Abbreviated

12 Z.
GARCIA
8. Celine Pajon, “Japan and the South China Sea: Forging Strategic
Partnerships in a Divided Region,” Institut Francais des Relations
Internationales, Center for Asian Studies, 2013, p. 7, http://www.ifri.
org/?page=contribution-detail&id=7555.
9. “South China Sea,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013, https://
www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.php?RegionTopicID=SCS.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ralf Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia
(New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 77.
13. Ibid.
15. Rommel C. Banlaoi, Philippines-China Security Relations: Current Issues
and Emerging Concerns (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace,
Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012), p. 25.
17. Ibid.
18. Rommel C. Banlaoi, Philippines-China Security Relations: Current Issues
and Emerging Concerns (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace,
Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012), p. 25.
19. Edgardo D. Gomez, “Is the Degradation of Resources in the South China
Sea Reversible?: Approaches to Sustainable Management,” International
Symposium of Protection and Management of the Coastal Marine
Ecosystem, 2000, p. 219, http://www.emecs.or.jp/2000thai-sympo/pdf/
re-gomes.pdf.
20. U. Rashid Sumaila and William W. L. Cheung, “Boom or Bust? The Future
of Fish in the South China Sea,” OceanAsia Project, 2015, pp. 1, 3, 8–9,
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_oUJE4kCTZrbVI4N2tTVjlpYTA/
view.
21. Pakjuta Khemakorn, “Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the
South China Sea Region,” United Nations—The Nippon Foundation,
2006, p. 29, http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_
home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/khemakorn_0607_thailand.pdf.
22. Patrick M. Cronin, “China’s Global Quest for Resources and Implication
for the United States,” Center for a New American Security, 2012,
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20
Testimony%20Cronin%20012612_1.pdf.
23. Pakjuta Khemakorn, “Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the
South China Sea Region,” United Nations—The Nippon Foundation, 2006,
p. 29, http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/
fellows_pages/fellows_papers/khemakorn_0607_thailand.pdf.
1 INTRODUCTION 13
24. Ibid., pp. 18–19.

of Fish in the South China Sea,” Ocean Asia Project, 2015, p. 1, https://
drive.google.com/file/d/0B_oUJE4kCTZrbVI4N2tTVjlpYTA/view.
26. Ralf Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia
(New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 77.
of Fish in the South China Sea,” Ocean Asia Project, 2015, pp. 1, 3, 8–9,
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_oUJE4kCTZrbVI4N2tTVjlpYTA/
view.
28. See Ian Storey, “The South China Sea Dispute (Part 1): Negative Trends
Continue in 2013,” The Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13(12), 2013,
pp. 3–6, http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_06_09.pdf;
Keith Johnson and Dan de Luce, “Fishing Disputes Could Cause a South
China Sea Crisis,” Foreign Policy, April 7, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2016/04/07/fishing-disputes-could-spark-a-south-china-sea-crisis/.
29. Refers to Securitization Theory, discussed below.
31. Zenel Garcia, “A ‘Normal’ Japan and the Externalization of China’s
Securitization,” Japan Studies Review 20, 2016, pp. 157–178.
32. “Law of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February
1991,” United Nations, February 25, 1992, http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf.
33. See Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Naval Power,”
The New York Times, April 23, 2010, https://www.nytimes.
com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html; Edward Wong, “Security
Law Suggests a Broadening of China’s ‘Core Interests,’” The New
York Times, July 2, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/
world/asia/security-law-suggests-a-broadening-of-chinas-core-interests.
html?_r=0.
34. “China Passports Claim Ownership of South China Sea and Taiwan,”
The Guardian, November 23, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/nov/23/china-passports-ownership-sea-taiwan.
35. Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan, “Maritime Territorial
Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research
Service, May 14, 2014, p. 23, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R42930.pdf.
36. See Zenel Garcia, “A ‘Normal’ Japan and the Externalization of China’s
Securitization,” Japan Studies Review 20, 2016, 157–178; Bibek Chand
and Zenel Garcia, “Power Politics and Securitization: The Emerging
14 Z. GARCIA
Indo-Japanese Nexus in Southeast Asia,” Asia & the Pacific Policies

Studies 4(2), 2017, pp. 310–324.
37. Andrew Shearer, “Southeast Asia and Australia: Case Studies in
Responding to China’s Military Power,” in Strategic Asia 2012–13:
China’s Military Challenge (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of
Asian Research, 2012), pp. 251–253.
38. Peter A. Dutton, “Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission: China’s Views of Sovereignty and
Methods of Access Control,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, February 27, 2018, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
files/08_02_27_dutton_statement.pdf.
39. See Timothy R. Heath, “Chinese Political and Military Thinking
Regarding Taiwan and the East and South China Sea,” U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, April 13, 2017, pp. 1–12,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/
CT470/RAND_CT470.pdf; Jonathan Dixon, “East China Sea or South
China Sea, They Are All China’s Seas: Comparing Nationalism Among
China’s Maritime Irredentist Claims,” Nationalities Papers 42(6), 2014,
pp. 1053–1071.
40. Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan, “Maritime Territorial
Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research
Service, May 14, 2014, p. 26, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R42930.pdf.
41. Bibek Chand and Zenel Garcia, “Power Politics and Securitization: The
Emerging Indo-Japanese Nexus in Southeast Asia,” Asia & the Pacific
Policies Studies 4(2), 2017, pp. 310–324.
42. Evan S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific
Stability,” The Washington Quarterly 29(1), 2005, p. 145.
45. “Defense Posture Review Interim Report,” Ministry of Defense, 2013,
p. 2, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2013_chu-
kan/gaiyou_e.pdf.
46. Ian Storey, “Japan’s Growing Angst over the South China Sea,” Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies SEAS Perspective 20, 2013, p. 4, http://www.iseas.
edu.sg/documents/publication/ISEAS_Perspective%202013_20.pdf.
1 INTRODUCTION 15
48. “Opinion Poll on Japan in Six ASEAN Countries,” Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/
asean/survey/qa0803.pdf.
49. Zenel Garcia, “A ‘Normal’ Japan and the Externalization of China’s
Securitization,” Japan Studies Review 20, 2016, pp. 157–178.
50. “The World Needs the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF),” Ministry of
Defense, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/pamphlets/.
52. Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in On Security, ed.
Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 55.
53. Ibid.
54. Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and
International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47, 2003,
pp. 511–531.
55. Ibid.
CHAPTER 2
The South China Sea Disputes
Abstract This chapter provides an overview of the territorial claims

made by China, the Philippines, and Vietnam. It focuses on the histor-
ical trajectory of the competing claims, their legal basis, and their con-
gruence with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). Additionally, the chapter addresses the legal challenge
presented by the Philippines against China at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA), the results of the arbitration, and the response by the
affected parties. It concludes that despite China’s inconsistent applica-
tion of UNCLOS in the South China Sea, confirmed by the PCA ruling,
Beijing has not changed its approach to the disputes, thus heightening
tensions in the region. The first is that China’s claims in the SCS and
its increasing assertiveness toward the disputes have played a key role in
the growing tensions in the region. The second is that the Philippines
and Vietnam, as the most geographically proximate claimants to China,
have borne the brunt of China’s assertive policies in recent years. As a
result, the Philippines and Vietnam have been at the vanguard of con-
testing China’s claims and internationalizing the disputes in order to
hedge against China.
Keywords South China Sea · Territorial disputes · UNCLOS ·

International law · Arbitration
© The Author(s) 2019 17

Z. Garcia, China’s Military Modernization, Japan’s
Normalization and the South China Sea Territorial Disputes,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12827-2_2
18 Z. GARCIA
The vital resources and strategic location of the SCS make the ongoing
territorial disputes the most important security problem in the East and
Southeast Asia region. It is a dispute that has the potential to undermine
regional stability and the global economy. This potential is exacerbated
by the intensifying patterns of securitization surrounding the dispute.
In other words, the actions of direct claimants and indirect participants
to the South China Sea disputes are being increasingly filtered through
a negative image of the “other” that is produced through securitiza-
tion rhetoric. Consequently, the space for prudent action and negotia-
tion has been eroded and more assertive actions and counteractions are
legitimized.
It is through this lens that China perceives the actions of Southeast
Asian claimants, Japan, and the United States in the SCS as an affront to
its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Conversely, it is through this lens
that many of China’s neighbors perceive its assertiveness as detrimental
to regional stability and international norms such as freedom of naviga-
tion. In other words, each side is increasingly concluding that the other
is actively undermining its domestic and international interests through
their activities in the South China Sea. Because securitization processes
facilitate the utilization of extraordinary measures, this can have detri-
mental effects on possible resolution of the disputes and opens the possi-
bility for armed conflict.1
The parties to the current territorial disputes include: China, Taiwan,
Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. All of them are signatories
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The current statuses of the claims are as follows:
• A dispute over the Paracel Islands in the SCS, which are claimed
by China and Vietnam, and occupied by China;
• A dispute over the Spratly Islands in the SCS, which are claimed
entirely by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, and which are occupied in part
by all these countries except Brunei; and
• A dispute over Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, which is claimed by
China, Taiwan, and the Philippines2 (see Map 2.1).
For the purposes of this book, the only claims which will be evalu-
ated are those of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Philippines,
and Vietnam. The case study selection is predicated on two interrelated
2 THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES 19
Map. 2.1 SCS maritime claims (Source EIA: http://www.eia.gov/countries/

regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs)
20 Z. GARCIA
factors. The first is that China’s increasingly securitized claims in the SCS
have led to greater assertiveness toward the disputes. In essence, Beijing
has played a pivotal role in the growing tensions in the region. The sec-
ond is that the Philippines and Vietnam, as the most geographically
proximate claimants to China, have borne the brunt of China’s assertive
policies in recent years. As a result, the Philippines and Vietnam have
been at the vanguard of contesting China’s claims and internationalizing
the disputes in order to hedge against China.
The book will also focus on the Spratly archipelago and Scarborough
shoal component of the disputes. This is due to the fact that while the
Paracel archipelago is still disputed by Vietnam, there has been no sig-
nificant changes to the administration of the archipelago since China
evicted Vietnam from the islands. Consequently, it will focus on the fea-
tures currently controlled by the claimants disused.
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The claims of the PRC on the SCS are largely based on historical and
archeological grounds. Beijing regularly cites the numerous expeditions
sent to the area during the Han Dynasty in 110 CE and by the Ming
Dynasty in the fifteenth century as proof of discovery and administra-
tion of the area.3 In addition to these expeditions, historical references
in imperial records, maps, and archeological findings have been used
to supplement Chinese territorial claims.4 After World War II (WWII)
ended, Japan, which had been occupying many of the features in the
Paracel and Spratly archipelagos for years, withdrew its forces and aban-
doned all claims in the region as part of its unconditional surrender. This
paved the way for the Republic of China, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, to
raise Chinese traditional claims to the area by producing the now-famous
nine-dash map. The map was later adopted by the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) after their victory over the Nationalist forces of Chiang
Kai-Shek in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Although the original map
consisted of 11 dashes, Premier Zhou Enlai approved the removal of
two of the lines around the Gulf of Tonkin in 1953. Subsequent maps
published by the PRC have shown 9 rather than 11 lines.5 The San
Francisco Treaty of 1951, which finalized the terms of Japanese surren-
der, prompted the CCP to formalize its claims in the SCS by referring to
the Nationalist map (see Map 2.2).6
Map. 2.2 9-dash map (Source United Nations: http://www.un.org/Depts/

los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_vnm_37_2009.htm)
22 Z. GARCIA
This map represents the most expansive claim among the parties to
the disputes since the U-shaped line that is formed by the dashes encom-
passes roughly 80% of the total area of the South China Sea.7 The area
far exceeds what is claimable as territorial waters under the UNCLOS.
This is a problem exacerbated by the fact that the claimed area includes
waters that lie well within the claimable Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam.8 For its part,
China has been ambiguous over what the nine-dash line in the map actu-
ally represents. It is unclear whether Beijing is claiming sovereignty over
the entire sea and seabed in the enclosed area, or if it is making more
limited claims, such as sovereignty over the land features or to historical
fishing and navigational rights.9
Despite some ambiguity over the exact claims being made by the
Chinese government with the nine-dash line, it does appear that at
minimum China is claiming sovereignty over the island groups within
the area enclosed by U-shaped line on the map. The island groups
claimed are the Pratas Islands (Dongsha), the Paracel Islands (Xisha),
Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), and the Spratly Islands (Nansha).10
China’s 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
placed these island groups under the administration of Hainan Island
Province.11 This claim was further reinforced in 2009 when China sub-
mitted the nine-dash map to the United Nations with an accompanying
statement that read:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China
Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction
over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see
attached map [of the nine-dash line]). The above position is consistently
held by the Chinese Government, and is widely known by the international
community.12
The Chinese statement was made in response to a joint submission made

by Malaysia and Vietnam regarding their delimitations of their continen-
tal shelf claims to the United Nations.13 However, as will be discussed
below, China’s counterclaim and submission of the nine-dash map to
the U.N. was challenged by the Philippines for not being consistent with
UNCLOS standards.
By June 2012, the Chinese government had announced that it
would be upgrading the administrative level of the Paracel Island
group.14 The following month, the PRC formally established Sansha

City on Woody Island (Yongxing) which is located in the Paracel archi-
pelago. The act of elevating Sansha to a prefecture-level city was not
merely political theater. Along with its administrative upgrade, Sansha
City was given an accompanying military garrison which would facili-
tate its new role as the administrative seat of the SCS for the Chinese
government.15 Since 2012, Sansha has served as a staging point for
Chinese operations in the SCS as it aims to demonstrate effective
administration of the area through its fishing moratoriums, interdic-
tions of fishing vessels from neighboring countries, and interdiction of
foreign military vessels conducting surveillance outside of its territorial
waters.16
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

The Republic of the Philippines’ claims in the SCS are also based on
historical justifications as well as the principle of terra nullius, which
essentially means that the islands were not occupied or under the sover-
eign authority of any other state. The Philippines began laying claims in
the SCS as early as 1947. At the time, the Spratly Islands were referred
to as the “New Southern Islands” by the Philippine government. The
Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary at the time, Carlos P. Garcia,
requested the Allied Forces to place the islands under the jurisdiction
of the Philippines, citing security reasons.17 In the same year, a Filipino
businessman and lawyer by the name of Tomas Cloma established settle-
ments in the Spratly archipelago and declared them a protectorate. He
named the group of islands he identified or settled as the “Kalaya’an” or
“Freedomland.”18
By 1974, Cloma deeded the Kalaya’an group to the Philippine gov-
ernment and in both 1971 and 1978 the Philippine President Ferdinand
Marcos declared the Kalaya’an Island Group (KIG) to be formally part
of the Philippines.19 The 1978 declaration was made official through
Presidential Decree No. 1596 in which the KIG were identified as a
municipality of Palawan.20 Since 1968, the Philippines has had a mili-
tary presence in the KIG group and effectively controls and administers
at least 8 of its features. The KIG also hosts residents who participate in
local elections, a fact that allows the Philippine government to demon-
strate administrative capacity in the area.21 It is the exploration and
24 Z. GARCIA
“discovery” of the KIG group by Tomas Cloma that serves as one of the
historical bases of the Philippine claim.
The second historical base for the Philippine claim comes from previ-
ous treaties it had signed with other parties in order to demarcate mari-
time boundaries. In essence, “the Philippines continues to claim that all
of the waters between its baselines and the lines defined by a series of
treaties dating from 1898, 1900, and 1930, the so-called ‘Philippines
Treaty Limits’ or ‘Philippines Box,’ constitute its territorial waters.”22
These claims essentially extend the Philippines’ territorial sea from the 12
nautical miles allowed by the UNCLOS to 285 nautical miles. Although
the disparity between the customary law of the UNCLOS and these trea-
ties is clear, the Philippines has had difficulties abandoning the Treaty
Limits claim as a result of domestic pressures as well as constitutional
constraints.23
The Philippine justification for its terra nullius claim is centered
on the Japanese withdrawal from the area after its defeat in WWII.
Because Japan did not cede the islands to any other nation in the San
Francisco Treaty, the islands were given the status of “trusts.” This
essentially nullified any previous ownership of the islands. As a result,
the Philippine government felt that its occupation of the islands was
justified.24
In recent years, the Philippine government has attempted to bring
its SCS claims more in line with the UNCLOS due to the fact that its
Treaty Limits claim was undermining its position as a claimant.25 In
2009, the Philippine Congress ratified the Archipelagic Baselines Act. In
accordance with UNCLOS provisions, the Philippine claimed 12 nautical
miles of territorial sea and 200 nautical miles of EEZ straight from ter-
ritorial baselines. The Kalaya’an box that previously used to encapsulate
the 53 features that it claimed has been done away with, although the
Philippine continues to lay claim to those features under the “Regime
of Islands” clause in the UNCLOS. At present, only a small section of
its southern boundary with Malaysia continues to be determined by the
Treaty of Paris which is one of the treaties that make up the old Treaty
Limits.26 Furthermore, in 2013, in an effort to validate its EEZ claims
and invalidate China’s in the SCS, the Philippines submitted for arbitra-
tion its dispute with China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
under the compromissory clauses of the UNCLOS (this will be discussed
further below).
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam bases some of its claims on his-
torical usage. Court records from the reign of King Le Thanh Tong
(1460–1497) indicate that Vietnam claimed sovereignty over the Spratly
Islands. This historical claim is reinforced by Vietnamese maps dated to
the seventeenth century that incorporated the Spratly Archipelago into
Vietnam.27 Like China, Vietnam has also presented archeological evi-
dence to bolster its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands.28 In addi-
tion to historical usage and archeological evidence, the Vietnamese
government proclaims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Island
groups based on French colonial claims. When Vietnam became a pro-
tectorate of France in 1884 in the aftermath of the Sino-French War,
France declared sovereignty over the entirety of the Paracel and Spratly
archipelagos, an act which continues to be used to justify Vietnamese
claims to this day.29
Like the Philippines, Vietnam has made some of its claims on the con-
cept of terra/res nullius. The Vietnamese claim that before the French
formally occupied some of the features in the Paracel and Spratly archi-
pelagos in 1933, the islands were essentially unclaimed and therefore a
“no man’s land.”30 As a result, Vietnam took over the sovereignty of the
islands after Vietnam became independent. Since 1973, the Vietnamese
have controlled up to 22 features in the Spratly Island group, making
them the most significant holder of territory among the claimants in
that archipelago.31 Although Vietnam also claims sovereignty over the
Paracels (Hoang Sa), the PRC effectively evicted the Vietnamese from
the archipelago in 1974 after an intense naval battle.32 In essence, Hanoi
has fared better in staking and solidifying its claims in the Spratly archi-
pelago. Since establishing a significant foothold in the Spratly Islands in
the 1970s, Vietnam has erected several military facilities throughout the
features it controls and, like China and the Philippines, it has established
a settler outpost. The outpost is located in Spratly Island (Dao Truong
Sa) which is the fourth largest feature in the Spratly archipelago and the
largest feature controlled by Vietnam. In 2007 the Vietnamese govern-
ment held local elections in the area in order for the inhabitants to select
a representative to the National Assembly.33 The Spratlys, known as
Quan Dao Truong Sa in Vietnam, are currently administered as a district
of the Khanh Hoa province.34
26 Z. GARCIA
The division of Vietnam from the 1950s to the 1970s led to some
confusion in regards to the claims being made in the South China Sea.
North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong stated that his government
recognized the PRC claims in both the Paracel and Spratly Archipelagos.
In contrast, the South Vietnamese government located in Saigon held
on to its claims on both groups.35 In fact, it was the Saigon government
that had been occupying the Paracels when the PRC dislodged its forces
from the archipelago. The North did not acknowledge the casualties suf-
fered by the South during this clash and instead supported its communist
ally in the claims.36 However, when South and North Vietnam reunited
in 1975, Vietnam reasserted its claims to both archipelagos.37
In recent years, much in the same way as the Philippines, Vietnam has
attempted to clarify its claims in the SCS in order to bring them into
proper standing with the UNCLOS. In 2003, Vietnam signed a treaty
with Indonesia that delimited the continental shelf and the EEZ bounda-
ries between the two countries. That was followed by an agreement with
China in 2004 that delimited the maritime boundaries in the Gulf of
Tonkin.38 Then in 2009 Vietnam and Malaysia made a joint submission
to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf (CLCS). The submission dealt with claims beyond the 200 nautical
mile EEZ. Lastly in 2012, Vietnam ratified a legislation called the Law of
the Sea in which it claimed a 200 nautical mile EEZ and a 350 nautical
mile continental shelf from its baselines.39 While there remain some dis-
crepancies regarding certain portions of Vietnam’s claims that do not fall
in accordance with this new law, it is clear that it has made some efforts
to bring its claims up to UNCLOS standards much the same manner as
the Philippine has done.
OTHER CLAIMANTS
Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei are also claimants in the SCS territorial
and maritime disputes. However, their response to China’s increasing
assertiveness in the SCS has been muted over the years. It is Indonesia,
a country that does not see itself as a party to the SCS disputes that
has gradually begun to challenge China’s claims in the region. Strictly
speaking, unlike the other six claimants, Indonesia is not a party to the
territorial component of the SCS disputes. Nevertheless, China’s nine-
dash map overlaps with the EEZ of the Natuna Islands, an area that is
rich in fish stocks and hydrocarbons. In other words, Indonesia is a de
facto participant in the maritime component of the South China Sea.

Indonesian President, Jokowi Widodo, has stated that “the ‘nine-dashed
line’ that China says marks its maritime border has no basis in any inter-
national law,” adding that Indonesia supports the completion of a code
of conduct for the South China Sea.40 The overlapping EEZ claims
in the SCS near the Natuna Islands has led to several confrontations
between fishermen and coast guard vessels from both countries within
the Natuna Island’s EEZ.41 In fact, a skirmish that occurred in 2016
prompted Beijing to claim that the nine-dash line accorded Chinese
fishermen with traditional fishing rights within the EEZs of the Natuna
Islands for the first time.42
These events have regularly raised tensions between the two countries
and have prompted Indonesia to bolster its military presence around
the Natuna Islands and conduct military exercises in its vicinity.43
Additionally, the Indonesian government has sought to build new bases
and upgrade existing ones in the Natuna Islands. These efforts comple-
ment Indonesia’s growing maritime capabilities aided by foreign weap-
ons acquisitions and the growing sophistication of its indigenous defense
shipbuilding sector.44 Indonesia has also renamed the EEZ around
the Natuna Islands as the “North Natuna Sea” in an effort to bolster
its claim.45 While some of its Neighbors, namely the Philippines and
Vietnam, have engaged in similar behavior, as will be discussed in fur-
ther chapters, Indonesia’s name change is limited to its EEZ as opposed
to the entirety of the South China Sea, signifying its efforts to remain
outside of the dispute and continue playing the role of “honest broker.”
In fact, Indonesia’s efforts to limit the extent of its involvement in the
SCS disputes is based on its desire to continue enjoying its trade and
investment relationship with China. Consequently, the main contestants
in the SCS disputes continue to be China, the Philippines, and Vietnam,
while Indonesia plays a limited role focused on the EEZ of the Natuna
Islands.
TOWARD A CODE OF CONDUCT

After a decade of heightened tensions in the SCS leading to perceptions
of a “China threat” among Southeast Asian countries, Beijing agreed
to discuss a Code of Conduct (CoC) with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). These discussions led to the Declaration of
Conduct (DoC) in 2002. This became a key component of China’s
28 Z. GARCIA
“charm offensive” in the region.46 The DoC outlines principles for

avoiding conflicts in the SCS. It states that:
The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdic-

tional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of
force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states
directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of
international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea.47
Although the DoC called for the peaceful resolution of the disputes, it
is nonbinding, and therefore has no enforcing mechanism in order to
uphold the agreed-upon principles. The DoC was successful in easing
tensions in the region for a number of years; however, by 2007 China
had reverted to its assertive posture in the South China Sea.48 Beijing’s
heightened securitization of the SCS since 2007, and the consequent
clashes that have resulted from its assertiveness and growing presence,
has made progress toward a formal CoC difficult.
After a long hiatus in negotiations, on August 6, 2017, foreign minis-
ters from ASEAN and China adopted a framework of a CoC on maritime
disputes. This framework is meant to pave the way for actual negotia-
tions on the code to take place. Although the framework is explicit that
the CoC “is not an instrument to settle territorial disputes or maritime
delimitation issues,” it aims to promote “mutual trust, cooperation
and confidence prevent incidents, manage incidents should they occur
and create a favourable environment for the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes.”49 There are still a number of obstacles for a formal CoC to be
finalized such China’s island reclamation efforts, fishing moratoriums,
interception of fishing vessels and oil exploration vessels, and its rejection
of the internationalization of the disputes. These obstacles are no minor
hurdles, particularly because they represent how China’s securitization
of the SCS disputes has resulted in several actions that run counter to
established international norms and pose a threat to regional stabil-
ity. Additionally, the responses by Southeast Asian states have paralleled
China’s by pursuing fishing moratoriums, renaming of the seas, and their
own island reclamation efforts, indicating that their securitization of
China’s actions has produced counter-normative actions. In other words,
there is a real possibility that a CoC, much like the DoC, will remain
unenforceable since the mutual securitization of the claimants is co-con-
stitutive and continues to produce enmity between them.

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12 Z.

24. Ibid., pp. 18–19.

Indo-Japanese Nexus in Southeast Asia,” Asia & the Pacific Policies

The South China Sea Disputes

Abstract This chapter provides an overview of the territorial claims

Keywords South China Sea · Territorial disputes · UNCLOS ·

© The Author(s) 2019 17

Map. 2.1 SCS maritime claims (Source EIA: http://www.eia.gov/countries/

THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Map. 2.2 9-dash map (Source United Nations: http://www.un.org/Depts/

The Chinese statement was made in response to a joint submission made

group.14 The following month, the PRC formally established Sansha

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

facto participant in the maritime component of the South China Sea.

TOWARD A CODE OF CONDUCT

“charm offensive” in the region.46 The DoC outlines principles for

The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdic-

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