens, such as benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylenes, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
and endocrine-disrupting chemicals which are associated with developmental problems in infants,
children, and young adults (the most vulnerable). More alarmingly, no data is available for almost
800 chemicals used in fracking.

One of the major drivers of fracking is the plastic industry. Plastics are fossil fuels in another form,
and fracked gas, in particular, supplies petrochemical feedstocks used to make plastic. Plastic
poses significant threats to water, the environment, and human health throughout its life
cycle, from the oil or gas wellhead to the refinery, from store shelves to kitchen tables, and from
waste heaps to the environment. Problematically, plastic does not break down or disintegrate
in the environment, and consequently it has continued to accumulate in waterways,
agricultural soils, rivers, and the ocean for decades which directly enter food chains. This
concern has expanded to the impacts of plastics on ecosystems, on food and water supplies, and
on human health, amidst emerging evidence that plastic is accumulating not only in our
environment but also in our bodies. Microplastics can exacerbate water pollution and human
exposure to pollutants by attracting and releasing chemical additives or bacteria. There's evidence
that microplastic particles are already contaminating drinking water and can penetrate deep into
body tissues.6 CIEL’s 2019 report on Plastic & Health, covers the issue of plastic pollution and
water in a comprehensive way, across the lifecycle of plastic.7

Consumption of contaminated water is a route through which humans and animals are
exposed to endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDC)8. EDC are pollutants of concern: in a 2012
report, the World Health Organization (WHO) concluded that EDCs are a 'global threat that needs
to be resolved'9. Exposure to EDCs can lead to the development of chronic diseases, hormone-
related cancers, diabetes, infertility, lower IQ, among others10. Women and children are among the
populations most vulnerable to EDCs, and there is growing scientific evidence that EDCs make
their adverse health effects heritable to future generations thereby harming the rights of individuals
across several generations.11

Heightened risks to the rights of communities in vulnerable situations.

The evidence is clear that the fracturing industry has infringed upon many provisions of
international human rights law, and so States that have authorised, financed, or facilitated fracking,

6
Plastic & Health, https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Plastic-and-Health-The-Hidden-Costs-of-a-
Plastic-Planet-February-2019.pdf
7
Plastic & Health, https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Plastic-and-Health-The-Hidden-Costs-of-a-
Plastic-Planet-February-2019.pdf ; Plastic & Climate https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Plastic-and-
Climate-FINAL-2019.pdf
8
See, e.g., Andressa Gonsioroski et al., 'Endocrine Disruptors in Water and Their Effects on the Reproductive
System', Int J Mol Sci. 2020 Mar; 21(6): 1929, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7139484/.
9
State of the science of endocrine disrupting chemicals 2012: https://www.who.int/ceh/publications/endocrine/en/
10
See e.g. IPEN and the Endocrine Society 'Introduction to EDCs'
https://ipen.org/sites/default/files/documents/ipen-intro-edc-v1_9a-en-web.pdf
11
La Merrill, M.A., Vandenberg, L.N., Smith, M.T. et al. Consensus on the key characteristics of endocrine-
disrupting chemicals as a basis for hazard identification. Nat Rev Endocrinol 16, 45–57 (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41574-019-0273-8

2
without the sufficient evaluation of its impacts, regulation or prevention of those adverse effects
on rights, violate their duties to protect human rights. This is especially concerning for particularly
vulnerable or marginalized populations, such as women, children and Indigenous Peoples,
who suffer disproportionately from the negative effects of fracking.12 Fracking puts local
communities at risk both through its immediate impacts on the right to water and through its
contributions to greenhouse gas emissions –including methane, a particularly potent GHG – which
aggravate the climate crisis. Furthermore, while fracking is associated with considerable harms for
communities and Indigenous Peoples whose lands are exploited for the extraction of fossil fuels,
the fracked oil and gas is largely produced for export to global commodity markets, with little or
no direct local benefits. For example, the Indigenous Mapuche in northern Patagonia, Argentina,
pay a high environmental and social price in relation to one the world’s largest fracking sites: the
Vaca Muerta deposits of shale gas situated under their territories. Fracking in this region has
resulted in a considerable number of leaks which have drastically affected the health of the people
and their livestocks. In 2018 for example, there were 934 incidents at 95 wells.13

By contributing to global warming, emissions from fracking--and from the use of fracked oil
and gas--compound threats to water posed by climate change.
Globally, the emissions reductions required to combat climate change can only be achieved if
fossil fuel emissions are significantly reduced, and if the majority of coal, oil and gas reserves halt
being explored and exploited.14 The global temperature objectives adopted in the Paris Agreement
can only be achieved if fossil fuel reserves that are not yet exploited remain in the ground–
particularly unconventional hydrocarbons such as shale gas and shale oil, the extraction of which
requires a comparatively higher investment generates more emissions of greenhouse gases than
conventional resources.15 Given the increasing availability and competitiveness of less carbon-
intensive, renewable energy sources, and the urgent need to drastically reduce the use of
petrochemicals for plastic production, there is no justification for fracking. Climate-related
secondary effects from the extraction of unconventional fossil fuels such as fracking include, inter
alia, the loss of livelihoods and reduced access to water and sanitation.16

Governmental policy responses

Given the significant known and foreseeable risks that fracking, plastics and the toxic chemicals
associated with both pose to human health and the environment, it is not enough to focus on
mitigation. A rights-based approach requires States to take affirmative action to prevent
these risks from materializing by adequately regulating or prohibiting hazardous activities
and substances. Failure to take measures to prevent foreseeable harms to human rights caused by
the immediate local impacts of fracking or its contributions to global climate change, which
compounds local vulnerabilities, constitutes a breach of this obligation.

12
https://www.tribunalonfracking.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PPT_Statement-Post-
Session_HR_FR_CC_4_6_18.pdf
13
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/14/indigenous-mapuche-argentina-fracking-communities
14
See McGlade, C., & Ekins, P. (2015). The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global
warming to 2 [deg] C. Nature, 517(7533), 187-190.
15
Howarth, Robert W. "Methane emissions and climatic warming risk from hydraulic fracturing and shale gas
development: implications for policy." Energy and Emission Control Technologies 3 (2015): 45-54.

3
Legislation to phase out or reduce hazardous substances, in line with the precautionary
principle, can prevent water pollution. Instead of regulating on a substance by substance
approach, the restriction of groups of chemicals can be more efficient. For instance, the European
Union recently committed to phase out the use of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) as
a group.17 PFAS are an example of substances found in several cases of fresh and drinking water
contamination all over the world, and linked to adverse impact on people's health (e.g. WHO,
Keeping our water clean: the case of water contamination in the Veneto Region).18

Similarly, prohibitions on fracking can help prevent water contamination and protect the
right to water and other interrelated human rights. Following the 2011 Report of the UN
Special Rapporteur on human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation regarding her country
visit to the United States, a series of moratoria on fracking were adopted for water and public
health protection, and bans were integrated into water policies.19 Vermont, Maryland, Oregon,
Washington, among other states, passed the ban.20 Although Europe has more reserves of shale
gas than in the US, there has been much less substantial fracking production, due in large part to
bans enacted in France, the Netherlands, Scotland, Ireland, Denmark and Bulgaria, as well as the
abandonment of projects in other countries.21

UN human rights authorities have requested in several instances that States uphold their
human rights obligations in the context of fracking. The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights recommended that Argentina adopt regulatory frameworks for hydraulic fracturing
assessing and addressing all relevant risks for the communities concerned as well as threats to
agriculture and the climate system.22 Similarly the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women recommended that the United Kingdom “review its policy on
fracking and its impact on the rights of women and girls and consider introducing a comprehensive
and complete ban on fracking”.23

Banning fracking reduces the availability of petrochemical feedstocks used to make plastic,
which is critical to shrinking the supply of plastic and combating the global plastics crisis.
Legislation banning single use plastics is another efficient way to curb plastic pollution, while

17
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/pdf/chemicals/2020/10/Strategy.pdf
18
https://www.euro.who.int/en/publications/abstracts/keeping-our-water-clean-the-case-of-water-contamination-in-
the-veneto-region,-italy-2017
19
De Albuquerque, C., Special Rapporteur (2011). Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human
rights to drinking water and sanitation. A/HRC/18/33/Add.4 Retrieved from
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/18session/A-HRC-18-33-Add4_en.pdf

20
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/434708-oregon-house-approves-10-year-fracking-ban
21
https://earthlawyers.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/APPENDIX-2-Legal-Status-of-UOGE-across-the-world-
31.03.18.pdf
22
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2018), Concluding Observations to Argentina.
E/C.12/ARG/CO/4.
23
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (2019), Concluding Observations to the United
Kingdom. CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/8.

4
also reducing water floods.24 This is because plastic debris often obstructs sewers and waterways
affecting in a disproportionate manner communities living in vulnerable situations who are more
likely to be settle in places with unsound solid waste and wastewater management. Plastic pollution
increases how often community members are forced to come into contact with the dirty water from
floods. For example, in Kenya, plastic ban legislation has significantly mitigated water
contamination and floods, as shown through Kenya’s Implementation Plan for the Ban of Single
Used Plastics in Protected Areas.25 Moreover, in the Philippines, 30 advocacy groups called on the
Cebu City government to immediately ban single-use plastics and enforce a holistic approach in
waste management to specifically address the garbage problem and mitigate flooding.26 Another
good practice to prevent and reduce water pollution includes Indigenous Peoples traditional
knowledge. For instance, some Māori, in New Zealand and the Pacific Ocean, who are using their
traditional watercrafts, known as Wakas, to trawl for microplastics.

International investment projects jeopardize the right to water

Case study from Chile: Hydroelectric project exacerbates water scarcity27

Adverse impacts on human rights

As it diverts water from the three main tributaries of Chile’s critical Maipo River into a system of
tunnels bored through the Andes Mountains, the Alto Maipo hydropower project is aggravating
a situation of extreme water scarcity by reducing rainfall, contributing to desertification,
and preventing the recharge of aquifers. Alto Maipo is predicted to diminish the Maipo River’s
flow significantly, jeopardizing access to water for 7 million people in Santiago who depend on
the river for drinking water; this is particularly concerning given the COVID-19 pandemic.
Rerouting the Maipo’s tributaries would also reduce the water available to irrigate over 120,000
hectares of farmland. Alto Maipo demonstrates how large-scale hydroelectric projects can
threaten, inter alia, the rights to water, life, health, food, and a healthy environment.

Linkages with climate change

Alto Maipo is exacerbating the serious effects of climate change on the region’s water
systems. In addition to the effects described above, blasting and drilling to create Alto Maipo’s
more than 70 km of tunnels have caused breakage and fissuring of glaciers. This is occurring in a
context where climate change has caused rapid glacial melt throughout Chile: some 50% of the
Andean cryosphere has already disappeared. By 2100, water discharge from glacial melt is
expected to slow dramatically, threatening both river flow and the availability of drinking water.
Low water flow can decrease ecosystem services of surface and groundwater, preventing water
systems from properly diluting and regulating pollutants and liquid waste emissions and risking
irreparable damage to sensitive Chilean flora and fauna.

24
https://news.grida.no/how-banning-plastic-prevents-flooding
25
https://www.tourism.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Action-Plan-Single-Use-Plastics-Ban-in-Protected-Areas-
February2020.pdf
26
https://www.philstar.com/the-freeman/cebu-news/2020/11/02/2054046/groups-ban-single-use-plastics
27
For more information about this case study, see annexes 1-3.

5
Infringement of human rights obligations and responsibilities
Among the serious challenges faced by local communities seeking to protect their rights and
environment is that Alto Maipo has enjoyed international financing from several
multilateral development banks, including the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation,
the Inter-American Development Bank, and the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
Investment by such entities in Alto Maipo has given the project an undeserved stamp of approval,
thus facilitating major investments from other financial institutions. The project has even been
designated under the UNFCCC’s “Clean Development Mechanism”. All this despite years of
litigation, local opposition to the project’s many harms, claims at non-judicial accountability
mechanisms, and the participation of thousands of Chileans in demonstrations demanding the
project’s cancellation.

Case study from Colombia: Mine project threatened water scarcity & pollution28

Adverse impacts on human rights

Before Colombia’s Constitutional Court stepped in to reaffirm Colombia’s prohibition on mining
within the country’s critical páramo ecosystems, Canadian-based junior mining company Eco Oro
Minerals Corp. had undertaken exploration for a gold mine in the Santurbán Páramo. This despite
the fact that Colombia’s páramos provide water for over 70% of Colombians, in addition to serving
as a major carbon sink. Construction of the gold mine would have severely impacted millions of
Colombians in the surrounding area, including by undermining a vital source of their drinking
water. This situation of water scarcity would have been exacerbated by the fact that industrial
mining requires significant quantities of water and produces enormous amounts of toxic waste,
which can contaminate water sources and the surrounding environment for decades. The Eco Oro
mine was emblematic of how industrial mining can cause or exacerbate water scarcity and
water pollution, thus jeopardizing the rights to water, health, life, and a healthy
environment.

Infringement of human rights obligations and responsibilities

A major challenge faced by local communities and the State of Colombia in their respective efforts
to protect the environment and human rights is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement system.
Under the Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement’s investment chapter, Eco Oro Minerals was
able to sue the Colombian state at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) for lost profits resulting from the decision by Colombia’s Constitutional Court
confirming a ban on mining activities within the Santurbán Páramo. Moreover, a request by local
communities to intervene in the arbitration case as amici curiae—the only way for communities
to bring environmental and human rights concerns into such cases—was denied by the ICSID
panel. This case illustrates how the costly, opaque, and undemocratic system of international
arbitration can undermine the ability of states to enforce democratically enacted policies and
legislation, as well as judicial rulings to protect citizens’ rights and the environment.

28
For more information about this case study, see annexes 4-5.

6
 QUEJA PRESENT ADA ANTE LA OFICINA DEL OMBUDSMAN Y ASESOR
EN MATERIA DE OBSERV ANCIA (CAO)

En relacion con:

El proyecto No. 31632, denominado PROYECTO HIDROELECTRICO ALTO

MAIPO, en proceso de construcci6n por parte de AES GENER y ANTOFAGASTA
MINERALS S.A. en Chile.

------------------Presentad·~~~;-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Los representantes de la COORDINADORA CIUDADANA NO ALTO MAIPO Y
ECOSISTEMAS.

La Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo esta localizada en la ciudad de Santiago,

comuna de San Jose de Maipo, Chile. La conforman vecinos del asi llamado "Cajon del
Maipo" y organizaciones de la sociedad civil vinculadas a movimientos ambientales. La
Coordinadora representa a miles de personas que siguen sus actividades, responden a
sus convocatorias, y apoyan la defensa socio-ambiental de la comuna y el rio Maipo.'

Ecosistemas es una organizaci6n no gubernamental chilena orientada a la defensa

ecol6gica y sociocultural tanto del pais, como del mundo, preocupada por temas criticos
relacionados con el agua, la protecci6n de los rios e impactos ambientales y sociales de
mega proyectos industriales e hi oe ectricos.2

Puntos de contacto:

1) Marcela Mella Ortiz: •••••••••••••••

2) Juan Pablo Orrego: ••••••••••••••

Con el apoyo internacional de:

Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), International

Rivers (IR), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) y Patagonia Inc.

I Fuente: Facebook (https:l/es-la.facebook.comlNoAIProyectoAltoMaipo/; 191.129 Me Gusta), Instagram

(https:llwww.instagram.com/noalaltomaipo/; 40.800 seguidores) y Twitter

(https://twitter.comlnoaltomaipo; 20.600 seguidores).
2 Ver: http://www.ecosistemas.cl/
Washington, 24 de enero, 2017

Senor
Osvaldo Gratacos
Vice President
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman - CAO
2121 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20433, USA

Reciba usted un saludo cordial.

Nos dirigimos a usted como integrantes y representantes de la Coordinadora

Ciudadana No Alto Maipo (en adelante, "la Coordinadora") y Ecosistemas,
organizaciones no gubernamentales', en representacion de los vecinos y ciudadanos
afectados por el Proyecto Hldroelectrlco Alto Maipo (en adelante, PHAM) , N°.
31632, financiado por la Corporaclon Financiera Internacional (en adelante, CFI)
en construccion en Chile por las empresas AES Gener S.A. y Antofagasta Minerals
S.A. (en adelante, "la Empresa").

La Empresa disefio, sometio a evaluacion ambiental y se encuentra actualmente

ejecutando la fase de construccion del PRAM.

Conforme a los antecedentes generales y fundamentos que a continuacion se exponen,

presentamos ante la CAO la presente queja en relacion con el Cumplimiento del
proyecto mencionado.

Adjuntamos al presente documento un Memorandum que permite ahondar en algunos

temas sobre el contexto en que este proyecto se aprobo y las condiciones actuales de su
construccion.

3A continuacion se especifican los datos de la personalidad juridica de las organizaciones presentando

esta queja. Coordinadora: personalidad juridica numero 65.865.110-2, de fecha lOde octubre de 2007;
Ecosistemas: personalidadjuridica nurnero 02886, de fecha 1 de agosto 2008.

2
INDICE

I. Resumen

2. Peticionarios

3. Descripci6n del proyecto

3.1. Caracteristicas de la cuenca y del area de influencia del ro ecto
__ 3.2 ..Impactos sociales y ambientales

4. Evaluaci6n ambiental y social incompleta, inadecuada e irregular

4. I. Principales problemas de la evaluaci6n ambiental del proyecto
4.2. Falta de transparencia, probidad, inconsistencias e irregularidades en la
evaluaci6n del proyecto

5. Violaciones de las Normas de Desempefio sobre Sostenibilidad Ambiental y Social

de laCFI

6. Actividades adelantadas por los demandantes

7. Acciones requeridas

3
1. RESUMEN

EI 5 de marzo de 2014, la CFr invirtio fond os -150 millones de dolares-, para el

desarrollo del PHAM.4 Como se vera en detalle a 10 largo de este documento,
consideramos que la CFI incumplio su propio mandato y normas al invertir en este
proyecto, ya que no se ajusta a las razones que la misma CFI da para proceder con
la inversion. EI PHAM tampoco se ajusta a las politic as y normas de desempeiio
sobre sostenibilidad ambiental y social de la CFI.

EI PHAM es un mega-proyecto hidroelectrico que interviene en forma particularmente

severa el sistema hidrico de la cuenca alta del rio Maipo, pero afecta tambien
directamente zonas intermedias y bajas de la cuenca. EI rio Maipo constituye la fuente
primordial de agua potable de la Region Metropolitana, abasteciendo alrededor del 70
por ciento de su demanda actual de agua potable, y cerca de un 90 por ciento de sus
demandas de agua para regadio.i

Debido a la magnitud de la intervencion del proyecto en la cuenca, much as de las

politicas de la CFl no se estan cumpliendo, as! como tampoco las razones que de
acuerdo al mismo organismo justifican la inversion.6 Las razones que, en opinion de la
CFT, tendran un impacto positivo en el desarrollo del pais se pueden revisar en el
siguiente extracto:

"The IFC investment will: (i) assist Chile in the enhancement of its energy
security in the most efficient manner by supporting large-scale run-of-the-river
hydropower projects, decreasing system costs by providing alternatives to
thermal generation (particularly diesel); (ii) enable the implementation oflarge-
scale zero-emission technology power generation sources, decreasing overall
emissions of C02 and GHG; (iii) increase the direct IFC developmental impact
of prior smaller projects in the small hydro and wind sector in Chile, which
focused mostly on providing demonstration effects, with a critical mobilization
role for a larger project; and (iv) provide support to hydropower projects
located close to the load center of the country, in a climate of increased
environmental opposition to other projects in the Patagonia region which
require extremely long and invasive power transmission lines. ,,7

A pesar de 10 seiialado en el parrafo precedente, existe evidencia que demuestra

que la inversion de la CFI no tendra estos impactos en el desarrollo sustentable de
nuestro pais, por el contra rio.

4 Ver:
http://ifcextapps.ifc.orglifcextispiwebsite l.nslnSe3b305216fcdbaS5257aSb0075079d/8bb8a2a6f805394I
85257bb70067ctDc')opendocument
5 Fuente: Anexo 08. Gestion de Cuencas y Cambio Clirnatico. EI caso del Maipo.
6 La informacion de la CFI .scbre el PHAM ha sido obtenida del siguiente link:
http://ifcextapps. ifc.org/ifcextlspiwebsite l.nsln8e3b305216fcdbaS5257a8b0075079d!8bb8a2a6f805394I
85257bb70067cfOc')opendocument
7 Ver seccion "Development Result" en:
hltp://i fcextapps. ifc.org/ifcextlspiwebsite I. nsf/78e3 b305216fcdba85257a8b0075079d!8bb8a2a6f805 3941
85257bb70067cfOc')opendocument

4
 A continuaci6n se revisan los argumentos de la CFI para financiar el PHAM y las
razones clave de por que, en la practica, estas condiciones no se cumplen. Mas
adelante, a 10 largo del documento, se encuentran mas antecedentes para respaldar
estas afirmaciones.

Respecto del punto (i), relativo al PHAM categorizado como una central de pasada
(run-of-the-river, ROR), que mejora la seguridad energetica y ayudara en la
disminuci6n del recio de la energia del ais:
__ aJ._EI EHAM_no es una.genuina central.hidroelectrica de pasadaEs un proyecto
hldroelecfr co que construve tuneles de 67 kilomelfos de 1~q_.eiiJot41 ¥ de 6 a
8 metros de diametro, trasvasijando aguas de tres sub-cuencas, y devolviendo las
aguas al rio Maipo 100 kil6metros aguas abajo de su captaci6n, entregando estas
aguas alteradas en su calidad y cantidad.
b) EI proyecto no mejora la seguridad energetica del pais. EI PHAM tiene entre sus
objetivos (que tampoco han sido constantes ni transparentes a 10 largo de su
disefio, evaluaci6n ambiental y construcci6n) suministrar energia a otra empresa
privada (Antofagasta Minerals, hoy socia minoritaria en el PHAM), cuyas
operaciones mineras se ubican en el norte del pais, a 250 kil6metros de la cuenca
del rio Maipo.
c) Respecto del precio de la energia, la actual administraci6n demostr6 que la
disminuci6n del precio de la energia en el pais depende de la existencia de
voluntad poiftica para modificar el marco regulatorio. EI 2016, el gobiemo
chileno logr6 reducir sustancialmente el valor promedio de la energia en la
mayor licitaci6nae suministro realiza a:--
valor promedio en la licitaci6noe
12.430 GWh/afio fue de 47,6 d61ares por MW/h, 10 que corresponde a una baja
del 63 y del 40 por ciento en comparaci6n a las licitaciones del 2013 y 2015,
respectivamente.i Esto se debe a cambios regulatorios Ilevados adelante por la
administraci6n del ex ministro de Energia Maximo Pacheco (2014-2016), que
. han permitido el ingreso de nuevos acto res, as! como el ingreso masivo de
energias renovables no convencionales (ERNC) al sistema.

Respecto del punto (ii), relativo a las emisiones de C02 y de gases de efecto
invernadero (GEl), debemos sefialar que proyectos como el PHAM no disminuyen
necesariamente las emisiones de C02 y de GHG. Si bien la fuente de generaci6n en este
caso es agua, y efectivamente existe una gran diferencia en este senti do con una central
termica a diesel 0 carb6n, no se ha medido ni evaluado la emisi6n de C02 y GEl a 10
largo del cicio de vida del PHAM, es decir durante todos los procesos de construcci6n,
operaci6n y cierre del proyecto; procesos que duran decadas e implican el
funcionamiento de camiones y maquinaria de gran envergadura que sf emiten estos
gases. No es efectivo entonces que este proyecto no emita C02 y GEl, y que por ende
sea un proyecto limpio. Adernas, no es un proyecto renovable, ya que la cuenca es
degradada irreversiblemente, y, por 10 tanto, se menoscaba el significativo aporte de la
cuenca del rio Maipo en la regulaci6n del cicio hidrol6gico a nivel local y global, y su
capacidad de sumir C02, a la vez que, dada la forma en que las aguas son utilizadas,
estas sufren importantes alteraciones tanto en cantidad como en calidad. Junto con esto,
durante la construcci6n del proyecto no se han respetado siquiera todas las medidas

8 Fuente: http://es.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idESKCN I as I SY

5
establecidas en la Resoluci6n de Calificaci6n Ambiental, como se dernostrara a 10 largo
de este documento.

Finalmente, respecto del punto (iv) y la cercania a los centros de consumo y el

c1ima de creciente oposicion y conflictividad ambiental en el pais:
a) No es efectivo que la electricidad generada por el PHAM este dedicada a centros
de consumo cercanos. Por el contrario, una parte importante de la electricidad,
que la Empresa no especifica, ira a un proyecto minero ubicado a 250 kil6metros
al norte de la cuenca del rio Maipo (minera Los Pelambres, de Antofagasta
Minerals).
b) Existe, ademas, una importante oposici6n al proyecto, y por razones muy
simi lares a las que motivan la masiva oposici6n a proyectos energeticos que
actual mente se pretende desarrollar en la Patagonia: (i) la energia es para
proyectos mineros ubicados lejos del punto de generaci6n; se generan entonces
significativas cargas ambientales a nivel local, pero los supuestos beneficios del
proyecto van para otros lugares distantes (problema de justicia ambiental); y (ii)
es un proyecto altamente invasivo y destructivo -tal como la misma
categorizaci6n social y ambiental de la CFI reconoce. Si bien en este caso las
lineas de alta tensi6n no son un problema mayor (como en el caso de los.
proyectos Hidro Aysen y Rio Cuervo, en la Patagonia chilena), se degrada y
pone en riesgo una cuenca de importancia ambiental y social fundamental para
mas del 40 por ciento de la poblaci6n de Chile -mas de siete millones de
habitantes-, que vive en la Region Metropolitana.

Estamos ante un proyecto categorizado ambiental y socialmente como "A" por la

CFI. Esta categorizaci6n requiere que el proyecto sea evaluado siguiendo los maximos
estandares ambientales y sociales, y que estos mismos estandares sean aplicados durante
la construccion y a 10 largo de toda la vida del proyecto. Esto no ha ocurrido, ni esta
ocurriendo actual mente durante la construcci6n del PHAM. Ademas, durante el proceso
de evaluaci6n ambiental no se consideraron aspectos criticos que se destacan a
continuacion.

Figura 1. Elementos criticos del PHAM que no fueron evaluados durante su paso por
el Sistema de Evaluacion de Impacto Ambiental (SEIA) y al recibir una Resolucion
de Calificacion Ambiental (RCA) favorable'
1) Efectos reales del cambio climatico y desertificacion
2) Diez afios consecutivos de sequia en la cuenca intervenida pOl' el proyecto
3) Caudales reales de los rios a intervenir
4) Efectos sobre la sedimentologia del rio
5) Efectos del proyecto sobre glaciares y aguas subterraneas
6) Impacto hidrogeol6gico de los tuneles
7) Cali dad de las aguas previa a la construcci6n
8) Habitat de especies como el pato cortacorrientes (Merganetta armata), en sector
del rio Volcan, y el c6ndor (Vultur gryphus), en rio Colorado
9) Corta de arboles nativos en zonas no evaluadas
10) Importantes impactos sociales, econ6micos, culturales y sobre el patrimonio
arqueologico y paleontol6gico de la zona

9 La RCA es la autorizacion 0 permiso arnbiental que permite la irnplementacion y operacion del proyecto
segun la norrnativa vigente en Chile.

6
 II) Significativos y sucesivos cambios de la ingenieria del proyecto desde la
obtenci6n de su licencia ambiental (RCA) a la fecha, entre ellos: a) nuevas obras
y sus localizaciones; b) falta de permisos para las nuevas obras, c) cambios en la
modalidad de construcci6n de los tuneles y el manejo de las aguas
contaminadas; y d) efecto sobre vegas y humedales de montana, en especial en
el Valle de la Engorda, en el Yeso yen Aucayes.

Respecto de las Normas de Desempeiio sobre Sostenibilidad Ambiental y Social de

la CFI, el PHAM no cumple con los requisitos de financiaci6n establecidos por este
organismo y por la mayoria de las instituciones financieras internacionales. En los
siguientes puntos se indica de forma resumida por que el PHAM no cumple con las
normas de la CFT:
• No se realize una evaluacion integrada: No se consideraron a todos los usuarios de
la cuenca y se estableci6 un area de influencia del proyecto muy reducida. Tampoco
se realiz6 una adecuada evaluaci6n de alternativas, ni se evaluaron ni estan
gestionando adecuadamente los riesgos del proyecto.
• No se evaluo el eJecto acumulativo del cambio climatico: La zona central de Chile
ha experimentado un record de ocho afios consecutivos de sequia, un hecho que la
Empresa no consider6, y que las autoridades estan definiendo como un "proceso de
desertificacion". Con esta sequia, el caudal de los rios de la cuenca del Maipo ha
disminuido en un 37 por ciento.11
• No existio participacion ciudadana eJectiva: La Empresa se neg6 a abrir un dialogo
con otros usuarios de agua de la cuenca. EI proceso de participaci6n ciudadana
durante el proceso de evaluacion ambiental no tuvo un impacto real en el disefto del
proyecto, y no logro legitimarse socialmente. AI contrario, es percibido como un
proceso viciado. Ninguna de las observaciones ciudadanas presentadas por escrito
recibi6 una respuesta adecuada.
• No se esta haciendo una gestion del desempeiio ambiental y social del proyecto:
Existen 14 denuncias presentadas ante la Superintendencia del Medio Ambiente y
varios recursos de protecci6n presentados y en curso (ver punto 6. Actividades
adelantadas por los demandantes).
• El PHAM no es eficiente: Basandonos en un anal isis de la informaci6n disponible
sobre proyectos de energia renovable, es posible observar que el PHAM no solo no
es eficiente, sino que practicamente se constituye como el proyecto electrico menos
eficiente que se desarrolla en Chile, con valores que sobrepasan absolutamente los

10 Ver: Anexo 05. Aporte potencial de generacion hidroelectrica y rentabilidad financiera (Stern, 2014).
11 Ver: "Atlas del Agua. Chile 2016", Capitulo 2, p. 62, Tabla 2.17. "Cornparacion del caudal medio
anual con el caudal medio de los anos 2013-2014 en 40 estaciones seleccionadas", Disponible en:
http://www.dga.cl/atl asde la gua/Pagi nasi de Ihu I t.aspx

7
 costos de otras iniciativas. A modo de ejemplo, y comparando con form as limpias
de generacion, que ademas tienen un nivel bajo de oposicion ciudadana y generan
escasa conflictividad, podemos citar el proyecto fotovoltaico EI Romero Solar, con
una potencia de 246 MW. Este proyecto implic6 una inversion de 343 millones de
dolares.l" Es decir, tiene una capacidad similar a cada una de las centrales del
PHAM, las que, consideradas individual mente, tendrfan un costa de 1.100 millones
de dolares cad a una, casi triplicando el costa del proyecto solar sefialado.13 Ademas,
la relacion entre la capacidad instalada del PHAM y la magnitud y extension de la
intervenci6n de la cuenca y sus niveles de riesgo, demuestran que es un proyecto
altamente ineficiente.
• No existen condiciones de trabajo adecuadas: Esto se ha evidenciado en cinco
huelgas de los trabajadores de las empresas contratistas contratadas por la Empresa,
en despidos, y en accidentes de trabajo durante la construccion del proyecto, asi
como en practicas anti-sindicales de la Empresa.
• Vulneracion de Derechos Humanos: Este proyecto esta catalogado por el Instituto
Nacional de Derechos Humanos como uno de los 100 conflictos que estarfan
vulnerando los derechos human os en Chile.14 De acuerdo a esta institucion, los
derechos humanos en juego son el derecho a la propiedad, el derecho a un
medioambiente libre de contaminaci6n, el derecho al agua, el derecho a la
participacion, el derecho de acceso a informacion publica y el derecho al territorio y
a los recursos naturales (Convenio 169 OrT). Un caso paradigrnatico que
destacamos mas adelante en este documento (yen el Anexo 02. Caso El Alfalfal) es
el del poblado EI Alfalfa!'

Es por estas, y otras razones que se desarrollan en extenso en este documento en

las secciones pertinentes, que el PHAM no esta cumpJiendo las siguientes Normas
de Deseinpeiio sobre Sostenibilidad Ambiental y Social de la CFI:
• Norma de Desempefio 1: Evaluacion y gesti6n de los riesgos e impactos
ambientales y sociales
• Norma de Desempefio 2: Trabajo y condiciones laborales
• Norma de Desempefio 3: Eficiencia del uso de los recursos y prevenci6n de la
contaminacion
• Norma de Desempefio 4: Salud y seguridad de la comunidad
• Norma de Desempefio 5: Adquisicion de tierras y reasentamiento involuntario
• Norma de Desempefio 6: Conservacion de la biodiversidad y gestion sostenible
de los recursos naturales vivos
• Norma de Desempefio 8: Patrimonio cultural

12 Fuente: http://www.emol.com/noticias/Ecollomial20161111 I 0/830548/Ponen-en-marcha-en- Vallenar-

la- planta-so lar- ("OlOVO Ita i ca- m as- grande-de- Lati noamerica. htm]
IJ Para ver el analisis completo, revisar el Anexo 01. Analisis sobre la Eficiencia del PHAM.
14 Ver: "Mapa de conflictos socioambientales en Chile" (INDH, 2015), p. 148. Disponible en el siguiente
lin k: http://m apacon fl i etos. indh. cl/assets/pdtil i bro- we b-descargable. pdf

8
 2. PETICIONARIOS

La Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo ("Ia Coordinadora"), es una

organizaci6n sin fines de lucro constituida por vecinos de la comuna de San Jose de
Maipo, ubicada en la Regi6n Metropolitana, Santiago, Chilel5.

Ecosistemas es una organizaci6n no gubernamental chilena orientada a la defensa

--- ambiental --ecol6 ica socio cultural- tanto del afs como del mundo reocu ada or
_temas criticos.relacionados can.el.agua.Ja proteccion.de.Ios.nos e Impactos amhientales

Apoyan esta queja personas y organizaciones sociales, gremiales, ambientalistas y

estudiantiles de todo Chile que participan y apoyan el movimiento social "No Alto
Maipo". Entre las organizaciones internacionales que apoyan esta queja podemos
mencionar al Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), International
Rivers (IR), Natural Resources Defense Council (NROC) y Patagonia Inc.

La Coordinadora fue constituida el afio 2007 con el objetivo de liderar e impulsar el

movimiento social en torno a la protecci6n de los rfos de la comuna de San Jose de
Maipo. Esta es una fuente de agua fundamental para la Region Metropolitana. La
Coordinadora surge como respuesta a la intenci6n de la Empresa de construir el PHAM.

La Coordinadora, Ecosistemas y el movimiento social "No Alto Maipo" se han

comprometido a desplegar tooos los esfuerzos que sean necesarios para de ener este
proyecto debido a las graves repercusiones arnbientales y sociales que tendra para las
comunidades directamente afectadas, para ecosistemas claves para el desarrollo
sustentable de la cuenca donde se ubica el proyecto, asi como para los habitantes de
capital de Chile, Santiago, y la Regi6n Metropolitana,

EI movimiento "No Alto Maipo" tiene un alto grado de influencia y participaci6n

ciudadana. Esto se puede comprobar en las redes sociales del movimiento, las que
cuentan con mas de 250 mil seguidores." La Coordinadora y el movimiento "No Alto
Maipo" han tenido un activo rol de movilizaci6n social. Se han organizado y llevado a
cabo masivas marchas (de mas de 25 mil personas) en la ciudad de Santiago. Entre las
mas emblernaticas se encuentran la deliS de noviembre de 2013, las del 2 de agosto y
del 14 de diciembre de 2014, Y la del 5 de diciembre de 2015. En el Caj6n del Maipo,
podemos mencionar las movilizaciones del 27 de junio y 24 de octubre de 2015, y la del
4 de diciembre de 2016. Todo esto en conjunto con una variada gama de actividades,
que incluyen cicletadas, protestas en edificios publicos y en empresas asociadas al
PHAM, participaci6n en actividades publicas como debates presidenciales, actos

15 Adhieren a la Coordinadora las siguientes organizaciones: Asamblea Agua y Soberania de Puente Alto,
Asociacion de Guias de Deporte Aventura y Operadores Turisticos, Camara de Turismo del Cajon del
Maipo, Camara de Turisrno de Pirque y Federacion de Andinismo de Chile.
16 Fuente: Facebook (https://es-la. facebook.com/NoAIProyectoAltoMaipo/; 191.129 Me Gusta),
Tnstagram (https:llwww.instagram.com/noalaltllmaipo/; 40.800 seguidores) y Twitter
(https:l/twitter.com/noaltomaipo; 20.600 seguidores).

9
culturales y lanzamientos de videos donde reconocidos politicos, activistas y artistas
presentan su apoyo al movimiento "No Alto Maipo".17

3. DESCRIPCION DEL PROYECTO

Corporacien Financiera Internacional- Proyecto Numero 3136218

El PHAM consiste en la construcci6n y operaci6n de dos centrales hidroelectricas

situadas en la parte baja de la cuenca del rio Maipo, aproximadamente a 50 kil6metros
al sur-este de la ciudad de Santiago, Chile. En la cuenca alta el PHAM captara las aguas
de los principales afluentes que alimentan al rio Maipo, para dirigirlos a tuneles de un
total de 67 kil6metros de largo, y de entre 6 y 8 metros de diarnetro. Los afluentes
corresponden a los rios Colorado, Volcan y Yeso. El proyecto trasvasijara las aguas de
estos tres rios para devolverlas al rio Maipo 100 kilometres aguas abajo.

Segun la informacion oficial de la Empresa la construcci6n del proyecto tomaria

aproximadamente cinco afios. Sin embargo, esta estimaci6n se aleja cada vez mas de los
tiempos reales de irnplernentacion, ya que el PHAM ya Ileva casi cuatro afios en
proceso de construccion y esta muy lejos de ser terminado.

Respecto de este punto, en los ultimos meses la Empresa ha informado, a traves de los
medios, un retraso en los cronogramas de actividades de ejecuci6n del PHAM,
derivados de problemas en la ingenieria de disefio y de construcci6n en eI tunel.19 Esto
retrasa el cronograma presentado en su evaluaci6n ambiental, aumentando la duracion
de la fase de construccion, y por tanto, aumentando el periodo en que se generan
impactos ambientales y sociales puntuales en el area producto de esta etapa del PHAM.
EI aumento de estos plazos y sus consecuencias negativas no han sido evaluados por la
autoridad. Estas dificultades y atrasos demuestran la superficialidad y mala calidad de
los estudios realizados.

17 Ver: Anexo 03. Movilizaci6n Social No Alto Maipo, para acceder a un listado de los eventos de
movilizaci6n mas importantes, asi como a diferentes links para acceder a la fuente y mas informacion
(incluida la convocatoria) de cada una de elias.
IS Mas informacion en el siguiente link:
http://i fcextupps.ifc.org/ifcextlspiwebsite l.nsti'78e3b305216fcdba85257a8b0075079d!8bb8a2u6f8053941
85257bb70067cfOc?opendocument
19 Fuente: https://www.df.cl/nati cias/em presas/enenri a/aes- geller-a licializa-atraso-de-a I to- mai po- v-

pospone-un-allo-entrada-de/20 16-02-24/212541.html; hnp:l/www.revistaei.cI/2016/02/25/provecto-alto-

maipo-alcunza-un-24-de-avance-pero-apertura-se-pospone-en-ull-ano/#

10
Figura 2. Mapa con ubicacion de PHAM

PROYECTO HIDROELECTRICO ALTO MAIPO AES Cener S.A.

Centrales de pasada Alfalfal II y Las Lajas

••••• 'unM~ ydun(lol;. I 0 IMbI.xll\n

~uhlprr.\nNX ptOyN"Md"l (eo!,,"

VifI" dt_" M"r.

VAI~,.aJsoQ

).Ill ""lolll0
Alt9Maipo

La Empresa ha promocionado el PHAM proyectando y declarando una capacidad

instalada de 531 MW, y una produccion anual de 2.100 GWh. Lo anterior, a pesar de
que calculos independientes basados en estadfsticas oficiales publicadas por la
Direccion General de Aguas demuestran que debido a las decrecientes aguas del Maipo
y sus tributarios (descenso medio del 23,5 por ciento entre 2007 y 2014), el proyecto
solo tendrfa una produccion anual de 1.790 GWh.20

EI PHAM se describe como un proyecto de central de pasada (run-of the-river, ROR),

debido a que no contempla la instalacion de un embalse. Sin embargo, se capturaran
casi por completo las aguas de los rios Colorado, Yeso y Volcan. Existe gran
incertidumbre respecto de la merma de los caudales de los afluentes que ocurriria con
estos trasvases. Segun calculos independientes, con la intervencion del PHAM, la
reduccion de los caudales de los afluentes del Maipo podria ser mucho mayor que la
proyectada por la Empresa, entre 60 a 90% de sus caudales naturales, y esto en el
contexto del proceso de desertificacion y disminucion natural de los caudales de los rios
que afecta la region norte y centro de Chile. Los trasvases Ie restarian esos caudales a
mas de 100 kilometres de los valles de los rios que componen la cuenca del rio Maipo;
esto significa que los flujos invernales del rio Maipo corresponderian mas a los de un
afluente de quebrada men or que a los del rio principal de la cuenca de la Region
Metropolitana. EI agua se desviara hacia las turbinas a traves de varios tuneles que en
total suman 67 kilometres. Una vez Ilenos, los tuneles contendran 2 millones de metros
cubicos de agua. Esta cantidad de agua es equivalente a la que contienen los embalses

20 Ver: Anexo 05. Aporte potencial de generacion hidroelectrica y rentabilidad financiera (Stern, 2014).

11
de centrales hidroelectricas importantes. Por 10 tanto, PHAM tiene una escala de
proyecto manifiestamente mas grande, y caracteristicas de disefio, de operaci6n, y con
un nivel de intervenci6n de la cuenca, e impactos mucho mayores que una genuina
instalaci6n ROR.

Esta categorizaci6n incorrecta del PHAM, como proyecto ROR, se hizo con el
prop6sito de minimizar la percepci6n del publico y de los inversores acerca de sus
potenciales impactos ambientales y sociales.

Cabe destacar que en Chile, segun las disposiciones del C6digo de Aguas y la normativa
sectorial de la Direcci6n General de Aguas relativas al uso de derechos de agua no
consuntivos, al tomar las aguas de un rio estas se deben devolver en la misma calidad y
cantidad. EI PHAM trasvasija agua de tres sub-cuencas distintas, devolviendo menos
agua al rfo (debido a que las aguas subterraneas depositadas en napas subterraneas y
acuiferos estan siendc intervenidas por los tuneles), y con una calidad distinta
(totalmente alterada en terrninos de temperatura, oxigenaci6n y sedimentos, ya que los
tres rios tienen calidades diferentes). Ademas, por el impacto en estos cursos de agua, la
cantidad final de aporte al rio Maipo sera probablemente menor debido al estancamiento
del agua y al aumento de temperatura y evaporaci6n en las orillas de los cauces ..

Respecto de la inversi6n necesaria para Ilevar a cabo el proyecto, la cifra ha variado

significativamente en el tiempo. Esta informaci6n no ha sido dada a conocer de manera
clara ni transparente por la Empresa, destacandose que el monte presentado a la
autoridad encargada de evaluar el proyecto (y por ende, a la ciudadania durante el
proceso de participaci6n ciudadana y a 10 largo de la ejecuci6n del proyecto) es mucho
menor que el costo estimado actual de la inversi6n, que sigue aumentando a medida
que el proyecto se sigue atrasando.

En un comienzo, y de acuerdo a la informaci6n publicada en el Sistema de Evaluaci6n

de Tmpacto Ambiental, el costa estimado del PHAM era de US$ 600 millones.i' Luego,
en el afio 2012, se publicaba en los medios que el proyecto aumentaba la inversi6n en
un 60 por ciento, sefialandose un aumento desde US$ 1.000 a US$ 1.600_22 Sin
embargo, y de acuerdo a la informaci6n publicada en el sitio web de la CFT, el proyecto
tendria un costa de US$ 1.900 millones. Recientemente, en julio de 2016, la Empresa
anunci6 un aumento que podrfa superar el 20 por ciento sobre el presupuesto original
(que, como se puede observar, nunca ha estado claro) y una nueva demora en su
construccion.r' De acuerdo a informaci6n publicada a fines de agosto del 2016, el costa
final de la iniciativa tluctuaria entre los US$ 2.225 y US$ 2.427 millones.24

21 Fuente: http://www.e-seia.cl/seia-web/richalticilaPrincipal.php·)modo=ticha&id expediente=2227972

22 Fuente: https://www.df.cl/noticias/empresas/energialcosto-de-alto-mai po-sube-hasta- us-I-600-
millones-v-obras-comenzaran-ell!20 12-12-1 0/2051 06.html
23 Fuentes: http://www.latercera.cominoticialnegocios/20 16/08/65 5-692833-9-aes-gener-advierte-g ue-
coslo-de 1- proyec(O-a I to- m ai po- podria-e leva rse- hasta- 20. shtm I:
http://www.emol.com/notici asfEconom ia!20 16/08/17/817 686/AES-Gener-preve-gue-el-costo-de-A Ito-
Mai po-aumentara-en- un- 2 O-de-su- pres llpuesto. htm I; http://www.nuevamineria.com/revistal al to- m ai po-
alza-ell-costo-podria-superar-el-20-v-aes-gener-negocia-con-contratistas/;
http://www.tI3.cl!radio/negocios/conex ion-tele 13/noticialconsorcio-fi nancia-al to-mai po- habria- f'i'enado-
entrega-di neros
24 Fuente: http://www.revistaei.cl/20 16/08/25/alto-mai po-tras-alza-costo-del-provecto-sera-casi-triple-
una-central-gas-natural/#

12
 El PHAM fue ingresado por primera vez al Sistema de Evaluacion de Impacto .
Ambiental (SEIA) el 5 de junio del 2007. EI primer proyecto evaluado consideraba la
utilizacion de los recursos hidricos de la cuenca de la Laguna Negra, recursos
destinados exclusivamente al abastecimiento de agua potable de la Region
Metropolitana. En visperas de la votacion para decidir si aprobar 0 rechazar
ambientalmente el proyecto, y a sabiendas que iba a ser rechazado, la Empresa retire el
ro ecto de la evaluacion ambiental.
----------~~-------~
m8AlVrfue tn.Qresado nuevarnente a
En esta nueva version elimino el uso de las reservas de agua potable de Santiago y
realize otros cam bios menores. Sin embargo, como se vera mas adelante, estas aguas
seran utilizadas de todas maneras producto de un acuerdo con la empresa sanitaria
Aguas Andinas. El PHAM obtuvo su Resolucion de Calificacion Ambiental el 30 de
marzo del 2009.

Dada la creciente controversia y oposicion publica al PHAM, y las denuncias realizadas

por la ciudadania, por iniciativa de varios Diputados, la Camara de Diputados instauro
una Comision Especial Investigadora. Su misi6n fue investigar: "Irregularidades en la
Aprobacion por la COREMA RM25 del Proyecto Hidroelectrico Alto Maipo".26 La
Comisi6n recibio en audiencia a representantes de distintas organizaciones, directores
de servicios publicos y a funcionarios publicos regionales y nacionales involucrados en
la evaluacion ambiental del proyecto. La Cornision concluyo que existian antecedentes
suftcientes que demoSffaban que no debra naberse aprobado este proyecto en las-
condiciones en que se presento.

El PHAM consiguio financiarse solo una vez que AES Gener llego a un acuerdo con
Antofagasta Minerals, aceptando una participacion accionaria de un 40 por ciento del
grupo Luksic, controlador de Antofagasta Minerals, en el PHAM. Es solo en este
contextci que las instituciones financieras nacionales e internacionales Ie adjudicaron los
creditos necesarios al proyecto, aceptando la participacion del grupo Luksic como
garantia suficiente. El consorcio bancario que se constituye incluye a nueve bancos: tres
con sede en Estados Unidos (BID, CFI y OPIC), tres bancos chilenos (Banco de Credito
e Inversiones, Banco Estado, Corplianca/ltau-Chile), el banco aleman KfW Ipex-Bank
Gmbtt y el banco noruego DNB Bank Asa. .

Es necesario sefialar que recientemente se ha puesto en creciente duda la viabilidad

financiera del PHAM, sobre todo considerando el nuevo contexto del mercado electrico
chileno. AI respecto, cabe destacar las palabras de Francesco Starace, CEO de ENEL
(controladora del paralizado proyecto HidrnAysen en la Patagonia chilena), quien
. sefialo en octubre de 2016 que "No tiene mucho sentido ahadir nuevas centrales al

25 COREMA RM corresponde a la "Cornision Regional de Medio Ambiente de la Region Metropolitana",

26 Mas antecedentes sobre la Comision Especial [nvestigadora en el siguiente link:
https:llviww.camara.cl/prensa/noticias detalle.asRx')prmid=365I 0: yel Anexo 10. Sesion 14.01.20 10
Congreso Nacional (Sala- Votacion Segunda Parte Informe PHAM-p.8- I 2). Cabe destacar que no
podemos entre gar un link para acceder al informe completo de la Cornision, ya que no se encuentra
disponible en linea. Si bien debiese estar disponible en el sitio web del Congreso Nacional y/o en la
Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, no 10 esta, AI tratar de acceder, ellink entrega un error y no da acceso
al documento.

13
sistema ".27 Esto se deberia a la existencia de sobrecapacidad instalada en el mercado
para los pr6ximos afios. Asi, el CEO de una de las mas grandes e importantes
generadoras en eI pais explic6 que de acuerdo a su anal isis, "en Chile el balance entre
energia producida y energia consumida se esta acercando a un equilibrio muy estrecho,
y si no cambia nada, pensamos que puede ser posible que en dos 0 tres aiios mas el pais
tenga un exceso de produccion que la demanda no podra absorber"_28

En especffico, y respecto del PHAM, este ha generado tensiones entre los dos socios
que impulsan el proyecto (AES Gener y Antofagasta Minerals). EI CEO de AES Corp,
la matriz de AES Gener, reconoci6 en noviembre de 2016 que el PHAM es hoy un
proyecto "men as atractivo ".29 Uno de los problemas que ha surgido es que el proyecto
fue concebido para operar en un mercado con val ores de la electricidad en tomo 0
superior a los US$ 100 por MWh, lejos de los val ores que resultaron de la ultima
licitaci6n electrica que rondan los US$50 por MWh.30 Respeeto a la postura del grupo
Luksic, duefio de Antofagasta Minerals, eabe destacar 10 sefialado a la prensa por
Andr6nieo Luksie, quien preside la empresa matriz del grupo: "Sin lugar a dudas que
Alto Maipo ha ten ida un tremendo costa para fa familia Luksic y para mi en
particular ".31 En el diario La Tercera del 3 de septiembre 2016, Ie preguntan a A.
Luksie "Si tuviera que tomar fa decision ahara, ;,volverian a invertir en ese proyecto
[PHAM]? ", a 10 que Luksie contesta "Par ningun motivo ". A la vez, y respeeto del
ultimo aumento del costa estimado de la inversi6n necesaria para el PHAM, el
presidente ejecutivo de Anfogasta PLC sefialo que "La industria minera esta pasando
por un periodo diflcil, por 10 tanto, no es fdcil para nosotros, en ese contexto, contribuir
confondos adicionales.32

Si el proyecto sigue adelante, es posible que la IFC, junto a los otros bancos, tenga que
asumir este sobrecosto adieional. Esto demuestra una vez mas la absurda mala calidad,
en todos sus aspectos, de la evaluaei6n del PHAM, 10 que incluye la evaluacion
realizada por los propios baneos. EI PHAM es de alto riesgo finaneiero para la Empresa
y los bane os acreedores: no tiene mercado para eolocar su producci6n, salvo el eontrato
con Pelambres, y su costo esta resultando exorbitante.

La CFr se involucr6 en este proceso en el afio 2012, aprobando el financiamiento del

PHAM en octubre de 2013. En esta etapa el proyecto ya estaba aprobado por las
autoridades chilenas y sin posibilidad de ser modificado sustancialmente. EI banco tom6
demasiado rapidamente la decisi6n de invertir, 10 que denota que no se tom6 el tiempo
suficiente para evaluar y estudiar apropiadamente la informaci6n entregada por la
Empresa. Ademas, euando el proyecto fue evaluado por las autoridades ambientales
ehilenas, la informacion entregada a las autoridades y a la ciudadania (por ejemplo,
respecto del monto de la inversi6n, la cantidad de energia generada, el destinatario de

27 Fuente: http://www.ecosistemas.cI!20 16/1 OI03/francesco-slarace-no-tiene-m ucho-senlido-anadir-

nuevas-c.e ntrales-al-s i stem a/
28 Fuente: idem.

29 Fuente: http://www.latercera.com/noti c ial dueno-aes- gener-rec.onoc.e-al 10- mai po-hov- provecto-menos-

atractivo/
30 Fuente: idem.

3 J Fue ntes: http://ww\v.latercera.com/noli c ia/ S ube-Ia-tensi on-enlre-aes- gener- v-el-grupo-Iuksi c-por-alto-

mai pol; htlp:l/www.laiercera.com/noli c ialprox imo-ano-sera-cla ve-desarro II o-del-prove cto-alto- m ai pol
32 Fuente: http://www·.latercera.com/noti c ia/sube-Ia-Iension-entre-aes- gener- v-e 1- grupo-I uks ic-por-al to-
maipo/

14
esta y los plazos de construccion) es distinta a la que ha sido entregada en afios
siguientes; la informacion entregada por la Empresa y asociados (a traves de distintos
medios, incluidos los medios de comunicacion) ha ido variando constantemente, 10 que
dificulta esclarecer emil es la informacion oficial y real.

Un ejemplo paradigrnatico de 10 anterior se da en el caso de un reportaje elaborado por

el programa "En La Mira", del canal Chilevision, denominado "Aguas Turbulentas en el
Cajon del Maipo". En este program a, un alto ejecutivo del PHAM, su vicedirector,
--------
Armando Lolas, sefiala respecto del contrato para vender energla desde el..EHAM a la
rmnera Cos Eelambres: "camq_generaclOn [enemas Lt'itrJY.tW . crea"7a! ... u...d""le""n'"'d
...o,_".a
...u""u,.......----------
contrato entre AES Gener y la minera Antofagasta Minerals (sin explicitar claramente
que contrato). EI periodista Ie consulta entonces si el PHAM "va a producir 200
aproximadamente, 250", a 10 que el vicedirector responde que sf. No queda claro
entonces si se esta hablando de capacidad instalada 0 energia a producir, cuanta va a ser
producida por el PHAM real mente, ni cuanta de esa energfa esta destinada a un
proyecto minero de Antofagasta Minerals. Este tipo de confusiones han sido una
constante en la forma de trabajar y operar de la Empresa, 10 que no permite una relacion
fluida, trans parente ni basada en la confianza con la ciudadanfa. 33

Este tipo de situaciones, entre otras, son las que hacen dudar de las condiciones y
calidad de la informacion con la cual se han tomado decisiones respecto del PHAM,
tanto de parte de las autoridades chilenas como de los bancos financistas.

EI area de influencia directa del PHAM es la cuenca hidrografica alta y media del rio
Maipo, ubicada sobre el valle de Santiago, ciudad con una poblacion que supera los
siete millones de habitantes. Esta es una cuenca vital para la provision de servicios
ambientales al 40 por ciento de la poblacion de Chile, que vive en esta region.

Algunos de los principales servicios ambientales y sociales que provee esta cuenca son:
a) Agua potable para alrededor del 70 por ciento de la demanda actual de agua
potable, y para cerca de un 90 por ciento de las demandas de regadio " en la
Region Metropolitana .
b) Servicios recreacionales para millones de turistas anuales, nacionales y
extranjeros. La cuenca fue seleccionada entre las 97 areas prioritarias para el
turismo a nivel pais ", y tercer destino turfstico mas importante de Chile. Ha sido
declarado destino sustentable junto con Rapanui y el Lago Llanquihue ". Segun
estimaciones de la Camara de Turismo del Cajon del Maipo, esta region recibe
anualmente a 3 millones 600 mil visitantes, y cada fin de semana congrega cerca
de 25 mil personas con un promedio de seis mil vehfculos, atraidas por las

33 EI program a de television se puede acceder en el siguiente link:

http://www.chilevision.cl/en la m iraicapitllio-completo/temporada- 20 l4/a£uas-tllrbulentas-en-el-caj 011-
del-maipo-25-de-jLlllio/20 14-06-16/00 19l3.html
34 Fuente: Anexo 08. Informe Final Gestion de Cuencas y Cambio Clirnatico. El caso del Maipo.
35 Fuente: http://www.sernatur.cl/wp-contentluploads/2015! 11/20 150909-1 nforme-Focalizaci'~'OC3~';'B3n-
Territorial- Tllr%C3%ADstica.pdf (p. 31).
36 http://www.mma.gob.cIl1304/w3-article-54433.html

15
 bellezas naturales como el Embalse EI Yeso, Monumento Natural EI Morado,
0 las rusticas pozas de aguas termales de Banos Colina y
Parque Rio Olivares,
Termas del Plorno."
c) Regulaci6n natural del ciima, temperatura y calidad del aire del valle de
Santiago
d) Fuente de aridos para la construcci6n de infraestructura en la Regi6n
Metropolitana

3.2. Impactos sociales y ambientales

EI PH AM producira importantes impactos sociales y ambientales. Pone en riesgo el

desarrollo sustentable de la cuenca del Maipo, impactando sus aguas superficiales y
subterraneas, algunos de sus paisajes mas valiosos, e instala el riesgo de acelerar la
desertificaci6n de decenas de miles de hectareas. Consideramos que estos impactos no
han sido evaluados de forma completa ni adecuada, y que han existido irregularidades,
trafico de influencias y lobby durante el proceso de evaluaci6n e implementaci6n del
proyecto. Existen problemas de probidad y falta de transparencia de parte de las
autoridades polfticas y de la Empresa durante la evaluaci6n e implementaci6n de este
proyecto.

EI PHAM plantea riesgos para la forma y calidad de vida de los habitantes del valle del
Maipo y para toda la Regi6n Metropolitana. Estos riesgos no han sido debidamente
considerados, ni se ha actuado para evitarlos 0 manejarlos adecuadamente. Simplemente
no fueron considerados. En consecuencia de la deficiente evaluaci6n, hoy, durante la
construcci6n del proyecto, se estan produciendo impactos negativos que no fueron
previstos por la autoridad ni la Empresa, y que amenazan la sa Iud de las personas (por
ejemplo, contaminaci6n del agua por metales pesados) y los ecosistemas (por ejemplo,
impactos en glaciares).

A continuaci6n presentamos un listado de algunos de los impactos mas importantes del

proyecto. Estos seran desarrollados en mayor profundidad a continuaci6n,
explicitandose tarnbien c6mo y por que no fueron adecuadamente evaluados.

Resumen de los principales impactos del PHAM:

a) Impactos sobre el agua y los ecosistemas
b) Contaminaci6n del agua, aire y suelo
c) Seguridad hidrica, desertificaci6n y cambio climatico
d) Impactos sociales y econ6micos
e) Otros impactos

a) Impactos sobre el agua y los ecosistemas

EI PHAM trasvasijara el agua de tres rios a traves de tuneles de un total de 67

kil6metros de largo. Los tuneles interceptan las napas subterraneas, drenan y desvian las
aguas que fluyen en vegas y esteros, secando vertientes y afectando los nacimientos de
los esteros. No es efectivo que el PHAM corresponda a una central de pasada de bajo

37 htlp:!/www.mma.gob.cI/1304/\;v3-article-54433.html

16
impacto, 0 que pueda ser calificado como un proyecto de energfa renovable no
convencional. Por el contrario, es un proyecto hibrido de alto impacto.

Cabe destacar que la Empresa no realize un estudio hidrogeologico para evaluar el

impacto del tunel y el efecto que tendra sobre los acufferos y flujos subterraneos, La
Empresa ha insistido en que mientras se construye el tune I se ira revisando el material
rocoso que se vaya encontrando y 10 que ocurra con las filtraciones e interferencias con
las na as freaticas (y no antes, como dicta el rinci io reventivo y recautorio. A
juzgar pox el hallazgo de rocas de calidad diferente (mas blanda) que la anticipada y.Ja
tasa de perforaclon hasfu:ra tecfia 0[0 Ia const ucclOnue los tuneles ya-ha tat:dado mas
del tiempo evaluado. Queda claro que en el proceso de evaluacion no se consideraron
apropiadamente la geologia, asf como las fallas sfsmicas y vulcanologicas de la zona.

EI PHAM tiene tam bien un impacto sobre humedales de altura y glaciares. Estos son
vitales para la permanencia estival del ganado, para.Ia cultura local de los arrieros" y
son de alto interes para investigadores que realizan estudios sobre estos tipos de
ecosistemas cordilleranos en la zona.

Respecto de los glaciares, en el Cajon del Maipo se encuentra el glaciar Olivares

Gamma, que desagua directamente en el rio Olivares, que a su vez alimenta al Colorado
y luego al Maipo. Por efectos del cambio climatico, este glaciar se ha derretido en forma
progresiva aproximadamente un kilometre anual des de los atios 60. Esto significa que
ha perdido en promedio 30 por ciento de su area. La disminucion de un conjunto de
glaciares impactara en aisminucion e masae un 40 por clento e
as precijiitaciones
de la zona central, para los proximos 30 afios, segun las proyecciones de la Direccion
Meteorologica de Chile.39

Hoy, el PHAM ya esta teniendo impactos en los glaciares de la zona. Las explosiones
Ilevadas a cabo para su construccion y el polvo levantado por las diversas faenas estan
influyendo en la degradacion de glaciares y nieves etemas. EI 2015, la Coordinadora
presento una denuncia a la Superintendencia del Medio Ambiente al respecto. Esta
acornpafiaba fotograffas de los dartos ocasionados por el proyecto al glaciar "Meson
Alto" como consecuencia de las explosiones.

En este contexto, es importante relevar que actual mente en Chile no existe normativa
especffica que proteja los glaciares 0 que regule los proyectos 0 actividades que se
pueden realizar en torno a ellos. Unicarnente existen algunas disposiciones dentro de la
normativa del Sistema de Evaluacion de Impacto Arnbiental que obligan a que los
proyectos que afecten glaciares presenten un Estudio de Impacto Ambiental. Lo anterior
es de suma relevancia, ya que los glaciares constituyen las reservas de agua para el
futuro, y la negligencia del legislador en Chile tiene a estos cuerpos de agua en la
absoluta desproteccion. Por 10 mismo la gravedad del PHAM, que se encuentra

38 Los arrieros son por [0 general hombres, quienes llevan pinos 0 arreos de animales de una propiedad a
otra, de una comuna a otra 0 incluso de un pais a otro. En la zona central de Chile, yen el Cajon del
Maipo, todavia existen personas dedicadas a esta actividad como modo de subsistencia economico, pero
tam bien cultural.
39 Fuente: http://wwvv.c:conomiavnegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp.iid=306035

17
afectando estos cuerpos de agua, que ademas ya se yen mermados por los efectos del
cambio climatico."

b) Contaminaci6n del agua, aire y suelo

Durante la construcci6n y operaci6n del PHAM, esta latente, y ya se produjo, el riesgo

de contaminaci6n de los suelos, agua y aire con arsenico y otros metales pesados. Estos
metales pesados estan presentes en las rocas que se estan pulverizando durante la
construcci6n del proyecto. Este material se extrae de los tuneles para luego ser
depositado en sitios de recolecci6n -llamados "rnarinas-, Estos polvos son levantados y
diseminados por los vientos, y escurren hacia los cauces principales al ser arrastrados
por el agua de las lluvias. EI material proveniente de la roca pulverizada, con particulas
de decimas de milimetros, puede contaminar aire, suelos y aguas por via aerea, al ser
acarreado por el viento. Se estima que para construir los tuneles del PHAM se extraera
un mi1l6n setecientos mil metros cubicos (1.700.000 m ') de material. A esto se sum a
que en los frentes de trabajo los materiales son acopiados cerca de los cursos de agua, y
que las lluvias los arrastran hacia esos cursos.

En' el afio 2016, el Colegio Medico de la Regi6n Metropolitana hizo publicos los
resultados de un estudio que demuestra la presencia de altas concentraciones de
elementos t6xicos en las aguas de la cuenca del rio Maipo. Las muestras tomadas por el
Colegio Medico y analizadas en los laboratorios del Centro Nacional de Medio
Ambiente (CENMA) corresponden a aguas extraidas en fuentes cercanas a las faenas de
excavaci6n de los tuneles del PHAM. EI informe revel6 que las muestras de agua
presentan concentraciones de distintos metales y metaloides que afectan tanto el agua
potable como el agua para riego, y que exceden la normativa chilena y 10 recomendado
por la Organizaci6n Mundial de la Salud.41

Ante esta situaci6n, mas de 500 habitantes del Caj6n del Maipo, junto a la
Coordinadora, presentaron un recurso de protecci6n contra la Empresa y tambien contra
el Servicio de Evaluaci6n Ambiental, ya que este no estaria controlando la calidad del
agua, condici6n que dicho servicio impuso al entregarle la licencia ambiental al
proyecto.

Recientemente, en octubre del 2016, la empresa sanitaria Aguas Andinas llev6 a cabo
un Estudio de Impacto Ambiental para un proyecto propio, el que revelo, nuevamente,
que varios metales y minerales presentes en el agua superan los limites que impone la
normativa chilena existente.42

40 '
Fuente: Idem.
41 EI hierro supero en 5.337 por ciento la norma chilena para agua potable y triplico 10 autorizado para
riego. Los niveles de manganeso excedieron en 189 yen 145 por ciento la norma para agua potable y de
agua de riego, respectivamente. EI molibdeno excedio en 20 por ciento la norma de agua para riego y el
arsenico sobrepaso en un 5 por ciento la norma chilena para agua potable. EI plomo supero en 170 por
ciento los niveles para agua potable recomendados por la OMS. Los niveles de cadmio estan allimite
maximo de 10 admisible segun la recornendacion de la OMS (Fuente:
I1ttp:/loRinion.cooperativa.cl/opinion/medio-ambientefalto-maipo-v-Ia-contaminacion-del-agua-gue-
abastece-santiago/20 16-03-20/064424.I1[m I).
42 Fuente: http://www.biobiochile.cllnoticias/nacional/chile!20 16/1 OIOSlinl'ormes-de-aguas-andinas-
detectan-contam i nac ion-en-el-ri 0- m aiRo. shtml

18
c) Seguridad hidrica, desertificaci6n y cambio climatico

EI PHAM tiene grave un impacto en el proceso de desertificacion que esta sufriendo la

zona central de Chile producto de, entre otras causas, el cambio clirnatico. EI proyecto
aumenta el riesgo relativo a la falta de abastecimiento de agua potable y de riego para la
ciudad de Santiago.

pm G- enro. Se, prmlOstlca 1J..J,!e para el 2ClI'O('fisminlliran en un 40 por crento. Rc;to

significa que la disminucion de los recursos hidricos estimados de la cuenca del Maipo
sera de entre 15 a 30 por ciento del caudal medio anua1.44

EI cambio climatico es relevante tambien en el sentido de la energia que el PHAM

podra producir una vez instalado. A la fecha, producto del cambio climatico, los
caudales reales disponibles han disminuido dramaticarnente, Al considerar las
estadisticas y registros fluviometricos oficiales de la Direccion General de Aguas, para
el periodo comprendido entre los afios 2007 y 2014, se observa una disminucion
promedio anual de caudales en la cuenca del rio Maipo de un -22 por ciento; en el rio
Colorado una reduccion de -24 por ciento, en el rfo Volcan y esteros afluentes de un -25
por ciento, y final mente en el rio Yeso una disminucion de -23 por ciento (en relacion a
los caudales considerados en el disefio del PHAM). En consecuencia, el factor de planta
para el PH AM y la incorporacion de energia al SIC tarnbien disminuyen, desde los
2.100 GWh/a promocionados por el proyecto a (790-GW11/a.4'5

Al mismo tiempo, se estima que la demanda por agua potable en la Region

Metropolitana seguira creciendo a un ritmo elevado, poniendo aun mas presion en la
disponibilidad de agua. Como se ha dicho, la ciudad de Santiago tiene una poblacion de
cerca de 7 millones de habitantes. La poblacion, sumada a la fuerte actividad industrial,
agrfcola y comercial existente en y alrededor de la ciudad, ejerce una gran presion sobre
los recursos hidricos en la cuenca del rfo Maipo. Gran parte de esta demanda es cubierta
por las empresas 'sanitarias' que proveen el agua potable a la poblacion, registrando
para el afio 2012 un consumo total de 555 millones de metros cubicos. Este es el
segundo mayor nivel de consumo de agua en la cuenca luego del uso de riego para
. I tura. 46
agncu

A mediados de abril del 2016, se produjo un temporal en la Region Metropolitana que

provoco inundaciones y aluviones, y tres cortes de suministro de agua potable en la
ciudad. Cuatro millones de personas fueron afectadas. La Superintendencia de Servicios
Sanitarios puso en marcha una investigacion que busca determinar las responsabilidades
detras el corte. En la Region Metropolitana, entre los factores que estan siendo
investigados, se encuentra la responsabilidad del PHAM en estos cortes, ya que fueron

4J Elaborados por el Centro de Cambio Global de la Universidad Catolica y la Universidad de Valparaiso,

bajo la supervision tecnica de la Cornision Economica para America Latina (CEPAL).
44 Fuente: http://www.publimetro.cl/notaicroll ica/cam bios-cl i maticos-pollen-en-riesgo-a-la-cuenca-del-
maipo/xIOpil!H3Lv5aICQluX6/; ver tam bien el Anexo 08. Gestion de cuencas y Cambio Climatico. El
caso del Maipo (CHS-Stern, 2008).
45 Para un analisis detallado, ver Anexo 05. Aporte potencial de generacion hidroelectrica y rentabilidad
financiera (Stern, 2014).
46 Maipo. Plan de Adaptacion, Newsletter 3, Julio 2014, ver: www.maipoadaptacion.cl.

19
causados por la incontrolable alta turbiedad del agua que acarreaba el rio Maipo.V Un
antecedente que hace sospechar de la responsabilidad del PHAM en estos eventos es
que la empresa sanitaria Aguas Andinas se opuso durante afios al PHAM,
argumentando, justamente, que ponia en riesgo el suministro de agua potable a la ciudad
porque implicaba realizar obras de magnitud en la cuenca que pod ian tener este tipo de
consecuencias. La posici6n de Aguas Andinas solo cambi6 luego de firmar un contrato
con la Empresa, el que tuvo que ser transparentado a la opini6n publica tras un fallo de
la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago en el afio 2013 (ver apartado sobre este tema mas
adelante) que oblig6 las empresas a dar a conocer el acuerdo secrete."

La Empresa ha sostenido que el flujo del rio Maipo se reducira s610 en un 15 por ciento
por causa del proyecto. Sin embargo, la disminuci6n sera mucho mayor, si
consideramos que dicho porcentaje se obtuvo usando mediciones desde hace 60 afios,
cuando el caudal era mucho mayor. La cifra que esgrime la Empresa tam poco considera
los ultirnos diez an os consecutivos de sequia en la zona, que ha generado una reducci6n
de aproximadamente un 40 por ciento del caudal del rio Maipo, segun 10 informado por
la Direcci6n General de Aguas en 2014. Teniendo to do esto en cuenta, la potencial
reducci6n del flujo del rfo Maipo en un 15 por ciento por causa del proyecto se acerca
mas a un 60 0 90 por ciento de acuerdo a calculos independientes.

En este sentido y debido a la sobreestimaci6n de los caudales que hace la Empresa, el

PHAM no respeta los caudales ecol6gicos minimos para mantener la vida en los
ecosistemas fluviales intervenidos. La legislaci6n anterior de aguas establecia el 10 por
ciento del caudal promedio anual del curso de agua como caudal ecol6gico minimo. La
legislaci6n actual (2014) establece que este debe ser un 20 por ciento. En la mayoria de
los rios que sedan intervenidos, el PHAM no cumple ni siquiera con el 10 por ciento,
como se puede observar en la tabla a continuacion'", donde se compara el caudal natural
de los rios con el caudal que dejaria Alto Maipo si es implementado:

Caudal medio sin Caudal Ecologico con

Atluentes
proyecto (m3/s) proyecto (m3/s)
Rio yeso 15 0,46
EI Morado 3,7 0,17
Las Placas I 0,1
EI Volcan 8 0,3
Colina 6 0,37
La Engorda 2,1 0,15
Aucayes
Rio Colorado
5
30 °
0,66

En un area que ya esta en proceso de desertificaci6n, un proyecto como el PHAM

representa una amenaza de efectos negativos inesperados para los dep6sitos de agua

47 Fuente: http://www.eimostrador.cl/notil:ias/pais/20 16/04/26/todas-las-dLldas-que-caen-sobre-alto-

mai po-e 1- proyecto-q LIe-com p i i ca -a-andron i co-I uks i cl
48 Fuentes: http://acLlerdos. c I/noti cias/ corte-ob I iga-a-revel ar-contrato-cn trc-a guas-and i nas- y-aes- gcncr-
por-proveC[O-aIIO-maipol; http://www.elmostrador.cl/noti cias/paisi20 13/02/1 8/el-acuerdo-secreto-entre-
aguas-andi nas- y-aes- gener-q lie-sal dra-a-ia-I uz-en-I as-prox i m as-semanasl
49 Punto 1 de ETA del PHAM "Descripci6n de Proyecto" y punto 5 "Linea Base". Complementado en las

Adendas 1 y 2.

20
subterraneos, afectando manantiales y acufferos. Los nineles tienen una inclinacion de
2,14 metros por kilometre, 10 que significa que el agua no viajara a presion. Esto quiere
decir que los aguas acarreadas por los tuneles redirigiran y absorberan las aguas
subterraneas con las que entren en contacto, causando el agotamiento y desviacion de
los manantiales superficiales naturales y de fuentes de agua similares en la zona del
proyecto. Esto es particularmente grave si se considera que muchas localidades aledafias
al rfo Maipo dependen de pozos profundos para su agua potable. Lo anterior se debe a
ue la concesion de la em resa sanitaria A uas Andinas en la comuna de San Jose---de
aipo solo abarca a UlL60 por ciento de a poblacion. El.restante 40 por.ciento se
aba.,<;tece a tra¥es de pogos, napas y nos utiltz..ando sistemas Instalados por las
Asociaciones de Agua Potable Rural, asi como por los mismos habitantes y
comunidades. Estos pozos, napas y los caudales de los rios podrfan verse afectados por
el efecto de los tuneles sobre las aguas subterraneas.

Aguas Andinas y el riesgo para la provision de agua potable de Santiago

Junto con el embalse el Yeso, las lagunas Laguna Negra y Lo Encafiado constituyen las
reservas de agua potable mas importantes para la Region Metropolitana. De acuerdo a la
Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios: "EI Gran Santiago se abastece
Jundamentalmente de recursos de agua superficiales, captados en el rio Maipo, el que
es respaldado con los aportes de la Laguna Negra y el embalse El Yeso y, ademas, en
un menor porcentaje de Juentes subterraneas que se ubican en el sector poniente del
Gran Santiago.
-
La capacidad
--
de produccion --0
para el dia de maximo consumo alcanza
aproximaaamente a 25 metros cubicos por segundoH.~

Las Laguna Negra y Lo Encafiado, y el embalse EI Yeso, constituyen bienes afectos a

concesion sanitaria de la empresa Aguas Andinas, una empresa privada de agua y
saneamiento que abastece de agua potable a la ciudad de Santiago. Desde que se
propuso el PH AM, durante cuatro afios, la empresa sanitaria expreso vehementemente
una fuerte oposicion al proyecto, cuestionandolo legal mente con el argumento de que
podria poner seriamente en peligro los recurs os hfdricos de la cuenca y el
abastecimiento de agua potable de Santiago de manera crftica. 51

Sin embargo, la posicion de Aguas Andinas se revirtio completamente en diciembre de

2010, despues de participar en negociaciones privadas con la Empresa. La ciudadania
pudo tener acceso a esta informacion y negociaciones luego de que la Coordinadora
apelara al Consejo de Transparencia y que la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago obligara
ala Empresas a hacer publico este contrato.Y dada la importancia del agua potable para.
la ciudad de Santiago y los efectos que este contrato podrfa tener sobre ella. Gracias a
estas gestiones se dio a conocer publicamente que Aguas Andinas y la Empresa habian
firmado un contrato donde Aguas Andinas acordo desviar las reservas de agua potable
para el uso de la Empresa por un perfodo de 40 afios. Esta reserva de agua potable para
Santiago correra por las turbinas de la hidroelectrica. A continuacion revisamos
brevemente algunos de los elementos mas crfticos de este contrato:

50 Fuente: http://www.siss.gob.cI/577iw3-articie-7329.html
51 Ver: Anexo 09. Observaciones Aguas Andinas durante proceso de evaluacion ambiental (2008).
52 Fuentes: http://ac uerdos. c]/l1oti ciasi cone-obli ga-a-re ve lar-con trato-en lre-a guas-andi nas-v-aes- gener-
por-provecto-alto-maipo!; http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/20 13/02/18!el-acuerdo-secreto-entre-
aguas-andi nas- v-aes- gener-q ue-sal dra-a-Ia-I uz-en-Ias-prox i mas-sem anas!

21
 • Aguas Andinas se oblig6 a entregar a la Empresa un caudal de 2,5 m3/s de las
aguas etluentes de las lagunas Negra y Lo Encafiado para uso no consuntivo en.
generaci6n electrica.
• EI contrato impide la construcci6n de nueva infraestructura, cam bios en el
regimen operacional y no permite la adecuaci6n de la infraestructura de
captaci6n a los cam bios climaticos que estan ocurriendo, 10 que deja con un gran
grado importante de vulnerabilidad al sistema de abastecimiento de agua potable
de la Region Metropolitana.
• EI contrato obliga a' entregar estas aguas y mezclarlas con aguas de altas
turbiedades provenientes de la cuenca baja del rfo Maipo y rio Colorado,
dejando el sistema de producci6n de agua potable limitado a la capacidad de
tratamiento de turbiedad de las plantas existentes (La Florida, Vizcachas,
Vizcachitas y Antonio Tagle). Este hecho disrninuira la calidad final de las
aguas que se entregan a los usuarios.
• Se establece que Aguas Andinas renuncia permanentemente, durante 40 afios, al
uso de las aguas puras, limpias y cristalinas que Ie fueron otorgadas por la
concesi6n, a excepci6n de eventos catastr6ficos de alta turbiedad de ocurrencia
habitual, 10 que afectara sin duda la tarificaci6n y costa de producci6n del
sistema.
• Se imponen restricciones y multas econ6micas a favor de la Empresa.

d) Impactos sociales y economicos

A continuaci6n desarrollamos algunos de los principales impactos sociales y

econ6micos que el PHAM tendra y ya esta teniendo en esta fase de construcci6n.

A nivel local, se pueden sefialar los siguientes impactos:

• Afectaci6n de fuentes de trabajo, sobre todo del turismo, y tambien de la
agricultura y la extracci6n artesanal de aridos.
• Condiciones de la construcci6n del proyecto y poblaci6n afectada por
contaminaci6n (acustica, del aire y agua) y riesgos de accidentes. El impacto del
ruido y las vibraciones producidas por la circulaci6n de camiones de gran
tonelaje, as! como el remolque de equipos de construcci6n que circulan por la
(mica ruta de acceso y frente a colegios han alterado sustantivamente la vida de
los habitantes, sobre todo de comunidades como EI Alfalfal y Los Maitenes.
• Significativa alteraci6n de la vida comunitaria y aumento de riesgos
considerando la alta atluencia de trabajadores extemos a las comunidades
afectadas. Es necesario destacar que el PHAM fue autorizado a instalar cinco
campamentos que incluyen las instalaciones de faenas, cada uno con una
dotaci6n aproximada de 200 a 400 trabajadores, suman do un promedio de 2.000
personas, con una cima de contrataci6n de 2.500 trabajadores.
• Graves impactos en el tejido social y divisiones en la comunidad producto de
contlictos a partir de la instalaci6n y operacion de la Empresa en la zona.r'
• Falta de fiscalizaci6n de las autoridades de las acciones de la Empresa, la que
muchas veces debe ser lIevada a cabo por la misma comunidad."

;3 Ver: Anexo 02. Caso El Alfalfa!.

;4 Unas de las principales actividades que realizan las organizaciones que se oponen al PHAM es la
fiscalizaci6n ciudadana constante a las obras de construcci6n del proyecto. 14 denuncias han sido

22
 • Convenios entre comunidades y la Empresa que no necesariamente respetan los
derechos de las comunidades afectadas, pero que terminan siendo aceptados
dadas las condiciones de vulnerabilidad social y econ6mica en la zona. 55
• Convenios entre Alto Maipo y la Municipalidad de San Jose de Maipo que
sesgan la postura de esta repartici6n publica hacia el PHAM, y que limitan 0
anulan su capacidad de fiscalizaci6n y monitoreo del proyecto. Esto comienza a
ocurrir muy tempranamente durante el proceso de Evaluaci6n de Jmpacto
Ambiental del PHAM, en el ue la MuniciRalidad es un referente clave ue debe
velar por el interes publico, y no el de la empresa, Es.ta co-opcion del municipio
no I!:t ¥ . 1"" " rercihi(i,H,nAI' pI n{1 i 0 A A" II rei on::'"
• A nivel regional de la Regi6n Metropolitana, la degradaci6n del rio Maipo
impacta una de las pocas areas de recreaci6n y uno de los pulmones verdes de
esta regi6n. Su intervenci6n afecta la calidad de vida no solo de la comunidad
local, sino que de los habitantes de la Regi6n Metropolitana en general.

Respecto del turismo, hay que destacar que la cuenca fue seleccionada entre las 97 areas
prioritarias para el turismo a nivel pais.56 EI Caj6n del Maipo esta dentro de los lugares
de descanso y recreaci6n de la poblaci6n de la Regi6n Metropolitana y otras,
destacandose las cifras relativas a la tasa de ocupabilidad en festividades (por ejemplo,
vacaciones de invierno).57 Estas cifras dan cuenta de que entre los destinos que
obtuvieron tasas de ocupabilidad por sobre el 70 se encuentra el Caj6n del Maipo, con
un 72,6 por ciento.

EI PHAM genera incertidumbre y riesgo para las actividades turfsticas por reducci6n de
caudal de los rios Colorado y Maipo. Estas actividades incluyen turismo recreacional,
de aventura y ecoturismo, asi como actividades de rafting, kayakismo, montafiismo y
escalada. Se producen riesgos adem as para la poblaci6n que participa de algunas de
estas actividades. EI Servicio Nacional de Turismo, en sus observaciones al Estudio de
Tmpacto Ambiental del PHAM, advirti6 que el proyecto podia poner en riesgo las vidas
de visitantes debido a potenciales descargas no previstas de agua, comunes en este tipo
de instalaciones. Esto se debe a que cuando se haga necesario apagar temporalmente las
turbinas hidroelectricas, por cualquier motivo, los caudales desviados sedan redirigidos
a los cauces de los rios, resultando en subitos golpes de aguas de gran magnitud aguas
abaj 0, en los rios Colorado, Volcan y Yeso. Esto instala un importante riesgo para el
publico desprevenido involucrado en actividades de turismo y recreaci6n a 10 largo de
los cauces en estos sectores, riesgo que no fue considerado a la hora de entre gar la
licencia ambiental al proyecto.

En cuanto a los trabajos relacionados con el turismo en el Caj6n del Maipo, y de

acuerdo a informaci6n entregada por el presidente de la Camara de Turismo, Andres

ingresadas a la Superintendencia del Medio Ambiente (SMA). De ellas, la SMA inform a que tres han
gatillado fiscalizaciones sin hallazgo alguno, razon poria que no hubo sancion, De las otras II no hay
pronunc iam iento (Fuente: http://www.radioyillati·aneia.cllreporta je-Ios- falsos-allal is i s-eon-Ios-9 ue-Ia-
5m a-des m i IItio-las-denulle i as- por-con tam i !laei on- de I-provecto-alto-mai PO#5 thash.1I i8 hO htp. dput).
55 Ver: Anexo 02. Caso EI Alfalfal y Anexo 04. Videos y Testimonios Impactos Sociales PHAM y
Condiciones Laborales.
56 Fuente: http://www.sernatul..cl/wp-contentluploads/20 15/1 1120 150909-Informe-Foealizaci%C3<l_'oB3n-
Territorial- Tur%C3%ADstica.pdf (p. 31).
57 Fuente: Servicio Nacional de Turismo, Tasa de Ocupabilidad en Establecimientos de Alojamiento
Turistico, 2016. Disponible en: http://www.sernalur.cIltasa-ocupabilidadi

23
Ahumada, es del orden de 1.500 trabajos directos y 3.700 indirectos. Ahumada tarnbien
estima que alrededor del 70 por ciento de los empleos del Cajon del Maipo estan
asociados al turismo.i" Este tipo de impactos del proyecto, no solo durante su
construccion, sino que tambien una vez que este operando, no fue evaluado
apropiadamente.

EI PHAM amenaza tam bien fuentes de trabajo en el area agricola y de areneros que
trabajan en el Cajon del Maipo. Estas actividades, junto al turismo, son la base de la
economia del valle del rio Maipo. En el caso del area agricola, podria verse afectada la
renovacion de los suelos que dan los nutrientes de la alta cordillera, y que dan el sello
especial a los productos del valle del Maipo. Respecto de la extraccion artesanal de
aridos (tarea realizada por los areneros), es una actividad de larga data que provee
empleos a familias que desde generaciones han practicado esa actividad econ6mica y
que adem as abastece a la industria de la construccion en la ciudad de Santiago.

El caso de El Alfalfal

EI caso del poblado de EI Alfalfal debe ser destacado aqui como un ejemplo
paradigmatico de impacto no solo ambiental, sino que tambien social del PHAM. Este
demuestra varios de los problemas del PH AM a la hora de su deficiente inserci6n y
legitimidad social y de los impactos socio-ecol6gicos que ya esta provocando en la
cuenca del rio Maipo.

EI Alfalfal es un poblado a los pies de la cordillera y del rio Colorado donde habitan
alrededor de 200 personas. En este lugar se construye un embalse que es un componente
estructural del PHAM. La Resoluci6n de Calificaci6n Ambiental del proyecto exigi6
que la empresa construyera un cierre perimetral del poblado para evitar polvo, ruido y
contaminaci6n. En la practica, esto se ha traducido en la construcci6n un muro que
rodea completamente al pueblo, y que ha afectado los accesos, la actividad y calidad de
vida de los habitantes del pueblo.

Los principales impactos sociales se pueden resumir de la siguiente forma:

• Condiciones de la construcci6n del proyecto e impactos en la poblaci6n afectada
por distintos tipos de contaminaci6n (acustica, del aire y del agua).
• Impacto negativo sobre el tejido social de las comunidades, expresados en
divisiones en la comunidad. Esto producto de conflictos a partir de la instalaci6n
y operacion de la Empresa en la zona.
• Falta de fiscalizaci6n de las autoridades de las acciones, medidas y compromisos
de la Empresa.
• Convenios y acuerdos entre las comunidades y la Empresa que no
necesariamente respetan los derechos de las comunidades afectadas y la
integridad ambiental del territorio, pero que terminan siendo aceptados dadas
las condiciones de vulnerabilidad social y econ6mica de la poblaci6n.

A la presente queja se anexan testimonios y videos de pobladores de EI Alfalfal y Los

Maitenes (otro poblado impactado por el PHAM, a pocos kil6metros de EI Alfalfal), y

58 Fuente: Informacion entregada par Andres Ahumada (13 de diciembre de 2016).

24
 un documento que incluye mas detalles sobre el caso de este poblado, asf como todas
las fucntcs de informacion.59

e) Otros impactos

Adernas de los impactos sociales y ambientales mencionados hasta ahora, hay una serie
de otros impactos, los cuales mencionamos de forma resumida aca:

Derechos.de.agua de terceros: La.Ernpresa.reconoce que la operacion del proyecto

",",",~..,.~arrec.tameFlte_los..oderechAs. (1 aiJ!iii:ftt> os.-a tll tg ISllar-!OS ~'rmm s (1 .
cantidad, calidad y oportunidad. La competencia por el recurso hidrico (agua potable
y/o agricultura versus generacion electrica) se visualiza claramente tanto con 10
sucedido con la empresa sanitaria Aguas Andinas (mas arriba), asf como con las
asociaciones de regantes y canalistas del Maipo. Hasta el verano del 2016, las
asociaciones de regantes y canalistas del Maipo se opusieron energicamente al PHAM.
Solo en el 2016, en el medio de un juicio y producto de una conciliacion, las
asociaciones llegaron a un acuerdo econornico con el PHAM y depusieron las acciones
legales en contra del proyecto. Esta conciliacion, sin embargo, no elimina el riesgo de
que los canalistas y sus clientes sufran perjuicios si el PHAM entra en operacion, y se
yea afectado su abastecimiento de agua para regadfo.

Respecto de los derechos de agua, una investigacion independiente'" estudio los efectos
del cambio clirnatico y el traslado de derechos de agua solicitado por el PHAM en la
disponibilidacCClel-recurso I1fdi·{co en la cuenca del Maipo. A continuacion revisamos
algunas de las principales conclusiones de esta investigacion:
• Los resultados de esta investigacion, realizada en 2009, confirmaban una
situacion de desbalance y escasez de los recurs os hfdricos en la cuenca Alta del
Rio Maipo. Esta situacion no se habfa manifestado todavia debido ados razones:
(i) Los con sum os de la cuenca se evaluan por puntos de control y no a 10 largo
del segmento, 10 que deja fuera de observacion las perdidas 0 demandas
intermedias no satisfechas que se yean afectadas por derechos no consuntivos61
que captan y restituyen antes de un punto de control; (ii) No se consumen
simultaneamente todos los derechos de agua otorgados. Sin embargo, esto ira y
ha ido cambiando, en la medida en que se realicen mas proyectos de
infraestructura en la cuenca (por ejemplo, el mismo PHAM) y en que aumenten
las demandas (por ejemplo, de agua potable en la Region Metropolitana, 10 que
tambien ha estado ocurriendo). Dentro de este contexto, 0 escenario base, el
traslado de los derechos otorgados para el PHAM implica un mayor riesgo de
indisponibilidad de recursos hfdricos para varios puntos de control, asf como a 10
largo de otros puntos en los segmentos de la cuenca, como demuestra la
investigacion anexada a esta queja.

S9 Ver: Anexo 02. Caso El Alfalfal, Anexo 04. Videos y Testimonios [mpactos Sociales PHAM y Anexo
06. Convenio Pl-lAlvl-Comite Adelanto EI Alfalfa!.
60 Ver: Anexo 08. Gesti6n de cuencas y Cambio Clirnatico. EI caso del Maipo (CHS-Stern, 2008).
61 En Chile el agua es un bien que se trans a en un mercado del agua. Esta privatizada. EI C6digo de Aguas
dispone de distintos tipos de derechos de agua. Entre ellos estan los derechos consuntivos (aquellos que
facultan a su titular para consumir total mente las aguas en cualquier actividad) y no consuntivos (aquellos
que permiten emplear el agua sin consumirla, y que obligan a restituirla en la forma que 10 determine el
acto de adquisici6n 0 de constituci6n del derecho). Por 10 mismo, en la practicas los derechos de agua no
consuntivos son para tines de generaci6n electrica,

25
 • EI traslado de derechos y el cambio clirnatico son fen6menos independientes que
generan impactos en distintos period os. EI traslado de los derechos de agua tiene
efectos en el corto plazo, en forma inmediata, mientras que el cambio climatico
esta teniendo efectos que antes se consideraba ocurririan en el largo plazo. Sin
embargo, ambos aspectos ponen en riesgo vital la disponibilidad de recursos
hidricos. EI traslado de derechos influye inmediatamente e incluso alterando
segmentos de la cuenca que no tendrian los mayores impactos bajo el cambio
climatico. Se concluye entonces que el traslado de derechos pone en riesgo las
pocas fuentes de recursos hidricos de Ia cuenca del Maipo que no estan siendo .
tan profundamente afectadas por el cambio climatico en este momento. Los
casos mas ilustrativos son el rio Yeso en junta con el Maipo, y el Maipo en EI
Manzano.
• Uno de los problemas relativos a la disponibilidad de recurs os hidricos y de
poder satisfacer los derechos de agua existentes se refieren a que la autoridad
cornpetente en Chi Ie no esta tomando en consideraci6n el estado de los recurs os
a 10 largo de cada segmento de la cuenca, sino que solo en los puntos de control,
10 que afecta los consumos dentro de los segmentos de la cuenca.

Infraestructura local: La erosion que se produce en la cuenca provocara una

disminuci6n de la cantidad de sedimentos del rio Maipo, arriesgando la infraestructura
que se apoya en su lecho y cauce. EI PHAM producira una reduccion mas iva de la carga
de sedimentos. La infraestructura publica y privada entre San Jose de Maipo y la Ruta 5
Sur (principal carretera norte-sur de Chile) se vera afectada, incluyendo puntos de tomas
de agua potable, de riego, puentes y otras vias de agua.

EI Estudio de Impacto Ambiental del PHAM contenfa un estudio denominado "Estudio

Sedimentol6gico en el Rio Maipo".62 Este estudio demuestra que el PHAM producira
una disminuci6n en la capacidad de producci6n de aridos del rio del orden del 22 por
ciento de su capacidad actual. En el mismo estudio, se sefiala que las tasas de
explotaci6n de aridos actuales en el rio Maipo, "estarian, aparentemente en el limite
sostenible (.. . .) par ella, de ser efectivas las reducciones estimadas en la disponibilidad
de sedimentos en la zona aguas abajo de la Bocatoma Independiente introducidas por
el proyecto, aunque relativamente leves, podrian generar problemas locales si no se
taman las medidas para un manejo mas racional del cauce" (Anexo 07, p. 5).

En relaci6n a las tasas de explotaci6n de aridos actuales en el rio Maipo, en el lecho del
rio se encuentra en marcha un proceso de degradaci6n. Esto significa que esta en
proceso una situaci6n de descenso de las cotas de fondo de los cauces que es de caracter
ininterrumpido y cuyo termino es dificil de precisar. Este fen6meno fue advertido por la
autoridad en el estudio "El Rio y sus afluentes como fuente de abastecimiento de aridos
Regiones Metropolitana, V y VI", encargado por la Direcci6n General de Obras
Publicas en el afio 1998. Este concluye que el rio se encuentra sobreexplotado. EI riesgo
que presenta la sobreexplotaci6n de aridos presente, y los procesos de erosi6n que estan
presentes en el cauce del rio Maipo, incluso sin el PHAM, no solo amenaza la
sustentaci6n de obras de riego, sino que tambien la estabilidad de importantes obras de
vialidad que cruzan el cauce del rio, como son los puentes sobre el rio Maipo en la ruta
concesionada Autopista del Maipo, el antiguo puente de vialidad y el puente ferroviario.

62 Ver: Anexo 07. Estudio Sedimentol6gico en el Rio Maipo (U. Chile, 2008).

26
Esta situaci6n ha sido reconocida por la autoridad sectorial, que ha sefialado la gravedad
del estado del rfo Maipo y el riesgo de socavaci6n de todas las obras civiles apoyadas en
el cauce en distintos documentos oficiales.63

Una reducci6n del 22 por ciento de la capacidad del rio para producir aridos, agravara la
situaci6n en que se encuentran las bocatomas de agua potable y riego, que pueden
quedar con un desnivel tal que no pueda ingresar el agua a estos canales, asi como el
sistema de uentes insertos en el rio.

4. EVALUACION AMBIENTAL Y SOCIAL INCOMPLETA, INADECUADA E

IRREGULAR

EI proceso de evaluaci6n ambiental del PHAM no solo fue incompleto e inadecuado

para un proyecto de esta magnitud. Tambien fue un proceso irregular y controversial, al
punto que el parlamento chileno estableci6 una Comisi6n Especial Tnvestigadora para
estudiar en profundidad el proceso de aprobaci6n del proyecto.?" A continuaci6n
revisamos los principales problemas de la evaluaci6n ambiental del proyecto, y nos
detenemos especfficamente, en e siguiente apartado, en los problemas de transparencia,-
falta probidad, inconsistencias de politica publica, as! como en las irregularidades
durante la evaluaci6n del proyecto.

4.1. Principales problemas de la evaluaci6n ambiental del proyecto

En apartados anteriores se revisaron los principales impactos del PHAM. A

continuaci6n nos centramos en los principales problemas de la evaluaci6n de estos
impactos durante el paso del proyecto por el Sistema de Evaluaci6n de Tmpacto
Ambiental (SETA).

Los aspectos criticos del PHAM que no fueron evaluados adecuadamente por las
autoridades competentes y la Empresa se pueden resumir en:
1) Efectos reales del cambio clirnatico y desertificaci6n
2) Diez afios consecutivos de sequia en la cuenca intervenida por el proyecto

63 Ver: Ordinario DOH RM N° 268 de 29 de marzo de 2006, enviado por el Director Regional de Obras
Hidraulicas R.M., al senor Alcalde de Buin; Ordinario DOH RM N" 462 de 24 de mayo de 2006, enviado
por el Director Regional de Obras Hidraulicas R.M. a los Alcaldes de Buin y San Bernardo; Ordinario
DOH RM N° 872 de 12 de septiernbre de 2006, enviado por el Director Regional de Obras Hidraulicas
R.M. a la senora Maria Pulgar Riedmann, de Aridos Buin Ltda; Ordinario 511 de 16 de mayo de 2008,
enviado por el actual titular de la DOH R.M al senor Director de la Comisi6n Nacional de Medio
Ambiente CONAMA RM; Ordinario 536 de 23 de mayo de 2008, en virtud del cualla DOH comunica al
Gerente General de Aridos Guerrico, senor Adam Vidal, que su proyecto de extracci6n de aridos no ha
sido aprobado.
64 Mas antecedentes sobre la Comisi6n Especial Tnvestigadora en el siguiente link:
https:/iwww.camara.cl/prensa/noticias detalle.aspx'Jprmid=365I 0: yen el Anexo 10. Sesion 14.01.2010
(Sala, votaci6n Segunda Parte Tnforme PHAM-p.8-12).

27
 3) Caudales reales de los rios a intervenir
4) Efectos sobre la sedimentologfa del rfo
5) Efectos del proyecto sobre glaciares y aguas subterraneas
6) Tmpacto hidrogeologico de los tuneles
7) Calidad de las aguas previa ala construccion
8) Habitat de especies como el pato cortacorrientes (Merganetta armata), en sector
del rio Volcan, y el emblernatico condor (Vultur gryphus), en rfo Colorado
9) Corta de arboles nativos en zonas no evaluadas
10) Tmportantes impactos sociales, econornicos y culturales, sobre actividades
tradicionales y sobre el patrimonio arqueologico y paleontologico de la zona
11) Significativos y sucesivos cambios de la ingenierfa del proyecto desde la
obtencion de su licencia ambiental (RCA) a la fecha. Entre ellos: a) nuevas obras
y sus localizaciones; b) falta de permisos para las nuevas obras; c) cambios en la
modalidad de construccion de los tuneles y el manejo de las aguas
contaminadas; d) efecto sobre vegas y humedales de montafia, en especial en el
Valle de la Engorda, en el Yeso yen Aucayes.

Es importante sefialar que la CFT, en su sitio web, sefiala que el PHAM llevo a cabo
estudios en algunas de las areas recien mencionadas entre mayo de 2012 y junio de
2013.65 Sin embargo, de acuerdo a quienes presentan esta queja, los estudios no
entregan absolutamente ninguna garantfa de independencia ni confiabilidad, ya que no
fueron realizados de manera idonea. Por el contrario, fue el mismo PHAM el que los
encargo a consultoras cercanas a la Empresa, siendo la principal interesada en obtener
financiamiento de la CFT. Dificilmente, entonces, los estudios llegarfan a conclusiones
que pusieran poner en riesgo este financiamiento. Ademas, los estudios fueron
contratados por el PHAM a la misma consultora que realize los estudios requeridos para
la evaluacion ambiental del proyecto. Como se demuestra a continuacion, esta
evaluacion fue incompleta, inadecuada e irregular. Todo esto en un contexto donde no
existe informacion publica con la que contrastar la informacion presentada por la
Empresa, principal interesada en IIevar adelante eI proyecto.

A continuacion desarrollamos algunos de estos problemas en mayor detalle.

a) Lineas de base, alternativas, area de influencia y variables criticas no

consideradas ni evaluadas

Uno de los principales problemas del PHAM y su evaluacion, es la falta de estudios de

linea de base. Alto Maipo no realize muchos de los estudios de Ifnea de base necesarios
para evaluar un proyecto de esta magnitud (por ejemplo, de la calidad del agua, estudio
serio hidrogeologico en tomo a los tuneles y sus potenciales impactos en el flujo de
aguas subterraneas). Estos estudios son necesarios para realizar un real seguimiento a
indicadores de sostenibilidad.

65 Ver:
http://i fcextapps. ifc.orgJifcext/spiwebsite I. nsf/78e3 b305216fcdba85257a8b007 5079d/c2ae8c88586c0702
85257bb7006810cd'"opendocumcnt

28
 POl' otro lado, respecto de la evaluaci6n de alternativas, el estudio realizado por la
Empresa para evaluarlas'" no incluy6 la alternativa "sin proyecto". En el documento se
sefiala que el proyecto "Contribuye al usa optima de los recurs os hidricos de la cuenca
del rio Maipo, puesto que en la situacion sin proyecto, corresponde a energia potencial
que se desaprovecha". Esta aseveraci6n deja en evidencia la ignorancia y falta de
analisis sisternico de un proyecto como el PHAM, al sefialar que el agua que se deja
correr por los rfos y no se utiliza con fines energeticos 0 comerciales se estaria
-----~-erdiendo. Esto im lica desconocer completamente el cicio hidrolozico alobal corto 0
continental, y largo 0 atm osferico), asi.como la importancia de Ios.rios y de os ciclos
relaclOnados de dlversos ecoslstemas (npananos humedales. osteros v mannost
ademas de todos los servicios ecosistemicos que provee una cuenca como la del rio
Maipo no solo a nivellocal, sino que tam bien regional.

Cabe destacar que tam poco se evaluaron los impactos indirectos y acumulativos del
. PHAM sobre toda la cuenca, sino solamente sobre la zona de "influencia directa"
determinada por la Empresa. No se consider6 la influencia del PHAM sobre la
estructura sanitaria de Santiago, ni los impactos del proyecto sobre las comunas
aledafias de Paine, Puente Alto y San Bernardo.

Existe, ademas, una serie de elementos que no fueron evaluados, pero que sf fueron
incorporados en el disefio del proyecto. Destacamos aquf algunos de forma resumida
por su relevancia:
• La Empresa incorpor6 la construcci6n de un embalse de acumulaci6n de 300 mil
--------- metros cubicos, el que no fue evaluado tecnica y ambientalmente. EI embalse es
adernas inconsistente con los derechos de agua de tipo no consuntivos que posee
la Empresa, que no permiten retener las aguas, ya que se estarfa afectando a
terceros.
• No se incorporaron caminos adicionales a los del trazado original del proyecto,
entre los cuales se destaca uno de ocho kil6metros en la cuenca del estero
Aucayes.
• Tampoco fueron evaluados acopios de marinas (material sacado de los tuneles)
en lugares no autorizados ni evaluados, ni las intervenciones de cauce que no
estan en la aprobaci6n ambiental del proyecto.
• La evaluaci6n del proyecto no contempla una etapa de abandono y cierre del
proyecto.

Finalmente, existen dos variables crfticas que tam poco fueron consideradas: no se
consider6 el proceso de desertificaci6n inducido por el cambio climatico que sufre el
Caj6n del Maipo (y la zona norte, centro y sur de Chile), ni el impacto del PHAM en la
vulnerabilidad de los recursos hidricos, perjudicando cualquier proceso de mitigaci6n y
adaptaci6n general de la cuenca. Esta exclusi6n es muy preocupante en un contexto de
cambio climatico, y ante la urgente necesidad de transitar hacia formas sostenibles de
desarrollo, como se plantea en el Plan de Acci6n Urbana del Servicio Nacional de
Turismo.67

66 Ver: "Resumen Informe Gap N°? Analisis de Alternativas", disponible en:

h ltp:! Iwww.altomaipo.com/Tem as%20de%20 interes/ Ana I is is%20de~'o2 Oalternati vas/Cone! us i ones/Ooeu
ments/analisis de aiternativas.pdf
67 Ver: http://www.serna!ur.cllwp-content/uploadsI20 16/04/plan-de-accion-metropol itana.pdf

29
b) Riesgos

El PHAM, desde el inicio de su construccion, ha instalado un enjambre de riesgos a

nivel local e incluso regional. Los eventos en la primera etapa de construccion
confirman algunos de estos riesgos, muchos de los cuales no fueron adecuadamente
considerados ni evaluados. Cabe destacar aqui que ya ha habido accidentes, uno con
consecuencias fatales.68

Un riesgo importante, y que esta teniendo consecuencias para la calidad del agua, se
refiere a la construccion de los tuneles que trasvasijan el agua de los rios sin los
necesarios estudios que muestren los cam bios en la geologia de los materiales. Esto,
ademas en una zona sismica. Lo anterior ha aumentado los niveles de vulnerabilidad
socio-ambiental frente a otro tipo de riesgos, y potencia los fen6menos naturales
reforzados por el cambio clirnatico,

Otro punto problernatico se refiere a las descargas no previstas de agua del proyecto. Si
bien final mente se torno en cuenta como riesgo, se propusieron medidas de mitigacion
(construccion de un canal secundario) que no han sido evaluadas por ningun organismo
competente en el pais.

4.2. Falta de transparencia, probidad, inconsistencias e irregularidades en la

evaluaci6n del proyecto

La aprobacion ambiental del proyecto en el afio 2009 se hizo a traves de un proceso

irregular caracterizado por la intervencion politi ca. y fue basado en un Estudio de
Impacto Ambiental defectuoso, mal informado y mal consultado. EI PHAM fue
aprobado irregularmente y se impuso sin participacion publica legitima y sin dar cuenta
de informacion critica para la ciudadania.

a) Interes nacional y destino de la energia producida

Respecto del uso que se Ie dara a la energia generada, y solo una vez que el PHAM fue
aprobado, se revelo un contrato firmado en junio de 2013 entre los socios actuales de la
Empresa (Antofagasta Minerals y AES Gener). En este contrato, el proyecto Los
Pelambres, de Antofagasta Minerals, se garantiza el acceso sin restricciones de hasta
110 MW del PHAM, durante 20 afios, a cambio de una participacion de inversion de
propiedad del 40 por ciento en el PHAM.69 Esta energia estaria disponible
exclusivamente para desarrollar un proyecto minero que es polemico en Chile. La mina
Los Pelambres esta ubicada a unos 250 kilometres al norte de Santiago, en la localidad
de Caimanes. Esta localidad ha sido uno de los "hot spots" de protesta social en Chile,
debido a los impactos de la mina y su tranque de relaves El Mauro, asf como a los
riesgos que estas obras implican para toda la poblacion que vive bajo ellas.70

68 Fuente: http://wvvw.lanaeion.cl/noticias/pai s/naei ona 11m ucre- un-lrabaj ador-dc-al to-mai po-en-acc idente-
earretero/20 16-0 1- 27/191621. htm I
69 Ver: AES Gener, 2015. Annual Report, p. 68-69.

70 Ver: "Mapa de eontlietos socioambientales en Chile" elaborado por ellnstituto Naeional de Oereehos

Humanos (!NOH) el afio 2015.

30
 EI problema es que esto tiene implicancias en la evaluacion del proyecto. Solo una vez
que el proccso de aprobacion sc complete, cl PHAM paso de scr un "proyccto de intcrcs
publico 0 nacional" a uno con un importante componente de interes privado. Estas
empresas han tornado el control de valiosos recurs os publicos para uso y
enriquecimiento privado. EI cambio es relevante, en tanto el uso de la figura de "interes
nacional" (por ejemplo, para el caso de la Ley de Bosque Nativo) se complejiza cuando
no esta claro para quien se esta generando energfa, asf como tam poco la cantidad exacta
de ener fa enerada. Lo anterior es im ortante tam bien si consideramos ue como

sequfa, desertificacion y cambio climatico.

Finalmente, cuando el proyecto fue presentado a la comunidad y tuvo su proceso de

participacion ciudadana, una de las form as en que el proyecto se promovio fue
sefialando que era un proyecto de interes nacional, ya que era para consumo residencial,
de la poblacion. Este cambio en la tipificacion del proyecto desnaturaliza 10 que se
afirmo en la evaluacion ambiental y contradice la forma en que fue promovido ante los
servicios publicos y la poblacion,

b) Cantidad de energia producida

Como se sefialo en la descripcion del proyecto, la Empresa ha promocionado el PHAM

_P!:2yectando y declarando una capacidad instala~~_531 MW, y una produccion anual
---------- de 2.100 GWh (Ia cifra varia segun la fuente, en el sitio web de la eFT se sefiala esta
ultima). Lo anterior, a pesar de que calculos independientes basados en estadisticas
oficiales publicadas por la Direccion General de Aguas demuestran que debido a las
decrecientes aguas del Maipo y sus tributarios (descenso medio del 23,5 por ciento entre
2007 y 2014), el proyecto solo tendria una produccion anual de 1.790 GWh.

Estamos asf ante un problema de transparencia y probidad, ya que al presentarse el

proyecto y al ser promovido en la ciudadanfa, no se rnenciono la verdadera magnitud
del proyecto ni 10 que estaba en juego al aprobarlo.

c) Central de embalse por una de pasada

EI PHAM se describe como un proyecto de central de pasada (ROR), debido a que no

contempla la construccion de un embalse. Sin embargo, se capturara casi por completo
las aguas de los rfos Colorado, Yeso y Volcan, reduciendo su volumen en mas de 60 por
ciento en promedio, restandole esos caudales a mas de 100 kilometres de los valles de
los rfos que componen la cuenca del rfo Maipo.

Esta categorizacion incorrecta del PHAM se hizo con el proposito de minimizar la

percepcion del publico y de los inversores ace rca de sus potenciales impactos
ambientales y sociales.

d) Acuerdo con la empresa sanitaria

Desde que se propuso el PHAM, durante cuatro afios, la empresa sanitaria Aguas
Andinas expreso una fuerte oposicion al proyecto, cuestionandolo legalmente con el
argumento de que podrfa poner seriamente en peligro los recursos hidricos de la cuenca

31
y el abastecimiento de agua potable de Santiago. Sin embargo, la posicion de Aguas
Andinas se revirtio completamente en diciembre de 2010, despues de participar en
negociaciones privadas con la Empresa. La ciudadania pudo tener acceso a esta
informacion y negociaciones luego de que la Coordinadora apelara al Consejo de
Transparencia y que la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago obligara a la Empresas a hacer
publico este contrato, dada la irnportancia del agua potable para la ciudad de Santiago y
los efectos que este contrato podria tener sobre ella. Gracias a estas gestiones, se dio a
conocer publicamente que Aguas Andinas y la Empresa habian realizado un contrato,
donde Aguas Andinas acordo desviar las reservas de agua potable para el uso de la
Empresa por un periodo de 40 afios. Esta. agua correra por las turbinas de la
hidroelectrica.

e) Inconsistencias en la politica publica

La importancia social, cultural, econornica y ambiental de la cuenca del rio Maipo ha

sido reconocida a traves de numerosos instrumentos de politica publica que apuntan a la
proteccion Y conservacion de la cuenca y sus recursos, as! como a la proteccion de su
integridad y atributos ambientales. Entre ellos se pueden destacar:
• Zona Interes Turistico (ZOJT)
• Zona Libre de Caza (ZLC)
• Zona de Interes Cientffico para Efectos Mineros (ZICEFM)
• Diversas zonas patrimoniales protegidas

La cuenca alta del rio Maipo es un ecosistema de montana unico y ha sido declarada
Zona de Interes Turistico, Zona Libre de Caza y Zona de Interes Cientifico (protegida
de la mineria). Existen cuatro Sitios Prioritarios de Conservacion de la Biodiversidad de
la Region Metropolitana en el territorio, que en conjunto suman 462.253 hectareas."

En total, en la cuenca del rio Maipo, se ubican: cuatro Sitios Prioritarios para la
Conservacion de la Biodiversidad, tres Santuarios de la Naturaleza, y un Monumento
Natural del Sistema Nacional de Areas Protegidas del Estado. Adernas, existen varias
zonas de patrimonio protegido (como antiguas construcciones y el Valle de las Arenas).
EI valle del Maipo es tambien Destino de Turismo Sustentable, una clasificacion que
comparte con lugares como la Isla de Rapa Nui (Isla de Pascua).

Existe entonces una incomprensible inconsistencia entre estos instrumentos, que buscan
proteger la cuenca, y el PHAM, que la reconfigura completamente en terminos
ambientales y sociales, arriesgando los mismos bienes que estos instrumentos de
politica publica buscan proteger.

1) Irregularidades en la evaluacion ambiental del proyecto

EI proyecto fue aprobado en un contexto de lobby politico y trafico de influencias

realizado en las altas esferas de la adrninistracion publica. Debido a denuncias de la
ciudadania, se creo una Cornision Especial Investigadora de la Camara de Diputados.f

71 Fuente: Plan de Acci6n Santiago Andino (2005-2015), disponible en: www.sinia.d/1292/artides-

37027 POA stgoandino.pdf
72 Mas antecedentes sobre la Comisi6n Especial Investigadora en el siguiente link:
ilttps://www.carnara.cl/prensa/noticias detalle.aspx'iprm id=3651 0: y el Anexo 10. Sesion 14.01.20 I 0

32
La investigaci6n dur6 11 meses, recibiendose en audiencia a representantes de distintas
organizaciones, directores de servicios y funcionarios publicos regionales y nacionales
involucrados en la evaluaci6n ambiental del proyecto. La Comisi6n Investigadora
concluy6, por votaci6n unanime, que el proceso de evaluaci6n ambiental del proyecto
estaba viciado. EI diputado Sepulveda, presidente de la Comisi6n sefial6 que:

"La Comision Investigadora pudo llegar a profundas convicciones y establecer

una.sen« de situaciones taesuku: anomalas ue de verdad dan ergii,enza «.: __
la institucionalidad ambiental del pais. Poder constatar que numerosos

La investigaci6n concluy6 que la operaci6n del PHAM afectaria la seguridad y calidad

del abastecimiento de agua potable de Santiago, asi como el agua de riego de las
comunas agricolas, entre otros impactos. El informe sefiala tarnbien que se producirfa
una degradaci6n irreversible de la cuenca del Maipo. rio
A pesar de 10 anterior, el PHAM continua con su licencia ambiental vigente y avanza en
el proceso de construcci6n de sus instalaciones. Durante este proceso, y como se dio
cuenta mas arriba, ya se han producido eventos de contaminaci6n del agua e imprevistos
que dan cuenta de la debil evaluaci6n ambiental del PH AM, y de c6mo los riesgos del
proyecto no fueron real mente tornados en cuenta.

5. VJOLACIONES DE LAS NORMAS DE DESEMPENO SOBRE

SOSTENIBILIDAD AMBIENT AL Y SOCIAL DE LA CFI

La CFT, a traves de su politica, cumple con su compromiso de sostenibilidad ambiental

y social, el cual surge de su misi6n y mandato. Como parte esencial de esta polftica la
CFT debe cumplir con "su responsabilidad de realizar la diligencia debida en materia
de evaluacion social y ambiental de las actividades propuestas para su
jinanciamiento ,,74. Por 10 tanto, "cuando las inversiones propuestas representan niveles
de riesgo ambiental a social considerados moderados a altos a pueden generar
impactos ambientales a sociales adversos se dara cumplimiento a los requisitos de
es tas ivormas
7I.T d.e D esempeno.
- ,,75

Las Normas de Desempefio sobre Sostenibilidad Ambiental y Social76 presentan un

"Marco de Sostenibilidad de la IFC, expresa el compromiso estrategico de la

(Sala, votacion Segunda Parte Informe PHAM-p.8-12). Cabe destacar que no podemos entregar un link
para acceder al inforrne completo de la Comisi6n ya que no se encuentra disponible en linea. Si bien
debiese estar disponible en el sitio web del Congreso Nacional y/o en la Biblioteca del Congreso
Nacional, no 10 esta, Al tratar de acceder, ellink entrega un error y no da acceso al documento.
73 Fuente: https://www.camara.cl/prensa/noticias detalle.aspx'7prmid=365I 0
74 Politica sobre Sostenibilidad Ambiental y Social de la Corporaci6n Financiera Internacional.
75 idem.

76 Disponibles en el siguiente link:

hnp://www.ifc.org/v .. ps/wcm/connect/55d37e804a5b586a908b9f8969adcc27/PS Spanish 2012 Full-
Docllment.pdfJMOD=AJPERES

33
Corporacion hacia el desarrollo sostenible, y es parte integral del enfoque de la IFC
para la gestion del riesgo".

De acuerdo a quienes suscriben esta queja, el PHAM no cumple con los estandares
definidos por la CFI, 10 que lIeva como conclusi6n que el proyecto no debiese recibir
financiamiento a traves de esta instituci6n. Durante la evaluaci6n, construcci6n y
posible implementaci6n del PHAM se estan incumpliendo varias de las Normas de
Desempefio, las que se revisaran a continuaci6n.

Norma de Desempefio 1: Evaluacion y gestion de los riesgos e impactos

ambientales y sociales

De acuerdo a documento de CFI:

"La Norma de Desempeho 1 establece la importancia de: i) una evaluacion

integrada para identificar los impactos, riesgos y oportunidades ambientales y
sociales de los proyectos; ii) una participacion comunitaria efectiva, basada en
la divulgacion de la informacion del proyecto y la consulta con las comunidades
locales en los temas que las afectan directamente, y iii) el manejo por parte del
cliente del desempeiio ambiental y social durante todo el transcurso del
proyecto. "

En relacion al punto. i), relativo a una evaluacion integrada para identificar los
impactos, riesgos y oportunidades ambientales de los proyectos, podemos sefialar
que:
• EI PHAM omite los impactos y la alteracion del regimen hidrol6gico de una
cuenca que abastece de agua potable a la capital de un pais habitada por 7
millones de personas. Sin embargo, el proyecto ha circunscrito los impactos a un
area de influencia rnuchisirno menor que deja fuera al Gran Santiago y toda la
Regi6n Metropolitana.
• No se consider6, durante la evaluaci6n del proyecto, una variable critica: el
cambio climatico. La Empresa ornitio este aspecto de todas sus evaluaciones y
presentaciones, no obstante que la autoridad ambiental, a traves del director de la
Comisi6n Nacional de Medio Ambiente (de esa epoca, hoy en dia contamos con
un Ministerio de Medio Ambiente), solicit6 los estudios respectivos. Esto no
sucedi6 y el proyecto fue aprobado por las autoridades ambientales chilenas de
todas maneras.

En relacion a la evaluacion integrada para identificar los impactos, riesgos y

oportunidades sociales:
• El PHAM pone en riesgo el abastecimiento de agua potable de parte importante
de la poblacion de la Regi6n Metropolitana, asf como la existencia de una
cuenca fundamental para la calidad de vida de la poblaci6n a nivel regional.
• A nivel local, el PHAM pone en riesgo la salud y seguridad de nifios y personas,
que enfrentan la presencia de explosiones, ruido, vibraciones, aumento del
trafico, contaminaci6n de las aguas, entre otros. Y un posible aumento de la de
la delincuencia, prostituci6n y trafico de drogas resultado de la af1uencia de
personas externas.
• Un impacto importante, sobre todo durante la fase de construcci6n, ha sido el
impacto del ruido y las vibraciones producidos por la circulacion de camiones de

34
 gran tonelaje y remolque de equipos de construcci6n que circulan por la (mica
ruta dc acccso. Estc tipo de impactos sc han scntido dc mancra prcpondcrantc en
poblados como EI Alfalfal y Los Maitenes. De acuerdo a testimonios de
personas que habitan estos lugares, la Empresa no ha respetado 10 establecido en
la Resoluci6n de Calificaci6n Ambiental, trabajando en horarios no acordados,
circulando a altas velocidades por los caminos, sin la adecuada fiscalizaci6n, etc.
(ver Anexo 04). Han existido una serie de movilizaciones por parte de los
afectados Ror el ro ecto e incluso de los RroRios traba· adores de Alto M<!igo. -- -------
EI 15 de septiembre de 2016, la comunidad de Los Maitenes..cerro el camino no
pp.r iti no (HCGP.SO iCLOs C n!fatistRs flel ,m)L 0 fih (]Il "
multiples los problemas que afectan a los habitantes de esa localidad y que se
cansaron de los abusos y mentiras de Alto Maipo","
• La evaluaci6n de impactos sociales realizada no es integrada. EI proyecto no se
hace cargo de ninguna manera de su impacto social en el area donde se inserta.
• Una de las principales actividades econ6micas de la comuna es el turismo. La
comuna de San Jose de Maipo recibe alrededor de 3 millones 600 mil visitantes
al afio. De acuerdo al presidente de la Camara de Turismo, Andres Ahumada, el
turismo da cuenta de 1.500 trabajos directos y 3.700 indirectos. Ahumada
tarnbien estima que alrededor del 70 por ciento de los empleos del Caj6n del
Maipo estan asociados a esta actividad." Este tipo de impactos no fue
considerado durante la evaluaci6n, ni se presentaron alternativas para su
mitigaci6n 0 compensaci6n. £1 valor turistico de la zona se vera afectado por
. este_ royecto durante la fase de_construcci6n, or los_irnpactos viales y de
transporte, asf como por las detonaciones por explosivos y la contaminaci6n del
aire y agua.
• Otro de los impacto a la actividad econ6mica local se refiere a la modificaci6n
del equilibrio de la cuenca. Una de las consecuencias sociales de este impacto es
que afecta la fuente de trabajos que dependen de la agricultura y de la extracci6n
de aridos del rfo. Esta actividad artesanal, en conjunto con el turismo y la
agricultura constituyen las actividades econ6micas y sociales de subsistencia en
la cuenca. Todo este entramado se vera afectado por el proyecto, 10 que no fue
real mente evaluado, mitigado ni compensado durante la evaluaci6n del PHAM.
• EI PHAM asegura la contrataci6n de 500 personas de la comuna donde se instala
durante el perfodo de construcci6n del proyecto. Ellas vendran por 10 general de
fuera de la comunidad, con los consecuentes impactos de un peak de
contrataci6n, para luego el abandono de la zona. Estos empleos no son
permanentes smo se daran solo durante el perfodo de construcci6n del
proyecto.
• La Empresa, como en muchos otros casos en Chile, y en el marco de la
responsabilidad social empresarial, estableci6 un convenio, a traves de la
Fundaci6n Los Maitenes, para entregar 200 mil dolares anuales por un periodo
de 30 afios a la comunidad de San Jose de Maipo. Esto se hara a traves de un
fondo concursable. Al respecto cabe destacar que este tipo de compensaciones
son problematicas en varios sentidos: I) De acuerdo a la legislaci6n chilena, no

77 Fuente: http://wwwbiobiochile.cl/noticias/nacionallregion-metropolitanal20 16/09/15!vecinos-de-

maitenes-cortan-ruta-para-protestar-contra-proyecto-hidroelectrico-alto-maipo.shtm I;
http://\V\Vw.cooperati va. cl/noti cias/pais/m an i lestaci ones/vee i nos-se- man i fiestan-ell- m a i lelles-contra-al (0-

maipo/10 16-09-15/ 1 04124.html

78 Fuente: Informacion entregada por Andres Ahumada (13 de diciernbre de 2016).

35
 es posible compensar darios ambientales con medidas no ambientales como
fondos concursables. Sin embargo, esta medida fue implementada de todas
maneras. Es necesario sefialar que Chile no cuenta con una legislacion que
regule la entrega de este tipo de compensaciones no ambientales; 2)
Considerando el monto de la inversion y los posibles retomos del proyecto, el
total de esta medida no suma mas 6 millones de dolares para la comunidad, cifra
no significativa si consideramos el monto de la inversion, rentabilidad e
impactos del proyecto; 3) Los montos asignados no son adecuados para una
comuna con una poblacion de 14 mil habitantes, much os de ellos de bajos
ingresos.
• Finalmente, cabe destacar el impacto que el proyecto ha tenido en el tejido social
a nivel local. Considerando la alta vulnerabilidad social y economica del pais y
la zona donde se construye el PHAM, cuando llega una empresa y ofrece
beneficios econornicos a la comunidad a cambio de aceptar el proyecto, se
producen divisiones al interior de esta, Algunos necesitan los ingresos que
ofrece la Empresa y las compensaciones economicas, aunque sean solo un alivio
temporal a la precariedad economica. Existe consenso respecto a que no es etico,
moral, ni tampoco sustentable transar bienes ambientales y relativos a la calidad
y estilo de vida en el largo plazo a cambio de compensaciones econornicas en el
corto plazo. Esto ha desembocado en contlictos al interior de las comunidades
(ver Anexo 04). En Chile esta politica, de acallar con dinero las fundadas
resistencias de la poblacion a proyectos de alto riesgo y potenciales impactos
negativos -como el PHAM-- ha llevado a la proliferacion de "zonas de
sacrificio" con graves perjuicios para la poblacion, incluyendo impactos severos
en la salud, perdida de modos de vida, de economias locales saludables y
sustentables, y otros.

En relacion al punto ii), relativo una participacion comunitaria efectiva, basada en

la divulgacion de la informacion del proyecto y la consulta con las comunidades
locales en los temas que las afectan directamente:
• Durante el proceso de evaluacion ambiental del proyecto, este tuvo una activa
participacion ciudadana. Durante su primera tramitacion, la ciudadania (de
manera independiente y tarnbien a traves de la Coordinadora) ingreso 6 mil
observaciones al proyecto. Este primer proyecto fue retirado en mayo del 2008,
antes de que fuera revisado por la comision evaluadora, ya que se sospechaba
que iba a ser rechazado. Luego, ese mismo mes, la Empresa ingreso nuevamente
a trarnitacion ambiental el proyecto. Este segundo proceso tuvo una mayor
participacion ciudadana, ingresandose 8 mil observaciones al proyecto. Ninguna
de las observaciones ciudadanas fue respondida adecuadamente. La Empresa
copio y pego frente a cada observacion algun parrafo del Estudio de Tmpacto
Ambiental (EIA) que no respondia necesariamente a la observacion y no
aclaraba las dudas. Lo mismo es valido para las observaciones que plantearon
muchos de los servicios publicos. En las adendas (informacion adicional al ETA
producida por la Empresa ante los requerimientos de los servicios publicos y
observaciones ciudadanas) solo se hacfan afirmaciones sin respaldo alguno, 0 se
presentaban simulaciones rnatematicas de un ambiguo alcance. A pesar de to do
10 anterior, el proyecto fue aprobado.
• La situacion antes descrita se repite en innumerables contlictos a 10 largo de
Chile, donde la ciudadania organizada participa en los procesos de evaluacion
ambiental sin ninguna garantia. Se establece un proceso de participacion

36
 ciudadana, donde las personas son informadas del proyecto por las empresas y
las autoridades e invitadas a participar. Sin embargo, no hay garantias respecto
de la informaci6n entregada (que es elaborada por los proponentes de los
proyectos de infraestructura, sin que exista una linea de base publica contra la
cual contrarrestarla), ni respecto del proceso de participaci6n ciudadana. A pesar
de la desconfianza y escepticismo, en general las comunidades organizadas
participan de estos procesos y presentan observaciones, ya que es la unica
___ ...L.U<anera....que.permite continuar con.prccesns.adminisnati os Jiu_.iJ,Ldiciales . as -------
observaciones no son consideradas. Sin embargo, las observaciones ciudadanas

proyecto. Esto desemboca en innumerables conflictos a 10 largo del pais y en

una creciente judicializaci6n de los procesos de evaluaci6n ambiental, ya que
recurrir a la justicia es la (mica alternativa que Ie queda finalmente a la
ciudadania.79
• EI disefio del proyecto fue realizado sin una evaluaci6n integrada de los
impactos que produce, dejando en todo momenta fuera de la discusi6n a otros
usuarios de la cuenca/" EI PH AM reconoce como area de influencia del
proyecto un area mucho menor, y no considera los impactos aguas abajo del
punto de restituci6n, zona donde se ubican las captaciones de canales de regadio,
de agua potable, la zona de extracci6n de aridos y la infraestructura vial y
ferroviaria que conecta Santiago con el sur del pais. Tampoco consider6 el
impacto del PHAM en los numerosos servicios ambientales que ofrece la cuenca
a toda la Regi6n Metro olitana de Santiago de Chile.
• Las asociaciones de canalistas" y en general los usuarios del rio, no fueron
tornados en cuenta, consultados ni considerados durante el disefio del PHAM.
Durante toda la tramitaci6n del proyecto, la Empresa se neg6 a realizar mesas de
dialogo con los otros usuarios de la cuenca. En el caso de los canalistas, el
conflicto termin6 en la justicia, donde solo a traves de una compensaci6n
econ6mica se logr6 llegar a un acuerdo y acallar su oposici6n. Esta ha sido la
t6nica del PHAM. Se han acallado oposiciones y aprensiones fundadas en los
riesgos reales e inminentes del PHAM, con compensaciones econ6micas.

En resumen, y revisando en detalle la Norma 1, los siguiente elementos criticos no

fueron adecuadamente considerados en el caso del PHAM. Todos estos elementos
son explicitamente mencionados en la Norma como elementos centrales para su
cumplimiento:

79 En este link es posible descargar un documento con mas antecedentes al respecto, elaborado en 2015 y
2016 por la Comisi6n Sindical Ciudadano Tecnico Parlamentaria (CSCP) para la Reforma al Sistema de
Evaluacion de Impacto Ambiental: http://Vvww.chilesllstentable.net/propuestas-comision-sindical-
c i udadana-par lamentari a-para-I a-re forma-al-sistema-de-eval uac ion-de- i m pacto-am bienta II
80 Otros usuarios incluyen los usos del agua que no son para tines hidroelectricos de la Empresa, por
ejemplo, riego a traves de canales de regadlo (de ahi el nombre de los "canalistas"), consumo humano y
de ani males, servicios y funciones ecosisternicas, entre otros.
81 En Chile, existen distintas organizaciones de usuarios del agua. Entre elias estan las juntas de
vigilancia, las asociaciones de canalistas y las comunidades de aguas. El objeto de las organizaciones de
usuarios de agua es tomar las aguas del caudal matriz, repartirlas entre los titulares de derechos, construir,
explotar, conservar y mejorar las obras de captacion, acueductos y otras que sean necesarias para su
aprovechamiento. En el caso de cauces naturales, pueden organizarse como juntas de vigilancia, mientras
que las asociaciones de canalistas se constituyen en torno a cauces artificiales. Normalmente se organizan
en los canales matrices de los sistemas de riego extraprediales, cuya fuente es el rio.

37
 • No se identificaron los riesgos e impactos basados en datos de una linea de base
recientes de los aspectos ambientales y sociales, con un nivel de detalle
adecuado. Tampoco se consideraron las emisiones de GHG, los riesgos
asociados al cambio climatico y las oportunidades de adaptaci6n.
• No se realiz6 un adecuado analisis de alternativas, a pesar de que el proyecto
puede generar impactos ambientales y sociales significativos.
• Estando en una circunstancia de alto riesgo, no se complement6 el proceso de
identificaci6n de los riesgos ambientales y sociales con un proceso especffico de
debida diligencia sobre derechos humanos. Cabe sefialar que de acuerdo al
Tnstituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos, el PHAM estarfa afectando derechos
humanos (ver apartado mas abajo).
• Esta Norma recomienda una consideraci6n amplia del area de influencia, es
decir, la zona que posiblemente se vera afectada por el proyecto, los impactos de
acontecimientos no programados aunque previsibles provocados por el proyecto,
asi como los impactos indirectos del proyecto sobre la biodiversidad 0 sobre los
servicios ecosistemicos de los que dependen las comunidades afectadas para
obtener sus medias de subsistencia. Esto no fue considerado en la evaluaci6n del
proyecto.
• La Norma tarnbien recomienda la consideraci6n de impactos acumulativos, 10
que tam poco fue evaluado adecuadamente.
• Para los proyectos que tengan impactos adversos significativos sobre las
comunidades afectadas, se estipula realizar un proceso de consulta y
participaci6n informada (CPT). Sin embargo, nunca tuvo lugar un proceso de
intercambio profundo de perspectivas e informacion, ni tampoco una consulta
organizada e iterativa. Es mas, la Empresa no incorporo al proceso de
formulacion de decisiones las opiniones de las comunidades afectadas sobre los
asuntos que las afectan directamente, tales como las medidas de rnitigacion
propuestas, la distribucion de los beneficios y oportunidades derivadas del
desarrollo ni los problemas de implementacion,
• La Norma I sefiala que cuando la capacidad del gobierno es limitada, el cliente
desempefiara una funcion activa durante la planificaci6n, la realizacion y el
seguimiento del proceso de participacion de los actores sociales. Si el proceso
conducido por el gobierno no satisface los requisitos pertinentes de esta Norma,
el cliente ernprendera un proceso complementario. Esto no ocurri6, a pesar de
las evidentes deficiencias del proceso de participacion ciudadana del Sistema de
Evaluaci6n de Tmpacto Ambiental (SEIA) chileno.Y

82 Las limitaciones del SErA chileno han sido evidenciadas por acadernicos, organizaciones de la
sociedad civil, funcionarios publicos y las mismas autoridades, Recientemente, el gobierno convoco una
Com is ion Asesora Presidencial para estudiar el SErA y proponer reform as. Dado que no logro convocar a
organizaciones de la sociedad civil ni a los sindicatos asociados a la institucionalidad ambiental, quienes
no confiaron en la instancia gubernamental, se creo una cornision paralela, denominada Cornision
Sindical Ciudadano Parlamentaria para la Reforma del SErA. Mas informacion en los siguientes links:
http://porta 1.111 mao gob. ell eom is ion-asesora-pres i dellc ietl-entre ga- 25-propues tas-petra-reform ar-e 1-5 i stema-
de-evaillacioll- de- i m pac to-am b i ental!; http://Vvww.chilesllstentab Ie. net/propuestas-com is i on-si Ildical-
c i udadana-par lal1lentari a-para-Ia-re forma-al-sistem a-de-evaillaci oll-de-i m pacto-am bientaJI

38
 Derechos Humanos y el PHAM

Es importante sefialar que este proyecto esta catalogado por el Instituto Nacional de
Derechos Humanos como uno de los 100 conflictos que estarian vulnerando los
derechos humanos en Chile.83 De acuerdo a esta institucion, la causa del conflicto
estaria en el lugar donde el proyecto se localiza. En este conflicto, los derechos
humanos en juego sedan el derecho a la propiedad, el derecho a un medioambiente libre
de contarninacion, el derecho al agua, el derecho a la artici acion, el derecho de acceso
a informacion publ ica y el derecho al territorio y a los recursos naturales (Convenio 169

Norma de Desempeiio 2: Trabajo y condiciones laborales

De acuerdo a esta Norma, es importante que los clientes actuen reconociendo que la
busqueda del crecimiento econornico a traves de la creacion de empleo y la generacion
de ingresos deben estar acornpafiada por la proteccion de los derechos basicos de los
trabajadores.

Respecto de esta norma, y en el caso del PH AM han existido:

• Practicas antisindicales
• Despidos injustificados
• Accidentes de trabajo
• Huelgas de los contratistas contratados_por la em resa y sus trabajadores
~----------------------
En el afio 2015, se registraron al menos dos paros que afectaron la construccion del
PHAM. Las razones se relacionaban con 10 que los trabajadores calificaron de
condiciones laborales "inhumanas", Uno de los paros movilizo a mas de 800
trabajadores contratados para desarrollar las faenas de mineria en los sectores de Las
Lajas y EI Alfalfal, y que acusaron que no se curnplian a los derechos y condiciones
laborales minimas de los trabajadores, como las deficientes condiciones de higiene,
alirnentacion, seguridad y nula fiscalizacion.84

En 2016, a fines de noviembre, los trabajadores de uno de los sindicatos del PHAM
completaron mas de 30 dias de huelga, exigiendo mejoras salariales y mayor seguridad.
Las demandas de los trabajadores se relacionaban con ineficiencia en los articulos de
seguridad, la· vestimenta y las condiciones de hacinamiento que habrfa en los
campamentos, sumado a la desproteccion en los trabajos de tuneles. De acuerdo a
medios nacionales, como represalia la Empresa corto el agua y la energia en los
campamentos, dejando a los trabajadores sin estos insumos vitales.i" Los trabajadores
tambien denunciaron la presencia de 60 guardias arm ados yalta conflictividad e
.msegun ·d a d en I a zona. 86

83 Ver "Mapa de contlictos soeioambientales en Chile" (INDH, 2015), p. 148. Disponible en el siguiente
I ink: http://m aRaeon!' i etos. indh. cllassels/pdtili bro-we b-descargable. pd f
84 Fuente: httR:i/era. www.cambio21.elica111bio21/site/artic!20 150714/Rags!20 150714162426. hl1111
85 Fuente: httR://www.biobiochile.clll1oticias/opinion/entrevistas/20 16/11123/sindicato-de-proveeto-alto-
111 ai po- y- h lie 1 ga-de-l1las-de- 20-dias- 110- hav- una- vo 1 untad-de- negoci ar. shIm 1
86 Fuente: http://www.eldesconcierto.cl/pais-desconeertado/20 16/11 i23/trabajadores-de-a]to-maipo-en-
hue Iga-denul1cian-presencia-de-param i 1 itares-para-baj ar-sll-lTIovi 1 iZlleioni

39
De acuerdo a Jorge Hernandez, presidente del Sindicato Interempresa Nacional de
Trabajadores de la Construcci6n, Montaje Industrial y Afines (SINTEC),87 uno de los
principales problemas que los trabajadores han tenido con el PHAM, a traves de las dos
empresas subcontratadas para su construcci6n (Hochtief y Strabag), se refieren a
practicas antisindicales y condiciones de trabajo.

SINTEC tiene presencia en el PHAM, y desde el sindicato han observado malas

practicas que han dificultado la labor sindical. EI conflicto con la empresa Hochtief
escal6 a la huelga mencionada mas arriba, a fines del 2016, de mas de 30 dias, ya que
Hochtief se rehusaba, entre otras cosas, a que este sindicato tuviera presencia en el
PHAM. De acuerdo a Hernandez, el problema se origina porque el mandante (el
PHAM), no quiere la presencia de un sindicato independiente como es el caso de
SINTEC en el proyecto. Esto se debe a que los trabajadores son acto res privilegiados
para observar malas practicas de todo tipo de las empresas, entre elIas en los arnbitos
laboral y ambiental, y un sindicato independiente como SINTEC no haria la vista gorda
ante ese tipo de situaciones. Entre las practicas antisindicales Hernandez menciona
amedrentamiento de trabajadores y luego, en el contexto de la huelga, el corte de los
servicios basicos a los trabajadores en los campamentos, asi como el posterior despido
de alrededor del 30 por ciento de los trabajadores. Esta huelga se dio en el contexto de
una negociaci6n sobre reajuste salarial, las condiciones de vida en los campamentos y
de seguridad en el trabajo, sobre todo en el caso del tunel minero, que a juicio de
SINTEC no cum pie los estandares de seguridad basicos. La huelga termin6 y se
lIegaron a algunos de acuerdo, pero el proceso continua.

El presidente de SINTEC tarnbien sefiala que el sindicato ha realizado acetones

internacionales, en las casas matrices de las empresas contratadas para construir el
PHAM, con el fin de denunciar los problemas y exigir soluciones.

Respecto de los accidentes laborales, el 27 de enero de 2016 tuvo lugar uno con
consecuencias fatales. Un trabajador del PHAM falleci6 en las cercanias de las faenas.
EI trabajador era vecino de la comuna de San Jose de Maipo y se desempefiaba como
conductor profesional de camiones.

Respecto de los despidos injustificados, existen testimonios de trabajadores que han

sido despedidos por participar de movilizaciones pacificas en contra del PHAM. Es el
caso, por ejemplo, del presidente de la Junta de Vecinos de L9S Maitenes, quien en su
calidad de presidente y miembro de la comunidad particip6 en una movilizaci6n (en su
dia libre) solicitando que la Empresa cumpliera con 10 acordado en la Resoluci6n de
Calificacion Ambiental y se hiciera cargo de los impactos de la construcci6n del
proyecto. Luego de participar de esta movilizaci6n fue despedido de su trabajo (vel'
Anexo 04).

Norma de Desempefio 3: Eficiencia del uso de los recursos y prevencion de la

contaminacion

De acuerdo a esta norma, en el transcurso del cicio de vida del proyecto se tendran en
cuenta las condiciones ambientales y se aplicaran los principios y tecnicas de eficiencia

87Para ver el testimonio completo de Jorge Hernandez, ver el Anexo 04. Videos y Testimonios Tmpactos
Sociales PHAM y Condiciones Laborales.

40
 en el uso de los recursos y prevenci6n de la contaminaci6n. Respecto del consumo de
agua, esta Norma sefiala que cuando "sc trate de un proyecto que podria consumir una
cantidad significativa de agua, ademas de aplicar los requisitos sobre eficiencia en el
uso de los recursos contenidos en esta Norma de Desempefio, el cliente adoptard
medidas para evitar 0 reducir el consumo de agua del proyecto, a fin de que no tenga
impactos adversos significativos sobre terceros" (p. 3).

______ -"T-"a=m~b~i'
se _sefiala
=_'en ue el cliente evitara las emisiones de contaminante ue esto se
aplica a las emisiones de contaminantes al aire, aLagua 0 al suelo, Y que cuando "exista
una contamznacion hlstoriGa en e1 terrene 0 las aguas suhterraneas. el cLzente
procurard determinar si es responsable de adoptar medidas de mitigacion" (p. 3).
Finalmente, se sefiala que el "cliente evitard la generacion de materiales de desecho,
peligrosos 0 no peligrosos" (p. 4).

AI respecto, cabe seiialar que:

• EI PHAM captara los principales afluentes que alimentan al rio Maipo, para
dirigirlos por tuneles de 67 kil6metros de largo, y de entre 6 y 8 metros de
diametro. EI proyecto trasvasijara las aguas de tres rios para devolverlas 100
kil6metros mas abajo, en el rio principal. Segun calculos independientes, la
disminucion de los caudales de los afluentes del Maipo podria ser mucho mayor
que la proyectada por la empresa, entre 60 a 90% de sus caudales naturales,
considerando adernas el proceso de desertificaci6n y disminuci6n natural de los
caudales de los rios que afect~..la~gi6n norte y centro de Chile. Los trasvases Ie
restarian esos caudales a mas ae 100 kilometres de los valles de los rios que
componen la cuenca del rio Maipo. Esto no es en absoluto eficiente, todavia mas
si consideramos que la energia a producir no es la que el proyecto prometio
publicamente y al ser evaluado ambientalmente.
• EI PHAM ha sefialo que tendrfa una producci6n anual de 2.100 GWh. Sin
embargo, esta cifra fue obtenida con registros desde hace 60 afios que
sobreestiman los caudales de los rios. Cal cui os basados en estadisticas oficiales
demuestran que el proyecto solo tendria una producci6n anual de 1.790 GWh.
La Empresa, recientemente, confirm6 que la energia a generar era menor a 10
que se habia sefialado hasta esa fecha.88
• La Empresa no realize un estudio hidrogeologico para evaluar el impacto del
ninel y el efecto que tendra sobre los acuiferos y flujos subterraneos.
• EI PHAM tiene un impacto sobre humedales de altura y glaciares. Las
explosiones llevadas a cabo para su construcci6n estan influyendo en la
degradacion de glaciares y nieves eternas. Esto, a su vez, impacta en una zona
vulnerable y bajo los efectos de la desertificaci6n y el cambio climatico.
• Durante la construcci6n y operacion del PHAM, esta latente, y ya se produjo,
contaminaci6n de los suelos, agua y aire con metales pesados y minerales que se
encuentran en las rocas que son removidas para construir el tunel. Esto tiene
impactos amplios en el ecosistema y en las personas que dependen del mismo.
La Empresa reconoce que la operacion del proyecto afecta directamente los
derechos de agua de los actuales usuarios en terminos de can tid ad, calidad y
oportunidad. Por esta razon, varias asociaciones de regantes y agricultores se

88Ver reportaje de Chilevisi6n: http://vvww.chilevision.cl/en la miralcapitulo-completoltemporada-

20 14/aguas-lurbulentas-en-el-cajon-del-maipo-25-de-junio/2014-06-26/001913. htm I

41
 opusieron al proyecto desde sus inicios, y solo depusieron sus acciones a traves
de un acuerdo econ6mico que no se hace cargo de los impactos ambientales ni
sobre todos los usuarios de agua de la cuenca.
• Finalmente, basandonos en un analisis de la informaci6n disponible sobre otros
proyectos de energia renovable, es posible observar que el PHAM tambien es
ineficiente respecto del uso de recursos naturales y los servicios ecosisternicos
en general. A modo de ejemplo, y comparando con otras formas limpias de
generaci6n, que ademas no generan tanta confl ictividad, podemos citar el
proyecto fotovoltaico El Romero Solar, con una potencia de 246 MW. Este
proyecto implic6 una inversi6n de 343 millones de d6lares.89 Es decir, tiene una
capacidad similar a cada una de las centrales del PH AM, las que, consideradas
individualmente, tendrfan un costa de 1.100 millones de d6lares cada una, casi
triplicando el costa del proyecto solar sefialado.I'' Estamos, entonces, ante un
proyecto que se inserta en una cuenca altamente vulnerable al cambio climatico
y de vital importancia para la capital del pais, con consecuencias inciertas y que
pone en riesgo el abastecimiento de agua potable para toda la regi6n. Y este
mismo proyecto es altamente ineficiente, ya que la inversi6n es altisima respecto
de la cantidad de energia a generar. Bajo este punto de vista, no se entiende la
16gica detras de invertir y construir un proyecto de estas caracterfsticas.

Norma de Desempeiio 4: Salud y seguridad de la comunidad

Esta Norma "reconoce que las actividades, los equipos y la infraestructura de un

proyecto pueden aumentar las posibilidades de que la comunidad se encuentre expuesta
a riesgos e impactos. Asimismo, las comunidades que ya estdn sometidas a los impactos
del cambio climatico pueden experimentar ademas una aceleracion 0 intensificacion de
dichos impactos como consecuencia de las actividades del proyecto" (p. 1).

Es necesario destacar la menci6n a los conflictos que hace esta Norma, sefialando que
"el nivel de riesgos e impactos que se describen en esta Norma de Desempeiio puede
ser mayor en proyectos ubicados en areas donde hay 0 ha habido conflictos" (p. I).

Tarnbien se mencionan especfficamente los requisitos sobre la preparaci6n y respuesta a

emergencias, explicitandose que "el cliente tambien asistira y colaborara con las
Comunidades Afectadas, los organismos gubemamentales locales y otras partes
pertinentes en los preparativos para responder ejicazmente a situaciones de
emergencia, en especial cuando su participacion y colaboracion sean necesarias para
responder a dichas situaciones de emergencia" (p. 3).

Respecto de esta Norma:

• Como se sefial6 a 10 largo del documento, el proyecto pone en riesgo el
abastecimiento de agua potable de la poblaci6n de Santiago.
• A la fecha, y solo en el proceso de construcci6n, ya existe evidencia y acciones
administrativas y legales presentadas por la contaminaci6n del agua con
minerales y metales pesados.

89 Fuente: http://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/20 16/ II! I O/830548/Poncn-en-marcha-en- Vallenar-

la-planta-so lal"- [otovo I taica-m as- grande-de- Latinoameri ca. hIm I
90 Para ver el analisis cornpleto, revisar el Anexo 0 I. Analisis sobre la Eficiencia del PHAM.

42
 • Respecto de la preparaci6n ante emergencias, un punto problematico se refiere a
las descargas no previstas de agua. Si bien finalmente se tom6 en cuenta como
riesgo durante la evaluaci6n ambiental, se propusieron medidas de mitigaci6n
(construcci6n de un canal secundario) que no han sido evaluadas por ningun
organismo competente en Chile.
• Durante la etapa de construcci6n del proyecto, se ha podido consignar que el
transporte y almacenaje de explosivos se realiza de forma irregular y en
eual €lui e-r-flOraFi . (por=ejeen (31e,-I-as-c-amieneta EjH€-tr-an Si3ertan-e-x!3I·~s-i¥e
______________ l ...r..a...n""srt
...
· ..,an.._,a~la..jlOra
en que as escnelas a dis:p",o",iS,y·o"""-""ru"'e,
"""",· _
ellliesesados en las marinas iampoco l1i:1 ccr1100 un t ulamieriLO ade uado.
• Existe una situacion crftica en los poblados mas afectados por la construccion
del PHAM (El Alfalfal y Los Maitenes, ver Anexos 02 y 04). En el caso de EI
Alfalfal, estamos ante una comunidad que actual mente vive confinada entre
cuatro murallas, ya que la licencia ambiental oblige al PHAM a cerrar el
perf metro que rodea al pueblo para evitar ruidos y contarninacion, Sin embargo,
la medida no ha disminuido ni los ruidos ni la contarninacion. Los vecinos
alegan que la Empresa no ha cumplido con las promesas, y el poblado ha
terminado dividido entre quienes estan a favor y en contra del proyecto. EI
PHAM ha seiialado adernas que los vecinos que reciban beneficios econornicos
no pueden oponerse al proyecto."

Norma de Desempeiio 5: Adguisicion de tierras y reasentamiento involuntario

De acuerdo a esta Norma, esta situacion se presenta en casos de: "(i) expropiacion
segun la ley 0 restricciones temporales 0 permanentes sobre el uso de la tierra y (ii)
acuerdos negociados en los que el comprador puede recurrir a la expropiacion 0
imponer restricciones legales sobre el uso de la tierra si fracasan las negociaciones con
el vendedor" (p. I).

Esta Norma tam bien considera el caso de desplazamiento economico, sefialando que
"En el caso de los proyectos que solo involucren un desplazamiento economico, el
cliente desarrollara un plan de restablecimiento de medios de subsistencia para
compensar a las personas 0 Comunidades Afectadas y ofrecera otra asistencia en
cumplimiento de los objetivos de esta Norma de Desempeno" (p. 7).

Respecto de esta Norma, podemos seiialar que:

• EI caso del poblado Alfalfal, y la construccion de murallas para cerrar el
perf metro del pueblo para evitar ruidos y contaminacion, constituye una
restriccion en el uso de la tierra y acceso a los recursos, que de acuerdo a los
vecinos no ha sido manejada de forma regular y clara.
• Respecto del caso de EI Alfalfal, es necesario sefialar que se han establecido
convenios con la comunidad para reasentar a algunos de los vecinos, situacion
irregular y que no fue parte del proceso de evaluacion ambiental del proyecto.
Lo anterior se debe, de acuerdo a estos convenios'", a la situacion de

91 Ver el reportaje realizado por el program a 24 Horas, donde se constata que los vecinos temen hablar
con los investigadores del program a televisivo respecto del PHAM:
h ltp:l Iwww.24hams.cl/notic iar i oslreporta i es24/reportai es - 24-e I-m uro-de-I os-I amentos-q ue-di v ide-a-e 1-
alfalfal-2151883
92 Ver el Anexo 06. Convenio PHAM-Comite Adelanto EI Alfalfal.

43
 "allegamiento=" en que vivman estas farnilias, asi como a un problema
hist6rico del poblado con la formalizaci6n de los tftulos de dominio de los
vecinos. EI problema de fondo es que la forma de hacerse cargo de problemas
hist6ricos de vulnerabilidad econ6mica y social en la comunidad ha sido
irregular, y sin participaci6n de las autoridades competentes. Al contrario, la
situaci6n ha sido dejada a las soluciones que pueda entregar la Empresa en
negociaciones privadas con la comunidad.
• EI proyecto genera incertidumbre y riesgo para las personas que desempefian
actividades turfsticas debido a la reducci6n de caudal de los rlos Colorado y
Maipo. Estas actividades incluyen turismo recreacional, de aventura y
ecoturismo, asf como actividades de rafting, kayakismo, rnontafiismo y escalada.
• El PHAM amenaza tambien fuentes de trabajo en el area agricola y de areneros.
Respecto de la extracci6n artesanal de aridos, es una actividad de larga data que
provee empleos y que adernas abastece a la industria de la construcci6n en la
ciudad de Santiago.

Norma de Desempeiio 6: Conservacion de la biodiversidad y gestion sostenible de

los recursos naturales vivos

Esta Norma define cuatro tipos de servicros ecosisternicos: "(i) los servtctos de
aprovisionamiento, que son los productos que obtienen las personas de los ecosistemas;
(ii) los servicios de regulacion, que son los beneficios que obtienen las personas de la
regulacion de los procesos de los ecosistemas; (iii) los servicios culturales, que son los
beneficios no materiales que las personas obtienen de los ecosistemas y (iv) los
servicios de apoyo, que son los procesos naturales que mantienen a los demas
servicios" (p. I).

A 10 largo de este documento se han presentado variados antecedentes que

demuestrun que este proyecto prescnta problemas respccto de la eonscrvacion de
la biodiversidad y la gestion de recursos naturales vivos. En particular podemos
destacar aqui:
• La cuenca alta del rio Maipo es un ecosistema de montana unico y ha sido
declarada Zona de Interes Turistico, Zona Libre de Caza y Zona de Interes
Cientffico (protegida de la mineria). Existen cuatro Sitios Prioritarios de
Conservaci6n de la Biodiversidad de la Regi6n Metropolitana en el terri tori 0,
que en conjunto SUman 462.253 hectareaS.94
• El PHAM no consider6, durante la evaluaci6n ambiental, el habitat de especies
como el pato cortacorrientes (Merganetta armata), en sector del rio Volcan, y el
c6ndor, en rio Colorado.
• Tampoco se evalu6 apropiadamente la corta de arboles nativos.
• La degradaci6n del rfo Maipo impacta una de las pocas areas de recreaci6n y
uno de los pulmones verdes de la Regi6n Metropolitana. Como ya se ha dicho,
esta area es visitada por tres millones 600 mil visitantes al afio. La cuenca del rfo
Maipo fue seleccionada entre las 97 areas prioritarias para el turismo a nivel

93 EI allegamiento es la estrategia utilizada por los hogares para solueionar el problema de alojamiento.
Consiste en com partir una vivienda con otro hogar. Se tiene de esta forma un hogar que es el "receptor" y
otro hogar 0 nucleo que corresponde a los allegados propiamente tal.
94 Fuente: Plan de Accion Santiago Andino (2005-2015), disponible en: www.sinia.dIl292/articles-
37027 PDA stgoandino.pdf

44
 pais95 y esta dentro de los lugares de descanso y recreaci6n de la poblaci6n.
Aqui se destacan las cifras relativas a la tasa de ocupabilidad en festividades
(por ejemplo, vacaciones de inviemo ).96 Estas cifras dan cuenta de que entre los
destinos que obtuvieron tasas de ocupabilidad por sobre el 70 se encuentra el
Caj6n del Maipo (con un 72,6 por ciento).
• Su intervenci6n afecta la calidad de vida no solo de la comunidad local, sino que
de los habitantes de la Regi6n Metropolitana en general. Este impacto del
---------~r~e0t{) ne-fue-eveluede-ai-eeesideeade.

Esta Norma define el terrnino patrimonio cultural como Uri) las formas tangibles del
patrimonio cultural, tales como objetos tangibles muebles 0 inmuebles, propiedades,
sitios, estructuras 0 grupos de estructuras, que tienen valor arqueologico
(prehistorico), paleontologico, historico, cultural, artistico 0 religioso; (ii)
caracteristicas naturales u objetos tangibles unicos que representan valores culturales,
como los bosques, rocas, lagos y cascadas sagrados, y (iii) ciertas formas intangibles
de cultura cuyo usa se propone con fines comerciales, como los conocimientos
culturales, las innovaciones y las practicas de las comunidades que entrahan estilos de
vida tradicionales" (p. I).

Respecto de esta Norma, es necesario destacar los siguientes elementos:

• No=se-evaluawn los efectos del PHAM sobre la cultura.alasaactividades
tradicionales ni sobre el patrimonio arqueol6gico y paleontol6gico. Existen
varias zonas de patrimonio protegido (como antiguas construcciones y el Valle
de las Arenas) donde no se evalu6 el impacto del proyecto sobre elias.
• En el area de influencia del proyecto existen sitios de interes arqueol6gico y
paleontol6gico ya descubiertos y, segun los expertos, aun que dan muchos sitios
por descubrir. Muchos de estos sitios ya estan siendo dinamitados y destruidos
sin la investigaci6n y resguardos apropiados.
• EI PHAM vera afectadas las actividades tradicionales de los arrieros.
• El turismo y las actividades de deporte y recreaci6n al aire libre, base de la
econornia local, tam bien se veran afectadas por esta mega intervenci6n en una
cuenca fundamental para la Regi6n Metropolitana.
• EI poblado de EI Alfalfal tarnbien se ve afectado en esta dimensi6n, ya que se
han visto privados de espacios comunitarios (entre ell os, la cancha de futbol, que
fue trasladada a otro poblado), ademas de los lugares de pastoreo, de recolecci6n
de miel, entre otros.

6. ACTIVIDADES ADELANT ADAS POR LOS DEMANDANTES

6.1. Acciones judiciales y administrativas

A la fecha de presentaci6n de este documento, existen tres juicios pendientes contra el

PHAM que estan en curso en los tribunales chilenos y 14 denuncias ante la

95 Fuente: http://ww"\v.sernatur.cl!wp-contentluploads/20 15/llI20 150909-[nforme-Focalizaci%C3%B3n-

Territorial- T ur%C3%ADstica.pdf (p. 31).
96 Fuente: Servicio Nacional de Turismo, Tasa de Ocupabilidad en Establecimientos de Alojamiento
Turistico, 2016. Disponible en: http://www.sernatur.cl!tasa-ocupabilidadl

45
Superintendencia de Medio Ambiente. Actualmente se estan preparando nuevas
acciones legales para ser presentadas en Chile, as! como demandas para ser presentadas
en tribunales intemacionales.

El pas ado 19 de febrero de 2016, la Coordinadora present6 ante la Corte de Apelaciones

de San Miguel (Santiago, Regi6n Metropolitana) un Recurso de Protecci6n de Garantias
Constitucionales en contra de la Sociedad Alto Maipo S.A., titular del PHAM. Este
recurso se bas6 en el informe del doctor Andrei Tchernitchin, presidente del
Departamento de Medio Ambiente del Colegio Medico de Chile, sobre la calidad de las
aguas en algunos sectores de la cuenca del rio Maipo. Este informe evidenci6 que se
superaba la norma de calidad de aguas de metales pes ados en zonas donde el agua se
ocupa para uso humano (especialmente para bebida). Los anal isis mostraron altos
niveles de manganeso, aluminio y hierro. Este recurso fue rechazado el lOde enero,
2017 por la Corte de Apelaciones de San Miguel dado que en su informe, la autoridad
ambiental, la Superintendencia de Medio Ambiente (SMA), afirm6 que el episodio de
contaminaci6n fue puntual, y que los analisis de agua realizados posteriormente no
entregaban evidencia de contaminaci6n por sobre la contaminaci6n base, natural, del rio
Maipo. No conformes con este fall 0, y tal como 10 permite nuestra legislaci6n, la
Coordinadora llevara el caso al Tribunal Ambiental de Santiago. En el caso del PHAM
la SMA consistentemente no ha ejercido el rol de fiscalizacion que debe cumplir.
Catorce denuncias respecto del PHAM se han acumulado en esta entidad, pero no hay
respuesta alguna al respecto, ni tam poco informaci6n sobre si se realizaron
fiscalizaciones, 0 si existe algun proceso sancionatorio por parte de esta autoridad.

Durante el proceso de tramitaci6n de estos recursos, han salido a la luz nuevos

antecedentes, uno de los cuales tiene relaci6n con la entrega deliberada a los tribunales
de justicia de informaci6n err6nea por parte de la Superintendencia del Medio
Ambiente." que se refieren a la autoridad dando cumplimiento solo aparente al
monitoreo ordenados por la Corte de Apelaciones de San Miguel. Esta situaci6n, en
caso de ser demostrada, es penada por el C6digo Penal chileno, en especifico 10 que
tiene relaci6n a la falsedad ideol6gica de los antecedentes y su posterior entrega a los
tribunales.

Por la via administrativa, se han hecho varias presentaciones a la Superintendencia del

Medio Ambiente por incumplimiento de las condiciones establecidas en la Resoluci6n
de Calificaci6n Ambiental del PHAM. Esto incluye denuncias por:
1. Contaminaci6n del agua
ii. Intervenci6n no evaluada de cursos de agua
iii. Impactos a glaciares
IV. Alquileres ilegales de casas y cabanas utilizadas por los contratistas que
participan en la construcci6n
v. Aumento del trafico en la carretera publica del Cajon del Maipo
vi. Impacto del ruido y vibraciones producido por la circulaci6n de camiones de
gran tonelaje y remolque de equipos de construcci6n que circulan por la unica
ruta de acceso y frente a colegios
VII. Omisi6n de las evaluaciones de impacto en flora y fauna
Vlll. Degradaci6n del patrimonio paleontol6gico y arqueol6gico

97Ver: http://www.radiovillafrancia.cllreportaie-los-falsos-anal isis-con-Ios-gue-Ia-sma-desm i ntio-Ias-

den unc ias-por-contam i naci on-de I-proyecto-a I (0- rnai po#stllas h. ni 8hO hlp. dpbs

46
 IX. Impacto en el valor paisajistico de la cuenca

6.2. Movilizacion ciudadana

Una amplia movilizacion social contra el PRAM esta en marcha desde hace varios afios,
con protestas masivas en torno al movimiento ciudadano "No Alto Maipo". Estas
protestas se estan intensificando ahora que el proyecto se encuentra en construccion. La
gravedad del dafio que el proyecto causara esta empezando a ser conocida por los

Se han organizado y llevado a cabo masivas marchas (de mas de 25 mil personas) en la
ciudad de Santiago. Entre las mas emblematicas se encuentran la del 15 de noviembre
de 2013, las del 2 de agosto y del 14 de diciembre de 2014, y la del 5 de diciembre de
2015. En el Cajon del Maipo, podemos mencionar las movilizaciones del 27 de junio y
24 de octubre de 2015, y la del 4 de diciembre de 2016. Todo esto en conjunto con una
variada gama de actividades, que incluyen cicletadas, protestas en edificios publicos y
en empresas asociadas al PRAM, participacion en actividades publicas como debates
presidenciales, actos culturales y lanzamientos de videos donde reconocidos politicos,
activistas y artistas presentan su apoyo al movimiento "No Alto Maipo".98

6.3. Otras acciones

a) Denuncia ante la London Mining Network y la Junta Anual de Antofagasta PLC

EL 18 de mayo de 2016, se llevo una denuncia a la London Mining Network y ante la

Junta Anual de Antofagasta PLC.99 La dirigente de la Coordinadora, Marcela Mella,
argumento que el PRAM se esta construyendo sobre una cuenca que proporciona agua
potable a los 7 millones habitantes de la capital de Chile. Y que el objetivo final del
proyecto es proporcionar energfa para la mina Los Pelambres. Antofagasta Minerals
(propiedad de Antofagasta PLC) posee el 40 por ciento de las acciones del PRAM, por
10 tanto tiene gran parte de la responsabilidad frente a las comunidades que estan siendo
afectadas por este. Marcela tambien informo sobre el recurso de proteccion por
contaminacion de las aguas con metales pesados producto de las obras del PRAM, y
sobre las enfermedades que puede provocar. Finalmente, la dirigente denuncio que el
proyecto amenaza los derechos humanos de las comunidades, que ya han sufrido graves
impactos, citando como ejemplo el caso de un pueblo entero que ha sido amurallado con
altas paredes de seguridad (El Alfalfal).

Cabe destacar que en esa instancia, directores de Antofagasta PLC se comprometieron

con los accionistas a llevar a cabo una auditoria independiente del PHAM, considerando
10 denunciado por la dirigente. Sin embargo, a la fecha, la Coordinadora no ha recibido
noticias de este trabajo ni de sus resultados.

b) Viaje a Estados Unidos para reunirse con instituciones con sede en EEUU que
financian el PHAM:

98Ver: Anexo 03. Movilizacion Social No Alto Maipo.

99Ver: http://www.latercera.com/noticiai opositores-a-al to-maipo- intervienen-en- j unta-de-minera-del-
grupo-Iuksic-en-Iondresl

47
Debido a las numerosas preocupaciones insolubles, y sin ninguna respuesta seria
respecto de los riesgos del PRAM por parte de la Empresa, de las instituciones
financieras y del Estado de Chile, los representantes de la Coordinadora, Tomas
Gonzalez y Marcela Mella, junto a Juan Pablo Orrego, presidente de Ecosistemas y
director de International Rivers, viajaron en septiembre del 2015 a Washington para
reunirse con representantes de las instituciones financieras con sede en Estados Unidos
que estan financiando el PRAM (BID, CFI y el banco asegurador del gobierno
norteamericano, OPIC).

El 14 de septiembre de 2015, los tres dirigentes chilenos, acompafiados de dos personas

de CIEL, se reunieron con funcionarios del BID. Aunque los funcionarios de OPIC, via
e-mail, contestaron negativamente la solicitud de reunion, dos funcionarios de OPIC
asistieron sin anuncio previo a esta reunion en la sede del BID. Los funcionarios de los
dos bancos contestaron los planteamientos criticos del PRAM de la Coordinadora en
base a los estudios encargados por la misma Empresa a consultoras que el publico
chileno conoce muy bien, y que no considera idoneas. Se indico que habian estudios
realizados por estas mismas consultoras que estan publicados en la web institucional del
BID, y que supuestamente responden algunos de los temas planteados por la
Coordinadora y otros stakeholders, pero que no han sido puestos a disposicion del
publico en forma proactiva ni por la Empresa ni por los bancos acreedores.

Algunos de los temas clave planteados por la Coordinadora en la reunion fueron: a) la

no consideracion en la evaluaci6n del PRAM del principio precautorio internacional y
el principio preventivo de la legislacion ambiental chilena que debiera haber detenido la
evaluacion, autorizaci6n e inicio de este proyecto, que en forma manifiesta pone en
riesgo el abastecimiento de agua potable y de riego a la capital de Chile, Santiago, y a la
Region Metropolitana circundante, con mas de siete millones de habitantes, en una
macro-region en proceso de desertificacion, ademas de multiples otros servicios
ambientales a la region; b) la irregularidad e ilegalidad de la evaluacion del proyecto
tramitada en base al trafico de influencias y poder politico; c) la alarmante pobreza,
mala calidad e insuficiencia de los estudios realizados por las consultoras para un
proyecto de tan elevado riesgo y masiva intervencion de estrategica cuenca del rio
Maipo; y d) el nulo monitoreo por parte de las instituciones financieras del
cumplimiento de las condiciones impuestas para los creditos. Las respuestas de los
funcionarios fueron estandar, las mismas que esgrime la Empresa amparada en los
estudios de las consultoras.

La delegacion se reunio tambien con funcionarios del Banco Mundial, del

Departamento del Tesoro y del US Senate Staff, para dar a conocer la postura de la
Coordinadora y sus denuncias respecto del PRAM. Finalmente, se realizaron reuniones
con Victoria Marquez del MICI-BID, y con Osvaldo Gratacos de CAO-CFI, quienes
nos explicaron como funcionan estos mecanismos de consulta e investigacion y nos
entregaron las guias de presentacion de quejas que se han utilizado para esta
presentacion.

Los integrantes de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil que nos oponemos al PRAM
consideramos altamente preocupante que estas instituciones financieras insistan en
calificar positivamente el PRAM, a pesar de la informacion presentada por la
Coordinadora en los afios 2012-2013, y luego en 2015. AlIi se demuestra incluso la
inviabilidad economica del PRAM, dada la disminucion significativa de los caudales en

48
 los cursos de agua necesarios para su operacion, el cada vez mayor atraso en su
construccion, el aumento de la inversion 100, la disminucion de los precios de la
electricidad, y sus impactos sociales ambientales a nivellocal, regional y nacional.

7. ACCIONES REQUERIDAS

-- ------
yc c
en Chile (ingreso al Sistema de Evaluacion de Impacto Ambiental), por tribunales de
justicia que conocen sobre las denuncias y reclamaciones interpuestas, por autoridades
municipales y regionales quienes han respondido a nuestros requerimientos, y,
fundamental mente, por la validacion y reconocimiento de la base social que constituye
el movimiento ciudadano "No Alto Maipo".

7.2 Manifestamos la no intencion de negociacion 0 mediacion con la empresa a traves

de la funcion de Resolucion de Conflictos durante este proceso de reclamacion. En su
lugar, solicitamos una investigacion de la CAO sobre el cumplimiento que verifique y
evalue objetivamente el proceso de financiamiento de la CFI del proyecto No. 31362,
denominado "Proyecto Hidroelectrico Alto Maipo" (PHAM). Esto en base a la falta de
cumplimiento que dicho proyecto ha tenido con las politicas, normas de desempefio de
la CFI, ademas de las normas y legislacion chilena e intemacional. Asimismo, que se
determine si de la financiacion se pueden determinar consecuencias am ientales y
sociales coherentes con los objetivos, la mision y politicas de la CFI.

7.3 Solicitamos a la CAO tomar todas las medidas posibles para acelerar las etapas de
analisis para determinar admisibilidad asi como la evaluacion del presente reclamo.
Dado que las operaciones y construccion en tomo al PRAM estan en pleno desempefio
y actualmente causando impactos ambientales y sociales en la region, es urgente que se
inicie la funcion de cumplimiento cuanto antes.

7.4 Pedimos a la CAO que si las conclusiones de la investigacion sobre cumplimiento

que realice confinnan el incumplimiento de las politicas y nonnas de desempefio de la
CFI, la CAO emita un reporte indiscutible y contundente a la gerencia de la CFI para
que esta ponga en consideracion la suspension inmediata de dicho financiamiento y la
no-financiacion de futuros sobrecostos del PRAM.

Sin otro particular, se despiden cordialmente,

100 Para mas informacion, ver: http://www.latercera.com/noticialproximo-ano-sera-clave-desarrollo-del-

proyecto-al to-maipo/

49
Marcela Mella

Juan Pablo Orrego

Coordinadora Ciudadana Rios del Maipo - Ecosistema

Con el apoyo nacional de: Camara de Turismo del Cajon del Maipo; Asociacion
Gremial de Guias y Operadores Turisticos del Cajon del Maipo; Asociacion Gremial de
Empresarios Turisticos y Hoteleros del Cajon del Maipo y Movimiento Social por la
Recuperacion del Agua y la Vida; Asamblea Agua y Soberania de Puente Alto.

Con el apoyo nacional de

Con el apoyo internacional del Center for International Environmental

Law (CIEL), International Rivers, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
Patagonia Inc.

50
 Informe Paralelo

Presentado por:

La Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo

Ecosistemas

El Centro para el Derecho Ambiental Internacional (CIEL)

al

Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales

con motivo de la consideración de la Lista de Cuestiones

relativa al Quinto Informe Periódico de Chile
durante el Sexagésimo Sexto Grupo de Trabajo de la Pre-Sesión,
9 – 13 de marzo de 2020

Presentado el 21 de enero de 2020

 I. Introducción

El Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo (PHAM)1 es un proyecto caracterizado como central de

pasada (run-of-the-river)2 de gran escala ubicado en el Cajón del Maipo, aproximadamente a 50
kilómetros de Santiago, Chile. Consiste el proyecto en desviar y capturar la mayor parte de las
aguas de los ríos Yeso, Volcán y Colorado – principales afluentes del Río Maipo – para conducirlas
a través de un sistema de 70 kilómetros de túneles perforados a través de las montañas, hasta
dos cavernas de máquinas donde estarían instaladas las turbinas y generadores eléctricos. Este
desvío de aguas significa restarle esta gran cantidad de agua al valle del río Maipo por más de
100 kilómetros.

El PHAM está impactando dramáticamente la cuenca del Río Maipo, así como los acuíferos en el
área afectada, poniendo en riesgo el acceso al agua potable no solamente de los habitantes del
Cajón del Maipo sino también de los 7 millones de personas que viven en la Región Metropolitana
de Santiago. La construcción del PHAM está afectando además el ambiente de forma irreversible,
con severas consecuencias para la salud, las formas y calidad de vida, los derechos económicos,
sociales y culturales de las comunidades.

Cabe señalar que el PHAM ha recibido financiamiento de dos bancos multilaterales, el Banco
Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) 3 y la Corporación Financiera Internacional (IFC) del Banco
Mundial, 4 así como de la Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) del gobierno
estadounidense.5 Adicionalmente el proyecto cuenta con créditos de la banca comercial nacional
e internacional: Corpbanca, Banco de Crédito e Inversiones, Banco Itaú Chile, Banco del Estado
de Chile, KfW Ipex-Bank (Alemania), y DNB Bank ASA (Noruega).

A causa de reiterados problemas técnicos, la construcción del PHAM está significativamente

atrasada respecto del plazo de 5 años que dio a conocer la empresa inicialmente. Los atrasos y
dificultades técnicas imprevistas han redundado en importantes sobrecostos, los cuales han
dejado el proyecto en un estado financiero precario.6 Cabe hacer notar que el importante atraso

1
Para información adicional acerca de este proyecto, ver Centro para el Derecho Ambiental Internacional, Fact
Sheet: Chile’s Alto Maipo Hydroelectric Project (PHAM) [“Hoja de Datos: El Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo
(PHAM) de Chile”], disponible en: https://www.ciel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/FactSheet_AltoMaipo_Chile.pdf.
2
Es necesario señalar que técnica y legalmente el PHAM no es un proyecto de pasada, ya que consiste en trasvasar
tres afluentes y devolver las aguas al río Maipo 100 kilómetros más abajo. No obstante, se ha presentado así para
minimizar la percepción del público y de los inversores acerca de sus potenciales impactos ambientales y sociales.
3
Ver Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, CH-L1067: Proyecto de Energía Hidroeléctrica Alto Maipo, disponible en:
https://www.iadb.org/es/project/CH-L1067
4
Ver International Finance Corporation, Alto Maipo: https://disclosures.ifc.org/#/projectDetail/SII/31632.
5
OPIC firmó un préstamo de US$245 millones a AES Gener a finales de 2013, a pesar de que los impactos previstos
del proyecto se describieron como “diversos y posiblemente irreversibles”, ver OPIC, Public Project Summary: Alto
Maipo, Chile: https://www3.opic.gov/Environment/EIA/aesgener/Public%20Project%20Summary.pdf. Para mayor
información acerca de los problemas asociados con la inversión de OPIC en el PHAM, ver Office of Inspector
General, U.S. Agency for International Development, OPIC Investments Increased Chile’s Energy Capacity, but Weak
Processes and Internal Controls Diminish OPIC’s Ability to Gauge Project Effects and Risks, Audit Report 9-OPIC-19-
002-P, 1 de febrero de 2019, disponible en: https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2019-02/9-OPC-19-002-P.pdf.
6
El PHAM se ha vuelto el proyecto hidroeléctrico más caro de Chile. El costo final del proyecto – de US$3 mil
millones – será 5 veces más alto del presupuesto inicial. Para mayor información, ver Electricidad, AES Gener
1
de la construcción se debe principalmente a graves complicaciones de ingeniería relacionadas
con la perforación de los túneles, una consecuencia directa de estudios geológicos e
hidrogeológicos de muy mala calidad, y en general de la grave falta de información esencial
respecto de temas sociales y ambientales críticos.

A nivel social, la oposición ciudadana chilena al PHAM se ha mantenido constante por casi 12
años, desde que la empresa anunciara sus intenciones, a través de movimientos sociales y
coaliciones de personas y organizaciones tales como la Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo
(en adelante: CCNAM), y la coalición Somos Maipo surgida recientemente. Las preocupaciones
de los opositores del PHAM son los múltiples impactos negativos económicos, sociales, culturales
y ambientales que está provocando el PHAM desde el inicio de su construcción y que se prevén
en el largo plazo, si entra en operación, que se describirán brevemente a continuación. Asimismo,
las comunidades afectadas denuncian la falta de un proceso adecuado de consulta,7 así como el
hecho de que la implementación del proyecto ha violado tanto el principio precautorio
internacional, como el principio preventivo de la legislación ambiental chilena.

Las comunidades y personas afectadas por el PHAM han reclamado constantemente y

expresando con sólidos argumentos su rechazo a la implementación de este proyecto
devastador. La oposición ciudadana ha incluido numerosas movilizaciones masivas bajo el lema
¡No Alto Maipo!, que han convocado a decenas de miles de personas durante los últimos años,
que representan a unas 100 organizaciones sociales que exigen se cancele el PHAM y que se
proteja la estratégica cuenca del Río Maipo.

No obstante, las preocupaciones de estas comunidades sobre las innumerables fallas del
proyecto y sus reclamos han sido desoídas por los proponentes del PHAM, AES Gener y Strabag,
así como por las autoridades de cuatro gobiernos sucesivos y también por las instituciones que
financian el proyecto. Es importante señalar que, a principios de 2017, representantes de las
comunidades afectadas interpusieron quejas 8 ante los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas,
tanto de la IFC como del BID, 9 señalando que éstos incumplieron con su deber de la debida

reporta avance de 75% en obras de Alto Maipo y acelera proyectos de energías renovables, 28 de febrero de 2019,
disponible en: www.revistaei.cl/2019/02/28/aes-gener-reporta-avance-75-obras-alto-maipo-acelera-proyectos-
energias-renovables/#.
7
Es decir, AES Gener se negó a abrir un diálogo con otros usuarios de agua de la cuenca. El proceso de
participación ciudadana de la de evaluación ambiental tampoco tuvo un impacto real en el diseño del proyecto ni
logró legitimarse socialmente. Al contrario, es percibido como un proceso viciado, ya que ninguna de las
observaciones ciudadanas presentadas por escrito recibió una respuesta adecuada.
8
Para información adicional, ver Centro para el Derecho Ambiental Internacional, International Complaints
Highlight Looming Environmental Disaster of Alto Maipo Hydroelectric Project, Chile [“Quejas Internacionales
Subrayan Desastre Ambiental Inminente Causado por Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo, Chile”], 24 de enero de
2017, disponible en: https://www.ciel.org/news/international-complaints-highlight-looming-environmental-
disaster-alto-maipo-hydroelectric-project-chile/; ver también Centro para el Derecho Ambiental Internacional,
Mecanismos Internacionales Acogen Denuncias por el Proyecto Alto Maipo en Chile, 19 de marzo de 2017,
disponible en: https://www.ciel.org/news/mecanismos-internacionales-acogen-denuncias-por-el-proyecto-alto-
maipo-en-chile/.
9
Para información adicional, ver Mecanismo Independiente de Consulta e Investigación, Proyecto de Energía
Hidroeléctrica Alto Maipo, Caso MICI-BID-CH-2017-0115, disponible en: https://www.iadb.org/es/mici/detalle-de-
la-solicitud?ID=MICI-BID-CH-2017-0115&nid=21796; ver también Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Chile/Alto
2
diligencia al no asegurar que AES Gener respetara las salvaguardas sociales y ambientales,
políticas o las normas de desempeño de los mismos, incluida la obligación de evaluar y manejar
los riesgos asociados al proyecto.

A través de este informe, deseamos comunicar al Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y

Culturales (en adelante: el Comité) nuestra profunda preocupación por la vulneración de los
derechos económicos, sociales, culturales y ambientales de las personas afectadas por el PHAM
en Chile.10

II. Los impactos directos del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo para los derechos
económicos, sociales y culturales de las personas afectadas

A. El derecho al agua11

El PHAM interviene severamente el sistema hidrológico de la cuenca del Río Maipo, como se
describirá con mayor detalle en la Sección III a continuación. Destacamos que el PHAM, al desviar
los Ríos Yeso, Volcán y Colorado, pondría en riesgo el abastecimiento y suministro de agua
potable12 de la que dependen más de siete millones de personas que viven en la capital de Chile,
Santiago, y la Región Metropolitana circundante. Esto debido a que el proyecto reduciría los
caudales naturales de estos ríos en 60 a 90%. Esta situación es hoy de extrema gravedad en el
contexto de la severa y prolongada sequía que afecta a Chile central desde hace más de diez
años. Los expertos afirman que la zona central de Chile y el Cajón del Maipo han entrado a un
proceso de desertificación. En este período, el río Maipo ha perdido el cuarto de su caudal.13
Además, se prevé que la actual crisis hídrica que se está viviendo en el Cajón del Maipo14 se
agravará durante los próximos meses, debido a que los caudales de los ríos en esta región suelen
alcanzar su nivel más bajo al final de los veranos. Autoridades, expertos y habitantes locales están
alertando respecto de una emergencia hídrica sin precedentes que está amenazando no
solamente al Cajón del Maipo, sino también a toda la Región Metropolitana de Santiago, la capital
de Chile.

Maipo-01/Cajon del Maipo, Proyecto Alto Maipo 31632, disponible en: http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=1255.
10
Cabe señalar que el Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos (INDH) de Chile ha catalogado el PHAM como un
conflicto que vulneraría los derechos humanos. Ver INDH, Mapa de Conflictos Socioambientales en Chile, 2015, p.
148, disponible en: https://bibliotecadigital.indh.cl/bitstream/handle/123456789/989/libro.pdf?sequence=5.
11
Al establecer que los artículos 11 y 12 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (en
adelante: el Pacto) protegen el derecho humano al agua, el Comité manifestó en su Observación General No. 15
que “[e]l derecho humano al agua es indispensable para vivir dignamente y es condición previa para la realización
de otros derechos humanos”. Ver Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observación General No.
15 (2002) sobre el derecho al agua, Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, 20 de enero de 2003, párr. 1.
12
Cabe destacar que con ocasión del cuarto informe periódico de Chile, el Comité expresó su preocupación sobre
el acceso limitado a servicios de agua potable en el país, recomendando al Estado de Chile garantizar el acceso al
agua potable. Ver Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observaciones finales sobre el cuarto
informe periódico de Chile, Doc. E/C.12/CHL/CO/4, 7 de julio de 2015, párr. 27.
13
La Tercera, Río Maipo pierde un cuarto de su nivel: Informe muestra cómo en las últimas tres décadas Chile se
está quedando sin agua, 23 de agosto de 2019, disponible en: www.latercera.com/que-pasa/noticia/rio-maipo-
pierde-un-cuarto-de-su-nivel/794825/.
14
Para mayor información sobre esta crisis hídrica, ver la discusión sobre la declaración de una zona de escasez
hídrica en la comuna de San José de Maipo, incluida en la Sección III a continuación.
3
Es importante tener en cuenta que la construcción del PHAM ya puso en riesgo el acceso al agua
para los residentes del Cajón del Maipo. La mayoría de los pueblos se abastecen de agua potable
subterránea desde pozos profundos que dependen de la integridad de los acuíferos, o napas
freáticas. Estos están siendo gravemente afectados hoy por la construcción de los túneles del
PHAM que han provocado la filtración y evacuación de grandes cantidades de agua subterránea.
En este contexto, cabe subrayar nuevamente la mala calidad y superficialidad de los estudios
hidrogeológicos presentados por la empresa para el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental del PHAM.
Los graves problemas ingenieriles relacionados con la perforación de los túneles y la constante
inundación de estos demuestran claramente la mala calidad de las prospecciones y del análisis
respecto de la presencia y ubicación de los acuíferos y napas que cruzan la cordillera andina en
los sectores donde se están construyendo los túneles, así como respecto del impacto que los
túneles tendrían en todo el sistema hidrogeológico del cual depende el abastecimiento de agua
potable de miles de habitantes del Cajón del Maipo.

Dado que este sistema hidrológico constituye la fuente primordial de agua potable tanto para el
Cajón del Maipo como para la zona metropolitana de Santiago, el PHAM pone en riesgo los
derechos fundamentales a la vida y a la salud de millones de personas.15

B. El derecho a la alimentación16

Además de proveer agua potable a millones de personas, los ríos Maipo y sus afluentes, Yeso,
Volcán y Colorado constituyen la fuente primordial de riego en la región, abasteciendo cerca de
un 90% de la demanda actual de agua para más de 120,000 hectáreas de tierras de cultivo. Al
disminuir severamente el caudal del Río Maipo y de sus afluentes, el PHAM dejaría cientos de
hectáreas de diversos cultivos y viñedos aguas abajo sin suficiente agua, poniendo así en jaque
un sector estratégico crítico para la economía nacional. Consecuentemente, ante esta potencial
falta de agua para abastecer las actividades agrícolas, se afecta necesariamente el derecho a la
alimentación de la población de la Región Metropolitana.

C. El derecho al trabajo17

El Valle del Río Maipo, o Cajón del Maipo, es actualmente una de las áreas recreativas y turísticas
más importantes de Chile central, recibiendo millones de visitantes nacionales y extranjeros al
año. Dicha actividad de ecoturismo y turismo aventura ha sostenido la forma de vida de los
habitantes del Cajón del Maipo por generaciones. Al desviar y capturar las aguas de los

15
El Comité ha reconocido que “el agua es […] fundamental para la vida y la salud”. Ver Comité de Derechos
Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observación General No. 15 (2002) sobre el derecho al agua, Doc.
E/C.12/2002/11, 20 de enero de 2003, párr. 1.
16
El Comité ha afirmado que el derecho a una alimentación adecuada, el cual está protegido por Artículo 11 del
Pacto, “está inseparablemente vinculado a la dignidad inherente de la persona humana y es indispensable para el
disfrute de otros derechos humanos”. Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observación General
No. 12 (1999) sobre el derecho a una alimentación adecuada, Doc. E/C.12/1999/5, 12 de mayo de 1999, párr. 4.
17
Elaborando el significado del derecho al trabajo, el cual está protegido por Artículo 6 del Pacto, el Comité ha
reconocido que este derecho “es esencial para la realización de otros derechos humanos y constituye una parte
inseparable e inherente de la dignidad humana.” Ver Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales,
Observación General No. 18 (2005) sobre el derecho al trabajo, Doc. E/C.12/GC/18, 6 de febrero de 2006 (en
adelante: Observación general sobre el derecho al trabajo), párr. 1.
4
principales afluentes del río Maipo en la cabecera de la cuenca, el PHAM impacta las
oportunidades de trabajo y el modo de vida de las comunidades del Cajón, poniendo en serio
riesgo las economías locales que dependen de la integridad ambiental del territorio, de los ríos y
su belleza natural para atraer a los visitantes.

D. El derecho a trabajar en condiciones adecuadas18

Desde el inicio de la construcción del PHAM, el sindicato de los trabajadores SINTEC de la

empresa Strabag19 ha denunciado las escasas e insuficientes medidas de seguridad para quienes
trabajan al interior de los túneles. En al menos 5 ocasiones los trabajadores en las obras del PHAM
se han declarado en huelga para exigir garantías de condiciones adecuadas de trabajo.

Esta falta de medidas de seguridad ha provocado accidentes frecuentes que han dejado heridos
a varios trabajadores. Durante el mes de mayo del año 2019, ocurrieron dos “explosiones de
roca”, es decir que en el proceso de la construcción de los túneles las rocas explotan y producen
derrumbes. Este fenómeno pudo haberse previsto si AES Gener hubiese realizado estudios
geotécnicos adecuados para identificar los lugares de mayor inestabilidad al interior de la
montaña.20

Es importante tener en cuenta que el 26 de julio de 2017 falleció Patricio Alberto Urrutia Ubilla,
mecánico empleado por un contratista de AES Gener, al ser impactado por una maquinaria
mientras trabajaba en la obra del PHAM. De acuerdo con una declaración publicada por el
sindicato chileno SINTEC: “los accidentes de este tipo son completamente evitables. Sin embargo,
muchas veces el apuro de la producción, las presiones de las jefaturas y una serie de otros
factores, ponen en riesgo nuestra vida” 21 . Esto muestra claramente un patrón de urgencia
indebida, que instala un alto nivel de inseguridad para los trabajadores durante la construcción
del PHAM, lo cual ha sido expresado públicamente incluso por trabajadores de la obra. Los
constantes retrasos en la construcción del PHAM han provocado una serie de decisiones por

18
El Comité ha tratado el derecho al goce de condiciones de trabajo satisfactorias, el cual está protegido por el
Artículo 7 del Pacto, reconociendo que este Artículo “presenta varias dimensiones, especialmente el derecho del
trabajador […] a condiciones laborales seguras.” Ver Observación General No. 18, párr. 12(c). En su Observación
General No. 23, el Comité profundizó su análisis sobre el tema, estableciendo que “[l]a prevención de accidentes y
enfermedades profesionales es un componente fundamental del derecho [al trabajo], y guarda estrecha relación
con otros derechos reconocidos en el Pacto, en particular con el derecho al más alto nivel posible de salud física y
mental”. Ver Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observación General No. 23 (2016) sobre el
derecho a condiciones de trabajo equitativas y satisfactorias, Doc. E/C.12/GC/23, 27 de abril de 2016, párr. 25.
19
Sindicato Interempresa Nacional de Trabajadores de la Construcción, Montaje y Afines.
20
En ese entonces, SINTEC publicó lo siguiente: “Desde hace una semana se están desarrollando graves accidentes
en la construcción de Alto Maipo, sector V1 (Aucayes) producto la explosión de rocas donde el primer evento dejo
a 8 heridos y una segunda explosión que se generó el sábado pasado ha afectado al mismo sector pero esta vez sin
heridos, desde ese día trabajadores del proyecto Alto Maipo se niegan a ingresar a ese portal producto de la
inestabilidad de la zona la que carece de estudios geotécnicos para determinar donde se encuentran estos temidos
eventos. Nos parece inaceptable que generado estos accidentes graves SERNAGEOMIN no detenga estas faenas
poniendo en riesgo gravemente la vida de los trabajadores que se encuentran al interior de los túneles.”
21
Ver ADN Radio, Fallece un Trabajador en el Proyecto Alto Maipo, 26 de julio de 2017, disponible en:
https://www.adnradio.cl/noticias/nacional/fallece-un-trabajador-en-el-proyecto-alto-
maipo/20170726/nota/3531418.aspx.
5
parte de AES Gener, las cuales han sido altamente criticadas por poner en riesgo los procesos de
seguridad laboral y debida diligencia en este ámbito.

E. El derecho a una vivienda adecuada22

Entre los impactos más preocupantes del PHAM está la situación que vive la comunidad de El
Alfalfal, profundamente afectada por la construcción del PHAM y de un embalse de regulación
del proyecto. AES Gener inició la construcción de este reservorio sin realizar ninguna evaluación
de los potenciales impactos ambientales o sociales negativos de la obra. Además, después de
afirmar repetidamente que no sería necesario reubicar a los habitantes de El Alfalfal para
construir el embalse, AES Gener realizó convenios con un comité comunitario para reubicar a
algunos de los residentes. En dichos convenios AES Gener se comprometió a proporcionar una
compensación económica para aquellos residentes, además de proporcionar apoyo jurídico para
ayudarlos a garantizar los derechos de propiedad. No obstante, la compañía aún no ha cumplido
con estos acuerdos.

Desde hace años el pueblo El Alfalfal se encuentra rodeado, encerrado completamente por un
alto muro perimetral, construido por AES Gener supuestamente para proteger a los habitantes
de la contaminación, polvo, ruido e iluminación causados por la construcción del embalse. Sin
embargo, la medida no ha disminuido los ruidos ni la contaminación al interior del pueblo.
Actualmente, los habitantes de El Alfalfal han visto desaparecer su paisaje, el río y los bosques
nativos circundantes, y viven sitiados por la construcción ruidosa y polvorienta del PHAM, con
acceso restringido a su propia comunidad. Las gestiones y ofertas económicas de la empresa han
generado una profunda división de la comunidad entre las familias que aceptan el proyecto y
reciben beneficios de ella, y los opositores.

F. Los derechos culturales23

El Cajón del Maipo alberga monumentos naturales, santuarios de la naturaleza, y zonas de

patrimonio protegido. Entre ellos están el Monumento Natural el Morado, el Santuario de la
Naturaleza Cascada de las Ánimas, el Valle de las Arenas, así como vestigios de antiguas
construcciones. En el área afectada por el PHAM existen numerosos sitios de interés
arqueológico y paleontológico que ya han sido descubiertos, pero, según expertos, existen
muchos sitios por descubrir. Muchos de ellos – como el camino del Inca, declarado patrimonio

22
El Comité ha manifestado que el derecho a una vivienda adecuada, el cual está protegido por el Artículo 11 del
Pacto, “no se debe interpretar en un sentido estricto o restrictivo que lo equipare, por ejemplo, con el cobijo que
resulta del mero hecho de tener un tejado por encima de la cabeza o lo considere exclusivamente como una
comodidad. Debe considerarse más bien como el derecho a vivir en seguridad, paz y dignidad en alguna parte“.
Ver Comité de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, Observación General No. 4 (1991) sobre el derecho a
una vivienda adecuada, Doc. E/1992/23, párr. 7.
23
El Comité ha reconocido que el derecho de toda persona a participar en la vida cultural, el cual está protegido
por el Artículo 15 del Pacto, impone a los Estados Partes las obligaciones de “respetar y proteger el patrimonio
cultural en todas sus formas”, explicando que “[e]sas obligaciones incluyen el cuidado, la preservación y la
restauración de sitios históricos, monumentos […] entre otras cosas”. Ver Comité de Derechos Económicos,
Sociales y Culturales, Observación General No. 21 (2009) sobre el derecho de toda persona a participar en la vida
cultural, Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, párr. 50(a).
6
de la humanidad – no fueron incluidos en las evaluaciones de impacto ambiental del PHAM, y
están siendo dinamitados y destruidos sin la investigación y resguardos apropiados.

III. Impactos ambientales del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo y consecuencias para
el disfrute de los derecho económicos, culturales y sociales

Durante su 41a sesión en julio de 2019, el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas
aprobó una resolución sobre derechos humanos y el cambio climático, en la que declaró que “el
cambio climático ha contribuido y sigue contribuyendo al aumento de la frecuencia y la
intensidad de los desastres naturales repentinos y de los fenómenos de evolución lenta”,
reconociendo también que “esos fenómenos tienen efectos adversos en el pleno disfrute de
todos los derechos humanos”. Con sustento en ello, el Consejo insistió en “la urgencia e
importancia de seguir combatiendo, en la medida en que guardan relación con las obligaciones
de los Estados en materia de derechos humanos, las consecuencias adversas que tiene el cambio
climático para todos”24.

Con base en el mandato contenido en dicha resolución, consideramos necesario abordar el

tema de los impactos que tendrá el PHAM para el cambio climático y otros fenómenos
ambientales relacionados. Esto con la finalidad de que el Comité incluya en el Quinto Informe
Periódico de Chile una consideración sobre las consecuencias concretas del cambio climático
para el disfrute de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales en el país.

Como se señaló anteriormente, el PHAM altera severamente el régimen hidrológico de la cuenca

del Río Maipo, afectada por el cambio climático, lo cual amenaza con exacerbar las sequías que
están afectando crecientemente a Chile nor-central por más de una década. Dichas sequías están
siendo tan severas que en varias regiones del país se considera que se trata de procesos de
desertificación. Es indudable que la degradación de la cuenca del río Maipo que está provocando
el PHAM está profundizando y acelerando este proceso de desertificación debido a que la
desviación de estos tres ríos y la merma resultante del caudal del río Maipo a lo largo de 100
kilómetros, resultará en una reducción drástica de los caudales de los mismos, y al mismo tiempo
también impedirá la recarga de los acuíferos.25

Ante esta prolongada sequía, el Gobierno de Chile se vio obligado en septiembre de 2019 a emitir
un decreto de escasez hídrica en la Comuna de San José de Maipo, donde se ubica el Cajón del
Maipo.26 Este decreto otorga poder a las municipalidades y el Ministerio del Interior para hacer
gestiones sobre el agua que deberán priorizar el consumo humano.

24
Consejo de Derechos Humanos, Resolución sobre los derechos humanos y el cambio climático, Doc.
A/HRC/RES/41/21, párrs. 1-2.
25
Para mayor información acerca de los impactos del PHAM para la escasez del agua y el cambio climático, ver
Marcela Mella Ortiz, Observaciones en el marco del Procedimiento de Revisión de la Resolución de Calificación
Ambiental No. 256/2009 del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo, recibido por el Servicio de Evaluación Ambiental
de Chile el 1 de marzo de 2019, disponible en: https://www.sea.gob.cl/sites/default/files/adjuntos/paginas-
estaticas/n_17_consolidado.pdf.
26
Ver Dirección General de Aguas del Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Gobierno de Chile, Decreto MOP No 105 de 6
de septiembre de 2019, declara zona de escasez hídrica a las comunas de San José de Maipo, Pirque, Puente Alto,
San Bernardo, Isla de Maipo y Buin, región Metropolitana. Fecha de caducidad: 06-03-2020, disponible en:
https://dga.mop.gob.cl/administracionrecursoshidricos/decretosZonasEscasez/Paginas/default.aspx. Para mayor
7
El mapa incluido arriba señala las áreas a las cuales se aplica el decreto de escasez hídrica emitido por el Ministerio
de Obras Públicas el 6 de septiembre de 2019, incluida la Comuna de San José de Maipo, donde se ubica el Río Maipo
y sus principales afluentes: el Río Yeso, el Río Volcán y el Río Colorado. Este mapa se publicó junto con el Decreto del
Ministerio de Obras Públicas No. 105 y fue tomado de la página web de dicho Ministerio (disponible en:
https://dga.mop.gob.cl/administracionrecursoshidricos/decretosZonasEscasez/Documents/DTR%20105%202019%
20Escasez%20Comunas%20San%20Jose%20de%20Maipo,%20Pirque,%20Puente%20Alto,%20San%20Bernardo,%2
0Isla%20de%20Maipo%20y%20Buin.zip).

información, ver La Tercera, Aguas Andinas y Junta de Vigilancia solicitan declarar zona de escasez hídrica en
cuenca del Maipo, 31 de agosto de 2019, disponible en: https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/aguas-
andinas-junta-vigilancia-solicitan-declarar-zona-escasez-hidrica-cuenca-del-maipo/804902/.
8
Cabe destacar que la situación de escasez hídrica en el Cajón del Maipo no constituye un caso
único: al momento de redactar este informe, 17 decretos de escasez hídrica están vigentes en
Chile, afectando a 136 comunas, como se describe en el gráfico a continuación:27

Asimismo, es importante
tener en cuenta el impacto
actual y futuro que el PHAM
tendrá en los glaciares que
alimentan el Río Maipo y sus
afluentes, el deshielo de los
cuales se ha ido acelerando
a una de las tasas más altas
del mundo.28 Esto debido a
que los 67 kilómetros de
túneles del PHAM se están
construyendo a través de
procesos de perforación,
taladrado y explosiones, los
cuales amenazan con crear
y exacerbar fisuras en los
glaciares circundantes,
además de emitir grandes cantidades de polvo que se depositan sobre los glaciares, acelerando
su derretimiento. Cabe mencionar que dichos procesos industriales durante la construcción del
PHAM ya han provocado la fracturación y destrucción de secciones de los glaciares.

A pesar de que estos impactos ambientales severos eran previsibles, durante el proceso de
evaluación ambiental del PHAM no se consideraron varios elementos críticos del proyecto,
incluidos los efectos reales del cambio climático y desertificación, los efectos sobre glaciares y
aguas subterráneas, y el impacto hidrogeológico de los túneles, además de los impactos del
proyecto para la integridad ambiental de una cuenca fundamental para la calidad de vida de la
mayor población a nivel regional. 29 Los estudios ambientales que realizó AES Gener no
proyectaron cómo se verían afectados los 100 kilómetros del valle del Río Maipo y sus tres
afluentes principales al intervenir y reducir el caudal de estos ríos a cantidades mínimas de agua,
especialmente a medida que aumentan las temperaturas, disminuyen las precipitaciones y
retroceden los glaciares.

En este momento señalamos que en enero de 2019 el Servicio de Evaluación Ambiental de Chile
(SEA) abrió un expediente para revisar los aspectos de los permisos ambientales del PHAM que

27
El gráfico incluido arriba fue tomado de la página web del Ministerio de Obras Públicas de Chile, disponible en:
https://dga.mop.gob.cl/DGADocumentos/Decretos_vigentes.jpg.
28
Ver ScienceBlogs, Chile’s Devastating Fires: Another Climate Change Story [“Los incendios devastadores de Chile:
otra historia del cambio climático”], 2 de febrero de 2017, disponible en:
https://scienceblogs.com/gregladen/2017/02/02/chiles-devastating-fires-another-climate-change-story.
29
Para mayor información acerca de las deficiencias de los estudios para el PHAM, así como del proyecto mismo,
ver Carta de Reclamo, interpuesta ante el Mecanismo Independiente de Consulta e Investigación del BID el 23 de
enero de 2017, disponible en: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=40837423.
9
se relacionan con los recursos hídricos subterráneos del proyecto. 30 Como este proceso de
revisión permite la participación ciudadana, la CCNAM presentó sus observaciones al respecto,
las cuales contaron con el respaldo de 4 mil firmas de ciudadanos del Cajón del Maipo y
Santiago.31

Cabe destacar que en vista de la magnitud de los impactos dañinos del PHAM para el medio
ambiente, así como su potencial para exacerbar el cambio climático, las comunidades afectadas
cuestionan la designación del PHAM como un proyecto del Mecanismo de Desarrollo Limpio
(“CDM”) de la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático.32

Si bien este comunicado ha tratado los impactos del proyecto hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo para las
comunidades circundantes, las externalidades negativas de los proyectos hidroeléctricos y de
otros proyectos de infraestructura energética se sienten en todo el país. El bloqueo y
represamiento de los ríos, la extracción y quema de carbón, y la construcción y operación de
otros proyectos energéticos de gran escala para abastecer de energía a proyectos y procesos
mineros, tienen como principal consecuencia exacerbar el cambio climático, además de
magnificar los síntomas del mismo, a través de las sequías, la desertificación, la fusión de los
glaciares y la destrucción de los ecosistemas.

IV. Cuestiones recomendadas

Con sustento en lo expuesto, instamos al Comité a exigir al Estado de Chile que proporcione
información adicional acerca de las siguientes cuestiones relacionadas con el desarrollo de la
infraestructura energética, como el Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo:

1. Sírvanse explicar qué medidas concretas ha adoptado o propone adoptar el Estado

Parte para mitigar los impactos negativos de la infraestructura energética –
incluidos los proyectos hidroeléctricos, como el Proyecto Alto Maipo – para asegurar
los derechos a la vivienda, el agua, la alimentación y la salud de las personas que
viven en las áreas afectadas.

2. Sírvanse proporcionar información sobre las medidas adoptadas por el Estado Parte
para garantizar que los proyectos energéticos, como el Proyecto Alto Maipo, no
exacerben los fenómenos relacionados con el cambio climático que amenazan los
derechos económicos, sociales y culturales de comunidades y personas, incluyendo
la sequía prolongada, el deshielo de los glaciares, la desertificación y la destrucción
de los ecosistemas.

30
Para mayor información acerca de este proceso de revisión, ver Servicio de Evaluación Ambiental del Gobierno
de Chile, Revisión de la RCA proyecto: Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo Exp N 105, disponible en:
https://www.sea.gob.cl/rca/revision-de-la-rca-proyecto-proyecto-hidroelectrico-alto-maipo-exp-n-105.
31
Ver El Ciudadano, Entregan 4 mil firmas al Servicio de Evaluación Ambiental con observaciones al proyecto Alto
Maipo, 1 de marzo de 2019, disponible en: https://www.elciudadano.com/chile/entregan-4-mil-firmas-al-servicio-
de-evaluacion-ambiental-con-observaciones-al-proyecto-alto-maipo/03/01/#.
32
UNFCCC CDM, Alto Maipo Hydroelectric project, disponible en:
https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/Validation/DB/2CB7GPPZM1GN0OG90BPS2R3LL4O5LR/view.html.
10
Las organizaciones firmantes

Aprovechamos la ocasión para expresarles las muestras de más alta consideración y estima,
agradeciendo de antemano su atención a este comunicado y quedando a su disposición para lo
que se necesite en este respecto.

Presentado por:

La Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo

La Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo es una organización fundada el año 2007 ante la
amenaza que se ejecutara el mega proyecto hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo, interviniendo
irremediablemente la cuenca del Río Maipo. Para información adicional acerca de la
Coordinadora, ver: www.coordinadoranoaltomaipo.cl.

Ecosistemas
Ecosistemas es una organización chilena que apoya a las comunidades afectadas por el proyecto
hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo desde la ciudad de Santiago. Para información adicional acerca de
Ecosistemas, su misión y sus actividades, ver: https://www.ecosistemas.cl/.

El Centro para el Derecho Ambiental Internacional (CIEL)

CIEL acompaña a la Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo y a Ecosistemas en acciones de
incidencia y rendición de cuentas resaltando las violaciones de derechos humanos que ha
ocasionado el proyecto hidroeléctrico Alto Maipo en Chile. Para información adicional acerca de
CIEL, su misión y sus actividades, ver: www.ciel.org.

Para más información, comunicarse con:

Marcela Mella
Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo
[email protected]
+56 9 9094 9063

Juan Pablo Orrego

Ecosistemas
[email protected] / [email protected]
+56 9 9225 6238

Carla García Zendejas

Centro para el Derecho Ambiental Internacional (CIEL)
[email protected]
+1 202 742 5846
 Parallel Report to the Fifth Periodic Review of Chile by the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Presented by: The Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo, Ecosistemas, and the
Center for International Environmental Law

Executive Summary

The Alto Maipo Project is a large-scale hydroelectric project being constructed in the Cajón del Maipo,
approximately 50 kilometers southeast of the Chilean capital of Santiago. The project consists of
capturing much of the water of the three main tributaries of the Maipo River and rerouting it through a
system of tunnels bored in the Andes Mountains, using underground turbines to generate electricity. In
addition to depriving 100 kilometers of the Maipo river valley of this water, this massive intervention in
the Maipo river basin will affect access to water for millions of people, undermine local economies, and
exacerbate the effects of climate change. Opposition to the project has been ongoing for nearly 12 years,
with legal challenges being paired with multiple marches held by a grassroots movement and joined by
thousands of Chilean citizens calling for the project’s cancellation and the protection of the Maipo River.

We highlight this situation for the Committee’s attention ahead of the upcoming Periodic Review of
Chile, underscoring that the project is violating Chileans’ rights in the following ways:

The right to water: The Yeso, Volcan, and Colorado rivers, tributaries of the Maipo River, are the main
source of drinking water for more than 7 million people in the Santiago metropolitan area. The project
is estimated to diminish the flows of these rivers by 60-90%, putting the right to water at severe risk.

The rights to life and health: As the Committee has noted, water is essential for life and health. By
threatening Chileans’ access to water, this project also jeopardizes these fundamental rights.

The right to food: The Maipo river basin provides irrigation water for over 120,000 hectares of farmland.
Rerouting its rivers will paralyze the region’s agriculture, threatening the right to food.

The right to work: The Cajón del Maipo is one of Chile’s most important tourist and recreational areas.
Rerouting its rivers will devastate the livelihoods of residents of this area and undermine entire local
economies, which have long depended on tourism.

The right to work in adequate conditions: Since construction on the project began, the workers’ union
has consistently denounced the insufficient safety measures for those working within the tunnels, as
well as a lack of due diligence regarding excavation and construction methods. These dangerous
conditions have resulted in several worker injuries and even one death.

The right to adequate housing: The construction of a forebay for the project has severely affected the
town of El Alfalfal, which has been surrounded by a barrier wall. Residents essentially live in the middle
of a construction site, with increasingly limited access to their own homes.

The right to participate in cultural life: The project also threatens the Cajón del Maipo’s monuments,
natural sanctuaries, and protected heritage sites of archeological and paleontological value, which could
be lost forever.

The right to a healthy environment: In light of the crucial connection between the environment, climate
change and the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, as recognized, inter alia, by the Human
Rights Council at its 41st session in July 2019, we consider it necessary to outline some of the
environmental ramifications of the Alto Maipo Project. Of great concern is that the project will reduce
rainfall and aggravate the decade-long mega-drought that Chile has experienced, contribute to a process
of desertification, prevent the recharge of underground aquifers, and increase the fissuring of Chile’s
glaciers – all of which exacerbate the impacts of climate change. Therefore, affected communities also
question the project’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) designation under the UNFCCC.

The Alto Maipo Project’s adverse impacts for Chileans’ economic, social, cultural and environmental
rights are indicative of the long-term effects of hydroelectric projects and large-scale energy
infrastructure, with impacts already being felt throughout Chile. Therefore, we respectfully ask the
Committee to request that the State of Chile provide additional information regarding the following:

1. Please explain what concrete measures the State Party has taken or intends to take to mitigate
the negative impacts of energy infrastructure – including hydroelectric projects, such as the
Alto Maipo Project – and to guarantee the rights to housing, water, food and health of persons
living in affected areas.

2. Please provide information regarding measures adopted by the State Party to ensure that
energy projects, such as the Alto Maipo Project, do not exacerbate the climate-related
phenomena that threaten economic, social and cultural rights, including prolonged drought,
glacial melting, desertification, and the destruction of ecosystems.

For more information, please contact:

Marcela Mella Juan Pablo Orrego

Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo Ecosistemas
[email protected] | +56 9 9094 9063 [email protected] | +56 9 9349 9236

Carla García Zendejas

Center for International Environmental Law
[email protected] | +1 202 742 5846
Cajón del Maipo, Chile
 Learning the Lessons from Chile’s Alto Maipo Hydroelectric Project
Why the Paris Agreement’s cooperative approaches to reduce emissions must include
social safeguards, stakeholder consultation & an independent redress mechanism

The lack of even the most basic social safeguards for the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon trading
mechanism led to projects that have violated the rights of local communities—such as Chile’s
Alto Maipo Project—being touted as “clean development” projects. With the rules for the Article
6 mechanisms of the Paris Agreement under negotiation at COP25, it is imperative that the
Parties learn the lessons from past CDM projects such as Alto Maipo in order to avoid repeating
the mistakes made under Kyoto.

The Alto Maipo Hydroelectric Project

The Alto Maipo Project is a large-scale run-of-the-river hydroelectric project being constructed
in the Cajón del Maipo, approximately 50 kilometers southeast of the Chilean capital of
Santiago. The project consists of rerouting the three main tributaries of the Maipo River for 100
kilometers through tunnels bored in the Andes Mountains, using underground turbines to
generate electricity. This massive intervention in the Maipo river basin will affect access to water
for millions of people, undermine local economies, and exacerbate climate change.
Opposition to the project has been ongoing for more than ten years, with legal challenges being
paired with multiple marches held by a grassroots movement and joined by thousands of
Chilean citizens calling for the project’s cancellation and the protection of the Maipo River.

The Alto Maipo Project was verified under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the
Kyoto Protocol, despite the fact that it violates Chileans’ rights in the following ways:

The right to a healthy environment: The Alto Maipo project will reduce rainfall and aggravate
the decade-long mega-drought that Chile has experienced, contribute to a process of
desertification, prevent the recharge of underground aquifers, and increase the fissuring of
Chile’s glaciers – all of which exacerbate the impacts of climate change. Given these negative
impacts, affected communities question the project’s CDM designation under the UNFCCC.

The right to water: The Yeso, Volcan, and Colorado rivers, tributaries of the Maipo River, are the
main source of drinking water for the 7 million people that live in the Santiago metropolitan area.
The project is estimated to diminish the flows of these rivers by 60-90%, putting the right to water
at severe risk.

The rights to life and health: Water is essential for the realization of all human rights, including the
rights to life and health. By threatening access to water, this project also jeopardizes these
fundamental rights.

The right to participate in decision-making: Despite the project’s harmful impacts, affected local
communities were not adequately consulted and have not been allowed to participate
effectively in decisions regarding the design and implementation of the Alto Maipo Project.
The right to food: The Maipo river basin provides irrigation water for over 120,000 hectares of
farmland. Rerouting its rivers will paralyze the region’s agriculture, threatening the right to food.

The right to adequate housing: The construction of a forebay for the project severely affected
the town of El Alfalfal, which has been surrounded by a barrier wall. Residents essentially live in
the middle of a construction site, with increasingly limited access to their own homes.

The right to work: The Cajón del Maipo is one of Chile’s most important tourist and recreational
areas. Rerouting its rivers will devastate the livelihoods of residents of this area and undermine
entire local economies, which have long depended on tourism.

The right to work in adequate conditions: Since project construction began, the workers’ union
has consistently denounced the insufficient safety measures for those working within the tunnels,
as well as a lack of due diligence regarding excavation and construction methods. These
dangerous conditions have resulted in several worker injuries and even one death.

The right to participate in cultural life: The project also threatens the Cajón del Maipo’s
monuments, natural sanctuaries, and protected heritage sites of archeological and
paleontological value, which could be lost forever.

Recommendations for COP25

The Alto Maipo Project’s adverse impacts for both the environment and Chileans’ human rights
are indicative of the long-term effects of hydroelectric projects and large-scale energy
infrastructure, with impacts already being felt throughout Chile. The Alto Maipo Hydroelectric
Project in Chile should be removed from the list of projects verified under the “Clean
Development Mechanism”; the construction of this project should be immediately halted in
order to prevent further environmental and social harm; and redress should be provided for
harms already incurred as a result of the project.

Further, projects with such impacts must not be considered “sustainable development” projects
under the mechanisms of Article 6. To avoid repeating the mistakes made under Kyoto, any
mechanism that the Parties might agree upon in Madrid must be governed by robust social and
environmental safeguards, requirements for meaningful and effective stakeholder
consultations, and independent grievance mechanisms.

For more information, please contact:

Marcela Mella Juan Pablo Orrego

Coordinadora Ciudadana No Alto Maipo Ecosistemas
[email protected] [email protected]

Sarah Dorman (regarding Alto Maipo) Erika Lennon (regarding Article 6)

Center for International Environmental Law Center for International Environmental Law
[email protected] [email protected]

For further information in Spanish, please visit:

https://www.facebook.com/NoAlProyectoAltoMaipo
For further information in English, please visit: https://www.ciel.org/project-update/alto-maipo-
hydroelectric-project-threat-chiles-environment/
COMPLAINT PRESENTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR /
OMBUDSMAN (CAO)

Re: International Financial Corporation Project No. 27961 in Colombia

Presented by:

The representatives of the Comité por la Defensa del Agua y el Paramo de Santurbán. The
Committee is located in the city of Bucaramanga, Department of Santander, Colombia (see map in
Annex 20), is made up of 40 civil society organizations that in turn represent about seventy-five
thousand (75,000) persons, and can be contacted at the following address: Avenida González
Valencia, #58-20, barrio Conucos de Bucaramanga, Santander, Colombia.

Points of Contact:

1. Alix Mancilla Moreno: Mobile: (+57) 3112439273 Emails:

[email protected] and [email protected]

2. Luis Carlos Estupiñán: Mobile (+57) 3158850347 Email: [email protected]

3. Miguel Andrés Ramos Jaimes: Mobile (+57) 3144164531 [email protected]

With the support of:

Asociación Interamericana para la Defensa del Ambiente (AIDA)

(Inter-American Association for the Defense of the Environment)
Diagonal 40 A No 14 -75
Bogota, Colombia

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)

1350 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20036

MiningWatch Canada
250 City Centre Ave., Suite 508
Ottawa, Ontario K1R 6K7
Canada

1
1. Summary ........................................................................................................................ 3

2. The Complainants ........................................................................................................ 4

3. Actions Requested ....................................................................................................... 6

4. Project Description........................................................................................................ 7

4.1. Social and Environmental Impacts ................................................................... 10

4.2. Considerations regarding the Santurban Paramo area to be affected by

the Angostura Project ........................................................................................ 13

5. Violations of Policies and Procedures ............................................................................ 16

5.1. Violations of the IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability ...... 16

5.1.1 The IFC invested before the Environmental and Social Impact
Study of the Project ........................................................................... 16

5.1.2 The IFC Categorized the Project Incorrectly .................................... 17

5.1.3 The IFC Failed to Assess the Client‟s Capacity and Commitment
Adequately ......................................................................................... 17

5.2 Violations of the Performance Standards ....................................................... 19

5.2.1 Performance Standard 1, System of Social and Environmental

Management and Assessment ........................................................... 19

5.2.2 Performance Standard 1, Section 4 .................................................... 25

5.2.3 Performance Standard 6. Biodiversity Conservation and

Sustainable Natural Resource Management ...................................... 26

VI. Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 30

VII. Annexes....................................................................................................................... 31

VIII. Signatures ................................................................................................................... 33

2
Bucaramanga, Washington, June 13, 2012.
Mrs. MEG TAYLOR, Vice-president Compliance Advisor / Ombudsman (CAO)
2121 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20422 USA

Receive our cordial greeting. We address you respectfully as Colombian citizens and
representatives of the Comité por la Defensa del Agua y el Paramo de Santurbán, and as those
affected by the project of the International Finance Corporation (hereinafter IFC), Project Number
27961, to be implemented in Colombia by the firm Greystar Resources Ltd., now Eco Oro
Minerals Corp. (hereinafter “the Company”). Based on what is grounded below, we hereby present
the CAO with this complaint regarding said project.

1. Summary

In March 2009, the IFC invested funds to develop the Angostura mining project through the
purchase of shares in the company. As we will show in detail through this report, we believe that
during the financing process, the IFC violated the policies of that entity and permitted violations of
the Performance Standards as mentioned below.

First of all, the IFC violated the provisions of its Policy on Social and Environmental
Sustainability, as it invested in the project without having a Social and Environmental Impact
Assessment, as that policy requires.1 The IFC categorized the project as B, while it should have
been category A given the magnitude of its impacts. In addition, it failed to perform an adequate
assessment of the client‟s capacity and commitment as required by the IFC Social and
Environmental Policy.

Secondly, the IFC was remiss in its duty of due diligence and did not ensure that the company
complied with some of its Performance Standards. In particular, the IFC failed to ensure that the
client complied with Performance Standards 1,2 4,3 and 6,4 since the project violates the
Colombian Constitution and environmental and mining laws. In addition, the Impact Assessment
is inadequate and incomplete. The project is located within a critical ecosystem, and the IFC failed
to ensure that the client truly identifies the affected community and includes in its review process
the cumulative impacts that would occur in the mining district where the project is located. The
latter is significant, since this mining district has an area of 70,000 hectares and has sparked great
interest in other mining companies, which could result in even greater social and environmental
impacts.

1
International Finance Corporation, Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability. April 30, 2006.
2
International Finance Corporation, Performance Standard 1. System of Social and Environmental Management and Assessment.
April 30, 2006.
3
International Finance Corporation, Performance Standard 4. Community Health and Safety. April 30, 2006.
4
International Finance Corporation, Performance Standard 6. Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management. April 30,
2006.
3
Once the IFC had invested in the project, the Colombian Government through the Ministry of
Environment, Housing and Land Development (MAVDT from the Spanish), currently the Ministry
of Sustainable Development, concluded in May 2011 that the project was nonviable and declined
to issue the Environmental License.5 Following a review of the Environmental Impact Assessment
presented by the company to the Ministry, the latter recognized as serious and irreparable the
impacts that the project would have in an area of high ecological importance, where there is a legal
prohibition to carry out mining activities, as is the case of the Santurban Paramo. Despite the
pronouncement of the MAVDT and the ongoing open opposition to the project in Colombia, the
IFC is still an important shareholder in this project.

Given the violation of policies and Performance Standards by the company in this project, as shall
be shown herein, the social and environmental impacts and outcomes will be very serious for a
community of nearly two million persons living around 20 municipalities. Therefore, it is essential
for the CAO to intervene in order to assess and remediate the situation.

2. The Complainants

The Comité por la Defensa del Agua y el Paramo de Santurbán, hereinafter “the Committee,” is a
coalition of social, union, environmentalist, and student individuals and organizations in the
metropolitan district of Bucaramanga. This Committee was created in response to an initiative to
open a gold mine in the Santurban Paramo on behalf of the IFC client company. The Committee,
made up of 40 organizations from the metropolitan district of Bucaramanga,6 was formed in 2009
to head and promote the social movement to protect the Santurban Paramo as a key water source
for the region, since over two million Colombians depend on it.

Actions Taken by the Complainants:

In February 2010, several member organizations of the Committee7 were warned of the potential
risks of mining in the Santurban Paramo. Since then, various joint activities have been carried out
to address the threats that the project would pose to the community of Bucaramanga and the
region. Other organizations and stakeholders started to join what today is known as the Comité por
la Defensa del Agua y el Paramo de Santurbán.8 At the same time, meetings were held with the
different neighborhoods of the city and areas benefitting from the Metropolitan Aqueduct of

5
Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development, Resolution 1015 of 2011, May 31, 2011 (Annex 19).
6
Fundaexpresión, CPDM, Asociación Central Ecologica de Santander, CORPHUS, ANDES, Liga de Usuarios, Corporación
Cindar, Liga de Usuarios, Corambiente, Corporación CIP, Corporación Espacio Abierto, CUT Santander, Sintraempas,
Corporación Atrévase, ASDEUIS, CORDESCO, Asociavita, Sindicato Metropolitano Acueducto, Minga Comunera, Comités de
Base Popular, Asociación Extra, CUDERC, COCUZA, Colectivo de Abogados, Luis Carlos Pérez, Juventudes, Iniciativas,
SDER, FESAMIN, Compromiso, Sintra Metalúrgicos, Veeduría La Lupa, Fundación Ambiental Ekox, Asociabita, Sintracap,
Adan, Comité Magisterial, Sindicato Coca-Cola, O.C.E.-UIS (representative to the Academic Council), Sociedad Santandereana
de Ingenieros, Movimiento Cívico Conciencia Ciudadana, Dean of the Faculty of Environmental Chemistry at the Universidad
Santo Tomás, and Sociedad de Mejoras Públicas.
7
Corporación Compromiso, Corambiente, Cordesco, Fundaexpresión, and La Central Ecologica de Santander.
8
The following organizations joined the Committee: Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) of Santander, Liga de Usuarios de
los Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios, Comité Universitario por el Agua, the Departmental Congress through members Roberto
Schmalbach and Carlos Alberto Morales, Sociedad de Ingenieros de Santander (SSI), Sociedad de Mejoras Públicas de
Bucaramanga (SMPB), Universidad Santo Tomás, Faculty of Environmental Chemistry and Architecture, and Federación
Nacional de Comerciantes (FENALCO) of Santander.
4
Bucaramanga, inviting members of the Juntas de Accion Comunal (JAC), businesspersons,
neighborhood organizations and religious communities.

Several forums9 and marches have been organized. On May 20, 2010, NGOs of the Province of
Soto in Santander, many of which are Committee members, requested a public hearing within the
process of the environmental license application with the Ministry of Environment, Housing and
Land Development.10 On June 5, 2010, the first march against the mining project was organized by
the Aqueduct Union, the Corporación Compromiso, Fundaexpresión and others, and 150 persons
participated. On October 5, 2010, there was a second march in favor of water for Bucaramanga,
with some 5,000 persons attending. On November 18, 2010, there was a third march of protest and
resistance against the Angostura mining project. According to Vanguardia Liberal, the most
important newspaper in the region, this march saw the participation of some 8,000 persons. On
February 25, 2011, the Great March of Water for Bucaramanga was held, convened by FENALCO
Santander and the Committee, and 50,000 persons attended. Likewise, the Committee convened
the civic march of March 16, 2012, where once again the department of Santander made it clear
that it was opposed to the project, with some 30,000 participants.

To date, the Committee has also held workshops,11 used legal strategies,12 prepared public
instruments,13 prepared the Pliego Verde,14 collected 75,000 signatures backing it, and
delivered it to the Ministry of Environment.15

The Committee has also attended public hearings and legal and constitutional citizen
participation meetings,16 thus proving the interests of communities, citizens and even the

9
On August 26, 2010, the Sociedad de Ingenieros de Santander (SSI) held an international forum on mining and paramos, with
over 400 persons in attendance. On March 9, 2012, the II Foro Riqueza Hídrica vs Minería Subterránea was held (URL:
http://salvemoselaguaylavida.drupalgardens.com/content/ii-foro-riqueza-h%C3%ADdrica-vs-mineria-subterranea).
10
Public hearing request by the NGOs of the Province of Soto Santander within the process of requesting the Environmental
License for the Angostura Project (Annex 1).
11
On June 2, 2011, the Governor of Santander, Horacio Serpa, and Assembly President Roberto Schmalbach invited the municipal
authorities, council members and leaders of Soto Norte, and the Comité por la Defensa del Paramo de Santurbán, the CAS, the
CDMB, and other social organizations, to set up a work table to seek alternatives for municipal development in the sub-province
of Soto Norte.
12
I) Establishment of third parties intervening in the administrative process of the environmental license application for the
Angostura mining project, Dossier 4706, from the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development. II) Writ for the
protection of fundamental constitutional rights filed by and awarded to the Comité por la Defensa del Paramo de Santurbán,
requesting a new public hearing due to the difficulties that arose at the hearing of November 21, 2010. Finally, the ruling so
instructed and the Ministry convened the second hearing.
13
The Committee presented the Ministry with nine papers reviewing the nonviability and negative impacts of the Angostura mining
project at the public hearings of 2010 in the application process for the Environmental License, as contained in Dossier 4706 of
the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development.
14
Gathering signatures for the Pliego Verde was an initiative that began in 2010 and lasted until March 2011. The 75,000
signatures backing the Pliego Verde were presented at the same time as the papers that could not be read at the public hearing of
March 4, 2011 (Annex 2). The Pliego Verde stated: “We the undersigned entirely reject open-air mining in the Santurban
Paramo and demand that the paramo be preserved for water production for this and future generations.” See:
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/15750330/129096637/name/pliego+verde+produccion.pdf.
15
See: http://salvemoselaguaylavida.drupalgardens.com/content/el-pueblo-lo-dijo-y-tiene-la-raz%C3%B3n.
16
Referendum on the question “Do you agree that the essential ecosystems in the Santander water cycle be declared public utility
resources of common interest for their protection?” Unfortunately, the process produced no fruits due to State negligence, since
although in the department of North Santander the Tribunal accepted and declared the consultation constitutional (Annex 3), the
authorities in charge of the referendum voting failed to fulfill their duties and the elections were never held. On the other hand,
the Administrative Court of Santander rejected the referendum via its Decision 2011-0058900. See: Diario La Opinión. Agoniza
la consulta popular por el Paramo de Santurbán. Cúcuta, October 14, 2011. URL (accessed May 16, 2012):
http://www.laopinion.com.co/noticias/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=383053&Itemid=31.
5
industrial sector17, bringing the issue to public view and elevating it to a national debate. The
sectors have unanimously stated their opposition to all mining projects that might affect the
paramos.

3. Requested Actions

1. This case is legitimate, as it meets the criteria established by the CAO for this type of
complaint.18 The capacity of the complainants as affected parties and stakeholders in the
Angostura Project was acknowledged during the environmental license procedure by the
Colombian Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development. Other State entities,
including the Judicial Branch, have made the same acknowledgement. In addition, there is
evidence that this IFC-funded project could have significantly adverse social and environmental
outcomes in the future for the complainants. Finally, there is evidence of violation of IFC Policies
and Performance Standards, and of the Colombian Constitution and laws.

2. We hereby state that we do not seek negotiation or mediation with the company in this
complaint process. Instead, we request that the CAO perform an audit to objectively verify and
assess the IFC financing process No. 27961 for non-compliance with its policies and Performance
Standards and with Colombian and international legislation, and to decide whether environmental
and social consequences can be determined due to this financing, in consistency with the goals and
mission of the IFC and its own policies.

3. We hereby request that our identities remain confidential throughout this complaint process.
As will be seen below in this document, the undersigned are in a situation of vulnerability and
threats that could grow if the identity of the signatories were to be made known.

4. We hereby request a review of the IFC decision to invest in the firm Greystar Resources Ltd.,
now Eco Oro Minerals Corporation, for the Angostura Project.

4. Project description

In 1994, the firm Greystar Resources Ltd. purchased, from private parties,19 mining rights in the
territory of the Santurban Paramo located in the Municipalities of Vetas and California in the
Santander Department.20 The company began its exploration work in 1995 and has continued it for

17
The Chamber of Commerce of Cúcuta, via official letter dated March 4, 2010, asked President Juan Manuel Santos “Not to grant
environmental licenses to companies seeking to participate in exploiting gold deposits in the Santurban Paramo, as this would
pose a threat to the natural reserves of Santander and North Santander, and to the aqueducts of these capitals, and could cause
serious ecological and health damages to the communities and the regional ecosystem.” On its behalf, the Santander Section of
the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes (FENALCO), which represents over 500 businesspersons from 28 sectors of the
economy, sent the President of the Republic a letter dated January 13, 2011, expressing concern with and opposition to the
Angostura mining project.
18
CAO, Operational Guidelines, April 2007, section 2.2, page 14.
19
The sellers were José Rangel Lizcano and Crisanto Peña Gálvez, who sold the rights they had held since 1979 on December 16,
1994.
20
Information available in Dossier LAM 4706 of the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development.
6
over 15 years. The Financing Summary states that Greystar purchased 30,000 hectares 21 in
concessions. However, the Instituto Colombiano de Geología y Minería (INGEOMINAS)
informed that the Angostura Project covers six (6) mining entitlements, including concession
contracts and mining exploitation licenses, for a total of 56,491 hectares. 22 Based on the findings
of the intensive drilling program completed in 2008, the company established that available
resources would average 511 thousand ounces of gold and 2.5 million ounces of silver per year. 23
Base on this estimate, the IFC invested funds in the Angostura mining project in March 2009, by
purchasing shares in the company. The IFC described this investment project as a study to
determine the feasibility of the mining project. However, it is clear that the IFC is investing in the
mining project itself and not just in preparing a study, as it also covers the impacts of the project
itself.

Initially, the IFC invested a total of nearly US$ 11.4 million to complete the mine‟s Environmental
Impact Assessment,24 expected to be prepared in late 2009 and early 2010.25 Later, during the
production phase, the IFC could consider other mechanisms to continue financing the company.

On August 28, 2008, eight months prior to the IFC investment, the company began its
Environmental Impact Assessment for the Angostura Project for the area granted in the Mining
Concession Contract No. 3452.26

On December 22, 2009, the company submitted its Environmental Impact Assessment to the
MAVDT.27 The Environmental Impact Assessment it presented was for a much smaller area than
the entire project, covering only Concession Contract No. 3452 of February 18, 2007, which
according to the Instituto Colombiano de Geología y Minería covers an area of 5,244 hectares.28
Therefore, a large part of the supposed area of Angostura was not included in the EIA, which
demonstrates that the fact that the IFC purchased its client‟s shares before it had prepared and
presented the EIA was counterproductive.

The MAVDT returned the study with Decision No. 1241 of April 20, 2010, indicating that the
company should prepare a new assessment considering that “the ecosystem called „Santurban
Paramo‟ is an area that has been excluded from mining, since in accordance with domestic law,

21
IFC, Greystar Summary of Proposed Investment. Available at:
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/0/DF15489BFDE959D6852576BA000E2D0C (accessed on March 7, 2012).
22
Mining entitlements: 1) No. 3452 for the technical exploration and exploitation of a deposit of gold, silver, zinc chromium,
copper, tin, lead, manganese, precious metals, associated metals, and other licensable materials in an area of 5,244.8584 hectares.
2) No. 22346 for the construction, assembly and technical exploitation of precious metals and other licensable materials, for an
area of 1,184 hectares and 1,165 m2. 3) No. EJ1-163 for the exploration and exploitation of an associated gold deposit and other
licensable materials in the municipalities of Cucutilla, Pamplona and Surata, with an area in of 8,424 hectares and 6,596 m2. 4)
No. 0127-68 for the technical exploitation of a gold and silver deposit with an area of 3,4590 hectares. No. 0101-68 for the
technical exploitation of a gold and silver deposit with an area of 5,6575; and No. 6979 for the exploitation and appropriation of
gold mineral in California and Surata for an extension of 3999815 hectares (Annex 4). INGEOMINAS, Letter addressed to Mrs.
Diana Marcela Zapata, Director of Environmental Licenses, Permits and Processes of the Ministry of Environment, Housing and
Land Development, dated August 28, 2010 and filed as Number 4120-E1-80963.
23
IFC, Greystar Summary of Proposed Investment. Available at:
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/0/DF15489BFDE959D6852576BA000E2D0C (last accessed on March 7, 2012).
24
IFC, Summary of the Investment Proposal: Greystar Angostura Project, ID 27961.
25
Ibid.
26
Greystar Resources, “Chapter 1: Environmental Impact Assessment – Angostura Project,” December 2009.
27
Ibid.
28
Ingeominas, letter addressed to Mrs. Diana Marcela Zapata, Director of Licenses, Permits and Procedures of the MAVDT, and
dated June 18, 2010.
7
mining in paramos is forbidden.”29 In consequence, since April 2010 the Colombian authorities
have made it clear that the Angostura mine whose development is being sought in the Santurban
Paramo is nonviable.

In the same way, the technical concept paper of the Corporación Autónoma Regional para la
Defensa de la Meseta de Bucaramanga (CDMB),30 issued that same month, concluded that the
EIA was incomplete and therefore could not be authorized. The criteria used to reach this
conclusion included the lack of detailed information on: matters of transcendence for the project
such as the hydrogeology of the area to be affected; the design and potential impacts of the access
route to the project; the neutralization of cyanide-polluted waters; and the lack of a design for the
mine dump.31

In December 2010, the State Attorney General‟s Office issued a pronouncement on the location of
the Angostura Project, saying that: “in view of the applicable environmental and mining
legislation, this is a nonviable project.” This is why the Attorney General asked the Minister of the
Environment, Housing and Territorial Development to “study the possibility of not granting the
requested environmental license.”32

In March 2011, the State Comptroller also emphasized that “Greystar Resources Ltd., should
comply with Decision 1241 of April 20, 2010, issued by the Ministry of Environment, Housing
and Land Development, by which it is instructed to consider the Santurban Paramo as an area that
is excluded from mining activities,” and that “it should consider total exclusion of mining in the
paramos, due to their unique ecosystem features, extreme fragility, ecological importance, and
environmental services.”33 In its letter to INGEOMINAS, in addition to mentioning Decision 1241
of 2010, the Comptroller made reference to the Constitution, environmental and mining
legislation, and jurisprudence of Colombia.

Finally, on May 31, 2011, the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development issued a
statement on the environmental viability of the proposed project. Based on the features of the
ecosystem where the project was supposed to be developed, the Ministry denied the environmental
license requested by the company. The Ministry textually stated that:

“…regarding the areas pertaining to the bio-climatic level and specifically with regard to
some of the sectors that would be intervened for project implementation (PAD Angostura,
PAD Paez, Mongora dump and the areas programmed for dams, particularly the sector of
the El Pajarito lake, and the complex of glacier lakes in the area), catalogued by the
Company as areas of medium fragility and in some very localized sectors as low fragility,
it gave them this score from the viewpoint of environmental management as „areas of
intervention with restrictions‟ and as „areas of intervention‟, which as the CDMB has

29
Ibid.
30
Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development, Resolution 1015 of 2011 (Annex 19). The Corporación Autónoma
Regional para la Defensa de la Meseta de Bucaramanga (CDMB) is the local environmental authority in charge of implementing
the policies, plans, programs, and projects on environment and renewable natural resources, in accordance with the guidance
issued by the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development. See: www.cdmb.gov.co.
31
Corporación Autónoma Regional para la Defensa de la Meseta de Bucaramanga, Environmental Impact Assessment Concept
Paper or the Angostura Project Owned by Greystar Resources Ltd. SIC 17343,” April 13, 2010 (Annex 5), available in
Resolution 1015 of 2011 (Annex 19).
32
State Attorney General‟s Office.
33
Ibid.
8
 stated on this matter, this Ministry believes is inconsistent with the information reported in
the baseline and observed during the assessment visit, regarding the high sensitivity and
significance of these geographic areas from an ecological standpoint, which makes them
classifiable as areas of exclusion.34

The Ministry also said that:

“The inevitable, irreversible nature of these impacts, along with the high degree of fragility
and low level of resilience of the paramo areas, and the extreme fragility of high Andean
forests, mean that from a management viewpoint these remaining impacts belong to a
category of low to medium manageability, and not as the company categorized them by
placing them at a level of manageable.”35

“This Ministry believes that, as can be seen from these considerations, technically the
Angostura Project is environmentally nonviable in the way its development and
environmental management have been structured, since it is located in a highly sensitive,
environmentally fragile ecosystems, in an eco-region that the State has prioritized for
conservation, preservation and restoration, as is the case of the Santurban Paramo
ecosystem and the Andean ecosystem, this prohibits the development of anthropic
activities such as mining exploitation in such areas, because should such activities be
carried out, they would generate negative, inevitable, irreversible impacts with a very low
possibility of environmental management.” (boldface added)

The Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development stated that it evaluated the
environmental license request carefully, having ascertained beforehand the possible effect that
Angostura Project development could have on the paramo ecosystem and water supply and that, as
a consequence of that assessment, it determined that: “Of the area of the project‟s direct influence
(6155 ha), 85.5 % (5261.8 ha) has soils that are characteristic of the paramo and sub-paramo
thermal level, and the remaining 14.5 % (893.2 ha) of the Andean thermal level (cold climate).”36

The MAVDT was sufficiently clear in establishing that the non-viability of the project is based on
the features of the site where it was supposed to be implemented, that is, in areas of paramo
ecosystems.

However, since denial of the license does not annul any mining entitlements, and since therefore
the company still holds the same, it can reapply for a new environmental license. In fact, this is
what it will do, as in March 2011 the company, now called Eco Oro Minerals,37 announced its
commencement of feasibility studies for underground mining in the same area where the Ministry
has already denied it a license.38

4.1. Social and Environmental Impacts

34
Ibid, p. 86.
35
Ibid, p. 96.
36
Ibid, p. 79.
37
Greystar Resources Ltd. Press Release of August 16, 2011. Available at: http://www.eco-oro.com/News-and-Media/News-
Details/2011/Greystar-Changes-Name-to-Eco-Oro-Minerals-Corp/default.aspx (last accessed on May 14, 2012).
38
Greystar Resources Ltd. Press Release of August 11, 2011. Available at: http://www.eco-oro.com/News-and-Media/News-
Details/2011/Greystar-Awards-Contracts-and-Sets-Time-Line-for-Angostura-Feasibility-Study/default.aspx (last accessed on
May 14, 2012).
9
The primary impacts that could be caused by open air or underground mining projects in areas
with Santurban Paramo ecosystems include:

Affecting the supply and quality of water in the region, on which some two million persons
depend. The Santurban Paramo is of vital importance to the Santander region and all inhabitants
downstream of the paramo. Currently, water generated at the paramo supplies the aqueducts of
urban centers in over 20 municipalities in the North Santander and Santander departments, as well
as the irrigation districts, a thermoelectric plant, and the farming sector.

The municipalities that depend on water from the Santurban Paramo include Bucaramanga and its
metropolitan district, with about one million inhabitants. The Metropolitan Aqueduct of
Bucaramanga captures a large percentage of its waters from the sub-basin of the Surata River (up
to 78% in critically dry periods) with an average flow rate of 2,301 liters per second. That is why
historically they have carefully monitored the behavior of the water bodies that flow from the
Santurban Paramo, such as the Vetas, Surata and Charta rivers, important streams such as El
Salado, Pajaritos, Mongora, Paez, Angostura, La Baja, Monsalve, and over 35 lakes that form part
of the Santurban Paramo‟s lentic regulatory complex, which ultimately drain into the Surata River
that carries the water to the Bosconia Plant.39

In its Environmental Concept Paper on the project, dated April 2010, the CDMB
acknowledges the probability of “indirect socio-environmental impacts on the population.” This
paper observes with concern that the company‟s assessment “does not reflect the people‟s feelings
and opinions regarding its implications and ways to prevent, mitigate, restore, correct, or
compensate these damages.”40 It also stated that “the process of open air exploitation and the
industrial treatment system cause environmental losses in water, landscape, biodiversity, and
decreased quality and quantity of environmental supply. Many will disappear forever, thus
affecting the downstream inhabitants and depriving future generations of their enjoyment.”41
Although there are unsustainable activities in the paramo that should be controlled, the magnitude
of the Angostura Project would cause significantly more serious impacts.

The EIA states that large-scale mining would displace the current small-scale mining within
the direct area of influence, which employs over 80% of the workforce in this area according to the
company‟s own calculations. Other impacts in that report include raises in the local cost of living,
complete transformation of the farming culture due to the arrival of new immigrants to the area,
the development of inequality, competition for water and disincentives for local farm production.
Likewise, there would be a drop in farming as a land use, competition from the mining business,
and greater vulnerability among the poorest of the poor, particularly due to negative impacts on
food security.42

39
Metropolitan Aqueduct of Bucaramanga, Technical Report to the Chamber of Representatives for debate regarding Proposal No.
034 of September 22, 2010 – Questionnaire on issues caused by the intervention of small and large-scale mining in the paramos
and water production areas, and implications for income from royalties, versus potential damages in those areas. August 10, 2011
(Annex 6).
40
CDMB, “Environmental Concept Paper on the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Angostura Project by Greystar
Resources Ltd. SIC 17343,” April 13, 2010 (Annex 5). See also Resolution 1015 of 2011 (Annex 19).
41
CDMB, “Environmental Concept Paper on the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Angostura Project by Greystar
Resources Ltd. SIC 17343,” April 13, 2010. See Resolution 1015 of 2011 (Annex 19).
42
Greystar, “Chapter 5: Environmental Impact Assessment – Angostura Project,” December 2009.
10
 The risk of benefitting from the internal displacement of the local population that occurred
due to the armed conflict, without any signs of government or company efforts to return farm
production and land to affected communities, or to offer economic alternatives or compensations
for the land. The project could worsen this situation, making it irreversible.

Risk of inadvertently compensating persons or groups who were the authors of human rights
violations, through security agreements.43

Risks to the personal safety and right to freedom expression of those opposing the project.
Some of the organizations and individuals involved in the demonstrations of the past two years
have been the targets of smear campaigns (calumnies) and stigmatization through local and
national press, pointed out as “false apostles of environmentalism,”44 and the more serious false
accusation of being “intermediaries of the guerrilla.” On September 22, 2010, the journal “El
Frente” published an editorial comparing “certain environmentalist groups that used to form part
of the armed groups opposing the government.”45 Another editorial, published in the same
newspaper on November 13, 2010, accused environmentalist groups of being subsidized by
“foreign governments to obstruct this type of project.”46 On August 16, 2011, General Pedro León
Soto, Commander of the Second Division, said that the demonstrations against the company Eco
Oro “are attractive to the guerrilla,” mentioned the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional, and claimed
that “this will be a favorable environment for the area to be retaken by bandits.”47

Decreased capacity for climate change mitigation and adaptation. According to the Instituto de
Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales (IDEAM), a study of paramo vulnerability to
global climate change found that potential impacts expected over the 2011 – 2040 period are very
high, as much of the paramos would be drier than they are now. The paramo area of Northeastern
Santander would have drier conditions even than High Andean ecosystems, which is the area
located from 2,000 to 2.700 meters above sea level (masl).48 The Angostura mining project would
worsen this situation even further, due to its destruction of the area.

Loss of biodiversity. In just three localities of the Vetas Municipality, part of the Santurban
Paramo complex, there is a total of 42 bird species belonging to seven families, the most abundant
of which is the Trochillidae hummingbird. Five of these 42 species have a high conservation
priority and are especially vulnerable to the loss of habitat.49 Furthermore, according to a Concept
Paper by the Ecosystems Department of the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial
Development, requested as part of the environmental license process for the Angostura Project, the
drastic changes, whether natural or anthropic (burning, grazing, farming, or mining activities) have

43
MiningWatch Canada and CENSAT – Agua Viva, “Land and Conflict: Extraction of resources, human rights and corporate social
responsibility: Canadian firms in Colombia,” September 2009. Available at:
http://www.interpares.ca/en/publications/pdf/Land_and_Conflict.pdf
44
El Frente newspaper, editorial, “Suspicious debates against mining companies,” September 22, 2010 (Annex 7).
45
Ibid.
46
El Frente newspaper, editorial, “Greystar Resources, a company with a Santander heart,” November 13, 2010 (Annex 8).
47
Noticiero Caracol Radio, version for the Santander department, recording, August 16, 2011 (Annex 9).
48
IDEAM – MAVDT. Study of the vulnerability and adverse impacts of climate change on the high Andean paramos and wetlands
of Colombia. Technical report. Mentioned in: Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development, Department of
Ecosystems, Memorandum 2100-3-131081 of March 17, 2011. Important Considerations on the Paramos (Annex 10).
49
The Migratory Yellow-Billed Cuckoo (Coccyzus americanus), the Yellow-Billed Teal or Paramo Duck (Anas flavirostris), the
Torrent Duck (Merganetta armata), the Rusty-Faced Parrot (Hapalopsittaca amazonina), and the Flame-Winged Parakeet
(Pyrrhura calliptera).
11
negative impacts on the biotic component of the soil and, therefore, on their evolutionary process
and state of conservation.50 Therefore, the substantial change that would derive from the project
would negatively affect the conservation status of the paramo, increasing current impacts.

Impacts on agriculture and forest resources: the project would also cover areas of Vetas,
which are areas of agricultural and agroforestry development. Impacts anticipated by the company
from this situation include a drying trend in the municipalities, reduction in forest buffer areas due
to migratory pressures, erosion of soils and increased vulnerability to flooding and landslides,
desertification and degradation of Andean ecosystems, and impacts on “basins, micro-basins,
streams and lakes that are also catalogued as environmental protection areas in the land-use
planning of the California municipality.51

Violation of minimal required standards for treating acid water, drainage from tunnels and
leachates from dumps, waste water, erosion control, and stabilizing embankments and mitigation
measures for soil saturation and landslides.52

4.2. Considerations on the Santurban Paramo, an area to be affected by the Angostura

Project

The paramo ecosystems are “geographic islands,” not continual ecosystems, and therefore
extremely fragile, which is recognized in the international environmental standards. They provide
Colombian society with key ecosystem services such as safe water, since 70% of the Colombian
population is supplied from sources that spring from paramos. They are biodiversity habitats and
carbon sinks, and therefore are essential to climate change mitigation.

Paramos provide substantial fresh water that is consumed by millions of inhabitants in the capital
cities and Andean towns, and are major sources of irrigation for farm production. Andean cities
fed by basins from wetlands and high Andean wetland systems include Merida and San Cristobal
in Venezuela; Bucaramanga, Bogota, Cali, Tunja, and Medellin in Colombia; Quito and Cuenca in
Ecuador; and Cajamarca and Piura in Peru. Colombia has approximately 1,600,000 ha of paramo
located in the three ranges and the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, from whence the country‟s main
rivers spring.

In particular, the Santurban Paramo complex, part of the Reserva Forestal Protectora Nacional
Río Algodonal, covers nearly 82,664 hectares between 3,000 and 4,290 masl,53 and includes 20
municipalities located between the departments of Santander and North Santander.54 Thirty-five
percent of the total Santurban complex has intervened areas.55 This relatively high level of natural

50
Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development, Ecosystems Department, Memo 2100-3-131081 of March 17, 2011.
Important Considerations on the Paramos (Annex 10).
51
CDMB, “Environmental concept paper on the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Angostura Project by Greystar
Resources Ltd. SIC 17343,” April 13, 2010 (Annex 5).
52
CDMB Resolution 1248 of October 22, 2010, confirmed in Resolution 271 of January 25, 2011, by which Greystar is penalized
for violating these standards.
53
Morales M., Otero J., Van der Hammen T., Torres A., Cadena C., Pedraza, Rodriguez N., Franco C., Betancourt J.C., Olaya E.,
Posada E., and Cardenas L., 2007. Atlas of Colombian Paramos. Instituto de Investigaciones Alexander Von Humboldt, Bogota,
208p, Sector Cordillera Oriental. Paramos District of the Santander Complex, Santurban jurisdiction. Available at:
http://www.paramo.org/files/recursos/02_juris_santurban.pdf
54
Abrego, Arboledas, Cachira, Cacota, Chitaga, Cucutilla, La Esperanza, Labateca, Mutiscua, Pamplona, Pamplonita, Salzar, Silos,
Toledo, Villa Caro, California, Charta, Surata, Tona, and Vetas.
55
Morales, et al., op. cit., p. 23.
12
ecosystem alteration is related to the anthropic intervention found in this area, especially due to
mining development. We should point out that despite the existence of mining, so far it has only
been small-scale mining, and that Angostura would be the first large-scale mining project.

The significance of the geological formations in the Santurban complex area is due to its
dependence on the existence, distribution and dynamics of water, both on the surface and
underground.56 In fact, these complexes are part of watersheds that give rise to international water
bodies.57 In accordance to the Colombian Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios
Ambientales (IDEAM) the Santurban complex is an important part of the fluvial star formed by the
Caribbean, Magdalena–Cauca and Orinoco hydrographic areas, and is divided into the areas of the
Catatumbo, Medio Magdalena, and Arauca rivers, and into seven hydrographic sub-zones,
especially those of the Zulia, Lebrija and Chitaga rivers.58

The Santurban Paramo complex is of vital importance to Colombia, because it is part of the Surata
and Vetas river basins that supply the aqueducts of the urban centers in the municipalities of
Cucuta, La Zulia, Abrego, Ocaña, Arboledas, Cachira, Cacota, Chitaga, Cucutilla, La Esperanza,
Labateca, Mutiscua, Pamplona, Pamplonita, Salazar, Silos, and Villa Caro in North Santander, and
Bucaramanga, California, Charta, Surata, Tona, and Vetas in Santander, as well as the irrigation
districts, a thermoelectric plant, and the farming sector, benefitting more than two million people.

The paramos have immense value for biodiversity conservation due to the unique species
inhabiting them, many of which are endemic. In addition, the concentration of organic matter in
the soils of paramo ecosystems enables them to store carbon in greater proportions than would be
possible of plant mass in those same paramo areas and even more than tropical jungles.59
Therefore, paramo ecosystems are essential as carbon sinks,60 making their conservation essential
to addressing the effects of climate change. In consequence, the Colombian State created the
“Programa Piloto Nacional Integrado de Adaptación” for high mountain ecosystems, islands of
the Colombian Caribbean and human health (INAP),61 as the first pilot project on climate change
adaptation in Colombia and the world.

In general, paramos are ecosystems that are adapted to conditions of water stress, low
temperatures, low availability of nutrients, mechanical stress, and energy stress, but are not
adapted to high intensity disturbances such as those caused by anthropic activities like mining.62

56
Ibid, p. 42.
57
According to the Atlas of Colombian Paramos by the Instituto de Investigaciones Alexander Von Humboldt, the Cordillera
Oriental Sector, Paramos District of the Santander El Almorzadero Complex is a particular situation that is seen in the paramos of
the Sierra Nevada of the Cocuy, Almorzadero, Sumapaz, and Chingaza (the latter included on the Ramsar list).
58
Morales M., Otero J., Van der Hammen T., Torres A., Cadena C., Pedraza., Rodríguez N., Franco C., Betancourt J.C., Olaya E.,
Posada E., and Cardenas L., 2007. Atlas of Colombian Paramos. Instituto de Investigaciones Alexander Von Humboldt. Bogota,
208p. Cordillera Oriental Sector. Paramos District of the Santander Complex, Santurban jurisdiction. p. 42. Available at:
http://www.paramo.org/files/recursos/02_juris_santurban.pdf
59
Community of Andean Nations (CAN), Paramo Information Mechanism. Taken from: Robert Hofstede, The paramos in the
World; their Diversity and Inhabitants, in: Hofstede, Robert, Patricio Mena and Pool Zegarra (Eds.), 2003. Available at:
http://www.paramo.org/node/1763 (accessed on July 26, 2010).
60
According to Art. 1, Section 8 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “A sink is any process, activity
or mechanism that absorbs greenhouse gases, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas in the atmosphere.”
61
To know more about the project and why one of its central issues is high montane ecosystems, see:
http://www.cambioclimatico.gov.co/adaptacion-inap.html
62
Vargas, Orlando. ¿Por qué los páramos son ecosistemas particularmente vulnerables frente a impactos intensivos como la
minería? Una perspectiva científica – ecológica. Memoirs of the Regional Workshop on Mining and Paramos from a Sustainable
Development Perspective, Seat of the Andean Community Secretary General, Lima, Peru, March 10-11, 2009.
13
Under natural conditions, all ecosystems are adapted to a regime of disturbances (natural fires,
wind erosion and icy rain, animal disturbances, etc.), but in the case of paramos, disturbances are
infrequent, because when they occur they significantly affect the plant cover. 63 The panorama of
impacts on paramo ecosystems due to stress regimes64 and disturbance regimes65 is serious.

The environmental, technical and water conditions of the paramo ecosystem mean that an open air
or underground mining project in these ecosystems poses a real risk of causing serious, irreversible
environmental and social impacts. So far, these elements have not been taken into account in the
IFC‟s assessment for financing.

“The hydrological parameters that are affected the most by mining are soil functions
associated with water regulation. Even minor disturbances (e.g., compacting with
machinery) affect their structure, because these soils are very fragile and have no
mechanical resistance. The most serious thing is that once the edaphic structure has
collapsed, the loss of functions (filtration capacity and water-holding capacity) is
irreversible. This has to do with elements such as organic material and organo-metallic
complexes, structures that are generally very porous but that when dried out lose their
hydraulic capacities, and even become hydrophobic. In consequence, the key to assessing
impacts on the hydrological services of paramos is in the structure and function of their
soils. That is why plant cover loss in the paramos is so delicate, because it leaves soils
uncovered and exposed to drying out. In practice, what this means is that restoring the
hydrological functions of soils cannot be ensured simply by replacing some of the plant
cover. Likewise, removing soils results in irreversible impacts because in addition to
drying, their structure is destroyed (due to the aforementioned condition of low mechanical
resistance). Other aspects that should be assessed when studying paramo hydrology in
mining contexts are:

(a) impacts on the hydrology of slopes caused by works such as building roads, with effects
such as accelerated drainage; (b) the need to characterize aquifers and underground flows
exhaustively; (c) afforestation with pine and its effects on soil filtration capacity and water-
holding capacity; and (d) the effects of climate change on the hydrological functions.”66

None of this is unfamiliar to environmental authorities. The CDMB Environmental Concept Paper
dated April 2010 within the project‟s environmental license process before the Ministry of

63
Ibid.
64
According to the Instituto de Investigación de Recursos Biológicos Alexander von Humboldt, “Stress is any environmental factor
that harms organisms and thereby limits their growth... In general, the major sources of stress in many ecosystems are: heat,
water, herbivores, and pollution… if the limits of tolerance to stress are exceeded and their adaptation capacity is surpassed,
permanent damage or death ensues. The main stress factors for paramos are: low and high temperatures (heat stress), freezing
water (water stress), soil mobility (mechanical stress), low photosynthetic radiation (energy stress), and presence of oligotrophic
soils (nutritional stress).” In the magazine “Colombia has paramos,” No. 1/2011, p. 58.
65
According to the Instituto de Investigación de Recursos Biológicos Alexander von Humboldt, disturbances are decisive in
ecological dynamics, being one of the factors that trigger the process of succession. Disturbances are any relatively discrete event
in time that breaks the structure of populations, communities or ecosystems and changes resource availability and physical
environments. In the magazine “Colombia has paramos” No 1/ 2011, p. 58.
66
de Bert Viebre, ¿Por qué los paramos son ecosistemas particularmente vulnerables frente a impactos intensivos como la
minería? Una perspectiva científica desde la hidrología. CONDESAN – Andean Paramo Project. In: Memoirs of the Regional
Workshop on Mining and Paramos from a Sustainable Development Perspective. Seat of the Andean Community Secretary
General, Lima, Peru, March 10 – 11, 2009. Available at:
http://www.infoandina.org/sites/default/files/recursos/memorias_taller_mineria_paramos_lima_marzo_2009_.pdf
14
Environment, Housing and Land Development, stresses that the area of the Angostura Project is
considered an “area of ecosystem importance” according to the 2007 Land Use and Environmental
Management Plan for the Surata River Sub-Basin. These areas are of high ecological value and
need to be kept free from anthropic activities, and should be used for conservation and protection
of natural resources with a special emphasis on water resources.”67 The company itself also
recognized in its EIA for the Angostura Project that “according to the environmental zoning for the
Land-Use Planning of [the municipality of] California [where the project is located], the paramo
and high Andean forest areas located North of the municipality occupy an extension of 1,192 ha
and are areas of special environmental significance due to their fragility and ecological function
that favors the generation of water flows. The Angostura Project will cover nearly 1,000 ha of the
paramo area in the municipality of California. This means that it will occupy soils that are
currently used for protection, are of great environmental significance and are very fragile.”

5. Violations of Policies and Procedures

5.1. Violations of the IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability

5.1.1 The IFC Invested prior to the Project’s Environmental and Social Impact Study

In accordance with the paragraph 15 of the Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, the
IFC‟s inspection that should be conducted before deciding on a project includes three key
components: i) all social and environmental risks and impacts of the project assessed by the client;
ii) the client‟s commitment and capacity to handle expected impacts, including the client‟s social
and environmental management system; and iii) the role of third parties in ensuring that the project
complies with all Performance Standards.

Despite the above, the IFC invested eight months before the company completed the
Environmental Impact Assessment for the Angostura Project, and two years before knowing
whether or not the MAVDT would approve the EIA submitted by the company. Therefore, the IFC
invested in a project that, as demonstrated in the review by the Colombian Ministry of
Environment, and as several Colombian authorities had noted previously, would generate immense
adverse environmental and social impacts, thereby violating the provisions of the Policy on Social
and Environmental Sustainability.

5.1.2 The IFC Categorized the Project Incorrectly

In accordance with the IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, as part of its social
and environmental inspection, the IFC should use a system of social and environmental
categorization that: i) reflects the magnitude of the impacts, understood as an outcome of the
client‟s Social and Environmental Assessment; and ii) specifies the IFC‟s institutional
requirements to publicly disclose specific project information prior to submitting projects for
approval by its Board of Directors. In this way, Category A refers to projects with environmental
and social impacts of greater magnitude, and Category B refers to projects with lower-magnitude,
limited, manageable impacts.

67
CDMB, “Environmental Concept Paper on the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Angostura Project by Greystar
Resources Ltd. SIC 17343,” April 13, 2010 (Annex 5).
15
The IFC investment in the Angostura mining project violated this Policy by categorizing the
project as “B” when it should have been categorized as “A.” In effect, the impacts associated with
the Angostura mining project are not limited adverse impacts, a fact that the IFC would have
known had it categorized the project after the EIA had been concluded and reviewed. Contrary to
what the company says, although the project is being proposed for a very specific site, the impacts
it would cause are neither reversible nor easily manageable using mitigation measures. This is
even what the Ministry of Environment stated in its Resolution by which it denied the
environmental license requested by the company, as discussed in Section 4.

Neither are the displacement of the area‟s small-scale mining, and other serious impacts that the
company would have on the local farming society, limited adverse impacts. In its Environmental
Concept Paper of April 2010 on the project, the CDMB even noted with concern that the company
study “does not reflect the people‟s feelings and opinions regarding its implications and the ways
to prevent, mitigate, restore, correct, or compensate these damages,” as mentioned above.68

5.1.3 The IFC Failed to Perform an Adequate Assessment of its Client’s Capacity and
Commitment

The IFC failed to perform an adequate social and environmental inspection that would also enable
it to verify the eligibility of the applicant company. In addition to being an IFC requirement, it is
also essential in this case because the company has been fined for violating the Colombian law and
lacks experience with this type of mining.

In effect, the company‟s violation of the Colombian environmental law was reiterated and
therefore penalized by the CDMB. Through Resolution 488 of 2006, the CDMB filed a
penalization procedure against the firm Greystar Resources Ltd. as the executor of the Angostura
mining project in the California municipality, due to a violation of CDMB Resolution No. 568 of
June 4, 1997, by which it established the Environmental Management Plan for mining exploration
by the firm Greystar Resources Ltd.

Subsequently, via Resolution No. 488 of May 23, 2006, a preventative measure was imposed that
consisted of suspending all mining exploration activities relating to the Angostura Project in the
municipality of California until all things that were demanded by the environmental authority had
been fulfilled.

Finally, given the recurring violations and omissions by the company, the CDMB once again
penalized the firm Greystar Resources Ltd. through Sanction Resolution No. 1248 of October
2010, due to violation of national environmental law.69

On the other hand, being a junior firm, it is not known whether this same company would be the
one to develop the project in the future and the one that would have to comply with the IFC

68
CDMB, “Environmental Concept Paper on the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Angostura Project by Greystar
Resources Ltd. SIC 17343,” April 13, 2010 (Annex 5).
69
According to the penalization, the company changed the final disposal system for drilling slurry from surface platforms; had not
completed the septic systems for most sites that needed such systems; and the SNETE was not working, apparently due to a lack
of personnel to operate it, and therefore direct dumping was being used without any treatment. This is a system that treats
effluents form the tunnels (mine drainage and drilling returns inside the tunnel). In the field there are no environmental
documents or logs for environmental intervention and follow-up of the runoff, and these activities have not been implemented
although the tunnel has progressed more or less 50% of what was scheduled (Annex 11).
16
directives. This is a matter to be attended to, since “Junior firms frequently have poor performance
in terms of environmental and social standards, and have less motivation than large companies to
relate suitably with local communities, adequately plan the site‟s environmental management and
implement sustainable development practices,” according to Michael Dougherty who wrote on the
growing participation of junior firms in mining exploration in 2011.70

For example, in the Marlin mine OF Guatemala there were a series of sales among junior mining
firms until the medium-sized company Glamis Gold developed the project and then sold it to the
company Goldcorp. In fact, prior to production there was already a conflict around this mine, and
there was even one death due to police repression.71 Furthermore, the EIA that said company
prepared lacked proper grounding and the prior, free, informed consent of the affected indigenous
communities, and this deepened the conflict which has continued even after the mine was sold.72
Although the IFC had invested in that mine, the company Goldcorp returned the loan and therefore
did not have to follow the Bank‟s guidelines.

5.2 Violations of Performance Standards

5.2.1 Performance Standard No. 1, Social and Environmental Assessment and

Management System

a) Project failure to comply with Colombian laws and regulations

In accordance with paragraph 3 of the introduction to the Performance Standards [TN: now
paragraph 5], “In addition to meeting the requirements under the Performance Standards, clients
must comply with applicable national law, including those laws implementing host country
obligations under international law.” Furthermore, according to Performance Standard 1, Section
4, the client‟s mandatory Social and Environmental Assessment should take into account all
pertinent social and environmental risks and impacts, including the matters identified in IFC
Performance Standards 2 through 8, and in the applicable laws and regulations of the jurisdictions
where the project operates regarding social and environmental issues, including laws that States
must follow by virtue of international law.

Even before the project was proposed, Colombian law was quite clear in forbidding all types of
mining activities in paramo ecosystems. In effect, the Colombian Constitution of 1991 establishes
the obligation to conserve paramo ecosystems (articles 8, 58, 79, 80, 333, and 334). In addition,
Law 99 of 1993, which regulates the national environmental protection system, establishes the
specific obligation to protect the paramos as a national environmental principle. The Colombian
mining code, law 685 of 2011, in consonance with these obligations, expressly prohibits mining in
paramo ecosystems. Furthermore, the Colombian Constitutional Court recognized paramos as
mining exclusion areas in the mining code due to their features and of their constitutional and
international protection.73

70
Michael L. Dougherty, “The Global Gold Mining Industry, Junior Firms, and Civil Society Resistance in Guatemala,” Bulletin of
Latin American Research, 2011.
71
Halifax Initiative, “The World Bank and Extractive Industries – The Divisive „Demonstration Impact‟ of the Marlin Mine,” June
2005.
72
Ibid.
73
Colombian Constitutional Court, rulings C-339 of 2002 (Annex 12) and C-443 of 2009 (Annex 13).
17
Since the Environmental Impact Assessment was submitted and the initial environmental license
was requested, both the Colombian Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development and
the company were aware of the legal prohibition against developing any type of mining project in
areas with paramo ecosystems. As mentioned above, since the beginning of the environmental
license application process, the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development
informed the firm Greystar Resources Ltd. of the prohibition against the proposed project, being in
constitutionally, legally and internationally protected paramo areas and therefore excluded from
mining. This point was underlined in the Ministry‟s Technical Concept Paper No. 594 of April
2010, which led to the devolution of the Environmental Impact Assessment that same month.

Now, although the company is now considering changing the project type to underground mining,
this activity is also nonviable, since the prohibition is against all types of mining.74

Therefore, given that from the beginning it was clear that the project would be implemented in
paramo areas and that these areas are set aside for protection by local, national and international
norms, the IFC should have verified this situation and not authorized the investment.

b) The Impact Assessment is inadequate

The project impact assessment of the violates Performance Standard 1 – Social and Environmental
Assessment and Management System, for two reasons: first because the assessment was conducted
in a fragmented way; and second because neither the company nor the IFC considered the
cumulative impacts of this project plus any other projects that it could encourage in the area,
towards the development of a mining district.

In accordance with section 5 of Performance Standard 1 – Social and Environmental Assessment

and Management System, risks and impacts should be reviewed in the context of the project area
of influence. This includes, where pertinent, the primary project site(s) and any related facilities
that the client (including its contractors) might develop and control. The above includes areas such
as corridors for power transmission, tubing, construction fields, related facilities not financed as
part of the project, the area that might be affected by cumulative impacts from planned
development that is additional to the project, any existing conditions or projects at the time of the
Social and Environmental Assessment, and areas that might be affected by development impacts
although they were not planned, but that can be foreseen because of the project and may occur
subsequently or in a different location.

According to the summary of the IFC Social and Environmental Review, the Angostura Project
financed by the IFC failed to comply with what is required by section 5 of Performance Standard 1
– Social and Environmental Assessment and Management System, because the following elements
were lacking assessment:

b.1) All of the primary project site(s) controlled by the firm Greystar Resources Ltd.

74
Let us bear in mind what was mentioned above, that Resolution No. 1015, by which the environmental license for the Angostura
Project was denied, determined that: “It was precisely based on the findings of the review of the Environmental Impact
Assessment and of the visit to the project‟s area of influence and the protected ecosystem, that this Ministry determined the
environmental nonviability of implementing the Angostura gold and silver mining project, located in the jurisdiction of the
California and Vetas municipalities in the Santander department and, consequently, denied the environmental license requested
by the firm Greystar Resources Ltd.” (Annex 19).
18
In the assessment for financing, it is necessary to examine all mining entitlements and concessions
owned by the firm Greystar Resources Ltd. that are now or are expected to become part of the
mining project. This applies not only in the municipalities of Vetas and California (the project‟s
area of direct influence where there are nine titles75) but throughout the area, in order to discard the
possibility that these titles affect present paramo ecosystems in the Santurban Paramo complex.

The IFC assessment should include all areas of all mining concession contracts owned by the
company, since this is how the true impacts of the entire proposed project can really be assessed,
especially taking into account that the Environmental Impact Assessment submitted to the
Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development was based solely on the area of the
Concession Contract No. 3452, leaving out the areas of the other titles, and also because, as the
IFC is aware and is contained in the Summary of the Environmental and Social Assessment, “there
are expansion plans,” which were not assessed.

b.2) All project-related infrastructure (including that of its contractors)

These include corridors for power transmission, tubing, canals, tunnels, relocation and access
routes, transition or elimination areas, construction fields, and in general all facilities whose
viability and existence depend solely on the project and whose goods and services are essential to
its satisfactory operation.

The firm Greystar Resources Ltd., is currently requesting an environmental license application
through the Ministry of Sustainable Development for supplementary infrastructure in Angostura,
under a different environmental license process from that which ended in the Resolution of the
Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development that denied the license. The procedure
for environmental license NDA 07374 assesses the layout for a 230 Kw power line to supply
electricity for mining exploitation under the firm Greystar Resources Ltd. This infrastructure
project shares a portion of the area of influence characterized in the Environmental Impact
Assessment for mining exploitation presented by Greystar Resources Ltd. to the MAVDT in
December 2009. Furthermore, the licensing procedure for the supplementary infrastructure states
that the “Area of Direct Socioeconomic Influence” (ADSEI) includes the districts of each of the
municipalities of direct influence through which the four alternative power lines pass: Matanza,
Surata, California, Vetas, Charta, and Bucaramanga. Since the power line for which the license is
requested is directly related to the Angostura mining project, and the route would also affect more
thousands of persons, the population that is actually affected by Angostura may be even greater
that what was initially calculated.

According to information supplied by the company, which should be verified, there are four
alternatives for the project, two of which include excluded areas and all of which include areas of
restricted intervention.76

The supplementary infrastructure also includes building two dams in the basin of the El Salado
stream. The first is in the main current of the El Salado stream, which affects an area of 7.4 ha,
with a dike height of 30 m, a crest of 3,376 masl and a storage capacity of 600,500 m 3. The second
75
3452, 020268, EJ1-164, 6979, 0127-68, 13921, AJ5-143, 22346, AJ-142. Source: Colombian Mining Cadastre. Available at:
http://www.cmc.gov.co:8080/CmcFrontEnd/consulta/busqueda.cmc (accessed June 15, 2011).
76
Dossier NDA 0737, Environmental Assessment of Alternatives. Transmission Lines for the Angostura Project, September 2010,
p. 30 (Annex 14).
19
dam is in Pajarito lake, in the same area as the El Salado stream and immediately East of the
aforementioned dam upstream, with a dike height of 20 m, a crest of 3,525 masl, and a water
storage capacity of 506,800 m3. However, at the preparatory meeting for the Environmental Public
Hearing (February 21, 2011) the company publicly announced its intention to build a single dam.
It will also build a truck workshop with a 720 m2 office building, explosives magazine,
administrative facilities, a laboratory, tire deposit and storage, mess hall, kitchen, guard house, etc.
In addition, there will be a permanent camp with an 80-person capacity, in addition to the 384 m2
military camp with a 40-person capacity.

The above demonstrates that these works are directly related to the project. Therefore, to process
an environmental license application separate from the “supplementary infrastructure” for the
benefit of the Angostura Project is a fragmented assessment of the mining project. This violates
what was established by the IFC, which requires including all project elements within the same
assessment. For this reason, the true area and scope of the entire project is currently undetermined.

b.3 ) Impacts due to nearby mining developments and projects associated with the project, and
lack of strategic, sectoral and regional assessment

In the indirect area of influence of the Angostura Project and its supplementary infrastructure,
several mining projects are planned that would put pressure on the aquifer recharge deriving from
the paramo ecosystems, the Santurban complex paramo ecosystems themselves, and the
communities that depend on them.77 Eco Oro and at least five other companies already have
concessions assigned or in process for a minimum of 70,000 hectares in the area of the Angostura
Project.78 In its corporate presentation of December 2011, the company Eco Oro advertized its
project as a “tip of the iceberg” project, 79 while other companies such as AUX Canada Acquisition
Inc. (formerly Ventana Gold),80 Galway Resources,81 CB Gold,82 AuRo Resources,83 and Calvista
Gold84 mention discovering Angostura when advertizing their projects to other investors.
According to the IFC, “A successful project of this size would probably cause more significant
foreign interest in the Colombian mining sector.”85 Therefore, one should take into account the
potential cumulative impacts on the district as part of an assessment of this or any other project in
the area.

In fact, the companies AUX, Galway Resources and AuRo Resources obtained their mining rights
in Santurban prior to the IFC investment. The company Ventana Gold (now AUX Canada
Acquisition Inc.) received its mining rights in Santurban in 2006, when exploration activities were
just beginning.86 The company, which now belongs to the Brazilian Eike Batista,87 has 4,591 ha of

77
Comptroller, Leyhat Warning Function (Annex 15).
78
Eco Oro Minerales: Angostura Project and up to 30,000 hectares of concessions; Galway Resources.
79
Eco Oro Minerales, “Corporate Presentation,” December 2011.
80
Ventana Gold, “Preliminary Assessment: La Bodega Project, Department of Santander, Colombia,” Samuel Engineering Inc.,
November 8, 2010.
81
Galway Resources, corporate presentation, “Galway‟s California-Vetas Gold Projects, Santander State, Colombia” obtained from
the Web site of Galway Resources on January 17, 2011.
82
CB Gold & First Source Resources Inc., “Technical Report on the Vetas Gold Project, Colombia: NI 43 -101 Report,” Hrayr
Agnerian, M.Sc (Applied), P.Geo., Scott Wilson Mining, May 31, 2010.
83
AuRo Resources Corp., “Developing Gold Projects in Colombia‟s Richest Gold Regions,” November 2011.
84
Calvista Gold, “Prospectus,” April 25, 2011.
85
IFC, “Anticipated Development Impact of the Project,” obtained from the IFC Web site on January 17, 2011.
86
Ventana Gold, “Preliminary Assessment: La Bodega Project, Department of Santander, Colombia,” Samuel Engineering Inc.,
November 8, 2010.
20
mining concessions divided into two projects: La Bodega and Cal Vetas,88 and is now preparing to
exploit approximately 3.5 million ounces of gold, in addition to any silver and copper resources
that are found.89

The companies White Gold Corporation and Empresa Minera Reina de Oro Ltda. purchased
mining rights in the area in November 2007 that since 2010 belong to Galway Resources, a junior
mining firm.90 This situation shows that the Angostura Project has sparked much speculation
regarding its size, assuming that it will be a much larger project than it is.

Likewise, AuRo Resources, known locally for its subsidiary Oro Barracuda, began explorations in
2007. This company has 14,000 hectares of contiguous entitlements with the block of mining
concessions where Eco Oro operates, and another 18,734 hectares in the area between the
departments of Santander and North Santander.

The other companies operating in the area identified for this complaint received mining
concessions in Santurban after the IFC invested in the area. In fact, the Canadian firm CB Gold
started to purchase titles and commence exploration activities on its Vetas project in 2009.91

In addition, being an IFC investment that seeks to promote mining investments in Colombia in
general, the Angostura Project is a bad precedent for the area and the country, because it promotes
projects in violation of Colombian, international and IFC norms. Furthermore, considering that
there are also mining concessions in other parts of the country that are located in an estimated
108,972 hectares of paramo through 391 mining entitlements in 22 different areas,92 the
repercussions would be worse. The cumulative impacts of these projects, and of any other that are
under development or planned for development in paramo ecosystems or that affect the services
and benefits of the Santurban complex, should be taken into account by the IFC. As a consequence
of this, the IFC should have requested a strategic, sectoral and regional assessment in accordance
with section 9 of Performance Standard 1 that establishes, among other things, that in exceptional
circumstances a strategic, sectoral and regional assessment can be requested. The absence of this
assessment shows a violation of that Performance Standard by the company and a lack of
stringency on behalf of the IFC.

c) Lack of effective community participation guarantees

The IFC failed to ensure that the client had correctly identified the affected populations and, as a
result thereof, that it had consulted with them sufficiently, in accordance with what is required in
section 12 of IFC Performance Standard 1 – Social and Environmental Assessment and
Management System.

c.1) On community participation and community consultation

87
Financial Post, “Ventana Accepts Sweetened Bid from Brazil Billionaire,” February 14, 2011.
88
Ventana Gold Corp, “Management‟s Discussion and Analysis for the Quarter ended December 31, 2010.”
89
Ventana Gold, “Preliminary Assessment: La Bodega Project, Department of Santander, Colombia,” Samuel Engineering Inc.,
November 8, 2010.
90
Galway Resources Ltd., “Technical Report on the Vetas Gold project, Department of Santander, Colombia: N1 43-101 Report,”
James G. Lavigne, M.Ssc., P.Geo., Roscoe Postle Associates Inc., August 16, 2011, p6-4.
91
CB Gold & First Source Resources Inc., “Technical Report on the Vetas Gold Project, Colombia: NI 43-101 Report,” Hrayr
Agnerian, M.Sc. (Applied), P.Geo., Scott Wilson Mining, May 31, 2010.
92
El Espectador, “Minería Amenaza Paramos,” January 25, 2011.
21
As persons who are affected by the project, we believe that the communities were not adequately
consulted and lacked suitable opportunities to participate in the assessment and approval process.
The above has even been confirmed in various reports, as follow.

The Corporación Autónoma Regional para la Defensa de la Meseta de Bucaramanga (CDMB)

noted with concern in its Environmental Concept Paper on the project issued on April 13, 2010,
that the company “did not reflect the people‟s feelings and opinions on its implications and on how
to prevent, mitigate, restore, correct or compensate these damages.”93 In fact, in 2008 the vice-
president of Greystar at that time stated that “the people already fear for their water,” 94 despite
which no action was taken to address this situation. On the other hand, the company has provided
“little information to the communities on its plans regarding the scope of the mining project, while
short-term social initiatives are promoted that scarcely prepare the community to face future social,
environmental and economic impacts, both during mine growth and at the final stages and closing
of the mine.”95

Due to the potential impacts of project implementation, the inhabitants of Bucaramanga and its
metropolitan district, and nearly 40,000 inhabitants of municipalities surrounding the project,
stated that they also have a legitimate interest in this project because they would be affected by it.
In November 2010, citizens of Bucaramanga and other municipalities attempted to participate in
the public hearing held by the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development within
the framework of the environmental licensing process for the Angostura Project in the
municipality of California. Although this was the only opportunity for public debate on the issue,
since these people have no other place to make their positions heard, they were once again unable
to participate in it.96

As a result of a constitutional proceeding for the protection of human rights (acción de tutela)
lodged by various organizations and 238 citizens,97 some of which are part of the Petitioner
Committee for this complaint, a judge instructed the Ministry of Environment to hold a second
public hearing to provide stakeholder guarantees. That hearing was held in Bucaramanga on March
4, 2011, and had to be suspended due to problems of order, as many stakeholders who were
registered to participate would not have been able to do so. The MAVDT sought no other time or
mechanism to hold the hearing after that date.

Added to the above are the calumnies that complainants have been subject to, which have
adversely affected their opportunities to express themselves and hold a significant consultation in
spaces of public debate on the project.

93
CDMB, “Environmental Concept Paper on the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Angostura Project by Greystar
Resources Ltd. SIC 17343,” April 13, 2010 (Annex 5).
94
MiningWatch Canada and CENSAT – Agua Viva, “Land and conflict: Extraction of resources, human rights and corporate social
responsibility: Canadian firms in Colombia,” September 2009.
95
MiningWatch Canada and CENSAT – Agua Viva, “Land and conflict: Extraction of resources, human rights and corporate social
responsibility: Canadian firms in Colombia,” September 2009.
96
Vanguardia Liberal. Ambientalistas no llegaron a la audiencia en California. Sunday, November 21, 2010. URL (accessed April
22, 2012): http://www.vanguardia.com/historico/83208-ambientalistas-no-llegaron-a-la-audiencia-en-california (Annex 8).
97
This lawsuit was brought by the Asociación Defensora de los Animales y la Naturaleza (ADAN), Corporación Compromiso,
Corporación para el Desarrollo Sostenible de las Comunidades (CORDESCO), Sindicato de Trabajadores y Empleados de
Servicios Públicos Autónomos e Institutos Descentralizados de Colombia (SINTRAEMSDES), Corporación para la Liberación
Animal (CORFAUNA), Asociación Cultural y Ambiental – ZUA QUETZAL, Corporación Verde Limpio, and two hundred
thirty-eight (238) citizens.
22
Considering the above, the project as was presented to the IFC has not taken the affected
population into account in the assessments made by the IFC.

5.2.2 Performance Standard 1, Section 4

The project assessment did not contain adequate information on social risks with regard to safety.
The Impact Assessment of this IFC–financed project violates section 4 of Performance Standard 1
on the Social and Environmental Assessment and Management System, which establishes that
“The client will conduct a process of Social and Environmental Assessment that will take into
consideration, in a comprehensive fashion, all of the project‟s potential risks (including labor,
health and safety). This assessment shall be done based on current information, including an exact
project description and the basic pertinent social and environmental data.”

It is important to bear in mind that this project is proposed for an area where there was an armed
conflict since the time that the firm Eco Oro Minerales arrived.98 This is contained in the summary
of the IFC‟s social and environmental review of the company, which states that “Since [2003] no
significant event has occurred that would impact the security of the area. The armed forces control
the area and maintain a significant presence in the project area and surrounding regions, thereby
contributing to the stability of the region.”99 In addition, in its project justification, the IFC says,
“Colombia has shown significant progress in attending to matters of security”100 as a reason to
legitimize its initial investment in the Colombian mining sector with the purchase of shares in
Greystar, now Eco Oro. However, we believe that the assessment of this aspect of the project was
too superficial and that further information is needed on violent acts in the area since 2003. In fact,
in 2004 there were bombings in the rural communities of the area:

“The return of Greystar to the area [in 2003] was preceded by a series of military
operations, including one particularly extensive martial campaign. The Berlin operation
was carried out to keep the FARC‟s “Arturo Ruiz” mobile column from moving into
Catatumbo, where presumably the AUC disputed control over 55,000 hectares of high-
quality cocaine production. Despite the lack of official information beyond media and
Army reports, it is clear that the local population was seriously affected by this operation,
including lack of communication, food transport and displacement in the region during 59
consecutive days. In 2004, there were reports of Air Force bombings in rural and
indigenous communities as part of the government‟s military campaign against the
guerrillas, and apparently on this occasion the same occurred. Community testimonies
confirm that the bombs affected members of the civilian population.”101

Although installing the armed forces facilitated the company‟s return, as stated in the Summary of
the IFC‟s Social and Environmental Review, it is not certain that violence has ended in this area
due to military presence.

98
MiningWatch Canada and CENSAT – Agua Viva, “Land and conflict: Extraction of resources, human rights and corporate social
responsibility: Canadian firms in Colombia,” September 2009.
99
IFC, “Resumen de la Revisión Social y Ambiental de la IFC del Banco Mundial,” Greystar Resource Ltd. #27961.
100
IFC, “Greystar: Summary of Proposed Investment.” URL (accessed January 17, 2011):
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/c9aba76ed1df1938852571c400727d66/df15489bfde959d6852576ba000e2d0c?opendoc
ument
101
MiningWatch Canada and CENSAT – Agua Viva, “Land and conflict: Extraction of resources, human rights and
corporate social responsibility: Canadian firms in Colombia,” September 2009.
23
 “There have been reports of selective assassinations, threats and displacements by armed,
masked men, presumably paramilitaries, in the area of Greystar‟s Angostura Project
around Mohan, Turbay and Cachirí in the Surata municipality, where the population has
been accused of collaborating with the guerrilla. The existence of minefields exacerbates a
situation that already poses risks for this population.”102

In addition, a 2007 report of Colombia‟s Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman Office) and its Early
Warning System reveals that:

“Once again there is an apparent interest on behalf of illegal armed groups to recover
control of the land and population in this area and to seek through violent means to impose
themselves both on rural areas and on urban centers and municipal seats. The current
context has to do with a strategic repositioning of guerrilla fronts and regrouping of
paramilitary structures in an attempt to recover their old corridors of mobility and insert
themselves into regional socioeconomic dynamics.”103

This contradicts company claims that there have been “no significant events that impact the
security of the area” since 2003. Therefore, this means that the IFC failed to act with due diligence
during the social and environmental assessment of the project to determine the security risk level
for the inhabitants in the area of influence.

5.2.3 Performance Standard 6: Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resources

Management

The financing process violated the provisions of IFC Performance Standard 6, which states that
this type of project shall not be implemented in habitats that are considered critical. According to
specialized studies and information contained in the Integrated Biodiversity Assessment Tool
(IBAT),104 the area of the mining project contains at least six endangered fauna species as defined
by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES). These species are:

1. Tremarctos ornatus (Spectacled Bear), currently catalogued as vulnerable. According to the

IUCN,105 mining poses an additional, substantial threat to this species.106

2. Tapirus pinchaque (mountain tapir or woolly tapir), currently catalogued as endangered.

According to the IUCN, a mining project in Peru threatens the small remaining population.107

3. Mazama Rufina (Little Red Brocket or Ecuador Red Brocket), considered Near Threatened
since 1996. According to the IUCN, mining poses an additional threat to this species and has
left it without its habitat in Colombia.108

4. Odocoileus virginianus (White-tailed Deer), catalogued as Near Threatened since 1996.

102
Ibid.
103
Defensoría del Pueblo, Early Warning System, Informe de Riesgo No. 026-07, October 13, 2007 (Annex 16).
104
According to the IFC procedural manual, p. 42 of the Spanish version, the IBAT is its official source of such information.
105
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).
106
See: http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/22066/0 (accessed December 10, 2011).
107
See: http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/21473/0 (accessed December 10, 2011).
108
See: http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/12914/0 (accessed December 10, 2011).
24
5. Puma concolor (Cougar, Puma, Mountain Lion, Mountain Cat, Catamount, or Panther),
considered Near Threatened since 2002.

6. Vultur gryphus (Andean Condor), considered Endangered since 1970. This is Colombia‟s
national bird.

Given the importance of paramo ecosystems, there have been many initiatives to conserve them
due to their vulnerability, fragility and critical state. This has been translated into various levels of
protection, both nationally and internationally, the most important of which are mentioned below.

Paramos Protection in Colombia

Colombia has several commitments to conserve paramo ecosystems, contained in international

treaties109 and in the 1991 Constitution of Colombia.110 Paramo ecosystems are considered areas
that are excluded from mining in the Constitution, and has been reiterated by the Constitutional
Court since 2002 through rulings C-339 of 2002 and C-443 of 2009, and recently in ruling C-036
of 2011.111

The mining law also contains a prohibition against mining in these ecosystems in accordance with
applicable law 685 of 2001.112 This means that all types of mining are prohibited. The Constitution
of Colombia establishes specific obligations for the State to protect the environment and natural
wealth of the country, and to conserve the paramos. These obligations are especially contained in
the following constitutional provisions: Art. 8, Art. 58, Art. 79, Art. 80, Art. 333, and Art. 334.
Article 79 of the Constitution clearly establishes, among other things, that “it is the duty of the
State to protect the diversity and integrity of the environment, conserve areas of special
ecological importance and promote education towards these ends” (boldface added). Article 80 of
the Constitution states that “the State shall prevent and control factors of environmental
degradation.”

The Constitutional Court of Colombia determined that the paramo ecosystem is one of the areas of
special ecological importance,113 and that therefore the State has the constitutional obligation to
conserve areas of paramo ecosystems especially. These constitutional mandates give the State
concrete obligations, such as:

1. Conserving and ensuring the ecological intangibility of the entire Santurban complex, as an
ecosystem of special ecological importance. The Court established that “the mandate to conserve
areas of special ecological importance derived from article 79 of the Political Constitution
imposes an obligation to ensure their intangibility. Therefore, the only admissible uses are those

109
Such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, and
the Convention on Climate Change.
110
1991 Constitution of Colombia, Art. 8, Art. 58, Art. 79, Art. 80, Art. 333. and Art. 334.
111
Constitutional Court of Colombia. Ruling C-336 of 2011. M.P. Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva.
112
Article 34 of the Colombian Mining Code (Law 1382 of 2010 reforming the former Mining Code) expressly establishes
areas where no mining activities may be carried out, including paramo ecosystems. This exclusion derives from constitutional
obligations and is therefore precedent to that law and in accordance with prior pronouncements of the Constitutional Court. Art.
34 of the Colombian Mining Code reads: “Areas that are excludible from mining: No mining exploration and exploitation works
may be carried out in areas declared and delimited in conformity with applicable law as areas of natural resource and
environmental protection and development. Said areas of exclusion shall include those that are constituted as such and those that
are constituted in conformity with applicable provisions as… paramo ecosystems…”
113
Constitutional Court of Colombia, Ruling C-339 of 2002. M.P. Jaime Araujo Rentería (Annex 12).
25
which are compatible with conservation and this proscribes their exploitation, because areas of
special ecological importance are subject to a more intense protection regime than the rest of the
environment”114 (boldfacing added). Therefore, activities with irreversible damages that could
destroy the ecosystem are incompatible with the constitutional obligation to conserve the paramos.

2. Adopting effective measures in areas of special ecological importance such as paramos, to

counteract threats of destruction or irreversible damage. The Constitutional Court of Colombia has
stated that the obligation to conserve implies environmental declaration and delimitation based on
technical, social and environmental studies and adopting effective measures on behalf of the
authority. Concretely it said that:

“it deems therefore necessary for the Constitutional Court to exhort the Ministry of
Environment, Housing and Land Development, as well as the regional autonomous
corporations and cognizant environmental authorities, to fulfill the various environmental
duties under their charge and, on the one hand, promote the declaration and delimitation
of areas excluded from mining and, on the other, adopt effective measures to protect the
environment in general and areas of special ecological importance such as paramos”115
(boldfacing added).

International Recognition

The World Bank Group was aware of the importance of paramo ecosystems long before the permit
application for the Angostura Project. Several of its programs even established that paramo
ecosystems needed to be conserved due to their vulnerability, primarily against climate change
effects that might arise in the future. To ensure their preservation, the World Bank, through the
Global Environment Facility (GEF), has financed several projects whose purpose is paramo
conservation.

Thus, for example, in 2005 the GEF financed the project “Integrated National Adaptation Pilot
Project: High Mountain Ecosystems, Colombia‟s Caribbean Insular Areas, and Human Health
(INAP),116 whose purpose was to support Colombia‟s efforts to formulate programs and apply
pilot adaptation measures and policies to address climate change impacts. This GEF-funded
project responded to national priorities after examining of the consequences of climate change and
identifying high montane ecosystems in the Northern Andes as the country‟s most vulnerable
ecosystems to the expected impacts of climate change. Another project related to the Colombian
paramos and supported by the World Bank through GEF is “Conservation and Sustainable Use of
Biodiversity in the Andes”117 that sought to increase the conservation, understanding and use –
from 2001 to 2007 – of global important biodiversity such as that represented by the Colombian
Andes, particularly in high montane habitats such as paramo ecosystems.

On a regional scale, the GEF has financed the Andean Paramo Project through the Consorcio para
el Desarrollo Sostenible de la Ecorregión Andina (CONDESAN), which promotes paramo
conservation in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. In 2009, CONDESAN coordinated the

114
Constitutional Court of Colombia. Ruling T- 666 of 2002. M.P. Eduardo Montealegre Lynett.
115
Constitutional Court of Colombia. Ruling C-443 of 2009 M.P. Humberto Sierra Porto (Annex 13).
116
http://www.unep.org/climatechange/adaptation/Portals/133/documents/AdaptationKnowledgeDay_AngelaAndrade.pdf
117
For more information, see: http://www.humboldt.org.co/iavh/historico/item/87-conservaci%C3%B3n-y-uso-de-la-
biodiversidaden-los-andes-colombianos
26
Second World Congress on Paramos (PARAMUNDI) where participants concluded, “For reasons
of higher interest and common wellbeing, mining of all types should be excluded from the
paramos, taking into account the context, legal codes and sovereignty of each country.”118

Since the GEF, World Bank and IFC belong to the same financial group, this information should
have been taken into account by the IFC when identifying and assessing social and environmental
impacts in the project area of influence. Furthermore, the IFC should have considered the
accumulated impacts should a mining district develop in the area, as well as the implications of
promoting such investments on a national scale in a country that contains 48% of the region‟s
paramos. However, this was not done. To the contrary, the IFC ended up investing in a project that
would seriously, irreversibly affect a strategic, vulnerable environmental area that the World Bank
Group has identified as subject to conservation.

Considering, in addition, that this project represents the starting point for a mining district to form
in the departments of Santander and North Santander, development of this project can be expected
to continue causing uncertainty. It could also set a precedent that would mean significant reversals
for Colombia in its intension to conserve these ecosystems. We believe that since mining
concessions have been granted in several paramo areas and other fragile ecosystems in the country,
the company‟s success with the Angostura Project would be a terrible beginning for the
destruction of the paramos and source of water for millions of Colombians who depend on this
ecosystem for their water supply. So far, the costs that Colombia would incur from this have not
been put in the balance with the anticipated economic benefits.

VI. Conclusions

As this document has demonstrated, there is evidence that significant, irreversible, adverse social
and environmental impacts could occur in the future as a consequence of implementing the IFC-
financed mining project No. 27961 in Angostura. In particular, the project would be implemented
in an area where mining is prohibited under Colombian and international norms, being essential to
supplying fresh water for at least two million persons, and to mitigating climate change.
Furthermore, the project would cause serious local socio-economic impacts and irreversible loss of
key ecosystems for biodiversity and climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Likewise, there are indications that the IFC did not fully comply with its policies. Particularly with
regard to the Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, the IFC invested before it had an
EIA for the project, categorized it as B when it should have received category A, and failed to
perform an adequate assessment of the client‟s capacity and commitment in accordance with the
requirements of the IFC Social and Environmental Policy.

The IFC was also remiss in its due diligence and failed to ensure that the client fulfilled
Performance Standards 1, 4 and 6, since the project is not in compliance with Colombia‟s
Constitution and environmental and mining laws, the impact assessment is inadequate and
incomplete, the project is located in a critical ecosystem, and the IFC failed to ensure that the

118
Memoirs of the Second World Congress on Paramos (PARAMUNDI), available at:
http://www.paramo.org/content/memorias-paramundi-2009-ii-congreso-mundial-de-paramos
27
client had really identified the affected community and included in its review process the
cumulative impacts that a mining district would have on the project area.

Therefore, our expectation is that the CAO will intervene in this situation, accept our complaint
and determine that the IFC failed to address the social and environmental issues in its project
examination process and that, as a consequence, the social and environmental outcomes of the
assessment that could be caused by the project contradict the expected effects contained in the
provisions of both the Social and Environmental Policy and the Performance Standards.

Therefore, implementation of this project would work against what the IFC seeks to achieve
through its investments. Since the IFC continues to be a shareholder in this project, it is important
to consider whether or not it is advisable to keep its money in this project. Therefore, it is our
expectation that through this complaint the IFC will be able to decide whether or not to continue
its financial backing for this project.

VII. Annexes

1. Public Hearing request by NGOs of the Soto Santander province in the Environmental
License application process for the Angostura Project.

2. The Pliego Verde Initiative that gathered 75,000 support signatures.

3. Ruling by the Court of North Santander that acknowledged the constitutionality of the
referendum with the question “Do you agree that ecosystems that are essential to the
Santander water cycle should be declared public utility goods and of common interest their
protection purposes?”

4. INGEOMINAS, list of mining entitlements pertaining to the Angostura mining project.

5. Corporación Autónoma Regional para la Defensa de la Meseta de Bucaramanga,

Environmental Concept Paper on the Environmental Impact Assessment for the Angostura
Project by Greystar Resources Ltd. SIC 17343,” April 13, 2010.

6. Metropolitan Aqueduct of Bucaramanga, Technical Report given to the Chamber of

Representatives for debate pursuant to proposal No. 034 of September 22, 2010.
Questionnaire on issues caused through the intervention of small and large-scale mining in the
paramos and water producing areas, and implications for income to be obtained from royalties
versus potential damages to those areas. August 10, 2011.

7. El Frente newspaper, editorial, “Debates sospechosos contra empresas mineras,” September

22, 2010.

8. Compilation of press releases.

9. News recording, Caracol Radio, version for the Santander department. Recorded on August
16, 2011.

28
10. Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development, Ecosystems Department, Memo
2100-3-131081 dated March 17, 2011. “Consideraciones importantes sobre los páramos.”

11. CDMB penalization of the firm Greystar Resources due to the company‟s recurring violations
and omissions, via Penalty Resolution No. 1248 of October 2010, due to non-compliance with
national environmental laws.

12. Ruling C-339 of 2009 by which the Constitutional Court of Colombia acknowledged that
paramo areas are excluded from mining in the Mining Code by virtue of their features and
their constitutional and international protection.

13. Ruling C-443 of 2010 by which the Constitutional Court of Colombia acknowledged that
paramo areas are excluded from mining within the Mining Code by virtue of their features
and their constitutional and international protection.

14. Environmental Assessment of Alternatives for Supplementary Infrastructure in the

Angostura Project. Dossier NDA 0737.

15. Comptroller warning served to the firm Leyhat.

16. Pueblo, Early Warning System, Risk Report No. 026-07 of October 13, 2007.

17. Concept paper of the Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales within
the Environmental License application process for the Angostura Project.

18. Technical Concept Paper by the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Land Development
for the construction and operation of the transmission line and Angostura Substation for the
Angostura gold and silver mining project.

19. Ministry of Environment, Housing and Sustainable Development. Resolution 1015 of 2011,
May 31, 2011. Available at: http://www.aida-
americas.org/sites/default/files/Ministry%20of%20Environment%20Resolution%20denying%
20permit.pdf

20. Maps of Bucaramanga.

29
5.

30
Table of Contents | 1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY ……………………………………………………………………………………………...……… 3

1. INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………………………………. 5

2. THE IMPACTS OF LARGE-SCALE MINING IN LATIN AMERICA ……………………..….….. 8

Key Elements of Investor Protections in Trade and Investment Treaties........................ 11

3. MINING INVESTOR CASES AGAINST LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS ................. 14

Analysis of Cases ............................................................................................................ 16
Country-by-Country Overview …………………………………………………..…..……..…… 19

4. PROPOSALS FOR ACTION …………………………………………………….…………………...... 35

Lessons for Movement Building from Pacific Rim Mining/OceanaGold v. El Salvador.. 39

APPENDIX .................................................................................................................... 41
ISDS-Cases brought by Mining Companies vs Latin American Countries…………………… 41

This report is dedicated to all those who have been murdered, criminalized, or threatened or who are
otherwise risking their lives to bravely defend their water, land, and territory for future generations from the
devastating impacts of mining.

Thanks to Sarah Anderson, Rick Arnold, Nicolás Boeglin, Robin Broad, John Cavanagh, Pedro Cabezas,
Kirsten Francescone, Carla García-Zendejas, Kelsey Alford-Jones, Jamie Kneen, Lavinia Stenford, Carlos
Lozano Acosta, Thomas McDonagh, Aldo Orellana López and Luis Parada for their input and assistance with
reviewing this report, and Sarah Gertler for the design and layout. Thank you to Olimpia Boido for the
Spanish translation of this report.

We acknowledge the support of the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) for their
contribution to research for this report.

This report was last updated April 2019.

Table of Contents | 2
 SUMMARY
During the last couple of decades—and particularly during the last ten years—mining
companies have filed dozens of claims against Latin American countries before international
arbitration panels, demanding compensation for court decisions, public policies and other
government measures that they claim reduce the value of their investments. In a majority of
these cases, the communities most affected by the mining projects have been actively
organizing to defend their territories and natural resources. For local residents, these projects
are a threat to their land, health, environment, self-determination and ways of life. These suits
represent a further assault. For the global mining companies, international arbitration is merely
another opportunity to strike it rich through reckless, casino-style gambling, given how the
recourse they have to bring expensive lawsuits to international tribunals takes place within a
system in which the deck is heavily stacked in their favor.

This paper analyses 38 cases filed by global mining corporations against Latin American
governments using the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system. Reflective of the
disproportionate participation of Canadian financing in the global mining sector, the majority
of these cases were brought or threatened by Canadian-domiciled firms, although U.S., U.K.,
South African, Swiss, French, Dutch, Chilean, Australian and East Indian companies have also
taken part. While companies do not always win, the low risk that corporations face to gamble
on a case valued in the millions, or even billions of dollars, along with the increasing
availability of third-party funding and rules biased in their favour, provide strong incentives
for ever more outrageous suits.

The purpose of this brief is to document the magnitude of the problem in the context of
mining conflicts in Latin America and the troubling implications that these suits pose for the
already difficult struggles of Indigenous Peoples and mining-affected communities to
exercise their self-determination and to defend lands, water and ways of life from the
destructive impacts of industrial mining. In particular, these suits further undermine the
already marginal protections mining-affected communities have access to through their
courts, regulatory systems and governments to guarantee their rights, enforce laws and
regulations, and otherwise act in their interest.

This paper begins with an introduction to the problem of mining companies bringing ISDS
suits by providing some data for extractive industries as a whole, but with a focus on mining
cases. This is followed by an overview of the impacts of industrial mining in Latin America, as
well as a description of the investor protection rules most frequently cited in mining
arbitration suits. From there, we provide a more detailed account and analysis of nearly forty
mining suits brought against Latin American governments to date, over two thirds of which
have been brought in cases where communities have been defending land and territory.
More than one third of the suits reviewed have been brought by mining companies against
states that have nationalized mining projects or sought to boost taxes. These suits indicate
how ISDS is also serving to constrain the resource management options of states, as
described in greater detail elsewhere.1

Finally, the paper concludes with an overview of alternatives being proposed to the current
trade and investment framework. We include a reflection on the recent experiences in a
transnational campaign against a mining suit against El Salvador, that helped pave the way
for a historic ban on metals mining in the country. This and other recent developments
should encourage affected communities, civil society organizations, and government officials

1
For example: Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, “A Losing Proposition:
The Failure of Canadian ISDS Policy at Home and Abroad,” August 2015.

Summary | 3
to step up the global movement against international investment agreements, related laws,
and contracts that threaten to dispossess mining-affected communities and peoples of not
only their territories, land and water, but also their sovereignty and self-determination.

Table 1A. Number of Mining, Oil and

Gas Cases Per Year
(Source: ICSID)
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1994

2010
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992

1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008

2012
2014
2016
2018
Table 1B. Number of Mining, Oil and
Gas Cases Per Year and Per Decade
(Source: ICSID)
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1994
1996
1998
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992

2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018

Number of Mining , Oil and Gas Cases Per year

Number of Mining , Oil and Gas Cases Per decade

Summary | 4
 1
INTRODUCTION
Latin American countries are increasingly the targets of multimillion dollar claims by
corporations to undermine the efforts of mining-affected communities, courts, governments
and even international human rights bodies to protect people and the environment from the
harms of industrial mineral extraction. At the same time that corporations have been granted
recourse to an unparalleled international legal system which enables them to bring abusive
and costly suits, they largely operate with impunity regardless of the many harms taking
place in connection with their operations throughout the hemisphere.

The inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses in Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other investment pacts, laws or contracts2
enables investors to bypass domestic courts and bring claims to a supranational arbitration
system. This system gives foreign investors recourse to make claims against sovereign states
for millions—and even billions—of dollars before private arbitration “tribunals”, the World
Bank´s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) being the most
commonly used, and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
being another.

These suits are brought before highly-paid, three-person panels of corporate lawyers who
usually meet in secret with no witnesses. Such “tribunals” should not be mistaken for a court
of law. Rather, they have been called a “caricature of a legal system” with little regard for
precedent nor any commitment to truth or justice.3 George Kahale III, the chairperson of a
Washington-based law firm who defends governments in such suits, describes them as the
“Wild Wild West of International Law,” in which “there are really no hard and fast laws” and
where “misrepresentations of fact and gross mis-citations of authorities are rampant and,
when discovered, usually go unpunished.”4 It is therefore highly troubling that in suits
brought by mining companies these panels are often deliberating on matters of utmost
importance to the interests of mining-affected communities, Indigenous Peoples and entire
countries, effectively usurping the role of domestic courts and administrative agencies.5 In
contrast, citizens and communities have no comparable legal counterweight at the
international level to launch proceedings when mining company activities violate human and
environmental rights, or interfere with public policies intended to serve the common good.

As a result, the prevailing international investment framework, put in place through

thousands of multilateral and bilateral investor protection agreements around the world,
impedes the ability of governments to regulate in the public interest or to effectively
implement the decisions of domestic court systems, administrative agencies or even
international human rights bodies (as we will see with the case of Goldcorp v. Guatemala).
The rules found in investment agreements are not consistent with the self-determination of
Indigenous peoples, human rights and environmental protection. Rather, they contain clauses
that effectively restrain the capacity of recipient governments to act in support of sustainable
livelihoods, to protect the environment and public health, to defend their countries from
financial crises, or to guarantee human rights and the rights and self-determination of

2
Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2015.
3
George Kahale III (forthcoming). ISDS: The Wild, Wild West of International Law and Arbitration. Brooklyn
Journal of International Law, 44(1).
4
George Kahale III (forthcoming).
5
Johnson, L., Sachs, L., Güven, B., & Coleman, J. (2018). Costs and Benefits of Investment Treaties: Practical
Considerations for States. Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment.

Section 1: Introduction | 5
Indigenous Peoples. As such, investment protection rules threaten to dispossess mining-
affected communities and Indigenous Peoples of not only land and water, but of the
potential for state agencies to respect their self-determination and govern in their best
interest and that of future generations.

Extractive corporations, particularly in the oil, gas and mining industries, take enormous
advantage of these provisions. In fact, the extractives industry sector has made the greatest
use of the ISDS system. (SEE GRAPH 2, next page.) Today, over 140 known extractive industry
cases globally have been registered at ICSID and other tribunals.6 The majority of cases
brought by Canadian investors, a principal source of financing in the global mining industry
and the source of the majority of cases discussed in this paper, arise from the mining and
energy sectors.7 Notably, half of the companies that have brought or threatened suits
discussed in this paper have no operating mine anywhere and yet are still able to bring
costly, abusive claims.

Further, these claims have increasingly been for staggering amounts. Following one of the
largest awards in history, Ecuador was ordered to pay US$1.8 billion plus interest to the U.S.
corporation Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) for cancelling an operating contract in 20068 under
tremendous pressure from Indigenous Peoples and social movements in this Andean country
and after the company illegally sold a portion of its project to another firm.9 The largest
amount awarded in a single mining case so far has been US$1.2 billion plus interest to
Canadian mining company Crystallex against Venezuela for having cancelled a mine
operation contract.10 Meanwhile, in 2017, Uruguay was served with notice of arbitration from
individuals connected to UK-based Zamin Ferrous for US$3.54 billion11 over a new mining law
and changes in the location of a port in connection with the controversial Valentines iron ore
project.12 In 2019, the US firm Odyssey Marine Exploration filed its notice of intent to sue
Mexico similarly for US$3.54 billion for having failed to obtain permits needed to advance an
offshore phosphate mine project off the coast of Baja California Sur.13 At the same time,
Colombia faces around US$18 billion in threatened or actual claims from six mining
companies gambling on international arbitration to pursue future lost profits over measures
to protect water and Indigenous territory.14

6
We only report on “known” ISDS cases, since parties to such suits are not always obliged to disclose the
existence of such proceedings.
7
Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (2015).
8
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/238
9
Wallach, L. & Beachy, B. (2012). Memorandum: Occidental Oil v. Ecuador. Public Citizen Retrieved from
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/oxy-v-ecuador-memo.pdf
10
Luke Eric Peterson, IAReporter, “Billion dollar award against Venezuela is reward for investor that had
battled its creditors for time to pursue ICSID claim – and also a huge win for hedge fund that backed the
case,” April 5, 2016; https://www.iareporter.com/articles/billion-dollar-award-against-venezuela-is-reward-
for-investor-that-had-battled-its-creditors-for-time-to-pursue-icsid-claim-and-also-a-huge-win-for-new-
york-hedge-fund-that-backed-the-case/
11
Valentina Ruis Leotaud, mining.com, “Indian miner sues Uruguay for $3.5 billion,” August 8, 2018;
http://www.mining.com/indian-miner-sues-uruguay-3-5-billion/
12
See: Latin American Observatory of Mining Conflicts (OCMAL from its initials in Spanish), “Conflicto
Minero; Aratirí. NO a la minería de hierro a cielo abierto,” Accessed September 26, 2018;
https://mapa.conflictosmineros.net/ocmal_db-v2/conflicto/view/228
13
Odyssey Marine Exploration, Notice of Intent, dated January 4, 2019;
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10442.pdf
14
Calculated from http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/45?partyRole=2

Section 1: Introduction | 6
Graph 2. Sectoral Distribution of ISDS cases
at ICSID
(Source: ICSID)
OIL, GAS AND MINING
ELECTRIC POWER AND
OTHER ENERGY
TRANSPORTATION
13% CONSTRUCTION
24%
3% FINANCE
4%
INFORMATION AND
4% COMMUNICATION
WATER SANITATION AND
5% FLOOD PROTECTION
TOURISM

6% 17% AGRICULTURE, FISHING AND

FORESTRY
SERVICES AND TRADE
7%
8% 9% OTHER INDUSTRY

Viewing the Los Filos mine, Guerrero, Mexico

Credit: Cristian Leyva

Section 1: Introduction | 7
 2
THE IMPACTS OF LARGE-SCALE MINING
IN LATIN AMERICA
Since the 1980s, in Latin America and around the world, the World Bank Group with the
support of a number of governments in the global north, has driven efforts to institute
reforms in the mining codes of country after country to facilitate private foreign investment.15
Such reforms ended restrictions on foreign ownership and repatriation of profits, lowered
rates of taxation and royalties, ended local sourcing and hiring obligations, eroded labor
protections, and streamlined administrative processes to make permitting easier.16 They also
encouraged privatization of state-owned companies and properties. Concurrently, powerful
protections for foreign investors were ushered into law, particularly through the negotiation
of bilateral and multilateral free trade and investor protection agreements between countries
in the region with the U.S., Canada, European countries and others. These have the effect of
locking in place the neoliberal legal reforms that privilege heightened dependence in the
region on privatized, large-scale mineral extraction for export.17

As prices for mineral commodities boomed through the early 2000s, driven in part by China
and India’s expanding economies, mineral exploration and extraction grew exponentially in
the region. Other factors influencing mining expansion included industrial and military
spending, the proliferation of consumer electronic products, and the shift away from fossil
fuel extraction, leading to increased demand for renewable energy products such as
rechargeable batteries and wind and solar energy technologies. As of 2017, Latin America
accounted for 30% of world investment in non-ferrous mineral exploration, with Chile, Peru,
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina on the receiving end of 26% of gold exploration alone,
accounting for 44% of total investment in the region.18 With regard to mineral extraction,
Mexico is followed by Peru as world leader in silver extraction,19 while Chile is out ahead of
Peru in leading world copper extraction,20 and Peru, Mexico and Brazil figure as principal
sources of new gold.21

Since Canadian companies are behind the majority of the cases studied in this report, it is
worthwhile contextualizing Canadian mining investment. Canada has emerged as a key

15
Canadian Network on Corporate Accountability, “Dirty Business, Dirty Practices: How the Federal
Government Supports Canadian Mining, Oil and Gas Companies Abroad,” May 2007; Also, Roger Moody,
Rocks and Hard Places: The Globalization of Mining, Zed Books, 2007.
16
David Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining, Communities and the World Bank, Hart
Publishing, 2007.
17
Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, “A Losing Proposition: The Failure of
Canadian ISDS Policy at Home and Abroad,” August 2015.
18
S&P Global Market Intelligence, World Exploration Trends, March 2018,
https://pages.marketintelligence.spglobal.com/rs/565-BDO-100/images/World-Exploration-Trends-
Report-2018.pdf
19
U.S. Geological Service, Silver, 2018; https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/silver/mcs-2018-
silve.pdf
20
U.S. Geological Service, Copper, 2018; https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/copper/mcs-
2018-coppe.pdf
21
U.S. Geological Service, Gold, 2018; https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/gold/mcs-2018-
gold.pdf

Section 2: The Impacts of Large Scale Mining in Latin America | 8

source of equity financing for the globalized mining industry, with an estimated 60% of the
world’s mining companies listing in Canada. Canadian stock exchanges estimate that they
raised 34% of equity financing for mining activities worldwide in 2015.22 Regionally, Latin
America is the principal destination for Canadian foreign investment, with 55% of Canadian
mining assets outside Canada and the United States located in Latin America, according to
the most recent estimates.23 Some have called Canada a “judicial paradise”24 for the
globalized mining industry, thanks to lax listing and incorporation standards, low corporate
taxes, a comprehensive framework of tax treaties with other countries, and near negligible
control over company activities abroad, as well as generous trade commissioner and
diplomatic support to promote mining industry interests. The vast majority of the companies
listing in Canada are prospecting and exploration firms, known as “junior” mining companies,
many of which will never operate a mine. Rather, junior companies tend to pave the way for
larger mining companies to move in once a project becomes sufficiently advanced and make
their millions from the selling the project, often laying the seeds of conflict or giving rise to
serious conflict in the process, as over half of the companies profiled in the case studies in
this report demonstrate. Canada is also domicile for a number of the world’s biggest mining
companies, largely involved in gold, silver, and uranium extraction.

Whatever the source of capital for a mine, as known mineral deposits have been exhausted,
companies are exploring in many areas never before mined, encroaching on fragile
ecosystems, vital sources of water, the lands and territories of Indigenous and subsistence
communities, and even urban areas. Further, as the concentration of minerals in remaining
deposits of metals trends ever lower, the size and long-term risks of industrial mines have
multiplied.25 Extracting just a single ounce of gold entails an estimated 79 tons of mine waste
that is left on the land, a significant source of potential contamination for decades and even
centuries to come.26

In a recent survey of operating gold mines in the U.S., Earthworks and Great Basin Resource
Watch found evidence that all 27 mines surveyed had spills and other seepage failures at
least once. They also found evidence of contamination for all mines near surface water or
groundwater sources.27

Industrial mines also make use of tremendous quantities of energy and water, which can
enter into competition with other users.28 Further, increasing automation of mining
operations also means they employ fewer and fewer people. While the socioeconomic and
environmental impacts intensify, those resisting mines or trying to address their impacts or to
renegotiate their terms have been facing increasing threats of criminalization, militarization

22
TMX Group, Mining Pitchbook, April 2016
23
Natural Resources Canada, “Canadian Mining Assets: Information Bulletin, December 2014,” published
February 2015; https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/publications/17072
24
Alain Deneault, Pushing the Debate: Noir Canada’s critical perspective, December 28, 2008;
http://www.dominionpaper.ca/articles/2305
25
MiningWatch Canada, “New Study Indicates Increasing Mine Disasters Worldwide — Why is the industry
incapable of learning from its biggest mishaps?” August 7, 2015;
https://miningwatch.ca/blog/2015/8/7/new-study-indicates-increasing-mine-disasters-worldwide-why-
industry-incapable
26
Earthworks and Oxfam America, Dirty Metals: Mining, Communities and the Environment, 2004.
27
Earthworks and Great Basic Resource Watch, “US Gold Mines: Spills & Failures Report,” July 2017;
https://earthworks.org/publications/us_gold_mines_spills_failures/
28
Earthworks and Oxfam America, 2004.

Section 2: The Impacts of Large Scale Mining in Latin America | 9

and targeted violence in many parts of the region. In one survey of Canadian mining conflicts
between 2000-2015, over 40 killings and over 700 cases of criminalization (legal complaints,
arrests, detentions or charges) were identified in connection with 28 Canadian mining
operations in 13 countries.29

In this high stakes life and death scenario, Indigenous Peoples and mining-affected
communities have little recourse when individuals are attacked or killed, communities are
forcibly displaced, agricultural lands destroyed, sources of water contaminated, diverted or
dried up, ways of life radically transformed or denied, and spills or other accidents occur.
Meanwhile, Canadian, U.S. and other mining companies are turning to supranational panels
of corporate lawyers to sue governments for hundreds of millions of dollars, putting in
jeopardy important efforts to protect people and the environment, while undermining the
sovereignty and self-determination of peoples seeking to defend themselves.

Banner reads "KCA's suit against Guatemala is the result of the inefficiency of public
officials who obey individual interests; the Guatemalan people shouldn't bear this
responsibility"; Credit: Jen Moore/IPS

29
The Justice and Corporate Accountability Project (JCAP), The ‘Canada Brand’: Violence and Canadian
Mining Companies in Latin America, October 24, 2016; https://justice-project.org/the-canada-brand-
violence-and-canadian-mining-companies-in-latin-america/

Section 2: The Impacts of Large Scale Mining in Latin America | 10

 KEY ELEMENTS OF INVESTOR PROTECTIONS IN TRADE AND
INVESTMENT TREATIES
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

Private foreign investors can bypass domestic courts and sue governments directly before
supranational arbitration panels of corporate lawyers that largely meet in secret with no
witnesses. The most commonly used arbitration tribunal is the World Bank’s International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is another. These tribunals rule on claims of violations of
investors protections enshrined in a wide array of legal agreements, including thousands of
trade and investment treaties. While these protections vary somewhat in different
agreements, the following are some of the most common:

Restrictions on “Indirect” Expropriation

Whereas expropriation used to be understood as physical taking of property, current rules

also protect investors from “indirect” expropriation. This is interpreted to mean regulations
and other government actions that reduce the value of an investment. Hence, corporations
can sue governments over the enforcement of environmental, health, and other public
interest laws or measures arising from democratic or judicial processes. While investment
tribunals cannot force a government to repeal laws and regulations, time-consuming, costly
litigation and the threat of massive awards for damages can put a “chilling effect”30 on
responsible policy-making.

Vague “Fair and Equitable Treatment” Standards

Under a typical trade or investment agreement, governments are obligated to provide

foreign investors a “Minimum Standard of Treatment”, including “Fair and Equitable
Treatment”. These terms are highly vague and subjective, and arbitrators have interpreted
them in wildly different ways without regard for the diverse histories, cultures and value
systems in different countries. Foreign investors allege violations of these investment rules
more than any others. Similarly, there are clauses frequently found in international investment
agreements that protect investors from “arbitrary/unreasonable and discriminatory
measures” on the part of states. Nonetheless, long before the international protection
treaties came along, protections for foreigners against arbitrary state action was already
considered part of international law.31

30
Kyla Tienhaara, “Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science,” October 28,
2010 in Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration, Chester Brown, Kate Miles, eds., Cambridge
University Press, 2011; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2065706
31
Ursula Kriebaum “Arbitrary/Unreasonable or Discriminatory Measures” in M. Bungenberg, J. Griebel, S.
Hobe, A. Reinisch (eds), International Investment Law, Baden Baden: Nomos (2013, Forthcoming)
University Vienna, November 11, 2012.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=2061075

Section 2: The Impacts of Large Scale Mining in Latin America | 11

National Treatment and Most-Favored Nation Treatment

Investment agreements also often require that governments treat foreign investors and their
investments at least as favorably as domestic investors and those from any third country.
While this is touted as a basic principle of fairness, it strips the power of governments to
pursue national economic strategies that have been used successfully in the past. Moreover,
a regulatory action that applies to all corporations, but that may have a disproportionate
impact—real or perceived—on a foreign investor could be targeted under this rule. Some
governments have negotiated exceptions to this rule for certain sensitive sectors, such as
national oil reserves (Mexico, for example, prior to its recent energy reforms).

Ban on Capital Controls

Most agreements prohibit governments from applying restrictions on the flows of capital, to
prevent or mitigate financial crises. In December 2012, even the International Monetary Fund
adopted an official policy endorsing the regulation of cross-border finance in some
circumstances. While such measures are not directly related to resource extraction, this rule
means countries mired in financial crises face additional pressure to exploit resources
recklessly. It also helps extractive industries to move their capitals in and out of a country
without restrictions.

Limits on Performance Requirements

Most agreements oblige governments to surrender their authority to require foreign

investors to use a minimum percentage of local inputs in production, or to transfer
technology, or other conditions on investment that have been used in the past as tools for
economic development. This is particularly problematic for governments attempting to avoid
certain aspects of the “resource curse”.32 Without the ability to ensure that extractive
industries create good local jobs by requiring them to give a share of their business to
domestic suppliers and train personnel to use advanced technologies, the potential benefits
for the broader economy are limited.

Full Protection and Security Standard (FPS)

The FPS standard encompasses both physical and legal damages to investments supposedly
caused by the state or third parties (i.e. civil society). Until recently, FPS maintained a low
profile in investment treaties, but investors are now using it more. According to the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), “the stakes for developing states
found liable for breach of treaty obligations are particularly high. The seemingly innocuous
and obvious treaty promise to accord Full Protection and Security to investments can impose
32
In mainstream economics, the “resource curse” is usually understood as the macroeconomic pitfalls of
dependence on non-renewable resource extraction, including the ways that such dependency tends to
undermine economic development on a national scale. Factors responsible for the resource curse include
the vulnerability of a national economy to the boom and bust cycles of mineral prices on the global
market, over-evaluation of local currency when mineral prices are high (also known as the “Dutch
Disease”), a tendency to foster corruption and misspending during boom periods, and diminished
attention to more sustainable economic sectors. There is also a local side to such dependency, what Stuart
Kirsch calls “the microeconomics of the resource curse,” or the incomplete accounting for the social and
environmental costs of mining projects at the local level, which frequently result in a net loss for affected
communities. (Kirsch, Mining Capitalism, 2014). Others have focused on the political economy of the
resource curse – that is the fact that the elite (not the marginalized and dispossessed) stand to benefit
from the exploitation of minerals rather than from long-term sustainable pathways.

Section 2: The Impacts of Large Scale Mining in Latin America | 12

an onerous level of liability on states with scarce resources. Investment treaties formulate the
standard of Full Protection and Security in a broad manner, and tribunals have taken this at
face value, thus interpreting the obligation as imposing a duty upon states to prevent harm
to the investment from the acts of government and non-government actors.”33 For example,
this could conceivably include using state armed forces or other means to ensure investors’
protection from community protests against their projects.

Umbrella Clause

Another controversial clause in investor protection agreements is the so-called “Umbrella

clause”. This enforces a requirement on each State party to the agreement to observe all
investment obligations entered into with investors from the other Contracting State. In
practice, an Umbrella clause can raise a contract claim to the level of a treaty claim. Usually,
violating a contract does not invoke treaty protection under international law. However,
adding an Umbrella clause to an investor protection agreement does so in several ways. For
example, it removes the need for investors to rely on dispute resolution clauses in an
investment contract (which may, for example, give exclusive jurisdiction to local courts), and
allow them to bring a claim to a supranational arbitration body instead.34

Protest at the World Bank in favor of El Salvador, September 15th, 2014

Photo credit: Amanda Kistler, CIEL

33
Mahnaz Malik, “The Full Protection and Security Standard Comes of Age: Yet another challenge for states
in investment treaty arbitration?”. Best Practices Series. November 2011. International Institute for
Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/full_protection.pdf
34
“The Umbrella Clause.” Thomson Practical Law.
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I43e21e821c9a11e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?co
ntextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1

Section 2: The Impacts of Large Scale Mining in Latin America | 13

 3
MINING INVESTOR CASES AGAINST LATIN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENTS
The proliferation of investor state arbitration by mining companies against governments in
Latin America has coincided with growing conflict and community resistance against the
rampant expansion of industrial metal mining in the region. Neoliberal reforms to mining
codes in country after country, along with the rise of prices for commodities such as gold and
silver through much of the 2000s, facilitated exponential levels of investment in the sector
and soon gave rise to a proliferation of conflict with Indigenous Peoples and affected
communities.

Opposition grew, especially in areas where there has been little industrial mining previously,
as communities started learning from their own experience and that of others about the
long-term social and environmental harms that accompany industrial mining, often
threatening existing ways of life and livelihoods. In other cases, locally-led movements
emerged to fight for redress for the environmental and health impacts of mining. Where
community and citizen-led efforts to protect fragile ecosystems, water sources, land,
Indigenous territories, and the overall health of their communities pressured governments,
courts and even international human rights bodies to respond to their demands,
governments have been punished with the costly reality of mining investors taking them to
supranational arbitration. A considerable number of cases have also arisen from government
measures to nationalize mining projects or increase their tax intake from specific mines.

As can be seen in Graph 3, Central America and South America are the most sued regions in
the world. Graph 4 illustrates the countries that have been or are being sued the most.

Graph 3. Geographic Distribution of Cases

(Source: ICSID, 2018 )
CENTRAL AMERICA AND
SOUTH AMERICA
EASTERN EUROPE AND
4% CENTRAL ASIA
8%
7% 29% SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

11% MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH

AFRICA
SOUTH AND EAST ASIA AND
15%
26% THE PACIFIC
WESTERN EUROPE

NORTH AMERICA

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 14

 Graph 4A. Outcome of ISDS Cases Against Latin
American and Caribbean States.
(Source: UNCTAD, 2018)
DISCONTINUED
9%

PENDING PENDING
SETTLED 29%
18% FAVOR STATE

FAVOR
INVESTOR

FAVOR INVESTOR
SETTLED
25% FAVOR STATE
19% DISCONTINUED

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 15

 ANALYSIS OF CASES
Although all Latin American countries that have been sued by mining companies under the
ISDS system share the commonality of having to defend themselves in the same unjust
manner under rules engineered in favor of corporations, the underlying issues, government
measures, and alleged breaches of investor protection rules vary.

Of the thirty-eight suits identified in our study, in over two thirds of the cases, some degree
of community resistance has been involved, whether or not this was a direct determinant of
the government measure in dispute.

Over half of the mining companies that have brought cases are Canadian-domiciled.
Furthermore, a majority of these cases have been brought by exploration companies that
have no operating mine, or no other mining project at all, and are making a last-ditch effort
to extract millions or even billions of dollars from governments in the region through
international arbitration whether they have followed local environmental and mining
regulations or not, and almost always lacking community consent to operate. In several
cases, (Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica, Eco Oro Minerals v. Colombia, and TriMetals Mining -
formerly South American Silver- v. Bolivia), exploration companies are being backed by third-
party funders35 who will profit from the case if the arbitration panel finds in favor of the
company.

Issues and government measures in dispute

Companies may bring suits involving a range of issues while alleging that different types of
government measures have affected or potentially affected their mining projects and future
profits. We break these down into three issue areas within which we describe a variety of
government measures being disputed:

1. Indigenous rights and lack of community consent

In thirteen cases, or roughly one-third, mining companies are disputing a variety of

government measures that principally hinge on the issue of Indigenous rights and
community consent. Of these thirteen cases, nine were brought by junior mining companies
or companies without an operating mine during the duration of the arbitration.
In the case of Goldcorp v. Guatemala, the Guatemalan government cited potential
arbitration as part of considerations preventing it from implementing an order from the Inter
American Human Rights Commission to suspend the Marlin mine operations over violations
of Indigenous rights and issues related to protection of water supplies and community
health. This is the only case that we found in which an international human rights body is
involved.
In Guatemala, Kappes, Cassidy & Associates (KCA) has initiated a claim and Tahoe
Resources has threatened to file a claim involving court decisions that led to the suspension
of mining operations over lack of respect for Indigenous consultation and consent.
Another four cases related to Indigenous rights or community consent were brought
over regulatory decisions to revoke permits for lack of consultation and consent. Examples of
this include Dominion Minerals v. Panama, Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, Copper Mesa Mining v.
Ecuador, and Cosigo Resources v. Colombia.
In the case of TriMetals Mining (formerly South American Silver) v. Bolivia, the
company’s project was nationalized in the wake of community conflict.

35
These are investor groups that help to fund an arbitration case that, although they do not have a direct
involvement in the claim or process, have an economic interest in the company achieving a financial award.

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 16

 In the case of Gran Colombia Gold v. Colombia, the company is suing over the need
for further community consultation and perceived lack of action on the part of authorities to
protect company interests in the face of conflict with informal miners.
Meanwhile, INV Metals has threatened to sue Ecuador over a referendum approved
by the national electoral authority regarding its mining activities in water sources upstream of
a rural county affected by its proposed gold and silver project.

2. Enforcement of environmental and health protections

Twenty cases, or over half, relate to government measures concerning the implementation or
modification of environmental and mining regulations. Of these twenty suits, fifteen were
brought by junior mining companies or companies without an operating mine during the
duration of the arbitration.
In four cases identified, mining companies are suing the government over court
decisions related to environmental and mining regulations that impeded their projects. These
include Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica, Eco Oro Minerals v. Colombia, Galway Gold v. Colombia
and Red Eagle Exploration v. Colombia.
Eight cases relate to regulatory enforcement by state authorities. In El Salvador, suits
brought by Commerce Group and Pacific Rim Mining (later acquired by OceanaGold) were
over regulatory enforcement of environmental and mining laws by the central government.
Blackfire Exploration v. Mexico is a case where the company threatened arbitration after
authorities enforced environmental regulation at the local and state, rather than the federal
level. More recently, Legacy Vulcan is suing Mexico over measures related to a municipal land
use plan that prevents it from quarrying in an ecologically sensitive area. Corona Materials
LLC sued the Dominican Republic when it turned down its application for an environmental
permit and Renco Group sued Peru for canceling its permit for the La Oroya smelter over
environmental remediation measures. Zamin Ferrous investors v. Uruguay relates to
regulatory enforcement in a context of local and national resistance to an open-pit iron ore
project. Odyssey Marine Exploration v. Mexico similarly is over enforcement of environmental
regulations in a context of resistance to its seabed phosphate project.
Given how issues can be interrelated in mining conflicts, several cases involve a
combination of environmental issues and lack of respect for Indigenous rights and
community consent. For example, Goldcorp v. Guatemala, TriMetals Mining (formerly South
American Silver) v. Bolivia, Dominion Minerals v. Panama, Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, Copper
Mesa Mining v. Ecuador and Zamora Gold v. Ecuador. Environmental enforcement also
entered into disputes brought by Crystallex and Gold Reserve against Venezuela over
nationalization of their projects.

3. Resource management

Fifteen cases, or over one-third of those investigated, hinge on government measures related
to resource management, including nationalization of a project or taxation. Of these twelve
suits, five were brought by junior mining companies or companies without an operating mine
during the duration of the arbitration.
Compagnie Minière Internationale Or S.A. v. Peru sued alleging that U.S. and Peruvian
investors were favored over French investment in the Yanacocha gold project.
Primero Mining v. Mexico, Glencore v. Colombia, Quiborax v. Bolivia and Rusoro
Mining v. Venezuela sued over taxation and associated economic measures.
With regard to nationalization of projects, TriMetals Mining (formerly South American
Silver) v. Bolivia, Glencore v. Bolivia and six other cases brought against Venezuela by mining
companies Vanessa Ventures (now Infinito Gold), Gold Reserve, Nova Scotia Power, Crystallex,
Anglo American and Highbury International pertain to such measures. Nova Scotia Power
and Highbury International have each brought suits twice against Venezuela.

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 17

 Alleged Breaches of Investor Protection Rules

Cases also diverge with regard to the investor protection rules allegedly breached (see Table
6). Given that full data is not available for over a dozen cases, we arrive at some preliminary
observations about the investor protection rules that mining companies are most frequently
invoking:

The right to protection against Indirect Expropriation has been the most invoked
clause by mining companies, involving at least 21 cases. Unlike Direct Expropriation, which
has been invoked only six times, Indirect Expropriation does not relate to the physical taking
of property or other investments. Instead, corporations can use this clause to sue over
regulations and other government actions that they claim reduce the value of their
investment. Arbitration panels have found that states have “breached” Indirect Expropriation
four times and Direct Expropriation three times.
Fair and Equitable Treatment/Minimum Standard of Treatment clauses, which are
highly controversial given their vague language and arbitrary interpretation by tribunals, have
been invoked by mining companies at least 20 times.
The third most used clause by mining companies is Full Protection and Security, used
at least 13 times, which perversely enables companies to sue states for not doing everything
in their power (like repressing their own populations) to protect foreign investments at any
cost. The case of Copper Mesa v. Ecuador is the only one so far in which a panel has found a
state to be in breach of an FPS clause, though the ruling was mitigated, in the panel’s view, by
the company’s bad behaviour.

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 18

 COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY OVERVIEW
A brief description follows of the arbitration suits brought by mining companies against Latin
American governments (organized in alphabetical order by country).

Bolivia

Bolivia has been hit by several ISDS claims from mining companies and has already been
ordered to pay US$48.6 million to Chilean mining and quarrying company Quiborax36
concerning the cancellation of ulexite mining concessions in 2004 for irregularities found
during an audit of the company’s operations.37 Quiborax brought its arbitration in 2006 under
the Chile Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty in a process that took over ten years.38

In November 2018, Bolivia was ordered to pay a further US$27.7 million to TriMetals Mining
Inc. (formerly South American Silver Limited).39 Canadian mining company TriMetals
Mining brought a suit against Bolivia for US$385.7 million in 2013 using its Bermudan
subsidiary. The company filed its suit under the UK-Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty for
expropriation of the Mallku Khota silver, indium and gallium project in 2012. The
expropriation took place after a months-long, escalating conflict with local communities
culminated in the shooting death of José Mamani Mamani, an Indigenous community
member, during a confrontation with police on July 5, 2012.40 The Bolivian state had been
largely supportive of the company up until the killing, after which it resorted to
nationalization of the project to quell the protests. It decreed the nationalization of the mine
on August 1, 2012.41 The company had failed to obtain the consent to operate from all 46
Indigenous communities in the area of its project and its actions aggravated divisions in the
local area between those who had become convinced of potential benefits from the mine
and others who found they would have too much to lose from its exploitation.42 This case
was only possible due to an anonymous third party funding agreement.43

Bolivia is facing yet another pending ISDS suit involving a mining company for over half a
billion dollars.

36
Martin Dietrich Brauch, International Institute for Sustainable Development, “Quiborax awarded US$50
million against Bolivia, one-third of initial claim, Feb 29, 2016;
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/02/29/quiborax-awarded-us50-million-against-bolivia-one-third-of-initial-
claim-quiborax-sa-and-non-metallic-minerals-sa-v-plurinational-state-of-bolivia-icsid-case-no-arb-06-2/
37
Bolivia: Decreto Supremo No. 27589, June 23, 2004; https://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-DS-27589.xhtml
38
Damian Charlotin, IAReporter, “$50 Mil Bolivia Award is Upheld Even Though Arbitrators Used Valuation
Method Different from those of the Parties; New Decision Casts Doubt on Power to Annul Provisinal
Measures or Arbitrator Disqualification Rulings,” May 20, 2018;
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/analysis-award-against-bolivia-is-upheld-even-though-arbitrators-
used-valuation-method-different-from-those-of-the-parties-new-decision-casts-doubt-on-power-to-
annul-provisional-measures-or-arbitrat/
39
Damien Charlotin, IAReporter, “South American Silver Wins on Expropriation in Long-Running Bilateral
Investment Treaty Case – But Collects Only Sunk Costs from Bolivia,” November 23, 2018;
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/south-american-silver-wins-on-merits-in-long-running-bilateral-
investment-treaty-case-but-collects-only-sunk-costs-from-bolivia/
40
Noalamina.org, “Evo ofrece revertir concesión de minera canadiense South American Silver,” Jul 9, 2012;
https://noalamina.org/latinoamerica/bolivia/item/9292-evo-ofrece-revertir-concesion-de-minera-
canadiense-south-american-silver
41
mining.com, “South American Silver announces receipt of formal decree and provides update on plan of
action,” August 2, 2012; http://www.mining.com/web/south-american-silver-announces-receipt-of-formal-
decree-and-provides-update-on-plan-of-action/
42
Andean Information Network, “Mallku Khota Mining Mess: Analysis,” July 20, 2012; http://ain-
bolivia.org/2012/07/mallku-khota-mining-mess-analysis/
43
South American Silver Corporation, “South American Silver Announces Arbitration Costs Funding
Arrangement,” May 24, 2013.

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 19

In 2016, Swiss commodities firm Glencore initiated arbitration for USD$675 million,44 also
under the UK-Bolivia Bilateral Investment Treaty, over the nationalization of a smelter and a
tin and antimony plant in 2007 and 2010 respectively,45 and of the Colquiri tin and zinc mine
in 2012 in the context of a conflict between cooperative miners and unionized workers at the
mine. The conflict was provoked when the company renegotiated production contracts with
the cooperative sector that overtook the salaried miners’ work areas.46 An estimated 15 to 28
people were injured.47,48

Colombia

Since 2016, Colombia has faced an onslaught of mining-related suits and threats of suits over
court decisions upholding constitutional protections for vital water supplies, measures to
protect Indigenous territory in areas suffering the ongoing impacts of armed conflict, and a
dispute over royalty payments. One of these suits alone is valued at the outrageous amount
of US$16.5 billion, with the rest totaling upwards of US$1.5 billion.

Three ISDS suits from Canadian mining companies against Colombia pertain to court
decisions upholding constitutional and legislative protections for sensitive ecosystems vital
for regulating water supplies in areas where there is also significant opposition to large-scale
mining activities from local downstream water users. In February 2016, the Constitutional
Court issued a ruling that impacted hundreds of mining licenses that overlap with páramo
ecosystems—a high-altitude wetland predominantly found in the Andes that is crucial for
regulating the water supplies of tens of millions of people in the country.

One such license was that of Canadian mining company Eco Oro Minerals (formerly
Greystar Resources) whose advanced exploration stage Angostura gold project is located in
the highlands of Santurbán. The company had previously failed to obtain an environmental
license for the open-pit design of the project in 2010, given broad opposition from
downstream communities led by the Committee in Defense of Water and the Páramo of
Santurbán (the Committee) in the metropolitan area of Bucaramanga. The company had
hoped to submit a redesigned underground plan for the project, but this was halted by the
Constitutional Court decision and what Eco Oro claims were unreasonable delays on the part
of the government to clarify limits of the protected páramo ecosystem.49

Notably, the World Bank Group’s private lending arm, the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), had made an equity investment in Eco Oro Minerals in 2009, followed by subsequent
investments. A complaint filed by the Committee with support from international allies

44
El Deber, “Glencore enjuicia a Bolivia por Vinto y Colquiri,” December 8, 2017;
https://www.eldeber.com.bo/economia/Glencore-enjuicia-a-Bolivia-por-Vinto-y-Colquiri-20171208-
0021.html
45
Perú21, “Bolivia nacionalizará mina de Glencore,” June 11, 2012; https://peru21.pe/mundo/bolivia-
nacionalizara-mina-glencore-32232
46
Sindicato de Trabajadores de Colquiri, “Pronunciamiento ante el conflicto en Colquiri”, July 8, 2012;
https://cedib.org/post_type_documentos/pronunciamiento-del-smtmh-ante-conflicto-en-colquiri-08-08-
12/
47
DW, “Bolivia expropia mina Colquiri a filial de empresa suiza Glencore,” June 20, 2012;
https://www.dw.com/es/bolivia-expropia-mina-colquiri-a-filial-de-empresa-suiza-glencore/a-16040034
48
Reuters, “Violence flares in Bolivian Glencore mine dispute,” June 15, 2012;
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=11755
49
Luke Eric Peterson and Zoe Williams, IAReporter, “Treaty-based disputes center on friction between
Colombian mining and national parks – and highlight differing transparency rules in Canadian and U.S.
FTAs,” Mar 9, 2016; http://www.iareporter.com/articles/analysis-two-new-treaty-based-disputes-center-
on-friction-between-colombian-mining-and-national-parks-and-highlight-differing-transparency-rules-in-
canadian-and-u-s-ftas/

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 20

demonstrated that the IFC had failed to comply with its own environmental and social
standards.50 After a public campaign calling for the IFC to divest from the project, it did so
quietly in December of 2016, just after Eco Oro had announced that it would file its suit
against Colombia (at another arm of the World Bank: ICSID) under the Canada-Colombia
Free Trade Agreement, seeking over US$764 million in compensation.51 Although the IFC—a
multilateral finance institution of which Colombia is a member State—is not party to the suit,
its financing helped Eco Oro justify its venture, counter to efforts in Colombia to enforce
environmental protections and stop destructive mining. It should be noted that Eco Oro has
only been able to move forward with this arbitration after receiving third party financing for
the lawsuit from a U.S. hedge fund, Trexs Investments, LLC.52 Since this time, two more
Canadian mining companies with mining concessions near the Angostura Project, Red Eagle
Exploration53 and Galway Gold54 have also initiated arbitration proceedings against
Colombia under the Canada-Colombia FTA.

Mining companies have also initiated or threatened suits over efforts to protect areas
important to Indigenous and farming communities.
In February 2016, Cosigo Resources (Canada), Cosigo Resources Sucursal Colombia
(Colombia) and Tobie Mining and Energy Inc. (U.S.A.) initiated a suit under the U.S.-
Colombia FTA over the creation of the Yaigojé Apaporis National Park in Vaupés, in the area
of the company’s gold mining exploration concession. Despite having done very little
exploration work before serious conflict arose with local Indigenous communities, the
company is seeking the remarkable amount of US$16.5 billion in compensation or for the
park to stop being a burden to its project.55
In 2017, Canadian company Gran Colombia Gold announced it would file a US$700 million
suit against Colombia under the Canada-Colombia FTA over a halt to its operations in a part
of Marmato, Caldas, pending consultation with local residents. The company has faced long-
standing opposition to its project, given the potential impacts on existing small-scale miners’
livelihoods, as well as impacts on Indigenous and Afro-Colombian people. It also claimed lack
of state support for removing informal miners from another of its projects in Antioquia.56 In
July 2018, Gran Colombia Gold followed through on its threat and filed notice of arbitration.57

50
Comité por la Defensa del Agua y el Páramo de Santurbán, CIEL, SOMO, AIDA and MiningWatch Canada,
“Ombudsman Finds IFC Failed to Comply with Own Investment Standards on Eco Oro Minerals in
Colombia,” September 1, 2016; https://miningwatch.ca/news/2016/9/1/ombudsman-finds-ifc-failed-
comply-own-investment-standards-eco-oro-minerals-colombia
51
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), World Bank divests from Eco Oro Minerals and its
mining project in the Colombian páramos, December 21, 2016; https://www.ciel.org/news/9504/
52
When You Thought Trade Deals Could Not Get Any Worse -- Enter Wall Street.
https://www.sierraclub.org/compass/2016/12/when-you-thought-trade-deals-could-not-get-any-worse-
enter-wall-street
53
Zoe Williams, IAReporter, “Colombia’s Scale-back of mining in sensitive conservation zone spurs a second
mining company to threaten arbitration,” March 28, 2018; https://www.iareporter.com/articles/colombias-
scale-back-of-mining-in-sensitive-conservation-zone-spurs-a-second-mining-company-to-threaten-
arbitration-if-it-is-not-compensated/
54
CIAR Global, “Nueva demanda contra Colombia: la minera canadiense Galway Gold presenta arbitraje,” Apr
20, 2018; http://ciarglobal.com/nueva-demanda-contra-colombia-la-minera-canadiense-galway-gold-
presenta-arbitraje/
55
Luke Eric Peterson and Zoe Williams, IAReporter, Mar 9, 2016.
56
Financial Post, “Canada’s Gran Colombia Gold files $700 million lawsuit against Colombia over Marmato
project,” April 10, 2017; http://business.financialpost.com/news/mining/canadas-gran-colombia-gold-files-
700-million-lawsuit-against-colombia-over-marmato-project
57
IAReporter, “Mining investor, Gran Colombia Gold, makes good on earlier threats of arbitration against
Colombia,” July 3, 2018; https://www.iareporter.com/articles/mining-investor-makes-good-on-earlier-
threats-of-arbitration-against-colombia/

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 21

Finally, in the case of Glencore, the company is disputing “royalty and financial calculations
applicable to the Calenturitas coal project” according to which the Colombian Comptroller’s
office asserts that the Swiss mining firm owes an additional US$18 million in royalty
payments. The company has brought its suits under the terms of the Switzerland-Colombia
bilateral investment treaty, for a non-available amount.58

Costa Rica

In October 2013, Canadian mining company Infinito Gold announced it would sue the
government of Costa Rica under the terms of the Canada Costa Rica Foreign Investment
Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA)59 for an initial amount of US$1 billion. However,
the request presented to ICSID in February 2014 claimed US$94 million, which was upped to
US$321 million in 2016.60,61 The company’s suit followed a series of unfavorable domestic
judicial rulings in 2010 and a Supreme Court decision in 2011 that led the government to
revoke the company’s mining concessions for the Las Crucitas gold project on the northern
border of Costa Rica with Nicaragua, near the San Juan River. The company is contesting
what it calls “legal insecurity” created by the court decisions.62 Notably, Infinito Gold’s
proposed mine gave rise to widespread opposition in this country where a ban on new open-
pit gold mining and mining activities using cyanide and mercury was approved by the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government in November 2010. After
running out of money to continue the case, Infinito Gold secured third-party financing from
Vannin Capital PCC63 in 2016 to continue pursuing this suit.64 In December 2017, ICSID
accepted jurisdiction over the case, which is proceeding to the merits phase.65 In September
2018, Canada obtained the status of “non-disputing party” to file its observations.66

Among other things, this case provides another example of third-party financing, a growing
trend in ISDS arbitration.67 It also illustrates ICSID’s pro-corporate bias since the case was not
thrown out when Infinito Gold was unable to meet ICSID's payment schedules.

Dominican Republic

In 2014, U.S. mining company Corona Materials LLC sued the Dominican Republic for
US$100 million under the Central America–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement

58
IAReporter, “Colombia faces two more investment disputes, leading to a total of at least four that have
come to light,” March 17, 2016; https://www.iareporter.com/articles/colombia-faces-two-more-
investment-disputes-leading-to-a-total-of-at-least-four-that-have-come-to-light/
59
MiningWatch Canada et al, “Canadian Mining Company Infinito Gold Seeks to Extort $1 Billion from Costa
Rica,” October 10, 2013; http://miningwatch.ca/news/2013/10/10/canadian-mining-company-infinito-
gold-seeks-extort-1-billion-costa-rica
60
Tico Times, “Canadian mining company reorganizes to seek damages from Costa Rica,” January 21, 2016;
http://www.ticotimes.net/2016/01/21/canadian-mining-company-reorganizes-seek-damages-costa-rica
61
Infinito Gold Ltd. v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5). Arnold and Porter;
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/services/experience/republic-of-costa-rica/infinito-gold-ltd-
v-republic-of-costa-rica-icsid__
62
Infinito Gold Ltd correspondence with the Costa Rican Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, April 4, 2013;
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3016.pdf
63
About Vannin Capital, see: https://www.vannin.com/about-us/
64
ICSID, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/15, December 4, 2017;
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3384/DS10811_En.pdf -
65
ICSID, Infinito Gold Ltd. v. Republic of Costa Rica, Case No. ARB/14/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, December
4, 2017; https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9384.pdf
66
See CRHoy, “Gobierno de Canadá se sumó a proceso por demanda internacional de Infinito Gold”,
September 22, 2018; https://www.crhoy.com/nacionales/gobierno-de-canada-se-sumo-a-proceso-por-
demanda-internacional-de-infinito-gold/
67
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,” Third Party Funding in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,”
2017;http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/third-party-funding-in-investor-state-dispute-settlement/

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 22

(CAFTA-DR) over ownership of an exploitation concession to mine aggregate materials for
construction. Corona Materials' claims arose from the government's refusal to grant an
environmental permit needed to start the mine, despite allegedly having received assurances
and previous formal approvals from senior government officials, as the company claimed. In
August 2010, the Ministry of the Environment denied Corona the license stating that the
project was “not environmentally viable.”68 In 2016, an ICSID tribunal refused jurisdiction over
the case arguing that the company had not presented its claim within the three-year time
period allowed under CAFTA-DR.69 The panel also decided that each part had to pay its legal
and arbitration costs, leaving the Dominican state with a bill for US$1.68 million.70

Ecuador

Ecuador is one of the countries in the world most heavily hit by ISDS arbitration from
extractive industries, particularly in the oil and gas sector, but also thanks to mining
companies.

Canadian firm Copper Mesa Mining (formerly Ascendant Copper) acquired exploration
concessions in the Intag valley in northwestern Ecuador in 2004. Local community opposition
to Copper Mesa’s Junín copper project was vehement, effectively prohibiting the company
from ever getting a drill in the ground.71 Company attempts to work on its mineral
concessions, included using private security forces who used threats and force against
community protesters, leading to an ultimately unsuccessful civil claim in Canadian courts.72
In 2008, the government of Ecuador nullified Copper Mesa’s claim to the Junín concession for
failure to produce a valid environmental impact study and for lack of prior consultation with
communities.73 In response, in 2011, Copper Mesa brought a suit originally for US$69.7M
against Ecuador under the Canada-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), alleging
expropriation of two of its mining concessions.74

UNCITRAL acknowledged that the corporation reacted to local opposition by “recruiting and
using armed men, firing guns and spraying mace at civilians, not as an accidental or isolated
incident but as part of premeditated, disguised and well-funded plan to take the law into its
own hands.”75 Nevertheless, in March 2016, the UNCITRAL tribunal awarded US$19.4 million
plus compound interest to Copper Mesa, only somewhat reducing the final amount of

68
Martin Dietrich Brauch “Philip Morris v. Uruguay: all claims dismissed; Uruguay to receive US$7 million
reimbursement”, Investment Treaty News, August 2016. https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/awards-and-
decisions-24/
69
María Florencia Sarmiento, “Claimant fails to comply with three-year limitation period under CAFTA-DR,”
August 10, 2016; https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/corona-materials-llc-v-dominican-republic-icsid-
case-no-arb-af-14-3/
70
Arnold and Porter LLP. Objeciones Preliminares Expeditas de Conformidad con el Artículo 10.20.5 del DR-
CAFTA CASO CIADI NO. ARB(AF)/14/3 https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7962.pdf
71
Briarpatch Magazine, Jennifer Moore, “Taking Stock of Canada’s Mining Industry,” May 5, 2010;
https://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/taking-stock-of-canadas-mining-industry
72
For more information: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/copper-mesa-mining-lawsuit-re-ecuador
73
Latin American Herald Tribune, “Ecuador Pulls Mining Concession from Canada’s Ascendant Copper,”
November 21, 2008; http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=321082&CategoryId=14089; Mines and
Communities, “Ecuador: It’s all over for Copper Mesa Mining Corporation in Intag — Copper Mesa pierde
concesión clave en Intag,” November 24, 2008; http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=8937
74
International Institute for Sustainable Development, “Ecuador ordered by PCA tribunal to pay $24 million
to Canadian mining company,” December 12, 2016; https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/12/12/ecuador-
ordered-by-pca-tribunal-to-pay-24-million-to-canadian-mining-company-copper-mesa-mining-
corporation-v-republic-of-ecuador-pca-2012-2/
75
Ben Beachy, Huffington Post, “Why Mining Corporations Love Trade Deals,” Jun 22, 2016;
https://www.commondreams.org/views/2016/06/22/why-mining-corporations-love-trade-deals

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 23

US$26.5 million demanded by the company.76 The tribunal decided that Ecuador had not
ensured due process when it terminated the company’s concessions and that it “should have
attempted something to assist [the company],” such as to help the company complete
community consultations or meet requirements for the environmental impact assessment.77

Two other suits—and the possible threat of others—may have also contributed to limiting
the application of a constitutional decree, known as the ‘Mining Mandate’, that was issued
around the same time that Copper Mesa lost its concessions. The Mining Mandate ordered
all mining concessions extinguished without compensation for lack of prior consultation with
communities, including overlap with water sources and protected natural areas, among other
criteria. Nonetheless, it was not applied to some of the most advanced Canadian owned
projects at the time.78 At least two companies brought suits against Ecuador, including
Zamora Gold in July 2010 under Canada’s Foreign Investment Protection Agreement with
Ecuador (FIPA-EC) and RSM Production Corporation, which filed suit under the US-Ecuador
BIT in October 2009.79 The status of both cases is pending.

In early 2019, Canadian company INV Metals started threatening Ecuador with arbitration
when the national electoral tribunal approved a long-awaited referendum over mining in a
rural county downstream of its proposed gold and silver project.80 The community voted
overwhelmingly against any mining near its water supplies.81

El Salvador

El Salvador has faced two international arbitration suits from mining companies over
implementation of the country’s mining and environmental laws. Local groups organized
strong nationwide resistance, led by the Salvadoran National Roundtable against Metallic
Mining (known as La Mesa)82 and illustrated by a public opinion poll that indicated that
79.5% of Salvadorans deemed metallic mining as inappropriate for their country.83 Their
movement has been a leading force in the global fight both against ISDS and destructive
mining. Mining-affected communities, local and national organizations who are part of La
Mesa, as well as university researchers and the Catholic Church, in coordination with allies
around the world, have successfully fought back against arbitration suits and any mining
activities in the country. These ISDS cases delayed the passing of a mining ban for seven
years, at high cost to affected communities and the country. In both cases however, the
World Bank tribunal ruled against the company, and on March 31st, 2017, Salvadorans
achieved a law prohibiting metallic mining..84

76
International Institute for Sustainable Development, December 12, 2016.
77
Award, Copper Mesa Mining Corporation and the Republic of Ecuador, March 15, 2016, part 6, page 26;
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7443.pdf
78
MiningWatch Canada and ICLMG, “In the National Interest? Criminalization of Land and Environment
Defenders in the Americas,” August 2015; http://miningwatch.ca/publications/2015/9/21/national-interest-
criminalization-land-and-environment-defenders-americas
79
Procuraduría General del Estado, Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Internacionales y Arbitraje, “Hoja Maestra
de Casos: Arbitrajes en Curso,” February 17, 2012.
80
MiningWatch Canada, “Ecuadorian Network Denounces Possible Threat of Investment Arbitration Made by
Canadian Company,” February 19, 2019; https://miningwatch.ca/news/2019/2/19/ecuadorian-network-
denounces-possible-threat-investment-arbitration-made-canadian
81
MiningWatch Canada, “Overwhelming ‘No’ Vote in Southern Ecuador Referendum Targets INV Metals
Project,” April 3, 2019; https://miningwatch.ca/blog/2019/4/3/overwhelming-no-vote-southern-ecuador-
referendum-targets-inv-metals-project
82
See more: http://noalamineria.org.sv/
83
Opiniones y percepciones hacia la minería metálica en El Salvador. Instituto Universitario de Opinión
Pública. Boletín de prensa Año XXIX, No. 2 http://www.uca.edu.sv/iudop/wp-
content/uploads/MINE_ESP.pdf
84
See http://noalamineria.org.sv/documentos/2017/oct/ley-prohibicion-mineria-metalica-salvador

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 24

U.S. corporation Commerce Group was the first mining company to lose a case against El
Salvador. Commerce Group operated the San Sebastian gold mine in northern El Salvador off
and on for decades since the late 1960s. It filed a notice of intent against El Salvador for
US$100 million under the terms of CAFTA-DR over the government having revoked
environmental permits for its mine and processing plant in 2006. The government did so
after the Salvadoran research group CEICOM found evidence of acid mine drainage85 from
the mine. This sparked a state environmental audit, which the company failed. As part of the
ISDS claim, the company also demanded that its permits be renewed so it could restart
mining activities. The ICSID panel ruled against Commerce Group in the jurisdiction stage of
deliberations.

Commerce Group then sought to have ICSID annul this decision. Unlike judicial appeals
processes, the ICSID annulment process is extremely narrow, focusing only on whether the
tribunal committed a procedural error, not a substantive error. However, ICSID ordered the
annulment case closed in August 2013 when Commerce Group failed to provide its share of
the funding needed to pay the fees for the ICSID tribunal to continue the litigation.86 Thus,
the jurisdiction ruling against Commerce Group was upheld. Nonetheless, it is important to
note that throughout the years of the case ICSID had provided numerous extensions on due
dates for Commerce Group to find funding. Although Commerce Group lost at ICSID, El
Salvador was not awarded any compensation for legal costs and tribunal fees. Rather, the
case cost El Salvador $1.4 million.87 Moreover, the affected area in San Sebastian has still not
been cleaned up and the toxic water and soil remain a hazard for local citizens.88

The second and most well-known case against El Salvador was filed in 2009 by Canadian
mining company Pacific Rim Mining for US$314 million (later reduced to US$250 million)
because El Salvador had not granted a permit to operate the company’s El Dorado project.
Pacific Rim filed the claim simultaneously under CAFTA-DR and El Salvador’s national
investment law, written with the help of the World Bank Group,89 which gave foreign
companies recourse to bring cases against El Salvador directly to ICSID rather than go
through domestic courts first. The Salvadoran government later reformed the law to prevent

85
When rock rich in sulfide minerals is crushed and ground as part of the mining process, the freed
sulphides are exposed to oxygen and water, which react to form sulphuric acid. As this acid leaches
through ground rock, it leaches out toxic heavy metals found in the rock, such as arsenic, cadmium,
copper, mercury and lead. This cycle can persist for decades, even centuries, leading to contamination of
water sources downstream.
86
ICSID, Commerce Group Corp. & San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. Republic of El Salvador, Case No.
ARB/09/07, Order of the Committee Discontinuing the Proceeding and Decision on Costs, August 28,
2013.
87
Order of the Committee Discontinuing the Proceeding and Decisions on Costs. ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17
(Annulment Proceeding) https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1571.pdf
88
Informe de la Calidad del Agua de los Ríos de El Salvador. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos
Naturales, 2017.
http://www.marn.gob.sv/descargas/Documentos/2018/Informe%20de%20la%20calidad%20de%20agua%2
02018.pdf
89
In Robin Broad and John Cavanagh “Gold for Export? … or Water & Food for Life? The Case of Gold Mining
in El Salvador”. International Conference Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue. Yale University, September
14-15, 2013. Working Paper #1.
“Research suggests that El Salvador’s investment law was revised in 1999 in connection with World Bank
structural adjustment lending. Two studies are particularly useful in linking that domestic law with the
World Bank’s structural adjustment requirements: Maria Eugenia Ochoa, Oscar Dada Hutt and Mario
Montecinos, “El Impacto De Los Programas de Ajuste Estructural Y Estabilización Economica en El
Salvador" [“The Impact Of Structural Adjustment Programs and Economic Stabilization in El Salvador”],
Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), December 2000 (see especially
chapter 1, pp.12-14).

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 25

further suits by this means.90 Prior to the arbitration, Pacific Rim Mining moved Pac Rim
Cayman’s registration from the Cayman Islands to the state of Nevada, in the United States,
with the seeming purpose of making this claim using CAFTA-DR, having no substantive
activities or other connection to the U.S. This is an example of “venue shopping”. El Salvador
made a forceful objection on these grounds and in 2012, as part of the “jurisdictional” phase,
the ICSID tribunal dismissed the claims under CAFTA-DR for lack of jurisdiction on other
grounds, but allowed the claims to proceed under the El Salvador investment law to the
“merits” phase of the arbitration. Canadian-Australian firm Oceana Gold bought Pacific Rim
in late 2013, after Pacific Rim nearly went bankrupt, and persisted with the arbitration
process. Thanks to international solidarity, the case received much publicity in the
international media, making it one of the best known ICSID cases.91 In October 2016, the
three-person ICSID panel ruled unanimously against the company, finding that Pacific Rim
had not met the terms of El Salvador’s mining law for a mineral extraction permit.
Furthermore, the Tribunal ordered the company to reimburse El Salvador US$8 million of
US$12.9 million in legal costs and ICSID fees. This long-term struggle came with a high price
for El Salvador: during the time that the suit continued four community activists were
murdered—one of them a pregnant woman—others were threatened, and the Salvadoran
state had to devote significant time, effort and millions of dollars over the years to fight the
suit.92

Nonetheless, the ICSID decision allowed La Mesa, the Catholic Church, universities like the
Central American University “José Simeón Cañas” (UCA), and other organizations across the
country to push for the long-awaited Law for the Prohibition of Metallic Mining in El
Salvador93, which was passed unanimously by the Salvadoran legislature in March 2017,
barely five months after the final decision in the arbitration. Despite the ban being passed, as
of the day of writing Oceana Gold still has an exploration subsidiary in the country, a
philanthropic foundation, and is believed to be waiting for political conditions to shift and
the ban to be lifted. Given the looming threat, Salvadorans have reinforced their commitment
to sustain the historic mining ban94 (see more on the El Salvador experience in the next
section).

Guatemala

Guatemala is now facing its first arbitration suit brought by a mining company, having
previously faced the threat of such a suit. Guatemala’s experience illustrates the “chilling
effect” that ISDS can even have on the effectiveness of orders from international human
rights bodies. It also demonstrates how ISDS poses a threat to processes of community
resistance over the health and environmental impacts of mining and puts pressure on
domestic courts that have been creating important jurisprudence regarding the lack of
respect for Indigenous rights.

90
Leonel Flores, ARPAS, “Reform to article 15 of the Investment Law: Assertive legislative action,” July 22,
2013; http://www.stopesmining.org/j25/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=243:reform-
article-15-investment-law&catid=89&Itemid=468
91 rd
For example: Manuel Pérez Rocha, “When Corporations Sue Governments”, New York Times, December 3 ,
2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/when-corporations-sue-governments.html
92
International Allies Against Mining in El Salvador, “There are No Winners in Pacific Rim Mining Company vs
El Salvador: Investor-State Arbitration Subverts Democracy,” October 14, 2016;
http://www.ciel.org/news/no-winners-pac-rim-mining-company-vs-el-salvador/
93
Ley de Prohibición de la Minería Metálica. Asamblea Legislativa de El Salvador.
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/decretos/details/3004
94
“Salvadorans Reinforce Commitment to Sustain Historic Mining Ban on its First Anniversary”. May, 2018.
http://stopesmining.org/news/82-media-releases-news/529-salvadorans-reinforce-commitment-to-sustain-
historic-mining-ban-on-its-first-anniversary

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 26

In 2010, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ordered precautionary measures
for eighteen Mayan Indigenous communities, requesting that the Guatemalan government
suspend Canada-based Goldcorp’s controversial Marlin Mine and address issues of water
contamination, illness and other measures necessary to guarantee the life and wellbeing of
the communities while an assessment was carried out of the complaint from affected
communities,95 who asserted that they never gave their consent for the controversial mine.96
The Guatemalan government agreed to suspend operations pending the outcomes of an
administrative process, but never followed through. In internal documents obtained through
a Freedom of Information request, the Guatemalan government cited potential arbitration as
a reason to avoid suspending the mine, writing that suspending the project could provoke
the mine’s owners “to invoke clauses of the free trade agreement and resort to international
arbitration to claim damages from the state.”97

More recently, Guatemala has received one notification of arbitration and a second threat of
arbitration over court decisions concerning Indigenous rights protections and associated
community resistance to mining.

On May 16, 2018, the U.S. company Kappes, Cassiday & Associates (KCA) filed a notice of
intent to sue Guatemala for at least US$300 million.98 The company argues that it was
unfairly treated given a 2016 Constitutional Court decision that upheld the suspension of the
El Tambor project for lack of prior consultation with affected communities, as well as for the
suspension of its export license and lack of state protection of company interests given
ongoing community protests that it claims have prevented exploration work on its Santa
Margarita project.99 Since 2010, community members have peacefully demonstrated
opposition to mining as they are concerned about potential impacts on water and health, for
which they have faced violence, repression and criminalization.100 KCA first threatened
arbitration in 2016.101

Canadian mining company Tahoe Resources has also threatened upward of US$1.7 billion in
arbitration over the court-ordered suspension of its Escobal silver mine since July 2017 as a
result of discrimination and lack of prior consultation with affected Xinka Indigenous people.
In three amicus briefs submitted to Guatemala’s Constitutional Court, the International Law
Institute (ILI), the American Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian
Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce all indicated that the company could bring a suit against
Guatemala under CAFTA-DR on the basis of the suspension. ILI’s amicus stated that

95
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Medida Cautelar MC-260-07 para Comunidades del
pueblo maya (Sipakepense y Mam) de los municipios de Sipacapa y San Miguel Ixtahacán en el
Departamento de San Marcos, Guatemala, May 20, 2010.
96
MiningWatch Canada and Center for International Environmental Law, “Guatemala Suspends Marlin mine
— Human rights and environmental organizations applaud the decision, urge President Colom’s
government to protect communities against retaliation,” June 24, 2010;
https://miningwatch.ca/news/2010/6/24/guatemala-suspends-marlin-mine-human-rights-and-
environmental-organizations-applaud
97
Brief prepared by Lic. Hugo Enrique Martínez Juárez, Comisión Presidencial Coordinadora de la Política del
Ejecutivo en Materia de Derechos Humanos (COPREDEH), “Análisis Medida Cautelar 260-07 solicitada por
la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos a favor de 18 comunidades de los municipios de
Sipacapa y San Miguel Ixtahuacán, en el Departamento de San Marcos: Asunto—Adopción de Medida
Cautelar,” page 16, obtained by the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) via a freedom of
information request; https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5obOY6qbEasQVlsdVdLNm02XzA/view
98
Prensa Libre, “Estado de Guatemala se expone a nuevo arbitraje internacional,” May 18, 2018.
99
IAReporter, “Full Details Emerge of Miner’s Allegations of Treaty Breach; Dispute Follows Domestic Court
Rulings on Investor Duty to Consult Local Communities,” May 20, 2018.
100
Guatemala Human Rights Commission (GHRC), “The Peaceful Environmental Justice Movement at
‘La Puya’: Violence, Repression and Resistance at the El Tambor Gold Mine in Guatemala,” November 2014;
http://www.ghrc-usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Puya-report-final.pdf
101
Prensa Libre, “Minera amenaza a Guatemala de poner demanda en Estados Unidos,” June 9, 2018.

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 27

“governments can be made responsible for the decisions of their courts” and cited investor
rules such as Fair and Equitable Treatment and the Full Protection and Security Standard.102
Company representatives have also made similar threats to the press, indicating that they
have been analyzing their options to recur to international arbitration, recognizing that “the
legal consequences would affect the entire Guatemalan population.”103 Despite the
company’s threats, in September 2018, the Constitutional Court ordered the Minister of
Mines and Energy to consult with the Xinka People and for the mine to remain suspended
during the process.104 In February 2019, Pan American Silver acquired Tahoe Resources and
all of its mining projects, including Escobal.105

Mexico

Four mining companies have brought threats of suits against Mexico over regulatory
measures related to local socio-environmental conflict in three cases and another concerning
tax regulation. One of these companies, Legacy Vulcan LLC, has already filed its demand.

In early 2010, Canadian company Blackfire Exploration threatened to bring a suit against
Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for $800 million after
environmental authorities in the State of Chiapas shuttered the Payback barite mine in
December 2009. This occurred within days of the murder of community leader Mariano
Abarca.106 All the suspects in the murder had links to the company, but no justice has been
served. Years later, an access to information request in Canada revealed that the Canadian
embassy in Mexico provided advice to Blackfire Exploration about how to launch such a suit,
despite Canadian officials’ detailed knowledge about protests over Blackfire’s barite mine, as
well as criminalization, threats and violence against community members who were vocal
about the mine’s impacts.107 The company never followed up on its threat and was dissolved
in 2017.

A few weeks ahead of a North American leaders’ summit in June 2016, Canadian company
Primero Mining (since purchased by First Majestic Silver) served the government of
Mexico with a notice of intent to launch supranational arbitration for alleged breaches of
NAFTA rules after Mexico’s tax authority took legal action to try to collect more tax from the
company based on its silver sales.108 Primero Mining was taxed on silver sales at a price well
below market price, based on an agreement with Mexican authorities for the period 2010 to

102
Expediente 4785-2017, Corte de Constitucionalidad, Guatemala, September 3, 2018.
103
Prensa Libre, “Una demanda internacional la pagarían todos los guatemaltecos,” Aug 9, 2018;
https://www.prensalibre.com/economia/mina-san-rafael-suspension-400-dias-corte-de-
constitucionalidad-aun-sin-resolvera
104
Earthworks et al, “Guatemala’s highest court orders Tahoe’s Escobal mine to remain suspended,” Sept 4,
2018; https://earthworks.org/media-releases/guatemalas-highest-court-orders-tahoes-escobal-mine-to-
remain-suspended/
105
Pan American Silver, “Pan American Silver Completes Acquisition of Tahoe Resources,” Feb 22, 2019;
https://www.panamericansilver.com/investors/news-releases/detail/76/2019-02-22-pan-american-silver-
completes-acquisition-of-tahoe-resources
106
Common Frontiers, United Steelworkers, MiningWatch Canada et al, “Blackfire adding threats to injury in
Mexico: Canadian mining firm looks to pocket $800 million via NAFTA Ch.11,” February 22, 2010;
https://miningwatch.ca/news/2010/2/22/blackfire-adding-threats-injury-mexico-canadian-mining-firm-
looks-pocket-800-million
107
Common Frontiers, United Steelworkers and MiningWatch Canada, “Corruption, Murder and Canadian
Mining in Mexico: The Case of Blackfire Exploration and the Canadian Embassy,” May 5, 2013;
https://miningwatch.ca/publications/2013/5/6/corruption-murder-and-canadian-mining-mexico-case-
blackfire-exploration-and
108
Financial Post, “Primero Mining launches NAFTA challenge against Mexico, puts tax concerns at centre,”
June 3, 2016; http://business.financialpost.com/commodities/mining/primero-mining-launches-nafta-
challenge-against-mexico-puts-tax-concerns-at-centre; CBC News, “Mexican tax demand prompts NAFTA
challenge by mining firm ahead of 3 Amigos summit,” Jun 5, 2016

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 28

2014. The low market price refers to Primero Mining’s contract with Silver Wheaton, to which
it sells a portion of silver from the San Dimas mine in Durango through an off-shore
subsidiary. Silver Wheaton then sells the silver at a higher price. The company reported that
its NAFTA threat for an undefined amount led to a process of dialogue with Mexican
authorities for which reason it had suspended arbitration proceedings as of March 2018.109
This is a typical case of the “chilling effect”.

In September 2018, shortly before the renegotiated text of NAFTA (now the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement or USMCA) was made public, U.S. company Legacy Vulcan LLC
and its Mexican subsidiary Calizas Industriales del Carmen (Calica), filed a notice of intent
to sue Mexico under NAFTA over an environmental dispute concerning limestone quarrying
in the state of Quintana Roo.110 The company is in conflict with the municipality of
Solidaridad whose ecological land use planning has prevented the company from mining on
two properties.111 The company is expected to sue for around US$500 million and followed
through on its threat, registering its suit on January 3, 2019.112

Following this, in early 2019, Odyssey Mineral Exploration filed a notice of intent against
Mexico for not having approved environmental permits for its seabed phosphate project off
the coast of Baja California Sur, claiming a whopping US$3.54 billion dollars.113

Panama

Panama is facing one ISDS case related to a mining project. In 2016, U.S.-based Dominion
Minerals Corp. brought a suit against Panama to ICSID for at least US$268.3 million under
the Panama-USA Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), six years after the government refused to
renew its exploration license for the Cerro Chorcha copper project in 2010.114 The permit
renewal was denied when the area was declared off limits to mining activities as a result of
the struggle of the Ngöbe-Buglé Indigenous People to protect their lands. In 2008, the
Ngöbe people declared: “We strongly reject the Chorcha Mining Project and the actions of
Dominion Minerals Corp. and those of the (Panamanian) State that violate our rights as
Indigenous Peoples and our heritage.”115 With legal support from local NGOs, the mining
project was deemed illegal for lack of public consultation and for being approved without a
proper Environmental Impact Assessment.116 In response, the Ministry of Commerce and

109
Primero Mining Corp, Annual Information Form for the year-ended December 31, 2017, March 28, 2018.
110
Damien Charlotin, IAReporter, “Citing Uncertainty over Future of NAFTA Chapter 11, a Pari of Investors File
Papers Notifying Mexico of a Dispute that Touches on Licensing and Environmental Issues,” October 5,
2018; https://www.iareporter.com/articles/citing-uncertainty-over-future-of-nafta-chapter-11-a-pair-of-
investors-act-to-file-papers-notifying-a-dispute-that-touches-on-licensing-and-environmental-issues/
111
Novedades Quintana Roo, “Calica daña ambientalmente a Solidaridad,” October 11, 2018;
https://sipse.com/novedades/laura-beristain-calica-dano-ambiental-adelita-corchalito-sipse-novedades-
quintana-roo-313039.html
112
Lisa Bohmer, IAReporter, “US Investor in Mexican Limestone Quarry Makes Good on Earlier Threats to
Initiate NAFTA Arbitration,” January 4, 2019; https://www.iareporter.com/articles/us-investor-in-mexican-
limestone-quarry-makes-good-on-earlier-threats-to-initiate-nafta-arbitration/
113
Odyssey Mineral Exploration, Notice of Intent, dated January 4, 2019;
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10442.pdf
114
“Solidarios contra la Mina Cerro Chorcha,” June 3, 2008; https://www.ocmal.org/4802/; See also Central
America Data, “Panama: Dominion Minerals demanda compensación,” March 31, 2016;
https://www.centralamericadata.com/es/article/home/Panam_Dominion_Minerals_demanda_compensacin
and italic, Dominion Minerals Corp. v. Republica of Panama, Case No. ARB/16/13,
https://www.italaw.com/cases/3972
115
“No Mine on Cerro Chorcha, say Ngöbe communities.” Mines and Communities. June, 2009.
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=9327, http://ejatlas.org/conflict/ngobe-bugle-
against-mining-panama
116
“Reclamo Millonario por Mina”. La Prensa, July 19th, 2017.
https://impresa.prensa.com/panorama/Reclamo-millonario-mina_0_4805519558.html

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 29

Industries issued a resolution rejecting the permit renewal and declared Cerro Chorcha a
“mineral reserve” of 24,000 hectares within which all mineral exploration and extraction work
is prohibited. The suit is currently pending.

Peru

Peru was the first Latin American country to be sued by a mining company in 1998 when it
was accused of leaving a French investor out of a major mining deal. Since then, two further
suits have been brought against Peru from mining companies that have public health, water
protection and Indigenous Peoples' self-determination at their center.

In 1998, Compagnie Minière Internationale Or S.A. sued Peru for US$560 million under the
Peru-France Bilateral Investment Treaty with regard to a battle over investment in the massive
Yanacocha gold project. The Fujimori government—reportedly under pressure from the U.S.
Embassy in Lima—had favored U.S. investor Newmont Mining and the Peruvian company
Buenaventura for involvement in the project instead of the French firm.117 The case was
settled in 2001 when Buenaventura and Newmont Mining agreed to pay the French firm
US$80 million.118

One of the most notorious cases that a mining company has brought to ICSID is The Renco
Group’s suit against Peru brought in 2011.119 Renco, a subsidiary of U.S. company Doe Run
sued for US$800 million when the government cancelled its operating permit for a smelter in
La Oroya after the company failed to submit a new environmental remediation plan and
financial guarantees on time after having received an extension.120 La Oroya is one of the
most contaminated sites on the planet, according to World Health Organization’s
standards.121 Renco purchased the lead smelter in the small mountain town of La Oroya in
1997, at which time it agreed to improve the facility to make it less harmful for the
environment. Instead, the company allowed toxic contamination from the smelting process to
pollute La Oroya’s air, water, and soil. This contributed to health problems, like lead
poisoning, that particularly affect local children.122 The tireless efforts of the Movement for
the Health of La Oroya,123 Peruvian NGOs and church organizations124 with international allies
brought attention to the situation. The case was finally decided in favor of Peru in 2016,
although Peru had to pay its own legal costs worth US$8.39 million. The prospect of a new
claim from Renco looms on the horizon.125

117
The Wall Street Journal, “Peru's Montesinos Pressured Court in Yanacocha Mine Case,” January 26, 2001;
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB98045179246288695
118
Ibid.
119
Network for Justice in Global Investment (NJGI), “A brief introduction of the Doe Run/Renco vs Peru case,”
April 16, 2012; http://justinvestment.org/2012/04/fact-sheet-la-oroya-peru/
120
OCMAL, “Perú cancela licencia a minera estadounidense Doe Run,” July 28, 2010;
https://www.ocmal.org/peru-cancela-licencia-a-minera-estadounidense-doe-run/
121
La Oroya, Peru from the list of Top 10: Most Polluted Places, 2007;
http://www.worstpolluted.org/projects_reports/display/41
122
Anna Miller, “More Than a Decade’s Wait for Justice in La Oroya, Peru,” December 14, 2016;
https://earthjustice.org/blog/2016-december/over-a-decade-s-wait-for-justice-in-la-oroya-peru
123
Testimony of Mrs. Rosa Noemi Amaro Toykin, President of the Movement for the Health in La Oroya
(MOSAO), to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human
Rights, July 19, 2012; http://archives-republicans-foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA16-WState-
AmaroR-20120719.pdf
124
Presbyterian Mission, “Justice for La Oroya: Renco Group loses arbitration suit against Peru,” July 18, 2016;
https://www.presbyterianmission.org/together-justice/2016/07/18/justice-la-oroya-renco-loses-
arbitration-suit-peru/
125
DAC Beachcroft, “The Republic of Peru is denied recovery of legal costs despite win in Renco Group
arbitration,” January 24, 2017; https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=630df79e-52c2-4bcf-8824-
dd4168f4b019

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 30

In a third mining-related case, Canadian company Bear Creek Mining sued Peru under the
Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement for having revoked a crucial permit for its Santa Ana
project in 2011, when Aymara Indigenous communities rose up against any mining on their
territory in Puno near the border with Bolivia out of concern for the potential impacts of
mining activities on water supplies.126 As a result of the 2011 protests, eighteen Aymara
social leaders faced formal legal charges for their alleged role in the regional strike that
blocked the mining project.127 All those charged were eventually acquitted over the years
except for one, Walter Aduviri. On October 5th, 2018, following widespread national and
international campaigning in support of Aduviri and much to the public’s surprise, the
Peruvian Supreme Court overturned Walter Aduviri’s conviction, which had carried a
sentence of 7 years in prison and a fine of approximately US$600,000, ordering the legal
process to start over again.128After three and a half years of proceedings, the ICSID tribunal
found in favor of the company, although it did not accept the company’s argument that it
should be owed the estimated US$522.2 million in profits that it purportedly could have
made should it have built the mine, given that it was made clear to the tribunal that the
company did not have the necessary support of the communities to actually advance the
project.129 Nonetheless, the tribunal ordered Peru to pay the company the reduced award of
US$18 million plus interest and legal costs.130 Communities have stated opposition to the
state paying any amount of money to the Canadian company.131 In what appears to be an
exchange of concessions for payment from the Peruvian government, however, Puno press
reported that the government paid Bear Creek after it renounced the mining concessions
related to the Santa Ana project in November 2018.132

Uruguay

One of the latest Latin American countries to join the list of countries sued by mining
companies is Uruguay, which is facing a suit for the staggering amount of US$3.54 billion.133
The suit is being brought by three individual investors, Rikita Mehta, Prenay Agarwal and
Vinita Agarwal, who are linked to the UK-Swiss firm Zamin Ferrous whose Uruguayan
subsidiary, Minera Aratiri, sought to exploit the Valentines iron ore project and build an

126
Henry Lazenby, Mining Weekly, “Bear Creek wins C$30.4m award in international arbitration against Peru,”
December 2, 2017; http://www.miningweekly.com/article/bear-creek-wins-c304m-award-in-international-
arbitration-against-peru-2017-12-02/rep_id:3650
127
“The judicial process of the Aymarazo socio environmental conflict.”Watch video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLKPdt99OqY
128
https://ips-dc.org/supreme-court-accepts-appeal-of-peruvian-human-rights-defender-and-overturns-
sentence/; Also peru21.com, “Corte Suprema informó que no declaró inocente Walter Aduviri del caso
'Aymarazo'”, October 9, 2018; https://peru21.pe/peru/corte-suprema-aclaro-declaro-inocente-walter-
aduviri-caso-aymarazo-nndc-433427
129
Jarrod Hepburn, IAReporter, “Tribunal Rejects DCF Approach in Bear Creek Case; Dissenter Sees ILO
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples as Imposing Obligations in Context of Miner’s ICSID Claim,”
December 4, 2017. See also: Jarrod Hepburn, IAReporter, “Requirement, Considers Interpretive Annex on
Indirect Expropriation, and Views Treaty’s General Exceptions Clause as Ruling Out Other Exceptions,”
December 4, 2017.
130
ICSID, Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru, Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, November 30,
2017; http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3745/DS10808_En.pdf
131
http://movimientom4.org/2018/09/piden-anular-sentencia-contra-aduviri-y-rechazan-pago-millonario-
a-minera/
132
Servindi, “Puno: Bear Creek renuncia a las concesiones mineras del proyecto Santa Ana,” January 11, 2019;
https://www.servindi.org/actualidad-noticias/11/01/2019/bear-creek-renuncia-las-concesiones-mineras-
del-proyecto-santa-ana; Correo Puno, “Gobierno pago 32 millones de dólares a Bear Creek por Santa
Ana,” January 1, 2019; https://diariocorreo.pe/edicion/puno/gobierno-pago-32-millones-de-dolares-bear-
creek-por-caso-santa-ana-862129/
133
“Minera india Aratirí inició demanda contra Uruguay por u$s 3.536 millones”. Marco Trade News, 10 de
Agosto, 2018. http://www.marcotradenews.com/noticias/minera-india-aratiri-inicio-demanda-contra-
uruguay-por-u-s-3-536-millones-63768

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 31

associated mineral duct.134,135 According to the UNCTAD investment policy hub, the claims
“[arise] out of allegedly arbitrary and non-transparent conduct of the Government in relation
to the claimants’ investments in the Valentines iron ore project, including repeated regulatory
changes with respect to the port terminal (which had to be built as part of the project),
ultimately leading to the project’s shutdown.”136 The case is proceeding under UNCITRAL
rules and under the UK-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty. Nonetheless, according to the
group Uruguay Free of Mega-Mining, the company never obtained the required
environmental permit nor presented the necessary financial guarantees as per Uruguayan law
to finalize a contract to build the project.137,138 The project faced strong opposition from local
farmers and environmentalists who wanted the open-pit iron ore project scrapped, and
open-pit mining banned,139 saying that the mine would be devastating for the
environment.140

Venezuela

Venezuela is the country that has been hit most frequently by mining company lawsuits.
Supranational tribunals have awarded US$2.9 billion to just three mining companies (see
Table 5A), although the Venezuelan state is disputing the award granted to Rusoro Mining,
discussed further below. Taking into consideration other extractive industries (mainly oil
companies), Venezuela has been penalized with US$5.6 billion.141 The disputes brought
against Venezuela principally concern matters related to resource management issues,
although environmental and Indigenous rights issues have also figured in the cases of
Crystallex and Gold Reserve.

The first mining case against Venezuela was brought in 2004 by Vanessa Ventures (now
Infinito Gold), which filed for arbitration invoking the Canada-Venezuela Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT) over its acquisition of concessions for the Las Cristinas mine in 2001
that the government considered illegal.142 The government then enabled a state-owned
company to take over the concessions, and shortly later, in 2002, granted the concessions to
Canadian company Crystallex. Vanessa Ventures tried to fight the case in domestic court and
then took the case to international arbitration, alleging expropriation and lack of Fair and
Equitable Treatment for US$1.045 billion. The panel found in favour of the state of
Venezuela.143 (Crystallex later sued Venezuela as well; see below.)

134
El Observador, “Gobierno se siente resguardado y no teme por le juicio de Aratirí,” July 21, 2017;
https://www.elobservador.com.uy/nota/gobierno-se-siente-resguardado-y-no-teme-por-el-juicio-de-
aratiri-2017721500
135
Marco Trade News, “Minera india Aratirí demanda contra Uruguay por U$S3.536 millones,” Aug 10, 2018;
http://www.marcotradenews.com/noticias/minera-india-aratiri-inicio-demanda-contra-uruguay-por-u-s-3-
536-millones-63768
136
Investment Policy Hub: 2017, Agarwal and Mehta v. Uruguay,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/824
137
Observatorio Minero de Uruguay, “Nuevo acto de piratería de Aratirí,” Aug 11, 2018;
http://www.observatorio-minero-del-uruguay.com/2018/08/nuevo-acto-de-pirateria-de-aratiri/
138
According to Uruguay Free of Mega-Mining, the company should not be able to proceed with the
arbitration based on Article 19 of Law 15.242 which states that “Mining activities, by whatever method, and
all disputes, complaints and petitions in this regard are subject, without exception, to the legislation and
jurisdiction of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay.”
139
See the webpage of Uruguay Libre de Megaminería: http://www.uruguaylibre.org/
140
United Press International, “Uruguay farmers set against open-pit iron ore mine,” Jan 20, 2014;
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=12542
141
ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30).
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/245
142
Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2015.
143
Ibid.

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 32

Nova Scotia Power initiated arbitration in 2008 under the Canada-Venezuela BIT over the
government’s cancellation in 2007 of a long-term coal supply contract with a state-owned
enterprise.144 It is not known how much Nova Scotia Power claimed. The panel dismissed the
claim and ordered Nova Scotia Power to pay the state’s costs, as a result of having been
brought under UNCITRAL instead of ICSID rules.145 Nova Scotia Power resubmitted its claim
under ICSID rules in 2010 for US$180 million, which was also dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds given that the panel did not agree that the contract constituted an “investment”
according to the treaty.146

In 2009, U.S. company Gold Reserve Corp. initiated arbitration under the Canada-Venezuela
BIT, through its subsidiary in the Yukon, over its attempts to advance the Las Brisas mine
project for which it had repeatedly failed to obtain environmental permits.147 The state took
control of the project in 2009, alleging that it “was causing serious environmental
deterioration to rivers and biodiversity in the region.”148 The tribunal admitted the claim,
despite it being filed through a company subsidiary in Canada, as a result of having received
Canadian diplomatic support. The panel ruled in favour of the company, finding that
Venezuela had not ensured Fair and Equitable Treatment, ordering the state to pay Gold
Reserve US$713 plus US$27.3 million in interest and legal costs.149

In 2011, Canadian mining company Crystallex sued Venezuela under the Canada-Venezuela
BIT for having revoked its permit to the Las Cristinas mining project, which it acquired in
2002 shortly after Vanessa Ventures lost the concessions to the project.150 Venezuela
terminated its contract with Crystallex over environmental concerns and potential impacts on
Indigenous peoples in the Imtaca Forest Reserve.151 Affected Indigenous Peoples in the
Imtaca Forest Reserve had been protesting the project.152 In April 2016, ICSID ordered
Venezuela to pay the company US$1.2 billion in lost profits plus interest and legal costs.153 As
it grapples with a severe economic crisis, the Venezuelan government has continued to
promote transnational investment in this and a much broader area known as the “Mining
Arc” that covers 12% of national territory, despite the ecological sensitivity of mining in this
area and the risks to Indigenous Peoples. This includes investments by Gold Reserve, which
after suing Venezuela in 2009, has reportedly entered into a joint venture with the state-
owned Venezuela Mining Corporation (CVM) in the hope of some day operating the Las
Brisas-Cristinas deposit. Some have raised the possibility that this deal is a further outcome
of Gold Reserve’s ICSID suit.154

Rusoro Mining filed its claim against Venezuela under the Canada-Venezuela BIT in 2012,
alleging that national reforms concerning gold marketing rules effectively nationalized its

144
Ibid.
145
Ibid.
146
Ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
Ibid.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.
151
Martin Dietrich Brauch, “Venezuela ordered to pay US$1.202 billion plus interest to Canadian mining
company Crystallex for FET breach and expropriation,” Aug 10, 2016;
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/crystallex-international-corporation-v-bolivarian-republic-of-
venezuela-icsid-case-no-arb-af-11-2/
152
Pratap Chatterjee, CorpWatch, “World Bank Orders Venezuela to Pay Crystallex $1.4 Billion for Gold
Mine,” April 6, 2016; https://corpwatch.org/article/world-bank-orders-venezuela-pay-crystallex-14-billion-
gold-mine
153
Martin Dietrich Brauch, Aug 10, 2016.
154
Bram Ebus, Mongabay, Maduro seeks sell off of Venezuela’s natural resources to escape debt – analysis,”
Jan 25, 2018; https://news.mongabay.com/2018/01/maduro-seeks-sell-off-of-venezuela-natural-
resources-to-escape-debt-analysis/

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 33

operations.155 The tribunal found in favour of the company in the amount of US$968
million.156 However, in response to Venezuela’s request for annulment, most of this award
was set aside given that it was based on a calculation of damages resulting from measures
taken by the Venezuelan state more than three years before Rusoro submitted its claim
against Venezuela. As a result, the claim failed to meet the three-year limitation period
defined in the Canada-Venezuela BIT.157 The company has stated that it will appeal this
decision and claims that Venezuela still owes it US$100 million based on an agreement
reached with the state in October 2018.158

U.K.-South African Anglo American, filed a suit against Venezuela in 2014 under the U.K.-
Venezuela BIT for US$400 million over the cancellation of concessions related to a nickel
mining project regarding failure to abide by contract obligations.159,160 In January 2019, the
arbitration panel found against the company, ordering each party to bear its own legal costs
and expenses, which totalled USD$9.4 million for the Venezuelan state.161

Venezuela faces yet another pending mining case.

Dutch companies Highbury International and Compañía Minera de Bajo Caroní, in

conjunction with Ramstein Trading Inc. of Panama, filed against Venezuela in 2014 under
the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT for US$209.7 million over the expropriation of gold and
diamond mining concessions.162,163 Highbury International and Ramstein Trading Inc. made a
first unsuccessful attempt to sue Venezuela for US$633 million in 2011 over expropriation of
mining properties, which was dismissed at the jurisdiction stage.164

If these companies win, the total amount that has been awarded against Venezuela for
mining cases alone could rise as high as US$3.1 billion, or roughly 1% of Venezuela’s GDP.

155
Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2015.
156
Investment Policy Hub, 2012: Rusoro Mining v. Venezuela:
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/483
157
Damien Charlotin, IAReporter, “Analysis: Paris Court of Appeal Deemed that Treaty’s Time-Bar Provisions
Should Have Affected Tribunal’s Quantum analysis in Billion Dollar Ruling,” January 31, 2019;
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/analysis-paris-court-of-appeal-deemed-that-treatys-time-bar-
provisions-should-have-affected-tribunals-quantum-analysis-in-billion-dollar-ruling/
158
Rusoro Mining, “Paris Court of Appeals Decision on Award,” January 30, 2019;
http://www.rusoro.com/s/News_Releases.asp?ReportID=844383
159
IAReporter, “Anglo-American invokes treaty protections in new arbitration with Venezuela,” April 14, 2014;
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/anglo-american-invokes-treaty-protections-in-new-arbitration-with-
venezuela/
160
Investment Policy Hub, 2014: Anglo American v. Venezuela:
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/605
161
ICSID (Additional Facility), Award, in the proceedings between Anglo American PLC and the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/14/1, January 18, 2019. Also see: FoleyHoag, “Foley Hoag
Wins Arbitration for Venezuela Obtaining Dismissal of $400M Claim,” January 29, 2019;
https://foleyhoag.com/news-and-events/news/2019/january/foley-hoag-wins-arbitration-for-venezuela-
obtaining-dismissal-of-400m-claim and Luke Eric Peterson, “Anglo American Falls Short in Investment
Treaty Claim Against Venezuela, As Majority of Tribunal Rejects All Claims,” January 24, 2019;
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/anglo-american-falls-short-in-investment-treaty-claim-against-
venezuela-as-majority-of-tribunal-rejects-all-claims/
162
Clovis Trevino and Luke Eric Peterson, “Venezuela Update: An arbitrator is challenges and a new case is
initiated,” Jan 20, 2015; https://www.iareporter.com/articles/venezuela-update-an-arbitrator-is-challenged-
and-a-new-case-is-initiated/
163
Investment Policy Hub, 2014: Highbury v. Venezuela:
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/596
164
Luke Eric Peterson, “Arbitrators decline jurisdiction over claims by Highbury and Ramstein under Dutch
treaty and Venezuelan statute for expropriation of mining assets,” Sept 30, 2013;
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/arbitrators-decline-jurisdiction-over-claims-by-highbury-and-
ramstein-under-dutch-treaty-and-venezuelan-statute-for-expropriation-of-mining-assets/

Section 3: Mining Investor Cases Against Latin American Governments | 34

 4
PROPOSALS FOR ACTION
The ISDS cases brought against Latin American states by mining companies and presented in
this report reflect the stark asymmetry in current rules that govern transnational investment,
which permit corporations to sue governments for hundreds of millions, and even billions, of
dollars for potential lost profits. The ISDS system entrenched in more than 3,000 bilateral
investment treaties and free trade agreements gives foreign investors powerful tools that
mining companies are using to undermine the implementation of decisions from courts and
human rights bodies, regulatory enforcement and other government measures in the interest
of Indigenous Peoples, mining-affected communities and environmental protection.
Meanwhile, the serious harms that extractive industries cause largely languish unaddressed.

The head of Washington-based law firm Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, one of two
firms that only represent states in arbitration suits, has called this a “dangerous” system. It is
“dangerous,” George Kahale III states, “not to the players in this game, but to those who
created the system and are always on the receiving end of claims: the states. Why do I say
dangerous? Because we have something posing as a developed legal system in which billion-
dollar claims created out of thin air have become commonplace and, believe it or not,
actually have a chance of success.” He concludes that it would be better to start from scratch
than try to reform it.

The Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment has also published a recent report on the
costs and benefits of this framework from the perspective of the state. The authors find that
the purported benefits of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) to attract foreign
investment are highly dubious at best and even deleterious to the extent that they promote a
race to the bottom in protections for labor, the environment and human rights.165 The costs,
however, are so well-demonstrated and substantial that they conclude “it is hard for states to
justify the continuation of their investment agreements or the conclusion of any new similar
agreement.”166

Additionally, in a May 2018 decision, the European Court of Justice ruled in its Achmea
judgement that investor arbitration in agreements between EU member states is essentially
incompatible with European law as a result of “sidelining and undermining the powers of the
courts of the Member States.” The Center for International Environmental Law observes,
“Although the case’s ruling only applies explicitly to bilateral investment agreements
between EU member countries, the implications of the case may well extend much further to
investment agreements between the EU or EU Member States and non-EU countries.”167

Further, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has stated
that “Reform of investment dispute settlement cannot be viewed in isolation; it needs to be
synchronized with reform of the substantive investment protection rules embodied in IIAs.
Without a comprehensive package that addresses both the substantive content of IIAs and
ISDS, any reform attempt risks achieving only piecemeal change and potentially creating new
forms of fragmentation and uncertainty.”168

165
Johnson, L., Sachs, L., Güven, B., & Coleman, J., Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2018.
166
Johnson, L., Sachs, L., Güven, B., & Coleman, J., Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2018.
167
Center for International Environmental Law, “Implications of Achmea: How the Achmea Judgement
Impacts Investment Agreements with Non-EU Countries,” April 2018;
https://www.ciel.org/reports/implications-of-achmea/
168
IIA Issue Note 4. “Improving Investment Dispute Settlement. UNCTAD Policy Tools”. November 2017.
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d8_en.pdf

Section 4: Proposals for Action | 35

Among these ever-broader demands for fundamental reform, civil society organizations and
policymakers around the world have been working to extricate their governments from ISDS
and foreign investment protection obligations, and exploring alternative approaches that
would prioritize people, workers and the environment over corporate profits.

As a result of the global backlash to this system, alternatives to the investment regime have
multiplied. One example is a document developed by dozens of organizations and experts
that proposes an alternative model for international investment to address corporate
impunity and set out new investment rules that favour the public interest.169 This document
draws from several proposals designed over the course of the last decades.

In broad terms these include:

1. Proposals to prioritize the protection of human rights, and in particular Indigenous

Peoples and environmental protection over investor rights, making them mandatory.
Respect for Indigenous Peoples, human rights and environmental protection rights should be
obligatory in international law and take precedence over other legislation, with binding
mechanisms to ensure corporate accountability. This has been the motivation behind
organizations engaged in negotiations for an International Binding Treaty on Transnational
Corporations and Human Rights,170 as well as national level efforts to pursue legal
mechanisms for corporate accountability.

2. Proposals for Alternative Dispute Settlement Solutions. Current clauses dealing with
Investor-State Dispute Settlement should be annulled, particularly those that allow investors
to challenge and sue host states using supranational arbitration over governmental
regulatory actions or related measures that they perceive to be harmful to their interests.
Investment disputes should be brought first to national courts, in accordance with the host
country’s legislation. According to these proposals, only after exhausting national procedures
would the investor accede to a permanent and duly constituted international tribunal to
review whether there was any violation of due process or that the appropriate national
legislation was properly applied. International dispute settlement mechanisms would also be
two-way. In addition to investors, states, communities and citizens would be able to initiate a
legal challenge, and tribunals would enable access and equitable participation for affected
communities, with the process conducted publicly. At a minimum, in the short term, given
the demonstrated social and environmental harms from extractive industries and the threat
to governments’ obligations to respect Indigenous and human rights and to protect water
supplies and fragile ecosystems, extractive industries should be prohibited (as the tobacco
industry already is) from using ISDS.

3. Proposals to abolish the privileges of foreign investors and guarantee states the
space to design and implement public policy, including special and differentiated
treatment to support national priorities and greater equality. The concept of “Indirect
Expropriation” would be eliminated from international legislation, given how such provisions
undermine the state’s right to regulate. The definition of expropriation would be limited to a
government act that for reasons of public interest takes over or nationalizes a tangible good
from an investor in exchange for economic compensation. These proposals also seek to
restore policy space for governments to pursue and prioritize local and national economic
priorities; social, cultural and environmental protections; as well as the preservation,
promotion and restoration of public services. More recently, proposals have also sought to

169
Working Group on Investment in the Americas, “A Call for the Building of an Alternative Legal Framework
to the International Investment Treaties,” May 2014; https://ips-dc.org/call-building-alternative-legal-
framework-international-investment-treaties-favoring-public-interest-away-transnational-corporate-
impunity/
170
See Proposals of the Global Campaign for the Binding Treaty on transnational corporations and Human
Rights https://www.stopcorporateimpunity.org/binding-treaty-un-process/

Section 4: Proposals for Action | 36

take climate change into consideration, proposing to eliminate ISDS and ensure policy space
for measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address climate change.171

In this context of growing discontent with the current regime, fewer agreements are being
reached and some reforms are being implemented. According to UNCTAD, only 18
international investment agreements (IIAs) were concluded in 2017, the lowest number since
1983. For the first time, the number of treaty terminations overtook the number of new IIAs,
and numerous countries have been making reforms to the system. Since 2012, more than
150 countries have devised new measures for IIAs that provide specific protection or carve-
outs for policies and decisions concerning the environment.172

Further evidence of rising discontent with the investor protection framework, and ICSID in
particular,173 include the withdrawal of at least three countries from the ICSID convention;
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.174 These same countries, in addition to India, Indonesia,
South Africa and Tanzania, have terminated several BITs, most notably with European
countries.175 Several countries are also developing alternative BIT models, including Brazil176,
India177, Indonesia178 and Tanzania.179 Regionally, the South African Development Council
(SADC) has developed an alternative Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with which
to advise members states, for example on opting for state-to-state arbitration before
recurring to international tribunals.180 Additionally, El Salvador reformed its investment law in
order to avoid being taken directly to ICSID after being sued by Commerce Group and Pacific
Rim Mining.

Recently, the governments of Canada, the United States, and Mexico agreed to a
renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (renamed the USMCA) that, in addition
to being a serious setback on many issues (such as intellectual property rights,
biotechnology, etc.), only reigns in investor powers between Canada and the U.S. The
published text, while not final, removes ISDS after a three-year phase out between Canada
and the U.S. Notably, Canada was the most-sued country under NAFTA, particularly over

171
Discussion Paper: A New Climate-Friendly Approach to Trade”. Sierra Club.
https://content.sierraclub.org/creative-archive/sites/content.sierraclub.org.creative-
archive/files/pdfs/1433%20New%20Trade%20Report%2005_low.pdf
172
IIA Issues Note: Recent Developments in the International Investment Regime. May, 2018.
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Publications/Details/1186
173
Dr. Robin Broad, “Corporate Bias in the World Bank Group’s International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes: A Case Study of a Global Mining Corporation Suing El Salvador,” University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 2015;
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1898&context=jil
174
Magdalena Bas, “Algunas reflexiones en torno al retiro de Bolivia, Ecuador y Venezuela del CIADI.”
Densidades no. 17, mayo 2015.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285233878_Algunas_reflexiones_en_torno_al_retiro_de_Bolivia_E
cuador_y_Venezuela_del_CIADI_2015
175
Research from UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub. See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA
176
José Henrique Vieira Martins, “Brazil’s Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements (CFIA) and
Recent Developments.” Investment Treaty News, June 2017. https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/brazils-
cooperation-facilitation-investment-agreements-cfia-recent-developments-jose-henrique-vieira-martins/
177 th
Amiti Sen, Surabhi, “India’s Bilateral Investment Pacts Under Cloud”. The Hindu Business Line. April 9 ,
2017. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/indias-bilateral-investment-pacts-under-
cloud/article9625580.ece
178
Rachmi Hertanti and Rika Febriani, “Update on Indonesia BITs review”. IGJ News Update / February, 18th
2015. http://isds.bilaterals.org/?update-on-indonesia-bits-review
179
Luke Eric Peterson and Zoe Williams, “As Tanzania seeks to overhaul mining regime, the government
th
reportedly moves to terminate a bilateral investment treaty that was up for renewal.” October 8 , 2018.
Investment Arbitration Reporter. https://www.iareporter.com/articles/as-tanzania-seeks-to-overhaul-
mining-regime-the-government-reportedly-moves-to-terminate-a-bilateral-investment-treaty-that-was-
up-for-renewal/
180
SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template with Commentary. Southern African Development
Community. July 2012. https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-
final.pdf

Section 4: Proposals for Action | 37

environmental and health protection measures.181 Nonetheless, ISDS persists in the USMCA
between the U.S. and Mexico, although requiring that local remedies be exhausted first,
excepting government contracts in some key sectors like energy.182 Furthermore, although
ISDS between Canada and Mexico is not part of the USMCA, it is part of the Trans Pacific
Partnership agreement (CPTPP), which both countries have ratified and which entered into
force on December 30, 2018,183 through which mining companies and other firms will be able
to continue bringing cases.

Furthermore, despite such shifts, thousands of agreements remain in place and are still being
negotiated with countries in Latin America. As this report demonstrates, until they are
undone these pose significant risk to Indigenous peoples and mining-affected communities
who are defending their lives and lands from extractive industry projects, eroding the already
limited legal tools they have with which to demand that decision-makers respect their self-
determination, as well as the decisions of human rights bodies and domestic courts,
including to enforce laws and regulations, and take measures to protect territories, water
supplies and ways of life and halt the aggressive expansion of mining and other extractive
industries.

In this context, many mining-affected communities and Indigenous Peoples in Latin America
are exercising their collective rights and learning important lessons from experience that they
cannot wait for investment to take place on mining concessions before getting informed
about the impacts of mining. Rather, communities and organizations that accompany them
are studying where mining concessions have been granted and are getting organized at an
early stage, even before there is much presence of a company or an investor. Doing so
provides communities with a greater opportunity to assert their self-determination to declare
their territories free of mining and avoid the same degree of social division, criminalization,
violence, impunity for harms, as well as investor arbitration suits that frequently arise when
mining companies start to carry out prospecting and exploration, whether or not companies
ever plan to build a mine.

In conclusion, in light of the threat that mining and other extractive industry companies pose
to people and the environment, and in the interest of recuperating national sovereignty over
policy making to protect the wellbeing of Indigenous Peoples and affected communities,
current International Investment Treaties urgently need to be audited and, only after
meaningful public participation, either be cancelled or rewritten on terms that put people’s
rights and the environment first. Furthermore, where abusive arbitration suits are brought by
mining companies to try to undermine the struggles of Indigenous Peoples and mining-
affected communities to prevent this industry from destroying their territory, their water
supplies and their ways of life, there is an opportunity to continue building international
solidarity with their struggles while continuing to demonstrate the abusiveness of
international investor protection agreements.

181
Council of Canadians, “Why Canada is one of the most sued countries in the world,” October 23, 2015;
https://canadians.org/blog/why-canada-one-most-sued-countries-world
182
Chapter 14 of the Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States and
Canada (USCMA). https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/14%20Investment.pdf
183
Janyce McGregor, CBC, “Why Canada raced to get in on the CPTPP trade deal,” December 30, 2018;
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cptpp-in-effect-sunday-1.4955582

Section 4: Proposals for Action | 38

Lessons for Movement Building from Pacific Rim Mining/OceanaGold v. El Salvador

The suit brought by Pacific Rim Cayman against El Salvador in 2009 for not having granted it
a permit to put a gold mine into operation—and for which it had never met regulatory
requirements—gave rise to a local, national and international campaign that provides
valuable lessons for building solidarity with struggles in defence of land and water, while
bringing critical attention on the ISDS system that poses great danger to these same life and
death battles. The local, national and international organizing that took place over the
duration of the arbitration, and a solid legal defence, contributed to ensure that the
Salvadoran state did not lose this case,184 while helping to clear the way for Salvadorans to
finally push their legislature to pass a ban on all metallic mining country-wide in March
2017.185

That this suit proceeded past the preliminary stages at all demonstrates the inherent
corruption within this self-perpetuating system of richly-paid corporate lawyers,186 third party
financiers and companies happy to roll the dice on multi-million-dollar suits, betting on
potential profits for investments not even made. As described earlier, Pacific Rim Mining
restructured its company, moving a subsidiary from the Cayman Islands to Nevada in order to
bring the suit under the terms of the CAFTA-DR. The arbitration panel, however, was unwilling
to dismiss the case despite such a glaring abuse, allowing the case to drag on for seven years
under El Salvador’s investment law. Although the company did not win in this case, the
process still cost the state millions of dollars, during which time four community activists
from the resistance were murdered while many others faced threats. Additionally, efforts to
achieve a nationwide ban on metal mining were put on hold while the suit continued so as to
avoid jeopardizing the arbitration by giving any appearance of prejudice against mining on
the part of the government of El Salvador.

Despite communities not being party to the suit, the solidarity built over the course of the
arbitration brought global attention to Salvadoran demands to protect water and health from
the deleterious impacts of gold mining. The movement created a counter-narrative to the
company’s misrepresentations and helped expose the threat that ISDS poses to the self-
determination of affected peoples and the sovereignty of whole nations. Building on the local
and national organizing that had begun years earlier to prevent the mine from operating, the
international campaign connected the local struggle to protect Salvador’s water from mining,
to the harms of the unjust investor protection framework that perversely allows corporations
who have wreaked havoc where they operate to sue governments for expected profits that
they have never earned.

The campaign garnered extensive international media coverage and protests in the U.S.,
Canada and Australia, as well as solidarity from as far away as the Philippines (given
OceanaGold’s operations in this country) helped shine a spotlight and put direct pressure on
the World Bank-based panel of corporate lawyers deciding over the interpretation of El
Salvador’s investment law. Reflecting on the campaign, one Salvadoran organizer stated that
the coverage obliged local actors in El Salvador, including politicians, to take a position on
the issue of mining.187 During this period, the government also amended the nation’s

184
International Allies Against Mining in El Salvador, “There Are No Winners: After Seven Years and Millions
of Dollars, Pac Rim Mining Loses Suit Against El Salvador,” October 14, 2016;
http://www.stopesmining.org/news/78-pacific-rim-news/462-press-release-coalition-of-groups-states-
there-are-no-winners
185
Esty Dinur, The Progressive, “How El Salvador Won on Mining,” April 1, 2018;
https://progressive.org/magazine/how-el-salvador-won-on-mining/
186
Cecilia Olivet, Pia Eberhardt, “Profiting from injustice How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fueling
an investment arbitration boom” November 2012. https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/profiting-injustice
187
Thomas McDonagh and Aldo Orellana López, Democracy Center, “El Salvador – When the Seeds of
Resistance Bloom,” May 2017; https://democracyctr.org/resource/el-salvador-when-the-seeds-of-
resistance-bloom/

Section 4: Proposals for Action | 39

investment law so that it would no longer provide foreign investors with recourse to
international tribunals.

Other aspects of this process that are more difficult to replicate include the willingness on
the part of the law firm representing the Salvadoran state to collaborate with local and
international civil society organizations.188 Furthermore, prior to the start of the suit, local
organizers were fortunate to achieve support from high-ranked government officials, the
head of the Catholic church, cattle ranchers and traditional oligarchy sympathetic to concerns
about the impacts of industrial gold mining.189,190 Nor were there any other operating mining
companies in El Salvador during this time. These conditions contributed to the success
Salvadorans had in achieving broad-based opposition across the country to mining, as
demonstrated in the results of successive public opinion polls carried out by the University of
Central America (UCA) in San Salvador, which indicated that 79.5% of Salvadorans were
against any gold mining as of 2015.191

In summary, it was vitally important that this campaign was grounded in close
communication with Salvadoran communities and organizations part of the National
Roundtable against Metal Mining (La Mesa) in order to keep efforts focused on their long-
term objective to prohibit any mining. Concurrently, while international organizations lifted
up the Salvadoran refrain that “water is more valuable than gold,” the focus on the defence of
water in a country facing a grave water crisis,192 rather than short-term economic gains,
resonated in many spheres. Further, creating a ‘poster child’ out of an abusive foreign mining
investor trying to bully a small Central American country effectively illustrated the injustices
of the biased trade and investment system in a context of corporate impunity. As allies in
solidarity with local groups, being clear about how these different issues fit together and
what each organization could bring to the campaign made it possible to deal with differences
over short-term tactics, while keeping a focus on the long-term goals of Salvadoran partners.

Recognizing the intersection between local concerns and global injustices was also crucial to
globalising the campaign, enabling a diverse range of organizations to get involved from
diverse points of entry. As a result, community-based organizations in the northern
Salvadoran department of Cabañas, a range of organizations and institutions in the capital
San Salvador, and numerous organizations around the world were able to fight together bt
making the connections between water, health and the defence of territory, as well as the
struggle to protect the natural commons against the imposition of corporate interests
through investor state arbitration before panel of corporate lawyers at the World Bank.

While this case does not provide a cookie cutter recipe to follow, this campaign demonstrates
that “when we have a clear, shared understanding of the ways in which local and international
struggles relate to and complement each other, we can leverage the diversity of our
relationships, privileges, power and resources to great effect.”193

188
Thomas McDonagh and Aldo Orellana López, Democracy Center, May 2017.
189
Esty Dinur, The Progressive, “How El Salvador Won on Mining,” April 1, 2018;
https://progressive.org/magazine/how-el-salvador-won-on-mining/
190
Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, Ethics & International Affairs, “Historic Wins for Democracy and Rights
in El Salvador, June 2017; https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/historic-wins-democracy-
rights-el-salvador/
191
Universidad Centroamericana ‘José Simeón Cañas’, “Encuesta sobre conocimientos y perceptions hacia el
medio ambiente y la minería metálica en El Salvador,” June 2015.
192
Meera Karunananthan, The Guardian, “The human right to water: Salvadoran NGOs and a global
campaign,” March 25, 2015; https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-
network/2015/mar/25/human-right-water-salvadoran-ngos-global-campaign
193
Thomas McDonagh and Aldo Orellana López, Democracy Center, May 2017.

Section 4: Proposals for Action | 40

 APPENDIX
Table 5.A CONCLUDED ISDS CASES BROUGHT BY MINING COMPANIES
TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
(Source UNCTAD)
AMOUNT
ORIGINAL AWARDED
AMOUNT TO
CLAIMED COMPANY
CLAIMANT (Millions (Millions
RESPONDENT MINING HOST USD - PARTY USD -
COUNTRY COMPANY COUNTRY rounded) "FAVORED" rounded)
BOLIVIA QUIBORAX CHILE 66 INVESTOR 48.6

TRIMETALS MINING
(FORMERLY SOUTH
BOLIVIA AMERICAN SILVER) CANADA 385 INVESTOR 27.7
DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC CORONA MATERIALS USA 100 STATE**
COPPER MESA
ECUADOR MINING CANADA 69.7 INVESTOR 19.4
PACIFIC RIM MINING
(TAKEN OVER BY
OCEANAGOLD CANADA
EL SALVADOR (AUS/CAN)) /AUSTRALIA 314 STATE**
EL SALVADOR COMMERCE GROUP USA 100 STATE**
PERU BEAR CREEK MINING CANADA 522 INVESTOR 18
COMPAGNIE MINIERE
INTERNATIONALE OR
PERU S.A. FRANCE 560 SETTLED
DOE RUN/RENCO
PERU GROUP PERU 800 STATE**
VENEZUELA RUSORO MINING CANADA 2,318 INVESTOR 968
VENEZUELA CRYSTALLEX CANADA 3,160 INVESTOR 1,202
VENEZUELA GOLD RESERVE CANADA 1,735 INVESTOR 713
HIGHBURY
VENEZUELA INTERNATIONAL (I) NL, PANAMA 633 STATE **
NOVA SCOTIA POWER
VENEZUELA (I) CANADA 180 STATE **
NOVA SCOTIA POWER
VENEZUELA (II) CANADA 180 STATE **
VENEZUELA VANESSA VENTURES CANADA 1,045 STATE **
VENEZUELA ANGLO AMERICAN UK 400 STATE **

7 in favor of
TOTAL 17 CASES 10 CANADIAN 12,568 Investor 2,997
**Even when an arbitration panel finds against a company, states still do not win. Rather, states still
end up paying hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars in legal costs and arbitration fees, in
addition to any chilling effect or other implications that such suits have with regard to policy making
and local struggles.

Appendix | 41
 Table 5.B PENDING ISDS CASES BROUGHT BY
MINING COMPANIES TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
(Source UNCTAD)
CLAIMED
CLAIMANT (Millions
RESPONDENT MINING HOST USD -
COUNTRY COMPANY COUNTRY rounded)
BOLIVIA GLENCORE UK 675
COSIGO RESOURCES AND
COLOMBIA OTHERS CANADA 16,511
COLOMBIA ECO ORO MINERALS CANADA 764
COLOMBIA GRAN COLOMBIA GOLD CANADA 700
COLOMBIA RED EAGLE EXPLORATION CANADA 40
COLOMBIA GALWAY GOLD CANADA N/A
COLOMBIA GLENCORE SWITZERLAND N/A
COSTA RICA INFINITO GOLD CANADA 321
ECUADOR ZAMORA GOLD CANADA N/A
ECUADOR RSM USA N/A
KAPPES, CASSIDY &
GUATEMALA ASSOCIATES (KCA) USA 300
MEXICO LEGACY VULCAN LLC USA 500
ODYSSEY MINERAL
MEXICO EXPLORATION USA 3,540
PANAMA DOMINION MINERALS USA 268
ZAMIN FERROUS
(ASSOCIATED
URUGUAY INDIVIDUALS) UK 3,536

VENEZUELA HIGHBURY (II) NL, PANAMA 209

TOTAL 16 CASES 7 CANADIAN 27,364

TABLE 5.C THREATENED ISDS CASES

CLAIMED
CLAIMANT (Millions
RESPONDENT MINING HOST USD -
COUNTRY COMPANY COUNTRY rounded)
GUATEMALA GOLDCORP CANADA

GUATEMALA TAHOE RESOURCES CANADA 1,700

ECUADOR INV METALS CANADA

MEXICO BLACKFIRE EXPLORATION CANADA 800

PRIMERO MINING (NOW

MEXICO SOLD TO FIRST MAJESTIC) CANADA

Appendix | 42
Center for International MiningWatch Canada The Institute for Policy Studies
Environmental Law (CIEL) (miningwatch.ca) is a pan- (www.IPS-dc.org) is a multi-
(www.ciel.org) uses the power Canadian initiative supported issue research center that works
of law to protect the by environmental, social on peace, justice, and the
environment, promote human justice, Indigenous and labour environment. Its vision is that
rights, and ensure a just and organisations from across everyone has the right to thrive
sustainable society. CIEL seeks a the country. It addresses the on a planet where all
world where the law reflects the urgent need for a coordinated communities are equitable,
interconnection between public interest response to the democratic, peaceful, and
humans and the environment, threats to public health, water sustainable. Among its work
respects the limits of the planet, and air quality, fish and over the last decade, IPS has
protects the dignity and wildlife habitat, and published several reports
equality of each person, and community interests posed by documenting the social,
encourages all of earth’s irresponsible mineral policies environmental and economic
inhabitants to live in balance and practices in Canada and impacts of mining corporations
with each other. around the world. in the Global South.