The Economist 2906
The Economist 2906
The Economist 2906
Politics
6月 27, 2024, 08:28 上午
Namibia’s high court struck down colonial-era laws that criminalised gay
sex between men. The judges ruled that the law banning sodomy and
“unnatural sex” between men was discriminatory. (There are no laws
prohibiting sex between women.) The judgment is a rare victory for gay
rights, which are being rolled back in several parts of Africa.
In a highly symbolic move, Ukraine and Moldova began formal talks with
the European Union to accede to the bloc. The initial negotiations allow the
EU to present both countries with a framework for the reforms that are
required to gain entry. A final decision is probably years away. Separately,
Mark Rutte, the outgoing Dutch prime minister, was confirmed as the next
secretary-general of NATO.
The International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants for
Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defence minister until last month, and Valery
Gerasimov, the senior commander of Russian troops in Ukraine. The ICC
said there were reasonable grounds to believe the pair ordered attacks on
Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and that the consequential harm to civilians
was “clearly excessive” to any military objective.
Evan Gershkovich went on trial in Russia. The journalist from the Wall
Street Journal is accused of espionage, a claim rejected by America. Russia
has suggested it would exchange Mr Gershkovich in a prisoner swap with
America.
Business
6月 27, 2024, 08:28 上午
The Federal Reserve released the results of its annual stress tests, which
assess how banks would cope with a severe global recession and meltdown
in the property market. All 31 of the banks, including Bank of America,
JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo, passed the Fed’s baseline scenario,
meeting their minimum capital ratios, though the aggregate ratio, a cushion
against losses, fell from 12.7% to 9.9%. The bank’s combined hypothetical
losses reached $685bn.
Lufthansa announced that it would pass on the cost of complying with new
emissions regulations to passengers. The German airline will introduce an
“environmental-cost surcharge” of between €1 and €72 ($77) on flights that
depart from the EU, Britain, Norway and Switzerland after December 31st.
Lufthansa said this was to help cover a European rule ensuring that at least
2% of airlines’ fuel consumption comes from more-expensive sustainable
aviation fuel, as well as other green tape.
Stalled engines
Airbus’s share price plunged by 10%, after it slashed its profit forecast
because of supply-chain problems that have left it with a shortage of aircraft
engines. It is now aiming to deliver 770 commercial planes this year, down
from a previous estimate of 800.
Volkswagen created a joint venture with Rivian, and will invest $5bn in the
maker of electric vehicles. Rivian, best known for supplying Amazon with
delivery vans, will share its technical expertise and software with VW,
which faces a big challenge in Europe from cheaper Chinese EV imports.
The deal is a potential lifeline for Rivian, which reported a net loss of
$1.4bn for the first three months of the year.
New York has the most traffic congestion of any city in the world,
according to a survey by INRIX, a data-analytics firm. New Yorkers spent
101 hours stuck in traffic last year, though London, Paris, Mexico City and
Chicago were not far behind in terms of time wasted. New York’s plan to
introduce a congestion charge was recently put on hold by New York state’s
governor. INRIX calculates that vehicles in downtown Manhattan crawl
along at a speed of 11 miles an hour (18kph) during peak morning periods.
KAL’s cartoon
6月 27, 2024, 10:10 上午
KAL’s cartoon appears weekly in The Economist. You can see last week’s
here.
The Economist
IN MOST OF the world this week our cover looked at the political gamble
taken by France’s president, Emmanuel Macron. After the snap legislative
election he called for June 30th, populists on the right and left could hobble
the centrist president. They would undo much of his work to remake France
as a modern, business-friendly economy.
Leader: Macron has done well by France. But he risks throwing it all away
More analysis: Emmanuel Macron’s centrists are facing a disastrous first-
round vote
Poll tracker: Who will control the National Assembly?
In Britain, we made the case for Keir Starmer to be the next prime minister.
After 14 years in power, the Conservatives face a massive defeat in the
general election on July 4th. We argue that the Labour Party must form the
next government because it has the greatest chance of tackling the biggest
problem that Britain faces: a chronic and debilitating lack of economic
growth.
Leader: Keir Starmer should be Britain’s next prime minister
The Starmer method: What the remaking of Labour reveals about Sir Keir
Starmer
Our best guess: The Economist’s final prediction points to a Tory wipeout
in Britain
Bagehot: Why the next Westminster scandal is already here
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this-week/2024/06/27/this-weeks-covers
Leaders
Keir Starmer should be Britain’s next prime minister
The British election :: Why Labour must form the next government
What of the Liberal Democrats? The logic that led us to endorse them in
2019 no longer holds. Against Boris Johnson’s Brexit-obsessed Tories and
Labour under Jeremy Corbyn, a hard-left charisma vacuum, they were the
only choice. Today the Lib Dems still have some good policies—letting
asylum-seekers work, say, or a new land-value tax—but they have become
more sceptical on trade and even more nimbyish on planning. The Lib
Dems do not aspire to be a credible party of government; they are barely
credible as liberals.
Trying to make the case for the Tories is like a teacher struggling to say
something nice about the class troublemaker. They have done some good
things: on educational standards, on regional devolution and on the tax
regime for capital investment. Rishi Sunak is a better prime minister than
Liz Truss, though if praise came any fainter it would be invisible. The
pandemic and the invasion of Ukraine—where they also did well—vastly
complicated their time in office.
But the other side of the ledger is long and damning. The public realm has
been hollowed out. Prisons are full; local government is badly underfunded;
and if the National Health Service is still a national treasure, that may be
because treatment is so hard to find. On migration, the Tories are illiberal
and ineffective: they want to crack down on it yet have presided over record
levels of net migration. They have become increasingly hostile to policies
designed to combat climate change. Above all, they have failed to build.
Housing supply lags behind demand, and grid connections take years to
materialise.
The Tories’ most memorable policy is to have severed the country from its
biggest trading partner. That was always going to be bad for Britain, but the
chaos of enacting Brexit split the party and voters have had to endure the
Tory psychodrama ever since. Each prime minister has undone the work of
the previous one. The party has neglected its prosperous voters in the south-
east. From drinking sessions in Downing Street during the pandemic to bets
allegedly placed on the timing of the election, a film of sleaze clings to the
Conservatives.
Although the Tory party does not deserve our endorsement, wishing its
obliteration would be wrong. The British electorate has become more
volatile. The political pendulum could swing away from Labour within a
single five-year term. Whenever it does so, Britain will need a capable
opposition party to offer an alternative. A Tory catastrophe and a strong
showing for Mr Farage, who dreams of staging a reverse Tory takeover,
would heighten the risk that the Conservatives lurch towards a dark,
populist extreme. Britain needs the party to rediscover its conservative, pro-
market instincts.
That is the negative case for voting Labour, but there are positive
arguments, too. The first is that the party has been transformed. Since the
last election Sir Keir Starmer has expelled Mr Corbyn, rooted out many of
his fellow travellers and dragged Labour away from radical socialism. The
Economist disagrees with the party on many things, such as its plan to
create a publicly owned energy provider. But elections are when voters
mete out rewards as well as punishments, and Labour’s reinvention
deserves credit.
The second positive reason to back Labour is its focus on growth. The party
is right in its diagnosis that nothing matters more than solving Britain’s
stagnant productivity. Its young, aspiring, urban supporters will give it
permission to act in ways that the Conservatives have avoided. The most
obvious of these is building more houses and infrastructure, and forging
closer relations with Europe. The party of public services may also have
more latitude to reform them than the Tories would.
The question that hangs over Labour is how radical it will be in pursuit of
growth. It has run a maddeningly cautious campaign, choosing to reassure
voters rather than seek a mandate for bold change. It does not help that Sir
Keir, having been in Mr Corbyn’s shadow cabinet before ejecting him,
seems to turn with the wind. Having strenuously avoided the subject in the
campaign, a Labour government will need to raise taxes (as would a
Conservative one if it was not to wreck public services). For all these
reasons, having failed to set out a vision to steer by, prime minister Starmer
could more easily be blown off course by events or sidetracked by growth-
stifling left-wing preoccupations, such as beefing up workers’ rights,
stamping out inequality and doling out industrial subsidies.
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our weekly Cover Story newsletter.
Also see our other coverage of Britain’s election, including our poll tracker,
updated daily.
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prime-minister
Governing America
SOME POLITICIANS are shy about revealing their ideas before elections
for fear of alarming the voters. Others simply do not have very much to say.
Which type is Joe Biden, as he pitches for a second presidential term? His
domestic-policy plans have received much less scrutiny than Donald
Trump’s. Our briefing this week is a first attempt to make up for that. The
most positive thing to say about this president’s platform is that the
alternative is a lot worse.
Mr Biden came to power in 2021 with a grand vision to remake the
American economy for the middle class. His foreign policy was organised
around this goal, too. FDR was mentioned. In office he was constrained by
the Senate. Without the votes to overcome the filibuster, Bidenomics had to
be implemented through giant budget bills and regulations. Some of the
results have been beneficial, particularly in spurring investment in green
technology. But overall, Mr Biden has placed far too much faith in
regulation, protection and intervention, rather than animal spirits, to boost
the economy.
A second term would be more timid. Team Biden talks of creating universal
pre-school and other big reforms, but will surely achieve far less. On tax,
trade and antitrust its ideas are a mix of promising and retrograde, reflecting
compromises to placate the party’s coalition. What it lacks is a realistic
appraisal of how the economy is doing, or a vision of where America could
be in ten years.
On fiscal policy Team Biden would like to restore the top marginal rate of
income tax to 39%, where it was before Trump-era cuts reduced it to 37%.
Given the vast budget deficit, this makes sense. The president’s team would
like to eliminate the “stepped-up basis” loophole for capital-gains tax,
which is a good idea, too. But Mr Biden is also committed to sparing those
earning less than $400,000 a year from any new taxes, a sop to the left-
populists who think that the super-rich can fund all their spending plans.
The Biden policy algorithm is: do not get outflanked by Donald Trump on
China or trade. Do not raise taxes on anyone without a yacht. Do not do
anything to annoy unions or to worsen racial disparities. The result is a
defensive crouch. For example, Team Biden wants to decarbonise the
economy but not look soft on China or unfriendly to unions. So it places
tariffs on imports of Chinese electric vehicles and solar panels, slowing
decarbonisation without doing much to create union jobs.
Global warming
The good news, however, is that even as temperatures soar, deaths can be
avoided and economic disruption can be minimised. Rich, hot places such
as Phoenix, Kuwait and Singapore are adapting, as did parts of Europe after
that heatwave two decades ago. Rather than swooning helplessly, the rest of
the world should look and learn. The basic idea is simple: get people out of
the sun and into the cool.
Rethinking how cities are built can help, too. Architects in Singapore design
buildings to funnel wind around the city, while a vast tree-planting effort
provides shade and retains moisture. However, it takes time and a mountain
of cash to redesign a city. That is why quicker, cheaper fixes are needed.
Three stand out. First, workplaces and schools need to be more flexible. In
America states such as California and Washington have rules that mandate
shade and water breaks for outdoor workers when it is excessively hot.
More places need similar guidelines. Also, children should be allowed to
study from home and public events should be cancelled when the
temperature is too high.
The second step is to create more chilled public spaces to provide relief and
refuge. Some American cities have “cooling centres”—as do others in India
and Vietnam. Often these are ordinary buildings with air conditioning, from
libraries to offices, that can temporarily be opened to all. Even simple
adaptations can make a difference: painting a roof white can cut indoor
temperatures by several degrees.
Cool it
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heatwaves
But this meeting is special, not only because the situation in China demands
action. It will be the committee’s third plenary session since its members
were selected for a five-year term in 2022. Previous third plenums have led
to momentous changes. At such a meeting in 1978, Deng Xiaoping set a
poor and insular China on a path to reform. The third plenum in 1993
entrenched the party’s goal of creating a “socialist market economy”. These
gatherings do not draft the details of new policies. Rather, they set the
party’s direction on big issues. And just now the issues that confront China
are very big indeed.
The storm began in the property sector, once a pillar of China’s economic
miracle. Now it is being buffeted by a years-long crisis which deepened in
May, when prices of new homes suffered their biggest fall in nearly a
decade and the decline in property investment gathered pace. That has hurt
local governments, which rely on land sales to raise money. And it has left
consumers depressed. Sales in the mid-year shopping festival, known as
618 (short for June 18th), declined this year for the first time ever.
Consumer confidence remains near the depths to which it fell during the
pandemic.
To hit its official annual growth target of 5%, China is leaning on exports
and industrial investment. The authorities have bet on their ability to boost
advanced manufacturing. Exports are booming for the time being. But weak
demand at home and growing protectionism abroad make this a risky
strategy. China’s trade partners increasingly complain that its industrial
policy leads to overcapacity and the dumping of low-cost goods on their
markets. From July, the European Union will impose new tariffs on Chinese
electric vehicles. And no matter who wins the White House in November,
America is likely to impose more restrictions on Chinese trade.
Xi Jinping, the party chief, is not short of advice on how to deal with
China’s problems. Even party insiders are calling for changes to policy.
Some want to see fiscal reforms to take the pressure off local governments.
Others believe Mr Xi needs to show more trust in the market and to boost
the confidence of disillusioned private companies, which account for 60%
of GDP. Entrepreneurs have suffered through years of unpredictable rule-
making, while hidden barriers make it nearly impossible for private firms to
compete with state-backed behemoths. The government needs to give
entrepreneurs dingxinwan, or “chill pills”, say some of its official advisers.
Stronger demand for their products might help entrepreneurs relax. On this
front, too, insiders want the state to take stronger action. Mr Xi, who frowns
on government handouts to ordinary citizens, refuses to spark the economy
with a big consumer stimulus. But there are other ways to gin up demand.
Some advisers advocate lower taxes, liberalising rural land sales or opening
up the services sector. There are calls for reform of the hukou system, which
bars rural migrants from many public services. Better state pensions and
health care would free consumers to spend more and save less, say others.
A call to action
When the central committee produces its final report, it will probably
include signs that China’s leaders are considering some reforms. But given
the scale of China’s problems, vague allusions to new policies are unlikely
to reassure investors or businesspeople. They have seen Mr Xi take half-
measures when bold ones are needed and fail to pursue supposedly agreed-
on new policies. As a result China’s leader will have to work harder to
rekindle confidence in the economy. Rousing rhetoric isn’t enough. Action
is needed. ■
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party
MANY PEOPLE are busily experimenting with chatbots in the hope that
generative artificial intelligence (AI) can improve their daily lives.
Scientists, brainy as they are, are several steps ahead. As we report, 10% or
more of abstracts for papers in scientific journals now appear to be written
at least in part by large language models. In fields such as computer science
that figure rises to 20%. Among Chinese computer scientists, it is a third.
Some see this enthusiastic adoption as a mistake. They fear that vast
quantities of poor-quality papers will introduce biases, boost plagiarism and
jam the machinery of scientific publication. Some journals, including the
Science family, are imposing onerous disclosure requirements on the use of
LLMs. Such attempts are futile and misguided. LLMs cannot easily be
policed. Even if they could be, many scientists find that their use brings real
benefits.
Research scientists are not just devoted to laboratory work or thinking big
thoughts. They face great demands on their time, from writing papers and
teaching to filling out endless grant applications. LLMs help by speeding up
the writing of papers, thereby freeing up time for scientists to develop new
ideas, collaborate or check for mistakes in their work.
The technology can also help level a playing-field that is tilted towards
native English speakers, because many of the prestigious journals are in
their tongue. LLMs can help those who do not speak the language well to
translate and edit their text. Thanks to LLMs, scientists everywhere should
be able to disseminate their findings more easily, and be judged by the
brilliance of their ideas and ingeniousness of their research, rather than their
skill in avoiding dangling modifiers.
As with any technology, there are worries. Because LLMs make it easier to
produce professional-sounding text, they will make it easier to generate
bogus scientific papers. Science received 10,444 submissions last year, of
which 83% were rejected before peer review. Some of these are bound to
have been AI-generated fantasies.
LLMs could also export, through their words, the cultural environment in
which they were trained. Their lack of imagination may spur inadvertent
plagiarism, in which they directly copy past work by humans.
“Hallucinations” that are obviously wrong to experts, but very believable to
everyone else, could also make their way into the text. And most worrying
of all, writing can be an integral part of the research process, by helping
researchers clarify and formulate their own ideas. An excessive reliance on
LLMs could therefore make science poorer.
Trying to restrict the use of LLMs is not the way to deal with these
problems. In the future they are rapidly going to become more prevalent
and more powerful. They are already embedded in word processors and
other software, and will soon be as common as spell-checkers. Researchers
tell surveys that they see the benefits of generative AI not just for writing
papers but for coding and doing administrative tasks. And crucially, their
use cannot easily be detected. Although journals can impose all the
burdensome disclosure requirements they like, it would not help, because
they cannot tell when their rules have been broken. Journals such as Science
should abandon detailed disclosures for the use of LLMs as a writing tool,
beyond a simple acknowledgment.
Science already has many defences against fabrication and plagiarism. In a
world where the cost of producing words falls to nothing, these must
become stronger still. Peer review, for instance, will become even more
important in a gen-AI world. It must be beefed up accordingly, perhaps by
paying reviewers for the time they sacrifice to scrutinise papers. There
should also be more incentives for researchers to replicate experiments.
Hiring and promotion committees at universities should ensure that
scientists are rewarded based on the quality of their work and the quantity
of new insights they generate. Curb the potential for misuse, and scientists
have plenty to gain from their LLM amanuenses. ■
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You might think voters would reward this record. Instead, Mr Macron’s
Ensemble alliance is heading for humiliation on June 30th: one analyst puts
its chance of forming a majority at 0%. As a result Mr Macron’s reforms
could soon begin to unravel—and that reflects a problem for centrist
incumbents everywhere. It was described best by Jean-Claude Juncker, a
former prime minister of Luxembourg and president of the European
Commission: “We all know what to do, but we don’t know how to get re-
elected once we have done it.”
One reason for the backlash against Mr Macron is his own rash decision to
call a snap parliamentary election for Sunday. That is three years earlier
than he needed to and just three weeks after the hard-right opposition
National Rally of Marine Le Pen walloped him at the European elections,
normally seen as only a protest vote. Remarkably, his move has also united
the fractious left-wing opposition, which runs from the traditional Socialist
centre-left to the loopily radical Unsubmissive France party, led by a former
Trotskyist. National Rally and the left-wing alliance, known as the New
Popular Front, are polling first and second respectively. In a two-round
contest, many of Mr Macron’s candidates are likely to be squeezed out of
the race after the first round.
But poor timing cannot explain the central fact of this election. In spite of
the benefits Mr Macron’s reforms have brought, French voters want to
dismantle them. National Rally is set on reversing pension reform and
restoring the wealth tax and promises to slash VAT on energy bills and fuel.
It also vows to crack down on migration, deport “Islamists”, ban the veil in
public places and reintroduce border controls with other European Union
countries. None of this chimes with the open climate for investment Mr
Macron has created. Fiscal rigour has not been Mr Macron’s strong suit—
France is running a 5% annual budget deficit and sitting on public debt
worth some 110% of GDP—all the more reason to believe that the extra
spending promised by the hard right would do serious damage to the
economy. The hard-left New Popular Front is less likely to win power, but
its platform would be even more harmful.
The most likely outcome, a hung parliament, will probably lead to reform
slipping backwards. The rules mean that fresh elections cannot be called for
at least a year and in that time France could have no government, no
legislation, and perhaps no new budget. Mr Macron will remain president;
his term does not end until 2027, at which point Ms Le Pen aims to succeed
him. Although he has extensive executive powers in defence and foreign
policy, he has limited ones on domestic policy, which is the preserve of the
government, accountable to parliament. He may try to impose a
technocratic government, but parliament could simply vote it out again.
Reform needs constant pressure, but that would dissipate instantly.
How has a president like Mr Macron, who has brought his country the fruits
of reform, arrived at such a pass? In part, it is because Mr Juncker is right.
It is customary to sneer at politicians, but being able to persuade voters that
painful change is worth it is a misunderstood and hugely underrated virtue.
In part it is because, while Paris and other big cities have thrived, much of
France has not. Perceptions of inequality are driving politics to the hard
right in much of the democratic world.
Mr Macron has also fallen into traps, some of his own making. The legacies
of covid-19 and inflation make this a rotten time to face voters. One reason
Mr Macron struggled to deal with them better is that he chose to construct
an Olympian presidency. He believed that the power of the office could
unite the country, but is instead seen as arrogant and out of touch. His other
mistake was to leave no opposition in the centre ground. An axiom of
democratic politics is that voters grow tired of incumbents. When they do,
they will turn to the alternative. In France, as elsewhere, that alternative
could do grave harm. ■
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risks-throwing-it-all-away
Letters
Letters to the editor
On software attacks, lab-grown meat, the pop industry, Iraq, the Moon, breasts :: A selection of
correspondence
On software attacks, lab-grown meat, the pop industry, Iraq, the Moon, breasts
DIOMIDIS SPINELLIS
Professor
Athens University of Economics and Business
Conservatives’ beef
American Republicans want to maintain control over food supplies and are
opposed to lab-grown meat, you said (The Economist explains, June 3rd).
America may just end up importing the meat alternative instead of growing
it. The Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates
are world leaders in lab-grown meat, thanks to favourable regulations and
incentives, while regulatory approvals in America have ground to a halt.
This threatens American food security and innovation. Lab-grown meat has
to achieve technical milestones for regulatory approval through the Food
and Drug Administration, which is unusual for a food product. Unlike the
drugs industry, cultivated-meat startups operate on lean budgets with little
cash to spend on R&D, large-scale facilities, lobbyists or long product-
development timelines.
DR TONY MOSES
Entrepreneur in residence
At One Ventures
Omaha, Nebraska
I don’t agree with your claim that “Pop Stars are all about albums” (June
8th). In the 1980s, when I was general manager of EMI’s international
marketing division, the thinking was certainly to sell singles in order to
make the real money selling albums. However, as the commercialisation of
pop tours took off, providing super returns derived from scaling up concerts
and event experiences, the thinking changed
to selling singles to sell
albums, in order to sell tickets and merchandise.
MANO MANOHARAN
London
OPEC countries failing to stick to lower output targets (“In the shadows”,
June 1st) was a factor behind Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Individual
countries in the oil cartel have an incentive to cheat, selling above their
quotas, so it needs an enforcer to keep would-be cheaters in line.
Historically, the role fell to Saudi Arabia, a swing producer capable of
flooding the market when members violated their quotas.
Kudos for a beautiful and deeply moving obituary (June 15th) on William
Anders, the Apollo 8 astronaut who took the “Earthrise” photograph in
1968. It reminded me of “In the Shadow of the Moon”, a documentary film
from 2007, which featured reflections from astronauts who flew on lunar
missions, and used the famous photo and a trove of spectacular imagery
taken on the Apollo flights. That film, like your obituary, reminds us that
“They had gone all the way to the Moon to discover the Earth.”
TOM NAGORSKI
New York
You touched on 1968 as a year of Vietnam and riots. Anders took his photo
at the end of the year, after the assassinations of Martin Luther King and
Bobby Kennedy, the Tet Offensive, and widespread disorder on college
campuses and city streets. It was a year of chaos, grief and mental and
spiritual exhaustion.
JOHN FOX
Mercersburg, Pennsylvania
MARTY KRASNEY
Sausalito, California
Bosom poetry
Yours despondently.
ANNE SMITH
London
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By Invitation
A hard-right government might disrupt France’s relations
with Europe
The French election :: Or it could try to change the EU from within—which would be worse,
reckons Jean Pisani-Ferry
The programmes of the three blocs now competing in the general election
are very different from each other. The NPF coalition envisions increasing
public spending by €150bn ($160bn), or around 4.5% of GDP, by 2027—
financed by €150bn in new taxes. With public spending at 57% of GDP in
2023, the highest ratio in the EU, this tax-and-spend programme, if
implemented, would push the country into uncharted fiscal territory. The
NPF also plans to raise the minimum wage by 14% in its first few months
in office. Although such increases have been implemented in other
countries and have proved effective, the French situation is special, with a
particularly compressed distribution of wages. A further increase of the
minimum wage, especially if sudden, would compress it further—and feel
like a demotion to many wage-earners. It might even trigger an inflationary
spiral.
The programme of the centrist coalition, whose leader is the current prime
minister, Gabriel Attal, envisions tax breaks on wage increases, means-
tested subsidies for acquiring electric vehicles and the elimination of stamp
duty for first-time homebuyers. It spices up but does not dramatically depart
from the Macronist strategy.
Despite being the front-runner and having a serious chance of seeing its
candidate, Jordan Bardella, appointed prime minister, the RN does not have
a fully fledged economic programme. In a recent hearing before the
employers’ association, Mr Bardella was cautious, arguing that the state of
public finances does not leave room for fiscal profligacy. He nevertheless
promised to lower the value-added-tax rate on energy products, to exempt
wage increases from social-security contributions (within limits) and to
make it possible for employees who entered the labour force before the age
of 20 to retire after having contributed for 40 years. As matching revenues
are conspicuously absent, implementing this programme would certainly
trigger a fight with Brussels.
The problem with the RN is not its fiscal strategy, however. It is its pro-
Russian stance, its deeply nationalist posture and its aversion to climate
action. Mr Bardella has indicated his intention to opt out of European
electricity-market rules, to apply a national preference to public
procurement and to renegotiate France’s net contribution to the EU budget.
This may be only the tip of the iceberg. In 2022 Ms Le Pen said that, if
elected, she would call a referendum to establish the primacy of the French
constitution over European law—a reversal of the current legal hierarchy.
In the abstract, we agree: a stable regime and “robust” legal system matter.
But Mr Trump’s recent conviction for falsifying business records was not an
example of a robust legal system at work. It was lawfare: a co-ordinated
attack to interfere in the election. A prosecutor who had pledged to go after
Mr Trump did so, concocting a legal theory to turn expired misdemeanours
into 34 “felonies”.
The lawfare has failed to erode support for Mr Trump, including among
entrepreneurs. Why? In short: we have seen the administrations of both
candidates. And contrary to Mr Hoffman’s assertions, business leaders who
support Mr Trump are not hoping to be his “oligarchs”. If anything, we
know that supporting him opens us up to attacks on our character in the
press, and attacks on our businesses by the administrative state. Just look at
how Mr Biden’s Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and other agencies mobilised against Elon Musk’s entities after he
embarrassed the federal government with the release of the “Twitter Files”,
which exposed the federal censorship apparatus.
But it’s not about us. It’s about the long-term health of the country. The
choice is clear. The only candidate in this race whose administration is
likely to restore competence to government is Mr Trump.
From the brazen plan to transfer $1trn or more in student-loan debt onto
working-class taxpayers, to the cynical idea of handing out $10,000 for
first-time home purchases, Mr Biden has proven himself willing to use
some people’s money to buy other people’s votes. He depleted the strategic
petroleum reserve in an attempt to lower fuel prices. And instead of
showing contrition for bad policy that stoked inflation, he blames CEOs and
corporations.
As a co-founder of Palantir, a data-analytics firm created to help dismantle
groups like al-Qaeda, I find Mr Biden’s foreign-policy debacles particularly
galling. The disgraceful withdrawal from Afghanistan left billions of
dollars’ worth of weaponry to the Taliban, and led to the release of
thousands of dangerous prisoners, including members of al-Qaeda who
intend to attack Americans again. Mr Biden has enabled the terrorist regime
in Iran through billions of dollars of sanctions relief and weak actions.
In 2016 Peter Thiel was considered a heretic in business circles for giving
$1m to Mr Trump and speaking at the Republican National Convention.
The difference today is palpable. Moreover, several business leaders who
had supported Mr Trump but backed away after the 2020 election and the
subsequent Capitol riot—including Stephen Schwarzman, Doug Leone and
David Sacks—have written thoughtfully about their decision to support him
once more.
There are many in Silicon Valley and on Wall Street who share Mr
Hoffman’s sharply negative views on Mr Trump. Vinod Khosla has said:
“We have to absolutely at any cost make sure that that donkey’s rump,
Trump, doesn’t get elected and destroy democracy.”
Briefing
What would Joe Biden actually do with a second term?
The trouble with sequels :: He has a domestic agenda, but no easy way to bring it about
MOST OCTOGENARIANS opt for the easy life. President Joe Biden is
embarking on a gruelling, billion-dollar campaign to win the privilege of
continuing to work until he is 86. To what end exactly? In his previous
campaign, in 2019, Mr Biden said he wanted to save “the soul of the
nation”—by which he meant depriving Donald Trump of the presidency. Mr
Trump’s revenge candidacy this year has prompted Mr Biden to revive his
old pitch. Our election model suggests the president has only about a 30%
chance of securing re-election, although a debate between the candidates on
June 27th could cause the polls to shift. A second victory for Mr Biden
would properly vanquish his nemesis. But it would also leave the president
with four more years in the White House. What would he do with them?
Bruce Reed, the president’s deputy chief of staff, says, “Biden got more
done in the last three years than most presidents have accomplished in two
terms.” He casts the president’s plans as building on a legacy of helping the
middle class: creating a $10,000 tax credit for first-time homebuyers,
extending the capped prices the elderly pay for insulin and some
prescription drugs to all Americans, banning “junk fees” that push up the
price of services and shielding ordinary Americans from tax rises while
making the rich and big business pay more. It is all sensible enough, but not
exactly a new New Deal.
A near-perfect defence is not impossible. Democrats did not lose any seats
in the mid-term elections of 2022—and in fact gained a vulnerable
Republican one—as a result of the Republicans’ abysmal candidate
selection and popular anger over abortion. Mr Biden could still get things
done with a 50-50 split, as he did during the first two years of his
presidency, when he pushed through both a big stimulus and the Inflation
Reduction Act, which despite its name was an ambitious law to cut
America’s emissions of greenhouse gases.
In fact, a 50-50 Senate under Mr Biden might be even more energetic in
2025, since Democrats would probably weaken the filibuster, a
parliamentary rule that in effect requires a supermajority of 60 to pass non-
fiscal laws. The two biggest opponents of reform on the Democratic side,
Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona, are leaving
office. Democrats are already talking about scrapping the filibuster to pass a
law reinstating a nationwide right to an abortion.
If Democrats controlled Congress and the White House, they would not
stop at that. Mr Biden’s nostalgia for labour unions, up to this point largely
rhetorical, would be channelled into the PRO Act, which would overrule
states’ “right-to-work” laws, making it easier for unions to organise.
Congress would probably also empower the National Labour Relations
Board, a government agency, to fine employers. A pledge to increase the
federal minimum wage for the first time since 2009, from $7.25 an hour to
$15, is another item on the agenda.
Fury Road
The Democrats also have a long fiscal wish-list. “It’s time to restructure the
tax code and use the revenues to invest in a stronger country, in child care,
health care, housing and fighting the climate crisis,” declares Elizabeth
Warren, a Democratic senator from Massachusetts. She is a standard-bearer
of the progressive wing of the party whose allies hold many big jobs in the
administration. “The key is more revenue,” she says of the president’s
agenda for a second-term. “It’s not like we need new ideas for how to do
this. We need the backbone to tax the wealthy and the giant corporations
that have figured out how to make paying taxes optional.” That, she hopes,
includes taxing wealth directly. Mr Biden has proposed increasing the main
corporate-tax rate from 21% to 28%, introducing a “billionaire minimum
tax” and eliminating various loopholes for the wealthy. The revenue could
in theory be used to plug America’s gaping fiscal deficits, though in practice
Democrats might be tempted to spend much of it on child-care subsidies,
universal pre-school and other schemes Mr Biden advocated unsuccessfully
in his first term.
But next year big chunks of the tax cuts pushed through by Mr Trump
expire. That will force Congress, whatever its hue, to legislate. Republicans
want the cuts extended in full, despite the $3.3trn price-tag; Democrats may
trade a more limited extension for pet projects. “That’s the train that’s
leaving the station,” says Bharat Ramamurti, a former deputy director of Mr
Biden’s National Economic Council. “If Democrats want to do something
on paid family leave, on child-care affordability, on housing supply, that tax
package becomes the opportunity to do that.”
It is in this realm that a second Biden term might have the most impact. The
president has put ideological allies of Ms Warren at the head of various
regulatory agencies. They, in turn, have interpreted their authority
expansively, to the ire of business. New edicts include much stricter limits
on carbon emissions from power plants, a broader definition of workers
who must receive overtime payments and a requirement for big publicly
traded firms to reveal their carbon emissions. Although many CEOs
acknowledge what they politely call the “tail risks” of a second Trump
presidency, they are reluctant to back a president who aims to raise their
taxes, bolster unions and regulate with zeal.
“We’ve been going back to the original statutes, making sure that we’re
fully exercising [their] provisions,” says Lina Khan, the head of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC). Her agency, she notes, has the authority to
investigate any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”, not just actions that
raise prices or reduce choice for consumers, its recent focus. It has banned
“non-compete” agreements, which prevent workers defecting to rival firms,
and is campaigning against “junk” (meaning hidden) fees. It has pursued
high-profile cases against Big Tech, including against Meta for its
domination of social networks and Amazon for its sway over e-commerce.
Ms Khan and Jonathan Kanter, who heads the antitrust division at the
Department of Justice, issued new guidelines on corporate mergers in
December. These are more exacting than the ones they replaced, requiring
many more firms to seek permission in advance to merge and greatly
expanding the grounds for refusal. Ms Khan says the intention was to
ensure “that we weren’t falling into a pattern of enforcers handicapping
themselves or undertaking really cramped meanings of what their own
authority or the law is”.
Administration officials also see scope to trim emissions under the Clean
Air Act and the Clean Water Act. A rule just finalised by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) obliges coal-fired power plants either to capture
90% of their carbon emissions by 2039 or shut down. Rules requiring
emissions cuts for new gas-fired power plants will also be coming into
effect. Once Mr Biden no longer has to worry about getting re-elected, he
might impose further constraints on the use of fossil fuels, such as higher
emissions standards for cars and factories. Some even argue that the
president has the authority under existing laws to implement something
very similar to a carbon tax. (Mr Trump, for his part, has reportedly been
asking oil firms to donate $1bn to his campaign, on the understanding that
he would call off this regulatory assault.)
Janet Yellen, the treasury secretary, is not expected to stay after the election.
Her replacement could be Gina Raimondo, the current commerce secretary,
who is one of the few members of the cabinet who receives high marks
from business, or Lael Brainard, the current director of the National
Economic Council and a former central banker. Both might have greater
sway over policy than Ms Yellen, whose free-market orientation is out of
step with the protectionist impulses of the administration. Ms Brainard is
also on the shortlist to replace Jerome Powell, the current chairman of the
Federal Reserve, whose term expires in 2026. Trade policy has been
moribund under Katherine Tai, the current United States Trade
Representative, and largely a continuation of Mr Trump’s blunderbuss
mercantilism.
United States
Young voters strongly favour Joe Biden, but will they turn
out?
The enthusiasm gap :: After a pummelling from campus protesters over Gaza, the president is
struggling to get his message across
Tour college campuses, however, and you will find plenty of young voters
ready—excited, even—to cast a ballot for Mr Biden. “He has been the most
progressive president we’ve ever had,” raves Ian Moore, a 20-year-old
student executive-board member of the University of Michigan’s College
Democrats, an arm of the Democratic National Committee. “Yeah, he’s a
little older, he’s a little less exciting,” he acknowledges, “but he gets the job
done.”
And that increase might prove to be short-lived. When the pandemic ended,
Republicans restored restrictions on postal and early voting in many states.
And if youth turnout more closely resembles the much lower levels of 2016,
Mr Biden would lose around 850,000 votes from his margin over Mr
Trump, even if he holds the 23-point advantage he enjoyed last time.
Pundits have attributed much of young voters’ mix of apathy and disdain for
Mr Biden to the war in Gaza. Half of those under 30 tell pollsters at
YouGov that they disapprove of his handling of the conflict. Their views of
Mr Biden’s performance have soured dramatically since the war’s early
days in October. And yet the great majority of these unhappy young voters
say they still intend to vote for Mr Biden. At the start of the war registered
voters under 30 preferred Mr Biden to Mr Trump by a 28-point margin. In
June the same group said they favoured Mr Biden by an average of 20
points.
TikTok tow
The evidence is clearer about two other problems Mr Biden has with young
voters. One is his low standing with independents. The president’s current
polling advantage among young Democrats is the same as it was at this
stage in 2020. Yet he is attracting a scant 27% of young independents. (Mr
Trump and Robert F. Kennedy junior are performing even worse; and 16%
of young independents tell pollsters they are undecided.)
In terms of issues, young voters are not so different from everyone else. In
April’s Harvard Youth Poll, the three most important issues they cited were
inflation, health care and housing. These are priorities for all voters. Young
Republicans prioritise immigration more than their Democratic
counterparts, while those Democrats prioritise women’s reproductive rights.
Mr Biden’s boomer backers may wring their hands over young voters’
seeming apathy about Mr Trump’s xenophobic populism. Yet the reality is
that for a growing share of young voters, Trumpism is the norm. This year’s
youngest eligible voter was just nine years old when Mr Trump declared
that Mexicans were rapists as he launched his 2016 campaign. And that
same voter was only in their first year of high school as his presidency
concluded with hundreds of his supporters attacking the Capitol. Younger
voters, like generations before them, are focused on their own futures. Quite
reasonably, they want to know what Mr Biden will do for them if he is re-
elected. ■
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states/2024/06/27/young-voters-strongly-favour-joe-biden-but-will-they-turn-out
Forensic fandom
IT IS 9AM on a Sunday and Liz is trying to figure out who did it.
Specifically: who killed this guy splayed across the floor? In her day job
Liz is a massage therapist, but today she is a homicide detective—or rather
she is cosplaying one. Wearing blue latex gloves she prods a blood-soaked
mannequin by her feet, part of a crime-scene simulation at CrimeCon, a
convention for true-crime fans. Liz came to learn from the experts. They
start with the basics: it is blood spatter, not splatter.
That some 5,000 cheery, normal-seeming people pay $350 and up to spend
their weekend chatting about grisly murders, online predators, what to do
when “love goes wrong”, and what really happened to Kathleen Peterson
illustrates the genre’s popularity. True crime is booming. In 2022 it
accounted for a quarter of top-ranked podcasts on Apple and Spotify,
according to the Pew Research Centre, a think-tank. That year a third of
people surveyed by YouGov, a pollster, said they consume true-crime
content at least once a week. Women are the most avid fans.
The genre is evolving. These days more content is devoted to open cases
and wrongful convictions rather than solved crimes, notes Haley Gray, a
researcher for several podcasts. The shift stems partly from a perception
that the criminal-justice system is not functioning fairly, which #MeToo and
the death of George Floyd intensified, says David Schmid of the University
at Buffalo. The other reason is that such cases present a puzzle to solve.
And who doesn’t like a puzzle?
For consumers and creators of the stuff, it is gratifying that a genre long
considered prurient and exploitative might instead promise justice. Some
podcasts have indeed changed the course of investigations, by identifying
victims or bringing pressure to bear on police. “Serial”, which spawned the
podcast boom a decade ago, led to the release of Adnan Syed from prison
(his conviction, over the murder of his ex-girlfriend in 1999, was reinstated
last year and is the subject of an appeal). In 2019 Chris Lambert, a singer-
songwriter with no journalism experience, made “Your Own Backyard”, a
podcast series about the decades-old murder of Kristin Smart. It renewed
attention on the case, and the police arrested her killer.
Yet as Liz in the latex gloves can attest, true crime is not like other
fandoms. It invites participation. Fans listen to stories, then they develop
theories about what happened. Sometimes they get involved and sleuth
around online themselves.
In 2013 Reddit apologised when its users misidentified suspects behind the
Boston Marathon bombing. In 2022 a professor at the University of Idaho
sued a TikToker for alleging that she had orchestrated the murder of four
students on campus that year. Victims’ families get harassed too. At
CrimeCon, anyone connected to a well-known victim is like a mini-
celebrity by association, granted spots on panels and booths in the
exhibition hall. But online it is a free-for-all. After Maura Murray
disappeared in New Hampshire 20 years ago, armchair detectives
insinuated that she was running from her family and that her relatives were
obstructing the police investigation. Internet sleuths “felt they had a right
not only to all this information about Maura, but also every single person
connected to her,” says Julie, her sister.
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states/2024/06/24/true-crime-fans-are-banding-together-online-to-try-to-solve-cases
Poles have been emigrating to America since the very beginning. At the
Polish Museum of America in Chicago, Beatrix Czerkawski, the resident
historian, briskly delivers a 1,000-year history, culminating in the claim that
America’s constitution has its origin in liberal ideas first adopted in Poland.
The country’s 16th-century laws protecting freedom of religion inspired
Thomas Jefferson, she argues. Behind her a monumental painting of
Casimir Pulaski, a Polish cavalryman who fought in the revolutionary war
and reputedly saved George Washington’s life, fills most of a wall.
Are the links strong enough for Przekrój to succeed? Half a century ago
Poles were a key constituency in American politics. In the 1960 election
campaign John F. Kennedy made sure to pay homage to the Polish
American Congress in Chicago. The magazine was then a valued
connection to the old country. Stefan Wiktor, a Polish-American whose
grandfather was the minister of defence in Poland’s wartime government-
in-exile, remembers his father reading the paper. Ties are looser these days.
“It doesn’t really last past the second generation,” sighs Terry Repak, Mr
Wiktor’s wife.
Still, as your correspondent watched, the couple got into a sharp debate
with Ms Czerkawski about democratic backsliding in Poland. Perhaps
Przekrój has been reborn at just the right time. ■
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states/2024/06/27/przekroj-an-iconic-polish-magazine-relaunches-in-america
AI and parenting
Anashay Wright, a black parent, says AI has changed her life. She uses AI
to help with her attention-deficit diagnosis. She speaks into the program,
and it translates her words into memos and slide decks. “In a world that
worships the written word, I could never convey the energy and the soul of
my emotions,” says Ms Wright. She also uses AI to help her children
brainstorm ideas and get feedback on their schoolwork. She and her son
used AI to draft an appeal letter after a university rejected him. (He was
then accepted.)
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states/2024/06/27/non-white-american-parents-are-embracing-ai-faster-than-white-ones
A SCOTUS snafu
Editor’s update: On June 27th the Supreme Court released its ruling in
Moyle v United States. The published opinions match those in the document
that was briefly posted in error on the court’s website the day before.
THE SUPREME COURT loves to keep America guessing. The justices say
which days they “may announce opinions” but offer no whisper of which
rulings are coming on a given day. On June 26th the court managed to raise
the intrigue to new heights. After just two of a dozen pending decisions
were released, Moyle v United States fleetingly appeared on the Supreme
Court’s website.
The document vanished as unceremoniously as it arrived, but not before
Bloomberg News grabbed a copy. Moyle addresses a stand-off between the
Idaho Defence of Life Act—which bans abortion unless the fetus is
conceived through rape or incest, or if the woman’s life is at stake—and
then only in the first trimester—and the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Labour Act (EMTALA), a law requiring hospitals that receive federal
funding to provide “stabilising treatment”. The Biden administration says
that includes abortion when a pregnancy threatens a woman’s health.
The court seemed split in the April 24th hearing. The inadvertently posted
document reveals rifts, too. But it suggests that women in Idaho facing
pregnancy-related health emergencies—including possible loss of
reproductive organs—may soon have access to abortion. An amicus brief
filed by the National Women’s Law Center stated that there are about 70
documented cases of pregnant women almost dying when they were denied
care following state abortion bans enacted after the court overturned Roe v
Wade.
The apparent ruling’s method for averting the madness is curious. Five
justices appear set to dismiss the case as “improvidently granted”, leaving
in place a lower court’s injunction curtailing the full force of Idaho’s ban.
This off-ramp is ordinarily a sign that after oral argument, a majority
concludes the case never should have been taken up in the first place.
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Ms Robinson saw this as an attempt to exert undue influence over what was
supposed to be an independent process. John Ioannidis of Stanford
University, who co-authored guidelines for systematic reviews, says that if
sponsors interfere or are allowed to veto results, this can lead to either
biased summaries or suppression of unfavourable evidence. Ms Robinson
sought to avoid such an outcome. “In general, my understanding is that the
university will not sign off on a contract that allows a sponsor to stop an
academic publication,” she wrote to Ms Kelly.
Ms Robinson protested that the new policy did not reflect the contract she
had signed and violated basic principles of unfettered scientific inquiry she
had emphasised repeatedly in her dealings with WPATH. The Hopkins team
published only one paper after WPATH implemented its new policy: a 2021
meta-analysis on the effects of hormone therapy on transgender people.
Among the recently released court documents is a WPATH checklist
confirming that an individual from WPATH was involved “in the design,
drafting of the article and final approval of [that] article”. (The article itself
explicitly claims the opposite.) Now, more than six years after signing the
agreement, the EPC team does not appear to have published anything else,
despite having provided WPATH with the material for six systematic
reviews, according to the documents.
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Lexington
For all the enthusiasm, there was, in retrospect, a touching quality to the
scene, and not only because the congressman who was the focus of the
rally, Jamaal Bowman, would go on to lose his primary three days later, on
June 25th. It captured the predicament Mr Biden has presented to his party’s
leftists, and that they are presenting him in return. Can they praise Mr
Biden, and he them, without alienating key supporters? Can they criticise
one another to court such supporters without helping Donald Trump?
The war in Gaza has so sharpened such questions about where Democrats
stand that it is splitting the anti-war left itself. Mr Bowman’s criticism of
Israel prompted the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a
pro-Israel group, to spend a record amount of money to defeat him. Yet
during the rally, scores of protesters, blocked off by steel barricades and
watched by police, chanted for a “free Palestine” and against Mr Bowman
and the other Democrats on stage, who included such stars of the left as
Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Bernie Sanders.
“AOC, Bowman, Sanders: Shills for ‘Genocide Joe’ Biden!” read one sign.
Even from inside the barricades, Mr Sanders drew some boos when he said
Israel “had the right to defend itself against a terrorist attack” before adding,
“It does not have the right to go to war against the entire Palestinian
people.”
The role of AIPAC in the race also complicates its lessons. The group’s
political arm spent more than $14.5m helping Mr Latimer, the most ever
spent by an interest group on a House race, but not by emphasising Mr
Bowman’s views on Israel. Instead, its ads portrayed him as undermining
Mr Biden by, for example, voting against his infrastructure bill.
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The Americas
An apparent coup in Bolivia founders, but the country
remains in trouble
Chaos in the Andes :: The sight of armoured vehicles ramming the presidential palace will
scare investors away
Nor, it seemed, did President Luis Arce. At one point he emerged to argue
with the putschists face-to-face. Returning inside, he managed to hold a
ceremony to appoint new heads of the armed forces, over the booming of
tear gas being fired at pro-democracy protesters outside. It was an
“atypical” day, he noted dryly, but swore “we will defeat any coup attempt.”
He called on Bolivians to mobilise to defend democracy, but also to stay
calm. The new top brass demanded all soldiers return to the barracks.
Meanwhile one of Bolivia’s biggest unions announced a general strike in
protest at the coup attempt. Condemnation of the attempted putsch poured
in from leaders across the world.
That is good news for a region that believed coups were largely consigned
to history. But the uprising was prompted, at least in some way, by a
profound political and economic crisis. Ahead of elections next year Mr
Arce and Evo Morales, a former president, are vying for power. Tensions
between the pair—both leftists and former colleagues—have paralysed the
government, aggravated economic woes and, in turn, fuelled street protests.
The sight of tanks ramming the presidential palace has succeeded only in
making Bolivia appear more unstable and chaotic to businesses, investors
and tourists.
The rolling political crisis began in 2019 when Mr Morales ran for an
unconstitutional third term. He won, but after accusations of fraud and mass
protests that caused 36 deaths the army asked him to resign. He did so, and
left the country.
Yet with soldiers back in their barracks the chances of a smooth resolution
to the leftists’ dispute remain slim. The army’s escapade may have
deepened it. General Zúñiga was arrested on the evening of his failed coup.
He may have been attempting to seize power, using the political and
economic crisis as justification; he was sacked after saying he would not let
Mr Morales be president again on national television. But as he was taken
away he accused Mr Arce of asking him to stage an uprising “to raise [the
president’s] popularity”. Even if false, the accusations may fuel more chaos.
The government spends some $2bn a year to import subsidised fuel, nearly
bankrupting it. Natural-gas extraction, once a source of strength, is fading
fast in part due to lack of investment by the state-owned hydrocarbons
company. By 2030 the country may be a net importer of natural gas. In
February Fitch downgraded the country’s debt from junk to even grimier
junk. Now deep divisions in the army must be added to the wider political
crisis. ■
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trouble
Then came fentanyl. Fifty times more potent than heroin, easy to make and
cheap, the synthetic opioid has flooded North America in recent years. “You
can’t even find heroin on the streets any more,” says Brittany Graham, head
of the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users, an activist group. Other
synthetics are often mixed with street drugs, including benzodiazepines,
sedatives which are especially dangerous combined with fentanyl.
In 2012 fentanyl was involved in just 5% of overdose deaths. In 2023 that
figure was 85%. The annual body count has risen ten-fold over the same
period. A record 2,511 people died from overdoses in 2023 across the
province of British Columbia, most of them in and around Vancouver, its
biggest city. BC’s fatal overdose rate is more than double Canada’s overall
rate, and six times the figure in England and Wales (though still lower than
the hardest-hit parts of the United States). Overdoses are now the leading
cause of death for British Columbians aged 10-59, taking more lives a year
than murder, suicide, accidents and natural disease combined.
The drug problem is at its most acute in Vancouver’s Downtown East Side,
several astonishingly squalid blocks that protrude from the city’s affluent
centre. On a given afternoon the area’s main drag is lined with people
sitting, slumping or prone on the pavement amid a jumble of makeshift
shelters. Many openly huff fumes from glass pipes or off patches of tinfoil.
Smoking opioids is now more common than injecting them, but used
needles are still scattered around. Most of the 50 calls to which the
neighbourhood’s firefighters respond every day are drug-related. The East
Side’s lethal overdose rate is a dozen times higher than the provincial
average.
But it is far from the only place where fatalities occur. Most happen
indoors. “We go all across the city,” says a fire-department spokesperson.
“We go into mansions and penthouses. It’s in every community and all age
groups.” Often the victims are not hard-core addicts, but unwary party-
goers who took something far more powerful than expected. It is an easy
mistake, especially as counterfeit pharmaceutical pills laced with fentanyl
circulate.
Nor is the scourge limited to cities. Overdose rates have spiked across the
province. The mountain town of Hope (population: about 7,000), a two-
hour drive north-west of Vancouver, has the province’s highest rate of drug
overdoses. Rural health officials blame a lack of services on top of the
supply of bad drugs.
There are some encouraging indicators. A recent study found addicts taking
prescribed opioids to be at a lower risk of overdosing. And after years of a
steady rise, overdoses may finally be trending down: the rate of fatal ones
in the first four months of this year is lower than the same period in any of
the preceding three years.
Few are calling for a return to a policy of flinging petty drug offenders in
jail, but critics say the province should put less emphasis on harm reduction
and more on efforts to get people to stop using drugs altogether. Some even
suggest forced treatment. For many addicts, however, a lack of affordable
housing, treatment beds and mental health care makes recovery nigh-
impossible. “Naloxone can help keep someone from dying today, but it
can’t solve all these other issues,” says Paxton Bach, a leading addiction
doctor.
Harm reduction alone can do no more than its name implies. It seems to be
helping to reduce the body count, but by itself it cannot cure all the damage
done by drugs as potent as fentanyl and other synthetics. “The drug supply
is changing under our feet. It’s not like a mutating virus but a whole new
disease,” says Bohdan Nosyk, an addiction researcher. The disease will
need new treatments. ■
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americas/2024/06/27/vancouver-pioneered-liberal-drug-policies-fentanyl-destroyed-
them
Mission impossible
CLICHÉD WISDOM suggests that those who wait are rewarded for doing
so. Haiti’s 12m people are about to find out whether this applies to them.
The first contingent of an international police mission tasked with bringing
stability to the gang-racked country landed in the capital, Port-au-Prince, on
June 25th. Their mission begins eight months after the UN authorised the
force, 20 months after Haiti’s government requested it.
Garry Conille, Haiti’s prime minister, calls the MSS’s arrival a “unique
opportunity” for the country. But Haiti is in different circumstances today
from those in which the mission was conceived. Ariel Henry, then Haiti’s
acting prime minister, asked for the intervention in October 2022; gang
violence had been growing since the murder of then-president Jovenel
Moïse in July 2021. But in February this year the gangs went on a rampage,
taking over critical infrastructure, including ports and prisons. Mr Henry
was pressed into standing down to make way for a transitional government.
Omens were bad as the Kenyan force landed. Their colleagues in Nairobi,
Kenya’s capital, were firing tear gas and bullets at protesters demonstrating
against proposed tax rises. They killed at least five people. The extent to
which the Kenyan police will respect human rights matters: the last
international intervention in Haiti, run by the UN, was undermined by
allegations of crimes, including rapes and kidnappings, committed by
troops who had supposedly come to help.
Kenyan officials think the mission will cost $600m. The United States alone
has pledged $360m, and is on the verge of handing over $110m of it. More
will be needed. Moreover, 2,500 police may be too few to deal with the
gangs. The United States has been the driving force behind the Kenyan-led
mission, and has built its accommodation and flown in supplies, but has
said it will not contribute officers.
Pessimists say the MSS is replaying a tired and failed formula. Optimists,
foremost the United States, say this time is different, because the process of
re-establishing legitimate, democratic leadership is already under way. A
transitional council, which will run the country until the elections,
appointed Mr Conille as prime minister on June 11th. Days later the council
installed a new police chief. Jimmy Chérizier, a prominent gang leader
better known as Barbeque, has adopted a more conciliatory tone since the
Kenyans’ arrival.
The force won’t “magically resolve” Haiti’s problems, says Jake Johnston
of the Centre for Economic and Policy Research in Washington. The
months of wrangling required to create the transitional institutions
demonstrated the messiness of Haitian politics, which may yet scupper the
election plans. Deep political and economic reforms are required to tackle
the root causes of violence. If that ever happens, a good thing will truly
have come to Haitians after years of waiting. ■
Asia
Meet the incels and anti-feminists in Asia
Rebels without much cause :: They threaten to make the region’s demographic decline even
worse
At first glance, this may not seem that unusual. Much of East Asia has
tended to be rather patriarchal. Japan and South Korea are the worst
performers in The Economist’s glass-ceiling index, a measure of how
women-friendly the working environment is in 29 well-off countries. In the
OECD, a club of mostly rich countries, South Korea has the biggest gender
pay gap. Women earn 31% less than men. In Japan that gap is 21%. In a
survey in 2023 by IPSOS, a pollster, 72% of South Koreans agreed that “a
man who stays home to look after his children is less of a man,” the highest
rate in the 30 countries surveyed.
Even so, women’s lives in much of the region have improved. East Asia’s
“son preference” is fading, with boys and girls alike expected to do well in
school. The college enrolment rate for girls is now higher than that of boys
in South Korea, China and Taiwan. In Japan it is still higher for boys, but
only by three percentage points. Women are increasingly entering the
workforce: in Japan the employment rate for women aged 25-39 surpassed
80% for the first time in 2022. In South Korea 74% of women aged 25-29
are employed.
This success is the first cause of the backlash. Young men are “surrounded
by women who do better in school or excel in work”, says Lee Hyun-jae of
the University of Seoul. Many men feel that “gender equality has already
been achieved,” says Ms Lee. In a world they believe is already egalitarian,
many young men feel that extra policies to uplift women are unfair. Most
do not wish to confine women to the home. But they are frustrated all the
same.
Another factor is that East Asian men are living in less optimistic economic
times than their fathers. Japan witnessed the burst of its “bubble economy”,
an end to decades of remarkable growth, in 1991. South Korea was hit hard
by an economic crisis in 1997. Young people born since then have lived in
an era marked by slow growth. The full-time “salarymen” work model has
eroded, with more precarious or part-time jobs on the rise. Last year in
Japan, inflation hit a four-decade high (of around 3%, so still low by current
rich-world standards). Real wages have fallen for the past two years. In
South Korea the share of young men not in education, employment or
training (NEET) has surged from 8% in 2000 to 21%. By contrast the share
of female NEETs has fallen from 44% to 21% over the same period.
Meanwhile, the dating market is becoming more brutal. Fewer people are
getting married: more than 60% of Japanese women in their late twenties
are unmarried, double the rate in the mid-1980s. In Japan the age at which
men lose their virginity has always been high. It has remained so: in 2022,
42% of men in their 20s said they had never had sex, while 17% of those in
their 30s were virgins, too. A government report from 2022 found that 40%
of men had never been on a date.
Marriage trends are similar in South Korea and Taiwan, while childbirth
outside of wedlock remains rare. This means that the countries are ageing,
and not enough babies are being born to support the population. South
Korea’s fertility rate is the lowest in the world, at 0.72. Taiwan’s is 0.87,
while Japan’s is 1.2. In South Korea some women have sworn off
heterosexual relationships altogether. In 2019 a fringe “4B” movement
emerged there. It involves women abstaining not just from marriage and
childbirth, but also dating and sex with men. They believe a life with a man
is a life without freedom. “I’m not even fighting the patriarchy—I’ve
decided to walk out of it,” says Kim Jina, a 4B practitioner.
South Korea’s politicians are pandering to these young angry male voters.
Yoon Suk Yeol, the current president, campaigned two years ago on a
pledge to abolish the gender-equality ministry. He claimed feminism is
hurting “healthy relationships between men and women”. The country’s
gruelling, 18-month mandatory military service is a particular flashpoint.
Unlike their fathers who served in the military without question, young
Korean men are increasingly disenchanted. According to a survey in 2021
by Hankook Research, a market research outfit, 62% of Korean men aged
18-29, the prime age for conscription, feel military service is a “waste of
time”.
Neighbouring Taiwan faces similar challenges. Its men must also serve in
the military, though for a much shorter stint. But an organised anti-feminist
movement is notably absent there, says Huang Chang-ling of the National
Taiwan University. Young Taiwanese men’s frustration, unlike South
Koreans’, “hasn’t become strong enough for any politician to want to
exploit”, says Ms Huang. Similarly, in Japan, where there is no mandatory
military service, politicians have not yet decided to stoke up the incel vote.
The rise in anti-feminist sentiment bodes badly for the region’s birth rates.
In South Korea, a government survey showed that over 60% of Korean men
in their late 20s believe getting married and having children is “necessary”
in their lives. Only 34% of women in the same age group agreed. But can
East Asian men and women find common ground? A survey by a dating app
last year found that, among divorced singles, 37% of Korean women said
that a “patriarchal” man would be their least favourite date. A similar share
of men said they didn’t want to date feminists. ■
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Beginner’s luck?
Thailand could hit an economic jackpot. Some 12m tourists have visited so
far this year, of whom nearly 20% are from China. According to the study
presented to the Thai parliament, the introduction of casinos would raise
average tourist spending by 52%. The additional expenditure could boost
GDP growth by one percentage point. A real-estate industry body estimated
that each new casino complex could create at least 30,000 jobs.
Yet many Thais do not share their government’s enthusiasm for casinos. An
opinion poll in 2021 found that nearly half of Thais opposed legalising
gambling amid concerns about crime and morality. Earlier this year, the
UN’s regional drugs agency blamed casinos for the rise in organised crime
across South-East Asia.
Ultimately, however, the success of casinos will depend on China. For all
the growth in South-East Asia, gambling revenues in the region were still
less than half the value of those in Macau. Chinese punters remain the
whales, but Mr Xi is trying to cut them down in size. Earlier this year Hun
Manet, Cambodia’s leader, announced that he would stop issuing licences
for new casinos, citing “difficulties” and the importance of creating jobs
through other means. Industry insiders believe Cambodia was influenced by
China.
Left wanting
In Ayodhya and across UP, many voters made the same choice, reducing the
BJP’s share of seats in the state in its northern heartland from 62 out of 80
in 2019 to just 33, its biggest loss in any state. The party also lost 14 seats
in Maharashtra, mostly in rural areas, and ten seats in Rajasthan, another
poor northern state, as well as in rural constituencies across India. Besides
(unfounded) concerns that a new BJP government could abolish
affirmative-action policies benefiting poor or lower-caste groups, the party’s
losses hint at a general sense of economic disaffection among the roughly
450m Indians, mostly from the country’s poor north, who get by on odd
jobs, small-scale self-employment or farming, supplemented by government
welfare.
Mr Modi was swept to power ten years ago on a platform combining Hindu
nationalism with anti-elitism, promising better jobs and better lives for poor
Indians such as Mr Yadav. But his government has struggled to tackle the
lopsidedness of India’s economy that is the source of their dissatisfaction.
Fixing those problems is the biggest challenge that his new coalition
government will face.
With the exception of a big dip during the covid-19 pandemic, India’s GDP
has grown steadily over the past decade. In the year to April it expanded by
8%, more than any other large economy. Yet many ordinary Indians have
not seen enough economic improvements in their day-to-day lives, largely
because the growth has not generated enough employment and higher
wages at the lower end of the scale. The price of food, which forms a large
share of poor people’s expenses, grew by over 10% between July 2022 and
July 2023, and by 9% in the past year. Since 2018 food inflation has
averaged over 6%, eating up a good chunk of wage increases (see chart).
Of the 570m, or just over half of working-age Indians in the labour force,
80% still make a living in the informal economy. This includes agriculture.
The share has hardly changed over the past decade. Informal work comes
without contracts, guaranteed hours or benefits.
Those interventions have saved many from destitution. Yet life remains
hard. In a survey conducted after the election by the Centre for the Study of
Developing Societies (CSDS), a think-tank in Delhi, voters’ top three
complaints were inflation, cited by 24% of respondents, growing
unemployment, highlighted by 23%, and increasing poverty, mentioned by
11%. Even many who support the BJP are unhappy with their lot. “I
appreciate that the government is giving us food,” says Rajni Dinesh
Kumar, who runs a small shop in a Hindu neighbourhood of Rampur, a
town in UP, and approves of Mr Modi. “But what we really need around
here are good jobs.”
Will the new government deliver? For now, it has extended the food-aid
programme and released fresh funds to build houses for the needy. The first
budget, expected in July, is likely to contain measures to encourage job
creation and stimulate private investment, particularly in underserved areas.
These include reducing compliance burdens and improving the accessibility
of credit for small companies, as well as more infrastructure investment in
rural areas. That could be a good start. But more will be needed if the
government is not to squander poor Indians’ future—and its own re-election
prospects. ■
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income-indians
Gen Z mayor
Mr Takashima has set the record as the youngest mayor in Japan. He stands
out in a country with a gerontocratic government. When Kishida Fumio,
Japan’s prime minister, reshuffled his cabinet in September last year, the
average age of its incoming members was 64. Across politics, younger
people are under-represented: in 2022, the share of national politicians aged
40 and under was 6%, compared with 29% in Germany and 22% in Britain.
Low voter turnout among the youth has also worried policymakers; just
over 30% of people in their 20s vote in elections, compared with 70% of
those in their 60s.
Japan’s political system is not set up to reward the young, reckons Charles
McClean, a political scientist at Yale University. The minimum age to be a
candidate for all offices is 25. It rises to 30 for governors and the upper
house. By contrast, in much of the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries,
the minimum age to run for office is the same as the voting age, which is
usually 18. Candidates must also pay an expensive deposit, which is set at
¥3m ($19,000) for governors.
Banyan
Now several artworks are being returned. The latest delivery arrives on July
3rd, when the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York returns 14
artefacts. The Met says this completes the removal of all of its Angkorian
sculptures known to be associated with Latchford. This is the most
significant delivery from the Met to Cambodia. The last time it sent back
objects was in 2013, when it returned two 10th-century statues of “Kneeling
Attendants”. Even so, the Cambodians say the Met has 49 more of their
allegedly looted artefacts and that hundreds remain in museums elsewhere.
This is part of a broader trend. Countries across Asia, growing richer and
more geopolitically powerful, are clamouring for the return of looted
artefacts. Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, has said he is making
restitution a big priority. Indeed in 2018 the Met returned two statues to the
Indian government. (The Koh-i-Noor diamond remains in Britain, despite
repeated attempts to get it back; however it was absent from the coronation
of King Charles III, possibly because of its bloody history.) Nepal has also
got several items back from the Met.
Tiny Cambodia stands out for its success. It claims to have brought home
around 800 artefacts, from various parts of the world, in the past two
decades. By contrast Tanongsak Hanwong, an archeologist, counts a
handful of returns to neighbouring Thailand in the same period.
This is not all selfless. Statues are a useful diplomatic tool. Hun Sen,
Cambodia’s former leader, has thanked President Joe Biden for returning
artefacts and dubbed America the “number one” country at repatriating. A
State Department official says that, although “our relationship with
Cambodia can be strained,” the returns are “bringing our countries
together”. Cambodia’s close ties with China are one area of concern.
But restitution can also divide neighbours. Cambodia and Thailand have
long contested ownership of Khmer heritage. For years troops have been
stationed at Preah Vihear, a temple on the border that both countries have
claimed. Some Cambodians were upset when the Met returned “Golden
Boy”, an Angkorian statue with disputed origins, to Thailand in May.
China
The surprisingly frank economic advice that Xi Jinping
gets
Reform in China :: The minutes of a party meeting show voices in favour of bolder reform
Reform in China
IN POLITICS, FRINGE ideas can become mainstream and vice versa. The
“window of political possibility” can expand or move, as Joe Overton, an
American political analyst, once put it. The same is true even in communist
China. In 1978, for example, the country’s Overton window made a
momentous shift. Two years after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong, it
became possible for the party to acknowledge that the great helmsman was
not infallible. This pragmatism paved the way for faster economic reform
and for Deng Xiaoping to become China’s paramount leader. The change
was sealed at a landmark meeting of the party’s central committee: the
“third plenum” of December 1978.
China is now preparing for another third plenum, which will be held from
July 15th to 18th. It has been over a decade since such a meeting was
devoted to economic reform. In principle, the gathering could signal a
renewed determination to tackle China’s long-standing economic problems,
including weak consumer demand, narrow taxes, miserly social spending,
restrictions on internal migrants’ access to services and bureaucratic
impediments to private enterprise. It is, therefore, a good time to examine
the country’s Overton window: the range of permissible economic opinion
within Chinese officialdom.
On the face of it, the window is narrow. The ideological ferment of 1978-81
is notably absent. The country’s current helmsman, Xi Jinping, has made
costly mistakes: an unsustainable zero-covid policy, clumsy restrictions on
China’s internet platforms and a poorly calibrated crackdown on the
property market. But no leader would dare say of him what Deng said of
Mao: that he was only 70% right, 30% wrong.
Indeed, some critics of China’s economic model worry that Mr Xi operates
in an information bubble. Perhaps the leader has fallen prey to his own
personality cult. He does not correct his blunders because he thinks they are
triumphs. But the explanation for his mistakes is not so simple. In the realm
of economic policy, the range of permissible opinions is wider perhaps than
many people realise. On a number of economic issues, including the woes
of private enterprise, the shortfall of consumption and the need for social
spending, some advisers are surprisingly frank.
One example is Yang Weimin, who helped draft the documents for the third
plenum in 2013 and served in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC), an official advisory body. “The core problem”, he
told Caixin magazine last year, “is that the government carries out too much
direct allocation of resources and too much unreasonable intervention.”
China suffers from overcapacity, for example, not just because of the
blindness of the market, but also because of “blind investment driven by
local governments”.
“Both theory and practice have proven that the market is the most efficient
way to allocate resources,” noted Yi Gang, a former governor of China’s
central bank, at the meeting. The phrase echoed a line Mr Xi himself wrote
after the third plenum of 2013. The government, Mr Yi added, should
concentrate on providing public goods, responding to market failures and
maintaining fair and competitive markets.
Firms will not thrive without strong demand for their products. The “three
horses” driving growth are consumption, investment and exports, pointed
out Sun Jiye, another delegate. But “the role of consumption in driving the
economy is not strong enough,” he argued, echoing economists outside the
party. To “eliminate consumption worries”, the government should boost
employment and wages and “expand the channels” for residents to earn
income from their property, presumably by renting it out. Other delegates
recommended giving “full play to the redistributive role of an effective
government”, revising taxes to favour low-income groups.
Consumers will also spend more and save less if they have fewer concerns
about paying for their retirement and potential medical expenses.
Government spending on health care and social security has increased as a
share of GDP in the past 15 years. Nonetheless, pensions remain
inadequate. “There is a lack of economic security in old age,” one CPPCC
member observed, especially in rural areas. Many gig workers also fall
outside the pension net. The delegate called on the government to transfer
more state-owned capital to the social-security pot, which is meant to fund
workers’ pensions.
The false promise of that meeting will cast a shadow over the gathering in
July. Even if the third plenum makes encouraging commitments, the people
who most need to hear its message may not believe it. Third plenums are an
opportunity for the country’s leaders to advertise their priorities to the party.
But to revive confidence in China’s economy, they will have to convince a
far bigger audience: the country’s disheartened entrepreneurs, homebuyers
and consumers, who take part in the everyday plenum of the marketplace. ■
Last call
FOR NEARLY a decade Roxie was one of Shanghai’s (and China’s) few
lesbian bars. It hosted speed dating and pole dancing, and boasted an
unusually risqué decor (patrons were encouraged to hang their bras above
the counter). But earlier this month the bar announced that it would close. It
blamed “forces beyond our control”, a euphemism for official pressure. On
June 16th, Roxie’s last night, grieving revellers danced and drank while
holding a large rainbow flag over their heads.
In the early days of Xi Jinping’s rule, LGBT groups were allowed some
space. But in recent years life has got much harder for them. Shanghai
Pride, the country’s only big gay celebration, has not been held since 2020,
also because of official pressure. Last year the Beijing LGBT Centre, an
advocacy group, had to close. Authorities often crack down in June as it is
Pride month, reckons a former patron of Roxie. “Everything we celebrate,
they want to crush,” she says.
Some in the party accuse LGBT groups of corrupting young people and
eroding traditional values. But the authorities seem more worried about
national security than morality. They see gay activists as potential tools of
subversion by hostile foreign forces.
Going private
China’s doctors have long felt aggrieved. Their wages ($13,000 a year on
average) are low compared with those of other Chinese professionals. Yet
they work long hours, often more than 50 a week. That is in part because
there are too few of them. China has 2.4 doctors per 1,000 people against an
average of 3.7 in the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries. Chinese
doctors tend to get less respect than their peers in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Trust in them is so low, and medical scandals so rife, that reports of patients
physically attacking them are common.
To make up for their low wages, many doctors bump up their income by
over-purchasing medical equipment or over-prescribing medication. These
scams usually involve illicit profit-sharing deals with medical-device
suppliers and chemists. Because more than 95% of Chinese citizens use
state-backed health insurance, this means the government has in effect been
footing the growing bills.
The new reforms are meant to reduce this by weeding out over-medication
and squeezing the cost of equipment. Poorer-quality state-run hospitals are
often in debt, and China’s populace is ageing fast. So a price cap now limits
how much a doctor can charge for each treatment. A fixed annual wage for
doctors is being gradually brought in. In June the State Council, China’s
cabinet, told provincial authorities to start imposing the reforms across
every city by the end of the year.
The reforms under way are said to have already saved 400bn yuan ($55bn).
But medical professionals worry that the new system may make it harder
for them to do their jobs responsibly. Nurses are using decades-old manuals
to prepare for operations. Doctors are relying on tatty medical equipment
and giving low-level treatment to save money. At a hospital in the province
of Shandong doctors were said to have debated whether to follow standard
procedures during surgery for a cerebral aneurysm. At issue was the cost.
Doctors have been loth to treat patients with complicated illnesses that need
lengthy procedures far exceeding the price cap. In the past they would
usually welcome patients with severe pneumonia and prescribe complex
treatment, but now they often turn them away. They are less willing to
prescribe costlier imported drugs, so patients who need them must buy them
off their own bat. When hospitals started barring patients with complex
conditions from staying for more than 15 days to control spending, the
health regulator denounced them and encouraged aggrieved citizens to
report them.
The health authorities have also vowed to continue their war on corruption.
Doctors have been told to voluntarily hand over ill-gotten proceeds. There
are plenty of examples of what happens if they don’t. Earlier this year,
before Dr Cheng’s case was reported, the medical world was shocked by the
arrest of Tian Wei, a member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, for
alleged corruption. Last year Wang Tianchao, the former director of the top
state hospital in Yunnan province, was sentenced to life in prison for
accepting bribes. He owned dozens of properties.
For veteran doctors seeing their incomes plummet, work in private hospitals
is plainly preferable. Public ones still handle 83% of the population. But
private hospitals now outnumber public ones and their share of patients is
growing. With its finances strained, the government might encourage this
trend, or at least nudge better-off citizens to take up private insurance as a
way of balancing the books. However, that risks widening the gap in the
quality of treatment between rich and poor, which is hardly in line with the
Communist Party’s lofty ideals. ■
Extreme weather
IT MAY NOT look like much any more, but in its heyday La Chaumière
was “the premier nightclub in all Saint Louis”, recalls Cheikh Badiane.
When the tide was low, the long beach extending far into the distance was
wide enough for crowds to gather for football matches on the sand. But in
recent years, the ageing fisherman says, “so many catastrophes have
happened.” La Chaumière is closed. The Koranic school along the
waterfront is no more. A few years ago, during a particularly terrible flood,
a house next to a mosque collapsed, killing the carpenter who lived there.
These days, when the storm-surge comes, the waters go all the way to the
war memorial a couple of hundred metres inland. Inch by inch, home by
home, Saint Louis is being washed into the sea.
West Africa’s coastal cities may not yet be the most visible victims of rising
seas. Several cities in Asia have witnessed more dramatic disasters. Half of
Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital, was submerged under nearly four metres of
water in 2007, which forced half a million people from their homes. But the
speed at which West Africa is urbanising, and the particularly low level of
income at which it is doing so, will greatly magnify the impact of swelling
tides. “These cities are the future mega-hubs of the continent,” explains
Kamal Amakrane of the UN’s Global Centre for Climate Mobility (GCCM).
The World Bank reckons some 42% of West Africa’s GDP is generated in
coastal areas, which are also home to a third of the region’s population.
Managed well, this could be an immense spur to economic growth. But the
GCCM warns that on current trends these coastal cities will in fact cease
being population magnets by 2050. As the effects of flooding and erosion
mount, whole neighbourhoods will become uninhabitable, turning cities
themselves into sources of climate migration.
Saint Louis illustrates some of the difficulties in holding back the waves.
France and the World Bank paid for an emergency dyke to be built after a
particularly catastrophic flood in 2007. But costly protective schemes are
not a long-term solution for most cities in poor countries. Several dykes in
Senegal have collapsed, as did a seawall in Ghana. The World Bank instead
touts “nature-based” alternatives, such as the mangroves and coral reefs that
once protected the coasts. But some of these “themselves are threatened by
climate change”, notes Nick Simpson of the Overseas Development
Institute, a think-tank in London.
Even if the world stopped carbon emissions today, inexorably rising seas
are already “baked in”, says Mr Amakrane. This means many people will
have no choice but to move to higher ground. Along the beachfront in Saint
Louis houses have been marked for demolition. More than 3,000 residents
have been resettled on the other side of the city. Mr Badiane is resigned to
moving, too. “Everyone must leave,” he sighs. ■
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Surrounded by trouble
Though Mauritania has left coups and terrorism behind, the rest of the
region has not. Deaths from conflict in the central Sahel increased by 38%
last year, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project,
a research group. A new crop of military juntas, which have booted out
Western troops and UN peacekeepers and brought in Russian mercenaries
instead, have fuelled the violence. Mauritania and Chad have been forced to
disband the G5 Sahel, a five-country anti-terrorist operation, after the
military regimes in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali withdrew.
That may let Mali’s chaos seep into Mauritania again. Clashes on their
shared border of 2,236km are rising, says Daniel Eizenga of the African
Centre for Strategic Studies, a think-tank tied to America’s defence
department. Tensions flared in April when Malian and Russian troops
pursued jihadists into a Mauritanian village.
At the same time, Mauritania has re-emerged as a key point of departure for
migrants headed for Europe. Roughly 18,000 irregular migrants arrived in
the Canary Islands this year, up 375% from the year before, according to
Frontex, the EU’s external border force. More than 80% of them embarked
from Mauritania, where people-smuggling gangs overload small boats with
migrants, half of whom are Malian. This flow has made Nouadhibou, a port
city, a hotspot for migrant smuggling, says Raouf Farrah of the Global
Initiative Against Transnational Crime, a research NGO. “Mauritania does
not have the capacity to absorb the flow of migrants [to Europe],” says
Bakari Gueye, an analyst based in Nouakchott, the capital.
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The most pertinent rupture with the past, however, is the nature of the
protest movement itself, which has the whiff of revolution. These protests
are the first in Kenya with more of a class tinge than an ethnic one. The
movement behind them has been driven by youngsters who wear their Gen
Z identity with pride and who have spread their message through TikTok
videos and social-media memes. “We are not our parents,” many say.
Alienating the 17% of workers in formal jobs may have seemed a small
price to pay for winning the support of Kenya’s vastly bigger huddled
masses. The likelihood of them taking to the streets seemed small. They
were merely “cool kids”, scoffed David Ndii, Mr Ruto’s chief economic
adviser.
But enraged by another round of tax increases in the budget for 2024,
unveiled earlier this month, the keyboard warriors began to show real fight.
As the protests swelled, government complacency gave way to panic. Some
drew comparisons with Egypt’s uprising of 2011, which was similarly
spearheaded by an underestimated middle class and driven by social media.
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Pier pressure
The reality was more complicated. The pier was finished on May 16th but
was soon damaged by rough seas. It was operational for just two of its first
six weeks.
When The Economist visited the pier on June 25th, the first journalists to
see it from inside Gaza, it was working again: two landing craft unloaded
their cargo in just over an hour. Lorries drove off the vessels and down a
causeway made of interlocking steel segments. They delivered pallets to a
staging area, an expanse of beach flattened by the Israeli army and
surrounded by berms and concrete barriers.
The Pentagon says the pier has delivered over 6,200 tonnes of aid this way
since it was first installed, equal to 25 to 30 lorries a day—not trivial, but
far short of the 150 a day that America promised.
Still, the pier is just one piece of a larger aid operation. Supplies are also
entering through Kerem Shalom, the main commercial crossing in the
south, and via three land crossings in the north. “We’re trying to create
different places of entry in order to have less friction,” says Rear Admiral
Daniel Hagari, an Israeli army spokesman.
This spring, briefly, aid workers said things were improving. In March the
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), a UN-backed initiative
that measures hunger, said that hundreds of thousands of people in northern
Gaza would face famine within two months. But its latest study, published
on June 25th, found that famine had been avoided, albeit temporarily, by a
big increase in aid deliveries since March.
The good news ends there. The IPC said that 495,000 Gazans (almost 25%
of the population) still face “catastrophic” levels of hunger. More than half
of Gazans have sold their clothes to buy food; one in five goes entire days
and nights without eating.
The staging areas next to the American-built pier have two sets of gates.
Lorries coming from the pier use those on the west side, next to the sea, to
deposit their cargo. The eastern gates are for Palestinian drivers arriving to
pick up aid. But the Israeli army says no one has come through those ones
for two weeks, and that 7,000 pallets of aid (mostly food) have piled up in
the staging areas. Your correspondents saw long rows of them, most bearing
the logo of the World Food Programme (WFP). Aid is getting into Gaza—
but no one is distributing it.
Israel blames Hamas for the delays. The group has repeatedly attacked the
pier and Kerem Shalom, periodically halting aid deliveries from there. “The
distribution problem is something hard to manage,” says Mr Hagari. “The
international community has to make more of an effort.”
Aid workers say much the same about Israel. On June 25th the UN warned
that it would suspend its operations in Gaza unless the Israeli army co-
ordinates more with them. Sending a convoy to pick up supplies involves
many delays, often in areas with spotty communication and nearby fighting.
“We’re going to ask for the green light to move that empty truck to a
waypoint, and then wait for the green light to move to another waypoint,”
says Matthew Hollingworth of the WFP. “Your 12-hour days have one hour
of action.”
Many Palestinians are sceptical of the pier. On June 8th Israeli troops freed
four hostages being held by Hamas a few kilometres away. A video filmed
by an Israeli soldier showed them being brought to a helicopter near the pier
and then evacuated from Gaza. It has fuelled conspiracy theories that
America built the pier for military purposes rather than to deliver aid.
The back-and-forth was typical of a prime minister who has long wavered
on whether to make a hostage deal, as most Israelis want, or continue the
war, as his right-wing supporters demand. Hamas, for its part, wants firmer
guarantees that the deal will end the war permanently. Like his plan for the
pier, Mr Biden’s efforts at diplomacy are crashing into a hard reality. ■
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No thanks
PITY THE ISLAMIC republic’s elected presidents. For over three decades
their fates have ended in censure, ignominy or early death. The last,
Ebrahim Raisi, died in May in a mysterious helicopter crash. Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, a president in the 1990s, suddenly died in his
swimming pool. Mir Hossein Moussavi, a contender many Iranians believe
lost the election in 2009 to rigging, has spent 13 years under house arrest.
Muhammad Khatami is banned from the airwaves, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
is banned from travel. Several remain butts of public ridicule.
“The affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of public
opinion expressed by the means of elections,” says the constitution, and it
names the president as Iran’s second highest official. But his prerogatives
are hobbled by myriad unelected forces wielding real power. The Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, the regime’s crack force, the state broadcaster
and a triad of assemblies and councils vet all posts, including the
president’s. At the pinnacle the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
answers only to God.
Why go through the farce? A sociologist might put it down to a Shia yen for
self-flagellation. A hunger to succeed the supreme leader, aged 85, might be
a lure. But of past presidents only Mr Khamenei won the spot, in 1989. He
seems keen to stop a repeat.
He has warned candidates in this election against straying from the regime’s
mores or cosying up to America, choosing the very day for his speech when
Shias believe the Prophet Muhammad named Ali, his son-in-law, to succeed
him. Yet a cohort of believers, or shura, elected other successors ahead of
Ali, an icon for Shias. Islam’s Sunni majority still accepts that verdict. As
long as he reigns, Mr Khamenei seems determined to deny Iran’s people a
real presidential choice. ■
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Europe
Emmanuel Macron’s centrists are facing a disastrous first-
round vote
France’s parliamentary election :: Marine Le Pen’s party will be the main beneficiary
CRADLING HIS demi of beer with a tattooed arm, Jocelyn needs few
words to sum up the upcoming French election: “It’s all about Macron”. In
the small town of Châteaudun, in rural west-central France, he is sitting at a
pavement café on the main square, shaded by plane trees, just days before
the first round of French parliamentary elections on June 30th. An
industrial-machine operator, Jocelyn has no doubt as to the way fellow
voters will show their displeasure at the French president, Emmanuel
Macron: by backing Marine Le Pen’s hard-right National Rally (RN). The
RN, he says, “used to have an image as a racist and fascist party, but not
any more.”
Home to some 13,000 inhabitants, Châteaudun is as close as France gets to
a town that reflects the country. Its outskirts are approached via a drive-in
McDonald’s and a “Buffalo Grill” steakhouse; its town centre is a
handsome mix of medieval and renaissance architecture. On the main
square, with its ornate centrepiece fountain, a Turkish kebab shop nestles
between a hairdresser’s and a pharmacy. At the past four presidential
elections the town has voted in line with the nation, too. In 2022 58% of the
townsfolk backed Mr Macron against Ms Le Pen, almost exactly the score
the centrist secured countrywide. Then, at voting for the European
Parliament on June 9th, the town swung the other way: 33% supported the
RN, just a touch above the national average.
Locals offer other explanations, too. “Our bills have gone up, so have petrol
prices, but we need to use our car around here,” says Pascal, a welder,
drinking coffee on the main square. His friend, a retired stonemason, thinks
the discontent is more about “the need for authority” and crime. José, who
would like a Socialist or Green government, argues that the anger is to do
with Mr Macron’s pension reform, which raised the legal minimum
retirement age from 62 years to 64. “What we need”, he says, “is just
change”.
Yet for now that rampart looks fragile. Far from bringing voters back to the
centre, Mr Macron’s unexpected decision to call a snap election has pushed
them further away. France is no stranger to revolution, and seems to be
gripped by a rebellious fervour that could usher in a form of political
instability that the country has not seen for decades. It is almost as if the
president looked at his poor European election results, and said, with a mix
of bravery and recklessness: OK, you don’t want me, but just see what
happens if you vote for the others.
The French go to the polls on edge. Many are at a loss to explain what
voters may be about to do: plunge the country into chronic uncertainty. A
poll for the Fondation Jean-Jaurès, a think-tank, found that the predominant
feelings in France right now are fatigue, anger, sadness and fear. A month
from the opening of the Paris Olympics, this was supposed to be a time
when the nation would come together. Instead, it seems apprehensive and
more divided than ever. ■
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Home-made highs
WHEN SPANISH police looked into a gang from the Canary Islands last
year, they unwittingly landed on something big. In an unassuming house in
Galicia, in north-western Spain, specialist teams were working around the
clock to produce up to 200kg of cocaine a day. Two gangs, one Colombian,
the other Mexican, had paid around €2m ($2.1m) to set up the lab, which
the Spaniards supplied with cocaine base. It was only the second cocaine
lab found in Spain. So far it is the largest ever discovered in Europe.
Cocaine was rarely produced in Europe until 2018. Increased coca
production in Latin America and improved police surveillance have
prodded some criminals into changing tack. While most still import the
finished product, crooks increasingly get cheaper products like cocaine
base, then turn them into cocaine hydrochloride (a white powder) using
chemicals in labs. Many more extract cocaine that has been chemically
hidden for shipment in the likes of charcoal, clothing and sugar. In 2022 39
cocaine labs were dismantled in the EU, up from 15 in 2019.
The risk of more potent drugs arriving on the market is growing. Novel
MDMA products, such as edibles and liquids, are getting more popular.
Cathinone production is growing in Poland. Captagon is now widely
produced on demand in the Netherlands. Mexican cooks versed in fentanyl
production have set up in Europe.
Public-awareness campaigns can help stem the tide of illegal drugs. A third
of police reports in the Netherlands led to the discovery of an illegal drug
lab last year. Sharing information is essential, since criminals import
chemicals from Schengen countries where licensing is less stringent. Next
month the EMCDDA (soon to be renamed the European Union Drugs
Agency) will start monitoring enhanced precursors. The challenge is
immense. “We need to evolve as quickly as they do,” says Dr Jorge. That
may be a tall order. ■
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making-their-own-illegal-drugs
Belgorod
FOR MOST people in Belgorod, once a quiet and comfortable Russian city
40km from the Ukrainian border, the war started on December 30th 2023,
almost two years after it began in Ukraine. That day the centre of Belgorod
was hit by a Ukrainian rocket, killing 25 civilians, including two children,
and wounding more than a hundred. Since then the city and the province
that surrounds it have been attacked almost daily. Some 200 civilians have
died and 800 have been wounded—small numbers compared with what
Ukraine has endured, but far more than anywhere else in Russia.
Mikhail Ivankiv, a 22-year-old final-year student at Belgorod State
University, had just finished shopping for New Year presents for his parents
and his fiancée. That New Year was supposed to be the start of his new life,
his father says. “He had found his first job, and was about to move in with
his fiancée. They planned to celebrate New Year’s Eve together and he said
he would come and see us the next day.” He never did. A few days later
Mikhail died in hospital, after losing both his legs.
Kharkiv and Belgorod, 80km apart and linked by a motorway, were not just
formally sister cities; they formed a common historic, cultural and linguistic
space. Belgorod was settled by free Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks who
fled Polish rule and Tatar raids. There was no distinction between their
accents and dialects. It was a rare family in Belgorod that did not have
relatives on the other side of the border.
Over the past few months it has been hit by everything that flies, including
rockets and kamikaze drones fired from Ukraine, debris that falls from the
sky when Russian air defence intercepts them, and Russian glide-bombs
destined for Kharkiv but frequently released prematurely by accident. That
is what happened on May 4th when a 500-kilogram bomb damaged 30
houses and ten cars and wounded seven civilians, including a child.
Once popular for its new housing and good schools, Belgorod now excels in
concrete shelters, online schooling and regular drills on how to resuscitate,
bandage and tourniquet the wounded. Once a champion of attracting
migrants from across the country, it now has a record outflow of people.
Some 26,000 houses have been damaged, and 9,000 children have been
evacuated. Those who have stayed are studying remotely. Elena Koneva,
founder of ExtremeScan Group, a sociology-research outfit, estimates that
150,000 people have relocated from the province.
Incoming armour
Vladimir Putin claims that the purpose of his stalled push into Kharkiv is to
protect Belgorod from being shelled. If so, his bombs are having the
opposite effect. And people in Belgorod know that when Russia bombs
Kharkiv, they also suffer. “When we hear that Russia has launched a big
attack, everybody anticipates an avenging strike,” says Timofey, a journalist
and activist.
Ukrainian commanders in Kharkiv say attacks on Belgorod have a dual
purpose. One is to take out military infrastructure. The other is to drive the
war home to people in Russia. Although the former is a legitimate act of
war, the latter smacks of retribution against civilians.
But, if anything, being drawn into war has consolidated Belgorod. Nearly
70% of its adults are volunteering: collecting money, joining territorial
defence, staffing hospitals, says Ms Koneva. Her research shows that
support for Mr Putin’s “special military operation” is 5-7% higher than in
Russia as a whole; not because they wish death on their neighbours, but
because they fear retribution from Ukraine. This fear breeds anxiety, a sense
of despair, depression and alienation, rather than any real enthusiasm, Ms
Koneva says.
Despite his loss, Mr Ivankiv feels no hatred towards Ukrainians on the other
side of the border, not even its soldiers. “They are people like us and their
soldiers are also someone’s brothers, husbands, fathers.” He blames the
governments of both countries for the war and describes it not as an act of
Russia’s aggression but as a tragic occurrence. Like many people across
Russia he knows that what is happening is not right, but in talking about the
war he invokes familiar propaganda tropes about Ukrainian nationalists,
America’s meddling in Ukraine or NATO’s threat to Russia: a psychological
safety-blanket, perhaps, that helps him deal with his grief.
For many people, particularly the young ones who did not bother
participating in the farce, that result was a clear sign of the disconnect
between their reality and Kremlin politics. “Moscow just does not give a
toss about Belgorod,” says Timofey. But just in case, the government has
been throwing money and perks at the city. On May 31st Russia’s Ministry
for Emergency Situations awarded Belgorod the first prize in its all-Russian
competition for “a city without dangers”. ■
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The idea of giving vacant desks to foreigners is newer, and has been
propelled by a Finnish startup. Finest Future sells Finnish lessons to eager
beavers in Asian, African and Latin American countries. Those who achieve
decent proficiency are referred to willing schools. By the end of this year,
the firm will have helped import around 1,500 foreign pupils. But it says its
goal is ultimately to supply Finland’s upper secondary schools—which
educate about 110,000 students in total—with around 15,000 new faces
each year. Already some small schools are taking in more foreign pupils
than Finnish ones.
In the long run all Finns benefit, argues Peter Vesterbacka, Finest Future’s
co-founder, an entrepreneur who helped build the “Angry Birds” brand for
Rovio, a games company. Finland’s total population of 5.5m will start
declining within the next decade. The country struggles to attract high-
skilled foreign workers (about 9% of its inhabitants were born abroad, one
of the lowest rates in Europe). Mr Vesterbacka reckons that foreigners who
turn up when they are teenagers, who learn the language, and who are
educated in the Finnish system are far more likely to stay, and to succeed,
than adults who are targeted later through skilled-worker programmes. He
reckons they bring much more money into the country than the government
must spend on their instruction.
The question is how far these arguments will keep winning out as the
scheme expands. At the moment, high schools require no special permission
from the central government to bring in Finnish-speaking foreigners,
provided they have vacant spots. That could easily change. The education
ministry in Helsinki has made it clear that it dislikes funding places for kids
from other countries. And focusing spending on fewer, bigger schools might
serve Finnish children much better than propping up small ones, even if
country-dwellers find that a wrench. Whatever happens next, Finland’s
experiment is likely to supply other shrinking school systems with valuable
lessons. ■
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importing-pupils-from-abroad
Charlemagne
Bar a last-minute calamity on June 27th European leaders will plump for
António Costa as the next PEC, as the job is known in the Brussels patois.
A former prime minister of Portugal from 2015 until April, the 62-year-old
will be the fourth person to hold the position since it was created in its
current form in 2009 (it used to rotate between the EU’s various leaders
every six months). The job is in effect for five years, meaning Mr Costa will
be on the European scene long after France’s Emmanuel Macron has gone,
and doubtless outlast the German chancellor Olaf Scholz, too. Making sure
that France and Germany are pushing in the same direction is one of the
jobs of the PEC, and not one that has been done well in recent years. Of the
three cheers that will resound when Mr Costa is confirmed, two of them
will be to celebrate the departure of the incumbent, Charles Michel, a
former Belgian prime minister who has fumbled his way in the role since
2019.
The white-coiffed Mr Costa, who would take up the job towards the end of
the year, is well-liked by his fellow leaders. He is reckoned to have done a
good job managing Portugal out of the austere straitjacket imposed by the
EU in the midst of the eurozone crisis a decade ago. Beyond not being Mr
Michel, his main quality is that he is a socialist from southern Europe. This
provides the requisite political and geographical contrast to Ursula von der
Leyen, the German conservative set to get another five years running the
European Commission. Holding the reins of the EU’s executive arm is the
more powerful job: Mrs von der Leyen gets to boss over 30,000 Eurocrats
around. But the European Council sets the political direction for the
commission, much as a board of directors bears down over a chief
executive. As chairman of the overseers, the PEC should ensure that the
Brussels apparatus is firmly under the political control of elected national
leaders.
Only if the presidential duo work well together does the union advance
smoothly. That has not happened of late. The self-aggrandising Mr Michel
has indulged in a pointless turf war with Mrs von der Leyen; in April 2021
the duo literally squabbled over who would sit in a throne-like seat during a
meeting with the president of Turkey. (The Belgian won, relegating Mrs
von der Leyen to a sofa.) This is the difficulty of the PEC job. It must go to
someone who has wielded power—only a current or former national leader
has any hope of landing the gig—but is now happy to midwife it instead.
Yes, EU treaties endow the position with a role representing the bloc
abroad, which Mr Michel used to jet around the world. A more poised
successor might leave the high-end photo ops (and throne) to Mrs von der
Leyen instead. Nobody at the G7 or G20 would miss having not one but
two representatives of the EU, when each country manages to send a single
leader.
That would leave the incoming PEC with more time to focus on the hard bit
of the job, which is making sure all 27 national leaders can live with EU
decisions they will have to defend at home. The seasoned Mr Costa, who
exudes the good-time vibes of an uncle who won’t rat on teenagers
sneaking a bottle of wine at a family function, is known as a capable
backroom operator. He has crafted wily party coalitions at home, of the sort
that might need to be replicated at the European level. He would also add a
touch of diversity in a town that has shockingly little of it: his father was of
Goan descent and Mr Costa is an “overseas citizen” of India.
Having a competent PEC matters more than ever. The Brussels machinery
is run by people who have spent too long in the Euro-bunker and whose
suggested solution to just about every problem is “more Europe”. Voters
across the continent seem to feel differently. Many, not least the French
heading again to the polls this weekend, have plumped for the extremes of
left and right because they are fed up with technocrats in Brussels and
elsewhere telling them there is only one way forward, whether it be on
immigration or public finances. Lots of the decisions the EU now has to
take, from the pace of carbon cutting to enlargement and support for
Ukraine, will be all the more credible if they are thrashed out by politicians
at the highest level. Wrangling the EU’s 27 national leaders into a coherent
force is as hard as it is necessary. ■
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Britain
What the remaking of Labour reveals about Sir Keir
Starmer
The Starmer method :: How might Britain’s would-be prime minister approach the job?
For Sir Keir’s circle, the job of reclaiming the party for the centre-left began
with a cultural critique. Mr Corbyn, as they saw it, was merely the symptom
of a party whose priorities had become warped. It had elevated its members’
views over the public’s. A party founded as an “instrument of power” for
the working classes had become an “expression of virtue” for progressive
activists. Labour was more of a T-shirt than a party of government.
Being serious about regaining power implied several things. Labour had to
try to get back into office in a single parliamentary term: those who claimed
it would take a decade were dodging hard choices. It had to abandon the
fatalism that said Labour’s old heartlands in northern England and Scotland
had been lost to the Conservatives and the Scottish National Party. And Sir
Keir would need to breach Labour norms about prioritising party unity.
To understand how he went about this task, you have to look at his career
before politics. Sir Keir entered Parliament only in 2015, when he was
already in his 50s. Before then, as a barrister working at the frontiers of
human-rights law, he took on cases in areas such as the death penalty that
he thought would lead to systemic change. And as the head of Britain’s
public prosecution service, he styled himself as a reformist administrator
who improved the service in an era of spending cuts.
The remaking of Labour operated via a ratchet. “He’s not iconoclastic and
he doesn’t go around saying, ‘I’m going to smash things up,’” is the verdict
of one party official. “He always says, ‘Let’s give everyone the benefit of
the doubt, lead them properly, put systems in place.’” Only after a by-
election defeat in Hartlepool in May 2021 did he become convinced that
Labour needed stronger medicine.
The process is oddly unnarrated. When he was in opposition Sir Tony Blair
made great play of his largely symbolic reforms to Labour’s “Clause IV”,
which ended the party’s constitutional commitment to nationalisation. Take
the more consequential changes that Sir Keir secured to the party’s rulebook
in 2021, which weakened the influence of Labour members. These reforms
were brought forward without fanfare at the party’s conference, and when
they passed, he did not bother to mention them in his speech afterwards. His
opponents, like unwitting frogs, were boiled slowly. Sir Keir’s leadership
began with left-wing Labour MPs in the shadow cabinet; it has since seen
the expulsion of Mr Corbyn and a last-minute purge of firebrand candidates
in favour of Starmerite loyalists.
On ideology, Sir Keir has travelled light. The most consistent thread has
been a self-confessed desire to get the party into power. As a candidate to
lead the party in 2020, Sir Keir wooed the Labour selectorate with a
Corbyn-lite pitch (“Defend migrants’ rights”; “No more illegal wars”). But
once in the job, he changed his focus to target swing voters in the provinces.
One Labour official uses another legal analogy: that of a barrister taking on
briefs for different clients and different juries. His defenders argue that this
flexibility is a virtue: whereas Mr Corbyn took rigid positions on every
question, Sir Keir is deliberative. “It’s not about the colour of the machine,
or how inspiring it is, or whether it is modern or old, but whether it works,”
says Mr Baldwin.
In some respects, Sir Keir can apply this template to government. As with
the overhaul of the party, a cultural critique serves as the starting-point.
Britain’s problems, in Sir Keir’s telling, stem from a governing class that
has become self-serving and inert; under Labour there would be an ascetic
emphasis on ethics. Another change in focus would be needed, this time
from swing voters to the country at large. The ratchet would be required,
too. There is a gulf in Labour’s manifesto between its five long-term
“missions”, such as achieving the highest sustained productivity growth in
the G7, and the more trifling measures it has identified as “first steps”. He
will again need to become more radical.
The big question is how well a project to save the Labour Party can
translate into government. Many of its positions—hawkishness on fiscal
deficits, toughness on crime—have been more about closing gaps in
Labour’s electoral appeal than about providing axioms to govern by. The
lack of a well-understood project is why internal party disputes—over
workers’ rights, for instance, or the scale of a green-subsidy programme—
have been resolved with painful slowness. In government Sir Keir cannot
afford to be as sluggish.
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about-sir-keir-starmer
WITH THE cut-off date for postal-voting applications already past, the
Tories are polling at historically awful levels. It is not simply that other
parties—Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Reform UK—are taking
chunks out of their support. It is the way they are doing it. A new mega-poll
conducted by The Economist with WeThink, a research firm, suggests that
they are hacking away at even the safest Tory seats.
Between May 30th and June 21st, WeThink asked 18,595 adults how they
intend to vote. The results suggest Labour has a 20-percentage-point lead
over the Conservatives, by 42% to 22%. Reform UK is on course for 14%
of the vote, the Liberal Democrats 11% and the Green Party 6%. This is a
dramatic turnaround from the 2019 election, when the Tories led by 12
points, and would be the largest swing between the main parties in modern
history. But even that does not tell the full story.
Because of the mega-poll’s large sample size, The Economist is able to use
it to analyse local and demographic trends in voting intention. Using a
statistical technique called multilevel regression and poststratification
(MRP), we have produced estimates of voting intentions for each
constituency in Britain. These MRP estimates suggest that the Labour Party
is on course to win 465 seats, 263 more than it won at the 2019 election.
The Tories are heading for just 76 seats, the lowest number in the party’s
history. The Lib Dems are estimated to win 52, their best result since 2010;
the Scottish National Party (SNP) is on track to lose 19 seats, though it
would remain the largest party in Scotland. Reform UK and the Green Party
are on course to take three seats each.
Close readers will notice that these tallies differ from the predictions of our
election model. During the same period that the mega-poll was being
conducted, that model was giving a central estimate of around 185 MPs for
the Tories, a very heavy defeat but not a rout. The key difference lies in the
“efficiency” of each party’s vote—how many seats they can expect to win
for a given number of votes. Our prediction model, which is based on
national and regional polls, assumes the distribution of votes for each party
across seats would be similar from election to election. Our MRP poll
shows that the Tories are underperforming in marginal constituencies.
Many MRP polls have been published since Mr Farage became leader of
Reform UK; all agree that the Conservatives are heading for a landslide
defeat. But the range of outcomes is large: four of these recent mega-polls
have shown Tory seat totals of between 53 and 155. One reason for that
great variation is the knife edge that the Conservatives sit on.
In our MRP estimates, we find that they win or lose by a margin of less than
5% in 91 constituencies. In these extreme electoral circumstances, the
difference between a heavy defeat and a total rout is a very small number of
votes. According to our own MRP, if Reform UK were to take just three
additional percentage points from the Conservatives, the Tories’ seat total
would fall to only 45.
MRPs are not foolproof. Like all polling, an MRP poll is a snapshot and has
a substantial margin of error due to statistical variation. Like all modelling,
the technique also relies on a number of subjective assumptions—which
variables should be included, how turnout is estimated, and so on. These
assumptions vary between pollsters, and it is difficult to know which set
will produce the most accurate estimates.
The best approach, therefore, is to pool information from across a full range
of forecasts. So we have updated our prediction model to incorporate the
results of all the published MRPs, our own included. This “blended”
election model, which will be updated between now and July 4th, is our
best guess at the final result. At the time of writing its central estimate is
that Labour will have 429 MPs, the Conservatives 117, the Liberal
Democrats 42 seats, the SNP 23 and Reform UK two (see chart 2). Pollsters
can get things wrong; we will do our own post-mortem after the election.
But with only days to go, for this result even to be a possibility is
remarkable. ■
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Lettuce pray
IT HAS BEEN a difficult few years for Liz Truss. First she crashed the
British economy. This was painful for her. (“I could hardly sleep,” she
writes in her recent memoir.) Then she became the shortest-reigning prime
minister in British history (she felt “angry and frustrated”). Then there was
that nasty business with the lettuce (“puerile”). To add to her woes, in the
middle of her premiership, the queen died. As Ms Truss, ever alive to the
emotional needs of the nation, wrote in anguished italics: “Why me? Why
now?”
“Why Liz Truss? Why now?” is a pertinent question once again. For Ms
Truss—“UK Prime Minister, Sept-Oct 2022”, as American television
tickers helpfully describe her—is once again standing for election to
promote “prosperity and economic growth” and to serve the constituents of
South West Norfolk. Somewhat to the alarm of said constituents, who, on a
sunny pre-election day, suggest to this correspondent that she is instead
standing because she is “arrogant”, “shameless”, lacking in “humility” and
—as one local says in the sort of whisper that deserves its own italics
—“batshit crazy”.
The outrage felt at Ms Truss (and indeed, at her predecessor, Boris Johnson,
for the pandemic-era parties in Downing Street) comes not merely from a
feeling that she made mistakes but that she seems insufficiently ashamed of
them. In some senses brazenness is to be expected. “You need an element of
shamelessness in politics,” says Matthew Parris, a former Conservative
politician and writer. But too little shame becomes unnerving and makes
you “shudder slightly”.
It also, in the case of some of the residents of South West Norfolk, makes
you mobilise. One of Ms Truss’s opponents in the constituency is an
independent candidate of the sort that true-blue voters could easily get
behind. James Bagge, a former Conservative Party member, former army
captain and former KC, is the kind of man usually described as an “old-
school Tory”, albeit one without airs. As a child he attended the local school
(which is not grand) though did travel there on horseback (arguably a trifle
more so).
The two could hardly be more different. Whereas Ms Truss goes about
flanked by a personal protection team, Mr Bagge is flanked by a retriever
(“Humphrey…lie down!”). Whereas Ms Truss is a Singapore-on-Thames
sort of Tory, Mr Bagge is more a wellies-in-Westminster kind. Ms Truss’s
memoir is called “Ten years To Save the West”; Mr Bagge champions local
issues, and he and his followers have been called the “Turnip Taliban”. (Mr
Bagge demurs: Norfolk, he says, is more a “sugar-beet” sort of area.)
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taliban
Part of the uncertainty about the outcome stems from the fact that Bicester
and Woodstock is a newly created constituency. It is cobbled together from
bits of three safe Conservative seats (including Witney, once the seat of
David Cameron, a former prime minister), as well as part of West Oxford
and Abingdon, a Lib Dem stronghold. Had it existed during the last election
in 2019, the seat would have been staunchly blue. But after big Lib Dem
wins in recent local elections and the large national swing away from the
Tories and towards Labour, its future is much murkier.
The Lib Dems are doing their best to turn it yellow. The party’s approach is
to persuade voters in winnable Lib Dem seats who are sick of the Tories to
vote tactically. Though their share of the national vote will not change
much, the Lib Dems could “quintuple” their seat count, notes Chris
Hanretty, a professor at Royal Holloway University of London. In many
constituencies, Labour and the Lib Dems do not compete directly. In
Bicester, Mr Miller insists that it is a two-way contest between him and the
Conservatives; leaflets scream that Labour is “out of the race”.
That infuriates Ms Oakeshott. Bicester is not one of the Labour Party’s 250
or so “battleground” seats; their campaign website directs local volunteers
to Banbury. But she is still doggedly in the contest. “I’m telling voters,
‘Don’t outsource your decision to AI,’” says Ms Oakeshott in an airy café
in Bicester, a reference to the advice given on tactical-voting websites.
“We’ve got something to offer.” Just then a Labour voter interrupts her. “We
get Lib Dem stuff through the letterbox every day,” he says. “Why have we
not had any of your campaign literature?”
Most voters care less about the horse race and more about what will come
after it. Behind the seat’s affluent façade lie deep-seated problems. Market
stalls selling artisanal bread and pear-and-ginger jams trade in front of
boarded-up stores; renters square off with NIMBYs. Citizens Advice, a
charity, is next door to the café. In the past year hundreds of pensioners
with small pension pots who can no longer make ends meet, as well as
young families struggling with mortgage costs, have asked for help, says its
boss, Pat Coomber-Wood. Mr Miller and Ms Oakeshott say that the
number-one issue voters raise is the state of the public services.
Mr Harrison accepts that the Tories will lose, this time around, but does not
accept that years in the wilderness will follow, as they did after the party’s
last big defeat in 1997. “Keir Starmer is not Tony Blair,” he says. “It’s a
volatile world, voter loyalty is collapsing.” The question is what kind of
party the Conservatives will be by the time the next general election comes
round. When Mr Harrison was selected as a candidate, Mr Osborne said that
it was a sign that the “seeds of renewal” were being planted for the
Conservatives. It is not certain they will germinate this year. ■
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the-race-in-bicester-is
Clarification: This article has been amended to make it clear that the
system is an allowance for expenses.
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ministers-is-mounting
This appears to mark the end of a long and unedifying legal drama. Mr
Assange was first arrested in Britain in 2010 after Sweden said it wanted to
question him over sex-crime allegations (these were later dropped, and he
denied them). He claimed asylum in Ecuador’s embassy in London, where
he lived for seven years. After Ecuador ran out of patience with him (at one
point it claimed that he had smeared faeces on the embassy wall), British
police removed Mr Assange and arrested him again.
Those who would have liked him to stand trial in America regard him as a
reckless criminal. If he exposed injustices by publishing unredacted copies
of government documents, he also put honourable people at risk. Amnesty
International and several other human-rights groups, which are not usually
slow to criticise governments, expressed fears that the leaks about
Afghanistan could be used to identify and imperil Afghans who had
supported America. Mr Assange’s lack of judgment was also on display in
2016, when WikiLeaks spread conspiracy theories about Hillary Clinton,
the Democratic candidate for the American presidential nomination, and
asked Russia for stolen emails about her.
But the central issue is that Mr Assange was accused of breaking the law.
His supporters often cite his First Amendment rights, comparing him to a
truth-telling journalist. But journalists do not have the right to hack
computers; on that ground, America was justified in asking Britain to
extradite him.
Showing him some compassion now is also no bad thing. The DoJ had
originally charged him on 18 counts, mostly under the Espionage Act. Its
part of the plea deal was to drop 17 of them; and because Mr Assange had
already spent several years in Belmarsh, American prosecutors did not try
to imprison him for the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Mr Assange is
not a hero, and does not deserve to be venerated as a martyr. A plea deal is a
suitable ending to a grubby saga. ■
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end-to-a-grubby-saga
Bagehot
Even those at the top of politics are not immune. Each MP must declare
every gift. The entry for Sir Keir Starmer, the studious and diligent Labour
Party leader, is lengthy. In the past few months alone Sir Keir has accepted
free tickets for Coldplay, a middlebrow band, and football tickets worth
nearly £20,000 in total. The mystery of why the Labour leader is more
nattily dressed in recent weeks has been solved: in April Sir Keir received
£16,200-worth of free clothes and £2,485-worth of trendy specs from
Waheed Alli, a Labour peer and former fast-fashion executive. Practically
every MP from every party accepts freebies. Sir Keir is simply the most
prominent, and among the most enthusiastic. In Westminster this is all
perfectly normal. But then so was gambling on politics until just a few days
ago.
Once the question of freebies has been pored over, donations might become
the next thing to attract scrutiny. Kevin Craig, a Labour candidate in Central
Suffolk and North Ipswich, was ejected from the party on June 25th for
betting on himself to lose in his seat. Before Mr Craig blew up his political
career for the sake of a bet, he had earned a fortune as a lobbyist (his firm
had even designed a “Responsible Gambling Week” campaign on behalf of
the gambling industry). He was also a donor to Labour, handing it £100,000
in 2023. This, again, is within the rules. Mr Craig’s company can donate to
whom it pleases; Labour is within its rights to hand him a no-hope-turned-
surprisingly-winnable seat. (Labour has since returned the £100,000.) All
this was as public as any selection in East Anglia is likely to be. But there is
a difference between what the public accepts and what it has not noticed.
The media offer only a spotlight, rather than a floodlight. Whatever happens
outside its glare goes unseen, and even things that are reported are not
always picked up. In 2020 the fact that Boris Johnson enjoyed an illicit
birthday party with colleagues during lockdown was a throwaway news
story on the inside pages of the Times. In 2022 it played a big part in Mr
Johnson’s fall. What was harmless one year can be fatal the next, if people
take notice.
In another example, at the end of 2021 a row erupted over whether MPs
should have second jobs. The trigger came when Owen Paterson, a former
Conservative MP, directly lobbied ministers on behalf of a company for
which he worked. Having MPs with other jobs was once a feature of
Parliament, until the public suddenly decided it was a bug. A frenzy broke
out, in which MPs were made to justify every penny of external income.
Since then the spotlight has moved on again, and little has changed. The
same PDF that lists those MPs who love Madonna also shows those who
are still on generous outside salaries.
Betting the Houses of Parliament
The gambling scandal will probably follow the same path as its
predecessors and successors. Behaviour that was once accepted and
common in Westminster becomes forbidden; frenzied journalists root out
any politician who has made a dodgy bet; voters tut; an inquiry is launched;
a regulator is beefed up. But then people stop noticing and attention turns to
a fresh outrage happening in plain sight, whether it be MPs snaffling
freebies or making hay in their second jobs. The next scandal will roll along
and it will all be so obvious in retrospect. If only someone had noticed. ■
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already-here
International
The rise of the truly cruel summer
Extreme temperatures :: Deadly heat is increasingly the norm, not an exception to it
Extreme temperatures
Cruel summers
That brings enormous burdens. Heatwaves are among the deadliest weather
and climate disasters globally, according to the UN and the International
Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent. Firm numbers are hard
to come by, but one analysis published in the Lancet in 2021 estimated that
heat contributed to an annual average of 489,000 deaths globally between
2000 and 2019. Almost a quarter were in southern Asia alone.
Such estimates, including those used in the Lancet, are typically based on
“excess deaths”—how many more people died across a period than might
ordinarily be expected—a measure which is both imperfect and often
available only well after the fact. It is harder still to pinpoint heat effects
that are detrimental but not fatal. The problem is acute in poor countries
with sparse health services, where the toll of high temperatures is not
known.
The economic costs can be estimated too, and they are significant. Heat has
been shown to have a sapping effect on productivity—a separate analysis in
the Lancet last year estimated that high temperatures led to 490bn lost
labour hours in 2022 around the world, an increase of almost 42% from the
annual average for 1991-2000. That, they reckon, reduced earnings in
South-East Asia alone by the equivalent of almost 5% of the region’s GDP.
Extreme temperatures can also play havoc with crop yields. A severe hot
spell in the spring of 2022, for example, is thought to have reduced India’s
national wheat production for that year by 4.5%.
There are myriad ways to adapt to these new risks and burdens: none is
perfect; too few are being attempted. For heatwaves, in particular, efforts to
deal with the problem are lagging behind its increasing salience. In many
places a summer that might have been expected once a century between the
1950s and 1980s is now likely to occur once every five years. But many
countries have no systematic plans to deal with them. And the plans they do
have may be ineffective.
High temperatures generally kill people by exacerbating their existing
health issues, such as heart and kidney disease or diabetes; this is one of the
reasons that deaths are clustered among the old, the poor and the socially
isolated. Temperatures soar far higher in crowded areas, which tend to be
cities’ poorest neighbourhoods. Cheap building materials, such as metal
roofs, exacerbate risks; so does a lack of trees which provide both shade
and, through the evapotranspiration of water from their leaves, cooling.
Homelessness is more dangerous still.
Deploying resources at the right time would also help. Temperatures are
relatively easy to predict. In large parts of the world the problem is that
early-warning systems are inadequate, not that the forecasts they rely on are
hazy. Still, improving meteorological services would boost the countries
where they still lag behind, including across large swathes of Africa. And in
rich countries, more finely grained forecasts would help power providers
avoid blackouts—a growing risk as more air-conditioning is needed to
weather hot spells.
Other potentially useful interventions lie well outside the traditional scope
of climate or health policies, and within the realms of urban planning or
labour-market regulation. Workers forced to toil in sweltering conditions
are particularly at risk of illness and death. This is true for those outside,
such as in agriculture and construction, but also for those crammed inside
within poorly ventilated settings. Commonsense measures, like mandatory
access to water, shade and rest when the mercury soars, can make a world
of difference. But businesses are often hostile to increased regulation of this
sort, fearing it will cut into their bottom line.
In the central capital of Madrid, the most modest dwellings typically come
with awnings to keep the sun off windows or shutters to block it out
entirely. Though many Spaniards no longer nap in the middle of the day, a
siesta-style break is still common in much of the country, with shops and
businesses shut in the hottest period of the afternoon. This gives everyone a
chance to rest.
Spain makes more concerted efforts to beat the heat, too. Most of the
country is covered by dedicated heat plans, and the national government co-
ordinates a heatwave alert system. Madrid’s plan includes measures to
reduce or change school hours, increase the frequency of public transport to
avoid people waiting outside on platforms, and to subsidise air-conditioning
upgrades in homes.
This year the city has also opened up access to air-conditioned spaces like
museums, and encouraged people to use them. A 36-year study, from 1980
to 2015, attributed a decline in heat-attributable deaths in Spain to both
“societal adaptation” and “socioeconomic development”. A repeatedly
finessed heat plan in neighbouring France is thought to have reduced deaths
in the very worst heatwaves by up to 90%.
As well as taking more steps of this kind, municipalities and regions need to
make sure that they work, and adapt them when they don’t. In 2013
Ahmedabad, in India’s western state of Gujarat, generated attention and
headlines for being the first city in South Asia to implement a heat-action
plan. Its measures included strengthening the early-warning system for
heatwaves and instructing local authorities when to send extra staff to
medical centres. A study published in 2018 credited the plan with averting
more than 1,000 deaths in the year after it was launched.
Whether it is still fit for purpose a decade later is an open question. The
plan is hard to assess because it is not routinely evaluated, a common
problem with climate policies. “I wish I could say that Ahmedabad did a
great job this year,” says Mr Pillai. “They probably did. But how do I
know?” Ascertaining how well current policies have performed is crucial to
coping in the future. And there will be a great deal of coping to do. ■
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summer
Business
Is the revival of Paris in peril?
Keeping the lights on :: The French election threatens a remarkable commercial renaissance
Only a few weeks ago Paris, which is also due to host the 2024 Summer
Olympics in July, was basking in the limelight. Now a cloud of uncertainty
hangs over its great commercial revival.
The French capital was once seen as a city of red tape, high taxes and
clogged-up streets, which dimmed its appeal to anyone other than tourists.
But over the seven years that Mr Macron, a former investment banker, has
been in charge, much has changed. That is most evident in two areas:
finance and tech.
Over the past decade Paris has been climbing the rankings of the world’s
financial centres (see chart 1). French financiers manage €5trn in assets, up
from €3.8trn in 2015. Amundi, a French firm that has become Europe’s
biggest fund manager, looks after €2.1trn-worth, more than double the
figure a decade ago.
Wall Street has been increasing its Parisian presence. In 2021 JPMorgan
Chase, America’s biggest bank, inaugurated Paris as its main European
trading floor, where it now employs around 1,000 people. Bank of America
has increased its Parisian headcount ten-fold, to 700; Citigroup’s has risen
from 170 to 400, with space in its office for 200 more. Morgan Stanley has
more than doubled its headcount in Paris over the past three years.
What has driven the great Parisian revival? Luck has played a part. After
Britain formally left the EU in 2020 bankers were no longer legally able to
provide some services to their European clients from London. For those
financiers who did not want to decamp from the British capital, Paris, a
two-hour train ride away, was easier to get to than Frankfurt. For those who
did decide to move, it was a more pleasant place to live. One finance boss
recalls asking his London-based traders to move to Frankfurt, only for them
to go home, speak to their partners and return the next day saying
“absolutely not”. When he posed the same question about Paris, the family
reaction was “of course”. (Preferential tax treatment of foreigners for the
first few years of their residency did not hurt, either.)
The boom in AI, meanwhile, has put a huge premium on the sort of
mathematical skills that have long been the forte of Paris’s renowned
technical universities. Two of Mistral’s six co-founders are products of
École Polytechnique; a third graduated from École Normale Supérieure.
This talent pool drew America’s tech giants such as Google and Meta,
which opened big AI labs in Paris. It also helps that France’s nuclear-
powered electricity grid can provide lots of clean energy to feed power-
hungry AI data centres.
But there is more to the city’s recent streak than just good fortune. Take
finance, where France was not merely a passive beneficiary of Brexit.
Frankfurt’s banking cluster and proximity to the European Central Bank
initially made it the more obvious destination for relocation.
Mr Macron’s government was also early to see AI’s potential and the role
Paris could play in the technology’s development. It produced its first
national AI strategy already in 2018, drawn up by Cédric Villani, a
mathematician. Cédric O, one of Mistral’s co-founders, who was previously
Mr Macron’s digital minister, says that the critical decision was to woo
American big tech. “At the time people said: you are crazy putting out the
red carpet for the Americans; they are going to steal your talent.” In fact,
the opposite happened. Many Parisian AI founders, including the Mistral
trio, left big tech’s research outposts to strike out on their own.
À bout de souffle?
In the event of a hung parliament, the most probable outcome, the most
extreme of these policies may not be implemented. Even so, politics looks
likely to get in the way of Paris’s revival as a global commercial centre. The
city benefited from having politicians in charge who understood and
welcomed business, and who worked together to draw in foreign talent and
capital. With that project almost certain to lose steam after the
parliamentary elections, global bosses may find themselves with fewer
reasons to drop by. ■
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Bolt-holes
Small wonder that the United Arab Emirates (UAE), of which Dubai is the
glitzy business hub, is forecast to draw a net 6,700 millionaires this year,
according to Henley & Partners, a wealth consultancy. That is almost twice
as many as are expected to head to America, the historic home of the
world’s rich, with 5.5m residents worth $1m or more. Long a bolt-hole for
rich Russians, Indians and Arabs from neighbouring countries, Dubai is
now attracting a new group of mogul migrants: Europeans fleeing rising
political uncertainty at home.
Brokers and agents are fielding more calls from wealthy French (at risk
from punitive policies if a hard-right government comes to power) and
Italians (who already have one). Some want to set up a family office to
manage their assets. Many are buying property. French and Italians were
among the most zealous homebuyers in Dubai in the first three months of
2024 (alongside Indians). Germans worried about the recent rise of their
own hard-right populists could follow.
Consultants and brokers report that this new scrutiny may have been
instrumental in Dubai’s removal from the FATF’s naughty step. The same
scrutiny may also have prompted wealthy Russians to take their money
elsewhere, for fear of losing it to Western sanctions. That should make it a
bit easier for the newcomers to find nannies, chauffeurs and advisers.
The European arrivals appear undeterred even by the conflict in Gaza, and
the threat that it might escalate into a regional conflagration (this week
fighting has intensified between Israel and Hizbullah, the Iran-backed group
that controls much of Lebanon). Perhaps they reason that a much more
dangerous war is already raging on the EU’s eastern flank. Or maybe any
fear of horrors elsewhere in the Middle East is outweighed by the bliss of
the autocratic UAE’s politics—or rather lack thereof. ■
You might wonder why anyone would invest, given the project’s apparent
lack of interest in making money. Perhaps backers hope SSI will in time
create a for-profit arm, as happened at OpenAI, which began as a non-profit
before realising that training its models required lots of expensive
computing power. Maybe they think Mr Sutskever will eventually convert
SSI into a regular business, which is something Mr Altman recently hinted
at to investors in OpenAI. Or they may have concluded that Mr Sutskever’s
team and the intellectual property it creates are likely to be valuable even if
SSI’s goal is never reached.
The idea of a fast take-off has lurked in Silicon Valley for over a decade. It
resurfaced in a widely shared 165-page paper published in June by a former
OpenAI employee. Entitled “Situational Awareness” and dedicated to Mr
Sutskever, it predicts that an AI as good as humans at all intellectual tasks
will arrive by 2027. One such human intellectual task is designing AI
models. And presto, fast take-off.
The paper’s author argues that before long America’s government will need
to “lock down” AI labs and move the research to an AI-equivalent of the
Manhattan project. Most AI researchers seem more circumspect. Half a
dozen who work at leading AI labs tell The Economist that the prevailing
view is that AI progress is more likely to continue in gradual fashion than
with a sudden explosion.
OpenAI, once among the most bullish about AI progress, has moved closer
to the gradualist camp. Mr Altman has repeatedly said that he believes in a
“slow take-off” and a more “gradual transition”. His company’s efforts are
increasingly focused on commercialising its products rather than on the
fundamental research needed for big breakthroughs (which may explain
several recent high-profile departures). Yann LeCun of Meta and François
Chollet of Google, two star AI researchers, have even said that current AI
systems hardly merit being called “intelligence”.
Bartleby
LAWYERS ARE often seen as the most tedious of professionals. And the
most derided (“What do you know when you find a lawyer up to his neck in
concrete? Someone ran out of concrete”). Yet that damning reputation is
undeserved: lawyers are in fact role models. The method and
meticulousness entrenched in the legal style of thought has something to
teach other knowledge workers and their managers.
In “One L”, a book about his first year at Harvard Law School, Scott Turow
describes the slow, arduous progress of going over his first case as “stirring
concrete with his eyelashes”. But legal education is not about specific cases
or statutes. It is, as Mr Turow later understands, about processing a
mountain of information and exercising judgment. It teaches how to infer
rules from patterns, use analogies, anticipate what might happen next,
accept ambiguity and be ready to question everything.
The sober way of going about this is by sticking to the facts. What matters
is what you can prove. In her final year of law school, this guest Bartleby
gave her hairdresser of many years advice on whether another client’s
behaviour amounted to breach of contract. It did not—the law did not offer
an effective remedy for that problem. This left the salon owner grateful not
to be spending resources on a lost cause. (She proceeded to remunerate your
columnist with a free haircut.)
Managers also have something to learn from the adversarial legal system,
central to common-law jurisdictions like America’s and Britain’s, where
advocates represent their parties before an impartial arbiter (usually a judge
and a jury). In preparing for trial, lawyers attempt to identify and rehearse
both sides of litigation. By putting themselves in their opponents’ shoes
they are forced to engage with a line of reasoning with which they may
disagree.
In so far as managing employees is, like arguing a case before a court, about
persuasion, managers would be wise to adopt some of the same tactics. That
means avoiding emotional reactions (lawyers may try to appeal to jurors’
feelings but they never let their own get in the way). It also means
considering the strongest criticism of their own reasoning. This not only
makes their own arguments bulletproof but is liable to look fair in the eyes
of employees and fellow managers. (Plus, a friendly but thorough
performance review is essentially a mock cross-examination of your
witnesses.)
Law, after all, is a way of dealing with social stress. If attorneys are trained
for one thing, it is on how to maintain focus, precision and a clear strategic
plan in the midst of a crisis. When a team feels a wrong should be
redressed, a manager should look for the rule that governs the conduct in
question, how that rule was applied in the past and act in a way that seems
morally defensible. If the crisis is external, a manager should also follow
precedent, which is the basis of common law and much of what lawyers do
in court. The purposefulness and heady resolve that characterise most
lawyers are attributes that executives, too, should cultivate. There is no
room for passivity when something goes wrong, only for action.
Perhaps the most valuable lesson from lawyers is both the most obvious and
the most scorned. The antidote to work anxiety is not taking your mind off
work with meditation or Netflix. It is disciplined preparation. There are
rewards in leaving no stone unturned. By putting in the hours, even if these
are not billable, managers can ensure they are as ready as they can be for
the uncertainties that lie ahead. As an added bonus, hard graft wins them the
respect of colleagues and subordinates.
Your columnist ended up not pursuing a career in law. But she never
regretted her training as a lawyer—and not just because of the free haircut.
■
BP AND SHELL, two British oil giants, have long sunk cash into solar and
wind farms. Their rivals elsewhere have mostly stuck to their drilling.
Investors have rewarded single-mindedness. ExxonMobil, an American
firm unapologetically wedded to the black stuff, is worth $510bn, half as
much again as the British duo combined. Its share price is up by 50% in the
past five years, compared with a rise of 10% for Shell and a fall of 13% for
BP.
That is not to say ExxonMobil has no interest in renewables. But rather than
getting into generation, it is placing an indirect bet on the energy transition.
On June 25th it signed a preliminary agreement to supply lithium to SK On,
a South Korean manufacturer whose lithium-ion batteries will power
electric Fords and Hyundais. This follows an announcement in November
that it was drilling its first lithium well in Arkansas. A “material” part of its
$20bn in low-carbon investments between 2022 and 2027 will go to
lithium, says Dan Holton, in charge of these projects. By 2030 the company
hopes to produce enough lithium to supply 1m electric vehicles (EVs) a
year. Darren Woods, its boss, sees lithium as a “high-return” opportunity.
His fellow oil CEOs agree. In June Occidental Petroleum set up a lithium
joint-venture with BHE Renewables, a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway, a
$900bn conglomerate. A month earlier Equinor, the state-owned Norwegian
oil firm, unveiled a partnership with Standard Lithium, an American miner.
Even the world’s oil colossi, Saudi Aramco and ADNOC of the United Arab
Emirates, are taking an interest.
Big oil’s enthusiasm for lithium makes sense. Demand for the stuff is likely
to rise as more of the world’s machines go electric. In contrast to running
the unfamiliar businesses of solar and wind power, oil firms already have
expertise that is useful in lithium mining. Extracting the white metal
involves tapping saltwater brine, often underground. This requires careful
mapping of reservoirs and precision drilling—skills oilmen have honed
over decades of subsurface crude extraction (in which brine also happens to
be a common waste product). Even the necessary permits are more akin to
those for oil and gas than the still more tedious paperwork associated with
tapping seams of ore. Refining the extracted metal is likewise similar to
what oil companies do in their petrochemicals businesses.
ExxonMobil, Occidental and Equinor are hoping to juice returns from their
lithium ventures with clever technologies to separate lithium ions directly
from brine using physical membranes or chemical solvents. This requires
less land, water and time than the current method, in which brine is
collected in vast evaporation ponds. It is also less polluting. Goldman
Sachs, a bank, expects that these innovations could do for lithium what
fracking did for oil. Brine accounts for nearly two-thirds of the world’s
known lithium resources but so far only 40% of production.
Big miners, for their part, have eschewed big bets on lithium. Their
shareholders prefer cash to reinvestment at the moment, and the new
technology’s upfront cost is at least a third higher than for the ponds,
reckons Goldman Sachs. Specialist lithium producers’ high valuations and
wild swings in the metal’s price are another turn-off. Miners that have
placed smaller wagers often got their fingers burnt. Rio Tinto completed its
$825m purchase of a lithium project in Argentina in 2022. By the following
year spending on exploration and evaluation had doubled, from less than
$200m to nearly $400m.
In contrast to big dirt, big oil has the profits and the balance-sheets to take
on capital-intensive ventures. But does it have the commitment? A quarter
of a century before it merged with Mobil in 1999, Exxon dabbled in battery
technology after the Arab oil embargo of 1973 frightened the world into
considering alternatives to fossil fuels. One of its star researchers at the time
was Stanley Whittingham, who went on to share the Nobel Prize in
chemistry in 2019 with two other pioneers of lithium-ion batteries. He left
Exxon in 1984—around the time that the company threw in the towel on
this sort of research. ■
On the surface, the answer should be: not long at all. Historically, value
destruction has been the industry norm. Bernstein, a broker, reckons that
between 2002 and 2019 shipping firms’ average return on capital of 4.7%
trailed in the wake of its cost of capital, which averaged 10% or so. New
ships take a couple of years to build. According to BIMCO, an industry
association, in 2023 the global fleet added capacity of around 2.3m 20-foot
equivalent units (the standard measure of container size), surpassing the
previous annual record by 37%. Another 1m arrived in the first four months
of 2024. In February worries about overcapacity led A.P Moller-Maersk, the
world’s second-largest shipping line, to warn it could lose up to $5bn this
year.
Now Maersk reckons it will instead make a pre-tax profit of perhaps $3bn.
What changed? Stephen Gordon of Clarkson’s, a shipbroker, points to the
disruption in the Red Sea as the main cause of surging demand. The
Houthis show no sign of letting up. In recent days a sailor was killed, a
vessel sunk and another abandoned in flames by its crew. The waterway
once accounted for 30% of global container traffic but 90% of vessels that
would have gone through the canal are now rerouting around Africa, adding
at least a week or two to journeys from Asia to Europe and America (see
chart 1). And longer journeys mean that more ships are needed to ferry the
same volume of goods in a given period.
The Suez onslaught is happening just as other forces put the wind in
shipping lines’ sails. The global economy has avoided recession and the
peak season for container traffic has arrived early, as importers stock up for
Christmas to evade disruptions, potential tariffs and further increases in
freight rates, explains HSBC, a bank. The cost of sending a container from
Shanghai to America’s west coast has doubled since late April. It is now
more than four times what it was in early December and only 12% below
the covid peak in February 2022 (see chart 2).
If the Red Sea remains rough until later this year, the extra demand could
more or less soak up the growing fleet, whose capacity is poised to expand
by 8% this year. If the Houthis stand back sooner, it would leave many of
the new ships idle. What of future years? Vincent Clerc, Maersk’s chief
executive, concedes that overcapacity is again one possible outcome.
Already many of Maersk’s rivals are using the unexpected windfall to order
new ships. But Mr Clerc remains optimistic that oversupply can be avoided
if shipping firms delay taking vessels from lessors and scrap older ships
sooner—not a bad idea as they green their fleets to meet emissions targets.
Although things are likely to stay “volatile and unpredictable”, that could
still mean “a decade of robust market conditions” for the industry. Spoken
like an old salt. ■
Today its market capitalisation is half that. Some of the decline has to do
with President Xi Jinping’s crackdown on graft, before which prized bottles
of the sorghum-based firewater would often change hands in place of cash.
When in 2020 state TV accused Moutai of benefiting from bribery, $25bn
instantly evaporated from its market capitalisation.
Yet the most recent slide in the company’s share price, which is down by
14% since early May, does not appear to be related to anti-corruption
campaigns. Moutai has not been subject to a recent state media hit-piece or
government investigation. Its revenues grew by nearly a fifth in the first
quarter, year on year, to 46bn yuan ($6bn). Net profit jumped by 16%, to
24bn yuan. Its margins remain as eye-watering as its booze. What is going
on?
An even quirkier explanation concerns a card game. Over the past few years
guandan (which translates as “egg tossing” or “bomb tossing”) has become
a fixture at banquets across the country. It is rumoured that even some of
China’s most senior officials enjoy the game, in which two teams of two
players attempt to empty their hands by playing high combinations of cards.
Richard Liu, who founded JD.com, a large e-merchant, is a self-professed
fan.
There are more mundane explanations for Moutai’s declining market value.
The firm is ramping up production at a time when consumer sentiment is
weakening. It has poor control over its distribution. But if Mr Xi’s new
economy features fewer property magnates and more young tech founders
who view winning at guandan rather than getting sloshed as a prerequisite
to signing deals, then this could really stick the knife into Moutai’s future
growth. ■
Schumpeter
This time, rather than waiting until deals are done and markets are stitched
up, the preference is to be nimble. It is now the trustbusters who are trying
to move fast and break things.
Broadly speaking, the authorities have two areas of concern. The first is
whether the world’s biggest companies are trying to tie businesses into their
products in anticompetitive ways. The second is about control: are some of
the largest generative-AI investments poorly disguised acquisitions
intended to sidestep antitrust consideration?
Nvidia faces scrutiny on the first count. It is under the gaze of America’s
Department of Justice, which is understood to be examining allegations that
it locks users of its graphics processing units (GPUs) into its software, and
that a scarcity of GPUs is the result of anticompetitive conduct. Nvidia
declined to comment.
The attention on Microsoft is more over the second category. The FTC has
launched a market inquiry of the software-provider’s $13bn investment in
OpenAI, which gives it a 49% share of the profits. It is also investigating
Microsoft’s hiring in March of most of the staff of Inflection, a rival to
OpenAI (the most significant hire was Mustafa Suleyman, Inflection’s co-
founder, who sits on the board of The Economist’s parent company).
Microsoft also declined to comment. The FTC has other big-tech firms
under the spotlight, too. It is looking at investments by Alphabet and
Amazon in Anthropic, another maker of large language models (LLMs).
In America, the government’s concerns are similar. But the trustbusters are
not just looking at LLMs. They have their eyes on the whole caboodle—
from the GPUS at the bottom to consumer applications at the top of the
generative-AI “stack”. The FTC’s investigation of Microsoft’s Inflection
deal is yet another type. The agency is probing whether Microsoft failed to
supply the correct merger paperwork when it hired most of Inflection’s
employees and paid for a non-exclusive licence to its technology. In other
words, it suspects it was an acquisition in disguise aimed at avoiding an
antitrust review. For Microsoft, it was not an acquisition at all. What is left
of Inflection remains an independent company.
This is all tricky terrain. Building LLMs is capital-intensive, like drilling for
oil. The requirements for computing power, digital information and human
expertise are such that model-builders justifiably turn to tech giants for
support. Big tech has the balance-sheets, data and cloud infrastructure to
help, as well as providing a seal of approval. Moreover, it is hard to assert
that a tech giant has an exclusive hold over any generative-AI startup when
so much polyamory is taking place. Satya Nadella, Microsoft’s boss, once
declared with regard to OpenAI that his firm was “below them, above them,
around them”. That sounded suspiciously like monogamy. When OpenAI
recently announced a partnership with Apple, a Microsoft rival, Mr Nadella
was reportedly miffed.
IN APRIL A New York fried-chicken shop went viral. It was not the food at
Sansan Chicken East Village that captured the world’s imagination, but the
service. Diners found an assistant from the Philippines running the till via
video link.
What does this mean for countries hoping to get rich? Speaking in 2005 Lee
Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister, observed that, “since the
industrial revolution, no country has become a major economy without
becoming an industrial power.” But since 2005, the world has changed.
Manufacturing is now more capital-intensive, making it easier for China to
retain its role as the world’s factory. In the past few years, Western countries
have embraced industrial policy and protectionism in an attempt to boost
domestic manufacturing. Policymakers in emerging markets are arguing
about how best to respond.
Then there is tourism. Not every country can replicate Japan’s temples or
Mexico’s beaches, but many are finding ways to entice visitors, such as
with medical services. Dentistry, hip replacements and hair transplants are
among the treatments on offer. Costa Rica, Croatia and Moldova export
health services worth between 0.2% and 0.5% of their economic output.
Armenia and Jordan manage 1% each. A few hours in Istanbul airport
provides a display of the thriving industry, as men return home with their
heads wrapped in plastic, fresh hair taking root underneath.
In the short term, it seems likely that service exports will keep growing. In
1992 Stan Shih, founder of Acer, a Taiwanese computer-maker, coined the
term “smile curve” to describe how value added in the manufacturing
process was rising faster in the first and third parts of making a product
(design and distribution, respectively) than in the second stage
(manufacturing). As manufacturing has become more competitive, the smile
has deepened. Think of Apple, which designs and distributes iPhones, and
collects the rents from its brand, but produces none of the devices itself. Its
market capitalisation is more than $3trn, whereas Foxconn, which makes
70% of the firm’s iPhones, is worth just $91bn. Even more cheerful is the
fact that the rise of remote work has made firms far more comfortable with
outsourcing operations. After all, a remote employee is not that different
from an outsourced one.
Start with technological growth. A factory in a poor country brings man and
machine together, placing an unskilled worker at the tech frontier. Then, as
the tech improves, the worker becomes still more productive. Tradable
services cannot absorb unskilled workers in this manner. Yet as the World
Bank has observed, since the 1990s labour-productivity growth in emerging
economies outside of East Asia has risen at roughly the same rate in
services as manufacturing—and services productivity has grown faster in
emerging economies than rich ones. Moreover, artificial intelligence may
soon provide service workers with another lift. Two experiments have
found that AI tools help the least skilled knowledge workers catch up with
more skilled ones when writing marketing copy and providing customer
service.
Services are also closing the gap with manufacturing when it comes to
tradability, albeit slowly. Before the internet, the ability to send products
overseas was the main way in which goods differed from services. Trade
allows exporters to reach much larger pools of demand and achieve
economies of scale that would otherwise have been beyond them. Because
goods trade has been stagnant as a share of global GDP since 2010, it has
become more difficult for newcomers to compete. Services trade is
booming, and thus more welcoming. But even at the growth rate of the past
decade, it will take 15 years to reach half the value of trade in manufactured
goods.
In the longer run, AI might cause problems. Models are best at well-defined
tasks that do not need in-person context. That makes business services
vulnerable. A report by Capital Economics, a consultancy, argues that AI
could lead to the “slow demise” of India’s service exports, cutting growth
by 0.3-0.4 percentage points a year over the next decade. The spread of
communication tech has facilitated services outsourcing. Fresh
technological change could, in time, be its undoing.
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Buttonwood
Investors who would rather not put all their eggs in one basket are worried.
Nvidia is now so large that a 13% fall in the chip-designer’s share price
between June 18th and 24th, driven by not very much at all, knocked 0.5%
off the value of the MSCI All Country World Index, which covers both
emerging and developed markets. The company’s share price later
rebounded, rising by 7% over the following two days.
But concentration can also be benign. During the 1950s and early 1960s,
markets were concentrated in both a single country and a small group of
firms within it. Europe was still recovering from the second world war and
Asian markets had yet to reach global prominence, meaning that American
stocks made up as much as 70% of the global market. A handful of blue-
chip firms, such as AT&T, Exxon and General Motors, were ascendant.
Indeed, the ten biggest stocks also accounted for a third of the stockmarket
back then, without obvious adverse consequences.
Does today’s situation resemble the benign leadership of the 1960s or the
speculative bubble of the late 1990s? Valuations are certainly steep. Nvidia
has a price-to-income ratio of 43, based on earnings expected next year.
That explains the volatility on show over the past week. Relatively small
changes in expectations can drive large movements in market value,
especially when a company is as large as Nvidia. The recent broader market
rally is based on hopes about the future impact of artificial intelligence,
which is inherently uncertain.
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economics/2024/06/27/american-stocks-are-consuming-global-markets
Bordering on madness
Congress created the exemption in the 1930s to reduce hassle for, among
others, tourists bringing home souvenirs. But Trump-era policies and the
rise of e-commerce have made it more important. In 2016 legislators lifted
the threshold on packages from $200 to $800 to save on enforcement. In
2018-19 they raised tariffs on Chinese products, increasing incentives to
find a dodge. During the covid-19 pandemic, American imports of cheap
goods such as clothes and homeware, which often come in under the
threshold, shot up.
The real de minimis tally may be bigger still. CBP relies on values entered
by foreign shippers, who lack both training and a reason to declare goods
accurately. An improbably high 16% of parcels claim to be valued at $1 or
less, according to data from private carriers. A Senate investigation in 2018
found that foreign-shipment data was often a “long line of illogical letters
and characters” in place of information about the origin and value of
parcels.
Some sellers exploit the threshold in ways other than simply posting parcels
worth less than $800. One option is to falsely declare a good’s value. Amit
Khandelwal of Yale University and Pablo Fajgelbaum of the University of
California, Los Angeles find that America receives 79% fewer shipments
from China with reported values just above $800 than just below, compared
with 24% fewer shipments from all other countries, which face lower duties
(see chart 2). Although some of this may reflect consumers opting for
cheaper items to avoid tariffs, it seems unlikely the whole difference does.
American authorities recently found that almost a tenth of parcels violated
import rules, typically by falsely listing the content or value of imports.
There are big winners from this tariff avoidance. They include Chinese
producers. However, the avoidance also generates a windfall for American
consumers. Messrs Khandelwal and Fajgelbaum calculate that, absent the
exemption, consumers would have paid $7.8bn more in tariffs in 2021.
Include fees and the fact that producers often cut prices just below the
threshold to avoid tariffs, and consumers save $22bn a year, or $69 each.
Poor households benefit most as they are the biggest consumers of cheap
Chinese goods. Indeed, one in every two de minimis parcels from China
lands in the poorest postcodes, compared with one in five for the richest.
Without the exemption, tariffs on China would be even more regressive.
Border towns, and those seeking employment within them, are another
winner. Although the number of commercial lanes at the Otay Mesa
crossing has doubled over the past year, waiting times for trucks entering
Mexico have risen, such is the level of demand. Firms are building
warehouses fast. DHL, a freight company, has constructed 15 in Mexico
since 2016. Industrial floorspace on the American side of Otay Mesa, where
packages are received before distribution, has grown by 45% since 2019.
Amazon, an online retailer, built 340,000 square metres of warehouses
across Otay Mesa and Tijuana in 2021-22.
But there are also losers. The wave of de minimis parcels, mostly filled with
cheap clothing, is hitting America’s heavily protected textiles sector.
Industry representatives say 18 cotton mills have shut since last summer.
Retailers with physical stores receive bulk shipments and thus cannot avoid
border levies. For example, retailers importing T-shirts from China must
pay a 16.5% duty, 7.5% in China-specific tariffs, as well as brokerage and
customs fees. That, in part, explains how Shein is able to list women’s
fashion items at 39-60% cheaper on average than H&M, a rival clothes
retailer. H&M paid $205m in import duties in 2022; Gap, a rival, paid
$700m. By contrast, Shein and Temu paid no import duties, according to a
recent congressional report.
Some firms, including Shein, say they want rules enforcing more
transparency for de minimis shipments, but the exemption to remain. For its
part, China shows no signs of relenting. In May the country’s cabinet
passed a resolution announcing its desire to “expand exports via cross-
border e-commerce and advance the development of overseas
warehousing”. The de minimis exemption is crucial to this strategy. Without
it, average tariffs on Chinese parcels worth less than $800 would jump from
zero to 15%, as well as a fixed charge.
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economics/2024/06/27/how-chinese-goods-dodge-american-tariffs
Biggie deal
Since June 25th Americans hungry for a deal have been able to get a
sandwich, fries, chicken nuggets and soft drink under the golden arches for
just $5. Burger King, a rival fast-food chain, is matching the offer with a $5
meal deal of its own. The two are following in the footsteps of Wendy’s,
which is temporarily adding an ice cream to its long-standing Biggie Bag
combo. Starbucks, seemingly determined to protect its reputation for high
mark-ups, is pricing a sandwich and a coffee at $6. McDonald’s calls this
the “summer of value”; economists call it deflation. However labelled, the
development is heartening for consumers—and for Federal Reserve
officials, who would like to reduce interest rates before the year is out.
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Rock steady
FROM SOME angles it seems as if thermal coal, the world’s dirtiest fuel, is
having a tough year. Prices are down a bit. China, which gobbles up over
half the world’s supply, is in economic trouble; a surge in hydropower
generation there is squeezing out the fuel. In May G7 members agreed to
phase out coal plants, where emissions are not captured, by 2035. Mining
stocks are trading at a huge discount.
Zoom out a little, however, and it is clear the embers of thermal coal remain
uncomfortably hot. (Metallurgical coal, burnt to produce steel, is a much
smaller market.) Although prices have come down from the peaks reached
in 2022, when the stand-off between Europe and Russia sparked a global
dash for energy, they have stabilised at higher levels than before the war in
Ukraine began, even in real terms (see chart). And in a period when
economic wobbles, war and weather are shaking many commodities, coal
markets have been placid. Is coal the new gold?
The price of coal is holding up despite formidable challenges. Mad
restocking in 2023, followed by a mild winter, means that Europe’s storage
facilities remain 65% full, well above the long-run average. China’s stash is
healthy, too. Supply is abundant: having risen by over 10% in two years,
China’s output is hitting records as the country seeks to cut dependence on
imports. Russia has managed to redirect the 50m tonnes of coal—worth
about 3% of globally traded volumes—it once sold to Europe. Meanwhile,
the global economy is tepid, cooled by high interest rates, a strong dollar
and lacklustre growth in China.
On top of this, the political will to move away from coal is reducing
consumption, particularly in rich countries. Last year America and the EU
reduced their use by 21% and 23%, respectively. In April Germany shut
down 15 coal power plants in a single weekend. China, too, is fast-tracking
solar and wind at the expense of coal so as to cut pollution. The
International Energy Agency, an official forecaster, reckons the country’s
coal use will shrink by 4% by 2026. Glen Kurokawa of CRU, a
consultancy, predicts it will ebb as soon as next year.
Yet even as wealthy economies ditch the dirty stuff, developing ones are
using more to keep the lights on. Many are in Asia, with India, where the
economy is going gangbusters, leading the way. Coal has always been a
cheap and reliable source of power, but the energy crisis in 2022 underlined
these strengths. Unlike natural gas—which, absent a pipeline, must be
superchilled into a liquid and loaded on expensive, specialised vessels—
coal is easy to transport to anywhere in the world. Energy-security
concerns, and the search for profit, are trumping climate ones. A coal trader
that serves Asian clients says it has become easier, not harder, to borrow
from banks, even European ones, to finance transactions. Last year exports
reached 1.5bn tonnes worldwide, a record.
In time, demand will wane for good. Yet that may not diminish coal’s
appeal to investors, since supply will probably fall faster. In the late 2000s,
when Chinese demand pushed coal prices to $200 a tonne, a wave of
investment in new mines followed. This time peaks above $400 and prices
that remain high have not triggered a similar rush. Outside China, capital
expenditure by coal miners, uncertain about future demand, has cratered.
Banks may finance traders, but they no longer want to lend money to get
coal out of the ground. Acquiring permits for new mines is hellish.
Coal supply may therefore fall sharply, and do so sooner than most people
anticipate. This may, in turn, transform today’s sure-fire bet into a riskier
but potentially even more profitable proposition, with price spikes
succeeded by busts as demand is suppressed. Existing coal investors who
stay in the game, or new entrants with a desire to gamble, could hit the
jackpot. Private-equity groups, as well as Chinese and Indonesian
companies, are already snapping up existing mines on the cheap in the hope
of making it big, says Steve Hulton of Rystad Energy, a consultancy. King
coal will reign for a while yet. ■
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Free exchange
It is not just the study of scarce resources that might make the pickleball-
tennis rivalry noteworthy to economists. It is also the nature of how the two
sports interact. Basic economics teaches students about substitute and
complementary goods. Substitutes are goods that can be replaced by one
another—think Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Rising demand for one will lead to
falling demand for the other. Complements are the opposite. Rising demand
for one stimulates demand for the other—think booze and painkillers.
In the long run, however, the impact of pickleball on tennis might be rosier.
There is even an argument that, rather than acting as substitutes, the two
sports may end up complementary.
First, it is hard to imagine there has ever been a time in which local
authorities have been keener on the provision of asphalt surfaces. Muriel
Bowser, mayor of Washington, DC, went to play pickleball in March last
year, having committed $750,000 in a recent budget to the sport. City
commissioners in Fort Pierce, Florida, a city nestled on the state’s Treasure
Coast, were asked to step in to mediate a homeowners-association
disagreement over the building of five courts in a gated community. They
sat through a four-and-a-half-hour hearing attended by more than 80 people.
Some of this energy will result in the conversion of tennis courts. But what
is really apparent is a rise in demand for hard-court spaces on which to play
both sports. If provision keeps up, it will result in more suitable surfaces for
both sports.
Up in rackets
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In the vacuum of space, a nuclear detonation does not generate a ball of fire
or a blast wave. It does, however, create a surge of radiation and charged
particles known as an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), which can disrupt
electrical circuitry. In 1962 the EMP from an infamous American nuclear
test called Starfish Prime disabled a third of all satellites then in orbit
(though some took months to succumb). The detonation, which took place
at an altitude of about 400km, also disrupted electrical equipment on the
ground in Hawaii. The following year such tests were banned by an
international treaty.
Strictly speaking, it is not the EMP itself that ruins circuitry. Rather, the
radiation and excited particles switch on microchip transistors all at once,
and the resulting voltage surge from the hardware’s power supply does the
frying. This means that if a satellite’s power can be shut down before the
brunt of an EMP arrives, the system may well survive. Devices designed to
do just this were first made during the cold war, but few companies have
carried on building them. Space nukes were “supposed to be off the table”,
so investing in protection wasn’t a priority, explains Colonel McCue. The
assumption that no one would be reckless enough to park a nuclear weapon
in orbit, he says, no longer holds.
The defence firm that got in touch with Micross sought a much better
“nuclear-event detector” (NED), as these microchip assemblies are known.
Micross says it has succeeded. On April 8th it announced a new line of
NEDs that are now in final testing. The devices shave up to 40 nanoseconds
off the response time of earlier models. Their new NED series has a
uniquely ungainly name: MYXRHNEDHCJ. The devices detect the initial
build-up of gamma rays produced by a nuclear detonation in 15
nanoseconds flat, before the radiation has risen to dangerous levels. The
devices immediately fire off what John Santini, the firm’s chief
technologist, calls a “here it comes” signal that shuts down power across the
hardware’s circuitry. Once the EMP subsides less than a second later, the
devices send a command to restore power.
Concerns over Russia’s nuclear intentions in space have fuelled a jump in
demand for NEDs that has surprised even Micross. Such gizmos are not
cheap. Equipping America’s GPS satellites with NEDs has increased their
total cost by about 1-2%. The same would be true for any other big
spacecraft, largely because making the necessary changes to the satellite’s
circuitry can take a handful of engineers half a year. Equipping smaller
satellites, which are typically flown in low Earth orbit, at altitudes below
2,000km, raises their total cost by a higher percentage.
Small satellites have, therefore, rarely been protected with NEDs. This may
change as rising demand lowers costs. Though Mr Santini declines to name
customers, he says it’s fair to assume that the MYXRHNEDHCJ series will
be put in future military satellites for low Earth orbit. Micross is now
fielding inquiries for detectors to protect ground vehicles. Fears of Russian
tactical nuclear-weapons use in Ukraine might be inspiring such
precautions.
This is not easy. As circuitry got faster and smaller, it has generally become
more delicate. The energy deposited by incoming radiation, for example,
can rewrite individual bits of memory. The problem is worsening as
chipmakers continue to develop new technologies. Daniel Loveless, an
engineer at Indiana University, Bloomington, specialising in the radiation-
hardening of electronics, laments that the field is “at the whim” of chip
innovations that render previous protections obsolete.
Viruses
The mpox outbreak in 2022 was caused by a different, and less severe form
of the virus of the type “clade II”. The new strain was first identified in
April in Kamituga, a gold-mining town in Congo’s South Kivu province.
Researchers discovered it was a new lineage of the virus, distinct from
previously known mpox strains, which they called “clade Ib”. The clade Ib
strain has reportedly mutated to become more efficient at human-to-human
transmission. This is causing concern about its potential for broader spread.
Mpox has been circulating in humans for many years but it also exists in
wild animals in several African countries and occasionally jumps to
humans, for example through the consumption of bushmeat.
In Congo the new strain is behaving quite differently from other strains of
mpox, with cases also suggesting transmission through close (non-sexual)
contact. Dr Udahemuka reports instances of household transmission as well
as an outbreak in a school. It is also just as common in women as in men,
and is reported to be causing miscarriages. The risk of international spread
appears to be high, with the strain detected in towns near national borders.
The new strain has also been found in sex workers from Rwanda and
Uganda, a group that is normally quite mobile. With the arrival of the dry
season facilitating greater migration, experts fear it is only a matter of time
before the virus starts to emerge in neighbouring countries and then spreads
worldwide through close contact at international airports.
In April the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention called for an
increase in surveillance and contact-tracing efforts. Some experts suggest it
would be worth deploying the smallpox vaccine among high-risk groups
such as sex workers and health-care workers, as it has been known in the
past to offer cross-protection against mpox, which is a related virus.
However, the effectiveness of the smallpox vaccine against this new strain
remains unknown. Trudie Lang, a professor of global-health research at the
University of Oxford, suggests that although there are uncertainties, the
vaccine is safe, easy to use and worth trying. There are also trials under way
of an antiviral drug known as tecovirimat, with results expected next year.
The researchers found that in most years, word usage was relatively stable:
in no year from 2013-19 did a word increase in frequency beyond
expectation by more than 1%. That changed in 2020, when “SARS”,
“coronavirus”, “pandemic”, “disease”, “patients” and “severe” all exploded.
(Covid-related words continued to merit abnormally high usage until 2022.)
By early 2024, about a year after LLMs like ChatGPT had become widely
available, a different set of words took off. Of the 774 words whose use
increased significantly between 2013 and 2024, 329 took off in the first
three months of 2024. Fully 280 of these were related to style, rather than
subject matter. Notable examples include: “delves”, “potential”, “intricate”,
“meticulously”, “crucial”, “significant”, and “insights” (see chart 2).
The most likely reason for such increases, say the researchers, is help from
LLMs. When they estimated the share of abstracts which used at least one
of the excess words (omitting words which are widely used anyway), they
found that at least 10% probably had LLM input. As PubMed indexes about
1.5m papers annually, that would mean that more than 150,000 papers per
year are currently written with LLM assistance.
This seems to be more widespread in some fields than others. The
researchers’ found that computer science had the most use, at over 20%,
whereas ecology had the least, with a lower bound below 5%. There was
also variation by geography: scientists from Taiwan, South Korea,
Indonesia and China were the most frequent users, and those from Britain
and New Zealand used them least (see chart 3). (Researchers from other
English-speaking countries also deployed LLMs infrequently.) Different
journals also yielded different results. Those in the Nature family, as well as
other prestigious publications like Science and Cell, appear to have a low
LLM-assistance rate (below 10%), while Sensors (a journal about,
unimaginatively, sensors), exceeded 24%.
For all these benefits, using LLMs to write manuscripts is not without risks.
Scientific papers rely on the precise communication of uncertainty, for
example, which is an area where the capabilities of LLMs remain murky.
Hallucination—whereby LLMs confidently assert fantasies—remains
common, as does a tendency to regurgitate other people’s words, verbatim
and without attribution.
Studies also indicate that LLMs preferentially cite other papers that are
highly cited in a field, potentially reinforcing existing biases and limiting
creativity. As algorithms, they can also not be listed as authors on a paper or
held accountable for the errors they introduce. Perhaps most worrying, the
speed at which LLMs can churn out prose risks flooding the scientific
world with low-quality publications.
Academic policies on LLM use are in flux. Some journals ban it outright.
Others have changed their minds. Up until November 2023, Science
labelled all LLM text as plagiarism, saying: “Ultimately the product must
come from—and be expressed by—the wonderful computers in our heads.”
They have since amended their policy: LLM text is now permitted if
detailed notes on how they were used are provided in the method section of
papers, as well as in accompanying cover letters. Nature and Cell also allow
its use, as long as it is acknowledged clearly.
How enforceable such policies will be is not clear. For now, no reliable
method exists to flush out LLM prose. Even the excess-vocabulary method,
though useful at spotting large-scale trends, cannot tell if a specific abstract
had LLM input. And researchers need only avoid certain words to evade
detection altogether. As the new preprint puts it, these are challenges that
must be meticulously delved into. ■
Culture
Donald Trump’s return is making Hollywood nervous
Stage fright :: News and politics are being left out of the streaming boom
Stage fright
THE STANDING ovation lasted for more than ten minutes. “The
Apprentice”, a dramatisation of the early career of Donald Trump, had one
of the buzziest premieres at the Cannes Film Festival in May, with
Hollywood grandees in attendance, including Cate Blanchett, an actress,
and Oliver Stone, a director. Distributors snapped up the rights to release
the title in many countries. But in America no big studio was willing to
touch it. The reason is simple, says one American content buyer, glancing
around a restaurant in Beverly Hills to check for eavesdroppers: “Fear.”
In some ways Hollywood is more daring than ever. The shift from broadcast
to streaming has freed producers from the rules that restrict bad language
and raunchy scenes on TV in many countries. Relying more on subscription
income and less on advertising has also reduced the need to make
inoffensive “brand-safe” content. In the past decade provocative drama has
flourished; boundary-pushing comedy is enjoying a rollicking renaissance.
It is not just at home that things are trickier. American movies began to
make most of their box-office takings overseas 20 years ago, forcing studios
to pay attention to the whims of audiences (and censors) in China and
beyond. Now streaming is internationalising television in the same way.
Netflix, the biggest streamer, is in more than 190 countries, each with
different politics. Sometimes local edits are required: last year Netflix
removed “Flight to You”, a Chinese series, from its platform in Vietnam
after the government there objected to the show’s endorsement of China’s
claim to territory in the South China Sea. No big streamer picked up “The
Dissident”, a film released in 2020 about the Saudi-orchestrated murder of
Jamal Khashoggi. Bryan Fogel, its Oscar-winning director, described
streamers’ calculus as: “It’s better to keep our doors open to Saudi business
and Saudi money than it is to…anger the kingdom.” (Streaming executives
dispute this.)
Amid such controversies, news is one part of the old television bundle that
is being left behind in the transition to streaming. Netflix has pushed into
most genres of TV—including, recently, live sport—but has no intention of
entering the news business, sticking to the mantra of its co-founder, Reed
Hastings, that “We’re not in the truth-to-power business, we’re in the
entertainment business.” Warner Bros Discovery cancelled its CNN+
streamer in 2022 after less than a month. Apple makes a bland daily-news
podcast and has no plans to do more. Nor has Amazon (which is fielding
requests that it reveal footage of Mr Trump allegedly using racist language
while filming a TV series for MGM, which Amazon now owns).
“To be in the news game right now is seen by these companies as a more
political act, arguably, than it ever was,” says James Tager of PEN America,
a free-speech group. “And if politics means ‘choosing sides’ in an
increasingly polarised country, then…reporting the news will seem to
cautious executives as a no-win situation.” Social-media firms have reached
much the same conclusion and have started down-ranking news content in
their feeds. Instagram’s boss explained recently that news and politics were
“not at all worth the scrutiny, negativity (let’s be honest) or integrity risks
that come along with them”.
Hollywood has not fled from politics entirely. Disney, which owns ABC, is
considering bringing more news to its streaming platforms. Jeff Bezos’s
ownership of the Washington Post shows that not all tech-media barons are
afraid of current affairs (though it has lately given the Amazon founder a
headache, with a newsroom revolt over a new publisher at the Post).
And not everyone in the media is scared of Mr Trump: one executive hopes
that a Trump administration might at least be more aggressive in asserting
intellectual-property rights in piracy-prone countries such as China. But for
now, most of Hollywood has decided that politics is a channel best left on
mute. ■
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Regional inequality
Britain’s political geography had shifted. Some of the most fervent support
for Brexit, and then for Mr Johnson’s Conservative Party, was found in
areas dubbed “left behind”. Sir Paul Collier, a British economist, picks up
this theme to look at the growing gap between successful places and
laggard ones, in Britain and elsewhere. His book starts in Sheffield, a once-
thriving English city that has been ailing since the 1980s. Sir Paul grew up
there but moved away (he is now a professor of economics at Oxford
University). He is, therefore, part of a trend that troubles him: the exodus of
talented people from poor areas.
Sir Paul convincingly argues that a big reason for Sheffield’s state is that it
has little control over its destiny. England is a highly centralised country
with an overweening Treasury, which strangles projects that might help
poor places. “Levelling up”, as the Conservative Party’s effort to help poor
regions is known, is a sham, with little money behind it. Compare it with
similar policies in Germany, which has invested heavily to bring the
formerly communist east up to speed.
Neglected places tend to latch onto politicians who promise easy solutions
to their problems, argues Sir Paul. It is a reasonable explanation for the
political upheavals of the past decade, although the news makes it seem a
little dubious. Eastern Germany, which has received so much attention and
cash, is falling in love with the far right. England’s neglected north will
probably help Sir Keir Starmer, a cautious politician of the centre-left, to a
huge parliamentary majority.
The book makes some intriguing stops in the left-behind parts of Colombia
and Russia. Strangely, it goes on to describe whole countries, including
Haiti and Somalia, as left behind, as well as the entire Sahel region. Sir Paul
knows this terrain well—“The Bottom Billion”, his book about the world’s
poorest people, is excellent—but surely he does not think that an
underperforming British city is at all like Somalia, with its warring clans
and jihadists?
Yet that is precisely what he thinks. Both have been “stripped of local
agency, neglected and subjected to ill-informed micromanagement from
elsewhere”. Sir Paul contends that aid agencies are as bad as Britain’s
Treasury, pushing remedies that make their patients worse. This is rather a
stretch.
The book’s serious title is a clue—prepare yourself for many charts and
even a few formulae—but it contains some amazing details. Even people
who know Britain well might not realise that the voters who propelled
Margaret Thatcher to power in 1979 were more working-class than those
who elected Mr Johnson in 2019. It is a fascinating guide to a country that
is about to undergo yet another political gyration. ■
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I Will Show You How It Was: The Story of Wartime Kyiv. By Illia
Ponomarenko. Bloomsbury; 288 pages; $28.99 and £22.99
Mr Putin’s invasion plan was built on a fantasy: that Ukraine was not a
“real nation”, and that, “except for a handful of grotesque Nazis and armed
nationalists”, it would not resist the invaders. This was such a preposterous
delusion that, at first, Ukrainians did not take the signs of looming war
seriously. In 2021 Mr Putin published an essay twisting centuries of history
into a list of supposed crimes committed by foreigners against Russia, and
threatening that if Ukraine did not end its anti-Russian policies it might lose
its statehood. Many dismissed it as a bluff rather than the rationale for “one
of the most shamelessly trumped-up, absurd and unnecessary wars the
world had ever seen”.
As for how the war will end, Mr Ponomarenko is grimly realistic. He has
seen what happens to towns the Russians capture: the torture, the rape, the
death pits. If Ukrainians do not keep fighting, their nation will “simply
cease to exist”.
For the Russian troops who commit atrocities, the author reserves a chilled
fury. Yet he musters empathy for those who are merely cannon fodder.
Seeing the patch on the uniform of a dead conscript, he searches the man’s
name online. He was from “a poor village of log houses and dusty, unpaved
streets” in the Russian far east, near Mongolia. His mum is a teacher; he
loved football. “You could have just stayed home,” laments Mr
Ponomarenko. “You could have had a family.” Instead, the soldier died
“7,000km away…in an idiotic war for the sake of just one delusional old
man’s monstrous act of megalomania”. ■
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siege
World in a dish
The döner kebab (the umlaut is essential) long ago displaced currywurst as
Berliners’ fast food of choice. But these days its ubiquity obliges it to carry
a lot more than succulent strips of seasoned meat—lamb, veal or beef—
served in flatbread with salad and sauces.
Take inflation: where Germans once assessed price rises via the cost of ice-
cream or beer, today newspapers calculate how many kebabs an hour’s
labour might earn you. After supply-chain shocks and war sent prices
soaring, some politicians called for a dönerpreisbremse: a cap on the cost of
kebabs. “Talk to Putin, I want to pay four euros for a kebab!” one döner-
demonstrator shouted at the chancellor in 2022.
Any foundational cuisine attracts its myths. Mr Seidel places the origins of
the döner in the Ottoman empire. (The vertical-roasting technique was
probably invented in Bursa, in north-west Turkey.) In the 1970s some
Turkish Gastarbeiter (guest workers) in West Germany were forced to open
kebab stands after the factories and mines they had migrated to work in
were closed. They adapted the döner to German tastes, concocting the trio
of sauces that any self-respecting stand must offer—herb, garlic and scharf
(spicy)—and, crucially, serving it in bread. This cheap, portable dish spread
across Germany quickly.
More recent migrants have taken the döner in new directions. At Rüyam
Kebab, in Berlin’s Schöneberg district, your correspondent is served a
gemüse (vegetable) döner as big as his head. The staff, largely Arabs rather
than Turks, have added carrots and aubergine to the usual salad. The
resulting array of lushly coloured, carefully layered ingredients is not just
delicious but (perhaps not coincidentally) perfect for Instagram. It is not yet
6pm, and the queue extends out of the door. ■
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Stringing along
The change stems from the retirement of two members: Hank Dutt, the
violist, and John Sherba, the second violinist, after 47 and 46 years
respectively. Ayane Kozasa and Gabriela Diaz have taken their places. Both
have extensive backgrounds in contemporary music—Ms Kozasa with the
Aizuri Quartet, which she co-founded, and Ms Diaz with the Boston
Modern Orchestra Project and the International Contemporary Ensemble.
Kronos’s body of work has been his answer. In 1975 the group formed a
nonprofit, the Kronos Performing Arts Association, in part to solicit funding
that would let them commission new works and pay for the time it takes to
rehearse them. The quartet has since ordered over 1,100 new works and
arrangements by composers from around the world. Ahead of the
anniversary, the group launched “50 for the Future”, a library which is free
for any quartet to access. More than half the composers commissioned for
the project are non-white; many are women.
The quartet has long revelled in breaking genre barriers. It has played songs
by Thelonious Monk and Jimi Hendrix and recorded original pieces by
some of the greatest living composers, including Philip Glass, Steve Reich
and Terry Riley. Kevin Kwan Loucks, the head of Chamber Music America,
a nonprofit, argues that Kronos has “revolutionised the string quartet.
They’ve made it a living, breathing entity that continues to evolve.”
Mr Dutt jokes that sometimes string quartets can be like “a bad sexless
marriage”: intimate but often racked with resentment. But for Kronos,
success and shared commitment has bred stability and comfort. “We always
felt that anyone could say anything if they’re having trouble,” Mr Dutt says.
Still, the quartet’s dynamics may change, not least because Mr Harrington
will soon be the only member based in San Francisco, the group’s home for
almost five decades. Ms Kozasa and her partner, Paul Wiancko, the group’s
cellist, live in Cincinnati and Ms Diaz in Boston, though Ms Diaz explains
they will “meet for big chunks of rehearsal time”. Already they have two
premieres and a festival lined up for next year, as well as a project tied to
America’s 250th anniversary in 2026. Kronos offers a salutary message to
any middle-aged fan: life can begin again at 50. ■
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innovative-string-quartet
Frequent travellers
That is not to say there have not been spells of ill health. Frommer’s, the
grandfather of American guidebooks, was sold in 2012 for $22m to Google,
which reportedly planned to end the series’ print run. (The following year
Arthur Frommer, its founder, bought the company back.) Lonely Planet, the
best-known publisher, has been through several owners at ever-lower
valuations. In 2020 the company ended up in the hands of Red Ventures, a
publishing house funded by private equity.
The one virus that did come close to killing guides off was covid-19.
Guidebook publishers saw 95-99% of revenues evaporate when lockdowns
hit. Yet in both America and Britain, the biggest markets for English-
language guides, sales are approaching pre-pandemic levels. Last year
Americans bought 5.8m guidebooks and maps—down from 6.9m before the
pandemic, but up from 4m in 2020.
Any obituaries, then, are premature. But why do guidebooks still roll off the
presses when all the information you could need is in your pocket? One
answer is that print is a useful medium for information on the go. Books can
be scribbled on and dog-eared; they need no charging or internet access.
They can be easier to browse than social media, websites or e-books (and
attract less attention from pickpockets).
Another is that guidebooks have changed with the times. Rick Steves, the
author of America’s bestselling guides to European destinations, published
his first guidebook 44 years ago. He still personally researches many of his
books, which offer a lot of information in small type. His publishers, being
more business-minded, also produce pocket guides, which take those tips
and enliven them with photographs. Double-dipping is one way to boost
profits; many other publishers do it.
Sales data support Lonely Planet’s claim. Guides that focus on food and
accommodation are falling out of favour in Britain according to Stephen
Mesquita, the author of the Nielsen Bookscan Travel Publishing Yearbook,
an industry bible. Between 2019 and 2023, sales of such guides for
domestic destinations were down by 49% and by 20% for overseas ones.
If print books are no longer selling comprehensiveness, then what is it they
are selling? One answer is authenticity. “I can’t help people that just want to
do what everybody else does,” Mr Steves says. Another is curation. “The
more content out there, the better for guide publishers,” says René Frey,
who publishes Rough Guides and Insight Guides.
Perhaps, in time, similar apps may take off in the West. Artificial
intelligence is another incipient challenge. Like a good guide, AI’s promise
is that it can do the tedious research and produce a precis. Frommer’s, for
its part, experimented with using AI to offer tailor-made answers to
travellers’ questions, but found that it was making things up too often to be
useful. Nothing makes a traveller reach for their trusty guidebook more than
a bogus tip. ■
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STARTING ON JUNE 26th more than 200,000 people will arrive in rural
Somerset, in south-west England, for the Glastonbury festival. They are
anticipating rockin’ music, phenomenal art, idyllic camping, beautiful
weather, delicious cider and togetherness with like-minded souls. If they
also endure long journeys, mud, stinking toilets, overpriced food and
enormous crowds, most will quickly forget about that part of the
experience. Such scenes happen across the world every summer as millions
of people flee the drudgery of normal life. Millions more will watch
festivals from their sofas, promising themselves that next time they will join
the throng. This collection of books and films about festivals in Britain and
America may encourage them, and remind the faithful of the magic that
such gatherings can create. All are nostalgic. Some celebrate spectacle.
Others are reminders of the hard work that goes into putting on a party, and
how badly one can go wrong.
Woodstock was not the first American rock-music festival. But it is the only
one whose name has become that of a generation. The youth who gathered
in August 1969 on a dairy farm in Bethel, in upstate New York, belonged to
the Vietnam-war-protesting, acid-dropping counterculture of the time. “The
Road to Woodstock”, published in 2009, is both an autobiography of
Michael Lang, who helped conceive and organise the festival, and a
detailed account of it. Lang had planned to bring 200,000 music fans to a
field, a daring enough idea. In the event 500,000 “freaks” and “cats” turned
up, subjecting themselves to traffic snarls, thunderstorms and food
shortages. Lang is frank about the difficulties, which included dealing with
local opposition and tripped-out musicians. As a financial investment
Woodstock was a bust. But it was worth the sacrifice, Lang writes. “Over
that August weekend, during a very tumultuous time in our country, we
showed the best of ourselves, and in the process created the sort of society
we all aspired to, even if only for a brief moment.”
To settle Woodstock’s debts Lang’s former business partners sold the film
rights to Warner Bros. This Oscar-winning documentary follows the festival
from Richie Havens’s opening act on Friday afternoon to Jimmy Hendrix’s
famous “Star Spangled Banner”, played to the die-hards who stayed until
Monday morning. The nakedness and drug-taking share in the technicolour
glory. To take it all in the film uses a three-way split screen, an innovation
at the time. Viewers unable to distinguish between the gig’s many long-
haired guitarists will find Lang’s book and the film’s Wikipedia page useful
accompaniments. (“Trainwreck: Woodstock ’99”, the story of Lang’s 30th-
anniversary revival, which ended in fire and violence, is available on
Netflix.)
Glastonbury 50. By Michael Eavis and Emily Eavis. Trapeze; 304 pages;
$39.99. Orion; £30
Glastonbury prides itself on its eclectic lineups. But in the late 1980s and
early 1990s Sir Michael was not keen to welcome the sort of dance-music
acts that appealed to ravers. Many of these fans had spent a decade off their
faces on ecstasy at illegal “acid-house” parties in fields and warehouses.
After 1994, when the government cracked down on such events, dance
music and club culture became an integral part of many legal festivals,
including Glastonbury. Two books published in 2023 tell the story of the
evolution of British dance music in very different ways. “Party Lines” is a
well researched history, spanning West Indian carnival and covid-19
lockdown parties. “Rave New World”, by Kirk Field, a journalist who once
served drinks at acid-house raves, gives an amusing insider account of the
1980s and 1990s party scene that will be especially interesting to anyone
who was there—or who partied in later decades. He suggests a soundtrack
to listen to while you read.
Organising a festival before the internet came along was challenging. But
“Fyre”, a documentary that tells the story of a disastrous event in the
Bahamas in 2017, warns that social media can cause its own problems.
Billed as the ultimate festival for rich American millennials, Fyre was the
brainchild of Ja Rule, a rapper, and Billy McFarland, a 25-year-old
wunderkind of the startup world. The price of tickets ranged from $1,000 to
$25,000. The organisers appear to have spent more money on promotion,
including Instagram posts by supermodels, than on producing the festival.
They provided no electricity or running water, let alone the promised haute
cuisine or entertainment. As time ran out, and it became clear that it would
be impossible to house guests in villas or yachts, Mr McFarland arranged
for them to be lodged in soggy disaster-relief tents. He was later imprisoned
for fraud. Ja Rule was cleared of wrongdoing. If Schadenfreude is your
thing, this film is well worth watching.
Also try
Indicators
Obituary
Willie Mays’s philosophy was simple: They throw the ball,
I hit the ball
Just keep having fun :: Possibly the best baseball player ever died on June 18th, aged 93
AROUND NINE o’clock in the morning, a tap would come at his window.
Outside his house in St Nicholas Place in Harlem milled a group of grinning
boys. They carried mop-handles and a pink bouncing ball, all the equipment
they needed. The street and the parked cars would provide the rest. What
they wanted was to play stickball, and he was only too eager to join them.
He’d play for an hour, morning or evening, as his job allowed. Soon he was
crouching, swinging the stick, just an ordinary man in a Polo shirt and
trousers. But when he made contact he whacked the ball so hard that it went
for three or four sewers, or three or four city blocks. Because, after all, he
was Willie Mays, then the star of the New York Giants.
Playing stickball taught him how to hit curveballs. You never knew how the
surface of the street might skew that high, wild bounce. Apart from that,
though, he did not have much to learn. His father, nicknamed “Cat” for his
slinky prowess on the field, had played baseball between jobs down near
Birmingham, Alabama. It was he who taught him how to be a centre fielder
and to stick with the game. At 16, playing practically barefooted, he already
knew exactly what he had to do. His body was built for baseball, strong,
sinewy and graceful, like his Dad’s. He could hit a ball out of the park,
defend, outsmart anyone and catch mostly anything. Easy. That happy
certainty lasted years.
The statistics followed. Over his 22-year Major League career—six years
with the Giants in New York, 15 more when they moved west in 1958 to
become the San Francisco Giants, two with the New York Mets—he
stacked up 3,293 hits, 660 home runs, 339 steals, a .301 batting average,
two National League Most Valuable Player awards and 12 Gold Gloves.
Ten of those hits, all that were recorded, were added in 2024 from his time
in 1948-50 with the Birmingham Black Barons in the segregated Negro
League. He could have scored even higher without army service, which he
mostly spent playing baseball anyway to entertain the troops.
Entertainment was the thing. Statistics didn’t lodge in his brain. Besides, a
few other players surpassed him in the numbers game, and it never mattered
as much as the way he played, with sheer joy. His philosophy was “They
throw the ball, I hit it; they hit the ball, I catch it.” If he did that as well as
he could, he could lead by example, and make the people around him play
better. When younger players asked him for advice, as they often did, he
would tell them first to enjoy themselves. He didn’t smoke, drink or fool
around with women, because baseball was the most fun he could think of.
His pink Lincoln Continental and his smile said it all. He also had ways of
making his job even more fun for fans: breaking late on a ball, to bait a
runner, before speeding up at just the right time; stealing bases on the
riskiest dare, in heroic explosions of dust; and wearing a cap one size too
small for him, which at exciting moments would blow right off his head.
It blew off, predictably, in his best play of all, in the 1954 World Series
when the Giants were facing the Cleveland Indians. Vic Wertz of Cleveland
powered the ball to the back of the ground, 460 feet or so, and Willie Mays
ran, raced, and right at the wall snagged it with one of his famous basket
catches over his left shoulder. It was known ever after as “The Catch”, and
brought the crowd to its feet. But he knew he had made better ones than
that. For a start, he was sure he would get it. (He often had a strange sort of
premonition about that. Lying down at night, watching TV, suddenly a
flyball would come out to him, and he’d know how to deal with it. The next
day he would recognise that very ball, because he had seen it the night
before.) But second, where The Catch was concerned, that was not the most
important bit of the play. The vital part was to instantly do a 360, whirl
around (cap off) and hurl the ball to the infield, so the runners at the bases
couldn’t score. He did it, and the Giants won the Series. Now, that was truly
great.
Being lighthearted was not always easy. When he signed for the New York
Giants in 1950 he went initially to Trenton, New Jersey, in the Interstate
League. From being a happy teenager in the Birmingham Black Barons,
where they were all brothers and everyone took care of him, he was
suddenly the only black player around. As he moved higher, too, the
pitching got fiercer. And he knew no one; his nickname, “The Say Hey
Kid”, came from his clumsy attempts to break in and make friends. In the
smaller towns people said openly that they didn’t like him playing. But he
had a neat answer for that: if they mocked him, he’d hit the ball further.
After a few nights of that, they would be applauding him.
Racism followed him, sadly, to the west coast. Two things surprised him
about San Francisco. First, how cold and windy Candlestick Park was, so
much so that he had to rub himself with hot oil before he played. But
second, that he could not buy a house in elegant Sherwood Forest because
the white neighbours objected. They backed down, but after two years he
moved 3,000 miles to the east coast, just north of New York. The city had
always welcomed him with open arms. So though he did not like to be
traded, he was content to end his career there with the New York Mets.
He hardly ever spoke out about civil rights. Off the field he was shy, and it
wasn’t his thing. Other black baseball greats, especially Hank Aaron and
Jackie Robinson, criticised him for that. But in Alabama he had learned to
keep his head down and his mouth shut. His way of joining in the fight
when he retired was again to lead by example, this time by giving his
money away. He gave his dentist $12,000 for a new chair, a young woman
$10,000 to clear her credit-card debts, and set up the Say Hey Foundation to
do what he could for underprivileged youngsters. This, he wanted to say,
was how black folk responded to prejudice. Whether by good works or by
playing ball, they changed hatred to joy. ■
This article was downloaded by calibre from
https://www.economist.com/obituary/2024/06/26/willie-mayss-philosophy-was-simple-
they-throw-the-ball-i-hit-the-ball